_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - src/ln/channelmanager.rs

   1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
   2 //!
   3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
   4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
   5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
   6 //!
   7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
   8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
   9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
  10
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
  12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
  13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
  16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
  17
  18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
  19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
  20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
  21 use secp256k1;
  22
  23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
  24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
  26 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
  27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
  28 use ln::msgs;
  29 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler};
  30 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
  31 use util::sha2::Sha256;
  32 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
  33 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
  34 use util::logger::Logger;
  35 use util::errors::APIError;
  36
  37 use crypto;
  38 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
  39 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
  40 use crypto::digest::Digest;
  41 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
  42
  43 use std::{ptr, mem};
  44 use std::collections::HashMap;
  45 use std::collections::hash_map;
  46 use std::io::Cursor;
  47 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
  48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
  49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
  50
  51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
  52 ///
  53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
  54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
  55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
  56 ///
  57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
  58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
  59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
  60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
  61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
  62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
  63 mod channel_held_info {
  64         use ln::msgs;
  65         use ln::router::Route;
  66         use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
  67         use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
  68
  69         /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
  70         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  71         pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
  72                 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
  73                 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
  74                 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
  75                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
  76                 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
  77                 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
  78         }
  79
  80         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  81         pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
  82                 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
  83                 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
  84         }
  85
  86         /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
  87         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  88         pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
  89                 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
  90                 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
  91         }
  92
  93         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
  94         #[derive(Clone)]
  95         pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
  96                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
  97                 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
  98                 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
  99         }
 100
 101         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
 102         #[derive(Clone)]
 103         pub enum HTLCSource {
 104                 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
 105                 OutboundRoute {
 106                         route: Route,
 107                         session_priv: SecretKey,
 108                 },
 109         }
 110         #[cfg(test)]
 111         impl HTLCSource {
 112                 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
 113                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
 114                                 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
 115                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
 116                         }
 117                 }
 118         }
 119
 120         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
 121         pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
 122                 ErrorPacket {
 123                         err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 124                 },
 125                 Reason {
 126                         failure_code: u16,
 127                         data: Vec<u8>,
 128                 }
 129         }
 130 }
 131 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
 132
 133 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
 134         err: msgs::HandleError,
 135         needs_channel_force_close: bool,
 136 }
 137 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
 138         #[inline]
 139         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 140                 Self {
 141                         err: HandleError {
 142                                 err,
 143                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 144                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 145                                                 channel_id,
 146                                                 data: err.to_string()
 147                                         },
 148                                 }),
 149                         },
 150                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
 151                 }
 152         }
 153         #[inline]
 154         fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 155                 Self {
 156                         err: HandleError {
 157                                 err,
 158                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 159                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 160                                                 channel_id,
 161                                                 data: err.to_string()
 162                                         },
 163                                 }),
 164                         },
 165                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
 166                 }
 167         }
 168         #[inline]
 169         fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
 170                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
 171         }
 172         #[inline]
 173         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
 174                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
 175         }
 176 }
 177
 178 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
 179 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
 180 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
 181 /// probably increase this significantly.
 182 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
 183
 184 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
 185         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
 186         prev_htlc_id: u64,
 187         forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
 188 }
 189
 190 struct ChannelHolder {
 191         by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
 192         short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
 193         next_forward: Instant,
 194         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
 195         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
 196         /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
 197         /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
 198         forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
 199         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
 200         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
 201         /// go to read them!
 202         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
 203 }
 204 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
 205         by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
 206         short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
 207         next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
 208         forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
 209         claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
 210 }
 211 impl ChannelHolder {
 212         fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
 213                 MutChannelHolder {
 214                         by_id: &mut self.by_id,
 215                         short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
 216                         next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
 217                         forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
 218                         claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
 219                 }
 220         }
 221 }
 222
 223 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
 224 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
 225
 226 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
 227 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
 228 ///
 229 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
 230 /// to individual Channels.
 231 pub struct ChannelManager {
 232         genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
 233         fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
 234         monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
 235         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
 236         tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
 237
 238         announce_channels_publicly: bool,
 239         fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
 240         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
 241         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 242
 243         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
 244         our_network_key: SecretKey,
 245
 246         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
 247
 248         logger: Arc<Logger>,
 249 }
 250
 251 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
 252
 253 macro_rules! secp_call {
 254         ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
 255                 match $res {
 256                         Ok(key) => key,
 257                         Err(_) => return Err($err),
 258                 }
 259         };
 260 }
 261
 262 struct OnionKeys {
 263         #[cfg(test)]
 264         shared_secret: SharedSecret,
 265         #[cfg(test)]
 266         blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
 267         ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
 268         rho: [u8; 32],
 269         mu: [u8; 32],
 270 }
 271
 272 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
 273 pub struct ChannelDetails {
 274         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
 275         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
 276         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
 277         /// lifetime of the channel.
 278         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
 279         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
 280         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
 281         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 282         /// The node_id of our counterparty
 283         pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
 284         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
 285         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 286         /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
 287         pub user_id: u64,
 288 }
 289
 290 impl ChannelManager {
 291         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
 292         ///
 293         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
 294         /// ChannelMessageHandler.
 295         ///
 296         /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
 297         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
 298         ///
 299         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
 300         pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
 301                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 302
 303                 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
 304                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
 305                         fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
 306                         monitor: monitor.clone(),
 307                         chain_monitor,
 308                         tx_broadcaster,
 309
 310                         announce_channels_publicly,
 311                         fee_proportional_millionths,
 312                         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
 313                         secp_ctx,
 314
 315                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
 316                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
 317                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
 318                                 next_forward: Instant::now(),
 319                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
 320                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
 321                         }),
 322                         our_network_key,
 323
 324                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
 325
 326                         logger,
 327                 });
 328                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
 329                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
 330                 Ok(res)
 331         }
 332
 333         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
 334         ///
 335         /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
 336         /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
 337         /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
 338         /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
 339         ///
 340         /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
 341         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
 342         ///
 343         /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
 344         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
 345                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
 346                         ChannelKeys {
 347                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 348                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 349                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 350                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 351                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 352                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 353                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 354                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
 355                         }
 356                 } else {
 357                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
 358                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
 359                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
 360                                 Ok(key) => key,
 361                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
 362                         }
 363                 };
 364
 365                 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
 366                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
 367                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 368                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
 369                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
 370                                 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
 371                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
 372                                 } else {
 373                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
 374                                 }
 375                         },
 376                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
 377                 }
 378
 379                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 380                 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
 381                         node_id: their_network_key,
 382                         msg: res,
 383                 });
 384                 Ok(())
 385         }
 386
 387         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
 388         /// more information.
 389         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
 390                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 391                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
 392                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
 393                         res.push(ChannelDetails {
 394                                 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
 395                                 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
 396                                 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
 397                                 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
 398                                 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
 399                         });
 400                 }
 401                 res
 402         }
 403
 404         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
 405         /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
 406         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
 407                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 408                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
 409                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
 410                         if channel.is_usable() {
 411                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
 412                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
 413                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
 414                                         remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
 415                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
 416                                         user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
 417                                 });
 418                         }
 419                 }
 420                 res
 421         }
 422
 423         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
 424         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
 425         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
 426         ///
 427         /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
 428         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 429                 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
 430                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 431                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 432                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
 433                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
 434                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
 435                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
 436                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
 437                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
 438                                                 }
 439                                                 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
 440                                         } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
 441                                 },
 442                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
 443                         }
 444                 };
 445                 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
 446                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
 447                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
 448                 }
 449                 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
 450                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
 451                                 Some(update)
 452                         } else { None }
 453                 } else { None };
 454
 455                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 456                 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
 457                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
 458                                 msg: update
 459                         });
 460                 }
 461                 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
 462                         node_id,
 463                         msg: res.0
 464                 });
 465
 466                 Ok(())
 467         }
 468
 469         #[inline]
 470         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
 471                 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
 472                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
 473                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
 474                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
 475                 }
 476                 for tx in local_txn {
 477                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
 478                 }
 479                 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
 480                 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
 481                 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
 482                 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
 483                 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
 484                 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
 485                 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
 486         }
 487
 488         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
 489         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
 490         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
 491                 let mut chan = {
 492                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 493                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 494                         if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
 495                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
 496                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
 497                                 }
 498                                 chan
 499                         } else {
 500                                 return;
 501                         }
 502                 };
 503                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
 504                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 505                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
 506                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
 507                                 msg: update
 508                         });
 509                 }
 510         }
 511
 512         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
 513         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
 514         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
 515                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
 516                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
 517                 }
 518         }
 519
 520         #[inline]
 521         fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
 522                 ({
 523                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
 524                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 525                         let mut res = [0; 32];
 526                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 527                         res
 528                 },
 529                 {
 530                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
 531                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 532                         let mut res = [0; 32];
 533                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 534                         res
 535                 })
 536         }
 537
 538         #[inline]
 539         fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
 540                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
 541                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 542                 let mut res = [0; 32];
 543                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 544                 res
 545         }
 546
 547         #[inline]
 548         fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
 549                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
 550                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 551                 let mut res = [0; 32];
 552                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 553                 res
 554         }
 555
 556         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
 557         #[inline]
 558         fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
 559                 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
 560                 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
 561
 562                 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
 563                         let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
 564
 565                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 566                         sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
 567                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 568                         let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
 569                         sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
 570
 571                         let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
 572
 573                         blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
 574                         blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
 575
 576                         callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
 577                 }
 578
 579                 Ok(())
 580         }
 581
 582         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
 583         fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
 584                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
 585
 586                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
 587                         let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 588
 589                         res.push(OnionKeys {
 590                                 #[cfg(test)]
 591                                 shared_secret,
 592                                 #[cfg(test)]
 593                                 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
 594                                 ephemeral_pubkey,
 595                                 rho,
 596                                 mu,
 597                         });
 598                 })?;
 599
 600                 Ok(res)
 601         }
 602
 603         /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
 604         fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
 605                 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
 606                 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
 607                 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
 608                 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
 609                 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
 610                 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
 611
 612                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
 613                         // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
 614                         // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
 615                         // the intended recipient).
 616                         let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
 617                         let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
 618                         res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
 619                                 realm: 0,
 620                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
 621                                         short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
 622                                         amt_to_forward: value_msat,
 623                                         outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
 624                                 },
 625                                 hmac: [0; 32],
 626                         };
 627                         cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
 628                         if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
 629                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
 630                         }
 631                         cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
 632                         if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
 633                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
 634                         }
 635                         last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
 636                 }
 637                 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
 638         }
 639
 640         #[inline]
 641         fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
 642                 unsafe {
 643                         ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
 644                 }
 645                 for i in 0..65 {
 646                         arr[i] = 0;
 647                 }
 648         }
 649
 650         #[inline]
 651         fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
 652                 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
 653
 654                 for i in 0..dst.len() {
 655                         dst[i] ^= src[i];
 656                 }
 657         }
 658
 659         const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
 660         fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
 661                 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
 662                 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
 663
 664                 let filler = {
 665                         let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
 666                         let end_len = iters * 65;
 667                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
 668                         res.resize(end_len, 0);
 669
 670                         for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
 671                                 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
 672                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 673                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
 674                                 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
 675                         }
 676                         res
 677                 };
 678
 679                 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
 680                 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
 681
 682                 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
 683                         ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
 684                         payload.hmac = hmac_res;
 685                         packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
 686
 687                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 688                         chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
 689                         packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
 690
 691                         if i == 0 {
 692                                 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
 693                         }
 694
 695                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
 696                         hmac.input(&packet_data);
 697                         hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
 698                         hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
 699                 }
 700
 701                 msgs::OnionPacket{
 702                         version: 0,
 703                         public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
 704                         hop_data: packet_data,
 705                         hmac: hmac_res,
 706                 }
 707         }
 708
 709         /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
 710         /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
 711         fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 712                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 713
 714                 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
 715                 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
 716                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
 717                 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
 718                 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 719                         data: packet_crypted,
 720                 }
 721         }
 722
 723         fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
 724                 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
 725
 726                 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 727
 728                 let failuremsg = {
 729                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
 730                         res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
 731                         res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
 732                         res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
 733                         res
 734                 };
 735                 let pad = {
 736                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
 737                         res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
 738                         res
 739                 };
 740                 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
 741                         hmac: [0; 32],
 742                         failuremsg: failuremsg,
 743                         pad: pad,
 744                 };
 745
 746                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
 747                 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
 748                 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
 749
 750                 packet
 751         }
 752
 753         #[inline]
 754         fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 755                 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
 756                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
 757         }
 758
 759         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
 760                 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
 761                         () => {
 762                                 {
 763                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 764                                         sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
 765                                         let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
 766                                         sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
 767                                         onion_hash
 768                                 }
 769                         }
 770                 }
 771
 772                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
 773                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
 774                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
 775                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 776                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 777                                 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
 778                                 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
 779                         })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 780                 }
 781
 782                 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
 783                 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 784
 785                 let mut channel_state = None;
 786                 macro_rules! return_err {
 787                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
 788                                 {
 789                                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
 790                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
 791                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 792                                         }
 793                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
 794                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 795                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 796                                                 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
 797                                         })), channel_state.unwrap());
 798                                 }
 799                         }
 800                 }
 801
 802                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
 803                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
 804                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
 805                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
 806                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
 807                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
 808                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
 809                         return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
 810                 }
 811
 812                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
 813                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
 814                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
 815                 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
 816                         return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
 817                 }
 818
 819                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 820                 let next_hop_data = {
 821                         let mut decoded = [0; 65];
 822                         chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
 823                         match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
 824                                 Err(err) => {
 825                                         let error_code = match err {
 826                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
 827                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
 828                                         };
 829                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
 830                                 },
 831                                 Ok(msg) => msg
 832                         }
 833                 };
 834
 835                 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
 836
 837                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
 838                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
 839                                 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
 840                                         return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
 841                                 }
 842                                 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
 843                                         return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
 844                                 }
 845
 846                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
 847                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
 848                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
 849                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
 850
 851                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
 852                                         onion_packet: None,
 853                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
 854                                         short_channel_id: 0,
 855                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
 856                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
 857                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
 858                                 })
 859                         } else {
 860                                 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
 861                                 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
 862                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
 863
 864                                 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
 865
 866                                 let blinding_factor = {
 867                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 868                                         sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
 869                                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 870                                         let mut res = [0u8; 32];
 871                                         sha.result(&mut res);
 872                                         match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
 873                                                 Err(_) => {
 874                                                         return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
 875                                                 },
 876                                                 Ok(key) => key
 877                                         }
 878                                 };
 879
 880                                 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
 881                                         return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
 882                                 }
 883
 884                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
 885                                         version: 0,
 886                                         public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
 887                                         hop_data: new_packet_data,
 888                                         hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
 889                                 };
 890
 891                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
 892                                         onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
 893                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
 894                                         short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
 895                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
 896                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
 897                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
 898                                 })
 899                         };
 900
 901                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 902                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
 903                         if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
 904                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
 905                                 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
 906                                         None => {
 907                                                 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
 908                                         },
 909                                         Some(id) => id.clone(),
 910                                 };
 911                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
 912                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
 913                                         if !chan.is_live() {
 914                                                 Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 915                                         } else {
 916                                                 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
 917                                                 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
 918                                                         Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 919                                                 } else {
 920                                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
 921                                                                 Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 922                                                         } else {
 923                                                                 None
 924                                                         }
 925                                                 }
 926                                         }
 927                                 } {
 928                                         return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
 929                                 }
 930                         }
 931                 }
 932
 933                 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
 934         }
 935
 936         /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
 937         fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
 938                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
 939                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
 940                         Some(id) => id,
 941                 };
 942
 943                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
 944
 945                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
 946                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
 947                         short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
 948                         timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
 949                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
 950                         cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
 951                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
 952                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
 953                         fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
 954                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
 955                 };
 956
 957                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
 958                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
 959
 960                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
 961                         signature: sig,
 962                         contents: unsigned
 963                 })
 964         }
 965
 966         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
 967         ///
 968         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
 969         /// fields for more info.
 970         ///
 971         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
 972         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
 973         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
 974         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
 975         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
 976         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
 977         ///
 978         /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
 979         ///
 980         /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
 981         /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
 982         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
 983                 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
 984                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
 985                 }
 986                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
 987                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
 988                         if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
 989                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
 990                         }
 991                 }
 992
 993                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
 994                         let mut session_key = [0; 32];
 995                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
 996                         session_key
 997                 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
 998
 999                 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1000
1001                 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1002                                 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1003                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1004                 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1005
1006                 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
1007                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1008                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1009
1010                         let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1011                                 None => return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1012                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1013                         };
1014
1015                         let res = {
1016                                 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1017                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1018                                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1019                                 }
1020                                 if !chan.is_live() {
1021                                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1022                                 }
1023                                 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1024                                         route: route.clone(),
1025                                         session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1026                                 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::RouteError{err: he.err})?
1027                         };
1028
1029                         let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1030
1031                         match res {
1032                                 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
1033                                 None => return Ok(()),
1034                         }
1035                 };
1036
1037                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1038                         unimplemented!();
1039                 }
1040
1041                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1042                 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1043                         node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1044                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1045                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1046                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1047                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1048                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1049                                 commitment_signed,
1050                         },
1051                 });
1052                 Ok(())
1053         }
1054
1055         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1056         ///
1057         /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1058         ///
1059         /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1060         /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1061         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1062
1063                 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1064                         ($event: expr) => {
1065                                 {
1066                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1067                                         pending_events.push($event);
1068                                 }
1069                         }
1070                 }
1071
1072                 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1073                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1074                         match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1075                                 Some(mut chan) => {
1076                                         match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1077                                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1078                                                         (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1079                                                 },
1080                                                 Err(e) => {
1081                                                         log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1082                                                         mem::drop(channel_state);
1083                                                         add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1084                                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1085                                                                 action: e.action,
1086                                                         });
1087                                                         return;
1088                                                 },
1089                                         }
1090                                 },
1091                                 None => return
1092                         }
1093                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1094                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1095                         unimplemented!();
1096                 }
1097                 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1098                         node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1099                         msg: msg,
1100                 });
1101
1102                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1103                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1104                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1105                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1106                         },
1107                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1108                                 e.insert(chan);
1109                         }
1110                 }
1111         }
1112
1113         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1114                 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1115
1116                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1117                         Ok(res) => res,
1118                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1119                 };
1120                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1121                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1122
1123                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1124                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1125                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1126                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
1127                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1128                 })
1129         }
1130
1131         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1132         ///
1133         /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1134         /// Will likely generate further events.
1135         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1136                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1137                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1138                 {
1139                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1140                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1141
1142                         if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1143                                 return;
1144                         }
1145
1146                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1147                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1148                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1149                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1150                                                 None => {
1151                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1152                                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1153                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1154                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1155                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1156                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1157                                                                 });
1158                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1159                                                         }
1160                                                         continue;
1161                                                 }
1162                                         };
1163                                         let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1164
1165                                         let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1166                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1167                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1168                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1169                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1170                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1171                                                 });
1172                                                 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1173                                                         Err(_e) => {
1174                                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1175                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1176                                                                 continue;
1177                                                         },
1178                                                         Ok(update_add) => {
1179                                                                 match update_add {
1180                                                                         Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1181                                                                         None => {
1182                                                                                 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1183                                                                                 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1184                                                                                 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1185                                                                                 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1186                                                                                 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1187                                                                                 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1188                                                                                 // this channel currently :/.
1189                                                                         }
1190                                                                 }
1191                                                         }
1192                                                 }
1193                                         }
1194
1195                                         if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1196                                                 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1197                                                         Ok(res) => res,
1198                                                         Err(e) => {
1199                                                                 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1200                                                                 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1201                                                                 } else {
1202                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1203                                                                 }
1204                                                                 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1205                                                                 continue;
1206                                                         },
1207                                                 };
1208                                                 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1209                                                         node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1210                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1211                                                                 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1212                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1213                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1214                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1215                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1216                                                         },
1217                                                 }));
1218                                         }
1219                                 } else {
1220                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1221                                                 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1222                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1223                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1224                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1225                                                 };
1226                                                 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1227                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1228                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1229                                                 };
1230                                                 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1231                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1232                                                         amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1233                                                 }));
1234                                         }
1235                                 }
1236                         }
1237                 }
1238
1239                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1240                         match update {
1241                                 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1242                                 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1243                         };
1244                 }
1245
1246                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1247
1248                 new_events.retain(|event| {
1249                         if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1250                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1251                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1252                                 }
1253                         }
1254                         true
1255                 });
1256
1257                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1258                 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1259                 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1260                         events.push(event.1);
1261                 }
1262         }
1263
1264         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1265         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1266                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1267                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1268                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1269                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1270                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1271                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1272                         }
1273                         true
1274                 } else { false }
1275         }
1276
1277         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1278         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1279         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1280         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1281         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1282         /// still-available channels.
1283         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1284                 match source {
1285                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1286                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1287
1288                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1289                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1290                                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1291                                 });
1292                         },
1293                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1294                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1295                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1296                                                 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1297                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1298                                         },
1299                                         HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1300                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1301                                         }
1302                                 };
1303
1304                                 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1305                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1306                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1307                                                 None => return
1308                                         };
1309
1310                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1311                                         match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1312                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1313                                                 Err(_e) => {
1314                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1315                                                         return;
1316                                                 },
1317                                         }
1318                                 };
1319
1320                                 match fail_msgs {
1321                                         Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1322                                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1323
1324                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1325                                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1326                                                 }
1327
1328                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1329                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1330                                                         node_id,
1331                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1332                                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1333                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1334                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1335                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1336                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1337                                                         },
1338                                                 });
1339                                         },
1340                                         None => {},
1341                                 }
1342                         },
1343                 }
1344         }
1345
1346         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1347         /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1348         /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1349         ///
1350         /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1351         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1352                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1353                 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1354                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1355                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1356
1357                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1358                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1359                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1360                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1361                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1362                                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1363                         }
1364                         true
1365                 } else { false }
1366         }
1367         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1368                 match source {
1369                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1370                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1371                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1372                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1373                                         payment_preimage
1374                                 });
1375                         },
1376                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1377                                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1378                                 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1379                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1380                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1381                                                 None => {
1382                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1383                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1384                                                         // why its missing.
1385                                                         return
1386                                                 }
1387                                         };
1388
1389                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1390                                         match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1391                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1392                                                 Err(_e) => {
1393                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1394                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1395                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1396                                                         return
1397                                                 },
1398                                         }
1399                                 };
1400
1401                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1402                                 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1403                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1404                                                 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1405                                         }
1406                                 }
1407
1408                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1409                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1410                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1411                                                 node_id: node_id,
1412                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1413                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1414                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1415                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1416                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1417                                                         commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1418                                                 }
1419                                         });
1420                                 }
1421                         },
1422                 }
1423         }
1424
1425         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1426         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1427                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1428         }
1429
1430         /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1431         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1432         /// operation.
1433         pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1434                 unimplemented!();
1435         }
1436
1437         fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1438                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1439                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1440                 }
1441                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1442                 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1443                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1444                 }
1445
1446                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1447                         ChannelKeys {
1448                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1449                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1450                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1451                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1452                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1453                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1454                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1455                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1456                         }
1457                 } else {
1458                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1459                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1460                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1461                                 Ok(key) => key,
1462                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1463                         }
1464                 };
1465
1466                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger)).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(e))?;
1467                 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1468                 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1469                 Ok(accept_msg)
1470         }
1471
1472         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1473                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1474                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1475                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1476                                 Some(chan) => {
1477                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1478                                                 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1479                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1480                                         }
1481                                         chan.accept_channel(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1482                                         (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1483                                 },
1484                                 //TODO: same as above
1485                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1486                         }
1487                 };
1488                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1489                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1490                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1491                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
1492                         output_script: output_script,
1493                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1494                 });
1495                 Ok(())
1496         }
1497
1498         fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1499                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1500                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1501                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1502                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1503                                         if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1504                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1505                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1506                                         }
1507                                         match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1508                                                 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1509                                                         (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1510                                                 },
1511                                                 Err(e) => {
1512                                                         return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1513                                                 }
1514                                         }
1515                                 },
1516                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1517                         }
1518                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1519                    // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1520                    // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1521                    // for a bogus channel.
1522                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1523                         unimplemented!();
1524                 }
1525                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1526                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1527                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1528                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1529                         },
1530                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1531                                 e.insert(chan);
1532                         }
1533                 }
1534                 Ok(funding_msg)
1535         }
1536
1537         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1538                 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1539                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1540                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1541                                 Some(chan) => {
1542                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1543                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1544                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1545                                         }
1546                                         let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1547                                         (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1548                                 },
1549                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1550                         }
1551                 };
1552                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1553                         unimplemented!();
1554                 }
1555                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1556                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1557                         funding_txo: funding_txo,
1558                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1559                 });
1560                 Ok(())
1561         }
1562
1563         fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1564                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1565                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1566                         Some(chan) => {
1567                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1568                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1569                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1570                                 }
1571                                 chan.funding_locked(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1572                                 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1573                         },
1574                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1575                 };
1576         }
1577
1578         fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1579                 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1580                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1581                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1582
1583                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1584                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1585                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1586                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1587                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1588                                         }
1589                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1590                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1591                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1592                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1593                                                 }
1594                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1595                                         } else { (res, None) }
1596                                 },
1597                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1598                         }
1599                 };
1600                 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1601                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1602                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1603                 }
1604                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1605                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1606                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1607                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1608                                         msg: update
1609                                 });
1610                         }
1611                 }
1612                 Ok((res.0, res.1))
1613         }
1614
1615         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1616                 let (res, chan_option) = {
1617                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1618                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1619                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1620                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1621                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1622                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1623                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1624                                         }
1625                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1626                                         if res.1.is_some() {
1627                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1628                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1629                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1630                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1631                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1632                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1633                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1634                                                 }
1635                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1636                                         } else { (res, None) }
1637                                 },
1638                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1639                         }
1640                 };
1641                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1642                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1643                 }
1644                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1645                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1646                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1647                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1648                                         msg: update
1649                                 });
1650                         }
1651                 }
1652                 Ok(res.0)
1653         }
1654
1655         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1656                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1657                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1658                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1659                 //
1660                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1661                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1662                 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1663                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1664
1665                 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1666                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1667
1668                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1669                         Some(chan) => {
1670                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1671                                         //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1672                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1673                                 }
1674                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
1675                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1676                                 }
1677                                 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1678                         },
1679                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1680                 }
1681         }
1682
1683         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1684                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1685                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1686                         Some(chan) => {
1687                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1688                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1689                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1690                                 }
1691                                 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?.clone()
1692                         },
1693                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1694                 };
1695                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1696                 Ok(())
1697         }
1698
1699         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1700                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1701                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1702                         Some(chan) => {
1703                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1704                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1705                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1706                                 }
1707                                 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1708                         },
1709                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1710                 }?;
1711
1712                 match htlc_source {
1713                         &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, .. } => {
1714                                 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1715                                 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1716                                 let mut res = None;
1717                                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1718                                         if res.is_some() { return; }
1719
1720                                         let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1721
1722                                         let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1723                                         decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1724                                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1725                                         chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1726                                         packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1727
1728                                         if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1729                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1730                                                         let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1731
1732                                                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1733                                                         hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1734                                                         let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1735                                                         hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1736                                                         if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1737                                                                 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1738                                                                 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1739                                                                 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1740                                                                         TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1741                                                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1742                                                                                         let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1743                                                                                         if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1744                                                                                                 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len])) {
1745                                                                                                         res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1746                                                                                                                 msg: chan_update,
1747                                                                                                         });
1748                                                                                                 }
1749                                                                                         }
1750                                                                                 }
1751                                                                         },
1752                                                                         UNKNOWN_CHAN => {
1753                                                                                 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1754                                                                                 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1755                                                                                 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1756                                                                                         short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1757                                                                                 });
1758                                                                         },
1759                                                                         _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1760                                                                 }
1761                                                         }
1762                                                 }
1763                                         }
1764                                 }).unwrap();
1765                                 Ok(res)
1766                         },
1767                         _ => { Ok(None) },
1768                 }
1769         }
1770
1771         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1772                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1773                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1774                         Some(chan) => {
1775                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1776                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1777                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1778                                 }
1779                                 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1780                                 Ok(())
1781                         },
1782                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1783                 }
1784         }
1785
1786         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1787                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1788                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1789                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1790                                 Some(chan) => {
1791                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1792                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1793                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1794                                         }
1795                                         chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?
1796                                 },
1797                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1798                         }
1799                 };
1800                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1801                         unimplemented!();
1802                 }
1803
1804                 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1805         }
1806
1807         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1808                 let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor), short_channel_id) = {
1809                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1810                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1811                                 Some(chan) => {
1812                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1813                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1814                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1815                                         }
1816                                         (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
1817                                 },
1818                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1819                         }
1820                 };
1821                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1822                         unimplemented!();
1823                 }
1824                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1825                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1826                 }
1827
1828                 let mut forward_event = None;
1829                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1830                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1831                         if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1832                                 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1833                                 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1834                         }
1835                         for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1836                                 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1837                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1838                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
1839                                         },
1840                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1841                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
1842                                         }
1843                                 }
1844                         }
1845                 }
1846                 match forward_event {
1847                         Some(time) => {
1848                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1849                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1850                                         time_forwardable: time
1851                                 });
1852                         }
1853                         None => {},
1854                 }
1855
1856                 Ok(res)
1857         }
1858
1859         fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1860                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1861                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1862                         Some(chan) => {
1863                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1864                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1865                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1866                                 }
1867                                 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1868                         },
1869                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1870                 }
1871         }
1872
1873         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1874                 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1875                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1876                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1877                                 Some(chan) => {
1878                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1879                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1880                                         }
1881                                         if !chan.is_usable() {
1882                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1883                                         }
1884
1885                                         let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1886                                         let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
1887                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1888
1889                                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1890                                         let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1891                                         let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
1892                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1893                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1894
1895                                         let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1896
1897                                         (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1898                                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1899                                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1900                                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1901                                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1902                                                 contents: announcement,
1903                                         }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1904                                 },
1905                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1906                         }
1907                 };
1908                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1909                 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1910                 Ok(())
1911         }
1912
1913         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1914                 let (res, chan_monitor) = {
1915                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1916                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1917                                 Some(chan) => {
1918                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1919                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1920                                         }
1921                                         let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1922                                         (Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update)), channel_monitor)
1923                                 },
1924                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1925                         }
1926                 };
1927                 if let Some(monitor) = chan_monitor {
1928                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1929                                 unimplemented!();
1930                         }
1931                 }
1932                 res
1933         }
1934 }
1935
1936 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1937         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1938                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1939                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1940                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1941                 ret
1942         }
1943 }
1944
1945 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1946         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1947                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1948                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1949                 {
1950                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1951                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1952                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1953                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1954                                 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
1955                                 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
1956                                         let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
1957                                         new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1958                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1959                                                 msg: funding_locked,
1960                                                 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1961                                         });
1962                                         short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1963                                 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
1964                                         new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
1965                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1966                                                 action: e.action,
1967                                         });
1968                                         if channel.is_shutdown() {
1969                                                 return false;
1970                                         }
1971                                 }
1972                                 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1973                                         for tx in txn_matched {
1974                                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1975                                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
1976                                                                 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1977                                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1978                                                                 }
1979                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
1980                                                                 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
1981                                                                 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
1982                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1983                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1984                                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1985                                                                                 msg: update
1986                                                                         });
1987                                                                 }
1988                                                                 return false;
1989                                                         }
1990                                                 }
1991                                         }
1992                                 }
1993                                 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1994                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1995                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1996                                         }
1997                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1998                                         // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
1999                                         // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2000                                         // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2001                                         failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2002                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2003                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2004                                                         msg: update
2005                                                 });
2006                                         }
2007                                         return false;
2008                                 }
2009                                 true
2010                         });
2011                 }
2012                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2013                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2014                 }
2015                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2016                 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2017                         pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2018                 }
2019                 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2020         }
2021
2022         /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2023         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2024                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2025                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2026                 {
2027                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2028                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2029                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2030                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_,  v| {
2031                                 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2032                                         if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2033                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2034                                         }
2035                                         failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2036                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2037                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2038                                                         msg: update
2039                                                 });
2040                                         }
2041                                         false
2042                                 } else {
2043                                         true
2044                                 }
2045                         });
2046                 }
2047                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2048                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2049                 }
2050                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2051                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2052                         for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2053                                 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2054                         }
2055                 }
2056                 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2057         }
2058 }
2059
2060 macro_rules! handle_error {
2061         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2062                 match $internal {
2063                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2064                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2065                                 if needs_channel_force_close {
2066                                         match &err.action {
2067                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2068                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2069                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2070                                                         } else {
2071                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2072                                                         }
2073                                                 },
2074                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2075                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2076                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2077                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2078                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2079                                                         } else {
2080                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2081                                                         }
2082                                                 },
2083                                                 &None => {},
2084                                         }
2085                                 }
2086                                 Err(err)
2087                         },
2088                 }
2089         }
2090 }
2091
2092 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2093         //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2094         fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2095                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2096         }
2097
2098         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2099                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2100         }
2101
2102         fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2103                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2104         }
2105
2106         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2107                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2108         }
2109
2110         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2111                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2112         }
2113
2114         fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2115                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2116         }
2117
2118         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2119                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2120         }
2121
2122         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2123                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2124         }
2125
2126         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2127                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2128         }
2129
2130         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
2131                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2132         }
2133
2134         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2135                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2136         }
2137
2138         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2139                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2140         }
2141
2142         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2143                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2144         }
2145
2146         fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2147                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2148         }
2149
2150         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2151                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2152         }
2153
2154         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), HandleError> {
2155                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2156         }
2157
2158         fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2159                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2160                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2161                 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2162                 {
2163                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2164                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2165                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2166                         if no_connection_possible {
2167                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2168                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2169                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2170                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2171                                                 }
2172                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2173                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2174                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2175                                                                 msg: update
2176                                                         });
2177                                                 }
2178                                                 false
2179                                         } else {
2180                                                 true
2181                                         }
2182                                 });
2183                         } else {
2184                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2185                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2186                                                 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2187                                                 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2188                                                 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2189                                                         let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2190                                                         failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2191                                                 }
2192                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2193                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2194                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2195                                                         }
2196                                                         return false;
2197                                                 }
2198                                         }
2199                                         true
2200                                 })
2201                         }
2202                 }
2203                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2204                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2205                 }
2206                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2207                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2208                         for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2209                                 pending_events.push(event);
2210                         }
2211                 }
2212                 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2213                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2214                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2215                         }
2216                 }
2217         }
2218
2219         fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2220                 let mut res = Vec::new();
2221                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2222                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2223                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2224                                 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2225                                         // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2226                                         // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2227                                         // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2228                                         // drop it.
2229                                         false
2230                                 } else {
2231                                         res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2232                                         true
2233                                 }
2234                         } else { true }
2235                 });
2236                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2237                 res
2238         }
2239
2240         fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2241                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2242                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
2243                                 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2244                                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2245                                 }
2246                         }
2247                 } else {
2248                         self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2249                 }
2250         }
2251 }
2252
2253 #[cfg(test)]
2254 mod tests {
2255         use chain::chaininterface;
2256         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2257         use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2258         use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2259         use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2260         use ln::msgs;
2261         use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2262         use util::test_utils;
2263         use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2264         use util::errors::APIError;
2265         use util::logger::Logger;
2266         use util::ser::Writeable;
2267
2268         use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2269         use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2270         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2271         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2272         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2273         use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2274         use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2275
2276         use hex;
2277
2278         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2279         use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2280
2281         use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2282         use crypto::digest::Digest;
2283
2284         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2285
2286         use std::cell::RefCell;
2287         use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2288         use std::default::Default;
2289         use std::rc::Rc;
2290         use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2291         use std::time::Instant;
2292         use std::mem;
2293
2294         fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2295                 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2296                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2297
2298                 let route = Route {
2299                         hops: vec!(
2300                                         RouteHop {
2301                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2302                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2303                                         },
2304                                         RouteHop {
2305                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2306                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2307                                         },
2308                                         RouteHop {
2309                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2310                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2311                                         },
2312                                         RouteHop {
2313                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2314                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2315                                         },
2316                                         RouteHop {
2317                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2318                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2319                                         },
2320                         ),
2321                 };
2322
2323                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2324
2325                 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2326                 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2327                 onion_keys
2328         }
2329
2330         #[test]
2331         fn onion_vectors() {
2332                 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2333                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2334
2335                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2336                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2337                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2338                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2339                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2340
2341                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2342                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2343                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2344                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2345                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2346
2347                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2348                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2349                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2350                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2351                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2352
2353                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2354                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2355                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2356                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2357                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2358
2359                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2360                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2361                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2362                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2363                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2364
2365                 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2366                 let payloads = vec!(
2367                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2368                                 realm: 0,
2369                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2370                                         short_channel_id: 0,
2371                                         amt_to_forward: 0,
2372                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2373                                 },
2374                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2375                         },
2376                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2377                                 realm: 0,
2378                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2379                                         short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2380                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2381                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2382                                 },
2383                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2384                         },
2385                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2386                                 realm: 0,
2387                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2388                                         short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2389                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2390                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2391                                 },
2392                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2393                         },
2394                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2395                                 realm: 0,
2396                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2397                                         short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2398                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2399                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2400                                 },
2401                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2402                         },
2403                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2404                                 realm: 0,
2405                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2406                                         short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2407                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2408                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2409                                 },
2410                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2411                         },
2412                 );
2413
2414                 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2415                 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2416                 // anyway...
2417                 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2418         }
2419
2420         #[test]
2421         fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2422                 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2423
2424                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2425                 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2426                 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2427
2428                 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2429                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2430
2431                 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2432                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("c49a1ce81680f78f5f2000cda36268de34a3f0a0662f55b4e837c83a8773c22aa081bab1616a0011585323930fa5b9fae0c85770a2279ff59ec427ad1bbff9001c0cd1497004bd2a0f68b50704cf6d6a4bf3c8b6a0833399a24b3456961ba00736785112594f65b6b2d44d9f5ea4e49b5e1ec2af978cbe31c67114440ac51a62081df0ed46d4a3df295da0b0fe25c0115019f03f15ec86fabb4c852f83449e812f141a9395b3f70b766ebbd4ec2fae2b6955bd8f32684c15abfe8fd3a6261e52650e8807a92158d9f1463261a925e4bfba44bd20b166d532f0017185c3a6ac7957adefe45559e3072c8dc35abeba835a8cb01a71a15c736911126f27d46a36168ca5ef7dccd4e2886212602b181463e0dd30185c96348f9743a02aca8ec27c0b90dca270").unwrap());
2433
2434                 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2435                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2436
2437                 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2438                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2439
2440                 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2441                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2442         }
2443
2444         fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2445                 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2446                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2447                 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2448                 for i in 2..100 {
2449                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2450                         chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2451                 }
2452         }
2453
2454         struct Node {
2455                 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2456                 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2457                 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2458                 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2459                 router: Router,
2460                 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2461                 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2462         }
2463         impl Drop for Node {
2464                 fn drop(&mut self) {
2465                         if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2466                                 // Check that we processed all pending events
2467                                 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2468                                 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2469                         }
2470                 }
2471         }
2472
2473         fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2474                 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42).unwrap();
2475
2476                 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2477                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2478                 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2479                         Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2480                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2481                                 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2482                         },
2483                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2484                 };
2485
2486                 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2487
2488                 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2489                 let tx;
2490                 let funding_output;
2491
2492                 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2493                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2494                 match events_2[0] {
2495                         Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2496                                 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2497                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2498
2499                                 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2500                                         value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2501                                 }]};
2502                                 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2503
2504                                 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2505                                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2506                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2507                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2508                                 added_monitors.clear();
2509                         },
2510                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2511                 }
2512
2513                 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2514                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2515                 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2516                         Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2517                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2518                                 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2519                                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2520                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2521                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2522                                 added_monitors.clear();
2523                                 res
2524                         },
2525                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2526                 };
2527
2528                 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2529                 {
2530                         let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2531                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2532                         assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2533                         added_monitors.clear();
2534                 }
2535
2536                 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2537                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2538                 match events_4[0] {
2539                         Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2540                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2541                                 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2542                         },
2543                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2544                 };
2545
2546                 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2547                 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2548                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2549                 match events_5[0] {
2550                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2551                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2552                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2553                                 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2554                         },
2555                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2556                 };
2557
2558                 let channel_id;
2559
2560                 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2561                 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2562                 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2563                 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2564                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2565                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2566                                 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2567                                 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2568                                 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2569                                 as_announcement_sigs
2570                         },
2571                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2572                 };
2573
2574                 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2575                 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2576                 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2577                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2578                                 (msg, update_msg)
2579                         },
2580                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2581                 };
2582
2583                 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2584                 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2585                 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2586                 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2587                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2588                                 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2589                                 update_msg
2590                         },
2591                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2592                 };
2593
2594                 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2595
2596                 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2597         }
2598
2599         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2600                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2601                 for node in nodes {
2602                         assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2603                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2604                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2605                 }
2606                 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2607         }
2608
2609         fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2610                 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2611                 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2612                 let (tx_a, tx_b);
2613
2614                 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2615                 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2616                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2617                 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2618                         Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2619                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2620                                 msg.clone()
2621                         },
2622                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2623                 };
2624
2625                 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2626                 if !close_inbound_first {
2627                         assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2628                 }
2629                 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2630                 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2631                 if close_inbound_first {
2632                         assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2633                         closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2634                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2635                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2636
2637                         let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2638                         assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2639                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2640                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2641                 } else {
2642                         closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2643                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2644                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2645
2646                         let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2647                         assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2648                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2649                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2650                 }
2651                 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2652                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2653                 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2654                 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2655
2656                 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2657                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2658                 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2659                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2660                                 msg.clone()
2661                         },
2662                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2663                 };
2664
2665                 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2666                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2667                 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2668                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2669                                 msg.clone()
2670                         },
2671                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2672                 };
2673
2674                 (as_update, bs_update)
2675         }
2676
2677         struct SendEvent {
2678                 node_id: PublicKey,
2679                 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2680                 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2681         }
2682         impl SendEvent {
2683                 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2684                         match event {
2685                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, commitment_signed } } => {
2686                                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2687                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2688                                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2689                                         SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2690                                 },
2691                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2692                         }
2693                 }
2694         }
2695
2696         macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
2697                 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
2698                         {
2699                                 {
2700                                         let added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2701                                         assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
2702                                 }
2703                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
2704                                 {
2705                                         let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2706                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2707                                         added_monitors.clear();
2708                                 }
2709                                 {
2710                                         let added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2711                                         assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
2712                                 }
2713                                 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2714                                 {
2715                                         let mut added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2716                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2717                                         added_monitors.clear();
2718                                 }
2719                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
2720                                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
2721                                 {
2722                                         let mut added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2723                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2724                                         added_monitors.clear();
2725                                 }
2726                                 if $fail_backwards {
2727                                         assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2728                                 }
2729                                 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2730                                 {
2731                                         let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2732                                         if $fail_backwards {
2733                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2734                                                 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2735                                         } else {
2736                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2737                                         }
2738                                         added_monitors.clear();
2739                                 }
2740                         }
2741                 }
2742         }
2743
2744         fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2745                 let our_payment_preimage = [*origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2746                 *origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2747                 let our_payment_hash = {
2748                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2749                         sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2750                         let mut ret = [0; 32];
2751                         sha.result(&mut ret);
2752                         ret
2753                 };
2754
2755                 let mut payment_event = {
2756                         origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2757                         {
2758                                 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2759                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2760                                 added_monitors.clear();
2761                         }
2762
2763                         let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2764                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2765                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2766                 };
2767                 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2768
2769                 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2770                         assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2771
2772                         node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2773                         {
2774                                 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2775                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2776                         }
2777
2778                         commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
2779
2780                         let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2781                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2782                         match events_1[0] {
2783                                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2784                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2785                         };
2786
2787                         node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2788                         node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2789
2790                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2791                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2792                         if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2793                                 match events_2[0] {
2794                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2795                                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2796                                                 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2797                                         },
2798                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2799                                 }
2800                         } else {
2801                                 {
2802                                         let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2803                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2804                                         added_monitors.clear();
2805                                 }
2806                                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2807                                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2808                         }
2809
2810                         prev_node = node;
2811                 }
2812
2813                 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2814         }
2815
2816         fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2817                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2818                 {
2819                         let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2820                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2821                         added_monitors.clear();
2822                 }
2823
2824                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2825                 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2826                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2827                                 {
2828                                         $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2829                                         {
2830                                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2831                                                 if $last_node {
2832                                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2833                                                 } else {
2834                                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2835                                                 }
2836                                                 added_monitors.clear();
2837                                         }
2838                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
2839                                 }
2840                         }
2841                 }
2842
2843                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2844                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2845                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2846                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2847                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
2848                                 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2849                         }
2850
2851                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2852                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2853                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2854                                 match events[0] {
2855                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2856                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2857                                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2858                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2859                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2860                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2861                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2862                                         },
2863                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2864                                 }
2865                         } else {
2866                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
2867                         }
2868                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2869                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2870                         }
2871
2872                         prev_node = node;
2873                 }
2874
2875                 if !skip_last {
2876                         update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2877                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2878                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2879                         match events[0] {
2880                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2881                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2882                                 },
2883                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2884                         }
2885                 }
2886         }
2887
2888         fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2889                 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
2890         }
2891
2892         const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2893
2894         fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2895                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2896                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2897                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2898                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2899                 }
2900
2901                 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2902         }
2903
2904         fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2905                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2906                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2907                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2908                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2909                 }
2910
2911                 let our_payment_preimage = [*origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2912                 *origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2913                 let our_payment_hash = {
2914                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2915                         sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2916                         let mut ret = [0; 32];
2917                         sha.result(&mut ret);
2918                         ret
2919                 };
2920
2921                 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2922                 match err {
2923                         APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
2924                         _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
2925                 };
2926         }
2927
2928         fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2929                 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2930                 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2931         }
2932
2933         fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2934                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2935                 {
2936                         let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2937                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2938                         added_monitors.clear();
2939                 }
2940
2941                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2942                 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2943                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2944                                 {
2945                                         $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2946                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
2947                                 }
2948                         }
2949                 }
2950
2951                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2952                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2953                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2954                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2955                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
2956                                 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
2957                                 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
2958                                 // second-to-last node!
2959                                 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
2960                         }
2961
2962                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2963                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2964                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2965                                 match events[0] {
2966                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2967                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2968                                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2969                                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2970                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2971                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2972                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2973                                         },
2974                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2975                                 }
2976                         } else {
2977                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
2978                         }
2979                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2980                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2981                         }
2982
2983                         prev_node = node;
2984                 }
2985
2986                 if !skip_last {
2987                         update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2988
2989                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2990                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2991                         match events[0] {
2992                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2993                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2994                                 },
2995                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2996                         }
2997                 }
2998         }
2999
3000         fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3001                 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3002         }
3003
3004         fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3005                 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3006                 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3007                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3008                 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3009
3010                 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3011                 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3012
3013                 for _ in 0..node_count {
3014                         let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3015                         let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3016                         let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3017                         let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3018                         let node_id = {
3019                                 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3020                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3021                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3022                         };
3023                         let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3024                         let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3025                         nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3026                                 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3027                                 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3028                         });
3029                 }
3030
3031                 nodes
3032         }
3033
3034         #[test]
3035         fn fake_network_test() {
3036                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3037                 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3038                 let nodes = create_network(4);
3039
3040                 // Create some initial channels
3041                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3042                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3043                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3044
3045                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3046                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3047                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3048                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3049                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3050
3051                 // Send some more payments
3052                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3053                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3054                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3055
3056                 // Test failure packets
3057                 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3058                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3059
3060                 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3061                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3062
3063                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3064                 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3065                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3066                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3067                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3068                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3069                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3070
3071                 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3072                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3073                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3074                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3075                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3076                         fee_msat: 0,
3077                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3078                 });
3079                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3080                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3081                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3082                         fee_msat: 0,
3083                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3084                 });
3085                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3086                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3087                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3088                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3089                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3090                 });
3091                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3092                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3093                 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3094
3095                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3096                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3097                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3098                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3099                         fee_msat: 0,
3100                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3101                 });
3102                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3103                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3104                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3105                         fee_msat: 0,
3106                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3107                 });
3108                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3109                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3110                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3111                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3112                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3113                 });
3114                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3115                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3116                 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3117
3118                 // Claim the rebalances...
3119                 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3120                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3121
3122                 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3123                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3124
3125                 // Send some payments across both channels
3126                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3127                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3128                 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3129
3130                 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3131
3132                 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3133
3134                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3135                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3136                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3137
3138                 // Close down the channels...
3139                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3140                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3141                 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3142                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3143                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3144         }
3145
3146         #[test]
3147         fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
3148                 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
3149                 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
3150                 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
3151
3152                 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
3153                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
3154                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3155                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3156                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3157                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
3158
3159                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
3160
3161                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3162                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3163
3164                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3165                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3166
3167                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
3168                 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
3169                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
3170         }
3171
3172         #[derive(PartialEq)]
3173         enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3174         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
3175         ///
3176         /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
3177         /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
3178         /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
3179         ///
3180         /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
3181         /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
3182         ///
3183         /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
3184         /// also fail.
3185         fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3186                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3187                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3188
3189                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3190                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3191                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3192                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3193                                 funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
3194                                 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3195                                 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
3196                                         res.push(tx.clone());
3197                                 }
3198                                 false
3199                         } else { true }
3200                 });
3201                 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3202                         res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3203                 }
3204
3205                 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3206
3207                 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3208                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3209                                 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3210                                         let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3211                                         funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
3212                                         tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3213                                         if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3214                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3215                                         } else {
3216                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3217                                         }
3218                                         res.push(tx.clone());
3219                                         false
3220                                 } else { true }
3221                         });
3222                         assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3223                 }
3224
3225                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3226                 res
3227         }
3228
3229         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
3230         /// HTLC transaction.
3231         fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
3232                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3233                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3234                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3235                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
3236                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3237                                 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_tx.txid(), revoked_tx.clone());
3238                                 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3239                                 false
3240                         } else { true }
3241                 });
3242                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3243         }
3244
3245         fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3246                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3247
3248                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3249                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3250                 let mut found_prev = false;
3251
3252                 for tx in prev_txn {
3253                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3254                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3255                                 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
3256                                 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3257
3258                                 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3259                                 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3260
3261                                 found_prev = true;
3262                                 break;
3263                         }
3264                 }
3265                 assert!(found_prev);
3266
3267                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3268                 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3269                 res
3270         }
3271
3272         fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3273                 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3274                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3275                 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3276                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3277                                 msg.clone()
3278                         },
3279                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3280                 };
3281
3282                 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3283                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3284                 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3285                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3286                                 msg.clone()
3287                         },
3288                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3289                 };
3290
3291                 for node in nodes {
3292                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3293                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3294                 }
3295         }
3296
3297         #[test]
3298         fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
3299                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3300                 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
3301                 let nodes = create_network(5);
3302
3303                 // Create some initial channels
3304                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3305                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3306                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3307                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3308
3309                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3310                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3311                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3312                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3313                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3314
3315                 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
3316                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3317                 {
3318                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3319                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3320                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3321                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3322                 }
3323                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3324                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3325                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3326
3327                 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
3328                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3329
3330                 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
3331                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3332                 {
3333                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3334                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3335                         nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3336                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3337                 }
3338                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
3339                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3340                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3341
3342                 macro_rules! claim_funds {
3343                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
3344                                 {
3345                                         assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
3346                                         {
3347                                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3348                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3349                                                 added_monitors.clear();
3350                                         }
3351
3352                                         let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3353                                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3354                                         match events[0] {
3355                                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
3356                                                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3357                                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3358                                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3359                                                 },
3360                                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3361                                         };
3362                                 }
3363                         }
3364                 }
3365
3366                 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
3367                 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
3368                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3369                 {
3370                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3371
3372                         // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3373                         claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
3374
3375                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3376                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3377
3378                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
3379                 }
3380                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
3381                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3382                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3383
3384                 // One pending HTLC to time out:
3385                 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
3386
3387                 {
3388                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3389                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3390                         for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3391                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3392                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3393                         }
3394
3395                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3396
3397                         // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3398                         claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
3399
3400                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3401                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3402                         for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3403                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3404                                 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3405                         }
3406
3407                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
3408
3409                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3410                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
3411
3412                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
3413                 }
3414                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
3415                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3416                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3417
3418                 // Create some new channels:
3419                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3420
3421                 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
3422                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
3423                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
3424                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3425                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
3426                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3427                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
3428                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
3429                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
3430                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
3431                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
3432                 // Revoke the old state
3433                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3434
3435                 {
3436                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3437                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3438                         {
3439                                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3440                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3441                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
3442                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
3443
3444                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3445                                 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
3446                                 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3447                                 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
3448                         }
3449                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3450
3451                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3452                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3453                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3454                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
3455                         test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
3456                 }
3457                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3458                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3459                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3460         }
3461
3462         #[test]
3463         fn revoked_output_claim() {
3464                 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
3465                 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
3466                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3467                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3468                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
3469                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3470                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
3471                 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
3472                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
3473                 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
3474                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
3475
3476                 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
3477                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3478                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3479                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3480                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
3481
3482                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
3483
3484                 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3485                 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
3486                 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
3487
3488                 revoked_tx_map.clear();
3489                 revoked_tx_map.insert(chan_1.3.txid(), chan_1.3.clone());
3490                 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
3491
3492                 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
3493                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3494                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3495         }
3496
3497         #[test]
3498         fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
3499                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
3500                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3501
3502                 // Create some new channel:
3503                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3504
3505                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
3506                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3507                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
3508                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
3509                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
3510
3511                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
3512                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3513                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
3514                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3515                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
3516                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
3517                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
3518                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
3519
3520                 //Revoke the old state
3521                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3522
3523                 {
3524                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3525
3526                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3527
3528                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3529                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3530                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
3531
3532                         let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3533                         revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
3534
3535                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
3536                         node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
3537                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
3538
3539                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
3540                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
3541                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
3542                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
3543                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
3544                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
3545                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
3546                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
3547
3548                         // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
3549                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
3550                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
3551
3552                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
3553                         let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
3554                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
3555                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
3556                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
3557                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
3558                 }
3559                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3560                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3561                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3562         }
3563
3564         #[test]
3565         fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
3566                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
3567                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3568
3569                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3570
3571                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
3572                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3573                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
3574                 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
3575                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
3576                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
3577
3578                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
3579                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3580
3581                 //Revoke the old state
3582                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3583
3584                 {
3585                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3586
3587                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
3588
3589                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
3590                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3591                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
3592
3593                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
3594                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
3595                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
3596                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
3597                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
3598                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
3599                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
3600
3601                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3602                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
3603                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
3604
3605                         let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3606                         revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
3607                         node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
3608                         node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
3609                         node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
3610
3611                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
3612                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
3613                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
3614                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
3615                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
3616                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
3617                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
3618                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
3619
3620                         let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3621                         funding_tx_map.insert(chan_1.3.txid(), chan_1.3.clone());
3622                         node_txn[3].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3623                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
3624
3625                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
3626                         let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
3627                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
3628                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
3629                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
3630                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
3631                 }
3632                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3633                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3634                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3635         }
3636
3637         #[test]
3638         fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3639                 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3640                 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3641                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3642                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3643
3644                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3645                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
3646                 {
3647                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3648                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3649                         match events[0] {
3650                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3651                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3652                                 },
3653                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3654                         }
3655                 }
3656
3657                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3658                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3659
3660                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3661                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
3662
3663                 {
3664                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3665                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3666                         match events[0] {
3667                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3668                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3669                                 },
3670                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3671                         }
3672                 }
3673
3674                 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
3675                 // registering new transactions
3676                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
3677         }
3678
3679         #[test]
3680         fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3681                 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3682                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
3683                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3684                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3685
3686                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
3687
3688                 let our_payment_preimage = [*nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3689                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3690                 let our_payment_hash = {
3691                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3692                         sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
3693                         let mut ret = [0; 32];
3694                         sha.result(&mut ret);
3695                         ret
3696                 };
3697
3698                 let mut payment_event = {
3699                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3700                         {
3701                                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3702                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3703                                 added_monitors.clear();
3704                         }
3705
3706                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3707                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3708                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3709                 };
3710
3711                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3712                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3713
3714                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3715                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3716                 match events_1[0] {
3717                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3718                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3719                 };
3720
3721                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3722                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3723
3724                 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3725                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3726                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3727                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3728
3729                 {
3730                         let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3731                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3732                         added_monitors.clear();
3733                 }
3734
3735                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3736                 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
3737
3738                 {
3739                         let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3740                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3741                         added_monitors.clear();
3742                 }
3743
3744                 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3745                 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3746                 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3747
3748                 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
3749                 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3750                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3751                 match events_3[0] {
3752                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3753                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3754                         },
3755                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3756                 }
3757
3758                 let tx = {
3759                         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3760                         // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3761                         // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3762                         // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3763                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3764                         node_txn.remove(0)
3765                 };
3766
3767                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3768                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
3769
3770                 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3771                 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3772                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3773                 match events_4[0] {
3774                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3775                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3776                         },
3777                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3778                 }
3779
3780                 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3781                 {
3782                         let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
3783                         monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
3784                                 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
3785                 }
3786                 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
3787                 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3788                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3789                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3790                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3791                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3792                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3793                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3794                 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx);
3795                 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3796         }
3797
3798         #[test]
3799         fn test_unconf_chan() {
3800                 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
3801                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3802                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3803
3804                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3805                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
3806                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
3807                 mem::drop(channel_state);
3808
3809                 let mut headers = Vec::new();
3810                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3811                 headers.push(header.clone());
3812                 for _i in 2..100 {
3813                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3814                         headers.push(header.clone());
3815                 }
3816                 while !headers.is_empty() {
3817                         nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
3818                 }
3819                 {
3820                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3821                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3822                         match events[0] {
3823                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3824                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3825                                 },
3826                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3827                         }
3828                 }
3829                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3830                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
3831                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
3832         }
3833
3834         fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_htlc_fails: (usize, usize)) {
3835                 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3836                 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3837
3838                 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
3839                 for msg in reestablish_1 {
3840                         resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
3841                 }
3842                 {
3843                         let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3844                         if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
3845                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3846                         } else {
3847                                 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
3848                         }
3849                         added_monitors.clear();
3850                 }
3851
3852                 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
3853                 for msg in reestablish_2 {
3854                         resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
3855                 }
3856                 {
3857                         let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3858                         if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
3859                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3860                         } else {
3861                                 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
3862                         }
3863                         added_monitors.clear();
3864                 }
3865
3866                 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
3867                 assert!((pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.0 == 0) || (pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
3868
3869                 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
3870                         if pre_all_htlcs {
3871                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
3872                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
3873                         } else {
3874                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
3875                         }
3876                         assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
3877                         if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
3878                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
3879                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
3880                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
3881                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
3882                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3883                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
3884                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
3885                                 }
3886                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
3887                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
3888                                 }
3889
3890                                 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
3891                         } else {
3892                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
3893                         }
3894                 }
3895
3896                 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
3897                         if pre_all_htlcs {
3898                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
3899                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
3900                         } else {
3901                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
3902                         }
3903                         assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
3904                         if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
3905                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
3906                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
3907                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
3908                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
3909                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3910                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
3911                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
3912                                 }
3913                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
3914                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
3915                                 }
3916
3917                                 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
3918                         } else {
3919                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
3920                         }
3921                 }
3922         }
3923
3924         #[test]
3925         fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3926                 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3927                 let nodes = create_network(3);
3928                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3929                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3930
3931                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3932                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3933                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0));
3934
3935                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3936                 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3937                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3938                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3939
3940                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3941                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3942                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0));
3943
3944                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3945                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3946                 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3947                 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3948
3949                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3950                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3951
3952                 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
3953                 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
3954
3955                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (1, 0), (1, 0));
3956                 {
3957                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3958                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3959                         match events[0] {
3960                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3961                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3962                                 },
3963                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3964                         }
3965                         match events[1] {
3966                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
3967                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3968                                 },
3969                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3970                         }
3971                 }
3972
3973                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3974                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3975         }
3976
3977         #[test]
3978         fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
3979                 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
3980                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3981                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3982
3983                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3984
3985                 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3986                 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3987                 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3988                 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3989
3990                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3991
3992                 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3993                 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3994
3995                 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
3996                 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
3997
3998                 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
3999
4000                 let mut chan_announcement;
4001
4002                 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
4003                         () => {
4004                                 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4005                                         features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
4006                                         chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
4007                                         short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4008                                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
4009                                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
4010                                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
4011                                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
4012                                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
4013                                 };
4014                         }
4015                 }
4016
4017                 macro_rules! sign_msg {
4018                         ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
4019                                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
4020                                 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4021                                 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4022                                 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
4023                                 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
4024                                 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4025                                         node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
4026                                         node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
4027                                         bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
4028                                         bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
4029                                         contents: $unsigned_msg
4030                                 }
4031                         }
4032                 }
4033
4034                 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
4035                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
4036                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
4037                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
4038
4039                 // Configured with Network::Testnet
4040                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
4041                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
4042                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
4043                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
4044
4045                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
4046                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
4047                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
4048                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
4049         }
4050 }