1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
52 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
53 use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
54 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
55 use util::{byte_utils, events};
56 use util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
57 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
58 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
59 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
67 use sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
72 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
74 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
75 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
76 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
78 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
79 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
80 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
81 // before we forward it.
83 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
84 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
85 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
86 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
87 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
89 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
90 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
92 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
93 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
94 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
100 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
103 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
104 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
108 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
109 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
110 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
111 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
112 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
113 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
114 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
119 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
120 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
123 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
126 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
127 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
130 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
132 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
134 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
135 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
136 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
139 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
140 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
142 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
146 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
150 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
151 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
152 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
153 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
154 short_channel_id: u64,
156 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
157 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
159 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
160 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
165 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
167 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
168 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
169 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
171 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
172 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
175 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
176 struct ClaimableHTLC {
177 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
179 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
181 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
183 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
187 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
188 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
189 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
190 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
192 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
193 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
198 impl Readable for PaymentId {
199 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
200 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
204 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
205 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
206 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
207 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
208 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
211 session_priv: SecretKey,
212 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
213 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
214 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
215 payment_id: PaymentId,
216 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
217 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
220 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
221 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
222 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
224 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
226 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
228 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
231 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
232 payment_id.hash(hasher);
233 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
234 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
235 payment_params.hash(hasher);
240 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
243 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
244 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
246 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
247 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
248 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
249 payment_secret: None,
250 payment_params: None,
255 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
256 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
258 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
266 struct ReceiveError {
272 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
273 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
275 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
280 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
282 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
283 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
284 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
285 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
286 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
288 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
289 err: msgs::LightningError,
290 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
291 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
293 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
295 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
297 err: LightningError {
299 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
300 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
307 shutdown_finish: None,
311 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
313 err: LightningError {
315 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
318 shutdown_finish: None,
322 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
323 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
326 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
328 err: LightningError {
330 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
331 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
337 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
338 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
342 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
345 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
347 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
348 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
352 log_level: Level::Warn,
355 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
357 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
359 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
362 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
370 shutdown_finish: None,
375 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
376 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
377 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
378 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
379 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
381 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
382 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
383 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
384 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
385 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
386 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
387 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
389 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
393 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
394 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
395 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
396 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
398 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
399 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
400 /// confirmation depth.
401 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>,
402 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
404 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
405 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
406 /// and via the classic SCID.
408 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
409 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
410 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
411 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
412 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
413 /// failed/claimed by the user.
415 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
416 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
418 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
419 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
420 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
421 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
424 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
425 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
426 /// quite some time lag.
427 enum BackgroundEvent {
428 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
429 /// commitment transaction.
430 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
433 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
434 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
436 latest_features: InitFeatures,
439 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
440 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
442 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
445 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
446 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
447 struct PendingInboundPayment {
448 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
449 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
450 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
451 /// this payment being removed.
453 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
454 user_payment_id: u64,
455 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
456 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
457 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
460 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
461 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
462 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
464 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
467 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
468 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
469 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
470 pending_amt_msat: u64,
471 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
472 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
473 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
475 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
476 starting_block_height: u32,
478 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
479 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
480 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
482 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
483 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
485 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
486 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
487 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
488 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
489 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
491 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
493 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
494 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
498 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
499 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
501 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
505 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
507 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
511 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
513 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
517 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
519 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
524 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
526 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
527 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
528 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
529 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
533 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
534 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
535 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
536 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
537 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
538 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
542 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
543 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
546 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
547 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
548 let our_payment_hash;
549 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
550 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
551 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
553 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
554 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
555 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
559 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
563 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
564 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
565 let remove_res = match self {
566 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
567 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
568 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
569 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
570 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
574 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
575 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
576 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
577 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
578 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
579 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
586 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
587 let insert_res = match self {
588 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
589 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
590 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
592 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
593 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
596 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
597 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
598 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
599 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
600 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
607 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
609 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
610 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
611 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
612 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
619 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
620 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
621 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
622 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
623 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
624 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
625 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
627 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
628 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
630 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
631 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
632 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
633 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
634 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
635 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
636 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
637 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
639 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
640 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
642 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
643 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
645 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
646 /// to individual Channels.
648 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
649 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
650 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
651 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
653 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
654 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
655 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
656 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
657 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
658 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
659 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
661 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
662 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
663 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
664 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
667 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
668 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
669 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
670 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
671 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
673 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
674 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
675 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
676 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
677 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
678 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
679 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
680 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
681 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
682 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
685 default_configuration: UserConfig,
686 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
687 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
692 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
694 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
695 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
697 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
698 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
699 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
700 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
702 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
703 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
704 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
705 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
706 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
707 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
709 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
710 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
711 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
712 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
713 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
714 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
715 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
716 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
718 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
720 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
721 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
723 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
724 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
725 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
726 /// active channel list on load.
727 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
729 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
731 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
732 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
733 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
735 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
736 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
737 /// the handling of the events.
740 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
741 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
742 /// would break backwards compatability.
743 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
744 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
745 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
746 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
748 our_network_key: SecretKey,
749 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
751 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
753 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
754 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
755 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
757 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
758 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
760 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
761 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
762 /// keeping additional state.
763 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
765 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
766 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
767 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
768 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
770 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
771 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
772 /// are currently open with that peer.
773 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
774 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
777 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
778 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
780 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
781 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
782 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
783 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
784 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
785 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
786 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
787 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
788 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
790 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
797 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
799 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
800 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
801 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
802 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
803 pub struct ChainParameters {
804 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
805 pub network: Network,
807 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
809 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
810 pub best_block: BestBlock,
813 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
819 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
820 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
821 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
822 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
823 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
824 /// updates are ready for persistence).
826 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
827 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
828 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
829 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
830 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
832 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
833 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
836 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
837 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
838 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
841 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
842 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
844 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
845 persistence_notifier: notifier,
846 should_persist: persist_check,
847 _read_guard: read_guard,
852 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
854 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
855 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
860 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
861 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
863 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
865 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
866 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
867 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
868 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
869 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
871 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
872 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
874 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
876 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
877 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
878 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
879 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
880 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
881 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
882 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
883 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
884 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
885 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
886 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
887 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
888 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
890 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
891 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
893 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
894 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
895 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
896 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
898 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
899 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
900 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
901 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
902 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
903 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
906 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
908 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
909 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
912 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
914 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
915 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
916 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
918 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
919 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
921 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
922 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
923 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
924 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
925 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
926 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
927 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
928 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
929 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
930 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
931 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
934 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
935 /// to better separate parameters.
936 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
937 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
938 /// The node_id of our counterparty
939 pub node_id: PublicKey,
940 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
941 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
942 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
943 pub features: InitFeatures,
944 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
945 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
946 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
948 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
950 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
951 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
952 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
953 /// payments to us through this channel.
954 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
955 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
956 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
957 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
958 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
959 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
960 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
963 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
964 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
965 pub struct ChannelDetails {
966 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
967 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
968 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
969 /// lifetime of the channel.
970 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
971 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
972 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
973 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
974 /// our counterparty already.
976 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
977 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
978 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
979 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
981 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
982 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
983 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
984 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
986 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
987 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
989 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
990 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
992 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
993 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
994 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
995 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
996 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
997 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
998 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
999 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1000 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1003 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1005 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1006 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1007 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1008 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1009 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1010 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1011 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1013 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1014 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1016 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1017 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1018 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1019 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1020 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1021 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1022 /// this value on chain.
1024 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1026 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1028 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1029 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1030 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1031 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1032 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1033 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1034 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1036 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1037 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1038 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1039 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1041 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1042 pub balance_msat: u64,
1043 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1044 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1045 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1046 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1048 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1050 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1051 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1052 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1053 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1054 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1055 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1056 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1057 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1059 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1060 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1061 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1062 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1063 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1064 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1065 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1067 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1068 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1069 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1070 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1071 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1072 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1073 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1074 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1075 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1077 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1079 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1080 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1081 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1082 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1083 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1084 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1085 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1086 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1087 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1089 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1090 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1091 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1092 pub is_outbound: bool,
1093 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1094 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1095 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1096 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1097 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1099 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1100 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1101 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1102 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1104 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1105 pub is_usable: bool,
1106 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1107 pub is_public: bool,
1108 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1109 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1110 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1111 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1112 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1113 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1115 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1116 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1119 impl ChannelDetails {
1120 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1121 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1122 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1124 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1125 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1126 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1127 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1130 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1131 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1132 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1134 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1135 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1136 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1137 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1141 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1142 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1143 /// states for more.
1144 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1145 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1146 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1147 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1148 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1149 ParameterError(APIError),
1150 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1151 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1152 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1153 /// payment in full.
1155 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1157 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1158 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1159 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1160 /// paths than the ones selected).
1161 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1162 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1163 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1164 /// in over-/re-payment.
1166 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1167 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1168 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1170 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1171 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1172 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1173 /// with the latest update_id.
1175 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1176 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1177 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1178 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1179 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1180 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1181 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1182 payment_id: PaymentId,
1186 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1188 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1190 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1191 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1192 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1193 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1195 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1196 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1197 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1200 macro_rules! handle_error {
1201 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1204 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1205 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1207 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1208 // entering the macro.
1209 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1210 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1213 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1215 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1216 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1217 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1218 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1222 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1223 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1224 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1225 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1230 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1231 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1233 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1234 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1235 action: err.action.clone()
1239 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1240 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1243 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1250 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1251 ($self: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1252 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1253 $short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1255 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1256 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1257 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1258 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1259 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1261 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1262 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1264 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1265 $short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1269 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1270 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1271 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1273 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1274 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1276 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1277 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1279 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1280 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1281 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $channel);
1282 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1283 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1284 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1290 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1291 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1295 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1297 $entry.remove_entry();
1305 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1306 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1310 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1312 $entry.remove_entry();
1320 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1321 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1323 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1324 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel);
1330 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1331 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1333 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1334 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1335 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $chan);
1336 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1337 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1338 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1339 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1340 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1341 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1342 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1343 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1344 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1345 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1346 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1349 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1350 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1351 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1352 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1353 match $action_type {
1354 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1355 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1357 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1358 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1360 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1361 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1362 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1363 if !$resend_commitment {
1364 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1367 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1369 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1370 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1374 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1375 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1377 $entry.remove_entry();
1381 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1382 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1383 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1385 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1386 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1388 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1389 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1391 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1392 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1394 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1395 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1399 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1400 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1401 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1403 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1404 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1408 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1409 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1410 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1411 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1412 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1415 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1420 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1421 ($short_to_chan_info: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
1422 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1423 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1424 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1426 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1427 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1428 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1429 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1430 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1431 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1432 let scid_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1433 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1434 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1439 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1440 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1441 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1442 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1443 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1445 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1446 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1447 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1449 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1450 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1451 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1452 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1455 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1456 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1457 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1458 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1459 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1460 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1461 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1462 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1463 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1464 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1465 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1466 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1469 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1470 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1471 // before it should be allowed to.
1472 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1473 send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1475 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1476 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1477 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1482 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1483 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1484 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1485 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1486 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1487 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1488 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1489 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1490 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1491 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1492 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1493 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1494 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1495 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1496 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1497 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1498 let mut order = $order;
1500 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1502 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1506 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1507 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1508 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1509 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1514 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1515 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1516 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1517 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1518 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1523 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1527 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1532 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1533 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1534 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1539 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1540 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1541 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1542 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1543 assert!(res.is_ok());
1546 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1550 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1551 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1552 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1554 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1556 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1557 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1562 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1563 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1564 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1565 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1566 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1569 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1571 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1572 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1574 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1576 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1577 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1578 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1579 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1580 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1581 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1582 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1583 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1585 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1586 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1587 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1591 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1593 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1594 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1595 short_to_chan_info: HashMap::new(),
1596 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1597 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1598 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1600 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1601 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1602 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1603 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1605 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1606 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1609 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1610 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1612 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1614 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1616 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1618 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1619 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1620 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1621 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1629 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1630 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1631 &self.default_configuration
1634 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1635 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1636 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1639 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1640 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1642 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1644 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1648 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1653 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1655 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1656 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1657 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1658 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1659 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1662 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1663 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1665 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1666 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1667 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1669 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1670 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1671 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1672 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1673 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1674 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1676 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1677 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1678 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1679 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1680 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1681 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1685 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1686 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1687 Some(peer_state) => {
1688 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1689 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1690 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1691 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1692 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1693 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1694 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1698 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1703 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1706 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1708 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1709 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1710 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1712 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1713 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1714 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1715 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1717 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1719 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1722 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1724 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1725 node_id: their_network_key,
1728 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1731 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1732 let mut res = Vec::new();
1734 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1735 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1736 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1737 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1738 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1739 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1740 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1741 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1742 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1743 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1744 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1745 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1746 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1747 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1748 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1749 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1750 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1751 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1752 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1753 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1754 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1756 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1757 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1758 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1759 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1760 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1761 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1762 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1763 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1764 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1765 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1766 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1767 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1768 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1769 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1770 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1771 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1772 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1773 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1774 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1775 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1776 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1777 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1778 config: Some(channel.config()),
1782 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1783 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1784 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1785 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1791 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1792 /// more information.
1793 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1794 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1797 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1798 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1800 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1801 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1804 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1805 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1806 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1807 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1808 // really wanted anyway.
1809 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1812 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1813 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1814 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1815 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1816 Some(transaction) => {
1817 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1821 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1822 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1823 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1824 reason: closure_reason
1828 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1829 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1831 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1832 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1833 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1834 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1835 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1836 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1837 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1838 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1840 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1841 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1842 Some(peer_state) => {
1843 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1844 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1845 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1847 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1849 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1851 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1852 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1853 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1854 let (result, is_permanent) =
1855 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1857 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1863 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1864 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1868 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1869 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1870 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1871 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1875 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1879 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1883 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1884 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1885 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1888 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1892 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1893 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1894 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1896 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1897 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1899 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1900 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1901 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1902 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1904 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1906 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1907 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1908 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1909 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1910 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1913 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1914 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1915 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1917 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1918 /// the channel being closed or not:
1919 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1920 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1921 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1922 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1923 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1924 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1925 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1927 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1929 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1930 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1931 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1932 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1933 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1937 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1938 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1939 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1940 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1941 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1942 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_id };
1943 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1945 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1946 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1947 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1948 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1949 // ignore the result here.
1950 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1954 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1955 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1956 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1957 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1959 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1960 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1961 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1962 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1963 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1965 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1966 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1968 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1970 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1972 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1975 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1976 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1977 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1978 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1979 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1984 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1987 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1988 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1989 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1990 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1991 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1992 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1993 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1994 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1995 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2005 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2006 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2007 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2009 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2010 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2011 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2014 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2015 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2016 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2018 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2019 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2020 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2021 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2022 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2025 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2026 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2027 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2028 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2029 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2033 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2034 /// local transaction(s).
2035 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2036 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2037 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2041 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2042 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2044 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2045 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2046 return Err(ReceiveError {
2047 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2049 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2052 // final_expiry_too_soon
2053 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2054 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2055 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2056 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2057 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2058 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2059 return Err(ReceiveError {
2061 err_data: Vec::new(),
2062 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2065 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2066 return Err(ReceiveError {
2068 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2069 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2073 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2074 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2075 return Err(ReceiveError {
2076 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2077 err_data: Vec::new(),
2078 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2081 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2082 return Err(ReceiveError {
2083 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2084 err_data: Vec::new(),
2085 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2088 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2089 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2090 return Err(ReceiveError {
2091 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2092 err_data: Vec::new(),
2093 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2095 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2096 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2098 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2099 phantom_shared_secret,
2101 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2102 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2103 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2104 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2105 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2106 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2107 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2108 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2109 return Err(ReceiveError {
2110 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2111 err_data: Vec::new(),
2112 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2116 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2118 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2121 return Err(ReceiveError {
2122 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2123 err_data: Vec::new(),
2124 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2129 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2132 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2133 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2134 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2138 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2139 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2140 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2142 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2143 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2144 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2145 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2146 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2147 failure_code: $err_code,
2153 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2154 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2157 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2159 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2160 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2161 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2162 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2163 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2164 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2165 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2166 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2168 macro_rules! return_err {
2169 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2171 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2172 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2173 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2174 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2175 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2181 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2183 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2184 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2186 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2187 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2191 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2192 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2194 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2196 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2197 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2198 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2199 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2200 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2202 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2205 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2206 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2207 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2209 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2210 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2211 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2214 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2215 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2216 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2217 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2218 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2222 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2223 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2224 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2227 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2228 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2229 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2230 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2235 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2236 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2237 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2238 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2239 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2240 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2241 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2242 let id_option = channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2243 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2244 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2245 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2247 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2250 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2253 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2255 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2256 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2257 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2258 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2259 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2260 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2261 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2263 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2264 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2265 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2266 // we don't have the channel here.
2267 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2269 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2271 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2272 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2273 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2274 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2275 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2276 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2277 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2279 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2280 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2282 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *amt_to_forward, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2283 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2287 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2289 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2296 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2297 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2298 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2299 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2300 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2301 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2303 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2304 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2306 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2307 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2308 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2309 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2310 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2311 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2312 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2313 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2314 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2315 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2321 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2322 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2323 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2324 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2326 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2327 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2329 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2330 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2331 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2333 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2334 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2335 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2337 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2342 pending_forward_info
2345 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2346 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2347 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2349 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2350 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2351 if !chan.should_announce() {
2352 return Err(LightningError {
2353 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2354 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2357 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2358 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2360 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2361 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2364 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2365 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2366 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2367 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2368 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2369 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2370 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2371 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2372 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2376 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2378 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2379 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2380 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2382 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2383 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2385 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2386 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2387 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2388 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2389 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2390 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2391 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2392 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2395 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2396 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2398 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2404 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2405 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2406 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2407 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2408 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2409 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2411 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2412 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2413 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2414 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2415 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2417 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2419 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2421 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2422 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2424 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2425 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2426 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2427 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2428 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2429 err: "Payment already completed"
2434 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_chan_info.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2435 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2436 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2439 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2441 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2442 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2443 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2444 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2445 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2446 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2447 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2448 total_msat: total_value,
2450 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2454 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2455 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2457 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2458 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2460 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2461 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2463 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2464 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2466 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2467 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2469 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2470 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2471 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2472 channel_state, chan)
2474 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2475 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2476 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2477 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2478 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2479 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2480 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2481 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2482 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2483 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2485 insert_outbound_payment!();
2487 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2488 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2489 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2490 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2491 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2492 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2493 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2494 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2500 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2502 } else { unreachable!(); }
2506 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2507 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2509 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2514 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2516 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2517 /// fields for more info.
2519 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2520 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2521 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2522 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2523 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2524 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2526 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2528 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2529 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2530 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2532 /// In general, a path may raise:
2533 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2534 /// node public key) is specified.
2535 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2536 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2538 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2539 /// relevant updates.
2541 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2542 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2543 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2545 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2546 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2547 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2548 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2550 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2551 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2552 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2553 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2554 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2557 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2558 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2559 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2561 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2562 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2564 let mut total_value = 0;
2565 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2566 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2567 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2568 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2569 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2570 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2571 continue 'path_check;
2573 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2574 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2575 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2576 continue 'path_check;
2579 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2580 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2582 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2583 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2585 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2586 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2587 total_value = amt_msat;
2590 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2591 let mut results = Vec::new();
2592 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2593 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2595 let mut has_ok = false;
2596 let mut has_err = false;
2597 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2598 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2599 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2600 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2601 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2602 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2603 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2607 } else if res.is_err() {
2608 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2609 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2612 if has_err && has_ok {
2613 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2616 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2617 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2618 Some(RouteParameters {
2619 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2620 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2621 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2627 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2628 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2629 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2630 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2636 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2638 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2639 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2640 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2641 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2642 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2644 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2645 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2646 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2647 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2648 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2649 if path.len() == 0 {
2650 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2651 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2656 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2657 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2658 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2660 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2661 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2663 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2664 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2665 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2666 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2669 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2671 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2672 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2673 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2676 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2677 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2678 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2681 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2682 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2683 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2688 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2689 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2693 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2696 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2698 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2699 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2700 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2701 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2703 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2704 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2705 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2707 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2708 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2709 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2710 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2711 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2713 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2714 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2715 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2716 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2717 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2719 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2727 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2728 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2729 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2730 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2731 /// never reach the recipient.
2733 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2735 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2736 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2738 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2740 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2741 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2742 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2744 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2746 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2747 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2748 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2753 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2754 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2755 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2756 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2757 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2759 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2762 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2763 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2767 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2769 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, Some(payment_id), None) {
2770 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2775 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2777 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2778 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2779 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2782 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2783 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2784 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2785 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2786 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2787 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2790 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2791 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2792 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2793 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2794 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2796 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2798 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2800 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2801 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2802 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2803 } else { unreachable!(); })
2806 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2808 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2809 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2812 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2813 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2818 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2819 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2820 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2823 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2824 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2825 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2827 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2828 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2829 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2830 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2839 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2840 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2841 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2845 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2847 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2848 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2850 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2851 /// across the p2p network.
2853 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2854 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2856 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2857 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2858 /// keys per-channel).
2860 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2861 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2862 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2864 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2865 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2866 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2868 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2869 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2870 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2871 /// for more details.
2873 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2874 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2875 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2876 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2878 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2879 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2880 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2881 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2886 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2887 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2888 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2889 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2890 // TODO: updated if/when https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/pull/994 landed and rust-bitcoin bumped.
2891 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2892 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2893 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2897 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2898 let mut output_index = None;
2899 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2900 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2901 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2902 if output_index.is_some() {
2903 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2904 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2907 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2908 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2909 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2912 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2915 if output_index.is_none() {
2916 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2917 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2920 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2924 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2926 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2927 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2928 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2929 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2931 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2932 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2934 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2935 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2937 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2939 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2940 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2941 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2942 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2943 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2944 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2945 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2946 pub fn update_channel_config(
2947 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2948 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2949 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2950 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2951 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2955 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2956 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2959 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2960 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2961 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2962 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
2963 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2964 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
2966 .get_counterparty_node_id();
2967 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
2968 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2969 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
2973 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2974 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2975 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2978 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2979 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2980 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2981 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2982 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2991 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2993 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2994 /// Will likely generate further events.
2995 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2998 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2999 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3000 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3001 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3003 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3004 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3006 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3007 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3008 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_chan_id) {
3009 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3011 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3012 match forward_info {
3013 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3014 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3015 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3016 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3017 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3018 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3020 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3021 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3022 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3023 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3024 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3025 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3028 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3029 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3031 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3034 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3035 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
3041 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3042 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3044 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3048 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3049 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3051 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3055 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3056 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3057 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3058 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3059 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3061 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3062 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3063 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3064 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3065 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3067 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3069 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3070 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3074 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3075 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3076 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3077 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3083 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3086 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3089 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3090 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3091 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3092 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3093 // problem, not ours.
3100 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3101 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3102 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3103 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3104 match forward_info {
3105 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3106 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3108 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3109 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3110 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3111 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3112 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3113 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3114 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3115 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3116 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3117 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3119 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3121 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3122 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3124 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3126 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3127 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3128 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
3129 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3135 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3137 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3138 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3139 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3140 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3141 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3142 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3143 // this channel currently :/.
3149 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3150 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3152 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3153 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3154 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3156 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3157 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3159 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3161 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3162 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3163 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3166 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3168 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3169 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3170 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3171 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3172 // messages when we can.
3173 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3174 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3175 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3182 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3183 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3186 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3187 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3188 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3189 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3190 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3191 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3193 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3194 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3195 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3196 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3197 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3200 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3204 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3205 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3208 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3209 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3210 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3211 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3212 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3213 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3214 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3215 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3216 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3218 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3226 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3227 match forward_info {
3228 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3229 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3230 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3231 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3232 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3233 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3234 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3236 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3237 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3239 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3242 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3243 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3244 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3245 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3246 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3247 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3248 phantom_shared_secret,
3250 value: amt_to_forward,
3252 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3257 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3258 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3259 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3260 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3261 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3263 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3264 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3265 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3266 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3267 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3268 phantom_shared_secret,
3270 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3271 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3276 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3277 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3278 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3280 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3281 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3282 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3285 let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3286 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3287 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3288 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3289 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3290 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3294 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3295 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3296 total_value += htlc.value;
3297 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3298 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3299 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3300 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3301 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3302 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3304 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3306 _ => unreachable!(),
3309 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3310 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3311 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3312 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3313 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3314 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3315 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3318 amount_msat: total_value,
3320 payment_received_generated = true;
3322 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3323 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3325 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3327 payment_received_generated
3331 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3332 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3333 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3334 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3335 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3336 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3337 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3338 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3339 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3340 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3341 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3342 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3343 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3344 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3346 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3350 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3352 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3353 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3354 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3355 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3356 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3357 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3359 amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
3363 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3364 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3365 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3371 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3372 if payment_data.is_none() {
3373 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3374 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3377 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3378 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3379 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3380 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3381 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3382 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3383 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3384 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3386 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3387 if payment_received_generated {
3388 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3394 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3395 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3403 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3404 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3406 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3408 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3409 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3412 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3413 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3414 events.append(&mut new_events);
3417 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3419 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3420 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3422 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3423 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3424 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3425 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3426 if background_events.is_empty() {
3430 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3432 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3433 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3434 // monitor updating completing.
3435 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3442 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3443 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3444 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3445 self.process_background_events();
3448 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_chan_info: &mut HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3449 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3450 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3451 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3452 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3453 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3454 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3456 if !chan.is_live() {
3457 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3458 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3459 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3461 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3462 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3464 let mut retain_channel = true;
3465 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3468 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
3469 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3473 let ret_err = match res {
3474 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3475 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3476 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3477 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3480 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3481 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3482 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3483 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3484 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3485 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3486 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3487 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3497 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3501 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3502 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3503 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3504 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3505 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3506 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3507 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3509 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3511 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3513 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3514 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3515 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3516 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
3517 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3518 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3519 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3521 handle_errors.push(err);
3531 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3533 /// This currently includes:
3534 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3535 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3536 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3538 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3539 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3541 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3542 /// estimate fetches.
3543 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3544 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3545 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3546 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3548 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3550 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3551 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3553 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3554 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3555 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3556 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
3557 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3558 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3559 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3560 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3562 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3564 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3566 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3567 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
3568 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3569 if needs_close { return false; }
3572 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3573 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3574 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3575 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3576 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3577 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3578 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3579 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3583 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3584 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3586 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3587 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3588 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3592 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3593 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3598 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3603 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3604 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3605 // This should be unreachable
3606 debug_assert!(false);
3609 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3610 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3611 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3612 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3614 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3615 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3616 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3618 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3626 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3627 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3628 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
3631 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3632 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3638 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3639 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3640 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3642 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3643 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3644 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3645 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3647 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3648 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3649 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3650 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3651 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3652 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3654 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3655 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3656 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3657 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3658 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3659 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3660 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3661 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3662 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3663 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3664 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3665 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
3670 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3671 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3673 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3675 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3676 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3677 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3678 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3679 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3680 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3681 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3683 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3685 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3686 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3688 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3693 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3694 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3695 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3696 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3697 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3698 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3699 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3700 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3701 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3702 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3704 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3705 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3706 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3707 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3709 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3710 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3711 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3712 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3713 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3717 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3718 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3719 // be surfaced to the user.
3720 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3721 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3722 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3724 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3725 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3726 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3727 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3728 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3729 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3731 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3734 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3735 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver);
3739 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3740 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3741 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3742 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3743 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3744 /// still-available channels.
3745 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3746 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3747 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3748 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3751 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3752 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3753 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3755 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3756 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3757 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3758 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3759 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3760 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3761 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3762 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3763 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3766 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3767 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3770 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3771 all_paths_failed = true;
3772 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3773 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3775 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3781 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3784 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3785 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3786 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3787 Some(RouteParameters {
3788 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3789 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3790 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3793 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3795 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3796 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3798 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3800 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3802 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3803 if !payment_retryable {
3804 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
3806 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3810 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3811 payment_id: payment_id,
3812 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3818 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3819 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3820 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3821 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
3822 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3824 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3825 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3826 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3827 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
3834 error_code: onion_error_code,
3836 error_data: onion_error_data
3840 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3846 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3847 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3848 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
3849 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3851 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3852 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3853 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
3854 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3856 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3857 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3858 payment_id: payment_id,
3859 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3861 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
3864 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3865 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3866 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3867 payment_failed_permanently: false,
3868 network_update: None,
3871 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
3874 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3876 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3881 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3882 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3883 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3885 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
3886 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3887 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3888 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3889 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3890 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3891 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3892 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3894 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3895 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3898 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3899 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3900 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3904 let mut forward_event = None;
3905 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3906 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3908 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3909 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3910 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3912 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3913 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3916 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3917 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3918 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3919 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3920 time_forwardable: time
3923 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3924 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3925 failed_next_destination: destination
3931 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3932 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3934 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3935 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3936 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3938 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3939 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3940 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3941 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3943 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3944 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3945 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3946 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3947 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3948 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3949 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3950 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3952 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3954 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3955 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3956 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3957 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3959 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3960 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3961 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3962 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3964 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3965 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3966 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3967 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3968 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3970 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3971 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3972 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3973 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3974 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_chan_info.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3978 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3979 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3980 debug_assert!(false);
3984 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3985 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3986 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3987 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3988 if sources.len() != 1 {
3989 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3990 debug_assert!(false);
3996 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3998 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3999 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4002 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4003 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4004 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4008 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4009 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4010 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4012 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4013 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4014 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4015 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4016 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
4017 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4018 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
4019 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
4021 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4022 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4023 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4024 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4025 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4026 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4027 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4028 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4030 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4031 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4032 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4033 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4034 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4035 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4037 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4042 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4043 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4045 purpose: payment_purpose,
4046 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4050 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
4051 // which were generated.
4052 channel_state.take();
4054 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4055 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4056 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4061 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4062 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4063 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4064 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4065 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4067 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4071 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4072 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4073 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4074 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4075 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4076 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4077 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4078 payment_preimage, e);
4079 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4080 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4081 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4082 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4085 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4086 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4087 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4088 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4089 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4090 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4091 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4092 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4093 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4094 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4100 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4102 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4105 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4106 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4107 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4108 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4109 payment_preimage, e);
4111 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4112 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4114 chan.remove_entry();
4116 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4119 } else { unreachable!(); }
4122 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4123 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4124 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4125 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4126 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4127 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4128 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4129 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4130 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4131 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4132 pending_events.push(
4133 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4135 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4140 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4148 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4150 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4151 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4152 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4153 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4154 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4155 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4156 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4157 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4158 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4159 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4160 pending_events.push(
4161 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4162 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4168 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4172 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4173 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4174 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4176 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4177 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4178 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4179 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4180 pending_events.push(
4181 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4189 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4194 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4197 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4198 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4199 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4200 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4201 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4202 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4203 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4206 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4207 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4208 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4209 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4210 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4213 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4214 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4215 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4216 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4217 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4218 payment_preimage, e);
4220 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4221 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4222 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4223 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4226 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4227 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4228 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4229 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4233 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4234 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4235 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4238 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4239 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4240 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4242 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4244 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4254 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4255 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4256 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4259 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4260 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4262 let chan_restoration_res;
4263 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4264 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4265 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4266 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4267 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4268 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4270 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4274 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4275 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4276 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4277 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4278 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4279 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4280 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4282 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4283 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4284 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4289 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4290 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4291 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4294 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4296 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4297 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4298 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4299 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4300 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4304 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4306 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4307 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4310 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4311 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4312 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4314 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4315 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4316 /// used to accept such channels.
4318 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4319 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4320 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4321 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4324 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4325 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4327 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4328 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4329 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4331 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4332 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4334 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4335 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4337 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4338 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4340 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4341 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4342 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4343 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4346 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4347 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4349 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4350 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4351 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4352 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4353 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4354 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4356 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4357 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4360 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4361 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4362 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4363 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4364 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4365 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4368 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4369 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, channel);
4370 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4373 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4374 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4375 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4378 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4379 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4385 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4386 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4387 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4390 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4391 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4394 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4395 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4396 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4397 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4400 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4401 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4405 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4406 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4407 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4408 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4409 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4410 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4412 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4413 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4414 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4415 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4417 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4418 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4419 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4422 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4423 pending_events.push(
4424 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4425 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4426 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4427 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4428 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4429 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4434 entry.insert(channel);
4440 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4441 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4442 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4443 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4444 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4445 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4446 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4447 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4449 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4450 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4452 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4455 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4456 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4457 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4458 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4459 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4461 user_channel_id: user_id,
4466 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4467 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4468 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4469 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4470 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4471 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4472 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4473 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4474 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4476 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4478 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4481 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4482 // lock before watch_channel
4483 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4485 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4486 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4487 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4488 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4489 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4490 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4491 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4492 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4493 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4494 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4495 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4497 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4498 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4499 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4500 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4501 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4502 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4503 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4507 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4508 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4509 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4510 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4511 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4513 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4514 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4515 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4516 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4517 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4518 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4519 funding_msg.channel_id))
4521 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4522 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4525 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4526 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4529 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4530 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4538 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4540 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4541 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4542 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4543 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4544 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4545 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4546 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4548 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4549 Ok(update) => update,
4550 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4552 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4553 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4554 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4555 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4556 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4557 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4558 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4559 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4564 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4565 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4569 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4572 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4573 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4577 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4578 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4579 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4580 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4581 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4582 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4583 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4585 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4586 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4587 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4588 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4589 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4590 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4591 msg: announcement_sigs,
4593 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4594 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4595 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4596 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4597 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4598 // announcement_signatures.
4599 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4600 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4601 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4602 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4609 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4613 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4614 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4615 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4616 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4617 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4619 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4620 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4621 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4622 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4625 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4626 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4627 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4628 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4631 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4632 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4634 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4635 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4636 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4637 let (result, is_permanent) =
4638 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4640 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4646 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4647 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4648 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4655 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4658 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4659 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4660 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
4663 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4667 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4668 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4669 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4670 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4671 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4672 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4673 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4674 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4676 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4677 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4678 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4679 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4684 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4685 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4686 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4687 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4688 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4689 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4690 } else { (tx, None) }
4692 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4695 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4696 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4697 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4699 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4700 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4701 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4702 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4706 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4711 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4712 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4713 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4714 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4716 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4717 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4718 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4719 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4721 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4722 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4723 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4725 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4726 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4727 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4728 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4731 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4732 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4733 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4734 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4735 match pending_forward_info {
4736 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4737 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4738 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4739 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4741 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4743 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4744 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4745 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4748 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4750 _ => pending_forward_info
4753 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4755 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4760 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4761 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4762 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4763 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4764 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4765 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4766 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4767 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4769 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4771 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4774 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4778 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4779 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4780 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4781 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4782 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4783 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4784 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4786 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4788 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4793 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4794 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4795 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4796 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4797 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4798 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4799 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4801 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4802 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4803 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4805 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4808 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4812 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4813 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4814 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4815 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4816 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4817 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4818 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4820 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4821 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4822 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4823 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4824 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4825 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4826 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4831 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4832 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4834 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4835 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4836 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4838 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4839 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4840 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4841 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4842 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4843 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4844 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4845 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4847 commitment_signed: msg,
4853 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4858 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4859 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4860 let mut forward_event = None;
4861 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4862 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4863 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4864 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4866 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4867 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4868 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4869 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4870 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4872 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4873 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4874 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4877 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4878 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4883 match forward_event {
4885 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4886 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4887 time_forwardable: time
4895 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4896 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4898 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4899 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4900 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4901 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4902 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4903 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4905 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4906 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4907 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4908 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4909 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4910 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4911 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4912 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4913 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4914 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4915 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4917 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4918 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4919 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4920 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4921 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4923 } else { unreachable!(); }
4926 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4927 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4928 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4932 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4933 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4934 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4935 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4936 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4938 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4941 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4943 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4944 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4946 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4947 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
4948 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4950 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4951 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4958 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4959 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4960 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4961 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4962 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4963 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4964 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4966 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4968 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4973 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4974 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4975 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4977 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4978 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4979 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4980 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4982 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4983 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4986 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4987 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4988 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4989 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4990 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4991 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4994 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4999 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5000 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5001 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5002 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5003 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5004 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5006 // It's not a local channel
5007 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5010 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5011 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5012 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5013 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5014 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5015 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5016 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5017 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5019 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5021 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5022 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5023 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5024 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5026 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5027 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
5030 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
5032 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5035 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5036 let chan_restoration_res;
5037 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
5038 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5039 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5041 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5042 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5043 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5044 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5046 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5047 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5048 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5049 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5050 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5051 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5052 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
5053 let mut channel_update = None;
5054 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5055 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5056 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5059 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5060 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5061 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5062 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5063 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5064 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5065 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5070 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5071 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5072 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5073 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5074 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5075 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5077 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5079 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5082 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5083 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5085 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5086 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5091 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5092 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5093 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5094 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5095 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5096 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5097 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5098 match monitor_event {
5099 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5100 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5101 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5102 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5104 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5105 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5106 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
5109 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5110 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5111 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5112 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5113 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5114 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5115 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5116 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
5117 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5118 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5119 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5123 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5124 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5126 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5128 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5129 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5130 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5131 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5132 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5137 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5138 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5144 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5145 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5148 has_pending_monitor_events
5151 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5152 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5153 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5155 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5156 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5159 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5160 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5161 /// update was applied.
5163 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5164 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5165 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5166 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5167 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5168 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5169 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5170 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5172 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5173 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5174 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5175 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5176 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5178 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5179 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5180 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5181 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5183 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5185 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5188 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5189 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5190 has_monitor_update = true;
5191 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5192 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5193 if close_channel { return false; }
5195 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5196 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5197 updates: commitment_update,
5204 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
5205 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5206 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5213 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5214 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5215 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5218 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5219 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5225 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5226 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5227 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5228 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5229 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5230 let mut has_update = false;
5232 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5233 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5234 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5235 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5236 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5238 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5239 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5240 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5241 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5243 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5244 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5247 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5248 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5249 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5250 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5251 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5256 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5258 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5259 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5260 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
5266 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
5267 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5274 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5275 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5281 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5282 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5284 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5285 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5286 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5287 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5288 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5289 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5290 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5291 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5292 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5293 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5294 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5295 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5296 assert!(should_broadcast);
5297 } else { unreachable!(); }
5298 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5300 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5304 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5305 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5307 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5308 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5311 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5313 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5314 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5315 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5316 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5317 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5318 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5319 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5320 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5321 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5322 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5323 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5324 // never fail a payment too early.
5325 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5327 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5330 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5335 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5338 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5339 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5341 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5342 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5343 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5345 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5347 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5348 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5352 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5353 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5355 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5357 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5358 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5359 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5360 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5361 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5362 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5365 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5366 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5368 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5371 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5373 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5375 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5376 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5377 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5378 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5379 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5382 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5383 /// stored external to LDK.
5385 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5386 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5387 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5389 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5390 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5393 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5394 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5395 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5396 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5398 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5399 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5400 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5401 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5402 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5404 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5405 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5406 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5407 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5408 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5410 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5411 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5413 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5414 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5418 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5419 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5421 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5423 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5424 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5425 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5426 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5429 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5430 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5432 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5435 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5437 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5439 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5440 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5443 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5444 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5446 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5447 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5448 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5451 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5452 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5454 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5455 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5456 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5457 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5459 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5460 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5461 match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.entry(scid_candidate) {
5462 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5463 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5468 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5470 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5471 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5473 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5474 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5475 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5479 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5480 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5481 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5482 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5483 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5488 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5489 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5493 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5494 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5498 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5499 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5500 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5501 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5502 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5505 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5506 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5507 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5508 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5510 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5511 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5512 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5513 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5516 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5517 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5519 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5520 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5523 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5524 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5525 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5527 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5528 events.replace(pending_events);
5537 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5539 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5540 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5541 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5542 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5545 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5547 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5548 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5549 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5550 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5551 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5553 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5554 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5555 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5556 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5559 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5560 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5561 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5564 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5565 handler.handle_event(&event);
5573 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5575 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5576 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5577 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5578 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5581 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5583 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5584 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5585 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5586 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5587 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5590 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5591 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5594 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5596 let new_height = height - 1;
5598 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5599 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5600 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5601 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5602 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5603 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5606 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5610 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5612 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5613 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5614 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5615 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5618 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5619 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5620 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5621 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5623 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5624 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5626 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5627 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5628 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5630 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5631 if height < last_best_block_height {
5632 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5633 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5637 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5638 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5639 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5640 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5642 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5643 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5645 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5647 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5649 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5651 macro_rules! max_time {
5652 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5654 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5655 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5656 // having an explicit local time source.
5657 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5658 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5659 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5660 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5661 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5667 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5668 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5669 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5670 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5673 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5674 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5675 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5676 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5677 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5678 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5679 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5680 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5681 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5689 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5690 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5691 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_chan_info.len());
5692 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5693 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5694 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5700 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5701 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5702 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5703 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5704 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5705 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5706 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5707 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5712 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5714 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5715 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5716 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5717 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5720 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5721 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5723 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5724 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5725 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5726 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5727 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5729 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5730 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5732 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5733 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5734 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5735 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5736 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5737 let res = f(channel);
5738 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5739 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5740 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5741 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5743 }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5745 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5746 send_channel_ready!(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5747 if channel.is_usable() {
5748 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5749 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5750 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5751 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5756 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5759 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5760 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5761 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5762 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5763 msg: announcement_sigs,
5765 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5766 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5767 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5769 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5770 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5771 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5776 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5777 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5778 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5779 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5780 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5781 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5782 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5783 // is always consistent.
5784 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5785 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5786 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5787 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5790 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5791 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, channel);
5792 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5793 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5794 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5795 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5796 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5800 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5801 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5802 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5803 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5804 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5805 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5806 data: reason_message,
5814 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5815 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5816 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5817 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5818 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5819 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5820 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5821 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5822 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5823 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5825 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5826 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5827 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5828 }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5832 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5837 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5839 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5840 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
5844 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5845 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5846 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5849 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5850 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5851 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5852 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5855 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5856 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5858 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5859 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5862 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
5863 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
5864 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
5865 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
5866 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
5869 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5870 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5871 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
5874 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5875 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5876 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5877 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5881 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5882 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5883 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5884 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5885 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5886 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5889 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5890 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5891 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5894 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5895 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5896 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5899 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5900 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5901 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5904 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5905 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5906 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5909 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
5910 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5911 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5914 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5915 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5916 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5919 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5920 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5921 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5924 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5925 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5926 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5929 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5930 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5931 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5934 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5935 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5936 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5939 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5940 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5941 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5944 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5945 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5946 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5949 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5950 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5951 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5954 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5955 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5956 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5959 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5960 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5961 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5964 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5965 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5966 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5969 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5974 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5975 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5976 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5979 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5980 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5981 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5982 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5984 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5985 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5986 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5987 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5988 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
5989 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
5990 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5991 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5992 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5993 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5994 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
5995 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5998 no_channels_remain = false;
6003 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6005 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6006 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6007 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6008 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6009 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6010 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6011 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6012 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6013 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6014 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6015 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6016 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6017 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6018 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6019 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6020 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6021 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6022 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6023 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6024 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6028 if no_channels_remain {
6029 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6032 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6033 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6037 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
6038 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6040 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6043 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6044 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6045 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6046 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6047 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6050 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6051 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6056 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6057 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6058 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6059 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6060 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6061 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6062 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6063 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6064 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6068 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6069 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6070 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6075 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6076 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6077 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6078 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6079 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6087 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6090 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6091 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6093 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6094 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6095 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6096 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6097 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6102 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6103 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6104 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6105 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6108 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6109 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6110 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6118 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6119 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6123 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6124 NodeFeatures::known_channel_features()
6127 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6128 InitFeatures::known_channel_features()
6132 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6133 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6135 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6136 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6137 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6138 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6141 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6142 (2, node_id, required),
6143 (4, features, required),
6144 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6145 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6146 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6147 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6150 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6151 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6152 (2, channel_id, required),
6153 (3, channel_type, option),
6154 (4, counterparty, required),
6155 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6156 (6, funding_txo, option),
6157 (7, config, option),
6158 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6159 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6160 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6161 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6162 (16, balance_msat, required),
6163 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6164 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6165 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6166 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6167 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6168 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6169 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6170 (26, is_outbound, required),
6171 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6172 (30, is_usable, required),
6173 (32, is_public, required),
6174 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6175 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6178 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6179 (2, channels, vec_type),
6180 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6181 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6184 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6186 (0, onion_packet, required),
6187 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6190 (0, payment_data, required),
6191 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6192 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6194 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6195 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6196 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6200 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6201 (0, routing, required),
6202 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6203 (4, payment_hash, required),
6204 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6205 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6209 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6210 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6212 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6214 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6215 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6216 reason.write(writer)?;
6218 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6219 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6222 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6223 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6224 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6225 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6232 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6233 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6234 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6237 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6238 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6239 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6240 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6244 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6245 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6246 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6247 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6248 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6251 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6252 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6253 // messages contained in the variants.
6254 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6255 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6256 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6258 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6259 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6260 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6261 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6262 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6265 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6266 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6267 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6268 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6269 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6271 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6276 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6281 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6282 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6283 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6284 (2, outpoint, required),
6285 (4, htlc_id, required),
6286 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6289 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6290 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6291 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6292 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6293 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6295 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6296 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6297 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6298 (2, self.value, required),
6299 (4, payment_data, option),
6300 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6301 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6307 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6308 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6309 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6311 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6312 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6313 let mut total_msat = None;
6314 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6315 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6316 (0, prev_hop, required),
6317 (1, total_msat, option),
6318 (2, value, required),
6319 (4, payment_data, option),
6320 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6321 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6323 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6325 if payment_data.is_some() {
6326 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6328 if total_msat.is_none() {
6329 total_msat = Some(value);
6331 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6334 if total_msat.is_none() {
6335 if payment_data.is_none() {
6336 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6338 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6340 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6344 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6347 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6354 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6355 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6356 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6359 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6360 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6361 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6362 let mut payment_id = None;
6363 let mut payment_secret = None;
6364 let mut payment_params = None;
6365 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6366 (0, session_priv, required),
6367 (1, payment_id, option),
6368 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6369 (3, payment_secret, option),
6370 (4, path, vec_type),
6371 (5, payment_params, option),
6373 if payment_id.is_none() {
6374 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6376 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6378 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6379 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6380 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6381 path: path.unwrap(),
6382 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6387 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6388 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6393 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6394 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6396 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6398 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6399 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6400 (0, session_priv, required),
6401 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6402 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6403 (3, payment_secret, option),
6404 (4, path, vec_type),
6405 (5, payment_params, option),
6408 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6410 field.write(writer)?;
6417 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6418 (0, LightningError) => {
6422 (0, failure_code, required),
6423 (2, data, vec_type),
6427 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6429 (0, forward_info, required),
6430 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6431 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6432 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6435 (0, htlc_id, required),
6436 (2, err_packet, required),
6440 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6441 (0, payment_secret, required),
6442 (2, expiry_time, required),
6443 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6444 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6445 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6448 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6450 (0, session_privs, required),
6453 (0, session_privs, required),
6454 (1, payment_hash, option),
6457 (0, session_privs, required),
6458 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6459 (2, payment_hash, required),
6460 (4, payment_secret, option),
6461 (6, total_msat, required),
6462 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6463 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6466 (0, session_privs, required),
6467 (2, payment_hash, required),
6471 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6472 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6473 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6474 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6475 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6478 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6479 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6481 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6483 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6485 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6486 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6487 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6490 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6491 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6492 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6493 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6494 unfunded_channels += 1;
6497 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6498 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6499 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6500 channel.write(writer)?;
6504 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6505 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6506 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6507 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6508 for forward in pending_forwards {
6509 forward.write(writer)?;
6513 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6514 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6515 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6516 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6517 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6518 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6519 htlc.write(writer)?;
6521 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6524 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6525 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6526 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6527 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6528 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6529 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6532 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6533 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6534 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6535 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6536 for event in events.iter() {
6537 event.write(writer)?;
6540 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6541 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6542 for event in background_events.iter() {
6544 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6546 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6547 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6552 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6553 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6554 // likely to be identical.
6555 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6556 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6558 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6559 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6560 hash.write(writer)?;
6561 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6564 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6565 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6566 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6567 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6568 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6571 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6572 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6574 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6575 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6576 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6577 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6580 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6581 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6585 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6586 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6587 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6589 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6590 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6591 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6596 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6597 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6598 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6599 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6600 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6601 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6602 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6609 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6611 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6613 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6614 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6615 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6616 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6617 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6618 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6619 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6620 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6621 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6622 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6623 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6624 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6625 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6627 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6628 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6630 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6631 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6633 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6634 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6635 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6636 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6637 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6638 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6640 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6641 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6642 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6643 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6644 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6645 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6648 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6649 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6651 pub keys_manager: K,
6653 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6655 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6656 pub fee_estimator: F,
6657 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6659 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6660 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6661 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6662 pub chain_monitor: M,
6664 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6665 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6666 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6667 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6668 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6669 /// deserialization.
6671 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6672 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6673 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6675 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6676 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6678 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6679 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6680 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6681 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6683 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6686 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6687 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6690 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6691 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6692 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6693 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6694 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6695 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6698 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6699 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6700 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6701 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6702 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6704 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6705 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6710 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6711 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6712 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6713 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6714 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6715 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6716 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6717 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6720 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6721 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6722 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6726 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6727 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6728 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6729 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6730 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6731 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6734 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6735 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6737 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6738 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6739 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6741 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6743 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6744 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6745 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6746 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6747 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6748 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6749 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6750 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6751 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6752 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6753 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6754 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6755 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6756 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6757 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6758 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6759 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6760 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6761 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6762 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6763 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6764 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6765 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6766 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6767 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6768 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6769 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6770 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6771 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6772 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6773 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6774 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6775 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6776 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6777 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6778 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6779 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6780 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6781 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6782 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6785 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6786 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6787 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6789 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6790 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
6792 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6795 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6796 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6797 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6798 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6799 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6800 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6804 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6805 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6806 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6807 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6811 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6812 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6813 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6814 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6815 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6816 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6817 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6818 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6819 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6821 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6824 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6825 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6826 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6827 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6828 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6829 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6830 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6831 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
6833 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
6836 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6837 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6838 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6839 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6840 let peer_state = PeerState {
6841 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6843 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6846 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6847 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6848 for _ in 0..event_count {
6849 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6850 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6854 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6855 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6856 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6857 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6858 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6859 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6860 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6861 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6865 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6866 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6867 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6868 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6869 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6870 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6874 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
6875 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6877 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6878 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6879 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6880 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6881 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6885 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6886 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6887 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6888 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6889 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6890 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6891 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6893 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6894 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6898 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6899 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6900 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6901 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6902 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6903 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6904 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
6905 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6906 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6907 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6908 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6909 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6910 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6911 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
6913 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6914 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6917 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
6918 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6921 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6922 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6923 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6924 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6925 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6926 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6928 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6930 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6931 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6932 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6933 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6934 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6935 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6936 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6938 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
6939 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6940 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6941 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6942 if path.is_empty() {
6943 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6944 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6946 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6947 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6948 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6949 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6950 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6951 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6952 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6953 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6955 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6956 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6957 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6958 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6959 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6961 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6962 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6963 total_msat: path_amt,
6964 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6966 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6967 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6976 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6977 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6979 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
6980 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
6981 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
6982 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6984 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
6985 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
6988 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
6989 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
6990 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
6991 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
6992 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6994 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
6995 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
6996 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
6997 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
6998 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
6999 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7000 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7001 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7003 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7004 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7008 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7010 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7012 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7013 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7015 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7019 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7020 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7022 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7023 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7026 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7028 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7030 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7031 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7032 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7033 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7034 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7038 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7039 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7040 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7041 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7043 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7044 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7045 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7047 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7048 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7049 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7050 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7051 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7052 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7054 if chan.is_usable() {
7055 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7056 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7057 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7058 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7059 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7064 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7066 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7067 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7068 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7069 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7070 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7071 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7072 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7074 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7075 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7076 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7077 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7079 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7080 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7081 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7082 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7084 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7085 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7086 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7087 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7089 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7090 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7091 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7093 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7094 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7097 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7099 purpose: payment_purpose,
7100 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7106 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7108 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7109 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7110 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7112 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7114 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7119 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7121 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7122 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7123 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7125 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7126 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7127 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7129 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7135 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7137 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7139 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7140 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7141 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7142 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7144 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7145 logger: args.logger,
7146 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7149 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7150 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7151 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7152 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
7155 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7156 //connection or two.
7158 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7164 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7165 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7166 use core::time::Duration;
7167 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7168 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7169 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7170 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
7171 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
7172 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7174 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7175 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7176 use util::errors::APIError;
7177 use util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7178 use util::test_utils;
7179 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7182 fn test_notify_limits() {
7183 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7184 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7185 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7186 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7187 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7188 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7190 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7191 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7192 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7193 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7194 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7196 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7198 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7199 // to connect messages with new values
7200 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7201 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7202 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7203 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7205 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7206 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7207 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7208 // ... but the last node should not.
7209 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7210 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7211 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7212 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7214 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7215 // about the channel.
7216 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7217 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7218 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7220 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7222 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7223 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7224 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7225 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7226 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7227 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7229 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7230 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7231 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7233 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7234 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7235 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7236 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7237 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7238 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7240 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7241 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7242 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7243 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7244 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7245 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7246 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7247 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7249 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7250 // the channel info has updated.
7251 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7252 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7253 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7254 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7255 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7256 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7260 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7261 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7263 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7264 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7265 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7266 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7267 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7269 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7270 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7271 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7272 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7273 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7274 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7275 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7277 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7278 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7279 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7281 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7282 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7284 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7285 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7286 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7287 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7288 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7290 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7291 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7292 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7294 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7295 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7296 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7297 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7298 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7299 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7300 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7301 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7302 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7304 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7305 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7307 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7308 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7309 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7311 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7312 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7313 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7314 // lightning messages manually.
7315 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7316 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7319 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7320 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7321 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7323 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7324 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7326 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7327 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7329 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7330 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7331 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7333 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7334 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7335 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7337 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7339 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7341 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7342 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7345 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7346 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7347 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7348 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7350 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7351 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7352 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7353 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7355 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7358 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7359 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7360 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7361 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7363 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7366 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7367 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7368 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7369 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7371 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7376 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7377 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7378 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7379 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7380 // fails as expected.
7381 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7382 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7383 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7384 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7385 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7386 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7387 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7389 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7390 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7391 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7393 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7394 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7395 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7396 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7397 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7399 let route = find_route(
7400 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7401 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7403 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7405 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7406 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7407 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7408 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7409 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7411 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7412 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7413 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7414 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7415 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7416 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7417 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7418 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7419 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7420 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7421 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7422 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7423 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7424 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7425 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7427 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7428 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7430 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7431 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7432 let route = find_route(
7433 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7434 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7436 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7438 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7439 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7440 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7441 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7442 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7444 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7445 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7446 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7448 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7449 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7450 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7451 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7452 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7454 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7455 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7456 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7458 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7459 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7460 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7461 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7462 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7463 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7464 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7465 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7466 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7468 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7469 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7473 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7474 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7475 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7476 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7477 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7478 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7479 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7481 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7482 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7483 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7484 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7486 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7487 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7488 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7489 final_value_msat: 10000,
7490 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7492 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7493 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7494 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7495 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7496 let route = find_route(
7497 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7498 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7501 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7502 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7503 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7506 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7507 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7508 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7509 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7510 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7511 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7512 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7514 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7518 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7519 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7520 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7521 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7522 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7523 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7525 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7526 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7527 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7528 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7530 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7531 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7532 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7533 final_value_msat: 10000,
7534 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7536 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7537 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7538 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7539 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7540 let route = find_route(
7541 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7542 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7545 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7546 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7547 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7548 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7551 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7552 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7553 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7554 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7555 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7556 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7557 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7559 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7563 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7564 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7565 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7566 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7567 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7569 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7570 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7571 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7572 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7574 // Marshall an MPP route.
7575 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7576 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7577 route.paths.push(path);
7578 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7579 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7580 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7581 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7582 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7583 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7585 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7586 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7587 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7588 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7593 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7594 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7595 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7596 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7597 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7598 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7600 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7601 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7603 total_msat: 100_000,
7606 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7607 // payment verification fails as expected.
7608 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7609 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7610 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7611 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7613 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7617 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7618 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7622 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
7623 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
7624 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
7625 // the channel is successfully closed.
7626 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7627 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7628 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7629 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7631 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7632 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7633 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7634 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7635 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7637 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
7638 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
7640 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
7641 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
7642 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7643 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7646 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7648 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7649 // as it has the funding transaction.
7650 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7651 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7652 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7654 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7657 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7659 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7661 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7662 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7663 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7665 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7666 // as it has the funding transaction.
7667 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7668 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7669 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7672 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7673 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
7674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7675 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7676 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
7677 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
7679 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7680 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7681 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7682 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
7684 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7685 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
7687 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
7688 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
7689 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
7690 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
7691 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7692 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7693 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7695 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
7696 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
7697 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
7698 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
7699 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7700 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7701 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7704 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
7706 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
7707 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
7708 // closing transaction).
7709 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
7710 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
7711 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7713 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
7714 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
7715 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7716 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7717 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7720 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7722 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
7724 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
7725 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
7726 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7728 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7730 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7731 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7735 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7738 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7739 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7740 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7741 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7742 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7743 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7744 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
7745 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7746 use util::test_utils;
7747 use util::config::UserConfig;
7748 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7750 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7751 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7752 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
7754 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7758 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7759 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7760 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7761 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7762 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7763 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7764 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7769 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7770 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7773 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7774 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7775 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7777 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7778 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7780 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7781 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7783 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7784 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7786 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7787 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7788 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7789 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7790 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7792 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7794 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7796 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7797 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7798 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7799 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7800 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7802 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7804 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7806 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7807 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7808 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7809 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7810 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7813 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7814 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7815 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7817 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7818 } else { panic!(); }
7820 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7821 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7823 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7826 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7829 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7830 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7832 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7833 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7834 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7835 match msg_events[0] {
7836 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
7837 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7838 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7842 match msg_events[1] {
7843 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7847 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
7849 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7850 macro_rules! send_payment {
7851 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7852 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7853 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7854 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7855 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7856 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7857 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7858 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7859 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7860 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7862 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7863 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7865 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7866 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7868 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7869 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7870 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7871 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7872 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7873 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7874 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7875 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7877 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7878 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7879 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7880 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
7882 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7883 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7884 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7885 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7886 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7888 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7891 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7892 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7893 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7894 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7896 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7901 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7902 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);