1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
22 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
23 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
24 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
27 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
28 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
29 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
30 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
31 use ln::router::Route;
34 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
35 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
37 use util::{byte_utils, events, rng};
38 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
39 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::errors::APIError;
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
64 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
65 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
66 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
67 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
68 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
69 short_channel_id: u64,
70 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
71 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
74 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
75 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
76 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
77 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
80 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
83 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
87 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
88 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
89 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
90 short_channel_id: u64,
92 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
95 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
96 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
97 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
98 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
101 session_priv: SecretKey,
102 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
103 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
104 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
109 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
110 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
111 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
112 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
113 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
121 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
129 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
130 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
131 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
132 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
133 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
134 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
136 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
138 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
139 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
140 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
141 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
142 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
144 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
145 err: msgs::HandleError,
146 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
148 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
150 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
154 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
155 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
157 data: err.to_string()
161 shutdown_finish: None,
165 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
166 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
169 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
173 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
174 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
176 data: err.to_string()
180 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
184 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
187 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
189 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
191 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
193 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
194 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
196 data: msg.to_string()
201 shutdown_finish: None,
206 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
207 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
208 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
209 /// probably increase this significantly.
210 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
212 pub(super) struct HTLCForwardInfo {
213 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
216 pub(super) forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
218 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
221 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
222 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
223 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
224 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
225 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
226 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
227 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
229 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
233 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
234 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
235 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
236 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
237 pub(super) next_forward: Instant,
238 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
239 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
240 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
241 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
242 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
243 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
244 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
246 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
247 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
248 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
249 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
251 pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
252 pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
253 pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
254 pub(super) next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
255 pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
256 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
257 pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
260 pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
262 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
263 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
264 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
265 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
266 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
267 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
272 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
273 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
275 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
276 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
278 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
279 /// to individual Channels.
281 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
282 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
283 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
284 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
286 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
287 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
288 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
289 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
290 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
291 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
292 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
294 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
295 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
296 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
297 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
299 pub struct ChannelManager {
300 default_configuration: UserConfig,
301 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
302 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
303 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
304 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
305 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
308 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
310 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
311 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
312 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
315 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
317 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
318 our_network_key: SecretKey,
320 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
321 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
322 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
323 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
324 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
326 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
331 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
332 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
333 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
334 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
335 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
336 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
337 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
339 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS +
340 // HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
341 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it
342 // backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel
343 // on-chain to time out the HTLC.
346 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
348 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
349 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
352 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
354 macro_rules! secp_call {
355 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
358 Err(_) => return Err($err),
363 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
364 pub struct ChannelDetails {
365 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
366 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
367 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
368 /// lifetime of the channel.
369 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
370 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
371 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
372 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
373 /// The node_id of our counterparty
374 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
375 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
376 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
377 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
381 macro_rules! handle_error {
382 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
385 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
386 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
387 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
388 if let Some(update) = update_option {
389 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
390 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
401 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
402 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
405 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
406 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
408 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
409 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
410 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
411 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
412 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
414 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
420 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
421 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
424 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
425 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
427 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
428 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
429 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
430 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
431 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
433 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
439 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
440 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
441 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
443 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
444 if $action_type != RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst { panic!("Bad return_monitor_err call!"); }
445 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $raa_first_dropped_cs)
447 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
448 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, false)
450 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
452 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
453 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
454 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
455 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
457 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
458 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
459 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
460 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
461 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
462 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
463 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
464 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
465 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
466 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
468 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
469 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $raa_first_dropped_cs);
470 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()));
476 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
477 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
478 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
480 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
481 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
482 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
483 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
485 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
487 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
488 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), false);
494 impl ChannelManager {
495 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
497 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
498 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
500 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
502 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
503 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
504 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
506 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
507 default_configuration: config.clone(),
508 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
509 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
510 monitor: monitor.clone(),
514 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
515 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
518 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
519 by_id: HashMap::new(),
520 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
521 next_forward: Instant::now(),
522 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
523 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
524 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
526 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
528 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
529 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
535 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
536 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
540 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
542 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
543 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
544 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
545 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
547 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
548 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
550 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
551 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
552 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
553 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
554 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
557 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
558 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
560 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
561 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
562 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
563 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
564 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
565 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
567 panic!("RNG is bad???");
570 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
572 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
573 node_id: their_network_key,
579 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
580 /// more information.
581 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
582 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
583 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
584 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
585 res.push(ChannelDetails {
586 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
587 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
588 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
589 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
590 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
596 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
597 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
598 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
599 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
600 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
601 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
602 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
603 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
604 // really wanted anyway.
605 if channel.is_live() {
606 res.push(ChannelDetails {
607 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
608 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
609 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
610 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
611 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
618 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
619 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
620 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
622 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
623 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
624 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
626 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
627 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
628 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
629 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
630 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
631 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
632 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
633 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
636 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
637 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
638 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
640 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
641 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
643 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
646 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
647 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
649 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
650 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
655 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
656 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
657 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
666 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
667 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
668 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
669 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
670 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
672 for tx in local_txn {
673 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
677 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
678 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
679 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
680 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
683 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
684 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
685 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
686 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
687 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
694 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
695 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
696 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
697 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
698 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
704 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
705 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
706 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
707 for chan in self.list_channels() {
708 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
712 const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
713 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
714 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
715 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
717 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
718 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
719 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
720 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
721 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
722 failure_code: $err_code,
723 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
728 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
729 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
732 let shared_secret = {
733 let mut arr = [0; 32];
734 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
737 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
739 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
740 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
741 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
742 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
743 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
744 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
745 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
746 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
749 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
750 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
751 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
752 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
753 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
756 let mut channel_state = None;
757 macro_rules! return_err {
758 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
760 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
761 if channel_state.is_none() {
762 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
764 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
765 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
766 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
767 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
768 })), channel_state.unwrap());
773 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
774 let next_hop_data = {
775 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
776 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
777 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
779 let error_code = match err {
780 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
781 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
783 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
789 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
791 // final_expiry_too_soon
792 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
793 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
795 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
796 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
797 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
799 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
800 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
801 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
804 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
805 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
806 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
807 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
809 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
811 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
813 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
814 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
815 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
818 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
819 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
820 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
822 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
824 let blinding_factor = {
825 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
826 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
827 sha.input(&shared_secret);
828 SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()).expect("SHA-256 is broken?")
831 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
833 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
835 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
838 hop_data: new_packet_data,
839 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
842 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
843 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
844 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
845 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
846 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
847 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
848 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
852 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
853 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
854 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
855 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
856 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
857 None => { // unknown_next_peer
858 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
860 Some(id) => id.clone(),
862 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
863 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
865 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
866 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
867 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
868 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
869 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
870 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
871 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
873 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
874 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
876 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
877 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
878 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
880 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
881 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
883 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
884 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
885 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
886 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
888 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
889 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
894 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
895 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
896 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
897 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
899 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
900 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
902 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
903 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
905 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
907 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
912 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
915 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
916 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
917 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
918 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
919 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
923 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
925 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
926 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
927 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
928 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
929 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
930 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
931 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
932 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
933 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
934 excess_data: Vec::new(),
937 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
938 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
940 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
946 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
948 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
949 /// fields for more info.
951 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
952 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
953 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
954 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
955 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
956 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
958 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
960 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
961 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
962 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
963 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
964 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
965 /// relevant updates.
967 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
968 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
969 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
970 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
971 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
972 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
973 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
974 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
976 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
977 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
978 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
979 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
983 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
985 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
987 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
988 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
989 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
990 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
992 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
994 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
995 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
997 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
998 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
999 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1002 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1003 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1005 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1006 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1008 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1009 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1011 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1012 route: route.clone(),
1013 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1014 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1015 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1017 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1018 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1019 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1020 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1021 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1022 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1023 // something else in case we will resend later!
1024 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1027 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1028 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1029 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1030 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1031 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1032 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1033 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1041 } else { unreachable!(); }
1045 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1046 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1048 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1050 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1051 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1052 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1053 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1057 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1062 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1064 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1065 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1067 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1069 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1070 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1071 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1072 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1074 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1076 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1077 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1079 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1080 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1081 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1082 } else { unreachable!(); })
1088 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1089 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1090 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1093 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1094 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1095 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1096 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1103 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1104 // lock before add_update_monitor
1105 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1109 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1110 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1111 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1114 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1115 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1116 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1118 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1124 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1125 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1127 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1129 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1131 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1132 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1134 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1135 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1136 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1137 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1138 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1142 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1144 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1145 /// Will likely generate further events.
1146 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1147 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1149 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1150 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1152 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1153 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1155 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1159 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1160 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1161 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1162 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1164 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1165 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1166 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1167 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1168 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1169 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1171 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1176 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1178 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1179 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1180 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1181 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1182 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1183 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1185 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1187 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1188 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1193 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1195 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1196 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1197 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1198 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1199 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1200 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1201 // this channel currently :/.
1208 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1209 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1212 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1213 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1215 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1219 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1222 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1223 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1224 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1225 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1226 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1227 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1228 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1230 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1235 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1236 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1237 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1238 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1239 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1241 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1242 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1243 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1245 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1246 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1247 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1254 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1256 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1257 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1261 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1262 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1263 events.append(&mut new_events);
1266 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1267 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
1268 /// expected_value is the value you expected the payment to be for (not the amount it actually
1269 /// was for from the PaymentReceived event).
1270 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, expected_value: u64) -> bool {
1271 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1273 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1274 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1275 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1276 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1277 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1278 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1279 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1280 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(expected_value).to_vec() });
1286 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1287 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1288 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1289 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1290 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1291 /// still-available channels.
1292 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1294 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1295 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1296 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1297 match &onion_error {
1298 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1300 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1302 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1303 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1304 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1305 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1306 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1307 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1308 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1313 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1314 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1315 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1316 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1318 error_code: onion_error_code
1322 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1326 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1327 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1328 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1329 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1331 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1332 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1333 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1334 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1335 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1336 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1338 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1344 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1345 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1346 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1347 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1348 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1349 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1351 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1352 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1353 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1357 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1359 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1360 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1364 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1365 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1366 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1367 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1370 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1371 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1372 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1373 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1374 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1375 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1376 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1378 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1384 //TODO: Do something with e?
1392 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1393 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1394 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1396 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1397 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1398 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1400 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1402 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1403 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1404 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1405 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1406 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1407 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1412 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1414 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1415 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1416 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1417 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1421 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1422 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1423 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1425 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1426 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1428 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1429 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1435 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1436 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1437 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1438 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1439 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1440 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1443 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1444 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1445 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1446 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1447 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1448 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1449 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1450 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1458 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1459 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1460 //TODO: Do something with e?
1468 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1469 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1470 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1473 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1474 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1476 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1477 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1478 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1479 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1480 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1483 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1484 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1485 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1486 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1487 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1488 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1489 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1490 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1492 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1493 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1494 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1495 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1496 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1497 // on-chain confirmations.
1498 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once its merged a test
1499 // should be written.
1500 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1501 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1503 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1504 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1505 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1511 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1514 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1515 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1516 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1518 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1520 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1521 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1522 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1523 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1528 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1529 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1530 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1531 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1532 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1537 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1541 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1552 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1553 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1555 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1557 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1558 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1562 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1563 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1564 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1567 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1568 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1569 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1570 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1571 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1572 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1573 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1574 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1575 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1576 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1578 entry.insert(channel);
1584 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1585 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1586 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1587 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1588 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1589 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1590 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1591 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1592 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1594 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1595 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1597 //TODO: same as above
1598 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1601 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1602 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1603 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1604 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1605 output_script: output_script,
1606 user_channel_id: user_id,
1611 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1612 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1613 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1614 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1615 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1616 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1617 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1618 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1619 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1621 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1623 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1626 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1627 // lock before add_update_monitor
1628 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1631 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1632 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1633 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1634 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1635 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1637 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1638 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1639 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1648 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1649 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1650 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1651 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1652 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1653 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1654 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1655 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1656 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1658 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1659 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1662 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1664 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1667 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1668 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1669 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1670 user_channel_id: user_id,
1675 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1676 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1677 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1678 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1679 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1680 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1681 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1682 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1684 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1685 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1686 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1687 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1688 msg: announcement_sigs,
1693 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1697 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1698 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1699 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1700 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1702 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1703 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1704 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1705 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1706 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1708 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1709 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1710 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1711 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1715 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1716 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1717 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1721 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1722 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1723 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1725 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1726 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1728 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1731 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1732 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1734 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1735 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1736 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1737 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1745 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1746 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1747 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1748 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1749 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1750 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1751 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1752 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1753 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1755 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1756 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1757 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1758 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1763 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1764 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1765 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1766 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1767 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1768 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1769 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1771 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1772 } else { (tx, None) }
1774 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1777 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1778 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1780 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1781 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1782 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1783 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1791 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1792 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1793 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1794 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1796 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1797 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1798 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1799 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1801 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1802 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1804 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1805 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1806 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1807 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1808 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1810 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
1811 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1812 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1813 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1814 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1815 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
1816 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1817 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1818 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1819 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
1820 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
1821 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
1822 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
1823 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
1825 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
1826 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1827 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
1828 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1832 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
1833 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
1834 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
1835 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
1836 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
1837 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
1842 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
1844 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1849 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1850 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1852 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1853 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1854 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1855 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1856 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1857 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1859 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
1861 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1864 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1868 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
1869 // indicating that the payment itself failed
1870 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool, Option<u16>) {
1871 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
1874 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
1875 let mut error_code_ret = None;
1876 let mut next_route_hop_ix = 0;
1877 let mut is_from_final_node = false;
1879 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1880 onion_utils::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1881 next_route_hop_ix += 1;
1882 if res.is_some() { return; }
1884 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
1885 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
1887 let ammag = onion_utils::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
1889 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1890 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1891 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1892 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1893 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1895 is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
1897 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1898 let um = onion_utils::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
1899 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
1900 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1902 if fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &err_packet.hmac) {
1903 if let Some(error_code_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2) {
1904 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
1905 const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
1906 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
1908 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&error_code_slice);
1909 error_code_ret = Some(error_code);
1911 let (debug_field, debug_field_size) = errors::get_onion_debug_field(error_code);
1913 // indicate that payment parameter has failed and no need to
1914 // update Route object
1915 let payment_failed = (match error_code & 0xff {
1916 15|16|17|18|19 => true,
1918 } && is_from_final_node) // PERM bit observed below even this error is from the intermediate nodes
1919 || error_code == 21; // Special case error 21 as the Route object is bogus, TODO: Maybe fail the node if the CLTV was reasonable?
1921 let mut fail_channel_update = None;
1923 if error_code & NODE == NODE {
1924 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM });
1926 else if error_code & PERM == PERM {
1927 fail_channel_update = if payment_failed {None} else {Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1928 short_channel_id: route.hops[next_route_hop_ix - if next_route_hop_ix == route.hops.len() { 1 } else { 0 }].short_channel_id,
1932 else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
1933 if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) {
1934 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&update_len_slice) as usize;
1935 if let Some(update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
1936 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice)) {
1937 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
1938 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
1939 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code & 0xff {
1941 11 => amt_to_forward > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
1943 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
1944 new_fee.is_some() && route_hop.fee_msat >= new_fee.unwrap()
1946 13 => route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
1947 14 => false, // expiry_too_soon; always valid?
1948 20 => chan_update.contents.flags & 2 == 0,
1949 _ => false, // unknown error code; take channel_update as valid
1951 fail_channel_update = if is_chan_update_invalid {
1952 // This probably indicates the node which forwarded
1953 // to the node in question corrupted something.
1954 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1955 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
1959 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1966 if fail_channel_update.is_none() {
1967 // They provided an UPDATE which was obviously bogus, not worth
1968 // trying to relay through them anymore.
1969 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1970 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1974 } else if !payment_failed {
1975 // We can't understand their error messages and they failed to
1976 // forward...they probably can't understand our forwards so its
1977 // really not worth trying any further.
1978 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1979 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1984 // TODO: Here (and a few other places) we assume that BADONION errors
1985 // are always "sourced" from the node previous to the one which failed
1986 // to decode the onion.
1987 res = Some((fail_channel_update, !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
1989 let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
1990 if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size {
1991 log_warn!(self, "Onion Error[{}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
1994 log_warn!(self, "Onion Error[{}({:#x})] {}", title, error_code, description);
1997 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
1998 // definitely came from the peer in question
1999 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2000 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2002 }), !is_from_final_node));
2006 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2007 if let Some((channel_update, payment_retryable)) = res {
2008 (channel_update, payment_retryable, error_code_ret)
2010 // only not set either packet unparseable or hmac does not match with any
2011 // payment not retryable only when garbage is from the final node
2012 (None, !is_from_final_node, None)
2014 } else { unreachable!(); }
2017 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2018 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2019 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2020 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2021 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2022 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2023 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2024 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2026 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2028 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2033 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2034 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2035 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2036 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2037 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2038 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2039 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2040 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2042 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2043 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2045 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2048 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2052 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2053 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2054 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2055 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2056 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2057 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2058 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2059 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2061 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2062 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2063 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2064 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, commitment_signed.is_some());
2065 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2067 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2068 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2069 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2071 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2072 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2073 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2074 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2075 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2076 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2077 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2078 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2080 commitment_signed: msg,
2084 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2085 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2086 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2092 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2097 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2098 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2099 let mut forward_event = None;
2100 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2101 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2102 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2103 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2104 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2106 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2107 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2108 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2109 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2111 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2112 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2117 match forward_event {
2119 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2120 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2121 time_forwardable: time
2129 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2130 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2131 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2132 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2133 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2134 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2135 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2136 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2137 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2139 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2140 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2141 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2142 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2144 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2145 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2146 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2150 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2151 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2152 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2156 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2158 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2161 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2162 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2164 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2169 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2170 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2171 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2172 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2173 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2174 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2175 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2176 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2178 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2180 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2185 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2186 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2187 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2189 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2190 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2191 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2192 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2194 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2195 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2198 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2199 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2200 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2202 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2203 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2204 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2205 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2206 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2209 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2211 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2212 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2213 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2214 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2215 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2216 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2217 contents: announcement,
2219 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2222 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2227 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2228 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2229 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2231 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2232 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2233 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2234 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2236 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2237 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2238 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2239 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2240 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2241 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2242 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2243 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2244 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2246 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2247 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2249 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order);
2250 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2253 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2254 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2255 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2259 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2260 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2261 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2262 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2267 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2268 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2269 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2270 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2276 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2280 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2285 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2286 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2287 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2293 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2297 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2298 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2299 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2300 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2302 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2303 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2305 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2306 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2307 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2309 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2310 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2311 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2312 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2313 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2315 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2316 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2318 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2319 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2321 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2322 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2323 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2325 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2328 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2329 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2330 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2331 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2332 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2333 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2334 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2335 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2345 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2346 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2348 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2350 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2351 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2352 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2353 node_id: their_node_id,
2357 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2363 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2364 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2365 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2366 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2367 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2369 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2370 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2371 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2372 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2373 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2375 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2376 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2381 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2382 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2383 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2388 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2389 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2390 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2391 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2392 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2394 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2395 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2396 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2397 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2398 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2400 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2401 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2406 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2407 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2408 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2413 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2414 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2415 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2416 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2417 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2418 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2420 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2421 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2422 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2423 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2424 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2425 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2426 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2427 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2428 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2429 msg: funding_locked,
2431 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2432 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2433 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2434 msg: announcement_sigs,
2437 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2438 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2439 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2440 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2441 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2445 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2446 for tx in txn_matched {
2447 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2448 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2449 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2450 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2451 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2453 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2454 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2455 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2456 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2457 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2458 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2467 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2468 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2469 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2471 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2472 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2473 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2474 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2475 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2476 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2477 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2486 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2487 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2489 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2490 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2493 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2494 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2495 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2496 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2498 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2499 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2500 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2501 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2502 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2503 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2504 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2505 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2507 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2508 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2509 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2519 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2520 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2522 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2523 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2527 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2528 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2529 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2530 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2531 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2534 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2535 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2536 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2539 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2540 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2541 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2544 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2545 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2546 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2549 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2550 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2551 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2554 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2555 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2556 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2559 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2560 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2561 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2564 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2565 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2566 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2569 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2570 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2571 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2574 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2575 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2576 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2579 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2580 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2581 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2584 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2585 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2586 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2589 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2590 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2591 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2594 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2595 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2596 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2599 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2600 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2601 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2604 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2605 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2606 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2609 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2610 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2611 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2612 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2614 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2615 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2616 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2617 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2618 if no_connection_possible {
2619 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2620 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2621 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2622 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2623 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2625 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2626 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2627 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2637 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2638 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2639 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2640 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2641 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2642 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2643 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2644 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2646 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2647 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2648 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2657 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2658 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2660 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2661 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2662 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2667 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2668 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2670 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2671 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2672 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2673 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2674 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2675 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2676 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2677 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2678 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2679 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2683 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2684 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2685 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2691 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2694 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2695 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2697 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2698 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2699 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2700 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2704 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2709 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2710 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2712 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2713 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2714 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2716 onion.write(writer)?;
2720 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2721 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2722 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2723 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2724 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2729 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2730 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2731 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2733 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2734 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2736 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2738 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2739 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2740 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2741 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2742 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2747 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2748 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2750 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2752 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2754 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2756 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2763 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2764 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2765 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2766 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2767 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2768 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2773 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2774 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2776 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2778 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2780 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2782 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2789 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2790 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2791 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2792 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2793 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2794 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2799 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2802 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2805 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2806 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2808 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2810 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2812 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2814 route.write(writer)?;
2815 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2816 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2823 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2824 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2825 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2826 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2827 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2828 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2829 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2830 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2832 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2837 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2838 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2840 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2844 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2846 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2847 data.write(writer)?;
2854 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
2855 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
2856 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2857 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
2858 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2859 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
2860 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
2862 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2867 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
2868 prev_short_channel_id,
2873 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
2874 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2875 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
2877 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2878 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2880 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
2881 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
2882 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
2884 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2885 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
2886 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2887 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2888 unfunded_channels += 1;
2891 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
2892 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2893 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2894 channel.write(writer)?;
2898 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2899 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
2900 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2901 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2902 for forward in pending_forwards {
2903 forward.write(writer)?;
2907 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2908 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
2909 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2910 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2911 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
2912 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
2920 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
2922 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
2924 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
2925 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
2926 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
2927 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
2928 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
2929 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
2930 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
2931 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
2932 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
2933 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
2934 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
2935 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
2936 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
2937 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
2938 /// deserialization.
2939 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
2941 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2943 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
2944 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
2945 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2947 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
2948 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
2949 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
2950 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
2951 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2953 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
2954 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
2955 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
2956 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
2957 /// force-closed during deserialization.
2958 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
2959 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
2960 /// deserialization.
2961 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
2962 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
2963 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
2964 pub default_config: UserConfig,
2966 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
2967 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
2969 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
2970 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
2971 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
2972 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
2974 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
2976 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
2979 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
2980 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2981 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2982 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2983 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2984 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2987 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2988 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2989 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2991 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
2993 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2994 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
2995 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
2996 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
2997 for _ in 0..channel_count {
2998 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
2999 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3000 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3003 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3004 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3005 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3006 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3007 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3008 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3009 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3010 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3011 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3013 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3014 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3016 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3019 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3023 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3024 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3025 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3029 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3030 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3031 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3032 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3033 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3034 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3035 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3036 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3038 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3041 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3042 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3043 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3044 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3045 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3046 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3047 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3048 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3050 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3053 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3055 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3056 monitor: args.monitor,
3057 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3058 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3060 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3061 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3062 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3064 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3067 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3070 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3072 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3074 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3075 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3076 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3077 logger: args.logger,
3078 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3081 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3082 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3083 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3084 //connection or two.
3087 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))