1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
18 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
19 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
22 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
23 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
26 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
29 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
30 use util::config::UserConfig;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
69 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
70 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
71 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
72 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
73 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
75 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
76 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
79 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
80 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
81 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
82 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
85 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
86 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
87 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
88 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
92 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
95 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
96 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
97 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
100 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102 pub enum HTLCSource {
103 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
106 session_priv: SecretKey,
107 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
108 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
109 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
114 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
115 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
116 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
117 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
118 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
126 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
134 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
136 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>);
138 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
139 err: msgs::HandleError,
140 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
141 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
143 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
145 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
149 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
150 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
152 data: err.to_string()
156 needs_channel_force_close: false,
157 shutdown_finish: None,
161 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
165 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
166 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
168 data: err.to_string()
172 needs_channel_force_close: true,
173 shutdown_finish: None,
177 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
178 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false, shutdown_finish: None }
181 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
185 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
186 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
188 data: err.to_string()
192 needs_channel_force_close: false,
193 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
197 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
200 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
202 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
204 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
206 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
207 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
209 data: msg.to_string()
214 needs_channel_force_close: false,
215 shutdown_finish: None,
220 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
221 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
223 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
224 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
226 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
230 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
231 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
232 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
233 /// probably increase this significantly.
234 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
236 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
237 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
239 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
242 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
243 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
244 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
245 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
246 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
247 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
248 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
250 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
254 struct ChannelHolder {
255 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
256 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
257 next_forward: Instant,
258 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
259 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
260 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
261 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
262 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
263 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
264 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
266 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
267 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
268 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
269 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
271 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
272 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
273 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
274 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
275 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
276 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
277 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
280 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
282 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
283 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
284 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
285 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
286 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
287 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
292 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
293 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
295 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
296 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
298 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
299 /// to individual Channels.
301 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
302 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
303 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
304 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
306 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
307 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
308 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
309 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
310 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
311 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
312 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
314 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
315 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
316 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
317 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
319 pub struct ChannelManager {
320 default_configuration: UserConfig,
321 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
322 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
323 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
324 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
325 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
327 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
328 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
329 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
331 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
332 our_network_key: SecretKey,
334 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
335 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
336 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
337 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
338 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
340 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
345 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
346 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
347 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
348 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
349 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
350 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
351 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
353 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
354 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
355 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
356 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
359 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
361 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
362 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
365 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
367 macro_rules! secp_call {
368 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
371 Err(_) => return Err($err),
378 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
380 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
381 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
386 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
387 pub struct ChannelDetails {
388 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
389 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
390 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
391 /// lifetime of the channel.
392 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
393 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
394 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
395 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
396 /// The node_id of our counterparty
397 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
398 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
399 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
400 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
404 macro_rules! handle_error {
405 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
408 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close, shutdown_finish }) => {
409 if needs_channel_force_close {
411 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
412 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
413 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
415 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
418 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
419 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
420 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
421 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
422 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
424 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
430 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
431 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
432 if let Some(update) = update_option {
433 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
434 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
445 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
446 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
449 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
450 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
452 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
453 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
454 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
455 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
457 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
463 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
464 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
467 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
468 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
470 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
471 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
472 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
473 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
475 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
481 impl ChannelManager {
482 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
484 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
485 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
487 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
489 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
490 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
491 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
493 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
494 default_configuration: config.clone(),
495 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
496 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
497 monitor: monitor.clone(),
501 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
502 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
505 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
506 by_id: HashMap::new(),
507 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
508 next_forward: Instant::now(),
509 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
510 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
511 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
513 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
515 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
516 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
522 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
523 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
527 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
529 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
530 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
531 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
532 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
534 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
535 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
537 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
538 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
539 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
540 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
541 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
544 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
545 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
547 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
548 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
549 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
550 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
551 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
552 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
554 panic!("RNG is bad???");
557 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
559 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
560 node_id: their_network_key,
566 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
567 /// more information.
568 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
569 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
570 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
571 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
572 res.push(ChannelDetails {
573 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
574 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
575 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
576 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
577 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
583 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
584 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
585 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
586 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
587 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
588 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
589 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
590 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
591 // really wanted anyway.
592 if channel.is_live() {
593 res.push(ChannelDetails {
594 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
595 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
596 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
597 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
598 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
605 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
606 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
607 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
609 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
610 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
611 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
613 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
614 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
615 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
616 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
617 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
618 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
619 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
620 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
623 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
624 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
625 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
627 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
628 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
630 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
633 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
634 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
635 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
637 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
638 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
643 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
644 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
645 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
654 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
655 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
656 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
657 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
658 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
660 for tx in local_txn {
661 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
663 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
664 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
665 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
666 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
667 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
668 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
669 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
672 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
673 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
674 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
675 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
678 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
679 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
680 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
681 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
682 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
689 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
690 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
691 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
692 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
698 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
699 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
700 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
701 for chan in self.list_channels() {
702 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
706 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
708 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
710 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
711 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
712 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
713 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
717 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
718 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
719 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
720 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
721 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
726 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
727 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
728 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
734 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
735 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
737 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
738 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
739 let mut res = [0; 32];
740 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
744 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
745 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
746 let mut res = [0; 32];
747 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
753 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
754 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
755 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
756 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
757 let mut res = [0; 32];
758 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
763 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
764 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
765 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
766 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
767 let mut res = [0; 32];
768 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
772 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
774 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
775 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
776 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
778 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
779 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
781 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
782 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
783 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
784 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
785 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
787 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
789 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
790 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
792 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
798 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
799 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
800 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
802 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
803 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
809 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
819 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
820 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
821 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
822 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
823 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
824 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
825 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
826 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
828 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
829 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
830 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
831 // the intended recipient).
832 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
833 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
834 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
836 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
837 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
838 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
839 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
843 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
844 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
845 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
847 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
848 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
849 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
851 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
853 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
857 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
859 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
867 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
868 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
870 for i in 0..dst.len() {
875 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
876 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
877 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
878 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
881 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
882 let end_len = iters * 65;
883 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
884 res.resize(end_len, 0);
886 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
887 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
888 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
889 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
890 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
895 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
896 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
898 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
899 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
900 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
901 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
903 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
904 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
905 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
908 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
911 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
912 hmac.input(&packet_data);
913 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
914 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
919 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
920 hop_data: packet_data,
925 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
926 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
927 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
928 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
930 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
931 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
932 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
933 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
934 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
935 data: packet_crypted,
939 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
940 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
941 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
943 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
946 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
947 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
948 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
949 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
953 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
954 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
957 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
959 failuremsg: failuremsg,
963 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
964 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
965 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
971 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
972 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
973 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
976 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
977 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
980 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
981 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
982 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
983 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
989 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
990 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
991 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
992 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
993 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
994 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
995 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
996 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
999 let shared_secret = {
1000 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1001 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1004 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1006 let mut channel_state = None;
1007 macro_rules! return_err {
1008 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1010 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1011 if channel_state.is_none() {
1012 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1014 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1015 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1016 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1017 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1018 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1023 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1024 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1025 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1026 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1027 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1028 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1029 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1030 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1033 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1034 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1035 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
1036 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1037 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1040 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1041 let next_hop_data = {
1042 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1043 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1044 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
1046 let error_code = match err {
1047 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1048 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1050 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1056 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1058 // final_expiry_too_soon
1059 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1060 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1062 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1063 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1064 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1066 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1067 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1068 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1071 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1072 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1073 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1074 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1076 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1078 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1079 short_channel_id: 0,
1080 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1081 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1082 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1085 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1086 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1087 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1089 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1091 let blinding_factor = {
1092 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1093 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1094 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1095 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1096 sha.result(&mut res);
1097 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1099 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1105 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1106 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1109 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1111 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1112 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1113 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1116 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1117 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1118 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1119 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1120 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1121 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1122 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1126 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1127 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1128 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1129 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1130 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1131 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1132 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1134 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1136 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1137 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1139 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1140 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1141 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1142 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1143 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1144 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1145 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1147 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1148 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1150 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1151 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1152 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1154 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1155 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1157 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1158 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1159 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1160 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1162 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1163 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1168 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1169 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1170 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1172 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1173 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1175 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1176 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1178 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1183 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1186 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1187 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1188 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1189 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1190 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1194 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1196 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1197 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1198 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1199 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1200 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1201 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1202 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1203 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1204 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1205 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1208 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1209 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1211 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1217 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1219 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1220 /// fields for more info.
1222 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1223 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1224 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1225 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1226 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1227 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1229 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1231 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1232 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1233 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1234 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1235 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1237 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1238 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1239 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1240 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1244 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1245 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1246 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1248 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1250 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1252 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1253 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1254 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1255 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1257 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1259 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1260 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1262 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1263 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1264 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1268 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1269 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1270 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1271 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1273 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1274 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1276 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1277 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1279 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1280 route: route.clone(),
1281 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1282 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1283 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1284 } else { unreachable!(); }
1286 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1287 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1288 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_lock, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1289 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1292 channel_lock.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1293 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1294 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1295 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1296 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1297 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1298 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1309 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1310 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1312 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1314 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1315 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1316 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1317 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1321 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1326 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1328 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1329 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1331 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1333 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1334 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1335 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1336 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1338 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1340 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1341 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1343 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1344 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1345 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1346 } else { unreachable!(); })
1352 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1353 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1354 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1357 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1358 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1359 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1360 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1367 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1368 // lock before add_update_monitor
1369 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1373 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1374 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1375 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1378 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1379 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1380 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1382 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1388 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1389 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1391 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1393 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1395 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1396 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1398 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1399 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1400 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1401 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1402 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1406 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1408 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1409 /// Will likely generate further events.
1410 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1411 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1413 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1414 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1416 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1417 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1419 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1423 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1424 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1425 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1426 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1428 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1429 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1430 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1431 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1432 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1433 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1435 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1440 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1442 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1443 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1444 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1445 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1446 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1447 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1449 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1451 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1452 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1457 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1459 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1460 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1461 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1462 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1463 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1464 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1465 // this channel currently :/.
1472 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1473 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1476 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1477 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1479 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1483 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1484 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1486 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1487 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1488 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1489 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1490 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1491 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1492 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1494 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1499 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1500 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1501 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1502 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1503 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1505 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1506 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1507 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1509 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1510 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1511 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1518 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1520 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1521 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1525 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1526 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1527 events.append(&mut new_events);
1530 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1531 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1532 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1534 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1535 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1536 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1537 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1538 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1539 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1545 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1546 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1547 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1548 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1549 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1550 /// still-available channels.
1551 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1553 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1554 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1555 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1556 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1557 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1558 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1559 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1564 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1565 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1566 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1569 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1572 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1573 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1574 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1575 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1576 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1578 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1579 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1583 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1585 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1586 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1590 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1591 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1592 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1593 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1596 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1597 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1598 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1599 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1600 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1601 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1602 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1604 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1610 //TODO: Do something with e?
1618 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1619 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1620 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1622 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1623 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1624 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1625 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1626 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1627 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1629 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1631 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1632 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1633 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1634 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1635 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1636 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1641 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1643 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1644 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1645 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1646 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1650 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1651 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1652 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1654 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1655 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1657 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1658 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1664 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1665 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1666 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1667 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1668 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1669 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1672 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1673 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1674 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1675 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1676 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1677 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1678 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1679 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1687 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1688 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1689 //TODO: Do something with e?
1697 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1698 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1699 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1702 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1703 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1705 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1706 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1707 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1708 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1709 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1712 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1713 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1714 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1715 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1716 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1717 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1718 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1719 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1721 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1722 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1723 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1725 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1726 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1727 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1733 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1736 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1737 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1738 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1740 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1742 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1743 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1744 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1745 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1750 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1751 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1752 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1753 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1754 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1759 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1763 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1774 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1775 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1777 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1779 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1780 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1784 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1785 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1786 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1789 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1790 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1791 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1792 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1793 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1794 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1795 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1796 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1797 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1798 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1800 entry.insert(channel);
1806 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1807 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1808 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1809 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1810 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1811 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1812 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1813 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1814 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1816 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1817 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1819 //TODO: same as above
1820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1823 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1824 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1825 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1826 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1827 output_script: output_script,
1828 user_channel_id: user_id,
1833 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1834 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1835 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1836 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1837 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1838 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1839 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1840 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1841 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1843 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1845 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1848 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1849 // lock before add_update_monitor
1850 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1853 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1854 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1855 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1856 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1857 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1859 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1860 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1861 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1870 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1871 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1872 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1873 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1874 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1875 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1876 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1877 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1878 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1880 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1881 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1884 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1886 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1889 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1890 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1891 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1892 user_channel_id: user_id,
1897 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1898 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1899 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1900 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1901 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1902 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1903 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1904 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1906 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1907 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1908 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1909 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1910 msg: announcement_sigs,
1915 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1919 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1920 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1921 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1922 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1924 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1925 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1926 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1927 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1928 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1930 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1931 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1932 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1933 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1937 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1938 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1939 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1943 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1944 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1945 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1947 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1948 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1950 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1953 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1954 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1955 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1957 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1958 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1959 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1960 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1968 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1969 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1970 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1971 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1972 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1973 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1974 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1975 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1976 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1978 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1979 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1980 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1981 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1986 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1987 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1988 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1989 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1990 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1991 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1992 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1994 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1995 } else { (tx, None) }
1997 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2000 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2001 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2003 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2004 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2005 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2006 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2014 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2015 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2016 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2017 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2019 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2020 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2021 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2022 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2024 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2025 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2027 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2028 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2029 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2030 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2031 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2033 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2034 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2035 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2036 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2037 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2038 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2039 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2040 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2041 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2042 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2043 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &update.encode_with_len()[..])
2045 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2046 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2047 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2048 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2049 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2050 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2055 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2057 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2062 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2063 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2065 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2066 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2067 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2068 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2069 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2070 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2072 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2074 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2077 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2081 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
2082 // indicating that the payment itself failed
2083 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
2084 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
2085 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
2086 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
2087 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
2089 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
2090 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
2094 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
2095 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
2096 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
2099 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
2101 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
2102 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
2103 if res.is_some() { return; }
2105 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
2106 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2107 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2109 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2111 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2112 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2113 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2114 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2115 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2117 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2119 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2120 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2121 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2122 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2123 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2124 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2126 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2127 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
2128 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2129 // definitely came from the peer in question
2130 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
2132 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
2134 match error_code & 0xff {
2136 // either from an intermediate or final node
2137 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
2138 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
2139 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
2140 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
2141 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2142 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2143 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
2144 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2145 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
2146 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2147 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2153 if is_from_final_node {
2154 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2155 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2156 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2157 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2158 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2159 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2162 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2163 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2167 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2168 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2169 // does not coform to the spec.
2170 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2171 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2172 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2178 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2182 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2184 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2185 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2186 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2190 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2191 let offset = match error_code {
2192 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2193 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2194 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2195 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2196 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2197 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2199 // node sending unknown code
2200 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2201 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2208 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2209 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2210 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2211 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2212 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2213 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2214 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2215 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2218 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2219 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2220 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2221 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2223 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2224 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2225 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2226 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2227 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2229 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2230 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2231 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2232 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2234 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2235 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2236 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2237 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2239 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2240 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2243 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2244 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2248 res = Some((msg, true));
2254 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2257 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2258 res = Some((None, true));
2262 // node sending unknown code
2263 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2264 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2273 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2274 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2275 } else { ((None, true)) }
2278 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2279 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2280 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2281 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2282 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2283 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2284 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2285 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2287 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2289 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2294 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2295 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2296 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2297 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2298 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2299 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2300 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2301 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2303 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2304 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set", msg.channel_id));
2306 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2309 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2313 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2314 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2315 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2316 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2317 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2318 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2319 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2320 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2322 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2323 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2324 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2327 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2328 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2329 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2331 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2332 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2333 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2334 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2335 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2336 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2337 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2338 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2340 commitment_signed: msg,
2344 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2345 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2346 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2352 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2357 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2358 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2359 let mut forward_event = None;
2360 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2361 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2362 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2363 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2364 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2366 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2367 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2368 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2369 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2371 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2372 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2377 match forward_event {
2379 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2380 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2381 time_forwardable: time
2389 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2390 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2391 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2392 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2393 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2394 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2395 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2396 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2397 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2399 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2400 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2401 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2404 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2405 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2406 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2410 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2411 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2412 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2416 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2418 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2421 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2422 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2424 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2429 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2430 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2431 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2432 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2434 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2435 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2436 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2438 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2440 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2445 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2446 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2447 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2449 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2450 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2451 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2452 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2454 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2455 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2458 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2459 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2460 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2462 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2463 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2464 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2465 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2466 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2468 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2470 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2471 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2472 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2473 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2474 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2475 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2476 contents: announcement,
2478 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2481 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2486 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2487 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2488 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2490 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2491 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2492 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2493 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2495 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order, shutdown) =
2496 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2497 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2498 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2502 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2503 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2504 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2508 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2509 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2510 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2511 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2516 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2517 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2518 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2519 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2525 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2529 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2534 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2535 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2536 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2542 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2546 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2547 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2548 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2549 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2551 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2552 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2554 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2555 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2556 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2558 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2559 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2560 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2561 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2562 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2564 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2565 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2567 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2568 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2570 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2571 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2572 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2574 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2577 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2578 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2579 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2580 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2581 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2582 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2583 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2584 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2594 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2595 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2597 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2599 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2600 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2601 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2602 node_id: their_node_id,
2606 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2612 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2613 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2614 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2615 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2616 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2621 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2622 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2623 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2624 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2625 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2630 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2631 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2632 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2633 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2635 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2636 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2637 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2638 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2639 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2640 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2641 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2642 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2643 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2644 msg: funding_locked,
2646 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2647 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2648 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2649 msg: announcement_sigs,
2652 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2653 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2654 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2655 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2656 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2660 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2661 for tx in txn_matched {
2662 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2663 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2664 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2665 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2667 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2668 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2669 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2670 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2671 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2672 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2681 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2682 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2683 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2685 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2686 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2687 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2688 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2689 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2690 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2691 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2700 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2701 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2703 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2704 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2707 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2708 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2709 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2710 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2712 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2713 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2714 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2715 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2716 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2717 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2718 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2719 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2721 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2722 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2723 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2733 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2734 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2736 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2737 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2741 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2742 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2743 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2744 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2745 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2748 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2749 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2750 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2753 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2754 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2755 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2758 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2759 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2760 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2763 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2764 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2765 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2768 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2769 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2770 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2773 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2774 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2775 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2778 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2779 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2780 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2783 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2784 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2785 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2788 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2789 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2790 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2793 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2794 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2795 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2798 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2799 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2800 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2803 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2804 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2805 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2808 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2809 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2810 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2813 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2814 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2815 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2818 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2819 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2820 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2823 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2824 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2825 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2826 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2828 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2829 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2830 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2831 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2832 if no_connection_possible {
2833 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2834 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2835 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2836 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2837 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2839 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2840 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2841 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2851 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2852 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2853 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2854 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2855 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2856 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2857 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2858 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2860 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2861 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2862 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2871 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2872 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2874 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2875 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2876 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2881 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2882 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2884 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2885 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2886 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2887 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2888 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2889 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2890 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2891 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2892 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2893 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2897 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2898 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2899 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2905 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2908 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2909 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2911 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2912 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2913 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2914 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2918 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2923 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2924 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2926 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2927 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2928 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2930 onion.write(writer)?;
2934 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2935 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2936 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2937 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2938 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2943 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2944 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2945 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2947 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2948 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2950 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2952 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2953 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2954 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2955 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2956 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2961 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2962 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2964 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2966 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2968 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2970 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2977 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2978 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2979 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2980 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2981 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2982 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2987 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2988 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2990 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2992 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2994 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2996 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3003 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3004 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3005 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3006 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3007 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3008 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3013 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3016 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3019 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3020 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3022 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3024 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3026 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3028 route.write(writer)?;
3029 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3030 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3037 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3038 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3039 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3040 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3041 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3042 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3043 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3044 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3046 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3051 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3052 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3054 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
3058 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3060 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3061 data.write(writer)?;
3068 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3069 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3070 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3071 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3072 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3073 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3074 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3076 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3081 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
3082 prev_short_channel_id,
3087 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3088 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3089 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3091 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3092 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3094 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3095 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3096 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3098 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3099 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3100 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3101 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3102 unfunded_channels += 1;
3105 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3106 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3107 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3108 channel.write(writer)?;
3112 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3113 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3114 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3115 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3116 for forward in pending_forwards {
3117 forward.write(writer)?;
3121 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3122 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3123 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3124 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3125 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3126 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3134 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3136 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3138 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3139 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3140 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3141 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3142 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3143 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3144 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3145 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3146 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3147 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3148 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3149 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3150 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3151 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3152 /// deserialization.
3153 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3155 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3157 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3158 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3159 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3161 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3162 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3163 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3164 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3165 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3167 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3168 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3169 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3170 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3171 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3172 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3173 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3174 /// deserialization.
3175 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3176 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3177 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3178 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3180 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3181 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3183 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3184 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3185 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3186 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3188 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3190 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3193 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3194 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3195 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3196 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3197 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3198 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3201 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3202 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3203 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3205 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3207 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3208 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3209 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3210 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3211 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3212 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3213 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3214 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3217 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3218 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3219 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3220 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3221 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3222 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3223 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3224 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3225 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3227 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3228 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3230 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3233 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3237 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3238 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3239 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3243 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3244 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3245 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3246 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3247 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3248 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3249 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3250 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3252 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3255 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3256 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3257 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3258 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3259 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3260 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3261 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3262 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3264 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3267 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3269 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3270 monitor: args.monitor,
3271 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3272 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3274 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3275 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3276 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3278 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3281 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3284 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3286 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3288 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3289 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3290 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3291 logger: args.logger,
3292 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3295 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3296 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3297 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3298 //connection or two.
3301 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3307 use chain::chaininterface;
3308 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3309 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3310 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
3311 use chain::keysinterface;
3312 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
3313 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
3314 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3315 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3317 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
3318 use util::test_utils;
3319 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3320 use util::errors::APIError;
3321 use util::logger::Logger;
3322 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3323 use util::config::UserConfig;
3325 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3326 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3327 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
3328 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
3329 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3330 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
3331 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
3332 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3333 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3334 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3338 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3339 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3341 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3342 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3344 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3346 use std::cell::RefCell;
3347 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
3348 use std::default::Default;
3350 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3351 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3352 use std::time::Instant;
3355 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3356 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3357 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3362 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3363 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3366 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3367 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3370 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3371 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3374 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3375 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3378 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3379 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3384 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3386 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3387 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3392 fn onion_vectors() {
3393 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3394 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3396 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3397 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3398 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3399 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3400 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3402 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3403 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3404 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3405 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3406 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3408 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3409 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3410 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3411 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3412 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3414 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3415 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3416 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3417 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3418 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3420 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3421 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3422 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3423 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3424 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3426 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3427 let payloads = vec!(
3428 msgs::OnionHopData {
3430 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3431 short_channel_id: 0,
3433 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3437 msgs::OnionHopData {
3439 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3440 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3441 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3442 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3446 msgs::OnionHopData {
3448 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3449 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3450 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3451 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3455 msgs::OnionHopData {
3457 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3458 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3459 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3460 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3464 msgs::OnionHopData {
3466 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3467 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3468 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3469 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3475 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
3476 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3478 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3482 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3483 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3485 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3486 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3487 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3489 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3490 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("a5e6bd0c74cb347f10cce367f949098f2457d14c046fd8a22cb96efb30b0fdcda8cb9168b50f2fd45edd73c1b0c8b33002df376801ff58aaa94000bf8a86f92620f343baef38a580102395ae3abf9128d1047a0736ff9b83d456740ebbb4aeb3aa9737f18fb4afb4aa074fb26c4d702f42968888550a3bded8c05247e045b866baef0499f079fdaeef6538f31d44deafffdfd3afa2fb4ca9082b8f1c465371a9894dd8c243fb4847e004f5256b3e90e2edde4c9fb3082ddfe4d1e734cacd96ef0706bf63c9984e22dc98851bcccd1c3494351feb458c9c6af41c0044bea3c47552b1d992ae542b17a2d0bba1a096c78d169034ecb55b6e3a7263c26017f033031228833c1daefc0dedb8cf7c3e37c9c37ebfe42f3225c326e8bcfd338804c145b16e34e4").unwrap());
3492 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3493 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3495 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3496 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3498 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3499 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3501 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3502 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3505 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3506 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3507 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3508 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3510 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3511 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3516 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3517 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3518 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3519 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3521 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3522 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3523 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3525 impl Drop for Node {
3526 fn drop(&mut self) {
3527 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3528 // Check that we processed all pending events
3529 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3530 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3531 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3536 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3537 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3540 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3541 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3542 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3543 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3546 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3547 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3549 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3550 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3552 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3553 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3556 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3557 }, match events[1] {
3558 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3559 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3560 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3561 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3562 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3563 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3564 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3565 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3567 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3573 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3574 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3576 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3577 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3579 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3580 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3583 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3589 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3590 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3592 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3593 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3595 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3596 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3599 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3605 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3606 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
3608 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3609 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3616 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3617 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3618 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3619 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3621 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3625 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3626 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3628 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3629 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3630 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3632 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3633 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3635 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3637 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3638 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3639 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3640 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3641 added_monitors.clear();
3643 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3646 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3648 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3649 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3650 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3651 added_monitors.clear();
3654 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3656 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3657 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3658 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3659 added_monitors.clear();
3662 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3663 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3665 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3666 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3667 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3669 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3675 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3676 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3677 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3681 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3682 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3683 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3684 ((match events_6[0] {
3685 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3686 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3687 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3690 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3691 }, match events_6[1] {
3692 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3693 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3696 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3700 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3701 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3702 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3706 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3707 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3708 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3709 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3711 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3712 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3713 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3714 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3717 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3720 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3721 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3722 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3723 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3724 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3725 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3731 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3733 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3736 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3737 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3740 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3741 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3743 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3744 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3745 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3747 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3750 macro_rules! check_spends {
3751 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3753 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3754 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3755 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3756 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3761 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3762 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3764 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3765 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3766 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3767 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3768 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3771 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3772 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3774 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3775 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3778 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3785 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
3786 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3787 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3790 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3791 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3793 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3794 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3795 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3796 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3797 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3800 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3803 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3804 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3807 Some(match events_1[1] {
3808 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3809 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3812 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3816 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3817 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3818 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3819 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3820 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3821 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3822 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3824 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3825 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3826 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3827 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3828 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3829 (as_update, bs_update)
3831 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3833 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3834 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3835 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3836 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3838 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3839 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3840 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3841 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3842 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3843 (as_update, bs_update)
3845 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3846 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3848 (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
3853 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3854 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3857 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3858 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3859 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3860 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3861 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3862 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3865 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3867 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3868 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3873 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3874 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3876 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3877 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3878 added_monitors.clear();
3883 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3884 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3886 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3887 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3888 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3889 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3890 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3893 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
3895 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3896 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3897 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3898 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3899 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3900 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3901 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3902 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3903 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3904 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3906 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3907 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3910 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3911 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3913 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3914 if $fail_backwards {
3915 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3916 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3918 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3920 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3921 if $fail_backwards {
3922 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3923 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3925 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3927 added_monitors.clear();
3932 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
3934 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
3937 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3939 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
3940 if $fail_backwards {
3941 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3942 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3943 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
3944 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3945 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
3947 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3953 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3956 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3957 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3958 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3959 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3960 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3961 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3962 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3967 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3968 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3970 let mut payment_event = {
3971 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3972 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3974 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3975 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3976 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3978 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3980 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3981 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3983 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3984 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3985 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3987 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3988 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3990 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3991 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3994 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3995 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3997 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3998 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3999 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4001 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4002 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4003 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
4005 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4008 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4009 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4010 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
4011 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4012 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4018 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
4021 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
4022 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4023 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4025 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4026 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4027 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
4030 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4031 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4033 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4034 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4035 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4036 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4037 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4038 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4039 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4040 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
4042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4048 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
4049 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
4051 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4052 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
4053 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4054 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4058 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
4059 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
4061 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4062 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4063 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
4064 get_next_msgs!($node)
4066 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4069 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4070 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
4075 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4076 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4077 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4078 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
4079 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4080 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
4081 } else if update_next_msgs {
4082 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
4084 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4086 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4087 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4094 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
4095 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4096 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4098 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4099 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4101 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4106 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
4107 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
4110 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
4112 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
4113 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4114 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4115 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4116 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4119 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4122 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4123 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4124 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4125 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4126 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4129 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4131 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4133 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4134 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4138 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4139 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4140 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4143 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4144 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
4145 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4147 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4148 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4149 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4151 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4152 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4157 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4158 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4159 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4160 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4161 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4162 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4163 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4164 // second-to-last node!
4165 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4168 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4169 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4170 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4172 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4173 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4174 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4175 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4176 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4177 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4178 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4179 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4181 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4184 assert!(events.is_empty());
4186 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4187 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4194 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4196 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4197 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4199 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
4200 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4201 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4203 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4208 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4209 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4212 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4213 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4214 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4215 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4216 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4218 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4219 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4221 for _ in 0..node_count {
4222 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4223 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4224 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4225 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4226 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4227 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4228 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4229 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4230 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4231 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4232 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4233 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4234 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
4235 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4236 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4244 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4245 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4246 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4247 let channel_id = chan.2;
4250 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4254 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4255 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4256 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4257 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4258 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4259 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4260 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4261 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4262 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4263 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4265 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4267 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4269 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4270 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4273 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4274 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4275 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4276 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4277 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4279 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4282 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4284 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4285 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4286 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4289 let payment_event = {
4290 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4291 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4292 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4294 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4295 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4297 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4298 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4299 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4300 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4301 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4304 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4305 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4306 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4307 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4310 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4311 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4312 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4313 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4314 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4315 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4316 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4319 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4320 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4321 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4322 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4323 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4324 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4325 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4328 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4329 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4330 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4333 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4334 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4337 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4340 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4341 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4343 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4344 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4347 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4352 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4353 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4354 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4355 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4356 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4357 let channel_id = chan.2;
4360 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4362 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4363 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4366 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4367 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4368 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4369 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4372 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4375 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4377 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4378 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4379 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4382 let payment_event = {
4383 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4384 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4385 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4387 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4388 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4390 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4391 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4392 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4393 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4394 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4397 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4400 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4404 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4405 let nodes = create_network(2);
4406 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4407 let channel_id = chan.2;
4410 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4411 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4412 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4413 // (3) update_fee ->
4414 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4415 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4416 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4417 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4418 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4419 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4420 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4421 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4422 // revoke_and_ack ->
4423 // B should send no response here
4424 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4425 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4426 // revoke_and_ack ->
4428 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4429 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4430 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4431 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4433 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4434 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4435 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4436 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4437 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4439 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4442 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4443 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4444 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4445 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4448 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4450 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4451 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4452 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4454 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4455 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4456 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4457 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4460 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4462 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4464 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4466 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4467 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4468 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4470 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4471 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4472 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4473 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4474 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4475 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4476 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4478 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4479 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4480 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4482 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4484 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4485 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4489 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4490 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4493 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4494 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4497 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4498 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4499 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4502 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4503 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4508 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4509 let nodes = create_network(2);
4510 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4511 let channel_id = chan.2;
4513 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4514 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
4515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4517 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4518 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4519 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4520 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4521 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4523 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4525 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4527 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4528 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4531 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4532 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4535 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4536 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4537 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4540 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4541 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4546 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
4547 let nodes = create_network(2);
4548 let channel_value = 1888;
4549 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
4550 let channel_id = chan.2;
4553 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
4554 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4555 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4557 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4559 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
4561 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
4562 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
4564 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4565 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4567 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
4568 let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
4569 let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
4570 let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
4571 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
4572 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
4575 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
4576 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
4577 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
4578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4580 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4582 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4584 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
4585 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
4586 //Should produce and error.
4587 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
4589 assert!(match err.err {
4590 "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
4594 //clear the message we could not handle
4595 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4599 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4600 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4601 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4602 let channel_id = chan.2;
4605 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4607 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4608 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4611 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4612 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4613 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4614 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4615 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4617 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4619 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4620 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4621 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4624 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4626 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4628 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4629 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4631 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4632 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4633 added_monitors.clear();
4635 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4636 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4637 // node[1] has nothing to do
4639 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4640 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4643 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4644 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4645 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4646 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4647 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4649 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4651 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4652 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4653 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4654 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4655 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4656 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4658 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4659 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4661 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4663 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4665 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4667 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4669 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4670 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4672 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4674 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4676 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4677 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4679 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4680 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4682 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4683 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4685 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4686 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4688 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4689 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4692 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4694 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4695 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4696 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4700 fn test_update_fee() {
4701 let nodes = create_network(2);
4702 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4703 let channel_id = chan.2;
4706 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4707 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4708 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4709 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4710 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4711 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4712 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4713 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4714 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4715 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4716 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4717 // revoke_and_ack ->
4719 // Create and deliver (1)...
4720 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4721 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4722 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4724 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4725 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4726 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4727 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4728 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4730 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4732 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4734 // Generate (2) and (3):
4735 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4736 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4740 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4741 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4744 // Create and deliver (4)...
4745 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4747 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4748 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4749 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4750 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4751 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4753 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4756 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4757 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4760 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4761 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4763 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4764 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4766 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4767 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4770 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4771 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4774 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4775 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4776 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4777 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4778 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4779 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4780 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4781 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4785 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4787 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4788 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4790 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4792 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4794 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4795 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4796 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4800 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4801 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4802 let nodes = create_network(2);
4803 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4804 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4805 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4806 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4808 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4809 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4810 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4811 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4812 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4814 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4815 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4816 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4817 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4818 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4819 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4821 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4822 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4826 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4827 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4828 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4829 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4830 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4831 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4832 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4834 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4836 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4837 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4838 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4839 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4840 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4842 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4843 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4845 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4846 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4847 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4848 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4849 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4851 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4853 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4854 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4855 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4856 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4857 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4858 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4859 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4861 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4862 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4864 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4865 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4866 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4867 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4868 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4869 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4870 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4872 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4873 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4875 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4876 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4878 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4881 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4882 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4883 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4884 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4885 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4886 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4888 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4890 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4891 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4892 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4893 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4894 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4898 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
4899 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
4900 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4901 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4902 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4904 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4905 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4906 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4908 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4909 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4910 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4911 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4912 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4913 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4915 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4916 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4917 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4918 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4920 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4921 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4923 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4924 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
4926 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4927 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4928 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4929 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4930 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4931 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4933 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4934 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4936 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4937 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4939 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest } => {
4940 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4941 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
4943 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4946 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4947 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4948 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4949 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4950 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4951 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4952 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4954 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4956 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4957 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4958 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4959 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4960 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4964 fn update_fee_async_shutdown() {
4965 // Test update_fee works after shutdown start if messages are delivered out-of-order
4966 let nodes = create_network(2);
4967 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4969 let starting_feerate = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().get_feerate();
4970 nodes[0].node.update_fee(chan_1.2.clone(), starting_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4972 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4973 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4974 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4975 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4976 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4977 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_some());
4979 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4980 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4981 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4982 // Note that we don't actually test normative behavior here. The spec indicates we could
4983 // actually send a closing_signed here, but is kinda unclear and could possibly be amended
4984 // to require waiting on the full commitment dance before doing so (see
4985 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/499). In any case, to avoid
4986 // ambiguity, we should wait until after the full commitment dance to send closing_signed.
4987 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4989 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4990 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4991 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4992 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4993 let node_0_closing_signed = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, true);
4995 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4996 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), match node_0_closing_signed.unwrap() {
4997 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
4998 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5001 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5003 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5004 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5005 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5006 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5009 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
5010 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
5011 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
5012 let nodes = create_network(3);
5013 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5014 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5016 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
5018 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
5019 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5021 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
5022 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5024 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5028 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5029 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5031 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5032 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5033 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5034 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5036 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
5037 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5038 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5040 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
5041 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
5042 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5043 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5046 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5047 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5048 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
5050 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5052 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5053 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5055 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5057 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5058 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5059 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5060 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5061 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5062 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5063 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5065 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5066 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
5068 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5069 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5070 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5071 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5072 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5073 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5074 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5076 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5077 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5079 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5080 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
5082 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5085 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5087 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5088 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5089 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
5092 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5093 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5095 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5096 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5097 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5098 if recv_count == 0 {
5099 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
5100 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5102 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5103 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5104 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
5106 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5107 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5108 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5110 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5111 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5113 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5114 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5115 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
5117 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
5118 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5119 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5120 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5121 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5123 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5124 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5125 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5126 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5127 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5128 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5130 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5132 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5133 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5134 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5135 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5136 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5137 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5139 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5140 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5141 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5142 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5143 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5145 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5146 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5148 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5152 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5154 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5155 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5156 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5157 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5158 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5162 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5163 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5164 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5165 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5169 fn fake_network_test() {
5170 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5171 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5172 let nodes = create_network(4);
5174 // Create some initial channels
5175 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5176 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5177 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5179 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5180 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5181 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5182 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5183 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5185 // Send some more payments
5186 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5187 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5188 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5190 // Test failure packets
5191 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5192 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5194 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5195 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5197 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5198 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5199 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5200 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5201 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5202 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5203 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5205 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5206 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5207 hops.push(RouteHop {
5208 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5209 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5211 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5213 hops.push(RouteHop {
5214 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5215 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5217 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5219 hops.push(RouteHop {
5220 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5221 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5223 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5225 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5226 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5227 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5229 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5230 hops.push(RouteHop {
5231 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5232 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5234 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5236 hops.push(RouteHop {
5237 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5238 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5240 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5242 hops.push(RouteHop {
5243 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5244 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5246 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5248 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5249 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5250 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5252 // Claim the rebalances...
5253 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5254 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5256 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5257 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5259 // Send some payments across both channels
5260 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5261 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5262 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5264 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5266 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5268 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5269 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5270 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5272 // Close down the channels...
5273 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5274 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5275 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5276 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5277 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5281 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5282 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5283 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5284 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5286 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5287 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5288 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5289 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5290 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5291 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5293 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5295 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5296 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5298 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5299 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5301 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5302 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5303 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5306 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5307 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5308 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5310 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5311 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5312 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5314 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5315 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5317 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5319 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5320 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5321 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5323 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5324 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5325 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5326 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5327 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5328 res.push(tx.clone());
5333 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5334 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5337 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5339 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5340 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5341 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5342 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5343 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5344 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5346 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5348 res.push(tx.clone());
5352 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
5355 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5359 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5360 /// HTLC transaction.
5361 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5362 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5363 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5364 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5365 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5366 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5370 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5373 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5374 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5376 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5377 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5378 let mut found_prev = false;
5380 for tx in prev_txn {
5381 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5382 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5383 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5384 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5390 assert!(found_prev);
5392 let mut res = Vec::new();
5393 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5397 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5398 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5399 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5400 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5401 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5404 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5407 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5408 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5409 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5410 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5413 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5417 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5418 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5422 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5424 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5425 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5427 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5428 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5430 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5431 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5435 fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
5437 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5438 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5440 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5441 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5442 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5443 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5444 chan.get_value_stat()
5448 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5449 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5450 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5452 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5453 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5455 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5456 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5458 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5459 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5460 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5461 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5462 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5466 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5468 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5469 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5470 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5471 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5476 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5477 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5478 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5479 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5481 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5482 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5483 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5485 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5490 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5491 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5493 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5495 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5497 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5498 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5499 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5501 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5502 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5506 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5507 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5508 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5510 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5511 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5514 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5517 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5518 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5519 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5520 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5521 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5524 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5525 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5526 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5527 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5528 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5532 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5533 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5534 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5535 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5537 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5538 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5542 // adding pending output
5543 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5544 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5546 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5547 let payment_event_1 = {
5548 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5551 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5552 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5553 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5555 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5557 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5558 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5560 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5561 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5562 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5563 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5568 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5569 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5571 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5572 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5573 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5574 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5575 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5577 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5579 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5580 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5581 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5582 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5583 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5584 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5586 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5587 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5588 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5589 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5593 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5595 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5597 // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
5598 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5599 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5600 let channel_close_broadcast = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5601 assert_eq!(channel_close_broadcast.len(), 1);
5602 match channel_close_broadcast[0] {
5603 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5604 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5606 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5612 // split the rest to test holding cell
5613 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5614 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5616 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5617 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5620 // now see if they go through on both sides
5621 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5622 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5623 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5625 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5626 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5628 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5630 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5631 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5632 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5633 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5637 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5638 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5639 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5641 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5642 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5644 // flush the pending htlc
5645 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5646 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5649 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5651 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5653 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5654 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5655 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5658 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5659 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5662 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5664 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5665 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5666 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5668 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5669 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5671 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5672 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5673 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5674 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5675 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5676 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5678 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5679 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5680 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5681 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5683 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5684 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5686 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5687 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5689 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5690 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5691 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5693 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5696 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5697 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5698 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5700 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5703 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5704 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5705 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5707 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5708 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5709 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5710 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5712 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5713 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5717 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5718 do_channel_reserve_test(false);
5719 do_channel_reserve_test(true);
5723 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5724 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5725 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5726 let nodes = create_network(5);
5728 // Create some initial channels
5729 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5730 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5731 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5732 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5734 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5735 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5736 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5737 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5738 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5740 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5741 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5743 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5744 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5745 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5746 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5748 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5749 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5750 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5752 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5753 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5755 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5756 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5758 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5759 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5760 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5761 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5763 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5764 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5765 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5767 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5768 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5770 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5771 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5773 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5774 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5776 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5777 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5778 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5779 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5781 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5787 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5788 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5789 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5791 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5793 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5794 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5796 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5797 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5799 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5801 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5802 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5803 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5805 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5806 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5807 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5810 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5811 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5812 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5813 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5814 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5818 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5819 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5820 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5821 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5822 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5825 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5827 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5828 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5830 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5831 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5832 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5833 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5834 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5837 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5839 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5840 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5842 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5844 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5845 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5846 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5850 fn test_justice_tx() {
5851 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5853 let nodes = create_network(2);
5854 // Create some new channels:
5855 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5857 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5858 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5859 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5860 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5861 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5862 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5863 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5864 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5865 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5866 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5867 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5868 // Revoke the old state
5869 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5872 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5873 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5875 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5876 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5877 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5878 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5880 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5881 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5883 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5885 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5886 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5887 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5888 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5889 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5891 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5893 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5894 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5896 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5897 // Create some new channels:
5898 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5900 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5901 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5902 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5903 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5904 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5905 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5906 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5907 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5908 // Revoke the old state
5909 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5911 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5912 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5914 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5915 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5916 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5917 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5919 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5920 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5922 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5924 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5925 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5926 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5927 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5928 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5930 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5931 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5932 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5936 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5937 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5938 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5939 let nodes = create_network(2);
5940 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5941 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5942 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5943 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5944 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5945 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5946 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5947 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5949 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5950 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5951 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5952 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5953 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
5955 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5957 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5958 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
5960 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
5961 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5962 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5966 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
5967 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
5968 let nodes = create_network(2);
5970 // Create some new channel:
5971 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5973 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5974 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5975 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
5976 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5977 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5979 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5980 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5981 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
5982 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5983 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5984 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5985 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5986 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5987 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5989 //Revoke the old state
5990 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5993 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5995 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5997 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5998 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5999 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6001 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
6002 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6004 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
6006 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6007 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6008 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6009 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6010 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6011 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6012 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
6013 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
6015 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
6016 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6017 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
6019 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6020 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
6021 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
6022 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
6023 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6024 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
6026 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6027 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6028 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6032 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
6033 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
6034 let nodes = create_network(2);
6036 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6038 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6039 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6040 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
6041 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
6042 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6043 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
6045 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6046 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6048 //Revoke the old state
6049 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6052 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6054 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6056 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6057 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6058 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6060 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
6061 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
6062 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
6063 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
6064 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
6065 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
6066 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
6068 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6069 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6070 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6072 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
6073 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6074 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6075 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6076 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6078 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6079 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6080 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6081 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6082 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6083 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6084 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
6085 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
6087 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
6088 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
6090 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
6091 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
6092 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
6093 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
6094 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6095 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6097 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6098 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6099 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6103 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
6104 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
6105 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
6106 let nodes = create_network(2);
6107 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6109 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
6110 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
6112 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6113 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6115 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6116 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6118 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6122 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6123 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
6125 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6126 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6129 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6130 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6132 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6133 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6135 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6139 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6140 // registering new transactions
6141 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6145 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6146 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6147 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6148 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6149 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6151 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6153 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6155 let mut payment_event = {
6156 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6159 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6160 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6161 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6164 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6165 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6167 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6168 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6170 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6171 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6174 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6175 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6177 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6178 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6179 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6180 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6183 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6184 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6186 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6188 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6189 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6190 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6192 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6193 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6194 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6196 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6197 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6203 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6204 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6205 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6206 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6207 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6211 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6212 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6214 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6215 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6216 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6218 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6219 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6221 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6224 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6226 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6227 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6228 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6230 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6231 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6232 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6233 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6234 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6235 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6236 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6238 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6242 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6243 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6244 let nodes = create_network(2);
6245 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6247 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6248 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6249 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6250 mem::drop(channel_state);
6252 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6253 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6254 headers.push(header.clone());
6256 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6257 headers.push(header.clone());
6259 while !headers.is_empty() {
6260 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6263 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6264 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6266 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6267 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6269 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6272 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6273 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6274 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6277 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6278 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6280 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6281 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6282 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6283 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6284 res.push(msg.clone());
6286 panic!("Unexpected event")
6294 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6295 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6297 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6299 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6301 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6307 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6308 let mut commitment_update = None;
6309 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6312 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6313 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6314 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6315 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6317 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6318 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6319 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6320 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6322 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6325 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6328 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6330 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6331 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6332 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6333 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6335 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6336 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6337 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6338 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6340 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6344 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6349 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6350 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6351 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6352 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6353 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6354 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6355 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6357 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
6358 for msg in reestablish_1 {
6359 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6360 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
6362 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6363 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6365 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
6368 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
6369 for msg in reestablish_2 {
6370 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6371 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
6373 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6374 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6376 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
6379 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
6380 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
6381 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
6383 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
6384 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6385 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6386 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6387 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6388 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6389 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6390 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6391 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6394 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6397 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6398 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6399 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6400 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6402 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6404 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6405 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6406 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6407 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
6409 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6411 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6412 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6413 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6414 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6415 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6417 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6418 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6420 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6421 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6424 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6425 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6427 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6428 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6429 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6430 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6431 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6432 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6433 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6436 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6440 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
6441 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6442 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6443 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6444 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6445 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6446 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6447 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6448 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6451 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6454 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6455 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6456 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6457 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6459 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6461 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6462 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6463 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6464 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
6466 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6467 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6468 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6469 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6470 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6472 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6473 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6475 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6476 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6479 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6480 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6482 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6483 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6484 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6485 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6486 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6487 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6488 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6491 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6497 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
6498 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
6499 let nodes = create_network(3);
6500 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6501 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6503 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6504 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6505 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6507 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6508 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6509 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
6510 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
6512 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6513 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6514 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6516 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6517 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6518 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6519 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6521 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6522 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6524 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
6525 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
6527 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
6529 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6530 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6532 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6533 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
6535 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6538 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
6539 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
6540 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
6542 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6546 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
6547 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
6550 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
6551 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
6552 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6553 if messages_delivered == 0 {
6554 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6555 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
6557 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6560 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6561 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6563 let payment_event = {
6564 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
6565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6567 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6568 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6569 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6571 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
6573 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6574 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
6576 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6577 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6578 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6580 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6582 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6583 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6584 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6587 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6588 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6589 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6590 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6593 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
6594 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6595 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6603 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6604 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6605 if messages_delivered < 3 {
6606 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
6607 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
6608 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6609 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6610 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6611 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6612 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6613 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6614 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6615 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6616 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6617 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6618 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
6619 // Everything was delivered...
6620 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6623 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6624 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6626 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6627 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6630 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6631 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6632 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6634 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6635 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6637 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6638 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6640 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6641 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6642 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6644 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6647 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6650 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6651 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6652 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
6653 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6654 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6655 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6656 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6657 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6658 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6659 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6660 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6662 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6665 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
6666 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
6668 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6669 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6671 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6672 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6674 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6677 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
6678 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
6679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6680 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6682 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6683 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6684 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6687 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6688 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6689 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6690 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6693 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6694 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6695 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6703 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6704 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6705 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6706 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6707 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
6708 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
6709 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6710 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6712 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6713 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6715 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6718 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
6719 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6720 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6721 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6722 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6723 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6724 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6725 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6726 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6727 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6728 // Everything was delivered...
6729 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6732 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6733 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6734 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6736 // Channel should still work fine...
6737 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
6738 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6742 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
6743 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
6744 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
6745 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
6746 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
6750 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
6751 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
6752 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
6753 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
6757 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
6758 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
6759 let nodes = create_network(2);
6760 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6762 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6763 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6765 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6766 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6767 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6769 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6770 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6772 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6775 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6777 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6778 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6780 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6781 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6782 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
6784 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6785 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6787 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6790 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6791 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6793 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6796 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6798 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
6799 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
6801 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6802 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6803 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
6807 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
6808 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
6809 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
6810 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6811 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6813 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6815 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6816 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6817 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6819 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
6820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6822 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6823 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6825 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
6826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6829 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6832 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6833 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6835 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6836 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6837 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6838 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6839 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6840 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6841 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6843 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6844 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6845 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6847 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6848 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6850 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6853 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6854 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6855 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6858 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6861 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6862 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6864 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6865 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6866 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6867 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6868 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6869 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6871 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6872 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6873 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6874 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6876 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6877 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6879 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6880 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6882 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6884 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6885 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6886 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6887 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6888 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6889 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6890 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6891 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6892 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6895 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
6896 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6897 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6898 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6899 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6900 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6901 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6904 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6905 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6906 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6907 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6908 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6909 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6910 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6913 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6914 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6915 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6918 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6919 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6920 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6923 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6924 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6927 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6928 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6930 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6931 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6934 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6935 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6937 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6938 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6940 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
6941 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6943 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6946 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6947 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6950 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6954 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
6955 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
6956 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6957 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6959 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6960 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6962 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6963 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6966 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6967 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6969 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6970 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6973 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6974 // PaymentFailed event
6976 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6979 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
6980 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
6981 // a disconnect in between
6982 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6983 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6985 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6986 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6988 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6989 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6992 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6993 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6994 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6997 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6998 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6999 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7002 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7003 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7006 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7007 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7008 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
7009 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7010 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7011 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7013 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7015 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7016 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7018 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7019 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7020 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7022 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7025 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
7027 // Now set it to failed again...
7028 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7029 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7030 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7033 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7034 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7035 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7038 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7039 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7040 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7043 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
7044 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7045 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7048 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7049 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7051 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7052 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7055 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7056 // PaymentFailed event
7058 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7062 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
7063 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
7064 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
7067 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
7068 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
7070 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
7071 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
7072 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
7073 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
7074 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
7075 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
7076 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
7077 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
7078 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
7079 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
7080 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
7081 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
7082 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
7083 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
7084 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
7085 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
7086 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
7087 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7088 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7090 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7092 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7093 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7094 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7096 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7097 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7100 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7101 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7102 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7104 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
7105 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
7106 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7108 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7109 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7110 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
7111 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7112 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7113 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7114 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7115 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7116 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7117 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7119 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7120 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7121 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7122 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7124 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7125 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7127 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7130 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
7131 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7132 } else { panic!(); }
7135 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7137 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7140 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7141 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7142 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7145 // Now fix monitor updating...
7146 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7147 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7150 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7151 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7152 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7154 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7155 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7156 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7157 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7158 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7159 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7161 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7162 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7163 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7164 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7166 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7167 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7169 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7172 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7173 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7174 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7176 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7177 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7178 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7179 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7180 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7181 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7183 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7185 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7186 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7188 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7190 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7191 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7193 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7194 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7195 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7197 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7198 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7199 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7201 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7202 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7203 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7204 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7205 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7206 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7208 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7210 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7211 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7212 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7214 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7215 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7217 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7220 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7221 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7222 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7225 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7229 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7230 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7232 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7233 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7234 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7236 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7237 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7240 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7242 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7243 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7244 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7245 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7246 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7253 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7255 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7256 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7257 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7258 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7261 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7262 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7264 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7265 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7267 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7268 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7271 let as_commitment_update;
7272 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7274 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7275 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7276 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7277 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7278 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7279 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7280 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7281 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7285 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7286 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7287 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7288 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7289 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7290 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7291 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7292 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7296 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7299 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7300 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7302 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7303 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7305 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7306 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7308 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7311 handle_initial_raa!();
7313 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7314 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7316 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7317 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7319 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7320 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7323 handle_initial_raa!();
7325 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7326 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7328 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7329 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7331 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7332 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7334 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7339 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7340 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7342 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7343 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7345 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7346 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7350 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7351 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7352 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7355 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7356 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7357 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7360 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7361 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7364 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7365 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7366 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7368 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7370 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7371 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7373 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7374 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7375 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7377 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7380 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7384 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
7385 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
7386 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
7387 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
7388 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
7389 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
7390 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
7394 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
7395 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
7396 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
7397 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
7398 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
7402 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
7403 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
7404 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
7405 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
7406 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
7407 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
7411 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
7412 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
7413 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7414 let nodes = create_network(2);
7416 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7418 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7419 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7420 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7421 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7423 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7425 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7426 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7428 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7429 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7431 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
7433 let mut chan_announcement;
7435 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
7437 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
7438 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
7439 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
7440 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
7441 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
7442 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
7443 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
7444 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
7445 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7450 macro_rules! sign_msg {
7451 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
7452 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
7453 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7454 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7455 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
7456 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
7457 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
7458 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
7459 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
7460 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
7461 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
7462 contents: $unsigned_msg
7467 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7468 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7469 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
7470 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7472 // Configured with Network::Testnet
7473 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7474 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
7475 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7476 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7478 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7479 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
7480 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7481 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7484 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
7485 impl Writer for VecWriter {
7486 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
7487 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
7490 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
7491 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
7496 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7497 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7499 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7501 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7503 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7504 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7505 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7507 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7508 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7509 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7510 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7512 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7513 let config = UserConfig::new();
7514 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7515 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7516 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7517 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7518 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7519 default_config: config,
7521 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7522 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7523 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7524 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7525 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7526 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7529 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7531 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7532 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7533 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
7534 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
7535 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7538 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7539 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7540 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7541 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7543 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7544 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7545 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7546 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7548 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7549 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
7550 for node in nodes.iter() {
7551 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
7552 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
7553 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
7556 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7560 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7561 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7562 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7564 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7565 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7567 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7569 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7570 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7571 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7573 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7574 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7575 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7576 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7578 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7579 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7580 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7581 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7582 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7583 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7584 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7586 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7587 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7588 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7589 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7590 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7591 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7594 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7596 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7597 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7600 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7602 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
7603 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7607 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
7608 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
7609 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
7610 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7611 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
7612 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
7614 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
7616 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
7617 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7619 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
7620 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7621 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7622 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7624 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
7626 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
7627 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
7628 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7629 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
7630 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
7633 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7634 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
7635 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
7636 let mut read = &serialized[..];
7637 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7638 assert!(read.is_empty());
7639 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
7642 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7643 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7644 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7645 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7647 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7648 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7649 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7650 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7651 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7652 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
7654 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7656 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
7657 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7658 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7659 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
7660 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
7663 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
7664 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
7665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7667 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7669 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
7670 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7671 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7672 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
7673 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7675 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7676 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7677 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
7678 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
7679 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
7680 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
7683 macro_rules! check_dynamic_output_p2wsh {
7686 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7687 let mut txn = Vec::new();
7688 for event in events {
7690 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7691 for outp in outputs {
7693 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
7695 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7696 script_sig: Script::new(),
7697 sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
7698 witness: Vec::new(),
7701 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7702 value: output.value,
7704 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7710 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7711 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7712 let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
7713 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7714 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7715 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
7716 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
7719 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7723 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7731 macro_rules! check_dynamic_output_p2wpkh {
7734 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7735 let mut txn = Vec::new();
7736 for event in events {
7738 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7739 for outp in outputs {
7741 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
7743 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7744 script_sig: Script::new(),
7746 witness: Vec::new(),
7749 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7750 value: output.value,
7752 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7758 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7759 let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
7760 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
7761 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7762 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
7763 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7764 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7765 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
7768 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7772 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7780 macro_rules! check_static_output {
7781 ($event: expr, $node: expr, $event_idx: expr, $output_idx: expr, $der_idx: expr, $idx_node: expr) => {
7782 match $event[$event_idx] {
7783 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7784 match outputs[$output_idx] {
7785 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
7786 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7788 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7789 script_sig: Script::new(),
7791 witness: Vec::new(),
7794 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7795 value: output.value,
7797 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7801 output: vec![outp.clone()],
7804 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node[$idx_node].node_seed) {
7806 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
7808 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
7811 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
7814 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
7815 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
7816 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7817 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
7818 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7819 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7820 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
7823 _ => panic!("Unexpected event !"),
7826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event !"),
7832 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
7833 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
7834 let nodes = create_network(2);
7836 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
7837 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
7838 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7840 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7841 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7843 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7844 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7845 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
7846 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
7848 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7849 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
7850 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wsh!(nodes[1]);
7851 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7852 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7856 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
7857 // Same test as precedent, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
7858 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
7860 let nodes = create_network(2);
7862 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
7863 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
7864 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7866 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7867 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7869 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7870 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7871 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
7872 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
7874 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7875 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
7876 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7878 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7879 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7881 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wpkh!(nodes[1]);
7882 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
7883 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
7884 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7888 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
7889 let nodes = create_network(2);
7891 // Create some initial channels
7892 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7894 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7896 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7897 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
7898 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7900 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
7901 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7902 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7904 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
7905 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7907 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7908 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7911 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7912 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
7915 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
7916 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
7917 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
7918 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
7919 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
7920 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
7922 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7923 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 1, 1);
7924 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[0].clone());
7928 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
7929 let nodes = create_network(2);
7931 // Create some initial channels
7932 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7934 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7935 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7936 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7937 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7939 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7941 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7942 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7943 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7945 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7946 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7948 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7949 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7950 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
7951 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7952 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7954 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7955 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 1, 1);
7956 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[0].clone());
7960 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
7961 let nodes = create_network(2);
7963 // Create some initial channels
7964 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7966 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7967 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7968 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7969 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7971 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7973 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7974 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
7975 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7976 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7978 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7979 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7981 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7982 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7983 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7984 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
7985 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7987 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
7988 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7989 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7991 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7992 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7995 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7996 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
7997 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
7998 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
8000 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8001 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
8002 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 1, 1, 1, 1);
8003 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[3].clone());
8007 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
8008 let nodes = create_network(2);
8010 // Create some initial channels
8011 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8013 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8014 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8015 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8016 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8018 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8020 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8021 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
8022 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8023 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8025 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8026 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8028 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8030 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8031 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8032 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
8033 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
8035 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
8036 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8037 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8039 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8040 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8043 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8044 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
8045 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
8046 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
8048 let events = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8049 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
8050 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 1, 2, 1, 0);
8051 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[3].clone());
8055 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
8056 let nodes = create_network(2);
8058 // Create some initial channels
8059 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8061 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
8062 let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8063 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8064 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
8066 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
8067 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8069 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8070 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8071 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8073 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
8074 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8077 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8078 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8080 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8081 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8082 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
8083 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8085 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8086 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wsh!(nodes[1]);
8087 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8088 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8092 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
8093 let nodes = create_network(2);
8095 // Create some initial channels
8096 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8098 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
8099 let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8100 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8101 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
8103 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8104 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8105 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
8106 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8108 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8109 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8111 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8112 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8113 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
8114 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8116 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8117 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wsh!(nodes[0]);
8118 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
8119 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
8120 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
8121 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8122 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8126 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
8127 let nodes = create_network(2);
8129 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8131 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
8132 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
8134 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8135 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8136 let events = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8137 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 2, 0);
8138 check_spends!(spend_tx, closing_tx.clone());
8140 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8141 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8142 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 2, 1);
8143 check_spends!(spend_tx, closing_tx);