1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
2 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
3 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
4 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
5 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
6 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
7 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
9 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
12 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
13 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
14 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
16 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
17 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
18 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
21 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
22 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
24 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
25 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
27 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler};
28 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
29 use util::sha2::Sha256;
30 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
31 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
32 use util::logger::Logger;
33 use util::errors::APIError;
36 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
37 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
38 use crypto::digest::Digest;
39 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
42 use std::collections::HashMap;
43 use std::collections::hash_map;
45 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
46 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
47 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
49 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
51 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
52 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
53 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
55 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
56 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
57 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
58 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
59 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
60 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
61 mod channel_held_info {
63 use ln::router::Route;
64 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
65 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
67 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
68 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
69 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
70 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
71 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
72 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
73 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
74 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
75 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
78 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
79 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
80 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
81 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
84 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
85 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
86 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
87 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
91 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
93 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
94 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
95 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
96 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
99 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
101 pub enum HTLCSource {
102 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
105 session_priv: SecretKey,
110 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
111 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
112 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
113 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
121 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
129 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
131 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
132 err: msgs::HandleError,
133 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
135 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
137 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
141 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
142 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
144 data: err.to_string()
148 needs_channel_force_close: false,
152 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
156 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
157 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
159 data: err.to_string()
163 needs_channel_force_close: true,
167 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
168 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
171 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
172 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
176 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
177 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
178 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
179 /// probably increase this significantly.
180 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
182 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
183 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
185 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
188 struct ChannelHolder {
189 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
190 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
191 next_forward: Instant,
192 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
193 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
194 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
195 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
196 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
197 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
198 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
200 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
202 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
203 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
204 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
205 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
206 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
207 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
210 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
212 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
213 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
214 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
215 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
216 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
221 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
222 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
224 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
225 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
226 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
227 /// to individual Channels.
228 pub struct ChannelManager {
229 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
230 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
231 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
232 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
233 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
235 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
236 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
237 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
238 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
240 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
241 our_network_key: SecretKey,
243 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
248 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
250 macro_rules! secp_call {
251 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
254 Err(_) => return Err($err),
261 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
263 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
264 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
269 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
270 pub struct ChannelDetails {
271 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
272 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
273 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
274 /// lifetime of the channel.
275 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
276 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
277 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
278 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
279 /// The node_id of our counterparty
280 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
281 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
282 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
283 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
287 impl ChannelManager {
288 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
289 /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
290 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
291 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
292 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
293 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
294 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
296 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
297 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
298 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
299 monitor: monitor.clone(),
303 announce_channels_publicly,
304 fee_proportional_millionths,
305 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
308 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
309 by_id: HashMap::new(),
310 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
311 next_forward: Instant::now(),
312 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
313 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
317 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
321 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
322 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
326 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
327 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
328 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
329 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
330 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
331 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
332 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
333 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
334 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
335 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
337 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
338 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
339 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
340 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
341 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
342 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
343 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
344 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
347 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
348 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
349 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
351 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
355 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
356 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
357 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
358 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
359 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
363 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
364 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
365 node_id: their_network_key,
371 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
372 /// more information.
373 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
374 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
375 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
376 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
377 res.push(ChannelDetails {
378 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
379 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
380 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
381 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
382 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
388 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
389 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
390 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
391 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
392 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
393 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
394 if channel.is_usable() {
395 res.push(ChannelDetails {
396 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
397 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
398 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
399 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
400 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
407 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
408 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
409 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
410 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
411 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
412 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
413 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
414 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
415 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
416 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
417 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
418 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
419 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
420 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
422 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
423 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
425 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
428 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
429 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
430 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
432 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
433 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
438 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
439 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
440 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
444 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
453 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
454 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
455 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
456 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
457 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
459 for tx in local_txn {
460 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
462 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
463 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
464 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
465 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
466 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
467 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
468 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
471 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
472 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
473 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
475 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
476 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
477 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
478 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
479 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
486 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
487 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
488 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
489 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
495 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
496 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
497 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
498 for chan in self.list_channels() {
499 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
504 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
506 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
507 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
508 let mut res = [0; 32];
509 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
513 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
514 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
515 let mut res = [0; 32];
516 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
522 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
523 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
524 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
525 let mut res = [0; 32];
526 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
531 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
532 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
533 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
534 let mut res = [0; 32];
535 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
539 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
541 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
542 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
543 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
545 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
546 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
548 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
549 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
550 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
551 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
552 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
554 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
556 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
557 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
559 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
565 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
566 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
567 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
569 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
570 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
576 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
586 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
587 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
588 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
589 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
590 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
591 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
592 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
593 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
595 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
596 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
597 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
598 // the intended recipient).
599 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
600 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
601 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
603 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
604 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
605 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
606 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
610 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
611 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
612 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
614 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
615 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
616 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
618 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
620 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
624 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
626 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
634 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
635 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
637 for i in 0..dst.len() {
642 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
643 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
644 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
645 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
648 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
649 let end_len = iters * 65;
650 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
651 res.resize(end_len, 0);
653 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
654 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
655 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
656 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
657 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
662 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
663 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
665 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
666 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
667 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
668 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
670 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
671 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
672 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
675 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
678 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
679 hmac.input(&packet_data);
680 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
681 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
686 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
687 hop_data: packet_data,
692 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
693 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
694 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
695 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
697 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
698 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
699 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
700 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
701 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
702 data: packet_crypted,
706 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
707 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
709 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
712 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
713 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
714 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
715 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
719 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
720 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
723 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
725 failuremsg: failuremsg,
729 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
730 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
731 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
737 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
738 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
739 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
742 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
743 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
746 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
747 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
748 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
749 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
755 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
756 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
757 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
758 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
759 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
760 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
761 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
762 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
765 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
766 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
768 let mut channel_state = None;
769 macro_rules! return_err {
770 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
772 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
773 if channel_state.is_none() {
774 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
776 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
777 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
778 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
779 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
780 })), channel_state.unwrap());
785 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
786 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
787 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
788 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
789 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
790 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
791 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
792 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
795 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
796 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
797 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
798 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
799 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
802 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
803 let next_hop_data = {
804 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
805 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
806 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
808 let error_code = match err {
809 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
810 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
812 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
818 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
820 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
822 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
823 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
825 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
826 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
829 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
830 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
831 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
832 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
834 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
836 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
838 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
839 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
840 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
843 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
844 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
845 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
847 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
849 let blinding_factor = {
850 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
851 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
852 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
853 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
854 sha.result(&mut res);
855 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
857 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
863 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
864 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
867 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
869 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
870 hop_data: new_packet_data,
871 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
874 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
875 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
876 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
877 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
878 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
879 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
880 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
884 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
885 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
886 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
887 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
888 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
890 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
892 Some(id) => id.clone(),
894 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
895 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
897 Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
899 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
900 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
901 Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
903 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
904 Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
911 return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
916 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
919 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
920 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
921 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
922 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
926 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
928 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
929 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
930 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
931 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
932 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
933 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
934 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
935 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
936 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
937 excess_data: Vec::new(),
940 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
941 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
943 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
949 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
950 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
951 /// fields for more info.
952 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
953 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
954 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
955 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
956 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
957 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
958 /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
959 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
960 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
961 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
962 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
963 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
964 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
966 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
967 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
968 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
969 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
973 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
974 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
975 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
977 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
979 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
981 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
982 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
983 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
984 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
986 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
987 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
988 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
990 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
991 None => return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
992 Some(id) => id.clone(),
996 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
997 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
998 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1000 if !chan.is_live() {
1001 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1003 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1004 route: route.clone(),
1005 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1006 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::RouteError{err: he.err})?
1009 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1012 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
1013 None => return Ok(()),
1017 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1021 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1022 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1023 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1024 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1025 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1026 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1027 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1028 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1035 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1036 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1037 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1038 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1039 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1041 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1044 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1045 pending_events.push($event);
1050 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1051 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1052 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1054 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1055 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1056 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1059 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1060 mem::drop(channel_state);
1061 add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1062 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1071 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1072 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1075 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1076 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1080 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1081 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1082 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1083 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1085 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1091 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1092 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1094 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1096 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1098 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1099 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1101 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1102 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1103 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1104 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1105 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1109 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1110 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1111 /// Will likely generate further events.
1112 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1113 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1114 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1116 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1117 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1119 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1123 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1124 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1125 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1126 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1128 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1129 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1130 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1131 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1132 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1133 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1135 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1140 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1142 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1143 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1144 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1145 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1146 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1147 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1149 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1151 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1152 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1157 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1159 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1160 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1161 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1162 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1163 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1164 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1165 // this channel currently :/.
1172 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1173 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1176 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1177 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1179 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1181 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1185 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1186 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1187 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1188 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1189 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1190 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1191 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1192 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1197 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1198 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1199 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1200 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1201 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1203 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1204 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1205 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1207 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1208 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1209 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1216 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1218 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1219 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1223 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1225 new_events.retain(|event| {
1226 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1227 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1228 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1234 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1235 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1236 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1237 events.push(event.1);
1241 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1242 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1243 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1244 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1245 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1246 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1247 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1248 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1254 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1255 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1256 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1257 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1258 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1259 /// still-available channels.
1260 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1262 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1263 mem::drop(channel_state);
1265 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1266 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1267 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1270 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1271 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1272 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1273 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1274 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1276 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1277 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1281 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1282 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1283 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1287 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1288 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1289 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1291 //TODO: Do something with e?
1298 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1299 mem::drop(channel_state);
1301 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1302 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1305 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1306 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1308 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1309 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1310 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1311 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1312 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1313 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1323 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1324 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1325 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1326 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1327 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1328 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1329 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1330 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1331 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1333 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1334 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1335 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1336 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1337 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1338 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1343 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1345 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1346 mem::drop(channel_state);
1347 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1348 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1352 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1353 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1354 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1355 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1356 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1358 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1359 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1365 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1366 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1367 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1369 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1370 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1371 //TODO: Do something with e?
1377 mem::drop(channel_state);
1378 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1379 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1380 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1384 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1385 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1386 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1388 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1389 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1390 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1391 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1392 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1393 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1401 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1402 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1403 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1406 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1407 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1409 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1413 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1414 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1415 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1417 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1418 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1419 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1422 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1424 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1425 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1426 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1427 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1428 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1429 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1430 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1431 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1434 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1435 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1436 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1438 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1442 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger)).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(e))?;
1443 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1444 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1448 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1449 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1450 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1451 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1453 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1454 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1455 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1457 chan.accept_channel(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1458 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1460 //TODO: same as above
1461 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1464 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1465 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1466 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1467 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1468 output_script: output_script,
1469 user_channel_id: user_id,
1474 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1475 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1476 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1477 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1478 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1479 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1480 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1481 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1483 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1484 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1485 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1488 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1492 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1494 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1495 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1496 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1497 // for a bogus channel.
1498 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1501 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1502 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1503 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1504 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1506 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1513 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1514 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1515 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1516 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1518 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1519 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1520 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1522 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1523 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1525 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1528 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1531 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1532 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1533 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1534 user_channel_id: user_id,
1539 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1540 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1541 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1543 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1544 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1545 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1547 chan.funding_locked(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1548 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1550 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1554 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1555 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1556 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1557 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1559 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1560 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1561 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1562 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1563 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1565 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1566 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1567 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1568 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1570 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1571 } else { (res, None) }
1573 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1576 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1577 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1578 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1580 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1581 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1582 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1583 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1591 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1592 let (res, chan_option) = {
1593 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1594 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1595 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1596 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1597 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1598 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1599 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1601 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1602 if res.1.is_some() {
1603 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1604 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1605 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1606 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1607 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1608 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1609 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1611 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1612 } else { (res, None) }
1614 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1617 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1618 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1620 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1621 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1622 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1623 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1631 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1632 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1633 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1634 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1636 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1637 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1638 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1639 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1641 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1642 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1644 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1646 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1647 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1648 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1650 if !chan.is_usable() {
1651 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1653 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1655 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1659 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1660 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1661 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1663 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1664 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1665 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1667 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?.clone()
1669 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1671 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1675 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1676 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1677 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1679 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1680 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1681 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1683 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1685 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1689 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, .. } => {
1690 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1691 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1693 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1694 if res.is_some() { return; }
1696 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1698 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1699 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1700 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1701 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1702 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1704 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1705 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1706 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1708 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1709 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1710 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1711 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1712 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1713 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1714 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1715 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1716 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1717 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1718 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1719 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1720 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len])) {
1721 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1729 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1730 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1731 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1732 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1735 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1747 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1748 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1749 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1751 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1752 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1753 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1755 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1758 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1762 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1763 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1764 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1765 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1767 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1768 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1769 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1771 chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?
1773 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1776 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1780 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1783 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1784 let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor), short_channel_id) = {
1785 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1786 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1788 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1789 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1790 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1792 (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
1794 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1797 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1800 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1801 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1804 let mut forward_event = None;
1805 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1806 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1807 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1808 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1809 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1811 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1812 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1813 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1814 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
1816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1817 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
1822 match forward_event {
1824 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1825 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1826 time_forwardable: time
1835 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1836 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1837 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1839 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1840 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1841 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1843 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1845 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1849 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1850 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1851 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1852 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1854 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1855 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1857 if !chan.is_usable() {
1858 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1861 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1862 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
1863 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1865 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1866 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1867 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
1868 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1869 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1871 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1873 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1874 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1875 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1876 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1877 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1878 contents: announcement,
1879 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1881 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1884 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1885 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1889 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1890 let (res, chan_monitor) = {
1891 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1892 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1894 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1895 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1897 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1898 (Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update)), channel_monitor)
1900 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1903 if let Some(monitor) = chan_monitor {
1904 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1912 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1913 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1914 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1915 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1916 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1921 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1922 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1923 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1924 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1926 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1927 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1928 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1929 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1930 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
1931 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
1932 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
1933 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1934 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1935 msg: funding_locked,
1936 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1938 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1939 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
1940 new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
1941 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1944 if channel.is_shutdown() {
1948 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1949 for tx in txn_matched {
1950 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1951 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
1952 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1953 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1955 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
1956 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
1957 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
1958 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1959 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1960 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1969 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1970 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1971 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1973 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1974 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
1975 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
1976 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
1977 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
1978 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1979 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1988 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
1989 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
1991 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1992 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1993 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1995 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
1998 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
1999 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2000 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2001 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2003 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2004 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2005 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2006 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2007 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2008 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2009 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2011 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2012 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2013 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2023 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2024 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2026 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2027 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2028 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2029 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2032 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2036 macro_rules! handle_error {
2037 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2040 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2041 if needs_channel_force_close {
2043 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2044 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2045 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2047 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2050 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2051 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2052 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2053 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2054 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2056 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2068 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2069 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2070 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2071 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2074 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2075 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2078 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2079 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2082 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2083 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2086 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2087 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2090 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2091 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2094 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2095 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2098 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2099 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2102 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2103 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2106 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
2107 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2110 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2111 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2114 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2115 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2118 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2119 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2122 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2123 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2126 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2127 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2130 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), HandleError> {
2131 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2134 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2135 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2136 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2137 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2139 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2140 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2141 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2142 if no_connection_possible {
2143 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2144 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2145 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2146 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2148 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2149 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2150 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2160 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2161 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2162 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2163 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2164 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2165 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2166 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2168 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2169 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2170 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2179 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2180 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2182 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2183 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2184 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2185 pending_events.push(event);
2188 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2189 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2190 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2195 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2196 let mut res = Vec::new();
2197 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2198 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2199 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2200 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2201 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2202 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2203 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2207 res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2212 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2216 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2217 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2218 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2219 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2220 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2224 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2231 use chain::chaininterface;
2232 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2233 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2234 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2235 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2237 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2238 use util::test_utils;
2239 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2240 use util::errors::APIError;
2241 use util::logger::Logger;
2242 use util::ser::Writeable;
2244 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2245 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2246 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2247 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2248 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2249 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2250 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2254 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2255 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2257 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2258 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2260 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2262 use std::cell::RefCell;
2263 use std::collections::HashMap;
2264 use std::default::Default;
2266 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2267 use std::time::Instant;
2270 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2271 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2272 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2277 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2278 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2281 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2282 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2285 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2286 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2289 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2290 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2293 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2294 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2299 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2301 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2302 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2307 fn onion_vectors() {
2308 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2309 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2311 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2312 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2313 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2314 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2315 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2317 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2318 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2319 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2320 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2321 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2323 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2324 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2325 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2326 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2327 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2329 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2330 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2331 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2332 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2333 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2335 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2336 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2337 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2338 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2339 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2341 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2342 let payloads = vec!(
2343 msgs::OnionHopData {
2345 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2346 short_channel_id: 0,
2348 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2352 msgs::OnionHopData {
2354 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2355 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2356 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2357 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2361 msgs::OnionHopData {
2363 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2364 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2365 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2366 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2370 msgs::OnionHopData {
2372 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2373 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2374 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2375 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2379 msgs::OnionHopData {
2381 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2382 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2383 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2384 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2390 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2391 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2393 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2397 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2398 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2400 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2401 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2402 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2404 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2405 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2407 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2408 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2410 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2411 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2413 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2414 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2416 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2417 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2420 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2421 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2422 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2423 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2425 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2426 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2431 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2432 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2433 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2434 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2436 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2437 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2439 impl Drop for Node {
2440 fn drop(&mut self) {
2441 // Check that we processed all pending events
2442 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2443 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2447 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2448 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42).unwrap();
2450 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2451 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2452 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2453 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2454 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2455 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2457 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2460 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2462 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2466 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2467 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2469 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2470 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2471 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2473 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2474 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2476 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2478 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2479 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2480 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2481 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2482 added_monitors.clear();
2484 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2487 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2488 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2489 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2490 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2491 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2492 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2493 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2494 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2495 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2496 added_monitors.clear();
2499 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2502 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2504 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2505 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2506 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2507 added_monitors.clear();
2510 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2511 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2513 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2514 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2515 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2517 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2520 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2521 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2522 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2524 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2525 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2526 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2527 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2529 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2534 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2535 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2536 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2537 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2538 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2539 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2540 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2541 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2542 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2543 as_announcement_sigs
2545 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2548 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2549 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2550 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2551 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2554 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2557 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2558 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2559 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2560 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2561 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2562 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2565 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2568 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2570 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2573 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2574 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2576 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2577 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2578 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2580 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2583 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2584 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2585 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2588 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2589 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2590 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2591 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2592 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2593 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2596 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2599 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2600 if !close_inbound_first {
2601 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2603 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2604 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2605 if close_inbound_first {
2606 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2607 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2608 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2609 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2611 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2612 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2613 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2614 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2616 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2617 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2618 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2620 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2621 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2622 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2623 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2625 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2626 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2627 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2628 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2630 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2631 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2632 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2633 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2636 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2639 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2640 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2641 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2642 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2645 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2648 (as_update, bs_update)
2653 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2654 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2657 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2659 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, commitment_signed } } => {
2660 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2661 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2662 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2663 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2665 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2670 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
2671 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
2674 let added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2675 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
2677 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
2679 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2680 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2681 added_monitors.clear();
2684 let added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2685 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
2687 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2689 let mut added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2690 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2691 added_monitors.clear();
2693 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
2694 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
2696 let mut added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2697 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2698 added_monitors.clear();
2700 if $fail_backwards {
2701 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2703 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2705 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2706 if $fail_backwards {
2707 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2708 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2710 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2712 added_monitors.clear();
2718 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2719 let our_payment_preimage = [*origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2720 *origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2721 let our_payment_hash = {
2722 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2723 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2724 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2725 sha.result(&mut ret);
2729 let mut payment_event = {
2730 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2732 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2733 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2734 added_monitors.clear();
2737 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2738 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2739 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2741 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2743 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2744 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2746 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2748 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2749 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2752 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
2754 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2755 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2757 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2761 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2762 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2764 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2765 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2766 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2768 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2769 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2770 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2772 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2776 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2777 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2778 added_monitors.clear();
2780 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2781 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2787 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2790 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2791 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2793 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2794 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2795 added_monitors.clear();
2798 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2799 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2800 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2802 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2804 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2806 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2808 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2810 added_monitors.clear();
2812 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
2817 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2818 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2819 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2820 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2821 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2822 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2825 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2826 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2827 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2829 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2830 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2831 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2832 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2833 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2834 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2835 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2837 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2840 assert!(events.is_empty());
2842 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2843 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2850 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2851 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2852 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2854 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2855 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2857 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2862 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2863 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
2866 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2868 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2869 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2870 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2871 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2872 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2875 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2878 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2879 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2880 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2881 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2882 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2885 let our_payment_preimage = [*origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2886 *origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2887 let our_payment_hash = {
2888 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2889 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2890 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2891 sha.result(&mut ret);
2895 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2897 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
2898 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
2902 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2903 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2904 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2907 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2908 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2910 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2911 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2912 added_monitors.clear();
2915 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2916 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2917 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2919 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2920 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
2925 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2926 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2927 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2928 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2929 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2930 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
2931 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
2932 // second-to-last node!
2933 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
2936 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2937 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2938 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2940 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2941 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2942 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2943 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2944 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2945 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2946 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2948 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2951 assert!(events.is_empty());
2953 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2954 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2961 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2963 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2964 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2966 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2967 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2974 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2975 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
2978 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2979 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2980 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2981 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2982 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2984 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
2985 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
2987 for _ in 0..node_count {
2988 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
2989 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
2990 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2991 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
2993 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2994 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2995 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2997 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
2998 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
2999 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3000 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3001 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3009 fn fake_network_test() {
3010 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3011 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3012 let nodes = create_network(4);
3014 // Create some initial channels
3015 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3016 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3017 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3019 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3020 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3021 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3022 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3023 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3025 // Send some more payments
3026 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3027 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3028 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3030 // Test failure packets
3031 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3032 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3034 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3035 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3037 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3038 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3039 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3040 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3041 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3042 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3043 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3045 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3046 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3047 hops.push(RouteHop {
3048 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3049 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3051 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3053 hops.push(RouteHop {
3054 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3055 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3057 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3059 hops.push(RouteHop {
3060 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3061 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3063 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3065 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3066 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3067 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3069 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3070 hops.push(RouteHop {
3071 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3072 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3074 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3076 hops.push(RouteHop {
3077 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3078 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3080 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3082 hops.push(RouteHop {
3083 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3084 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3086 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3088 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3089 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3090 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3092 // Claim the rebalances...
3093 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3094 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3096 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3097 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3099 // Send some payments across both channels
3100 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3101 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3102 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3104 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3106 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3108 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3109 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3110 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3112 // Close down the channels...
3113 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3114 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3115 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3116 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3117 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3121 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
3122 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
3123 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
3124 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
3126 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
3127 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
3128 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3129 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3130 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3131 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
3133 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
3135 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3136 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3138 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3139 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3141 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
3142 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
3143 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
3146 #[derive(PartialEq)]
3147 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3148 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
3150 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
3151 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
3152 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
3154 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
3155 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
3157 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
3159 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3160 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3161 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3163 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3164 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3165 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3166 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3167 funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
3168 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3169 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
3170 res.push(tx.clone());
3175 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3176 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3179 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3181 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3182 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3183 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3184 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3185 funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
3186 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3187 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3188 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3190 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3192 res.push(tx.clone());
3196 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3199 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3203 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
3204 /// HTLC transaction.
3205 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
3206 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3207 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3208 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3209 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
3210 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3211 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_tx.txid(), revoked_tx.clone());
3212 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3216 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3219 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3220 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3222 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3223 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3224 let mut found_prev = false;
3226 for tx in prev_txn {
3227 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3228 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3229 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
3230 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3232 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3233 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3239 assert!(found_prev);
3241 let mut res = Vec::new();
3242 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3246 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3247 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3248 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3249 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3250 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3253 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3256 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3257 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3258 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3259 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3262 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3266 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3267 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3272 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
3273 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3274 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
3275 let nodes = create_network(5);
3277 // Create some initial channels
3278 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3279 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3280 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3281 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3283 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3284 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3285 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3286 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3287 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3289 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
3290 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3292 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3293 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3294 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3295 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3297 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3298 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3299 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3301 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
3302 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3304 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
3305 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3307 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3308 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3309 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3310 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3312 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
3313 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3314 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3316 macro_rules! claim_funds {
3317 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
3319 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
3321 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3322 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3323 added_monitors.clear();
3326 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3327 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3329 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
3330 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3331 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3332 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3334 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3340 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
3341 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
3342 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3344 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3346 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3347 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
3349 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3350 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3352 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
3354 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
3355 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3356 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3358 // One pending HTLC to time out:
3359 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
3362 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3363 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3364 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3365 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3366 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3369 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3371 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3372 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
3374 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3375 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3376 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3377 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3378 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3381 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
3383 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3384 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
3386 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
3388 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
3389 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3390 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3392 // Create some new channels:
3393 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3395 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
3396 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
3397 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
3398 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3399 // Revoke the old state
3400 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3403 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3404 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3406 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3407 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3408 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
3409 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3411 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3412 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
3413 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3414 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
3416 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3418 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3419 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3420 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3421 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
3422 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
3424 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3425 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3426 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3430 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3431 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3432 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3433 let nodes = create_network(2);
3434 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3436 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3437 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
3439 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3440 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3442 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3443 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3445 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3449 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3450 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3452 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3453 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
3456 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3457 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3459 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3460 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3462 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3466 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
3467 // registering new transactions
3468 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
3472 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3473 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3474 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
3475 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3476 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3478 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
3480 let our_payment_preimage = [*nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3481 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3482 let our_payment_hash = {
3483 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3484 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
3485 let mut ret = [0; 32];
3486 sha.result(&mut ret);
3490 let mut payment_event = {
3491 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3493 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3494 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3495 added_monitors.clear();
3498 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3499 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3500 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3503 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3504 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3506 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3507 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3509 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3510 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3513 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3514 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3516 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3517 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3518 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3519 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3522 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3523 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3524 added_monitors.clear();
3527 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3528 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
3531 let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3532 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3533 added_monitors.clear();
3536 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3537 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3538 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3540 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
3541 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3542 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3544 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3545 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3547 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3551 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3552 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3553 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3554 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3555 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3559 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3560 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
3562 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3563 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3564 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3566 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3567 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3569 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3572 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3574 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
3575 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
3576 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
3578 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
3579 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3580 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3581 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3582 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3583 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3584 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3585 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3586 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx);
3587 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3591 fn test_unconf_chan() {
3592 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
3593 let nodes = create_network(2);
3594 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3596 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3597 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
3598 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
3599 mem::drop(channel_state);
3601 let mut headers = Vec::new();
3602 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3603 headers.push(header.clone());
3605 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3606 headers.push(header.clone());
3608 while !headers.is_empty() {
3609 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
3612 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3613 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3615 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3616 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3618 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3621 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3622 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
3623 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
3626 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_htlc_fails: (usize, usize)) {
3627 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3628 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3630 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
3631 for msg in reestablish_1 {
3632 resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
3635 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3636 if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
3637 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3639 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
3641 added_monitors.clear();
3644 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
3645 for msg in reestablish_2 {
3646 resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
3649 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3650 if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
3651 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3653 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
3655 added_monitors.clear();
3658 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
3659 assert!((pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.0 == 0) || (pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
3661 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
3663 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
3664 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
3666 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
3668 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
3669 if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
3670 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
3671 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
3672 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
3673 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
3674 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3675 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
3676 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
3678 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
3679 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
3682 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
3684 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
3688 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
3690 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
3691 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
3693 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
3695 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
3696 if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
3697 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
3698 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
3699 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
3700 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
3701 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3702 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
3703 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
3705 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
3706 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
3709 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
3711 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
3717 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3718 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3719 let nodes = create_network(3);
3720 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3721 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3723 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3724 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3725 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0));
3727 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3728 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3729 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3730 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3732 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3733 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3734 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0));
3736 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3737 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3738 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3739 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3741 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3742 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3744 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
3745 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
3747 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (1, 0), (1, 0));
3749 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3750 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3752 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3753 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3755 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3758 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
3759 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3761 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3765 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3766 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3770 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
3771 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
3772 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3773 let nodes = create_network(2);
3775 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3777 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3778 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3779 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3780 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3782 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3784 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3785 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3787 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
3788 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
3790 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
3792 let mut chan_announcement;
3794 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
3796 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3797 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
3798 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
3799 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3800 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
3801 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
3802 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
3803 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
3804 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3809 macro_rules! sign_msg {
3810 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
3811 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
3812 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3813 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3814 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
3815 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
3816 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3817 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
3818 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
3819 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
3820 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
3821 contents: $unsigned_msg
3826 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3827 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3828 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
3829 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3831 // Configured with Network::Testnet
3832 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3833 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
3834 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3835 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
3837 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3838 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
3839 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3840 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());