1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
18 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
19 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
22 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
23 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
26 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
29 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
30 use util::config::UserConfig;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
69 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
70 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
71 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
72 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
73 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
75 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
76 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
79 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
80 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
81 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
82 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
85 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
86 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
87 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
88 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
92 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
95 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
96 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
97 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
100 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102 pub enum HTLCSource {
103 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
106 session_priv: SecretKey,
107 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
108 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
109 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
114 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
115 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
116 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
117 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
118 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
126 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
134 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
136 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
137 err: msgs::HandleError,
138 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
140 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
142 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
146 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
147 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
149 data: err.to_string()
153 needs_channel_force_close: false,
157 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
161 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
162 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
164 data: err.to_string()
168 needs_channel_force_close: true,
172 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
173 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
176 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
177 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
180 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
183 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
185 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
187 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
189 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
190 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
192 data: msg.to_string()
197 needs_channel_force_close: false,
201 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
204 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
206 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
208 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
210 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
211 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
213 data: msg.to_string()
218 needs_channel_force_close: true,
223 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
224 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
226 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
227 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
229 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
233 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
234 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
235 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
236 /// probably increase this significantly.
237 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
239 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
240 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
242 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
245 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
246 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
247 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
248 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
249 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
250 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
251 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
253 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
257 struct ChannelHolder {
258 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
259 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
260 next_forward: Instant,
261 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
262 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
263 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
264 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
265 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
266 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
267 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
269 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
270 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
271 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
272 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
274 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
275 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
276 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
277 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
278 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
279 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
280 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
283 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
285 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
286 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
287 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
288 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
289 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
290 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
295 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
296 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
298 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
299 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
301 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
302 /// to individual Channels.
304 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
305 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
306 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
307 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
309 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
310 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
311 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
312 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
313 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
314 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
315 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
317 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
318 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
319 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
320 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
322 pub struct ChannelManager {
323 default_configuration: UserConfig,
324 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
325 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
326 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
327 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
328 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
330 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
331 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
332 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
334 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
335 our_network_key: SecretKey,
337 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
338 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
339 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
340 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
341 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
343 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
348 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
349 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
350 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
351 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
352 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
353 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
354 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
356 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
357 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
358 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
359 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
362 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
364 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
365 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
368 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
370 macro_rules! secp_call {
371 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
374 Err(_) => return Err($err),
381 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
383 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
384 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
389 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
390 pub struct ChannelDetails {
391 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
392 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
393 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
394 /// lifetime of the channel.
395 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
396 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
397 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
398 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
399 /// The node_id of our counterparty
400 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
401 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
402 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
403 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
407 macro_rules! handle_error {
408 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
411 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
412 if needs_channel_force_close {
414 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
415 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
416 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
418 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
421 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
422 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
423 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
424 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
425 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
427 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
439 impl ChannelManager {
440 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
442 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
443 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
445 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
447 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
448 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
449 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
451 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
452 default_configuration: config.clone(),
453 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
454 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
455 monitor: monitor.clone(),
459 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
460 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
463 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
464 by_id: HashMap::new(),
465 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
466 next_forward: Instant::now(),
467 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
468 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
469 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
471 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
473 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
474 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
480 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
481 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
485 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
487 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
488 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
489 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
490 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
492 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
493 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
495 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
496 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
497 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
498 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
499 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
502 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
503 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
505 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
506 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
507 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
508 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
509 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
510 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
512 panic!("RNG is bad???");
515 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
517 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
518 node_id: their_network_key,
524 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
525 /// more information.
526 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
527 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
528 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
529 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
530 res.push(ChannelDetails {
531 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
532 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
533 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
534 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
535 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
541 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
542 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
543 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
544 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
545 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
546 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
547 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
548 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
549 // really wanted anyway.
550 if channel.is_live() {
551 res.push(ChannelDetails {
552 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
553 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
554 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
555 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
556 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
563 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
564 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
565 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
567 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
568 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
569 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
571 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
572 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
573 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
574 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
575 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
576 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
577 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
578 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
581 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
582 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
583 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
585 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
586 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
588 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
591 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
592 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
593 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
595 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
596 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
601 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
602 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
603 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
612 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
613 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
614 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
615 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
616 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
618 for tx in local_txn {
619 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
621 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
622 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
623 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
624 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
625 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
626 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
627 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
630 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
631 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
632 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
633 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
636 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
637 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
638 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
639 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
640 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
647 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
648 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
649 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
650 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
656 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
657 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
658 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
659 for chan in self.list_channels() {
660 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
664 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
666 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
668 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
669 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
670 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
671 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
675 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
676 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
677 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
678 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
679 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
684 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
685 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
686 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
692 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
693 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
695 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
696 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
697 let mut res = [0; 32];
698 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
702 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
703 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
704 let mut res = [0; 32];
705 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
711 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
712 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
713 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
714 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
715 let mut res = [0; 32];
716 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
721 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
722 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
723 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
724 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
725 let mut res = [0; 32];
726 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
730 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
732 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
733 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
734 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
736 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
737 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
739 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
740 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
741 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
742 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
743 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
745 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
747 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
748 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
750 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
756 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
757 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
758 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
760 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
761 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
767 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
777 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
778 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
779 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
780 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
781 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
782 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
783 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
784 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
786 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
787 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
788 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
789 // the intended recipient).
790 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
791 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
792 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
794 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
795 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
796 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
797 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
801 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
802 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
803 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
805 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
806 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
807 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
809 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
811 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
815 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
817 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
825 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
826 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
828 for i in 0..dst.len() {
833 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
834 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
835 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
836 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
839 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
840 let end_len = iters * 65;
841 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
842 res.resize(end_len, 0);
844 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
845 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
846 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
847 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
848 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
853 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
854 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
856 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
857 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
858 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
859 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
861 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
862 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
863 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
866 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
869 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
870 hmac.input(&packet_data);
871 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
872 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
877 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
878 hop_data: packet_data,
883 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
884 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
885 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
886 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
888 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
889 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
890 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
891 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
892 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
893 data: packet_crypted,
897 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
898 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
899 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
901 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
904 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
905 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
906 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
907 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
911 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
912 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
915 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
917 failuremsg: failuremsg,
921 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
922 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
923 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
929 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
930 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
931 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
934 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
935 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
938 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
939 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
940 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
941 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
947 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
948 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
949 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
950 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
951 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
952 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
953 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
954 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
957 let shared_secret = {
958 let mut arr = [0; 32];
959 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
962 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
964 let mut channel_state = None;
965 macro_rules! return_err {
966 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
968 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
969 if channel_state.is_none() {
970 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
972 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
973 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
974 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
975 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
976 })), channel_state.unwrap());
981 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
982 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
983 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
984 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
985 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
986 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
987 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
988 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
991 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
992 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
993 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
994 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
995 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
998 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
999 let next_hop_data = {
1000 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1001 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1002 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
1004 let error_code = match err {
1005 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1006 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1008 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1014 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1016 // final_expiry_too_soon
1017 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1018 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1020 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1021 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1022 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1024 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1025 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1026 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1029 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1030 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1031 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1032 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1034 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1036 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1037 short_channel_id: 0,
1038 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1039 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1040 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1043 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1044 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1045 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1047 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1049 let blinding_factor = {
1050 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1051 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1052 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1053 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1054 sha.result(&mut res);
1055 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1057 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1063 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1064 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1067 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1069 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1070 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1071 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1074 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1075 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1076 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1077 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1078 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1079 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1080 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1084 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1085 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1086 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1087 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1088 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1089 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1090 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1092 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1094 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1095 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1097 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1098 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1099 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1100 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1101 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1102 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1103 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1105 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1106 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1108 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1109 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1110 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1112 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1113 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1115 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1116 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1117 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1118 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1120 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1121 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1126 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1127 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1128 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1130 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1131 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1133 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1134 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1136 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1141 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1144 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1145 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1146 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1147 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1148 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1152 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1154 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1155 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1156 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1157 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1158 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1159 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1160 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1161 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1162 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1163 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1166 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1167 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1169 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1175 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1177 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1178 /// fields for more info.
1180 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1181 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1182 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1183 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1184 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1185 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1187 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1189 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1190 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1191 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1192 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1193 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1195 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1196 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1197 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1198 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1202 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1204 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1206 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1207 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1208 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1209 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1211 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1212 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1214 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1215 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1216 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1220 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1221 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1222 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1224 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1225 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1227 if !chan.is_live() {
1228 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1230 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1231 route: route.clone(),
1232 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1233 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1234 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he|
1236 ChannelError::Close(err) => {
1237 // TODO: We need to close the channel here, but for that to be safe we have
1238 // to do all channel closure inside the channel_state lock which is a
1239 // somewhat-larger refactor, so we leave that for later.
1240 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }
1242 ChannelError::Ignore(err) => APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err },
1247 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1248 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1249 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1250 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1253 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1254 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1255 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1256 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1257 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1258 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1259 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1271 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1273 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1274 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1276 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1278 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1279 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1280 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1281 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1283 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1285 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1286 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1288 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1289 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, chan.channel_id()))
1295 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1296 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1297 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1300 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1301 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1302 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1303 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1310 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1311 // lock before add_update_monitor
1312 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1316 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1317 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1318 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1321 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1322 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1323 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1325 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1331 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1332 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1334 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1336 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1338 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1339 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1341 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1342 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1343 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1344 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1345 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1349 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1351 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1352 /// Will likely generate further events.
1353 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1354 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1356 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1357 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1359 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1360 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1362 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1366 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1367 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1368 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1369 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1371 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1372 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1373 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1374 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1375 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1376 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1378 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1383 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1385 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1386 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1387 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1388 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1389 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1390 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1392 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1394 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1395 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1400 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1402 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1403 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1404 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1405 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1406 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1407 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1408 // this channel currently :/.
1415 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1416 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1419 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1420 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1422 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1426 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1427 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1429 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1430 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1431 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1432 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1433 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1434 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1435 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1437 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1442 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1443 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1444 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1445 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1446 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1448 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1449 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1450 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1452 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1453 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1454 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1461 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1463 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1464 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1468 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1469 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1470 events.append(&mut new_events);
1473 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1474 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1475 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1477 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1478 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1479 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1480 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1481 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1482 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1488 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1489 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1490 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1491 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1492 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1493 /// still-available channels.
1494 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1496 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1497 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1498 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1499 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1500 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1501 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1502 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1507 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1508 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1509 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1512 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1515 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1516 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1517 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1518 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1519 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1521 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1522 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1526 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1528 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1529 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1533 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1534 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1535 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1536 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1539 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1540 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1541 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1542 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1543 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1544 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1545 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1547 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1553 //TODO: Do something with e?
1561 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1562 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1563 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1565 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1566 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1567 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1568 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1569 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1570 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1572 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1574 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1575 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1576 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1577 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1578 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1579 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1584 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1586 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1587 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1588 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1589 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1593 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1594 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1595 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1597 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1598 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1600 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1601 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1607 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1608 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1609 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1610 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1611 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1612 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1615 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1616 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1617 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1618 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1619 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1620 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1621 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1622 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1630 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1631 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1632 //TODO: Do something with e?
1640 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1641 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1642 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1645 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1646 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1648 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1649 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1650 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1651 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1652 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1655 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1656 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1657 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1658 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1659 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1660 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1661 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1662 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1664 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1665 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1666 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1668 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1669 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1670 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1676 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1679 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1680 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1681 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1683 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1685 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1686 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1687 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1688 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1693 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1694 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1695 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1696 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1697 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1702 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1706 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1717 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1718 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1720 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1722 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1723 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1727 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1728 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1729 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1732 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1733 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1734 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1735 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1736 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1737 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1738 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1739 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1740 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1741 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1743 entry.insert(channel);
1749 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1750 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1751 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1752 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1754 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1755 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1756 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1758 chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration)
1759 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1760 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1762 //TODO: same as above
1763 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1766 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1767 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1768 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1769 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1770 output_script: output_script,
1771 user_channel_id: user_id,
1776 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1777 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1778 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1779 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1781 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1782 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1783 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1785 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1786 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1787 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1790 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))
1794 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1797 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1798 // lock before add_update_monitor
1799 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1802 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1803 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1804 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1805 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1806 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1808 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1809 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1810 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1819 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1820 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1821 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1822 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1824 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1825 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1826 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1828 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1829 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1832 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1834 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1837 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1838 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1839 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1840 user_channel_id: user_id,
1845 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1846 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1847 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1848 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1850 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1851 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1852 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1854 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1855 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1856 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan) {
1857 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1858 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1859 msg: announcement_sigs,
1864 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1868 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1869 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1870 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1871 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1873 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1874 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1875 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1876 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1877 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1879 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1880 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1881 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1882 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1886 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1887 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1888 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1892 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1893 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1894 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1896 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1897 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1899 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1902 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1903 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1904 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1906 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1907 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1908 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1909 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1917 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1918 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1919 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1920 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1921 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1922 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1923 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1924 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1925 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1927 let (closing_signed, tx) = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1928 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1929 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1930 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1935 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1936 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1937 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1938 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1939 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1940 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1941 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1943 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1944 } else { (tx, None) }
1946 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1949 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1950 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1952 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1953 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1954 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1955 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1963 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1964 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1965 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1966 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1968 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1969 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1970 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1971 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1973 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1974 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1976 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1978 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1979 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1980 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1982 if !chan.is_usable() {
1983 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1984 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1985 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1986 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1987 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan);
1988 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1989 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1990 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1991 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
1992 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &update.encode_with_len()[..])
1994 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
1995 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
1996 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
1997 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
1998 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
1999 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2004 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
2006 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2010 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2011 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2012 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2014 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2015 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2016 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2018 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
2019 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
2021 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2023 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2027 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
2028 // indicating that the payment itself failed
2029 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
2030 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
2031 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
2032 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
2033 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
2035 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
2036 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
2040 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
2041 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
2042 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
2045 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
2047 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
2048 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
2049 if res.is_some() { return; }
2051 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
2052 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2053 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2055 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2057 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2058 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2059 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2060 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2061 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2063 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2065 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2066 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2067 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2068 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2069 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2070 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2072 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2073 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
2074 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2075 // definitely came from the peer in question
2076 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
2078 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
2080 match error_code & 0xff {
2082 // either from an intermediate or final node
2083 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
2084 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
2085 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
2086 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
2087 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2088 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2089 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
2090 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2091 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
2092 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2093 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2099 if is_from_final_node {
2100 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2101 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2102 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2103 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2104 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2105 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2108 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2109 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2113 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2114 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2115 // does not coform to the spec.
2116 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2117 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2118 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2124 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2128 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2130 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2131 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2132 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2136 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2137 let offset = match error_code {
2138 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2139 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2140 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2141 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2142 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2143 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2145 // node sending unknown code
2146 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2147 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2154 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2155 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2156 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2157 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2158 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2159 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2160 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2161 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2164 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2165 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2166 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2167 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2169 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2170 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2171 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2172 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2173 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2175 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2176 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2177 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2178 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2180 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2181 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2182 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2183 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2185 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2186 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2189 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2190 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2194 res = Some((msg, true));
2200 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2203 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2204 res = Some((None, true));
2208 // node sending unknown code
2209 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2210 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2219 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2220 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2221 } else { ((None, true)) }
2224 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2225 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2226 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2228 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2229 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2230 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2232 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2233 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2235 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2240 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2241 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2242 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2244 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2245 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2246 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2248 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2249 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set", msg.channel_id));
2251 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2252 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2255 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2259 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2260 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2261 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2262 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2264 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2265 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2266 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2268 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator)
2269 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2270 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2273 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2274 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2275 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2277 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2278 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2279 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2280 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2281 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2282 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2283 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2284 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2286 commitment_signed: msg,
2290 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2291 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2292 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2298 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2303 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2304 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2305 let mut forward_event = None;
2306 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2307 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2308 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2309 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2310 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2312 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2313 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2314 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2315 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2317 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2318 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2323 match forward_event {
2325 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2326 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2327 time_forwardable: time
2335 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2336 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2337 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2338 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2339 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2341 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2342 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2343 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2345 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator)
2346 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2347 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2350 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2351 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2352 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2356 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2357 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2358 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2362 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2364 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2367 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2368 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2370 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2375 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2376 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2377 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2379 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2380 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2381 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2383 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2385 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2389 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2390 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2391 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2393 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2395 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2396 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2398 if !chan.is_usable() {
2399 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2402 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2403 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2404 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2406 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2407 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2408 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2409 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2410 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2412 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2414 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2415 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2416 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2417 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2418 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2419 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2420 contents: announcement,
2422 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2425 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2430 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2431 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2432 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2434 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2436 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2437 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2439 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order, shutdown) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2440 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2441 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2442 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2446 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2447 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2448 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2452 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2453 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2454 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2455 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2460 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2461 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2462 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2463 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2469 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2473 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2478 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2479 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2480 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2486 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2490 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2491 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2492 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2493 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2495 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2496 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2497 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2498 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2500 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2501 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2503 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2504 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2506 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2507 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2509 if !chan.is_live() {
2510 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2512 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw)
2513 .map_err(|e| match e {
2514 ChannelError::Ignore(err) => APIError::APIMisuseError{err},
2515 ChannelError::Close(err) => {
2516 // TODO: We need to close the channel here, but for that to be safe we have
2517 // to do all channel closure inside the channel_state lock which is a
2518 // somewhat-larger refactor, so we leave that for later.
2519 APIError::APIMisuseError{err}
2522 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2525 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2526 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2527 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2528 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2529 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2530 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2531 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2532 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2543 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2544 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2545 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2546 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2547 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2552 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2553 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2554 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2555 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2556 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2561 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2562 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2563 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2564 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2566 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2567 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2568 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2569 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2570 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2571 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2572 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2573 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2574 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2575 msg: funding_locked,
2577 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2578 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2579 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2580 msg: announcement_sigs,
2583 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2584 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2585 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2586 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2589 if channel.is_shutdown() {
2593 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2594 for tx in txn_matched {
2595 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2596 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2597 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2598 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2600 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2601 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2602 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2603 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2604 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2605 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2614 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2615 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2616 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2618 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2619 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2620 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2621 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2622 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2623 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2624 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2633 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2634 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2636 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2637 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2640 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2641 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2642 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2643 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2645 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2646 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2647 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2648 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2649 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2650 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2651 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2652 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2654 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2655 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2656 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2666 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2667 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2669 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2670 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2674 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2675 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2676 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2677 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2678 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2681 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2682 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2683 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2686 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2687 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2688 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2691 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2692 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2693 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2696 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2697 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2698 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2701 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2702 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2703 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2706 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2707 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2708 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2711 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2712 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2713 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2716 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2717 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2718 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2721 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2722 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2723 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2726 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2727 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2728 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2731 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2732 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2733 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2736 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2737 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2738 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2741 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2742 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2743 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2746 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2747 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2748 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2751 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2752 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2753 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2756 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2757 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2758 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2759 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2761 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2762 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2763 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2764 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2765 if no_connection_possible {
2766 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2767 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2768 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2769 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2770 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2772 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2773 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2774 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2784 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2785 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2786 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2787 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2788 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2789 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2790 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2791 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2793 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2794 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2795 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2804 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2805 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2807 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2808 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2809 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2814 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2815 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2817 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2818 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2819 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2820 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2821 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2822 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2823 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2824 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2825 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2826 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2830 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2831 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2832 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2838 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2841 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2842 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2844 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2845 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2846 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2847 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2851 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2856 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2857 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2859 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2860 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2861 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2863 onion.write(writer)?;
2867 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2868 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2869 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2870 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2871 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2876 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2877 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2878 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2880 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2881 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2883 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2885 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2886 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2887 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2888 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2889 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2894 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2895 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2897 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2899 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2901 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2903 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2910 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2911 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2912 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2913 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2914 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2915 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2920 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2921 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2923 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2925 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2927 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2929 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2936 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2937 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2938 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2939 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2940 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2941 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2946 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2949 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2952 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2953 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2955 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2957 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2959 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2961 route.write(writer)?;
2962 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2963 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2970 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2971 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2972 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2973 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2974 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2975 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2976 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2977 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2979 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2984 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2985 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2987 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2991 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2993 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2994 data.write(writer)?;
3001 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3002 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3003 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3004 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3005 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3006 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3007 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3009 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3014 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
3015 prev_short_channel_id,
3020 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3021 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3022 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3024 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3025 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3027 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3028 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3029 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3031 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3032 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3033 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3034 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3035 unfunded_channels += 1;
3038 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3039 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3040 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3041 channel.write(writer)?;
3045 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3046 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3047 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3048 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3049 for forward in pending_forwards {
3050 forward.write(writer)?;
3054 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3055 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3056 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3057 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3058 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3059 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3067 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3069 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3071 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3072 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3073 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3074 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3075 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3076 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3077 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3078 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3079 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3080 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3081 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3082 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3083 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3084 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3085 /// deserialization.
3086 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3088 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3090 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3091 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3092 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3094 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3095 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3096 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3097 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3098 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3100 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3101 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3102 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3103 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3104 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3105 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3106 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3107 /// deserialization.
3108 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3109 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3110 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3111 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3113 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3114 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3116 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3117 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3118 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3119 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3121 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3123 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3126 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3127 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3128 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3129 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3130 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3131 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3134 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3135 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3136 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3138 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3140 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3141 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3142 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3143 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3144 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3145 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3146 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3147 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3150 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3151 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3152 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3153 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3154 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3155 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3156 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3157 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3158 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3160 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3161 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3163 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3166 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3170 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3171 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3172 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3176 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3177 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3178 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3179 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3180 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3181 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3182 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3183 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3185 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3188 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3189 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3190 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3191 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3192 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3193 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3194 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3195 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3197 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3200 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3202 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3203 monitor: args.monitor,
3204 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3205 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3207 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3208 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3209 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3211 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3214 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3217 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3219 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3221 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3222 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3223 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3224 logger: args.logger,
3225 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3228 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3229 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3230 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3231 //connection or two.
3234 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3240 use chain::chaininterface;
3241 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3242 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3243 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
3244 use chain::keysinterface;
3245 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
3246 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
3247 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3248 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3250 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
3251 use util::test_utils;
3252 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3253 use util::errors::APIError;
3254 use util::logger::Logger;
3255 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3256 use util::config::UserConfig;
3258 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3259 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3260 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
3261 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
3262 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3263 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
3264 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
3265 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3266 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3267 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3271 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3272 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3274 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3275 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3277 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3279 use std::cell::RefCell;
3280 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
3281 use std::default::Default;
3283 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3284 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3285 use std::time::Instant;
3288 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3289 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3290 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3295 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3296 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3299 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3300 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3303 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3304 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3307 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3308 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3311 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3312 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3317 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3319 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3320 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3325 fn onion_vectors() {
3326 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3327 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3329 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3330 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3331 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3332 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3333 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3335 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3336 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3337 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3338 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3339 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3341 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3342 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3343 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3344 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3345 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3347 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3348 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3349 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3350 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3351 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3353 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3354 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3355 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3356 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3357 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3359 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3360 let payloads = vec!(
3361 msgs::OnionHopData {
3363 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3364 short_channel_id: 0,
3366 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3370 msgs::OnionHopData {
3372 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3373 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3374 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3375 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3379 msgs::OnionHopData {
3381 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3382 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3383 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3384 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3388 msgs::OnionHopData {
3390 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3391 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3392 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3393 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3397 msgs::OnionHopData {
3399 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3400 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3401 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3402 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3408 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
3409 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3411 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3415 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3416 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3418 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3419 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3420 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3422 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3423 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3425 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3426 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3428 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3429 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("a5d3e8634cfe78b2307d87c6d90be6fe7855b4f2cc9b1dfb19e92e4b79103f61ff9ac25f412ddfb7466e74f81b3e545563cdd8f5524dae873de61d7bdfccd496af2584930d2b566b4f8d3881f8c043df92224f38cf094cfc09d92655989531524593ec6d6caec1863bdfaa79229b5020acc034cd6deeea1021c50586947b9b8e6faa83b81fbfa6133c0af5d6b07c017f7158fa94f0d206baf12dda6b68f785b773b360fd0497e16cc402d779c8d48d0fa6315536ef0660f3f4e1865f5b38ea49c7da4fd959de4e83ff3ab686f059a45c65ba2af4a6a79166aa0f496bf04d06987b6d2ea205bdb0d347718b9aeff5b61dfff344993a275b79717cd815b6ad4c0beb568c4ac9c36ff1c315ec1119a1993c4b61e6eaa0375e0aaf738ac691abd3263bf937e3").unwrap());
3431 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3432 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("aac3200c4968f56b21f53e5e374e3a2383ad2b1b6501bbcc45abc31e59b26881b7dfadbb56ec8dae8857add94e6702fb4c3a4de22e2e669e1ed926b04447fc73034bb730f4932acd62727b75348a648a1128744657ca6a4e713b9b646c3ca66cac02cdab44dd3439890ef3aaf61708714f7375349b8da541b2548d452d84de7084bb95b3ac2345201d624d31f4d52078aa0fa05a88b4e20202bd2b86ac5b52919ea305a8949de95e935eed0319cf3cf19ebea61d76ba92532497fcdc9411d06bcd4275094d0a4a3c5d3a945e43305a5a9256e333e1f64dbca5fcd4e03a39b9012d197506e06f29339dfee3331995b21615337ae060233d39befea925cc262873e0530408e6990f1cbd233a150ef7b004ff6166c70c68d9f8c853c1abca640b8660db2921").unwrap());
3434 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3435 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3438 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3439 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3440 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3441 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3443 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3444 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3449 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3450 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3451 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3452 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3454 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3455 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3456 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3458 impl Drop for Node {
3459 fn drop(&mut self) {
3460 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3461 // Check that we processed all pending events
3462 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3463 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3464 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3469 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3470 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3473 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3474 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3475 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3476 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3479 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3480 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3482 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3483 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3485 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3486 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3489 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3490 }, match events[1] {
3491 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3492 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3493 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3494 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3495 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3496 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3497 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3498 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3500 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3506 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3507 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3509 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3510 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3512 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3513 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3516 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3522 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3523 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3525 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3526 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3528 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3529 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3532 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3538 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3539 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
3541 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3542 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3549 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3550 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3551 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3552 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3554 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3558 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3559 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3561 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3562 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3563 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3565 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3566 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3568 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3570 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3571 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3572 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3573 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3574 added_monitors.clear();
3576 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3579 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3581 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3582 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3583 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3584 added_monitors.clear();
3587 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3589 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3590 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3591 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3592 added_monitors.clear();
3595 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3596 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3598 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3599 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3600 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3602 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3608 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3609 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3610 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3614 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3615 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3616 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3617 ((match events_6[0] {
3618 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3619 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3620 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3623 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3624 }, match events_6[1] {
3625 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3626 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3629 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3633 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3634 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3635 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3639 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3640 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3641 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3642 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3644 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3645 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3646 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3647 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3653 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3654 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3655 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3656 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3657 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3658 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3661 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3664 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3666 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3669 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3670 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3673 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3674 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3676 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3677 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3678 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3680 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3683 macro_rules! check_spends {
3684 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3686 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3687 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3688 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3689 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3694 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3695 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3697 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3698 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3699 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3700 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3701 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3704 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3705 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3707 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3708 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3711 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3718 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
3719 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3720 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3723 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3724 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3726 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3727 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3728 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3729 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3730 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3733 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3736 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3737 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3740 Some(match events_1[1] {
3741 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3742 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3745 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3749 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3750 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3751 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3752 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3753 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3754 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3755 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3757 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3758 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3759 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3760 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3761 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3762 (as_update, bs_update)
3764 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3766 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3767 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3768 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3769 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3771 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3772 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3773 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3774 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3775 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3776 (as_update, bs_update)
3778 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3779 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3781 (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
3786 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3787 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3790 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3791 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3792 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3793 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3794 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3795 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3798 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3800 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3801 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3806 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3807 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3809 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3810 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3811 added_monitors.clear();
3816 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3817 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3819 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3820 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3821 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3822 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3823 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3826 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
3828 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3829 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3830 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3831 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3832 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3833 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3834 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3835 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3836 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3837 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3839 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3840 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3844 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3846 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3847 if $fail_backwards {
3848 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3849 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3851 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3853 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3854 if $fail_backwards {
3855 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3856 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3858 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3860 added_monitors.clear();
3865 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
3867 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
3870 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3872 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
3873 if $fail_backwards {
3874 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3875 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3876 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
3877 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3878 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
3880 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3886 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3889 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3890 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3891 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3892 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3893 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3894 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3895 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3900 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3901 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3903 let mut payment_event = {
3904 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3905 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3907 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3908 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3909 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3911 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3913 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3914 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3916 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3917 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3918 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3920 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3921 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3923 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3924 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3927 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3928 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3930 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3931 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3932 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3934 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3935 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3936 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3941 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3942 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3943 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3944 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3945 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3951 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3954 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3955 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3956 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3958 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3959 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3960 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
3963 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3964 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3966 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3967 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3968 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3969 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3970 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3971 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3972 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3973 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
3975 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3981 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
3982 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
3984 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3985 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3986 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3987 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3991 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
3992 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
3994 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3995 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3996 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
3997 get_next_msgs!($node)
3999 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4002 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4003 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
4008 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4009 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4010 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4011 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
4012 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4013 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
4014 } else if update_next_msgs {
4015 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
4017 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4019 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4020 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4027 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
4028 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4029 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4031 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4032 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4034 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4039 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
4040 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
4043 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
4045 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
4046 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4047 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4048 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4049 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4052 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4055 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4056 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4057 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4058 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4059 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4062 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4064 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4066 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4067 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4071 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4072 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4073 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4076 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4077 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
4078 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4080 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4081 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4082 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4084 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4085 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4090 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4091 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4092 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4093 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4094 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4095 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4096 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4097 // second-to-last node!
4098 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4101 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4102 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4103 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4105 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4106 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4107 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4108 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4109 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4110 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4111 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4112 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4114 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4117 assert!(events.is_empty());
4119 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4120 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4127 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4129 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4130 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4132 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
4133 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4134 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4136 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4141 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4142 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4145 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4146 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4147 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4148 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4149 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4151 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4152 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4154 for _ in 0..node_count {
4155 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4156 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4157 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4158 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4159 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4160 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4161 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4162 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4163 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4164 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4165 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4166 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4167 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
4168 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4169 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4177 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4178 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4179 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4180 let channel_id = chan.2;
4183 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4187 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4188 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4189 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4190 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4191 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4192 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4193 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4194 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4195 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4196 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4198 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4200 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4202 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4203 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4206 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4207 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4208 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4209 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4210 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4212 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4215 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4217 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4218 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4219 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4222 let payment_event = {
4223 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4224 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4225 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4227 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4228 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4230 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4231 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4232 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4233 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4234 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4237 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4238 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4239 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4240 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4243 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4244 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4245 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4246 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4247 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4248 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4249 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4252 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4253 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4254 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4255 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4256 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4257 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4258 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4261 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4262 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4263 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4264 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4266 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4267 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4270 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4273 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4274 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4276 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4277 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4280 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4285 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4286 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4287 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4288 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4289 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4290 let channel_id = chan.2;
4293 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4295 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4296 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4299 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4300 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4301 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4302 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4305 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4308 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4310 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4311 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4312 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4315 let payment_event = {
4316 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4317 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4318 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4320 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4321 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4323 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4324 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4325 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4326 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4327 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4330 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4333 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4337 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4338 let nodes = create_network(2);
4339 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4340 let channel_id = chan.2;
4343 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4344 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4345 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4346 // (3) update_fee ->
4347 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4348 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4349 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4350 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4351 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4352 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4353 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4354 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4355 // revoke_and_ack ->
4356 // B should send no response here
4357 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4358 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4359 // revoke_and_ack ->
4361 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4362 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4363 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4366 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4367 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4368 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4369 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4370 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4372 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4375 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4376 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4377 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4378 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4381 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4383 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4384 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4385 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4387 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4388 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4389 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4390 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4393 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4395 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4397 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4399 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4400 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4401 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4403 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4404 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4405 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4406 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4407 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4408 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4409 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4411 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4412 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4413 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4415 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4417 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4418 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4422 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4423 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4426 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4427 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4430 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4431 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4432 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4435 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4436 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4441 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4442 let nodes = create_network(2);
4443 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4444 let channel_id = chan.2;
4446 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4447 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
4448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4450 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4451 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4452 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4453 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4454 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4456 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4458 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4460 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4461 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4464 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4465 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4468 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4469 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4470 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4473 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4474 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4479 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
4480 let nodes = create_network(2);
4481 let channel_value = 1888;
4482 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
4483 let channel_id = chan.2;
4486 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
4487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4488 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4490 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4492 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
4494 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
4495 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
4497 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4498 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4500 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
4501 let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
4502 let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
4503 let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
4504 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
4505 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
4508 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
4509 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
4510 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
4511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4513 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4515 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4517 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
4518 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
4519 //Should produce and error.
4520 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
4522 assert!(match err.err {
4523 "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
4527 //clear the message we could not handle
4528 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4532 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4533 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4534 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4535 let channel_id = chan.2;
4538 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4540 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4541 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4544 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4545 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4546 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4547 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4548 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4550 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4552 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4553 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4554 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4557 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4559 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4561 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4562 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4564 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4565 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4566 added_monitors.clear();
4568 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4569 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4570 // node[1] has nothing to do
4572 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4573 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4576 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4577 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4578 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4580 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4582 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4584 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4585 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4586 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4587 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4588 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4589 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4591 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4592 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4594 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4596 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4598 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4600 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4602 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4603 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4605 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4607 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4609 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4610 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4612 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4613 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4615 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4616 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4618 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4619 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4621 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4622 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4625 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4627 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4628 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4629 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4633 fn test_update_fee() {
4634 let nodes = create_network(2);
4635 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4636 let channel_id = chan.2;
4639 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4640 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4641 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4642 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4643 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4644 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4645 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4646 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4647 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4648 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4649 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4650 // revoke_and_ack ->
4652 // Create and deliver (1)...
4653 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4654 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4657 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4658 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4659 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4660 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4661 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4663 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4665 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4667 // Generate (2) and (3):
4668 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4669 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4673 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4674 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4677 // Create and deliver (4)...
4678 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4680 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4681 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4682 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4683 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4684 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4686 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4689 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4690 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4693 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4694 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4696 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4697 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4699 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4700 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4703 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4704 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4707 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4708 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4709 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4710 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4711 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4712 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4713 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4714 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4718 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4720 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4721 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4723 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4725 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4727 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4728 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4729 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4733 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4734 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4735 let nodes = create_network(2);
4736 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4737 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4738 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4739 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4741 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4742 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4743 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4744 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4745 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4747 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4748 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4749 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4750 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4751 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4752 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4754 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4755 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4759 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4760 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4761 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4762 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4763 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4764 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4765 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4767 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4769 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4770 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4771 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4772 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4773 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4775 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4776 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4778 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4779 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4780 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4781 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4782 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4784 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4786 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4787 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4788 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4789 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4790 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4791 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4792 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4794 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4795 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4797 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4798 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4799 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4800 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4801 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4802 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4803 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4805 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4806 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4808 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4809 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4811 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4814 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4815 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4816 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4817 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4818 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4819 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4821 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4823 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4824 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4825 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4826 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4827 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4831 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
4832 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
4833 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4834 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4835 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4837 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4838 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4839 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4841 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4842 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4843 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4844 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4845 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4846 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4848 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4849 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4850 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4851 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4853 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4854 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4856 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4857 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
4859 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4860 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4861 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4862 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4863 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4864 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4866 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4867 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4869 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4870 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4872 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest } => {
4873 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4874 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
4876 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4879 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4880 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4881 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4882 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4883 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4884 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4885 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4887 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4889 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4890 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4891 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4892 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4893 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4897 fn update_fee_async_shutdown() {
4898 // Test update_fee works after shutdown start if messages are delivered out-of-order
4899 let nodes = create_network(2);
4900 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4902 let starting_feerate = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().get_feerate();
4903 nodes[0].node.update_fee(chan_1.2.clone(), starting_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4905 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4906 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4907 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4908 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4909 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4910 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_some());
4912 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4913 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4914 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4915 // Note that we don't actually test normative behavior here. The spec indicates we could
4916 // actually send a closing_signed here, but is kinda unclear and could possibly be amended
4917 // to require waiting on the full commitment dance before doing so (see
4918 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/499). In any case, to avoid
4919 // ambiguity, we should wait until after the full commitment dance to send closing_signed.
4920 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4922 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4923 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4925 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4926 let node_0_closing_signed = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, true);
4928 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4929 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), match node_0_closing_signed.unwrap() {
4930 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
4931 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4934 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4936 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4937 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4938 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4939 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4942 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
4943 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
4944 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
4945 let nodes = create_network(3);
4946 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4947 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4949 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4951 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4952 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4954 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4955 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4957 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4961 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4962 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4964 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4965 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4966 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4967 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4969 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
4970 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4971 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
4973 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
4974 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
4975 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4976 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
4979 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4980 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
4981 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
4983 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
4985 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4986 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4988 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4990 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4991 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4992 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4993 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4994 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4995 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4996 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4998 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4999 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
5001 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5002 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5003 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5004 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5005 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5006 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5007 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5009 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5010 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5012 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5013 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
5015 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5018 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5020 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5021 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5022 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
5025 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5026 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5028 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5029 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5030 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5031 if recv_count == 0 {
5032 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
5033 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5035 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5036 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5037 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
5039 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5040 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5041 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5043 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5044 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5046 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5047 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5048 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
5050 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
5051 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5052 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5053 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5054 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5056 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5057 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5058 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5059 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5060 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5061 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5063 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5065 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5066 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5067 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5068 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5069 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5070 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5072 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5073 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5074 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5075 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5076 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5078 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5079 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5081 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5085 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5087 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5088 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5089 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5090 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5091 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5095 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5096 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5097 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5098 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5102 fn fake_network_test() {
5103 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5104 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5105 let nodes = create_network(4);
5107 // Create some initial channels
5108 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5109 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5110 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5112 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5113 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5114 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5115 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5116 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5118 // Send some more payments
5119 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5120 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5121 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5123 // Test failure packets
5124 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5125 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5127 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5128 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5130 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5131 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5132 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5133 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5134 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5135 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5136 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5138 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5139 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5140 hops.push(RouteHop {
5141 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5142 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5144 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5146 hops.push(RouteHop {
5147 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5148 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5150 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5152 hops.push(RouteHop {
5153 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5154 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5156 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5158 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5159 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5160 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5162 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5163 hops.push(RouteHop {
5164 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5165 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5167 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5169 hops.push(RouteHop {
5170 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5171 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5173 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5175 hops.push(RouteHop {
5176 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5177 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5179 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5181 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5182 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5183 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5185 // Claim the rebalances...
5186 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5187 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5189 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5190 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5192 // Send some payments across both channels
5193 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5194 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5195 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5197 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5199 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5201 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5202 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5203 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5205 // Close down the channels...
5206 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5207 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5208 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5209 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5210 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5214 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5215 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5216 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5217 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5219 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5220 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5221 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5222 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5223 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5224 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5226 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5228 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5229 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5231 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5232 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5234 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5235 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5236 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5239 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5240 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5241 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5243 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5244 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5245 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5247 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5248 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5250 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5252 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5253 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5254 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5256 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5257 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5258 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5259 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5260 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5261 res.push(tx.clone());
5266 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5267 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5270 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5272 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5273 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5274 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5275 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5276 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5277 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5279 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5281 res.push(tx.clone());
5285 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
5288 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5292 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5293 /// HTLC transaction.
5294 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5295 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5296 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5297 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5298 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5299 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5303 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5306 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5307 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5309 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5310 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5311 let mut found_prev = false;
5313 for tx in prev_txn {
5314 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5315 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5316 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5317 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5323 assert!(found_prev);
5325 let mut res = Vec::new();
5326 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5330 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5331 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5332 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5333 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5334 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5337 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5340 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5341 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5342 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5343 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5346 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5350 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5351 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5355 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5357 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5358 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5360 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5361 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5363 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5364 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5369 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5371 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5372 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5374 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5375 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5376 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5377 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5378 chan.get_value_stat()
5382 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5383 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5384 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5386 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5387 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5389 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5390 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5392 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5393 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5394 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5395 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5396 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5400 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5402 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5403 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5404 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5405 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5410 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5411 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5412 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5413 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5415 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5416 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5417 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5419 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5424 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5425 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5427 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5429 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5431 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5432 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5433 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5435 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5436 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5440 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5441 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5442 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5444 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5445 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5448 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5451 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5452 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5453 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5454 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5455 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5458 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5459 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5460 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5461 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5462 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5466 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5467 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5468 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5469 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5471 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5472 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5476 // adding pending output
5477 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5478 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5480 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5481 let payment_event_1 = {
5482 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5485 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5486 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5487 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5489 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5491 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5492 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5494 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5495 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5496 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5497 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5502 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5503 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5505 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5506 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5507 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5508 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5509 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5511 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5513 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5514 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5515 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5516 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5517 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5518 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5520 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5521 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5522 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5523 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5526 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5528 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5532 // split the rest to test holding cell
5533 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5534 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5536 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5537 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5540 // now see if they go through on both sides
5541 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5542 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5543 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5545 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5546 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5548 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5550 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5551 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5552 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5553 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5557 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5558 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5559 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5561 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5562 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5564 // flush the pending htlc
5565 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5566 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5569 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5571 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5573 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5574 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5575 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5578 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5579 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5582 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5584 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5585 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5586 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5588 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5589 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5591 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5592 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5593 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5594 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5595 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5596 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5598 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5599 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5600 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5601 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5603 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5604 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5606 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5607 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5609 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5610 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5611 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5613 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5616 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5617 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5618 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5620 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5623 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5624 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5625 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5627 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5628 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5629 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5630 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5632 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5633 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5637 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5638 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5639 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5640 let nodes = create_network(5);
5642 // Create some initial channels
5643 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5644 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5645 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5646 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5648 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5649 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5650 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5651 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5652 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5654 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5655 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5657 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5658 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5659 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5660 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5662 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5663 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5664 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5666 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5667 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5669 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5670 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5672 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5673 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5674 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5675 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5677 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5678 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5679 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5681 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5682 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5684 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5685 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5687 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5688 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5690 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5691 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5692 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5693 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5695 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5701 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5702 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5703 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5705 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5707 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5708 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5710 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5711 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5713 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5715 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5716 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5717 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5719 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5720 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5721 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5724 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5725 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5726 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5727 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5728 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5732 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5733 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5734 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5735 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5736 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5739 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5741 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5742 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5744 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5745 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5746 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5747 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5748 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5751 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5753 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5754 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5756 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5758 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5759 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5760 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5764 fn test_justice_tx() {
5765 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5767 let nodes = create_network(2);
5768 // Create some new channels:
5769 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5771 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5772 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5773 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5774 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5775 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5776 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5777 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5778 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5779 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5780 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5781 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5782 // Revoke the old state
5783 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5786 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5787 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5789 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5790 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5791 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5792 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5794 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5795 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5797 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5799 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5800 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5801 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5802 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5803 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5805 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5807 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5808 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5810 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5811 // Create some new channels:
5812 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5814 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5815 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5816 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5817 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5818 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5819 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5820 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5821 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5822 // Revoke the old state
5823 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5825 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5826 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5828 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5829 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5830 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5831 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5833 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5834 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5836 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5838 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5839 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5840 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5841 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5842 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5844 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5845 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5846 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5850 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5851 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5852 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5853 let nodes = create_network(2);
5854 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5855 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5856 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5857 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5858 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5859 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5860 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5861 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5863 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5864 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5865 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5866 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5867 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
5869 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5871 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5872 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
5874 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
5875 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5876 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5880 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
5881 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
5882 let nodes = create_network(2);
5884 // Create some new channel:
5885 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5887 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5888 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5889 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
5890 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5891 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5893 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5894 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5895 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
5896 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5897 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5898 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5899 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5900 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5901 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5903 //Revoke the old state
5904 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5907 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5909 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5911 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5912 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5913 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5915 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
5916 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5918 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
5920 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5921 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5922 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5923 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5924 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5925 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5926 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5927 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
5929 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
5930 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5931 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
5933 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5934 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
5935 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
5936 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
5937 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5938 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
5940 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5941 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5942 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5946 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
5947 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
5948 let nodes = create_network(2);
5950 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5952 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5953 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5954 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
5955 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
5956 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5957 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5959 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5960 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5962 //Revoke the old state
5963 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5966 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5968 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
5970 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
5971 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5972 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
5974 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
5975 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
5976 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
5977 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
5978 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
5979 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
5980 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
5982 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5983 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5984 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5986 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
5987 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5988 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5989 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5990 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5992 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5993 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5994 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5995 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5996 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5997 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5998 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5999 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
6001 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
6002 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
6004 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
6005 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
6006 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
6007 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
6008 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6009 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6011 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6012 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6013 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6017 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
6018 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
6019 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
6020 let nodes = create_network(2);
6021 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6023 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
6024 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
6026 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6027 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6029 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6030 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6032 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6036 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6037 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
6039 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6040 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6043 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6044 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6046 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6047 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6049 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6053 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6054 // registering new transactions
6055 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6059 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6060 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6061 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6062 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6063 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6065 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6067 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6069 let mut payment_event = {
6070 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6073 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6074 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6075 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6078 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6079 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6081 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6082 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6084 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6085 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6088 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6089 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6091 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6092 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6093 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6094 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6097 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6098 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6100 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6102 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6103 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6104 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6106 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6107 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6108 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6110 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6111 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6113 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6117 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6118 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6119 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6120 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6121 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6125 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6126 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6128 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6129 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6130 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6132 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6133 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6135 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6138 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6140 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6141 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6142 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6144 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6145 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6146 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6147 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6148 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6149 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6150 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6152 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6156 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6157 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6158 let nodes = create_network(2);
6159 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6161 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6162 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6163 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6164 mem::drop(channel_state);
6166 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6167 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6168 headers.push(header.clone());
6170 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6171 headers.push(header.clone());
6173 while !headers.is_empty() {
6174 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6177 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6178 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6180 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6181 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6186 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6187 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6188 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6191 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6192 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6194 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6195 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6196 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6197 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6198 res.push(msg.clone());
6200 panic!("Unexpected event")
6208 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6209 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6211 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6213 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6215 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6221 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6222 let mut commitment_update = None;
6223 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6226 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6227 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6228 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6229 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6231 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6232 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6233 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6234 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6239 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6242 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6244 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6245 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6246 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6247 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6249 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6250 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6251 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6252 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6254 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6258 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6263 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6264 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6265 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6266 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6267 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6268 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6269 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6271 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
6272 for msg in reestablish_1 {
6273 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6274 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
6276 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6277 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6279 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
6282 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
6283 for msg in reestablish_2 {
6284 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6285 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
6287 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6288 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6290 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
6293 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
6294 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
6295 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
6297 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
6298 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6299 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6300 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6301 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6302 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6303 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6304 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6305 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6308 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6311 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6312 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6313 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6314 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6316 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6318 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6319 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6320 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6321 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
6323 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6325 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6326 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6327 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6328 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6329 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6331 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6332 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6334 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6335 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6338 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6339 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6341 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6342 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6343 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6344 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6345 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6346 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6347 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6350 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6354 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
6355 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6356 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6357 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6358 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6359 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6360 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6361 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6362 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6365 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6368 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6369 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6370 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6371 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6373 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6375 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6376 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6377 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6378 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
6380 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6381 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6382 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6383 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6384 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6386 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6387 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6389 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6390 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6393 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6394 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6396 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6397 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6398 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6399 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6400 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6401 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6402 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6405 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6411 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
6412 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
6413 let nodes = create_network(3);
6414 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6415 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6417 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6418 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6419 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6421 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6422 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6423 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
6424 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
6426 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6427 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6428 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6430 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6431 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6432 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6433 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6435 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6436 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6438 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
6439 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
6441 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
6443 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6444 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6446 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6447 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
6449 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6452 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
6453 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
6454 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
6456 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6460 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
6461 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
6464 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
6465 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
6466 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6467 if messages_delivered == 0 {
6468 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6469 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
6471 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6474 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6475 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6477 let payment_event = {
6478 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
6479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6481 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6482 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6483 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6485 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
6487 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6488 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
6490 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6491 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6492 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6494 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6496 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6497 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6498 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6501 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6502 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6503 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6504 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6507 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
6508 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6509 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6517 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6518 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6519 if messages_delivered < 3 {
6520 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
6521 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
6522 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6523 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6524 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6525 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6526 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6527 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6528 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6529 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6530 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6531 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6532 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
6533 // Everything was delivered...
6534 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6537 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6538 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6540 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6541 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6544 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6545 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6546 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6548 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6549 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6551 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6552 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6554 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6555 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6556 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6558 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6561 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6564 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6565 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6566 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
6567 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6568 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6569 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6570 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6571 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6572 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6573 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6574 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6576 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6579 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
6580 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
6582 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6583 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6585 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6586 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6588 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6591 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
6592 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
6593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6594 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6596 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6597 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6598 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6601 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6602 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6603 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6604 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6607 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6608 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6609 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6617 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6618 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6619 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6620 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6621 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
6622 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
6623 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6624 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6626 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6627 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6629 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6632 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
6633 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6634 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6635 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6636 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6637 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6638 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6639 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6640 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6641 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6642 // Everything was delivered...
6643 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6646 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6647 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6648 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6650 // Channel should still work fine...
6651 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
6652 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6656 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
6657 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
6658 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
6659 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
6660 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
6664 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
6665 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
6666 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
6667 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
6671 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
6672 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
6673 let nodes = create_network(2);
6674 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6676 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6677 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6679 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6680 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6681 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6683 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6684 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6686 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6689 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6691 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6692 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6694 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6695 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6696 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
6698 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6699 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6701 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6704 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6705 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6707 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6710 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6712 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
6713 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
6715 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6716 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6717 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
6721 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
6722 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
6723 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
6724 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6725 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6727 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6729 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6730 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6731 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6733 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
6734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6736 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6737 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6739 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
6740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6743 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6746 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6747 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6749 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6750 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6751 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6752 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6753 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6754 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6755 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6757 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6758 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6759 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6761 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6762 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6764 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6767 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6768 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6769 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6770 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6772 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6775 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6776 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6778 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6779 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6780 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6781 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6782 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6783 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6785 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6786 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6787 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6788 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6790 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6791 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6793 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6794 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6796 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6798 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6799 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6800 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6801 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6802 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6803 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6804 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6805 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6806 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6809 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
6810 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6811 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6812 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6813 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6814 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6815 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6818 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6819 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6820 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6821 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6822 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6823 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6824 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6827 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6828 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6829 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6832 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6833 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6834 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6837 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6838 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6841 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6842 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6844 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6845 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6848 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6849 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6851 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6852 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6854 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
6855 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6857 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6860 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6861 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6864 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6868 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
6869 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
6870 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6871 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6873 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6874 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6876 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6877 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6880 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6881 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6883 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6884 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6887 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6888 // PaymentFailed event
6890 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6893 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
6894 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
6895 // a disconnect in between
6896 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6897 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6899 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6900 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6902 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6903 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6906 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6907 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6908 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6911 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6912 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6913 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6916 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
6917 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6920 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6921 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6922 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
6923 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6924 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6925 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6927 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6929 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6930 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6932 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6933 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6934 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6936 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6939 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
6941 // Now set it to failed again...
6942 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6943 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6944 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
6945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6947 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6948 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6949 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6952 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6953 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6954 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6957 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
6958 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6959 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6962 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6963 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6965 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6966 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6969 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6970 // PaymentFailed event
6972 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6976 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
6977 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
6978 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
6981 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
6982 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
6984 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
6985 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
6986 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
6987 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
6988 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
6989 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
6990 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
6991 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
6992 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
6993 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
6994 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
6995 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
6996 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
6997 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
6998 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
6999 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
7000 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
7001 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7002 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7004 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7006 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7007 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7008 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7010 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7011 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7014 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7015 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7016 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7018 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
7019 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
7020 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7022 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7023 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7024 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
7025 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7026 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7027 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7028 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7029 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7030 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7031 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7033 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7034 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7035 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7036 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7038 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7039 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7041 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7044 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
7045 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7046 } else { panic!(); }
7049 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7051 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7054 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7055 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7056 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7059 // Now fix monitor updating...
7060 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7061 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7064 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7065 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7066 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7068 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7069 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7070 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7071 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7072 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7073 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7075 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7076 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7077 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7078 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7080 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7081 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7083 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7086 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7087 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7088 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7090 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7091 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7092 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7093 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7094 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7095 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7097 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7099 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7100 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7102 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7104 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7105 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7107 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7108 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7109 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7111 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7112 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7113 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7115 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7116 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7117 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7118 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7119 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7120 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7122 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7124 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7125 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7126 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7128 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7129 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7131 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7134 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7135 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7136 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7139 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7143 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7144 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7146 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7147 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7148 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7150 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7151 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7154 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7156 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7157 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7158 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7159 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7160 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7163 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7167 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7169 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7170 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7171 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7172 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7175 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7176 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7178 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7179 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7181 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7182 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7185 let as_commitment_update;
7186 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7188 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7189 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7190 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7191 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7192 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7193 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7194 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7195 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7199 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7200 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7201 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7202 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7203 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7204 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7205 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7206 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7210 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7213 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7214 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7216 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7217 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7219 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7220 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7222 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7225 handle_initial_raa!();
7227 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7228 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7230 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7231 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7233 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7234 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7237 handle_initial_raa!();
7239 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7240 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7242 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7243 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7245 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7246 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7248 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7253 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7254 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7256 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7257 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7259 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7260 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7264 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7265 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7266 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7269 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7270 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7271 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7274 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7275 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7278 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7279 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7282 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7284 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7285 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7287 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7288 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7289 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7291 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7294 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7298 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
7299 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
7300 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
7301 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
7302 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
7303 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
7304 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
7308 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
7309 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
7310 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
7311 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
7312 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
7316 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
7317 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
7318 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
7319 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
7320 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
7321 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
7325 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
7326 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
7327 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7328 let nodes = create_network(2);
7330 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7332 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7333 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7334 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7335 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7337 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7339 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7340 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7342 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7343 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7345 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
7347 let mut chan_announcement;
7349 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
7351 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
7352 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
7353 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
7354 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
7355 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
7356 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
7357 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
7358 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
7359 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7364 macro_rules! sign_msg {
7365 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
7366 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
7367 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7368 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7369 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
7370 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
7371 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
7372 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
7373 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
7374 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
7375 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
7376 contents: $unsigned_msg
7381 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7382 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7383 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
7384 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7386 // Configured with Network::Testnet
7387 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7388 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
7389 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7390 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7392 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7393 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
7394 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7395 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7398 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
7399 impl Writer for VecWriter {
7400 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
7401 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
7404 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
7405 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
7410 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7411 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7413 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7415 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7417 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7418 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7419 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7421 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7422 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7423 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7424 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7426 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7427 let config = UserConfig::new();
7428 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7429 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7430 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7431 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7432 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7433 default_config: config,
7435 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7436 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7437 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7438 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7439 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7440 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7443 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7445 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7446 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7447 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
7448 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
7449 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7452 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7453 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7454 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7455 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7457 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7458 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7459 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7460 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7462 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7463 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
7464 for node in nodes.iter() {
7465 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
7466 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
7467 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
7470 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7474 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7475 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7476 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7478 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7479 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7481 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7483 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7484 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7485 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7487 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7488 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7489 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7490 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7492 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7493 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7494 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7495 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7496 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7497 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7498 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7500 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7501 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7502 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7503 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7504 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7505 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7508 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7510 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7511 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7514 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7516 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
7517 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7521 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
7522 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
7523 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
7524 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7525 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
7526 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
7528 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
7530 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
7531 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7533 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
7534 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7535 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7536 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7538 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
7540 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
7541 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
7542 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7543 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
7544 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
7547 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7548 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
7549 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
7550 let mut read = &serialized[..];
7551 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7552 assert!(read.is_empty());
7553 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
7556 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7557 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7558 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7559 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7561 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7562 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7563 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7564 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7565 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7566 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
7568 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7570 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
7571 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7572 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7573 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
7574 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
7577 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
7578 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
7579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7581 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7583 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
7584 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7585 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7586 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
7587 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7589 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7590 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7591 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
7592 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
7593 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
7594 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
7597 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
7598 ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => {
7600 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7601 let mut txn = Vec::new();
7602 for event in events {
7604 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7605 for outp in outputs {
7607 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
7609 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7610 script_sig: Script::new(),
7612 witness: Vec::new(),
7615 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7616 value: output.value,
7618 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7624 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7625 let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
7626 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
7627 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7628 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
7629 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7630 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7631 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
7634 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
7636 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7637 script_sig: Script::new(),
7638 sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
7639 witness: Vec::new(),
7642 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7643 value: output.value,
7645 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7651 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7652 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7653 let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
7654 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7655 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7656 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
7657 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
7660 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
7661 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7663 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7664 script_sig: Script::new(),
7666 witness: Vec::new(),
7669 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7670 value: output.value,
7672 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7676 output: vec![outp.clone()],
7679 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) {
7681 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
7683 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
7686 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
7689 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
7690 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
7691 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7692 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
7693 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7694 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7695 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
7701 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7710 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
7711 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
7712 let nodes = create_network(2);
7714 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
7715 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
7716 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7718 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7719 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7721 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7722 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7723 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
7724 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
7726 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7727 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
7728 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
7729 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7730 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7734 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
7735 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
7736 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
7738 let nodes = create_network(2);
7740 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
7741 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
7742 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7744 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7745 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7747 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7748 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7749 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
7750 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
7752 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7753 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
7754 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7756 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7757 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7759 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
7760 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
7761 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
7762 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7766 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
7767 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
7768 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
7770 let nodes = create_network(2);
7772 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
7773 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7774 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7775 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7776 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7778 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7779 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7780 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7781 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7783 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7784 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7786 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7787 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
7788 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
7789 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
7790 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7791 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx
7792 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
7796 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
7797 let nodes = create_network(2);
7799 // Create some initial channels
7800 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7802 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7804 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7805 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
7806 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7808 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
7809 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7810 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7812 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
7813 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7815 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7816 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7819 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7820 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
7823 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
7824 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
7825 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
7826 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
7827 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
7828 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
7830 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1);
7831 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
7832 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
7833 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7837 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
7838 let nodes = create_network(2);
7840 // Create some initial channels
7841 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7843 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7844 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7845 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7846 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7848 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7850 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7851 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7852 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7854 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7855 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7857 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7858 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7859 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
7860 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7861 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7863 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
7864 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
7865 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
7866 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7870 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
7871 let nodes = create_network(2);
7873 // Create some initial channels
7874 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7876 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7877 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7878 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7879 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7881 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7883 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7884 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
7885 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7886 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7888 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7889 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7891 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7892 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7893 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7894 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
7895 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7897 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
7898 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7899 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7901 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7902 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7905 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7906 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
7907 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
7908 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
7910 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
7911 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
7912 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
7913 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
7914 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7915 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone());
7919 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
7920 let nodes = create_network(2);
7922 // Create some initial channels
7923 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7925 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7926 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7927 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7928 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7930 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7932 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7933 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
7934 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7935 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7937 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7940 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7942 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7943 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7944 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
7945 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7947 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
7948 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7949 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7951 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7952 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7955 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7956 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
7957 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
7958 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
7960 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
7961 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
7962 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5);
7963 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
7964 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
7965 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
7966 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
7967 check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
7971 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
7972 let nodes = create_network(2);
7974 // Create some initial channels
7975 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7977 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
7978 let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7979 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7980 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
7982 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
7983 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7985 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7986 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7987 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7989 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7990 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7993 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7994 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
7996 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7997 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7998 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
7999 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8001 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8002 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8003 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8004 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8008 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
8009 let nodes = create_network(2);
8011 // Create some initial channels
8012 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8014 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
8015 let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8016 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8017 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
8019 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8020 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8021 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
8022 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8024 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8025 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8027 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8028 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8029 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
8030 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8032 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8033 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
8034 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
8035 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
8036 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
8037 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8038 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8042 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
8043 let nodes = create_network(2);
8045 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8047 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
8048 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
8050 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8051 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8052 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2);
8053 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8054 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx.clone());
8056 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8057 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2);
8058 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8059 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);