1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
18 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
19 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
22 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
23 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
26 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
29 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
30 use util::config::UserConfig;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
69 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
70 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
71 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
72 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
73 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
75 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
76 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
79 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
80 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
81 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
82 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
85 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
86 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
87 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
88 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
92 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
95 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
96 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
97 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
100 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102 pub enum HTLCSource {
103 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
106 session_priv: SecretKey,
107 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
108 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
109 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
114 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
115 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
116 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
117 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
118 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
126 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
134 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
136 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>);
138 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
139 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
140 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
141 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
142 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
143 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
144 err: msgs::HandleError,
145 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
147 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
149 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
153 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
154 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
156 data: err.to_string()
160 shutdown_finish: None,
164 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
165 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
168 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
172 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
173 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
175 data: err.to_string()
179 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
183 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
186 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
188 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
190 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
192 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
193 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
195 data: msg.to_string()
200 shutdown_finish: None,
205 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
206 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
208 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
209 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
211 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
215 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
216 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
217 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
218 /// probably increase this significantly.
219 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
221 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
222 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
224 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
227 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
228 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
229 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
230 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
231 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
232 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
233 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
235 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
239 struct ChannelHolder {
240 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
241 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
242 next_forward: Instant,
243 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
244 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
245 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
246 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
247 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
248 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
249 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
251 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
252 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
253 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
254 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
256 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
257 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
258 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
259 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
260 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
261 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
262 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
265 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
267 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
268 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
269 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
270 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
271 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
272 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
277 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
278 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
280 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
281 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
283 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
284 /// to individual Channels.
286 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
287 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
288 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
289 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
291 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
292 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
293 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
294 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
295 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
296 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
297 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
299 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
300 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
301 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
302 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
304 pub struct ChannelManager {
305 default_configuration: UserConfig,
306 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
307 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
308 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
309 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
310 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
312 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
313 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
314 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
316 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
317 our_network_key: SecretKey,
319 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
320 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
321 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
322 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
323 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
325 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
330 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
331 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
332 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
333 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
334 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
335 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
336 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
338 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
339 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
340 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
341 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
344 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
346 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
347 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
350 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
352 macro_rules! secp_call {
353 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
356 Err(_) => return Err($err),
363 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
365 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
366 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
371 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
372 pub struct ChannelDetails {
373 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
374 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
375 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
376 /// lifetime of the channel.
377 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
378 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
379 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
380 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
381 /// The node_id of our counterparty
382 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
383 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
384 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
385 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
389 macro_rules! handle_error {
390 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
393 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
394 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
395 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
396 if let Some(update) = update_option {
397 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
398 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
409 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
410 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
413 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
414 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
416 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
417 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
418 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
419 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
421 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
427 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
428 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
431 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
432 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
434 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
435 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
436 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
437 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
439 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
445 impl ChannelManager {
446 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
448 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
449 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
451 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
453 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
454 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
455 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
457 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
458 default_configuration: config.clone(),
459 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
460 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
461 monitor: monitor.clone(),
465 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
466 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
469 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
470 by_id: HashMap::new(),
471 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
472 next_forward: Instant::now(),
473 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
474 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
475 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
477 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
479 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
480 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
486 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
487 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
491 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
493 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
494 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
495 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
496 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
498 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
499 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
501 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
502 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
503 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
504 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
505 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
508 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
509 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
511 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
512 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
513 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
514 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
515 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
516 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
518 panic!("RNG is bad???");
521 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
523 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
524 node_id: their_network_key,
530 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
531 /// more information.
532 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
533 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
534 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
535 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
536 res.push(ChannelDetails {
537 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
538 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
539 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
540 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
541 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
547 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
548 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
549 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
550 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
551 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
552 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
553 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
554 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
555 // really wanted anyway.
556 if channel.is_live() {
557 res.push(ChannelDetails {
558 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
559 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
560 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
561 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
562 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
569 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
570 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
571 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
573 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
574 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
575 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
577 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
578 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
579 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
580 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
581 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
582 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
583 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
584 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
587 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
588 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
589 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
591 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
592 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
594 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
597 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
598 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
599 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
601 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
602 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
607 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
608 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
609 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
618 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
619 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
620 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
621 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
622 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
624 for tx in local_txn {
625 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
627 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
628 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
629 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
630 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
631 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
632 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
633 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
636 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
637 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
638 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
639 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
642 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
643 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
644 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
645 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
646 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
653 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
654 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
655 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
656 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
662 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
663 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
664 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
665 for chan in self.list_channels() {
666 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
670 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
672 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
674 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
675 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
676 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
677 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
681 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
682 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
683 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
684 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
685 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
690 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
691 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
692 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
698 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
699 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
701 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
702 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
703 let mut res = [0; 32];
704 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
708 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
709 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
710 let mut res = [0; 32];
711 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
717 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
718 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
719 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
720 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
721 let mut res = [0; 32];
722 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
727 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
728 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
729 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
730 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
731 let mut res = [0; 32];
732 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
736 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
738 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
739 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
740 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
742 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
743 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
745 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
746 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
747 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
748 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
749 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
751 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
753 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
754 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
756 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
762 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
763 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
764 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
766 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
767 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
773 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
783 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
784 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
785 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
786 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
787 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
788 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
789 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
790 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
792 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
793 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
794 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
795 // the intended recipient).
796 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
797 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
798 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
800 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
801 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
802 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
803 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
807 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
808 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
809 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
811 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
812 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
813 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
815 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
817 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
821 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
823 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
831 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
832 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
834 for i in 0..dst.len() {
839 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
840 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
841 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
842 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
845 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
846 let end_len = iters * 65;
847 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
848 res.resize(end_len, 0);
850 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
851 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
852 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
853 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
854 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
859 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
860 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
862 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
863 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
864 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
865 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
867 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
868 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
869 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
872 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
875 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
876 hmac.input(&packet_data);
877 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
878 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
883 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
884 hop_data: packet_data,
889 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
890 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
891 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
892 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
894 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
895 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
896 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
897 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
898 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
899 data: packet_crypted,
903 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
904 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
905 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
907 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
910 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
911 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
912 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
913 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
917 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
918 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
921 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
923 failuremsg: failuremsg,
927 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
928 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
929 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
935 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
936 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
937 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
940 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
941 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
944 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
945 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
946 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
947 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
953 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
954 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
955 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
956 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
957 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
958 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
959 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
960 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
963 let shared_secret = {
964 let mut arr = [0; 32];
965 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
968 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
970 let mut channel_state = None;
971 macro_rules! return_err {
972 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
974 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
975 if channel_state.is_none() {
976 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
978 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
979 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
980 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
981 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
982 })), channel_state.unwrap());
987 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
988 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
989 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
990 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
991 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
992 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
993 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
994 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
997 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
998 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
999 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
1000 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1001 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1004 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1005 let next_hop_data = {
1006 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1007 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1008 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
1010 let error_code = match err {
1011 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1012 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1014 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1020 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1022 // final_expiry_too_soon
1023 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1024 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1026 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1027 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1028 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1030 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1031 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1032 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1035 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1036 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1037 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1038 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1040 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1042 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1043 short_channel_id: 0,
1044 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1045 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1046 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1049 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1050 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1051 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1053 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1055 let blinding_factor = {
1056 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1057 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1058 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1059 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1060 sha.result(&mut res);
1061 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1063 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1069 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1070 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1073 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1075 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1076 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1077 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1080 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1081 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1082 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1083 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1084 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1085 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1086 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1090 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1091 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1092 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1093 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1094 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1095 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1096 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1098 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1100 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1101 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1103 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1104 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1105 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1106 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1107 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1108 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1109 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1111 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1112 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1114 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1115 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1116 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1118 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1119 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1121 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1122 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1123 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1124 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1126 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1127 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1132 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1133 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1134 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1136 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1137 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1139 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1140 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1142 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1147 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1150 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1151 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1152 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1153 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1154 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1158 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1160 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1161 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1162 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1163 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1164 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1165 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1166 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1167 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1168 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1169 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1172 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1173 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1175 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1181 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1183 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1184 /// fields for more info.
1186 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1187 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1188 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1189 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1190 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1191 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1193 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1195 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1196 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1197 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1198 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1199 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1201 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1202 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1203 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1204 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1208 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1209 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1210 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1212 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1214 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1216 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1217 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1218 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1219 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1221 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1223 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1224 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1226 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1227 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1228 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1232 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1233 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1234 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1235 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1237 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1238 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1240 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1241 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1243 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1244 route: route.clone(),
1245 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1246 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1247 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1248 } else { unreachable!(); }
1250 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1251 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1252 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_lock, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1253 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1256 channel_lock.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1257 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1258 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1259 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1260 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1261 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1262 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1273 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1274 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1276 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1278 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1279 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1280 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1281 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1285 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1290 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1292 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1293 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1295 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1297 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1298 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1299 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1300 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1302 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1304 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1305 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1307 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1308 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1309 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1310 } else { unreachable!(); })
1316 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1317 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1318 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1321 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1322 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1323 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1324 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1331 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1332 // lock before add_update_monitor
1333 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1337 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1338 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1339 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1342 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1343 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1344 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1346 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1352 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1353 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1355 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1357 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1359 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1360 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1362 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1363 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1364 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1365 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1366 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1370 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1372 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1373 /// Will likely generate further events.
1374 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1375 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1377 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1378 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1380 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1381 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1383 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1387 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1388 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1389 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1390 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1392 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1393 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1394 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1395 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1396 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1397 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1399 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1404 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1406 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1407 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1408 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1409 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1410 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1411 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1413 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1415 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1416 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1421 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1423 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1424 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1425 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1426 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1427 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1428 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1429 // this channel currently :/.
1436 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1437 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1440 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1441 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1443 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1447 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1448 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1450 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1451 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1452 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1453 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1454 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1455 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1456 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1458 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1463 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1464 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1465 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1466 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1467 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1469 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1471 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1473 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1474 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1475 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1482 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1484 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1485 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1489 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1490 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1491 events.append(&mut new_events);
1494 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1495 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1496 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1498 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1499 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1500 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1501 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1502 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1503 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1509 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1510 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1511 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1512 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1513 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1514 /// still-available channels.
1515 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1517 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1518 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1519 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1520 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1521 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1522 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1523 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1528 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1529 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1530 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1533 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1536 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1537 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1538 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1539 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1540 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1542 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1543 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1547 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1549 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1550 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1554 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1555 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1556 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1557 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1560 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1561 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1562 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1563 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1564 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1565 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1566 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1568 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1574 //TODO: Do something with e?
1582 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1583 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1584 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1586 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1587 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1588 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1589 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1590 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1591 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1593 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1595 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1596 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1597 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1598 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1599 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1600 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1605 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1607 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1608 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1609 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1610 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1614 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1615 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1616 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1618 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1619 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1621 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1622 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1628 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1629 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1630 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1631 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1632 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1633 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1636 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1637 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1638 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1639 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1640 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1641 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1642 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1643 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1651 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1652 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1653 //TODO: Do something with e?
1661 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1662 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1663 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1666 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1667 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1669 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1670 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1671 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1672 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1673 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1676 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1677 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1678 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1679 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1680 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1681 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1682 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1683 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1685 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1686 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1687 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1689 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1690 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1691 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1697 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1700 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1701 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1702 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1704 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1706 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1707 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1708 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1709 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1714 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1715 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1716 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1717 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1718 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1723 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1727 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1738 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1739 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1741 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1743 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1744 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1748 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1749 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1750 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1753 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1754 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1755 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1756 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1757 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1758 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1759 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1760 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1761 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1762 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1764 entry.insert(channel);
1770 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1771 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1772 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1773 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1774 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1775 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1776 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1777 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1778 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1780 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1781 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1783 //TODO: same as above
1784 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1787 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1788 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1789 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1790 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1791 output_script: output_script,
1792 user_channel_id: user_id,
1797 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1798 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1799 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1800 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1801 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1802 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1803 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1804 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1805 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1807 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1809 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1812 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1813 // lock before add_update_monitor
1814 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1817 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1818 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1819 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1820 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1821 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1823 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1824 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1825 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1834 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1835 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1836 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1837 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1838 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1839 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1840 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1841 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1842 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1844 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1845 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1848 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1850 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1853 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1854 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1855 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1856 user_channel_id: user_id,
1861 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1862 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1863 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1864 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1865 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1866 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1867 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1868 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1870 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1871 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1872 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1873 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1874 msg: announcement_sigs,
1879 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1883 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1884 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1885 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1886 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1888 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1889 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1890 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1891 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1892 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1894 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1895 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1896 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1897 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1901 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1902 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1903 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1907 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1908 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1909 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1911 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1912 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1914 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1917 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1918 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1919 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1921 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1922 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1923 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1924 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1932 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1933 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1934 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1935 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1936 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1937 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1938 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1939 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1940 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1942 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1943 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1944 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1945 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1950 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1951 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1952 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1953 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1954 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1955 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1956 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1958 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1959 } else { (tx, None) }
1961 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1964 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1965 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1967 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1968 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1969 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1970 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1978 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1979 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1980 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1981 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1983 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1984 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1985 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1986 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1988 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1989 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1991 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1992 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1993 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1994 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1995 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1997 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
1998 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1999 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2000 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2001 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2002 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2003 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2004 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2005 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2006 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2007 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &update.encode_with_len()[..])
2009 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2010 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2011 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2012 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2013 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2014 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2019 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2021 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2026 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2027 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2029 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2030 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2031 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2032 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2033 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2034 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2036 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2038 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2041 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2045 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
2046 // indicating that the payment itself failed
2047 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
2048 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
2049 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
2050 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
2051 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
2053 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
2054 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
2058 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
2059 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
2060 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
2063 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
2065 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
2066 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
2067 if res.is_some() { return; }
2069 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
2070 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2071 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2073 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2075 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2076 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2077 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2078 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2079 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2081 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2083 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2084 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2085 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2086 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2087 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2088 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2090 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2091 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
2092 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2093 // definitely came from the peer in question
2094 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
2096 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
2098 match error_code & 0xff {
2100 // either from an intermediate or final node
2101 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
2102 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
2103 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
2104 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
2105 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2106 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2107 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
2108 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2109 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
2110 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2111 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2117 if is_from_final_node {
2118 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2119 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2120 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2121 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2122 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2123 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2126 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2127 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2131 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2132 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2133 // does not coform to the spec.
2134 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2135 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2136 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2142 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2146 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2148 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2149 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2150 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2154 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2155 let offset = match error_code {
2156 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2157 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2158 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2159 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2160 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2161 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2163 // node sending unknown code
2164 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2165 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2172 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2173 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2174 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2175 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2176 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2177 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2178 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2179 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2182 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2183 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2184 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2185 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2187 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2188 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2189 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2190 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2191 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2193 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2194 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2195 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2196 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2198 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2199 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2200 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2201 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2203 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2204 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2207 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2208 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2212 res = Some((msg, true));
2218 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2221 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2222 res = Some((None, true));
2226 // node sending unknown code
2227 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2228 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2237 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2238 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2239 } else { ((None, true)) }
2242 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2243 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2244 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2245 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2246 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2247 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2248 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2249 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2251 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2253 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2258 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2259 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2260 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2261 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2262 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2263 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2264 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2265 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2267 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2268 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2270 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2273 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2277 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2278 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2279 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2280 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2281 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2282 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2283 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2284 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2286 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2287 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2288 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2291 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2292 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2293 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2295 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2296 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2297 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2298 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2299 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2300 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2301 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2302 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2304 commitment_signed: msg,
2308 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2309 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2310 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2316 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2321 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2322 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2323 let mut forward_event = None;
2324 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2325 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2326 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2327 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2328 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2330 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2331 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2332 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2333 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2335 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2336 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2341 match forward_event {
2343 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2344 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2345 time_forwardable: time
2353 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2354 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2355 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2356 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2357 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2358 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2359 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2360 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2361 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2363 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2364 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2365 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2368 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2369 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2370 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2374 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2375 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2376 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2380 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2382 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2385 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2386 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2388 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2393 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2394 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2395 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2396 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2397 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2398 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2399 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2400 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2402 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2404 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2409 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2410 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2411 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2413 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2414 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2415 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2416 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2418 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2419 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2422 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2423 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2424 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2426 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2427 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2428 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2429 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2430 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2433 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2435 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2436 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2437 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2438 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2439 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2440 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2441 contents: announcement,
2443 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2446 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2451 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2452 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2453 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2455 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2456 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2457 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2458 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2460 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order, shutdown) =
2461 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2462 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2463 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2467 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2468 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2469 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2473 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2474 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2475 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2476 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2481 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2482 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2483 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2484 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2490 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2494 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2499 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2500 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2501 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2507 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2511 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2512 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2513 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2514 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2516 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2517 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2519 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2520 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2521 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2523 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2524 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2525 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2526 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2527 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2529 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2530 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2532 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2533 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2535 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2536 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2537 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2539 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2542 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2543 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2544 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2545 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2546 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2547 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2548 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2549 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2559 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2560 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2562 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2564 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2565 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2566 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2567 node_id: their_node_id,
2571 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2577 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2578 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2579 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2580 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2581 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2586 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2587 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2588 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2589 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2590 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2595 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2596 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2597 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2598 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2600 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2601 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2602 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2603 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2604 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2605 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2606 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2607 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2608 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2609 msg: funding_locked,
2611 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2612 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2613 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2614 msg: announcement_sigs,
2617 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2618 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2619 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2620 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2621 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2625 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2626 for tx in txn_matched {
2627 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2628 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2629 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2630 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2632 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2633 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2634 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2635 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2636 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2637 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2646 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2647 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2648 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2650 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2651 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2652 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2653 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2654 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2655 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2656 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2665 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2666 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2668 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2669 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2672 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2673 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2674 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2675 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2677 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2678 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2679 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2680 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2681 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2682 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2683 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2684 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2686 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2687 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2688 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2698 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2699 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2701 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2702 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2706 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2707 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2708 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2709 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2710 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2713 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2714 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2715 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2718 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2719 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2720 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2723 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2724 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2725 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2728 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2729 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2730 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2733 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2734 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2735 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2738 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2739 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2740 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2743 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2744 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2745 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2748 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2749 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2750 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2753 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2754 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2755 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2758 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2759 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2760 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2763 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2764 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2765 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2768 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2769 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2770 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2773 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2774 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2775 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2778 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2779 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2780 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2783 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2784 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2785 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2788 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2789 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2790 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2791 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2793 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2794 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2795 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2796 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2797 if no_connection_possible {
2798 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2799 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2800 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2801 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2802 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2804 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2805 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2806 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2816 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2817 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2818 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2819 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2820 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2821 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2822 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2823 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2825 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2826 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2827 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2836 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2837 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2839 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2840 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2841 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2846 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2847 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2849 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2850 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2851 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2852 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2853 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2854 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2855 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2856 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2857 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2858 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2862 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2863 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2864 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2870 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2873 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2874 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2876 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2877 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2878 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2879 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2883 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2888 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2889 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2891 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2892 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2893 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2895 onion.write(writer)?;
2899 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2900 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2901 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2902 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2903 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2908 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2909 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2910 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2912 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2913 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2915 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2917 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2918 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2919 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2920 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2921 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2926 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2927 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2929 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2931 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2933 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2935 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2942 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2943 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2944 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2945 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2946 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2947 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2952 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2953 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2955 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2957 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2959 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2961 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2968 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2969 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2970 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2971 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2972 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2973 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2978 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2981 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2984 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2985 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2987 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2989 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2991 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2993 route.write(writer)?;
2994 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2995 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3002 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3003 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3004 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3005 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3006 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3007 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3008 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3009 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3011 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3016 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3017 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3019 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
3023 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3025 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3026 data.write(writer)?;
3033 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3034 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3035 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3036 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3037 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3038 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3039 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3041 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3046 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
3047 prev_short_channel_id,
3052 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3053 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3054 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3056 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3057 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3059 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3060 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3061 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3063 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3064 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3065 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3066 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3067 unfunded_channels += 1;
3070 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3071 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3072 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3073 channel.write(writer)?;
3077 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3078 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3079 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3080 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3081 for forward in pending_forwards {
3082 forward.write(writer)?;
3086 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3087 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3088 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3089 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3090 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3091 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3099 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3101 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3103 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3104 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3105 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3106 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3107 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3108 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3109 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3110 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3111 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3112 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3113 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3114 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3115 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3116 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3117 /// deserialization.
3118 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3120 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3122 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3123 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3124 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3126 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3127 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3128 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3129 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3130 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3132 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3133 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3134 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3135 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3136 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3137 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3138 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3139 /// deserialization.
3140 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3141 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3142 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3143 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3145 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3146 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3148 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3149 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3150 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3151 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3153 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3155 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3158 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3159 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3160 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3161 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3162 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3163 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3166 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3167 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3168 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3170 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3172 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3173 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3174 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3175 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3176 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3177 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3178 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3179 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3182 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3183 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3184 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3185 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3186 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3187 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3188 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3189 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3190 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3192 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3193 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3195 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3198 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3202 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3203 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3204 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3208 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3209 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3210 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3211 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3212 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3213 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3214 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3215 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3217 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3220 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3221 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3222 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3223 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3224 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3225 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3226 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3227 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3229 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3232 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3234 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3235 monitor: args.monitor,
3236 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3237 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3239 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3240 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3241 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3243 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3246 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3249 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3251 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3253 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3254 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3255 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3256 logger: args.logger,
3257 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3260 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3261 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3262 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3263 //connection or two.
3266 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3272 use chain::chaininterface;
3273 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3274 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3275 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
3276 use chain::keysinterface;
3277 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
3278 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
3279 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3280 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3282 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
3283 use util::test_utils;
3284 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3285 use util::errors::APIError;
3286 use util::logger::Logger;
3287 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3288 use util::config::UserConfig;
3290 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3291 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3292 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
3293 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
3294 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3295 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
3296 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
3297 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3298 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3299 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3303 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3304 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3306 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3307 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3309 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3311 use std::cell::RefCell;
3312 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
3313 use std::default::Default;
3315 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3316 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3317 use std::time::Instant;
3320 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3321 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3322 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3327 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3328 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3331 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3332 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3335 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3336 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3339 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3340 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3343 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3344 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3349 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3351 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3352 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3357 fn onion_vectors() {
3358 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3359 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3361 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3362 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3363 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3364 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3365 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3367 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3368 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3369 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3370 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3371 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3373 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3374 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3375 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3376 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3377 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3379 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3380 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3381 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3382 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3383 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3385 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3386 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3387 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3388 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3389 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3391 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3392 let payloads = vec!(
3393 msgs::OnionHopData {
3395 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3396 short_channel_id: 0,
3398 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3402 msgs::OnionHopData {
3404 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3405 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3406 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3407 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3411 msgs::OnionHopData {
3413 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3414 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3415 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3416 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3420 msgs::OnionHopData {
3422 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3423 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3424 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3425 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3429 msgs::OnionHopData {
3431 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3432 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3433 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3434 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3440 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
3441 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3443 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3447 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3448 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3450 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3451 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3452 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3454 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3455 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3457 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3458 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3460 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3461 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3463 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3464 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3466 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3467 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3470 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3471 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3472 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3473 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3475 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3476 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3481 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3482 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3483 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3484 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3486 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3487 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3488 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3490 impl Drop for Node {
3491 fn drop(&mut self) {
3492 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3493 // Check that we processed all pending events
3494 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3495 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3496 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3501 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3502 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3505 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3506 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3507 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3508 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3511 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3512 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3514 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3515 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3517 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3518 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3521 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3522 }, match events[1] {
3523 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3524 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3525 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3526 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3527 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3528 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3529 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3530 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3532 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3538 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3539 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3541 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3542 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3544 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3545 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3548 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3554 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3555 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3557 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3558 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3560 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3561 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3564 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3570 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3571 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
3573 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3574 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3581 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3582 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3583 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3584 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3586 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3590 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3591 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3593 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3594 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3595 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3597 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3598 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3600 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3602 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3603 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3604 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3605 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3606 added_monitors.clear();
3608 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3611 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3613 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3614 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3615 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3616 added_monitors.clear();
3619 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3621 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3622 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3623 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3624 added_monitors.clear();
3627 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3628 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3630 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3631 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3632 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3634 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3640 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3641 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3642 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3646 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3647 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3648 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3649 ((match events_6[0] {
3650 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3651 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3652 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3655 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3656 }, match events_6[1] {
3657 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3658 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3661 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3665 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3666 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3667 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3671 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3672 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3673 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3674 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3676 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3677 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3678 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3679 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3682 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3685 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3686 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3687 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3688 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3689 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3690 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3693 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3696 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3698 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3701 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3702 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3705 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3706 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3708 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3709 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3710 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3712 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3715 macro_rules! check_spends {
3716 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3718 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3719 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3720 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3721 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3726 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3727 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3729 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3730 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3731 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3732 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3733 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3736 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3737 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3739 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3740 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3743 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3750 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
3751 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3752 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3755 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3756 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3758 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3759 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3760 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3761 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3762 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3765 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3768 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3769 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3772 Some(match events_1[1] {
3773 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3774 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3777 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3781 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3782 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3783 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3784 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3785 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3786 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3787 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3789 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3790 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3791 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3792 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3793 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3794 (as_update, bs_update)
3796 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3798 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3799 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3800 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3801 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3803 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3804 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3805 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3806 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3807 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3808 (as_update, bs_update)
3810 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3811 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3813 (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
3818 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3819 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3822 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3823 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3824 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3825 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3826 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3827 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3830 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3832 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3833 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3838 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3839 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3841 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3842 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3843 added_monitors.clear();
3848 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3849 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3851 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3852 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3853 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3854 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3855 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3858 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
3860 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3861 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3862 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3863 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3864 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3865 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3866 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3867 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3868 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3869 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3871 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3872 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3875 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3876 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3878 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3879 if $fail_backwards {
3880 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3881 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3883 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3885 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3886 if $fail_backwards {
3887 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3888 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3890 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3892 added_monitors.clear();
3897 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
3899 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
3902 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3904 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
3905 if $fail_backwards {
3906 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3907 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3908 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
3909 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3910 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
3912 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3918 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3921 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3922 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3923 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3924 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3925 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3926 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3927 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3932 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3933 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3935 let mut payment_event = {
3936 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3937 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3939 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3940 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3941 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3943 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3945 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3946 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3948 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3949 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3950 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3952 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3953 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3955 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3956 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3959 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3960 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3962 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3963 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3964 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3966 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3967 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3968 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3970 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3973 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3974 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3975 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3976 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3977 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3983 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3986 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3987 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3988 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3990 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3991 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3992 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
3995 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3996 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3998 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3999 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4000 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4001 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4002 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4003 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4004 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4005 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
4007 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4013 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
4014 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
4016 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4017 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
4018 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4019 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4023 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
4024 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
4026 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4027 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4028 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
4029 get_next_msgs!($node)
4031 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4034 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4035 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
4040 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4041 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4042 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4043 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
4044 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4045 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
4046 } else if update_next_msgs {
4047 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
4049 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4051 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4052 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4059 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
4060 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4061 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4063 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4064 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4066 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4071 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
4072 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
4075 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
4077 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
4078 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4079 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4080 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4081 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4084 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4087 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4088 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4089 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4090 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4091 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4094 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4096 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4098 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4099 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4103 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4104 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4105 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4108 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4109 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
4110 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4112 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4113 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4114 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4116 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4117 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4122 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4123 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4124 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4125 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4126 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4127 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4128 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4129 // second-to-last node!
4130 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4133 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4134 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4135 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4137 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4138 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4139 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4140 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4141 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4142 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4143 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4144 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4146 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4149 assert!(events.is_empty());
4151 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4152 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4159 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4161 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4162 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4164 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
4165 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4166 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4168 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4173 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4174 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4177 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4178 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4179 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4180 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4181 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4183 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4184 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4186 for _ in 0..node_count {
4187 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4188 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4189 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4190 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4191 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4192 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4193 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4194 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4195 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4196 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4197 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4198 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4199 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
4200 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4201 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4209 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4210 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4211 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4212 let channel_id = chan.2;
4215 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4219 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4220 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4221 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4222 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4223 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4224 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4225 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4226 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4227 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4228 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4230 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4232 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4234 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4235 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4238 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4239 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4240 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4241 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4242 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4244 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4247 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4249 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4250 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4251 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4254 let payment_event = {
4255 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4256 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4257 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4259 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4260 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4262 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4263 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4264 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4265 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4266 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4269 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4270 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4271 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4272 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4275 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4276 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4277 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4278 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4279 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4280 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4281 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4284 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4285 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4286 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4287 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4288 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4289 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4290 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4293 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4294 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4295 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4298 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4299 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4302 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4305 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4306 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4308 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4309 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4312 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4317 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4318 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4319 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4320 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4321 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4322 let channel_id = chan.2;
4325 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4327 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4328 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4331 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4332 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4333 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4334 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4337 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4340 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4342 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4343 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4344 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4347 let payment_event = {
4348 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4349 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4350 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4352 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4353 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4355 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4356 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4357 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4358 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4359 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4362 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4365 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4369 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4370 let nodes = create_network(2);
4371 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4372 let channel_id = chan.2;
4375 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4376 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4377 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4378 // (3) update_fee ->
4379 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4380 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4381 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4382 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4383 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4384 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4385 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4386 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4387 // revoke_and_ack ->
4388 // B should send no response here
4389 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4390 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4391 // revoke_and_ack ->
4393 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4394 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4395 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4398 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4399 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4400 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4401 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4402 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4404 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4407 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4408 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4409 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4410 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4413 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4415 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4416 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4417 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4419 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4420 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4421 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4422 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4425 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4427 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4429 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4431 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4432 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4433 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4434 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4435 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4436 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4437 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4438 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4439 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4440 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4441 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4443 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4444 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4445 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4447 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4449 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4450 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4454 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4455 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4458 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4459 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4462 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4463 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4464 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4467 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4468 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4473 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4474 let nodes = create_network(2);
4475 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4476 let channel_id = chan.2;
4478 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4479 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
4480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4482 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4483 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4484 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4485 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4486 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4488 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4490 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4492 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4493 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4496 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4497 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4500 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4501 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4502 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4503 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4505 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4506 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4507 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4511 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
4512 let nodes = create_network(2);
4513 let channel_value = 1888;
4514 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
4515 let channel_id = chan.2;
4518 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
4519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4520 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4522 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4524 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
4526 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
4527 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
4529 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4530 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4532 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
4533 let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
4534 let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
4535 let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
4536 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
4537 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
4540 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
4541 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
4542 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
4543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4545 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4547 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4549 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
4550 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
4551 //Should produce and error.
4552 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
4554 assert!(match err.err {
4555 "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
4559 //clear the message we could not handle
4560 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4564 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4565 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4566 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4567 let channel_id = chan.2;
4570 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4572 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4573 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4576 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4577 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4578 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4579 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4580 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4582 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4584 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4585 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4586 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4589 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4591 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4593 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4594 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4596 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4597 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4598 added_monitors.clear();
4600 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4601 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4602 // node[1] has nothing to do
4604 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4605 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4608 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4609 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4610 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4612 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4614 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4616 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4617 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4618 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4619 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4620 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4621 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4623 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4624 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4626 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4628 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4630 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4632 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4633 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4634 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4635 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4637 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4639 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4641 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4642 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4644 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4645 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4647 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4648 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4650 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4651 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4653 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4654 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4657 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4659 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4660 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4661 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4665 fn test_update_fee() {
4666 let nodes = create_network(2);
4667 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4668 let channel_id = chan.2;
4671 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4672 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4673 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4674 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4675 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4676 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4677 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4678 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4679 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4680 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4681 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4682 // revoke_and_ack ->
4684 // Create and deliver (1)...
4685 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4686 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4689 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4690 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4691 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4692 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4693 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4695 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4697 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4699 // Generate (2) and (3):
4700 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4701 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4705 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4706 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4709 // Create and deliver (4)...
4710 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4712 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4713 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4714 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4715 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4716 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4718 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4721 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4722 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4725 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4726 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4728 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4729 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4731 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4732 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4735 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4736 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4739 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4740 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4741 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4742 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4743 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4744 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4745 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4746 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4747 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4750 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4752 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4753 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4755 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4757 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4759 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4760 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4761 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4765 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4766 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4767 let nodes = create_network(2);
4768 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4769 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4770 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4771 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4773 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4774 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4775 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4776 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4777 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4779 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4780 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4781 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4782 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4783 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4784 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4786 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4787 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4791 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4792 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4793 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4794 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4795 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4796 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4797 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4799 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4801 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4802 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4803 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4804 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4805 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4807 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4808 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4810 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4811 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4812 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4813 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4814 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4816 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4818 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4819 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4820 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4821 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4822 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4823 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4824 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4826 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4827 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4829 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4830 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4831 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4832 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4833 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4834 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4835 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4837 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4838 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4840 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4841 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4846 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4847 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4848 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4849 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4850 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4851 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4853 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4855 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4856 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4857 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4858 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4859 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4863 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
4864 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
4865 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4866 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4867 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4869 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4870 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4871 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4873 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4874 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4875 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4876 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4877 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4878 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4880 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4881 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4882 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4883 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4885 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4886 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4888 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4889 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
4891 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4892 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4893 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4894 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4895 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4896 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4898 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4899 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4901 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4902 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4904 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest } => {
4905 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4906 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
4908 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4911 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4912 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4913 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4914 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4915 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4916 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4917 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4919 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4921 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4922 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4923 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4924 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4925 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4929 fn update_fee_async_shutdown() {
4930 // Test update_fee works after shutdown start if messages are delivered out-of-order
4931 let nodes = create_network(2);
4932 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4934 let starting_feerate = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().get_feerate();
4935 nodes[0].node.update_fee(chan_1.2.clone(), starting_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4937 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4938 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4939 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4940 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4941 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4942 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_some());
4944 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4945 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4946 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4947 // Note that we don't actually test normative behavior here. The spec indicates we could
4948 // actually send a closing_signed here, but is kinda unclear and could possibly be amended
4949 // to require waiting on the full commitment dance before doing so (see
4950 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/499). In any case, to avoid
4951 // ambiguity, we should wait until after the full commitment dance to send closing_signed.
4952 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4954 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4955 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4957 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4958 let node_0_closing_signed = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, true);
4960 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4961 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), match node_0_closing_signed.unwrap() {
4962 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
4963 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4966 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4968 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4969 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4970 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4971 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4974 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
4975 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
4976 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
4977 let nodes = create_network(3);
4978 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4979 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4981 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4983 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4984 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4986 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4987 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4989 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4993 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4994 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4996 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4997 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4998 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4999 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5001 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
5002 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5003 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5005 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
5006 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
5007 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5008 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5011 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5012 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5013 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
5015 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5017 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5018 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5020 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5022 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5023 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5024 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5025 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5026 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5027 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5028 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5030 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5031 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
5033 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5034 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5035 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5036 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5037 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5038 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5039 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5041 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5042 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5044 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5045 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
5047 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5050 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5052 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5053 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5054 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
5057 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5058 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5060 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5061 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5062 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5063 if recv_count == 0 {
5064 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
5065 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5067 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5068 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5069 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
5071 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5072 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5073 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5075 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5076 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5078 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5079 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5080 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
5082 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
5083 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5084 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5085 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5086 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5088 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5089 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5090 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5091 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5092 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5093 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5095 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5097 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5098 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5099 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5100 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5101 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5102 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5104 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5105 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5106 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5107 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5108 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5110 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5111 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5113 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5117 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5119 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5120 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5121 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5122 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5123 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5127 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5128 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5129 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5130 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5134 fn fake_network_test() {
5135 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5136 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5137 let nodes = create_network(4);
5139 // Create some initial channels
5140 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5141 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5142 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5144 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5145 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5146 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5147 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5148 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5150 // Send some more payments
5151 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5152 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5153 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5155 // Test failure packets
5156 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5157 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5159 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5160 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5162 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5163 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5164 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5165 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5166 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5167 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5168 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5170 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5171 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5172 hops.push(RouteHop {
5173 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5174 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5176 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5178 hops.push(RouteHop {
5179 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5180 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5182 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5184 hops.push(RouteHop {
5185 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5186 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5188 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5190 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5191 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5192 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5194 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5195 hops.push(RouteHop {
5196 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5197 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5199 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5201 hops.push(RouteHop {
5202 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5203 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5205 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5207 hops.push(RouteHop {
5208 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5209 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5211 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5213 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5214 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5215 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5217 // Claim the rebalances...
5218 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5219 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5221 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5222 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5224 // Send some payments across both channels
5225 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5226 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5227 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5229 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5231 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5233 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5234 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5235 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5237 // Close down the channels...
5238 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5239 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5240 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5241 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5242 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5246 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5247 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5248 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5249 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5251 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5252 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5253 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5254 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5255 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5256 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5258 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5260 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5261 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5263 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5264 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5266 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5267 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5268 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5271 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5272 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5273 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5275 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5276 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5277 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5279 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5280 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5282 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5284 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5285 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5286 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5288 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5289 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5290 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5291 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5292 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5293 res.push(tx.clone());
5298 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5299 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5302 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5304 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5305 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5306 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5307 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5308 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5309 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5311 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5313 res.push(tx.clone());
5317 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
5320 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5324 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5325 /// HTLC transaction.
5326 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5327 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5328 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5329 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5330 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5331 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5335 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5338 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5339 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5341 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5342 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5343 let mut found_prev = false;
5345 for tx in prev_txn {
5346 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5347 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5348 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5349 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5355 assert!(found_prev);
5357 let mut res = Vec::new();
5358 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5362 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5363 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5364 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5365 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5366 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5369 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5372 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5373 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5374 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5375 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5378 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5382 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5383 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5387 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5389 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5390 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5392 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5393 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5395 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5396 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5400 fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
5402 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5403 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5405 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5406 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5407 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5408 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5409 chan.get_value_stat()
5413 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5414 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5415 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5417 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5418 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5420 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5421 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5423 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5424 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5425 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5426 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5427 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5431 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5433 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5434 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5435 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5436 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5441 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5442 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5443 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5444 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5446 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5447 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5448 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5450 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5455 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5456 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5458 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5460 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5462 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5463 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5464 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5466 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5467 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5471 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5472 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5473 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5475 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5476 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5479 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5482 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5483 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5484 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5485 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5486 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5489 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5490 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5491 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5492 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5493 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5497 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5498 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5499 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5500 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5502 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5503 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5507 // adding pending output
5508 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5509 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5511 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5512 let payment_event_1 = {
5513 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5516 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5517 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5518 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5520 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5522 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5523 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5525 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5526 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5527 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5528 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5533 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5534 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5536 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5537 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5538 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5539 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5540 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5542 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5544 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5545 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5546 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5547 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5548 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5549 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5551 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5552 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5553 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5554 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5558 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5560 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5562 // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
5563 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5564 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5565 let channel_close_broadcast = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5566 assert_eq!(channel_close_broadcast.len(), 1);
5567 match channel_close_broadcast[0] {
5568 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5569 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5571 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5577 // split the rest to test holding cell
5578 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5579 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5581 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5582 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5585 // now see if they go through on both sides
5586 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5587 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5588 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5590 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5591 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5593 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5595 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5596 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5597 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5598 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5602 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5603 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5604 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5606 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5607 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5609 // flush the pending htlc
5610 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5611 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5614 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5616 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5618 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5619 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5620 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5623 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5624 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5627 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5629 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5630 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5631 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5633 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5634 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5636 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5637 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5638 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5639 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5640 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5641 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5643 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5644 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5645 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5646 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5648 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5649 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5651 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5652 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5654 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5655 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5656 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5658 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5661 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5662 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5663 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5665 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5668 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5669 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5670 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5672 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5673 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5674 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5675 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5677 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5678 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5682 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5683 do_channel_reserve_test(false);
5684 do_channel_reserve_test(true);
5688 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5689 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5690 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5691 let nodes = create_network(5);
5693 // Create some initial channels
5694 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5695 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5696 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5697 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5699 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5700 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5701 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5702 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5703 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5705 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5706 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5708 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5709 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5710 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5711 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5713 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5714 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5715 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5717 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5718 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5720 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5721 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5723 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5724 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5725 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5726 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5728 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5729 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5730 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5732 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5733 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5735 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5736 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5738 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5739 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5741 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5742 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5743 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5744 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5746 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5752 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5753 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5754 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5756 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5758 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5759 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5761 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5762 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5764 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5766 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5767 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5768 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5770 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5771 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5772 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5775 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5776 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5777 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5778 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5779 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5783 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5784 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5785 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5786 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5787 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5790 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5792 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5793 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5795 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5796 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5797 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5798 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5799 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5802 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5804 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5805 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5807 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5809 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5810 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5811 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5815 fn test_justice_tx() {
5816 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5818 let nodes = create_network(2);
5819 // Create some new channels:
5820 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5822 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5823 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5824 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5825 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5826 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5827 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5828 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5829 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5830 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5831 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5832 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5833 // Revoke the old state
5834 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5837 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5838 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5840 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5841 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5842 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5843 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5845 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5846 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5848 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5850 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5851 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5852 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5853 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5854 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5856 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5858 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5859 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5861 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5862 // Create some new channels:
5863 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5865 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5866 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5867 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5868 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5869 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5870 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5871 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5872 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5873 // Revoke the old state
5874 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5876 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5877 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5879 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5880 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5881 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5882 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5884 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5885 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5887 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5889 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5890 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5891 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5892 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5893 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5895 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5896 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5897 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5901 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5902 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5903 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5904 let nodes = create_network(2);
5905 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5906 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5907 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5908 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5909 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5910 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5911 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5912 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5914 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5915 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5916 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5917 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5918 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
5920 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5922 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5923 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
5925 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
5926 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5927 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5931 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
5932 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
5933 let nodes = create_network(2);
5935 // Create some new channel:
5936 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5938 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5939 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5940 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
5941 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5942 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5944 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5945 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5946 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
5947 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5948 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5949 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5950 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5951 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5952 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5954 //Revoke the old state
5955 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5958 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5960 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5962 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5963 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5964 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5966 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
5967 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5969 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
5971 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5972 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5973 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5974 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5975 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5976 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5977 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5978 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
5980 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
5981 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5982 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
5984 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5985 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
5986 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
5987 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
5988 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5989 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
5991 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5992 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5993 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5997 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
5998 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
5999 let nodes = create_network(2);
6001 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6003 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6004 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6005 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
6006 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
6007 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6008 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
6010 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6011 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6013 //Revoke the old state
6014 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6017 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6019 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6021 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6022 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6023 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6025 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
6026 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
6027 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
6028 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
6029 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
6030 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
6031 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
6033 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6034 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6035 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6037 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
6038 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6039 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6040 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6041 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6043 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6044 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6045 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6046 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6047 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6048 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6049 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
6050 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
6052 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
6053 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
6055 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
6056 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
6057 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
6058 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
6059 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6060 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6062 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6063 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6064 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6068 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
6069 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
6070 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
6071 let nodes = create_network(2);
6072 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6074 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
6075 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
6077 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6078 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6080 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6081 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6083 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6087 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6088 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
6090 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6091 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6094 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6095 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6097 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6098 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6100 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6104 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6105 // registering new transactions
6106 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6110 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6111 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6112 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6113 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6114 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6116 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6118 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6120 let mut payment_event = {
6121 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6124 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6125 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6126 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6129 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6130 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6132 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6133 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6135 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6136 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6139 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6140 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6142 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6143 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6144 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6145 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6148 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6149 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6151 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6153 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6154 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6155 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6157 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6158 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6159 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6161 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6162 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6168 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6169 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6170 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6171 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6172 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6176 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6177 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6179 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6180 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6181 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6183 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6184 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6186 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6189 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6191 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6192 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6193 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6195 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6196 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6197 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6198 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6199 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6200 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6201 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6203 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6207 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6208 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6209 let nodes = create_network(2);
6210 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6212 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6213 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6214 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6215 mem::drop(channel_state);
6217 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6218 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6219 headers.push(header.clone());
6221 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6222 headers.push(header.clone());
6224 while !headers.is_empty() {
6225 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6228 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6229 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6231 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6232 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6234 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6237 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6238 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6239 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6242 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6243 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6245 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6246 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6247 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6248 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6249 res.push(msg.clone());
6251 panic!("Unexpected event")
6259 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6260 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6262 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6264 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6266 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6272 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6273 let mut commitment_update = None;
6274 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6277 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6278 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6279 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6280 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6282 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6283 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6284 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6285 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6287 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6290 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6293 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6295 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6296 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6297 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6298 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6300 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6301 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6302 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6303 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6305 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6309 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6314 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6315 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6316 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6317 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6318 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6319 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6320 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6322 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
6323 for msg in reestablish_1 {
6324 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6325 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
6327 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6328 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6330 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
6333 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
6334 for msg in reestablish_2 {
6335 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6336 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
6338 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6339 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6341 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
6344 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
6345 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
6346 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
6348 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
6349 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6350 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6351 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6352 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6353 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6354 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6355 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6356 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6359 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6362 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6363 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6364 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6365 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6367 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6369 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6370 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6371 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6372 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
6374 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6376 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6377 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6378 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6379 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6380 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6382 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6383 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6385 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6386 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6389 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6390 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6392 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6393 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6394 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6395 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6396 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6397 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6398 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6401 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6405 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
6406 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6407 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6408 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6409 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6410 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6411 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6412 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6413 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6416 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6419 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6420 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6421 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6422 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6424 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6426 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6427 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6428 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6429 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
6431 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6432 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6433 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6434 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6435 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6437 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6438 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6440 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6441 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6444 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6445 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6447 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6448 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6449 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6450 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6451 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6452 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6453 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6456 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6462 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
6463 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
6464 let nodes = create_network(3);
6465 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6466 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6468 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6469 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6470 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6472 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6473 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6474 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
6475 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
6477 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6478 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6479 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6481 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6482 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6483 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6484 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6486 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6487 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6489 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
6490 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
6492 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
6494 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6495 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6497 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6498 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
6500 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6503 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
6504 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
6505 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
6507 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6511 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
6512 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
6515 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
6516 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
6517 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6518 if messages_delivered == 0 {
6519 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6520 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
6522 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6525 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6526 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6528 let payment_event = {
6529 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
6530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6532 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6533 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6534 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6536 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
6538 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6539 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
6541 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6542 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6543 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6545 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6547 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6548 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6549 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6552 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6553 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6554 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6555 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6558 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
6559 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6560 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6568 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6569 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6570 if messages_delivered < 3 {
6571 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
6572 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
6573 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6574 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6575 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6576 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6577 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6578 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6579 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6580 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6581 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6582 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6583 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
6584 // Everything was delivered...
6585 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6588 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6589 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6591 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6592 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6595 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6596 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6597 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6599 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6600 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6602 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6603 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6605 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6606 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6607 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6609 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6612 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6615 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6616 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6617 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
6618 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6619 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6620 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6621 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6622 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6623 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6624 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6625 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6627 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6630 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
6631 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
6633 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6634 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6636 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6637 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6639 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6642 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
6643 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
6644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6645 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6647 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6648 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6649 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6652 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6653 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6654 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6655 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6658 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6659 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6660 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6668 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6669 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6670 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6671 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6672 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
6673 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
6674 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6675 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6677 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6678 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6680 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6683 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
6684 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6685 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6686 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6687 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6688 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6689 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6690 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6691 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6692 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6693 // Everything was delivered...
6694 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6697 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6698 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6699 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6701 // Channel should still work fine...
6702 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
6703 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6707 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
6708 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
6709 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
6710 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
6711 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
6715 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
6716 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
6717 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
6718 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
6722 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
6723 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
6724 let nodes = create_network(2);
6725 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6727 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6728 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6730 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6731 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6732 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6734 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6735 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6737 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6740 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6742 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6743 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6745 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6746 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6747 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
6749 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6750 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6752 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6755 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6756 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6761 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6763 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
6764 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
6766 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6767 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6768 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
6772 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
6773 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
6774 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
6775 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6776 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6778 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6780 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6781 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6782 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6784 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
6785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6787 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6788 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6790 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
6791 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6794 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6797 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6798 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6800 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6801 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6802 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6803 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6804 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6805 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6806 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6808 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6809 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6810 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6812 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6813 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6815 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6818 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6819 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6820 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6823 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6826 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6827 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6829 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6830 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6831 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6832 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6833 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6834 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6836 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6837 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6838 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6839 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6841 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6842 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6844 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6845 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6847 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6849 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6850 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6851 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6852 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6853 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6854 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6855 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6856 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6857 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6860 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
6861 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6862 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6863 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6864 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6865 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6866 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6869 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6870 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6871 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6872 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6873 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6874 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6875 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6878 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6879 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6880 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6883 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6884 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6885 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6888 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6889 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6892 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6893 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6895 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6896 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6899 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6900 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6902 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6903 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6905 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
6906 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6908 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6911 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6912 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6915 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6919 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
6920 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
6921 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6922 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6924 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6925 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6927 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6928 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6931 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6932 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6934 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6935 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6938 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6939 // PaymentFailed event
6941 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6944 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
6945 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
6946 // a disconnect in between
6947 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6948 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6950 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6951 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6953 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6954 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6957 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6958 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6959 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6962 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6963 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6964 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6967 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
6968 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6971 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6972 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6973 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
6974 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6975 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6976 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6978 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6980 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6981 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6983 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6984 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6985 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6987 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6990 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
6992 // Now set it to failed again...
6993 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6994 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6995 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
6996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6998 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6999 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7000 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7003 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7004 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7005 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7008 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
7009 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7010 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7013 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7014 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7016 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7017 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7020 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7021 // PaymentFailed event
7023 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7027 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
7028 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
7029 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
7032 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
7033 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
7035 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
7036 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
7037 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
7038 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
7039 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
7040 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
7041 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
7042 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
7043 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
7044 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
7045 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
7046 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
7047 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
7048 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
7049 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
7050 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
7051 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
7052 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7053 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7055 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7057 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7058 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7059 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7061 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7062 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7065 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7066 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7067 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7069 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
7070 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
7071 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7073 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7074 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7075 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
7076 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7077 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7078 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7079 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7080 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7081 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7082 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7084 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7085 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7086 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7087 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7089 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7090 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7092 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7095 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
7096 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7097 } else { panic!(); }
7100 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7102 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7105 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7106 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7107 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7110 // Now fix monitor updating...
7111 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7112 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7115 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7116 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7117 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7119 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7120 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7121 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7122 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7123 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7124 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7126 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7127 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7128 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7129 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7131 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7132 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7134 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7137 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7138 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7139 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7141 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7142 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7143 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7144 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7145 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7146 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7148 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7150 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7151 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7153 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7155 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7156 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7158 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7159 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7160 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7162 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7163 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7164 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7166 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7167 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7168 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7169 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7170 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7171 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7173 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7175 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7176 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7177 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7179 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7180 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7182 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7185 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7186 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7187 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7190 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7194 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7195 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7197 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7198 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7199 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7201 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7202 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7205 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7207 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7208 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7209 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7210 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7211 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7214 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7218 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7220 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7221 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7222 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7223 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7226 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7227 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7229 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7230 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7232 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7233 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7236 let as_commitment_update;
7237 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7239 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7240 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7241 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7242 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7243 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7244 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7245 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7246 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7250 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7251 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7252 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7253 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7254 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7255 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7256 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7257 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7261 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7264 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7265 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7267 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7268 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7270 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7271 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7273 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7276 handle_initial_raa!();
7278 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7279 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7281 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7282 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7284 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7285 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7288 handle_initial_raa!();
7290 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7291 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7293 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7294 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7296 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7297 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7299 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7304 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7305 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7307 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7308 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7310 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7311 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7315 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7316 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7317 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7320 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7321 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7322 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7325 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7326 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7329 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7330 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7333 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7335 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7336 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7338 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7339 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7340 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7342 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7345 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7349 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
7350 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
7351 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
7352 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
7353 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
7354 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
7355 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
7359 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
7360 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
7361 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
7362 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
7363 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
7367 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
7368 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
7369 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
7370 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
7371 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
7372 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
7376 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
7377 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
7378 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7379 let nodes = create_network(2);
7381 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7383 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7384 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7385 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7386 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7388 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7390 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7391 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7393 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7394 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7396 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
7398 let mut chan_announcement;
7400 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
7402 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
7403 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
7404 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
7405 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
7406 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
7407 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
7408 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
7409 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
7410 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7415 macro_rules! sign_msg {
7416 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
7417 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
7418 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7419 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7420 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
7421 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
7422 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
7423 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
7424 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
7425 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
7426 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
7427 contents: $unsigned_msg
7432 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7433 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7434 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
7435 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7437 // Configured with Network::Testnet
7438 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7439 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
7440 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7441 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7443 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7444 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
7445 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7446 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7449 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
7450 impl Writer for VecWriter {
7451 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
7452 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
7455 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
7456 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
7461 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7462 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7464 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7466 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7468 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7469 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7470 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7472 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7473 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7474 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7475 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7477 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7478 let config = UserConfig::new();
7479 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7480 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7481 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7482 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7483 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7484 default_config: config,
7486 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7487 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7488 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7489 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7490 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7491 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7494 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7496 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7497 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7498 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
7499 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
7500 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7503 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7504 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7505 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7506 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7508 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7509 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7510 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7511 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7513 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7514 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
7515 for node in nodes.iter() {
7516 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
7517 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
7518 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
7521 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7525 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7526 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7527 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7529 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7530 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7532 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7534 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7535 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7536 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7538 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7539 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7540 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7541 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7543 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7544 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7545 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7546 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7547 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7548 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7549 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7551 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7552 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7553 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7554 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7555 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7556 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7559 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7561 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7562 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7565 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7567 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
7568 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7572 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
7573 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
7574 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
7575 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7576 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
7577 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
7579 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
7581 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
7582 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7584 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
7585 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7586 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7587 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7589 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
7591 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
7592 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
7593 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7594 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
7595 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
7598 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7599 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
7600 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
7601 let mut read = &serialized[..];
7602 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7603 assert!(read.is_empty());
7604 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
7607 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7608 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7609 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7610 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7612 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7613 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7614 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7615 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7616 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7617 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
7619 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7621 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
7622 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7623 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7624 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
7625 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
7628 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
7629 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
7630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7632 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7634 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
7635 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7636 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7637 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
7638 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7640 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7641 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7642 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
7643 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
7644 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
7645 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
7648 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
7649 ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => {
7651 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7652 let mut txn = Vec::new();
7653 for event in events {
7655 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7656 for outp in outputs {
7658 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
7660 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7661 script_sig: Script::new(),
7663 witness: Vec::new(),
7666 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7667 value: output.value,
7669 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7675 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7676 let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
7677 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
7678 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7679 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
7680 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7681 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7682 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
7685 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
7687 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7688 script_sig: Script::new(),
7689 sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
7690 witness: Vec::new(),
7693 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7694 value: output.value,
7696 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7702 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7703 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7704 let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
7705 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7706 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7707 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
7708 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
7711 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
7712 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7714 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7715 script_sig: Script::new(),
7717 witness: Vec::new(),
7720 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7721 value: output.value,
7723 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7727 output: vec![outp.clone()],
7730 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) {
7732 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
7734 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
7737 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
7740 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
7741 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
7742 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7743 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
7744 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7745 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7746 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
7752 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7761 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
7762 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
7763 let nodes = create_network(2);
7765 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
7766 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
7767 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7769 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7770 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7772 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7773 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7774 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
7775 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
7777 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7778 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
7779 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
7780 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7781 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7785 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
7786 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
7787 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
7789 let nodes = create_network(2);
7791 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
7792 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
7793 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7795 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7796 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7798 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7799 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7800 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
7801 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
7803 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7804 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
7805 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7807 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7808 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7810 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
7811 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
7812 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
7813 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7817 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
7818 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
7819 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
7821 let nodes = create_network(2);
7823 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
7824 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7825 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7826 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7827 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7829 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7830 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7831 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7832 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7834 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7835 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7837 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7838 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
7839 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
7840 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
7841 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7842 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx
7843 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
7847 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
7848 let nodes = create_network(2);
7850 // Create some initial channels
7851 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7853 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7855 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7856 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
7857 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7859 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
7860 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7861 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7863 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
7864 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7866 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7867 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7870 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7871 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
7874 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
7875 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
7876 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
7877 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
7878 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
7879 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
7881 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1);
7882 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
7883 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
7884 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7888 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
7889 let nodes = create_network(2);
7891 // Create some initial channels
7892 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7894 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7895 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7896 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7897 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7899 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7901 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7902 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7903 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7905 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7906 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7908 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7909 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7910 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
7911 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7912 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7914 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
7915 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
7916 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
7917 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7921 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
7922 let nodes = create_network(2);
7924 // Create some initial channels
7925 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7927 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7928 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7929 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7930 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7932 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7934 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7935 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
7936 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7937 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7939 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7940 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7942 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7943 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7944 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7945 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
7946 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7948 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
7949 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7950 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7952 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7953 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7956 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7957 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
7958 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
7959 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
7961 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
7962 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
7963 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
7964 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
7965 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7966 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone());
7970 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
7971 let nodes = create_network(2);
7973 // Create some initial channels
7974 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7976 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7977 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7978 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7979 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7981 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7983 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7984 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
7985 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7986 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7988 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7989 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7991 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7993 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7994 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7995 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
7996 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7998 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
7999 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8000 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8002 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8003 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8006 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8007 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
8008 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
8009 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
8011 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
8012 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
8013 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5);
8014 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
8015 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
8016 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
8017 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
8018 check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
8022 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
8023 let nodes = create_network(2);
8025 // Create some initial channels
8026 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8028 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
8029 let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8030 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8031 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
8033 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
8034 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8036 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8037 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8038 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8040 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
8041 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8044 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8045 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8047 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8048 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8049 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
8050 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8052 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8053 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8054 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8055 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8059 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
8060 let nodes = create_network(2);
8062 // Create some initial channels
8063 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8065 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
8066 let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8067 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8068 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
8070 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8071 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8072 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
8073 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8075 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8076 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8078 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8079 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8080 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
8081 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8083 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8084 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
8085 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
8086 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
8087 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
8088 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8089 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8093 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
8094 let nodes = create_network(2);
8096 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8098 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
8099 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
8101 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8102 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8103 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2);
8104 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8105 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx.clone());
8107 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8108 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2);
8109 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8110 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);