1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
7 use bitcoin::util::uint::Uint256;
9 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
10 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
11 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
14 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
15 use ln::channel::Channel;
16 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
17 use ln::router::Route;
19 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable};
20 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
21 use util::sha2::Sha256;
23 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
24 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
25 use crypto::digest::Digest;
26 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
27 use crypto::chacha20::ChaCha20;
29 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
30 use std::collections::HashMap;
31 use std::collections::hash_map;
33 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
35 mod channel_held_info {
38 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
39 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
40 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
41 payment_hash: [u8; 32],
42 short_channel_id: u64,
43 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
45 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
48 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
49 impl PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
50 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
53 payment_hash: [0; 32],
55 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
57 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
62 pub enum HTLCFailReason {
64 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
72 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
73 pub use self::channel_held_info::*;
74 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
75 pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*;
77 enum PendingOutboundHTLC {
79 source_short_channel_id: u64,
80 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
85 /// Used for channel rebalancing
87 source_short_channel_id: u64,
88 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
93 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
94 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
95 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
96 /// probably increase this significantly.
97 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
99 struct ChannelHolder {
100 by_id: HashMap<Uint256, Channel>,
101 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, Uint256>,
102 next_forward: Instant,
103 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
104 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
105 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
107 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
108 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<Uint256, Channel>,
109 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Uint256>,
110 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
111 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
112 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
113 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
116 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
118 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
119 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
120 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
121 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
122 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
123 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
128 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
129 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
130 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
131 /// to individual Channels.
132 pub struct ChannelManager {
133 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
134 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
135 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
136 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
137 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
139 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
140 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
143 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
144 our_network_key: SecretKey,
146 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
149 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
151 macro_rules! secp_call {
155 //TODO: Make the err a parameter!
156 Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Key error", msg: None})
163 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
165 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
166 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
171 pub struct ChannelDetails {
172 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
173 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
174 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
175 /// lifetime of the channel.
176 pub channel_id: Uint256,
177 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
178 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
179 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
180 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
181 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
182 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
186 impl ChannelManager {
187 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
188 /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
189 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
190 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
191 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= (1 << 24)!
192 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
193 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
195 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
196 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
197 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
198 monitor: monitor.clone(),
202 announce_channels_publicly,
203 fee_proportional_millionths,
206 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
207 by_id: HashMap::new(),
208 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
209 next_forward: Instant::now(),
210 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
211 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
215 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
217 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
218 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
222 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, HandleError> {
223 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id);
224 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?;
225 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
226 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
227 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
232 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
233 /// more information.
234 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
235 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
236 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
237 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
238 res.push(ChannelDetails {
239 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
240 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
241 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
242 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
243 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
249 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
250 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
251 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
252 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &Uint256) -> Result<msgs::Shutdown, HandleError> {
254 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
255 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
256 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
257 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
258 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
259 chan_entry.remove_entry();
263 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", msg: None})
266 for payment_hash in res.1 {
267 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
268 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
274 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
276 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
277 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
278 let mut res = [0; 32];
279 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
283 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
284 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
285 let mut res = [0; 32];
286 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
292 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
293 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
294 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
295 let mut res = [0; 32];
296 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
300 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
301 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
302 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
303 let mut res = [0; 32];
304 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
308 fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, HandleError> {
309 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
310 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
311 let mut blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
312 let mut first_iteration = true;
314 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
315 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
317 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
318 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
319 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
320 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
321 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
324 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
325 first_iteration = false;
327 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
329 secp_call!(blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor))));
330 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
332 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
336 shared_secret: shared_secret,
338 blinding_factor: blinding_factor,
339 ephemeral_pubkey: ephemeral_pubkey,
348 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
349 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
350 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
351 let mut cur_cltv = 0u32;
352 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
353 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
354 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
355 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
357 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
358 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
359 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
360 // the intended recipient).
361 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
362 let cltv = if cur_cltv == 0 { hop.cltv_expiry_delta } else { cur_cltv };
363 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
365 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
366 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
367 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
368 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
372 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
373 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
374 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", msg: None});
376 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
377 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
378 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", msg: None});
380 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
382 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
386 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
388 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
396 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
397 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
399 for i in 0..dst.len() {
404 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
405 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, HandleError> {
406 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
407 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
410 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
411 let end_len = iters * 65;
412 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
413 res.resize(end_len, 0);
415 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
416 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
417 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
418 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
419 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
424 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
425 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
427 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
428 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
429 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
430 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
432 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
433 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
434 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
437 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
440 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
441 hmac.input(&packet_data);
442 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
443 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
446 Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{
448 public_key: onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey,
449 hop_data: packet_data,
454 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
455 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
456 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
457 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
459 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
460 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
461 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
462 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
463 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
464 data: packet_crypted,
468 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
469 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
471 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
474 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
475 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
476 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
477 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
481 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
482 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
485 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
487 failuremsg: failuremsg,
491 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
492 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
493 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
498 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
499 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
500 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
503 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
504 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &mut Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
505 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
506 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", msg: None}),
510 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap().serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
512 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
513 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
514 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
515 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
516 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
517 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
518 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
519 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
520 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
523 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
524 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).unwrap(); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
526 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
532 /// Sends a payment along a given route, returning the UpdateAddHTLC message to give to the
533 /// first hop in route. Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see
534 /// documentation for RouteHop fields for more info.
535 /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
536 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, HandleError> {
537 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
538 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", msg: None});
540 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
541 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
542 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
543 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", msg: None});
547 let session_priv = secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
548 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
549 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
553 let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here?
555 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv)?;
556 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route)?;
557 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, associated_data)?;
559 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
560 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
561 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", msg: None}),
562 Some(id) => id.clone()
565 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
566 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
567 return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", msg: None});
569 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
572 if channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
575 // TODO: We need to track these better, we're not generating these, so a
576 // third-party might make this happen:
577 panic!("payment_hash was repeated! Don't let this happen");
583 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
584 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
585 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &Uint256, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16)) {
587 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
588 match channel_state.by_id.remove(&temporary_channel_id) {
590 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo.0, funding_txo.1) {
595 //TODO: Push e to pendingevents
602 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
603 let chan_monitor = chan.channel_monitor();
604 match self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
607 //TODO: Push e to pendingevents?
613 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
614 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
615 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
620 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
621 channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan);
624 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
625 if !chan.is_usable() { return Ok(None) }
627 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
628 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
629 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
631 Ok(Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
632 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
633 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
634 node_signature: our_node_sig,
635 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
639 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forward(&self) {
640 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
641 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
643 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
644 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
646 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
650 for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
651 if short_chan_id != 0 {
652 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
653 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
655 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
656 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
657 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
659 // TODO: Send a failure packet back on each pending_forward
663 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
665 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
666 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
667 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
669 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
670 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
675 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
677 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
678 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
679 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
680 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
681 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
682 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
683 // this channel currently :/.
690 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
691 let commitment_msg = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
694 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
698 new_events.push(events::Event::SendHTLCs {
699 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
701 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
705 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
706 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
707 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
708 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
715 for failed_forward in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
716 match failed_forward.2 {
717 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: Vec::new() }),
718 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: chan_update.encode() }),
722 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
724 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
725 events.reserve(new_events.len());
726 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
731 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
732 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
733 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() })
736 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool {
737 let mut pending_htlc = {
738 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) {
739 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
740 None => return false,
745 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. } => {
746 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
752 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
753 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
754 //TODO: DECRYPT route from OutboundRoute
755 mem::drop(channel_state);
756 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
757 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
758 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
762 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => {
763 let err_packet = match onion_error {
764 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
765 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
766 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
768 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
769 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
773 let (node_id, fail_msg) = {
774 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
775 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
779 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
780 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc(payment_hash, err_packet) {
781 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
783 //TODO: Do something with e?
789 mem::drop(channel_state);
790 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
791 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFailHTLC {
801 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
802 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
803 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
804 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
805 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
806 self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true)
808 pub fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
809 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
810 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
811 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
812 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
814 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
815 let mut pending_htlc = {
816 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
817 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
818 None => return false,
823 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route } => {
824 if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us
825 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
826 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route });
827 } else { // This came from the first upstream node
828 // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow???
829 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route };
830 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret });
837 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
838 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
840 panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this...");
842 mem::drop(channel_state);
843 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
844 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
849 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => {
850 let (node_id, fulfill_msg, monitor) = {
851 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
852 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
856 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
857 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc(payment_preimage) {
858 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg, if from_user { Some(chan.channel_monitor()) } else { None }),
860 //TODO: Do something with e?
867 mem::drop(channel_state);
868 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
869 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFulfillHTLC {
875 //TODO: It may not be possible to handle add_update_monitor fails gracefully, maybe
876 //it should return no Err? Sadly, panic!()s instead doesn't help much :(
878 match self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.as_ref().unwrap().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.unwrap()) {
887 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
888 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
889 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap()
893 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
894 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
895 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
896 let mut ret = Vec::new();
897 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
902 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
903 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
904 let mut new_funding_locked_messages = Vec::new();
906 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
907 let mut short_to_ids_to_insert = Vec::new();
908 for channel in channel_state.by_id.values_mut() {
909 match channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched) {
910 Some(funding_locked) => {
911 let announcement_sigs = match self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
914 //TODO: push e on events and blow up the channel (it has bad keys)
918 new_funding_locked_messages.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
919 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
921 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
923 short_to_ids_to_insert.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()));
927 //TODO: Check if channel was closed (or disabled) here
929 for to_insert in short_to_ids_to_insert {
930 channel_state.short_to_id.insert(to_insert.0, to_insert.1);
933 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
934 for funding_locked in new_funding_locked_messages.drain(..) {
935 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
939 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
940 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
941 for channel in channel_state.by_id.values_mut() {
942 if channel.block_disconnected(header) {
943 //TODO Close channel here
949 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
950 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
951 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
952 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
953 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown genesis block hash", msg: None});
955 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
956 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
957 return Err(HandleError{err: "temporary_channel_id collision!", msg: None});
959 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, self.announce_channels_publicly)?;
960 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel()?;
961 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
965 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
966 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
967 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
968 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
970 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
971 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
973 chan.accept_channel(&msg)?;
974 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
976 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
979 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
980 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
981 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
982 channel_value_satoshis: value,
983 output_script: output_script,
984 user_channel_id: user_id,
989 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
990 //TODO: broke this - a node shouldn't be able to get their channel removed by sending a
991 //funding_created a second time, or long after the first, or whatever (note this also
992 //leaves the short_to_id map in a busted state.
994 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
995 match channel_state.by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
997 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
998 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1000 match chan.funding_created(msg) {
1001 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1009 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1011 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1012 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1013 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1014 // for a bogus channel.
1015 let chan_monitor = chan.0.channel_monitor();
1016 self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor)?;
1017 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1018 channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.1.channel_id, chan.0);
1022 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1023 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1024 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1025 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1027 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1028 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1030 chan.funding_signed(&msg)?;
1031 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1033 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1036 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1037 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1038 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1039 user_channel_id: user_id,
1044 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
1045 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1046 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1048 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1049 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1051 chan.funding_locked(&msg)?;
1052 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan)?);
1054 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1058 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
1060 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1062 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1063 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1064 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1065 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1067 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1068 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1069 chan_entry.remove_entry();
1073 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1076 for payment_hash in res.2 {
1077 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1078 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1083 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
1085 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1086 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1087 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1088 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1089 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1091 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1092 if res.1.is_some() {
1093 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1094 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1095 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1096 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1097 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1098 chan_entry.remove_entry();
1102 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1105 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1106 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1111 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
1112 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1113 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1114 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1116 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1117 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1118 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1119 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1121 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key);
1122 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1124 let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here?
1126 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
1129 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1130 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1131 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
1132 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
1138 macro_rules! return_err {
1139 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1140 return Err(msgs::HandleError {
1142 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::UpdateFailHTLC {
1143 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1144 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1145 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1146 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1153 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1154 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1155 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1156 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1157 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1158 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1159 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1160 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1163 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1164 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1165 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
1166 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1167 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1170 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1171 let next_hop_data = {
1172 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1173 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1174 match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
1176 let error_code = match err {
1177 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
1178 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1180 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1186 let mut pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1188 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
1189 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1191 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1192 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1195 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1196 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1197 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1198 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1200 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1202 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1203 short_channel_id: 0,
1204 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1205 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1206 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1209 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1210 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1211 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1213 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone();
1215 let blinding_factor = {
1216 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1217 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1218 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
1219 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1220 sha.result(&mut res);
1221 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1223 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1225 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1231 match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1233 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1235 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1240 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1242 public_key: new_pubkey,
1243 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1244 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1247 //TODO: Check amt_to_forward and outgoing_cltv_value are within acceptable ranges!
1249 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1250 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1251 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1252 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1253 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1254 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1255 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1259 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1260 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1262 if pending_forward_info.onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1263 let forwarding_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&pending_forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1265 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1267 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1269 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1270 if !chan.is_live() {
1271 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap();
1272 return_err!("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x4000 | 10, &chan_update.encode()[..]);
1276 let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
1278 // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
1279 // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
1280 // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
1281 // we send permanent_node_failure.
1282 match &claimable_htlcs_entry {
1283 &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) => {
1284 let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
1286 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1287 acceptable_cycle = pending_forward_info.short_channel_id == 0;
1291 if !acceptable_cycle {
1292 return_err!("Payment looped through us twice", 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1298 let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1300 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1301 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1303 if !chan.is_usable() {
1304 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", msg: None});
1306 let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
1307 pending_forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1308 (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
1310 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}), //TODO: panic?
1313 match claimable_htlcs_entry {
1314 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
1315 let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
1316 let route = match outbound_route {
1317 &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route } => {
1320 _ => { panic!("WAT") },
1322 *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
1323 source_short_channel_id,
1324 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1329 e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
1330 source_short_channel_id,
1331 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1339 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1340 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1341 // Claim funds first, cause we don't really care if the channel we received the message on
1342 // is broken, we may have enough info to get our own money!
1343 self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false);
1346 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1347 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1349 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1350 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1352 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)?;
1353 chan.channel_monitor()
1355 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1358 self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor)?;
1362 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1363 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1364 let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1366 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1367 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1369 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg)?
1371 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1373 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() });
1377 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1378 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1379 let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1381 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1382 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1384 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg)?
1386 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1388 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() });
1392 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<msgs::RevokeAndACK, HandleError> {
1393 let mut forward_event = None;
1394 let (res, monitor) = {
1395 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1397 let ((res, mut forwarding_infos), monitor) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1399 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1400 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1402 (chan.commitment_signed(&msg)?, chan.channel_monitor())
1404 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1407 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1408 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1409 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1411 for forward_info in forwarding_infos.drain(..) {
1412 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1413 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1414 entry.get_mut().push(forward_info);
1416 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1417 entry.insert(vec!(forward_info));
1424 //TODO: Only if we store HTLC sigs
1425 self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor)?;
1427 match forward_event {
1429 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1430 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1431 time_forwardable: time
1440 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<(Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, HandleError> {
1441 let (res, monitor) = {
1442 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1443 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1445 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1446 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1448 (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)?, chan.channel_monitor())
1450 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1453 self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor)?;
1457 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1458 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1459 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1461 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1462 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1464 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)
1466 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1470 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1471 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1472 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1473 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1475 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1476 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1478 if !chan.is_usable() {
1479 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", msg: None });
1482 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1483 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
1485 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1486 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1487 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }));
1488 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }));
1490 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
1492 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1493 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1494 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1495 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1496 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1497 contents: announcement,
1498 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1500 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1503 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1504 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1508 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
1509 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1510 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1511 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1512 if no_connection_possible {
1513 channel_state.by_id.retain(move |_, chan| {
1514 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1515 match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1517 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1521 //TODO: get the latest commitment tx, any HTLC txn built on top of it, etc out
1522 //of the channel and throw those into the announcement blackhole.
1529 for chan in channel_state.by_id {
1530 if chan.1.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1531 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). Also
1532 //fail and wipe any uncommitted outbound HTLCs as those are considered after
1542 use chain::chaininterface;
1543 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
1544 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
1546 use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
1547 use util::test_utils;
1548 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1550 use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
1551 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
1552 use bitcoin::util::uint::Uint256;
1553 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
1554 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
1555 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1556 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
1557 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
1559 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
1560 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
1562 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
1563 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1565 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1567 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
1568 use std::default::Default;
1569 use std::time::Instant;
1571 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
1572 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
1573 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1578 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1579 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1582 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1583 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1586 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1587 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1590 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1591 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1594 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1595 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1600 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1602 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
1603 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
1608 fn onion_vectors() {
1609 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
1610 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1612 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
1613 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
1614 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
1615 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex_bytes("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
1616 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex_bytes("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
1618 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
1619 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
1620 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
1621 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex_bytes("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
1622 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex_bytes("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
1624 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
1625 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
1626 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
1627 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex_bytes("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
1628 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex_bytes("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
1630 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
1631 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
1632 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
1633 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex_bytes("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
1634 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex_bytes("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
1636 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
1637 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
1638 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
1639 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex_bytes("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
1640 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex_bytes("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
1642 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
1643 let payloads = vec!(
1644 msgs::OnionHopData {
1646 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1647 short_channel_id: 0,
1649 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1653 msgs::OnionHopData {
1655 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1656 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
1657 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
1658 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1662 msgs::OnionHopData {
1664 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1665 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
1666 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
1667 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1671 msgs::OnionHopData {
1673 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1674 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
1675 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
1676 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1680 msgs::OnionHopData {
1682 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1683 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
1684 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
1685 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1691 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, hex_bytes("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()).unwrap();
1692 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
1694 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1698 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
1699 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
1701 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1702 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
1703 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1705 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
1706 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1708 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
1709 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1711 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
1712 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex_bytes("a5d3e8634cfe78b2307d87c6d90be6fe7855b4f2cc9b1dfb19e92e4b79103f61ff9ac25f412ddfb7466e74f81b3e545563cdd8f5524dae873de61d7bdfccd496af2584930d2b566b4f8d3881f8c043df92224f38cf094cfc09d92655989531524593ec6d6caec1863bdfaa79229b5020acc034cd6deeea1021c50586947b9b8e6faa83b81fbfa6133c0af5d6b07c017f7158fa94f0d206baf12dda6b68f785b773b360fd0497e16cc402d779c8d48d0fa6315536ef0660f3f4e1865f5b38ea49c7da4fd959de4e83ff3ab686f059a45c65ba2af4a6a79166aa0f496bf04d06987b6d2ea205bdb0d347718b9aeff5b61dfff344993a275b79717cd815b6ad4c0beb568c4ac9c36ff1c315ec1119a1993c4b61e6eaa0375e0aaf738ac691abd3263bf937e3").unwrap());
1714 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
1715 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1717 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
1718 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1721 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
1722 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
1723 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
1725 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
1726 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
1730 static mut CHAN_COUNT: u32 = 0;
1731 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &ChannelManager, chain_a: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, monitor_a: &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor, node_b: &ChannelManager, chain_b: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, monitor_b: &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Uint256, Transaction) {
1732 let open_chan = node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42).unwrap();
1733 let accept_chan = node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan).unwrap();
1734 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
1736 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
1740 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1741 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
1743 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
1744 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
1745 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1747 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
1748 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
1750 funding_output = (Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
1752 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output.clone());
1753 let mut added_monitors = monitor_a.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
1754 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
1755 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
1756 added_monitors.clear();
1758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1761 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1762 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
1763 let funding_signed = match events_2[0] {
1764 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
1765 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
1766 let res = node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
1767 let mut added_monitors = monitor_b.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
1768 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
1769 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
1770 added_monitors.clear();
1773 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1776 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
1778 let events_3 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1779 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
1781 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
1782 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1783 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
1785 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1788 confirm_transaction(&chain_a, &tx, chan_id);
1789 let events_4 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1790 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
1792 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
1793 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
1794 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
1795 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
1797 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1802 confirm_transaction(&chain_b, &tx, chan_id);
1803 let events_5 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1804 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
1805 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_5[0] {
1806 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
1807 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
1808 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
1809 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
1810 node_a.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
1811 as_announcement_sigs
1813 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1816 let events_6 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1817 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
1818 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_6[0] {
1819 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
1822 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1825 node_b.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
1826 let events_7 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1827 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
1828 let bs_update = match events_7[0] {
1829 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
1830 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
1833 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1840 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
1843 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &ChannelManager, outbound_broadcaster: &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, inbound_node: &ChannelManager, inbound_broadcaster: &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, channel_id: &Uint256, funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) {
1844 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (inbound_node, inbound_broadcaster) } else { (outbound_node, outbound_broadcaster) };
1845 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (outbound_node, outbound_broadcaster) } else { (inbound_node, inbound_broadcaster) };
1848 let shutdown_a = node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
1849 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
1850 if !close_inbound_first {
1851 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
1853 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
1854 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
1855 if close_inbound_first {
1856 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
1857 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
1858 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
1859 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
1861 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
1862 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
1863 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
1864 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
1866 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
1867 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
1868 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
1870 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
1871 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
1872 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
1873 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
1875 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
1876 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
1877 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
1878 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
1883 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1884 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
1887 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
1889 Event::SendHTLCs { node_id, msgs, commitment_msg } => {
1890 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: msgs, commitment_msg: commitment_msg }
1892 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
1897 static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0;
1898 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &ChannelManager, origin_monitor: &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor, route: Route, expected_route: &[(&ChannelManager, &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor)], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
1899 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
1900 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
1901 let our_payment_hash = {
1902 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1903 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
1904 let mut ret = [0; 32];
1905 sha.result(&mut ret);
1909 let mut payment_event = {
1910 let msgs = origin_node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap().unwrap();
1912 node_id: expected_route[0].0.get_our_node_id(),
1914 commitment_msg: msgs.1,
1917 let mut prev_node = (origin_node, origin_monitor);
1919 for (idx, &(node, monitor)) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
1920 assert_eq!(node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
1922 node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.0.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
1924 let added_monitors = monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
1925 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
1928 let revoke_and_ack = node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.0.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
1930 let mut added_monitors = monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
1931 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
1932 added_monitors.clear();
1934 assert!(prev_node.0.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
1936 let mut added_monitors = prev_node.1.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
1937 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
1938 added_monitors.clear();
1941 let events_1 = node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1942 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
1944 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
1945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1948 node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
1949 node.process_pending_htlc_forward();
1951 let mut events_2 = node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1952 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
1953 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
1955 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
1956 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
1957 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
1959 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1962 for event in events_2.drain(..) {
1963 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(event);
1965 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
1968 prev_node = (node, monitor);
1971 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
1974 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &ChannelManager, origin_monitor: &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor, expected_route: &[(&ChannelManager, &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor)], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1975 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().0.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
1977 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().1.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
1978 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
1979 added_monitors.clear();
1982 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().0.get_our_node_id();
1983 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().0;
1984 let mut next_msg = None;
1985 for &(node, monitor) in expected_route.iter().rev() {
1986 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.get_our_node_id());
1989 node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&prev_node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
1991 let mut added_monitors = monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
1992 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
1993 added_monitors.clear();
1998 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1999 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2001 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2002 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2003 next_msg = Some(msg.clone());
2005 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2011 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.get_our_node_id());
2012 origin_node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&expected_route.first().unwrap().0.get_our_node_id(), &next_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
2014 let mut added_monitors = origin_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2015 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2016 added_monitors.clear();
2019 let events = origin_node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2020 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2022 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2023 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2025 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2029 fn route_payment(origin_node: &ChannelManager, origin_monitor: &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor, origin_router: &Router, expected_route: &[(&ChannelManager, &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor)], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2030 let route = origin_router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().0.get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), recv_value, 142).unwrap();
2031 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2032 for (&(node, _), hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2033 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.get_our_node_id());
2036 send_along_route(origin_node, origin_monitor, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2039 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &ChannelManager, origin_router: &Router, expected_route: &[&ChannelManager], recv_value: u64) {
2040 let route = origin_router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), recv_value, 142).unwrap();
2041 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2042 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2043 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.get_our_node_id());
2046 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2047 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2048 let our_payment_hash = {
2049 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2050 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2051 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2052 sha.result(&mut ret);
2056 let err = origin_node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2057 assert_eq!(err.err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight");
2060 fn send_payment(origin_node: &ChannelManager, origin_monitor: &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor, origin_router: &Router, expected_route: &[(&ChannelManager, &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor)], recv_value: u64) {
2061 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(origin_node, origin_monitor, origin_router, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2062 claim_payment(origin_node, origin_monitor, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2065 fn send_failed_payment(origin_node: &ChannelManager, origin_monitor: &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor, origin_router: &Router, expected_route: &[(&ChannelManager, &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor)]) {
2066 let route = origin_router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().0.get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), 1000000, 142).unwrap();
2067 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2068 for (&(node, _), hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2069 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.get_our_node_id());
2071 let our_payment_hash = send_along_route(origin_node, origin_monitor, route, expected_route, 1000000).1;
2073 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().0.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2075 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().0.get_our_node_id();
2076 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().0;
2077 let mut next_msg = None;
2078 for &(node, _) in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2079 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.get_our_node_id());
2082 node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&prev_node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
2086 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2087 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2089 Event::SendFailHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2090 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2091 next_msg = Some(msg.clone());
2093 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2099 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.get_our_node_id());
2100 origin_node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&expected_route.first().unwrap().0.get_our_node_id(), &next_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
2102 let events = origin_node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2103 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2105 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2106 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2108 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2113 fn fake_network_test() {
2114 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2115 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
2116 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2117 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2119 let feeest_1 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
2120 let chain_monitor_1 = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
2121 let tx_broadcaster_1 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2122 let chan_monitor_1 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor_1.clone(), tx_broadcaster_1.clone()));
2124 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2125 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2126 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2128 let node_1 = ChannelManager::new(node_id_1.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest_1.clone(), chan_monitor_1.clone(), chain_monitor_1.clone(), tx_broadcaster_1.clone()).unwrap();
2129 let router_1 = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id_1).unwrap());
2131 let feeest_2 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
2132 let chain_monitor_2 = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
2133 let tx_broadcaster_2 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2134 let chan_monitor_2 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor_2.clone(), tx_broadcaster_2.clone()));
2136 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2137 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2138 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2140 let node_2 = ChannelManager::new(node_id_2.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest_2.clone(), chan_monitor_2.clone(), chain_monitor_2.clone(), tx_broadcaster_2.clone()).unwrap();
2141 let router_2 = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id_2).unwrap());
2143 let feeest_3 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
2144 let chain_monitor_3 = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
2145 let tx_broadcaster_3 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2146 let chan_monitor_3 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor_3.clone(), tx_broadcaster_3.clone()));
2148 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2149 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2150 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2152 let node_3 = ChannelManager::new(node_id_3.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest_3.clone(), chan_monitor_3.clone(), chain_monitor_3.clone(), tx_broadcaster_3.clone()).unwrap();
2153 let router_3 = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id_3).unwrap());
2155 let feeest_4 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
2156 let chain_monitor_4 = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
2157 let tx_broadcaster_4 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2158 let chan_monitor_4 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor_4.clone(), tx_broadcaster_4.clone()));
2160 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2161 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2162 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2164 let node_4 = ChannelManager::new(node_id_4.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest_4.clone(), chan_monitor_4.clone(), chain_monitor_4.clone(), tx_broadcaster_4.clone()).unwrap();
2165 let router_4 = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id_4).unwrap());
2167 // Create some initial channels
2168 let chan_announcement_1 = create_chan_between_nodes(&node_1, &chain_monitor_1, &chan_monitor_1, &node_2, &chain_monitor_2, &chan_monitor_2);
2169 for router in vec!(&router_1, &router_2, &router_3, &router_4) {
2170 assert!(router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement_1.0).unwrap());
2171 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_1.1).unwrap();
2172 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_1.2).unwrap();
2174 let chan_announcement_2 = create_chan_between_nodes(&node_2, &chain_monitor_2, &chan_monitor_2, &node_3, &chain_monitor_3, &chan_monitor_3);
2175 for router in vec!(&router_1, &router_2, &router_3, &router_4) {
2176 assert!(router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement_2.0).unwrap());
2177 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_2.1).unwrap();
2178 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_2.2).unwrap();
2180 let chan_announcement_3 = create_chan_between_nodes(&node_3, &chain_monitor_3, &chan_monitor_3, &node_4, &chain_monitor_4, &chan_monitor_4);
2181 for router in vec!(&router_1, &router_2, &router_3, &router_4) {
2182 assert!(router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement_3.0).unwrap());
2183 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_3.1).unwrap();
2184 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_3.2).unwrap();
2187 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2188 send_payment(&node_1, &chan_monitor_1, &router_1, &vec!((&*node_2, &*chan_monitor_2), (&*node_3, &*chan_monitor_3), (&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..], 8000000);
2189 send_payment(&node_1, &chan_monitor_1, &router_1, &vec!((&*node_2, &*chan_monitor_2), (&*node_3, &*chan_monitor_3), (&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..], 8000000);
2190 send_payment(&node_1, &chan_monitor_1, &router_1, &vec!((&*node_2, &*chan_monitor_2), (&*node_3, &*chan_monitor_3), (&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..], 8000000);
2191 send_payment(&node_1, &chan_monitor_1, &router_1, &vec!((&*node_2, &*chan_monitor_2), (&*node_3, &*chan_monitor_3), (&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..], 8000000);
2192 send_payment(&node_1, &chan_monitor_1, &router_1, &vec!((&*node_2, &*chan_monitor_2), (&*node_3, &*chan_monitor_3), (&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..], 8000000);
2194 // Send some more payments
2195 send_payment(&node_2, &chan_monitor_2, &router_2, &vec!((&*node_3, &*chan_monitor_3), (&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..], 1000000);
2196 send_payment(&node_4, &chan_monitor_4, &router_4, &vec!((&*node_3, &*chan_monitor_3), (&*node_2, &*chan_monitor_2), (&*node_1, &*chan_monitor_1))[..], 1000000);
2197 send_payment(&node_4, &chan_monitor_4, &router_4, &vec!((&*node_3, &*chan_monitor_3), (&*node_2, &*chan_monitor_2))[..], 1000000);
2199 // Test failure packets
2200 send_failed_payment(&node_1, &chan_monitor_1, &router_1, &vec!((&*node_2, &*chan_monitor_2), (&*node_3, &*chan_monitor_3), (&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..]);
2202 // Add a new channel that skips 3
2203 let chan_announcement_4 = create_chan_between_nodes(&node_2, &chain_monitor_2, &chan_monitor_2, &node_4, &chain_monitor_4, &chan_monitor_4);
2204 for router in vec!(&router_1, &router_2, &router_3, &router_4) {
2205 assert!(router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement_4.0).unwrap());
2206 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_4.1).unwrap();
2207 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_4.2).unwrap();
2210 send_payment(&node_1, &chan_monitor_1, &router_1, &vec!((&*node_2, &*chan_monitor_2), (&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..], 1000000);
2211 send_payment(&node_3, &chan_monitor_3, &router_3, &vec!((&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..], 1000000);
2212 send_payment(&node_2, &chan_monitor_2, &router_2, &vec!((&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..], 8000000);
2213 send_payment(&node_2, &chan_monitor_2, &router_2, &vec!((&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..], 8000000);
2214 send_payment(&node_2, &chan_monitor_2, &router_2, &vec!((&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..], 8000000);
2215 send_payment(&node_2, &chan_monitor_2, &router_2, &vec!((&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..], 8000000);
2216 send_payment(&node_2, &chan_monitor_2, &router_2, &vec!((&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..], 8000000);
2218 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
2219 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2220 hops.push(RouteHop {
2221 pubkey: node_3.get_our_node_id(),
2222 short_channel_id: chan_announcement_2.1.contents.short_channel_id,
2224 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_announcement_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2226 hops.push(RouteHop {
2227 pubkey: node_4.get_our_node_id(),
2228 short_channel_id: chan_announcement_3.1.contents.short_channel_id,
2230 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_announcement_4.2.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2232 hops.push(RouteHop {
2233 pubkey: node_2.get_our_node_id(),
2234 short_channel_id: chan_announcement_4.1.contents.short_channel_id,
2236 cltv_expiry_delta: 142,
2238 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_announcement_4.2.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_announcement_4.2.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2239 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_announcement_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_announcement_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2240 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&node_2, &chan_monitor_2, Route { hops }, &vec!((&*node_3, &*chan_monitor_3), (&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4), (&*node_2, &*chan_monitor_2))[..], 1000000).0;
2242 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2243 hops.push(RouteHop {
2244 pubkey: node_4.get_our_node_id(),
2245 short_channel_id: chan_announcement_4.1.contents.short_channel_id,
2247 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_announcement_3.2.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2249 hops.push(RouteHop {
2250 pubkey: node_3.get_our_node_id(),
2251 short_channel_id: chan_announcement_3.1.contents.short_channel_id,
2253 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_announcement_2.2.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2255 hops.push(RouteHop {
2256 pubkey: node_2.get_our_node_id(),
2257 short_channel_id: chan_announcement_2.1.contents.short_channel_id,
2259 cltv_expiry_delta: 142,
2261 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_announcement_2.2.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_announcement_2.2.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2262 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_announcement_3.2.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_announcement_3.2.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2263 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&node_2, &chan_monitor_2, Route { hops }, &vec!((&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4), (&*node_3, &*chan_monitor_3), (&*node_2, &*chan_monitor_2))[..], 1000000).0;
2265 // Claim the rebalances...
2266 claim_payment(&node_2, &chan_monitor_2, &vec!((&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4), (&*node_3, &*chan_monitor_3), (&*node_2, &*chan_monitor_2))[..], payment_preimage_2);
2267 claim_payment(&node_2, &chan_monitor_2, &vec!((&*node_3, &*chan_monitor_3), (&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4), (&*node_2, &*chan_monitor_2))[..], payment_preimage_1);
2269 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
2270 let chan_announcement_5 = create_chan_between_nodes(&node_2, &chain_monitor_2, &chan_monitor_2, &node_4, &chain_monitor_4, &chan_monitor_4);
2271 for router in vec!(&router_1, &router_2, &router_3, &router_4) {
2272 assert!(router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement_5.0).unwrap());
2273 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_5.1).unwrap();
2274 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_5.2).unwrap();
2277 // Send some payments across both channels
2278 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&node_1, &chan_monitor_1, &router_1, &vec!((&*node_2, &*chan_monitor_2), (&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..], 3000000).0;
2279 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&node_1, &chan_monitor_1, &router_1, &vec!((&*node_2, &*chan_monitor_2), (&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..], 3000000).0;
2280 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&node_1, &chan_monitor_1, &router_1, &vec!((&*node_2, &*chan_monitor_2), (&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..], 3000000).0;
2282 route_over_limit(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_4)[..], 3000000);
2284 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
2286 claim_payment(&node_1, &chan_monitor_1, &vec!((&*node_2, &*chan_monitor_2), (&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..], payment_preimage_3);
2287 claim_payment(&node_1, &chan_monitor_1, &vec!((&*node_2, &*chan_monitor_2), (&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..], payment_preimage_4);
2288 claim_payment(&node_1, &chan_monitor_1, &vec!((&*node_2, &*chan_monitor_2), (&*node_4, &*chan_monitor_4))[..], payment_preimage_5);
2290 // Close down the channels...
2291 close_channel(&node_1, &tx_broadcaster_1, &node_2, &tx_broadcaster_2, &chan_announcement_1.3, chan_announcement_1.4, true);
2292 close_channel(&node_2, &tx_broadcaster_2, &node_3, &tx_broadcaster_3, &chan_announcement_2.3, chan_announcement_2.4, false);
2293 close_channel(&node_3, &tx_broadcaster_3, &node_4, &tx_broadcaster_4, &chan_announcement_3.3, chan_announcement_3.4, true);
2294 close_channel(&node_2, &tx_broadcaster_2, &node_4, &tx_broadcaster_4, &chan_announcement_4.3, chan_announcement_4.4, false);
2296 // Check that we processed all pending events
2297 for node in vec!(&node_1, &node_2, &node_3, &node_4) {
2298 assert_eq!(node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2300 for chan_monitor in vec!(&chan_monitor_1, &chan_monitor_2, &chan_monitor_3, &chan_monitor_4) {
2301 assert_eq!(chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);