1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelKeys};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
29 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler};
30 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
31 use util::sha2::Sha256;
32 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
33 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
34 use util::logger::Logger;
35 use util::errors::APIError;
38 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
39 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
40 use crypto::digest::Digest;
41 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::collections::HashMap;
45 use std::collections::hash_map;
47 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
67 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
69 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
70 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
72 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
73 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
74 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
75 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
76 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
77 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
82 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
83 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
86 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
87 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
89 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
93 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
96 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
97 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
98 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
101 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
103 pub enum HTLCSource {
104 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
107 session_priv: SecretKey,
112 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
113 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
114 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
115 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
123 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
131 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
133 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
134 err: msgs::HandleError,
135 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
137 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
139 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
143 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
144 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
146 data: err.to_string()
150 needs_channel_force_close: false,
154 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
158 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
159 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
161 data: err.to_string()
165 needs_channel_force_close: true,
169 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
170 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
173 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
174 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
177 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
180 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
182 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
184 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
186 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
187 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
189 data: msg.to_string()
194 needs_channel_force_close: false,
198 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
201 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
203 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
205 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
207 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
208 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
210 data: msg.to_string()
215 needs_channel_force_close: true,
220 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
221 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
222 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
223 /// probably increase this significantly.
224 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
226 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
227 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
229 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
232 struct ChannelHolder {
233 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
234 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
235 next_forward: Instant,
236 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
237 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
238 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
239 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
240 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
241 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
242 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
244 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
246 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
247 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
248 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
249 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
250 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
251 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
254 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
256 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
257 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
258 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
259 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
260 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
265 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
266 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
268 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
269 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
271 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
272 /// to individual Channels.
273 pub struct ChannelManager {
274 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
275 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
276 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
277 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
278 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
280 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
281 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
282 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
283 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
285 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
286 our_network_key: SecretKey,
288 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
293 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
295 macro_rules! secp_call {
296 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
299 Err(_) => return Err($err),
306 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
308 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
309 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
314 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
315 pub struct ChannelDetails {
316 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
317 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
318 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
319 /// lifetime of the channel.
320 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
321 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
322 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
323 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
324 /// The node_id of our counterparty
325 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
326 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
327 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
328 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
332 impl ChannelManager {
333 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
335 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
336 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
338 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
339 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
341 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
342 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
343 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
345 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
346 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
347 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
348 monitor: monitor.clone(),
352 announce_channels_publicly,
353 fee_proportional_millionths,
354 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
357 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
358 by_id: HashMap::new(),
359 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
360 next_forward: Instant::now(),
361 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
362 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
366 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
370 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
371 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
375 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
377 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
378 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
379 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
380 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
382 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
383 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
385 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
386 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
387 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
389 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
390 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
391 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
392 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
393 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
394 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
395 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
396 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
399 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
400 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
401 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
403 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
407 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
408 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
409 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
410 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
411 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
412 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
413 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
415 panic!("RNG is bad???");
418 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
421 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
422 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
423 node_id: their_network_key,
429 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
430 /// more information.
431 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
432 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
433 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
434 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
435 res.push(ChannelDetails {
436 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
437 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
438 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
439 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
440 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
446 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
447 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
448 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
449 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
450 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
451 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
452 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
453 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
454 // really wanted anyway.
455 if channel.is_live() {
456 res.push(ChannelDetails {
457 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
458 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
459 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
460 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
461 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
468 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
469 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
470 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
472 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
473 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
474 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
475 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
476 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
477 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
478 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
479 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
480 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
481 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
482 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
484 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
485 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
487 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
490 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
491 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
492 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
494 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
495 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
500 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
501 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
502 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
506 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
515 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
516 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
517 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
518 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
519 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
521 for tx in local_txn {
522 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
524 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
525 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
526 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
527 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
528 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
529 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
530 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
533 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
534 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
535 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
537 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
538 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
539 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
540 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
541 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
548 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
549 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
550 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
551 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
557 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
558 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
559 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
560 for chan in self.list_channels() {
561 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
566 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
568 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
569 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
570 let mut res = [0; 32];
571 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
575 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
576 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
577 let mut res = [0; 32];
578 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
584 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
585 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
586 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
587 let mut res = [0; 32];
588 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
593 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
594 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
595 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
596 let mut res = [0; 32];
597 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
601 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
603 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
604 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
605 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
607 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
608 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
610 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
611 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
612 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
613 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
614 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
616 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
618 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
619 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
621 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
627 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
628 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
629 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
631 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
632 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
638 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
648 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
649 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
650 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
651 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
652 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
653 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
654 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
655 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
657 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
658 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
659 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
660 // the intended recipient).
661 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
662 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
663 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
665 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
666 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
667 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
668 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
672 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
673 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
674 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
676 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
677 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
678 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
680 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
682 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
686 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
688 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
696 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
697 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
699 for i in 0..dst.len() {
704 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
705 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
706 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
707 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
710 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
711 let end_len = iters * 65;
712 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
713 res.resize(end_len, 0);
715 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
716 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
717 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
718 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
719 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
724 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
725 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
727 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
728 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
729 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
730 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
732 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
733 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
734 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
737 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
740 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
741 hmac.input(&packet_data);
742 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
743 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
748 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
749 hop_data: packet_data,
754 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
755 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
756 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
757 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
759 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
760 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
761 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
762 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
763 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
764 data: packet_crypted,
768 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
769 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
771 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
774 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
775 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
776 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
777 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
781 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
782 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
785 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
787 failuremsg: failuremsg,
791 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
792 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
793 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
799 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
800 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
801 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
804 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
805 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
808 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
809 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
810 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
811 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
817 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
818 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
819 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
820 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
821 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
822 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
823 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
824 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
827 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
828 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
830 let mut channel_state = None;
831 macro_rules! return_err {
832 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
834 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
835 if channel_state.is_none() {
836 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
838 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
839 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
840 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
841 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
842 })), channel_state.unwrap());
847 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
848 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
849 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
850 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
851 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
852 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
853 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
854 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
857 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
858 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
859 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
860 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
861 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
864 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
865 let next_hop_data = {
866 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
867 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
868 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
870 let error_code = match err {
871 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
872 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
874 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
880 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
882 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
884 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
885 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
887 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
888 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
891 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
892 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
893 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
894 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
896 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
898 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
900 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
901 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
902 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
905 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
906 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
907 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
909 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
911 let blinding_factor = {
912 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
913 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
914 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
915 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
916 sha.result(&mut res);
917 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
919 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
925 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
926 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
929 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
931 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
932 hop_data: new_packet_data,
933 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
936 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
937 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
938 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
939 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
940 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
941 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
942 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
946 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
947 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
948 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
949 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
950 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
952 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
954 Some(id) => id.clone(),
956 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
957 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
959 Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
961 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
962 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
963 Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
965 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
966 Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
973 return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
978 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
981 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
982 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
983 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
984 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
988 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
990 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
991 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
992 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
993 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
994 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
995 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
996 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
997 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
998 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
999 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1002 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1003 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
1005 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1011 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1013 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1014 /// fields for more info.
1016 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1017 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1018 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1019 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1020 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1021 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1023 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
1025 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1026 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1027 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1028 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1029 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1031 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1032 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1033 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1034 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1038 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1039 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1040 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1042 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1044 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1046 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1047 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1048 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1049 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1051 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
1052 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1053 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1055 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1056 None => return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1057 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1061 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1062 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1063 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1065 if !chan.is_live() {
1066 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1068 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1069 route: route.clone(),
1070 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1071 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::RouteError{err: he.err})?
1074 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1077 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
1078 None => return Ok(()),
1082 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1086 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1087 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1088 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1089 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1090 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1091 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1092 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1093 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1101 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1103 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1105 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1106 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1107 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1109 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1112 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1113 pending_events.push($event);
1118 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1119 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1120 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1122 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1123 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1124 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1127 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1128 mem::drop(channel_state);
1129 add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1130 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1139 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1140 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1143 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1144 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1148 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1149 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1150 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1151 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1153 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1159 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1160 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1162 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1164 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1166 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1167 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1169 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1170 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1171 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1172 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1173 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1177 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1179 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1180 /// Will likely generate further events.
1181 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1182 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1183 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1185 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1186 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1188 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1192 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1193 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1194 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1195 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1197 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1198 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1199 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1200 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1201 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1202 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1204 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1209 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1211 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1212 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1213 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1214 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1215 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1216 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1218 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1220 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1221 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1226 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1228 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1229 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1230 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1231 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1232 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1233 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1234 // this channel currently :/.
1241 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1242 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1245 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1246 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1248 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1250 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1254 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1255 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1256 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1257 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1258 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1259 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1260 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1262 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1267 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1268 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1269 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1270 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1271 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1273 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1274 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1275 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1277 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1278 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1279 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1286 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1288 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1289 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1293 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1295 new_events.retain(|event| {
1296 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1297 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1298 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1304 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1305 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1306 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1307 events.push(event.1);
1311 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1312 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1313 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1314 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1315 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1316 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1317 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1318 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1324 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1325 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1326 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1327 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1328 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1329 /// still-available channels.
1330 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1332 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1333 mem::drop(channel_state);
1335 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1336 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1337 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1340 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1341 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1342 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1343 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1344 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1346 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1347 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1351 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1352 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1353 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1357 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1358 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1359 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1361 //TODO: Do something with e?
1368 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1369 mem::drop(channel_state);
1371 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1372 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1375 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1376 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1378 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1379 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1380 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1381 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1382 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1384 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1394 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1395 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1396 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1398 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1399 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1400 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1401 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1402 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1403 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1405 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1406 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1407 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1408 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1409 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1410 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1415 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1417 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1418 mem::drop(channel_state);
1419 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1420 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1424 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1425 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1426 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1427 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1428 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1430 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1431 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1437 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1438 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1439 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1441 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1442 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1443 //TODO: Do something with e?
1449 mem::drop(channel_state);
1450 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1451 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1452 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1456 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1457 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1458 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1460 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1461 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1462 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1463 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1464 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1466 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1474 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1475 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1476 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1479 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1480 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1482 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1486 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1487 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1488 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1490 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1491 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1492 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1495 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1497 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1498 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1499 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1500 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1501 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1502 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1503 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1504 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1507 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1508 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1509 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1511 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1515 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1516 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1517 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1518 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1522 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1523 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1524 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1525 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1527 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1528 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1529 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1531 chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1532 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1533 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1535 //TODO: same as above
1536 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1539 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1540 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1541 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1542 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1543 output_script: output_script,
1544 user_channel_id: user_id,
1549 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1550 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1551 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1552 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1553 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1554 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1555 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1556 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1558 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1559 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1560 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1563 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1567 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1569 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1570 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1571 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1572 // for a bogus channel.
1573 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1576 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1577 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1578 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1579 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1581 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1588 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1589 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1590 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1591 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1593 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1594 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1595 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1597 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1598 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1600 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1603 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1606 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1607 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1608 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1609 user_channel_id: user_id,
1614 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1615 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1616 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1618 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1619 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1620 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1622 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1623 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1624 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1626 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1630 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1631 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1632 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1633 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1635 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1636 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1637 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1638 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1639 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1641 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1642 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1643 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1644 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1646 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1647 } else { (res, None) }
1649 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1652 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1653 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1654 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1656 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1657 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1658 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1659 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1667 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1668 let (res, chan_option) = {
1669 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1670 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1671 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1672 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1673 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1674 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1675 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1677 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1678 if res.1.is_some() {
1679 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1680 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1681 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1682 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1683 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1684 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1685 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1687 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1688 } else { (res, None) }
1690 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1693 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1694 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1696 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1697 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1698 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1699 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1707 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1708 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1709 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1710 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1712 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1713 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1714 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1715 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1717 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1718 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1720 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1722 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1723 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1724 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1726 if !chan.is_usable() {
1727 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1729 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1731 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1735 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1736 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1737 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1739 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1740 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1741 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1743 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1744 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1746 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1748 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1752 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1753 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1754 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1756 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1757 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1758 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1760 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1761 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
1763 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1767 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, .. } => {
1768 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1769 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1771 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1772 if res.is_some() { return; }
1774 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1776 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1777 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1778 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1779 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1780 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1782 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1783 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1784 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1786 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1787 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1788 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1789 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1790 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1791 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1792 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1793 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1794 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1795 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1796 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1797 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1798 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len])) {
1799 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1807 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1808 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1809 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1810 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1813 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1825 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1826 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1827 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1829 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1830 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1831 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1833 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
1834 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
1836 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1837 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1840 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1844 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1845 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1846 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1847 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1849 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1850 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1851 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1853 chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?
1855 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1858 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1862 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1865 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1866 let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor), short_channel_id) = {
1867 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1868 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1870 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1871 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1872 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1874 (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
1876 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1879 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1882 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1883 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1886 let mut forward_event = None;
1887 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1888 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1889 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1890 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1891 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1893 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1894 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1895 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1896 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
1898 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1899 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
1904 match forward_event {
1906 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1907 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1908 time_forwardable: time
1917 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1918 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1919 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1921 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1922 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1923 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1925 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
1927 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1931 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1932 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1933 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1934 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1936 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1937 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1939 if !chan.is_usable() {
1940 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1943 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1944 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
1945 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1947 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1948 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1949 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
1950 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1951 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1953 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1955 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1956 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1957 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1958 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1959 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1960 contents: announcement,
1961 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1963 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1966 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1967 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1971 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1972 let (res, chan_monitor) = {
1973 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1974 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1976 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1977 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1979 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
1980 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1981 (Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update)), channel_monitor)
1983 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1986 if let Some(monitor) = chan_monitor {
1987 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1994 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
1995 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
1996 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1997 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
1999 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2000 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2001 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2002 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2004 if !chan.is_usable() {
2005 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Channel is not in usuable state"});
2007 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2008 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2010 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2011 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2014 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2015 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
2016 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2017 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2018 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2019 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2020 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2021 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2022 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2033 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2034 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2035 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2036 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2037 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2042 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2043 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2044 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2045 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2047 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2048 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2049 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2050 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2051 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2052 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2053 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
2054 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
2055 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2056 msg: funding_locked,
2057 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2059 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2060 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2061 new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
2062 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2065 if channel.is_shutdown() {
2069 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2070 for tx in txn_matched {
2071 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2072 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2073 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2074 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2076 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2077 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2078 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2079 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2080 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2081 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2090 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2091 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2092 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2094 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2095 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2096 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2097 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2098 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2099 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2100 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2109 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2110 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2112 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2113 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2114 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2116 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2119 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2120 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2121 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2122 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2124 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2125 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2126 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2127 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2128 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2129 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2130 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2132 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2133 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2134 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2144 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2145 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2147 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2148 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2149 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2150 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2153 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2157 macro_rules! handle_error {
2158 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2161 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2162 if needs_channel_force_close {
2164 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2165 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2166 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2168 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2171 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2172 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2173 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2174 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2175 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2177 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2189 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2190 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2191 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2192 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2195 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2196 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2199 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2200 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2203 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2204 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2207 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2208 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2211 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2212 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2215 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2216 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2219 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2220 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2223 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2224 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2227 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
2228 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2231 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2232 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2235 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2236 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2239 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2240 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2243 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2244 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2247 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2248 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2251 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), HandleError> {
2252 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2255 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2256 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2257 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2258 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2260 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2261 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2262 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2263 if no_connection_possible {
2264 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2265 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2266 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2267 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2269 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2270 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2271 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2281 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2282 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2283 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2284 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2285 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2286 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2287 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2289 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2290 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2291 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2300 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2301 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2303 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2304 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2305 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2306 pending_events.push(event);
2309 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2310 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2311 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2316 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2317 let mut res = Vec::new();
2318 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2319 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2320 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2321 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2322 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2323 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2324 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2328 res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2333 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2337 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2338 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2339 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2340 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2341 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2345 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2352 use chain::chaininterface;
2353 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2354 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2355 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2356 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2358 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2359 use util::test_utils;
2360 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2361 use util::errors::APIError;
2362 use util::logger::Logger;
2363 use util::ser::Writeable;
2365 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2366 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2367 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2368 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2369 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2370 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2371 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2375 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2376 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2378 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2379 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2381 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2383 use std::cell::RefCell;
2384 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2385 use std::default::Default;
2387 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2388 use std::time::Instant;
2391 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2392 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2393 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2398 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2399 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2402 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2403 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2406 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2407 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2410 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2411 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2414 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2415 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2420 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2422 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2423 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2428 fn onion_vectors() {
2429 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2430 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2432 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2433 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2434 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2435 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2436 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2438 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2439 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2440 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2441 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2442 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2444 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2445 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2446 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2447 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2448 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2450 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2451 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2452 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2453 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2454 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2456 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2457 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2458 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2459 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2460 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2462 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2463 let payloads = vec!(
2464 msgs::OnionHopData {
2466 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2467 short_channel_id: 0,
2469 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2473 msgs::OnionHopData {
2475 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2476 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2477 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2478 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2482 msgs::OnionHopData {
2484 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2485 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2486 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2487 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2491 msgs::OnionHopData {
2493 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2494 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2495 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2496 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2500 msgs::OnionHopData {
2502 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2503 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2504 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2505 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2511 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2512 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2514 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2518 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2519 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2521 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2522 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2523 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2525 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2526 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2528 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2529 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2531 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2532 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2534 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2535 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2537 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2538 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2541 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2542 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2543 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2544 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2546 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2547 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2552 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2553 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2554 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2555 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2557 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2558 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2560 impl Drop for Node {
2561 fn drop(&mut self) {
2562 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2563 // Check that we processed all pending events
2564 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2565 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2570 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2571 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2574 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2575 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2576 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
2577 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
2580 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
2581 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
2583 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2584 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2585 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2586 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2587 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2588 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2590 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2593 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2595 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2599 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2600 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2602 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2603 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
2604 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2606 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2607 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2609 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2611 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2612 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2613 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2614 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2615 added_monitors.clear();
2617 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2620 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2621 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2622 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2623 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2624 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2625 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2626 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2627 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2628 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2629 added_monitors.clear();
2632 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2635 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2637 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2638 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2639 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2640 added_monitors.clear();
2643 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2644 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2646 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2647 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2648 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2656 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
2657 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2658 let events_5 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2659 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2661 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2662 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2663 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2664 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2666 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2671 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2672 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2673 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2674 (match events_6[0] {
2675 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2676 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2677 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2678 (msg.clone(), announcement_sigs.clone().unwrap())
2680 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2684 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2685 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2686 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
2690 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2691 let bs_announcement_sigs = {
2692 let bs_announcement_sigs = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap().unwrap();
2693 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
2694 bs_announcement_sigs
2697 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2698 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2699 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
2700 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2703 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2706 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2707 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2708 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2709 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
2710 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2711 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2714 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2717 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2719 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
2722 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2723 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
2726 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2727 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
2729 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2730 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2731 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2733 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2736 macro_rules! check_spends {
2737 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
2739 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2740 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
2741 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
2742 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2747 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2748 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2749 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2752 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2753 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2754 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2755 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2756 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2757 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2760 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2763 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2764 if !close_inbound_first {
2765 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2767 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2768 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2769 if close_inbound_first {
2770 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2771 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2772 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2773 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2775 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2776 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2777 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2778 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2780 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2781 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2782 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2784 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2785 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2786 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2787 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2789 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2790 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
2792 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2793 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2794 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2795 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2798 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2801 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2802 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2803 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2804 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2807 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2810 (as_update, bs_update)
2815 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2816 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2819 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2821 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
2822 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2823 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2824 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2825 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2826 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2828 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2833 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
2834 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
2836 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2837 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
2838 added_monitors.clear();
2843 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
2844 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
2846 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
2847 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
2848 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
2849 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
2850 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2851 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2852 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
2853 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
2854 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2855 if $fail_backwards {
2856 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2858 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2860 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2861 if $fail_backwards {
2862 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2863 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2865 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2867 added_monitors.clear();
2873 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
2876 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2877 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2878 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
2879 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2880 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
2881 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
2882 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
2887 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2888 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
2890 let mut payment_event = {
2891 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2892 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
2894 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2895 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2896 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2898 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2900 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2901 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2903 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2904 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
2905 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
2907 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2908 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2910 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2911 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2914 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2915 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2917 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2918 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2919 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2921 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2922 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2923 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2925 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2928 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
2929 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2930 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2936 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2939 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2940 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2941 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
2943 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2944 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2945 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2947 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2949 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
2951 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2953 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
2958 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2959 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2960 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2961 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2962 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2963 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2966 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2967 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2968 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2970 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2971 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2972 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2973 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2974 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2975 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2976 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2977 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2979 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2982 assert!(events.is_empty());
2984 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2985 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2992 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2993 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2994 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2996 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2997 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2999 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3004 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3005 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3008 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3010 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3011 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3012 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3013 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3014 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3017 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3020 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3021 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3022 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3023 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3024 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3027 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3029 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3031 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3032 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3036 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3037 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3038 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3041 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3042 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
3043 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3045 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3046 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3047 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3049 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3050 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3055 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3056 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3057 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3058 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3059 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3060 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3061 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3062 // second-to-last node!
3063 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3066 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3067 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3068 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3070 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3071 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3072 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3073 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3074 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3075 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3076 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3077 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3079 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3082 assert!(events.is_empty());
3084 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3085 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3092 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3094 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3095 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3097 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
3098 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3100 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3105 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3106 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3109 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3110 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3111 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3112 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3113 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3115 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3116 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3118 for _ in 0..node_count {
3119 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3120 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3121 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3122 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3124 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3125 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3126 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3128 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3129 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3130 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3131 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3132 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3140 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3141 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3142 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3143 let channel_id = chan.2;
3145 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3147 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3148 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3154 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3158 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
3159 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3160 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3161 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3162 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3163 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
3164 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
3165 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
3166 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
3167 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3169 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3171 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
3173 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3174 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3177 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3178 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3179 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3180 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3181 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3186 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3188 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3189 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3190 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3193 let payment_event = {
3194 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3195 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3196 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3198 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3199 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3201 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3202 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3203 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3204 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3207 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3208 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3209 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3212 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3213 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3214 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3215 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3216 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3217 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3220 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3221 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3222 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3223 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3224 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3225 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3228 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3229 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3232 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3233 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3236 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3239 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3240 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3242 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3243 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3246 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3251 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3252 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3253 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3254 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3255 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3256 let channel_id = chan.2;
3258 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3260 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3261 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3267 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3269 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3270 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3273 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3274 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3275 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3276 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3279 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3282 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3284 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3285 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3286 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3289 let payment_event = {
3290 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3291 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3292 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3294 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3295 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3297 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3298 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3299 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3300 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3303 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3306 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3310 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3311 let nodes = create_network(2);
3312 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3313 let channel_id = chan.2;
3315 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3317 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3318 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3324 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3325 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3326 // update_fee (never committed) ->
3327 // (3) update_fee ->
3328 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3329 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3330 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3331 // <- (1) RAA delivered
3332 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
3333 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3334 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3335 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3336 // revoke_and_ack ->
3337 // B should send no response here
3338 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
3339 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3340 // revoke_and_ack ->
3342 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3343 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3344 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3347 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3348 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3349 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3350 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3351 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3353 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3356 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3357 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3358 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3361 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3363 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3364 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3366 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3367 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3368 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3369 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3372 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3374 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3376 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3378 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3379 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3381 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3382 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3383 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3384 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3385 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3386 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3387 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3389 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3390 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3392 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3394 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3398 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3401 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3404 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3405 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3408 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3413 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3414 let nodes = create_network(2);
3415 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3416 let channel_id = chan.2;
3418 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3420 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3421 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3426 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3427 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3429 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3430 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3431 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3432 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3433 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3435 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3437 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3439 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3440 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3444 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3445 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3448 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3449 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3452 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3453 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3458 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3459 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3460 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3461 let channel_id = chan.2;
3463 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3465 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3466 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3472 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3474 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3475 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3477 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3478 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3479 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3480 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3481 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3483 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3485 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3487 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3488 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3491 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3493 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3495 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3496 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3498 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3499 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3500 added_monitors.clear();
3502 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3503 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3504 // node[1] has nothing to do
3506 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3507 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3510 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3511 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3513 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3514 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3516 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3517 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3518 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3519 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3520 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3521 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3523 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3524 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3527 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3528 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3530 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3532 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3534 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3535 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3537 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3539 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3540 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3542 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3543 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3545 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3546 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3548 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3549 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3551 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3552 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3555 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3557 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3558 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3559 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3563 fn test_update_fee() {
3564 let nodes = create_network(2);
3565 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3566 let channel_id = chan.2;
3568 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3570 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3571 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3577 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3578 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3579 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
3580 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3581 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3582 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3583 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
3584 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3585 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
3586 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3587 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3588 // revoke_and_ack ->
3590 // Create and deliver (1)...
3591 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3592 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3594 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3595 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3596 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3597 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3598 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3600 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3602 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3604 // Generate (2) and (3):
3605 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3606 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3611 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3612 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3615 // Create and deliver (4)...
3616 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3617 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3618 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3619 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3620 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3621 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3623 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3625 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3627 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3629 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3633 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3634 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3635 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3639 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3640 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3643 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3644 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3645 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3646 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3649 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3650 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3652 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3653 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3656 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3657 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3658 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3662 fn fake_network_test() {
3663 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3664 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3665 let nodes = create_network(4);
3667 // Create some initial channels
3668 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3669 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3670 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3672 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3673 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3674 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3675 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3676 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3678 // Send some more payments
3679 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3680 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3681 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3683 // Test failure packets
3684 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3685 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3687 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3688 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3690 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3691 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3692 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3693 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3694 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3695 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3696 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3698 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3699 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3700 hops.push(RouteHop {
3701 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3702 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3704 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3706 hops.push(RouteHop {
3707 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3708 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3710 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3712 hops.push(RouteHop {
3713 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3714 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3716 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3718 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3719 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3720 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3722 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3723 hops.push(RouteHop {
3724 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3725 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3727 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3729 hops.push(RouteHop {
3730 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3731 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3733 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3735 hops.push(RouteHop {
3736 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3737 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3739 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3741 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3742 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3743 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3745 // Claim the rebalances...
3746 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3747 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3749 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3750 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3752 // Send some payments across both channels
3753 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3754 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3755 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3757 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3759 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3761 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3762 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3763 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3765 // Close down the channels...
3766 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3767 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3768 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3769 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3770 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3774 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
3775 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
3776 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
3777 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
3779 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
3780 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
3781 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3782 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3783 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3784 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
3786 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
3788 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3789 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3791 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3792 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3794 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
3795 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
3796 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
3799 #[derive(PartialEq)]
3800 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3801 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
3803 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
3804 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
3805 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
3807 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
3808 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
3810 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
3812 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3813 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3814 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3816 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3817 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3818 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3819 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
3820 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
3821 res.push(tx.clone());
3826 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3827 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3830 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3832 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3833 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3834 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3835 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
3836 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3837 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3839 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3841 res.push(tx.clone());
3845 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3848 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3852 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
3853 /// HTLC transaction.
3854 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
3855 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3856 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3857 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3858 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
3859 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
3863 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3866 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3867 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3869 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3870 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3871 let mut found_prev = false;
3873 for tx in prev_txn {
3874 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3875 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
3876 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3877 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3883 assert!(found_prev);
3885 let mut res = Vec::new();
3886 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3890 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3891 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3892 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3893 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3894 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3897 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3900 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3901 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3902 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3903 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3906 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3910 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3911 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3916 fn channel_reserve_test() {
3918 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3919 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
3921 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
3922 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
3923 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3924 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3925 chan.get_value_stat()
3929 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
3930 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
3931 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
3933 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
3934 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3936 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
3937 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3939 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
3940 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
3941 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3942 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3943 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
3947 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
3949 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3950 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3952 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3953 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3955 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3956 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3960 macro_rules! expect_forward {
3962 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3963 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3964 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3965 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
3970 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
3971 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
3972 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3973 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3975 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3976 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3977 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
3979 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3984 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
3985 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
3987 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
3989 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3991 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
3992 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
3993 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3995 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3996 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4000 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4001 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4002 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4004 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4005 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4008 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4011 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4012 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4013 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4014 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4015 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4018 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4019 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4020 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4021 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4022 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4026 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4027 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4028 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4029 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4031 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4032 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4036 // adding pending output
4037 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4038 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4040 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4041 let payment_event_1 = {
4042 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4045 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4046 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4047 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4049 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4051 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4052 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4054 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4055 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4056 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4057 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4062 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4063 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4065 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4066 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4067 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4068 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4069 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4071 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4073 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4074 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4075 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4076 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4077 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4078 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4080 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4081 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4082 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4083 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4086 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4088 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4092 // split the rest to test holding cell
4093 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4094 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4096 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4097 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4100 // now see if they go through on both sides
4101 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4102 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4103 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4105 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4106 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4108 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4110 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4111 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4112 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4113 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4117 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4118 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4119 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4121 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4122 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4124 // flush the pending htlc
4125 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4128 let commitment_update_2 = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
4129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4130 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4131 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
4132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4133 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4136 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4138 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4139 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4140 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4142 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4143 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4145 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4146 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4147 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4148 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4149 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4150 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4152 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4153 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4154 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4155 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4157 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4158 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4160 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4161 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4163 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4164 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4165 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4167 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4170 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4171 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4172 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4174 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4177 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4178 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4179 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4181 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4182 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4183 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4184 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4186 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4187 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4191 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4192 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4193 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4194 let nodes = create_network(5);
4196 // Create some initial channels
4197 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4198 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4199 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4200 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4202 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4203 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4204 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4205 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4206 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4208 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4209 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4211 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4212 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4213 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4214 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4216 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4217 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4218 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4220 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4221 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4223 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4224 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4226 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4227 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4228 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4229 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4231 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4232 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4233 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4235 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4236 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4238 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4239 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4241 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4242 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4244 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4245 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4246 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4247 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4255 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4256 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4257 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4259 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4261 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4262 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4264 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4265 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4267 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4269 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4270 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4271 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4273 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4274 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4277 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4278 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4279 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
4280 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4281 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4284 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4286 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4287 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4289 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4290 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4291 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
4292 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4293 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4296 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4298 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4299 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4301 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4303 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4304 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4305 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4307 // Create some new channels:
4308 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4310 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4311 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4312 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4313 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4314 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4315 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4316 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4317 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4318 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4319 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4320 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4321 // Revoke the old state
4322 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4325 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4326 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4328 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4329 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4330 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4331 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4333 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4334 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4336 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4338 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4339 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4340 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4341 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4342 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4344 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4345 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4346 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4350 fn revoked_output_claim() {
4351 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4352 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4353 let nodes = create_network(2);
4354 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4355 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4356 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4357 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4358 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4359 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4360 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4361 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4363 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4364 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4365 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4366 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4367 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4369 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4371 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4372 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4374 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4375 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4376 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4380 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4381 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4382 let nodes = create_network(2);
4384 // Create some new channel:
4385 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4387 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4388 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4389 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4390 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4391 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4393 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4394 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4395 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4396 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4397 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4398 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4399 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4400 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4401 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4403 //Revoke the old state
4404 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4407 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4409 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4411 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4412 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4413 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4415 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4416 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4418 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4420 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4421 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4422 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4423 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4424 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4425 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4426 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4427 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4429 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4430 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4431 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4433 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4434 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4435 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4436 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4437 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4438 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4440 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4441 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4442 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4446 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4447 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4448 let nodes = create_network(2);
4450 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4452 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4453 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4454 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4455 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4456 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4457 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4459 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4460 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4462 //Revoke the old state
4463 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4466 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4468 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4470 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4471 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4472 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4474 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4475 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4476 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4477 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4478 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4479 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4480 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4482 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4483 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4484 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4486 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4487 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4488 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4489 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4490 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4492 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4493 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4494 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4495 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4496 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4497 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4498 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4499 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4501 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4502 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4504 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4505 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4506 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4507 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4508 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4509 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4511 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4512 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4513 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4517 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4518 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4519 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4520 let nodes = create_network(2);
4521 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4523 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4524 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4526 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4527 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4529 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4530 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4532 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4536 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4537 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4539 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4540 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4543 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4544 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4546 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4547 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4549 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4553 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4554 // registering new transactions
4555 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4559 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4560 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4561 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4562 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4563 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4565 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4567 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4569 let mut payment_event = {
4570 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4573 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4574 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4575 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4578 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4579 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4581 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4582 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4584 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4585 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4588 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4589 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4591 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4592 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4593 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4594 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4597 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4598 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4601 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4602 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4603 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4605 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4606 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4607 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4609 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4610 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4612 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4616 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4617 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4618 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4619 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4620 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4624 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4625 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4627 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4628 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4629 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4631 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4632 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4634 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4637 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4639 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4640 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4641 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4643 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4644 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4645 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4646 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4647 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4648 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4649 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4651 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
4655 fn test_unconf_chan() {
4656 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
4657 let nodes = create_network(2);
4658 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4660 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4661 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
4662 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
4663 mem::drop(channel_state);
4665 let mut headers = Vec::new();
4666 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4667 headers.push(header.clone());
4669 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4670 headers.push(header.clone());
4672 while !headers.is_empty() {
4673 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
4676 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4677 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4679 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4680 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4682 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4685 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4686 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
4687 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
4690 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
4691 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
4692 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
4693 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4694 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4696 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
4697 for msg in reestablish_1 {
4698 resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4700 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4701 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4703 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
4706 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
4707 for msg in reestablish_2 {
4708 resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4710 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4711 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4713 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4716 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
4717 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
4718 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
4720 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
4722 let a = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap());
4723 let _announcement_sigs_opt = a.unwrap();
4724 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4726 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4729 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
4730 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4732 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4734 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4735 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4736 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4737 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
4739 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4741 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
4742 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
4743 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4744 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
4745 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
4747 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4748 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4750 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4751 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4754 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4755 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4757 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4758 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4759 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
4760 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4761 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4764 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4768 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
4770 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
4771 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4773 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4776 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
4777 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4779 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4781 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4782 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4783 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4784 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
4786 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
4787 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
4788 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4789 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
4790 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
4792 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4793 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4795 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4796 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4799 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4800 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4802 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4803 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4804 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
4805 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4806 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4809 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4815 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
4816 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
4817 let nodes = create_network(3);
4818 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4819 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4821 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4822 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4823 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4825 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4826 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4827 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
4828 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
4830 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4831 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4832 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4834 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4835 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4836 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4837 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4839 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4840 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4842 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
4843 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
4845 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
4847 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4848 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4850 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4851 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
4853 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4856 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
4857 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
4859 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4863 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
4864 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
4867 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
4868 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
4869 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4870 if messages_delivered == 0 {
4871 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
4872 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
4874 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4877 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4878 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4880 let payment_event = {
4881 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4884 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4885 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4886 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4888 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
4890 if messages_delivered < 2 {
4891 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
4893 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4894 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4897 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
4898 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4901 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
4902 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4903 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
4904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4906 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
4907 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4914 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4915 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4916 if messages_delivered < 2 {
4917 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
4918 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
4919 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4920 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
4921 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
4922 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
4923 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
4924 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
4925 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4926 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
4927 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
4928 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
4929 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
4930 // Everything was delivered...
4931 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4934 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4935 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4937 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4941 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4942 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4944 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4945 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4947 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4948 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
4949 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
4951 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4954 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4957 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4958 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4959 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
4960 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
4961 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4962 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4963 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4964 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4965 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4966 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4967 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
4969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4972 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
4973 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
4975 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4976 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4978 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4979 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
4981 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4984 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
4985 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4988 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
4989 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4992 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
4993 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4994 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
4995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4997 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
4998 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5006 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5007 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5008 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5009 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5010 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
5011 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
5012 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5013 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5015 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5016 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5018 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5021 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5022 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5023 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5024 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5025 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5026 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5027 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5028 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5029 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5030 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5031 // Everything was delivered...
5032 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5035 // Channel should still work fine...
5036 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
5037 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5041 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
5042 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
5043 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
5044 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
5048 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
5049 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
5050 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
5051 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
5055 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
5056 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
5057 let nodes = create_network(2);
5058 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5060 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5061 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5063 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5064 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5065 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5067 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5068 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5069 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5071 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5074 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5075 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5076 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5078 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5079 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5080 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5082 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5085 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5087 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
5088 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
5090 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5091 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5092 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
5096 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
5097 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
5098 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5099 let nodes = create_network(2);
5101 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
5103 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5104 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5105 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5106 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5108 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
5110 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5111 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5113 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5114 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5116 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
5118 let mut chan_announcement;
5120 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
5122 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5123 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
5124 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
5125 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5126 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
5127 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
5128 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
5129 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
5130 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5135 macro_rules! sign_msg {
5136 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
5137 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
5138 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5139 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5140 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
5141 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
5142 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5143 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
5144 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
5145 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
5146 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
5147 contents: $unsigned_msg
5152 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5153 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5154 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
5155 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
5157 // Configured with Network::Testnet
5158 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5159 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
5160 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5161 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
5163 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5164 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
5165 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5166 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());