_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - src/ln/channelmanager.rs

   1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
   2 //!
   3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
   4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
   5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
   6 //!
   7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
   8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
   9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
  10
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
  12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
  13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
  16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
  17
  18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
  19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
  20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
  21 use secp256k1;
  22
  23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
  24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
  27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
  28 use ln::msgs;
  29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HandleError, RAACommitmentOrder};
  30 use chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys;
  31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
  32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
  33 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
  34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
  35 use util::logger::Logger;
  36 use util::errors::APIError;
  37
  38 use crypto;
  39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
  40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
  41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
  42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
  43
  44 use std::{ptr, mem};
  45 use std::collections::HashMap;
  46 use std::collections::hash_map;
  47 use std::io::Cursor;
  48 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
  49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
  50 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
  51
  52 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
  53 ///
  54 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
  55 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
  56 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
  57 ///
  58 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
  59 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
  60 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
  61 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
  62 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
  63 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
  64 mod channel_held_info {
  65         use ln::msgs;
  66         use ln::router::Route;
  67         use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
  68         use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
  69
  70         /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
  71         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  72         pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
  73                 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
  74                 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
  75                 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
  76                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
  77                 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
  78                 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
  79         }
  80
  81         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  82         pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
  83                 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
  84                 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
  85         }
  86
  87         /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
  88         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  89         pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
  90                 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
  91                 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
  92         }
  93
  94         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
  95         #[derive(Clone)]
  96         pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
  97                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
  98                 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
  99                 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
 100         }
 101
 102         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
 103         #[derive(Clone)]
 104         pub enum HTLCSource {
 105                 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
 106                 OutboundRoute {
 107                         route: Route,
 108                         session_priv: SecretKey,
 109                         /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
 110                         /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
 111                         first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
 112                 },
 113         }
 114         #[cfg(test)]
 115         impl HTLCSource {
 116                 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
 117                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
 118                                 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
 119                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
 120                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
 121                         }
 122                 }
 123         }
 124
 125         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
 126         pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
 127                 ErrorPacket {
 128                         err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 129                 },
 130                 Reason {
 131                         failure_code: u16,
 132                         data: Vec<u8>,
 133                 }
 134         }
 135 }
 136 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
 137
 138 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
 139         err: msgs::HandleError,
 140         needs_channel_force_close: bool,
 141 }
 142 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
 143         #[inline]
 144         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 145                 Self {
 146                         err: HandleError {
 147                                 err,
 148                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 149                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 150                                                 channel_id,
 151                                                 data: err.to_string()
 152                                         },
 153                                 }),
 154                         },
 155                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
 156                 }
 157         }
 158         #[inline]
 159         fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 160                 Self {
 161                         err: HandleError {
 162                                 err,
 163                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 164                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 165                                                 channel_id,
 166                                                 data: err.to_string()
 167                                         },
 168                                 }),
 169                         },
 170                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
 171                 }
 172         }
 173         #[inline]
 174         fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
 175                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
 176         }
 177         #[inline]
 178         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
 179                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
 180         }
 181         #[inline]
 182         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 183                 Self {
 184                         err: match err {
 185                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
 186                                         err: msg,
 187                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
 188                                 },
 189                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
 190                                         err: msg,
 191                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 192                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 193                                                         channel_id,
 194                                                         data: msg.to_string()
 195                                                 },
 196                                         }),
 197                                 },
 198                         },
 199                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
 200                 }
 201         }
 202         #[inline]
 203         fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 204                 Self {
 205                         err: match err {
 206                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
 207                                         err: msg,
 208                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
 209                                 },
 210                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
 211                                         err: msg,
 212                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 213                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 214                                                         channel_id,
 215                                                         data: msg.to_string()
 216                                                 },
 217                                         }),
 218                                 },
 219                         },
 220                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
 221                 }
 222         }
 223 }
 224
 225 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
 226 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
 227 #[derive(PartialEq)]
 228 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
 229         /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
 230         PreimageUnknown,
 231         /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
 232         AmountMismatch,
 233 }
 234
 235 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
 236 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
 237 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
 238 /// probably increase this significantly.
 239 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
 240
 241 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
 242         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
 243         prev_htlc_id: u64,
 244         forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
 245 }
 246
 247 struct ChannelHolder {
 248         by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
 249         short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
 250         next_forward: Instant,
 251         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
 252         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
 253         /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
 254         /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
 255         forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
 256         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
 257         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
 258         /// go to read them!
 259         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
 260 }
 261 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
 262         by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
 263         short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
 264         next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
 265         forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
 266         claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
 267 }
 268 impl ChannelHolder {
 269         fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
 270                 MutChannelHolder {
 271                         by_id: &mut self.by_id,
 272                         short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
 273                         next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
 274                         forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
 275                         claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
 276                 }
 277         }
 278 }
 279
 280 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
 281 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
 282
 283 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
 284 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
 285 ///
 286 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
 287 /// to individual Channels.
 288 pub struct ChannelManager {
 289         genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
 290         fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
 291         monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
 292         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
 293         tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
 294
 295         announce_channels_publicly: bool,
 296         fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
 297         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
 298         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 299
 300         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
 301         our_network_key: SecretKey,
 302
 303         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
 304
 305         logger: Arc<Logger>,
 306 }
 307
 308 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
 309 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
 310 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
 311 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
 312 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
 313 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
 314 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
 315
 316 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
 317 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
 318 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
 319 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
 320 #[deny(const_err)]
 321 #[allow(dead_code)]
 322 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
 323
 324 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
 325 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
 326 #[deny(const_err)]
 327 #[allow(dead_code)]
 328 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
 329
 330 macro_rules! secp_call {
 331         ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
 332                 match $res {
 333                         Ok(key) => key,
 334                         Err(_) => return Err($err),
 335                 }
 336         };
 337 }
 338
 339 struct OnionKeys {
 340         #[cfg(test)]
 341         shared_secret: SharedSecret,
 342         #[cfg(test)]
 343         blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
 344         ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
 345         rho: [u8; 32],
 346         mu: [u8; 32],
 347 }
 348
 349 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
 350 pub struct ChannelDetails {
 351         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
 352         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
 353         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
 354         /// lifetime of the channel.
 355         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
 356         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
 357         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
 358         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 359         /// The node_id of our counterparty
 360         pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
 361         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
 362         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 363         /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
 364         pub user_id: u64,
 365 }
 366
 367 impl ChannelManager {
 368         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
 369         ///
 370         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
 371         /// ChannelMessageHandler.
 372         ///
 373         /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
 374         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
 375         ///
 376         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
 377         pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
 378                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 379
 380                 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
 381                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
 382                         fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
 383                         monitor: monitor.clone(),
 384                         chain_monitor,
 385                         tx_broadcaster,
 386
 387                         announce_channels_publicly,
 388                         fee_proportional_millionths,
 389                         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
 390                         secp_ctx,
 391
 392                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
 393                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
 394                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
 395                                 next_forward: Instant::now(),
 396                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
 397                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
 398                         }),
 399                         our_network_key,
 400
 401                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
 402
 403                         logger,
 404                 });
 405                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
 406                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
 407                 Ok(res)
 408         }
 409
 410         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
 411         ///
 412         /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
 413         /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
 414         /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
 415         /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
 416         ///
 417         /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
 418         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
 419         ///
 420         /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
 421         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
 422                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
 423                         ChannelKeys {
 424                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 425                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 426                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 427                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 428                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 429                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 430                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 431                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
 432                         }
 433                 } else {
 434                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
 435                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
 436                         ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed)
 437                 };
 438
 439                 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
 440                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
 441                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 442                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
 443                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
 444                                 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
 445                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
 446                                 } else {
 447                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
 448                                 }
 449                         },
 450                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
 451                 }
 452
 453                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 454                 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
 455                         node_id: their_network_key,
 456                         msg: res,
 457                 });
 458                 Ok(())
 459         }
 460
 461         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
 462         /// more information.
 463         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
 464                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 465                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
 466                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
 467                         res.push(ChannelDetails {
 468                                 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
 469                                 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
 470                                 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
 471                                 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
 472                                 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
 473                         });
 474                 }
 475                 res
 476         }
 477
 478         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
 479         /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
 480         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
 481                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 482                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
 483                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
 484                         // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
 485                         // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
 486                         // really wanted anyway.
 487                         if channel.is_live() {
 488                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
 489                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
 490                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
 491                                         remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
 492                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
 493                                         user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
 494                                 });
 495                         }
 496                 }
 497                 res
 498         }
 499
 500         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
 501         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
 502         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
 503         ///
 504         /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
 505         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
 506                 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
 507                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 508                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 509                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
 510                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
 511                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
 512                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
 513                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
 514                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
 515                                                 }
 516                                                 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
 517                                         } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
 518                                 },
 519                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
 520                         }
 521                 };
 522                 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
 523                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
 524                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
 525                 }
 526                 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
 527                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
 528                                 Some(update)
 529                         } else { None }
 530                 } else { None };
 531
 532                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 533                 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
 534                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
 535                                 msg: update
 536                         });
 537                 }
 538                 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
 539                         node_id,
 540                         msg: res.0
 541                 });
 542
 543                 Ok(())
 544         }
 545
 546         #[inline]
 547         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
 548                 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
 549                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
 550                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
 551                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
 552                 }
 553                 for tx in local_txn {
 554                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
 555                 }
 556                 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
 557                 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
 558                 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
 559                 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
 560                 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
 561                 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
 562                 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
 563         }
 564
 565         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
 566         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
 567         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
 568                 let mut chan = {
 569                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 570                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 571                         if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
 572                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
 573                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
 574                                 }
 575                                 chan
 576                         } else {
 577                                 return;
 578                         }
 579                 };
 580                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
 581                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 582                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
 583                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
 584                                 msg: update
 585                         });
 586                 }
 587         }
 588
 589         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
 590         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
 591         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
 592                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
 593                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
 594                 }
 595         }
 596
 597         fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
 598                 match err {
 599                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
 600                                 let mut chan = {
 601                                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 602                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
 603                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
 604                                                 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
 605                                         }
 606                                         chan
 607                                 };
 608                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
 609                                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
 610                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 611                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
 612                                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
 613                                                 msg: update
 614                                         });
 615                                 }
 616                         },
 617                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
 618                                 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
 619                                 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
 620                         },
 621                 }
 622         }
 623
 624         #[inline]
 625         fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
 626                 ({
 627                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
 628                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 629                         let mut res = [0; 32];
 630                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 631                         res
 632                 },
 633                 {
 634                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
 635                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 636                         let mut res = [0; 32];
 637                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 638                         res
 639                 })
 640         }
 641
 642         #[inline]
 643         fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
 644                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
 645                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 646                 let mut res = [0; 32];
 647                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 648                 res
 649         }
 650
 651         #[inline]
 652         fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
 653                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
 654                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 655                 let mut res = [0; 32];
 656                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 657                 res
 658         }
 659
 660         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
 661         #[inline]
 662         fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
 663                 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
 664                 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
 665
 666                 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
 667                         let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
 668
 669                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 670                         sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
 671                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 672                         let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
 673                         sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
 674
 675                         let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
 676
 677                         blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
 678                         blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
 679
 680                         callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
 681                 }
 682
 683                 Ok(())
 684         }
 685
 686         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
 687         fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
 688                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
 689
 690                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
 691                         let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 692
 693                         res.push(OnionKeys {
 694                                 #[cfg(test)]
 695                                 shared_secret,
 696                                 #[cfg(test)]
 697                                 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
 698                                 ephemeral_pubkey,
 699                                 rho,
 700                                 mu,
 701                         });
 702                 })?;
 703
 704                 Ok(res)
 705         }
 706
 707         /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
 708         fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
 709                 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
 710                 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
 711                 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
 712                 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
 713                 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
 714                 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
 715
 716                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
 717                         // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
 718                         // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
 719                         // the intended recipient).
 720                         let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
 721                         let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
 722                         res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
 723                                 realm: 0,
 724                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
 725                                         short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
 726                                         amt_to_forward: value_msat,
 727                                         outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
 728                                 },
 729                                 hmac: [0; 32],
 730                         };
 731                         cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
 732                         if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
 733                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
 734                         }
 735                         cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
 736                         if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
 737                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
 738                         }
 739                         last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
 740                 }
 741                 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
 742         }
 743
 744         #[inline]
 745         fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
 746                 unsafe {
 747                         ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
 748                 }
 749                 for i in 0..65 {
 750                         arr[i] = 0;
 751                 }
 752         }
 753
 754         #[inline]
 755         fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
 756                 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
 757
 758                 for i in 0..dst.len() {
 759                         dst[i] ^= src[i];
 760                 }
 761         }
 762
 763         const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
 764         fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
 765                 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
 766                 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
 767
 768                 let filler = {
 769                         let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
 770                         let end_len = iters * 65;
 771                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
 772                         res.resize(end_len, 0);
 773
 774                         for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
 775                                 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
 776                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 777                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
 778                                 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
 779                         }
 780                         res
 781                 };
 782
 783                 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
 784                 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
 785
 786                 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
 787                         ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
 788                         payload.hmac = hmac_res;
 789                         packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
 790
 791                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 792                         chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
 793                         packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
 794
 795                         if i == 0 {
 796                                 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
 797                         }
 798
 799                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
 800                         hmac.input(&packet_data);
 801                         hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
 802                         hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
 803                 }
 804
 805                 msgs::OnionPacket{
 806                         version: 0,
 807                         public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
 808                         hop_data: packet_data,
 809                         hmac: hmac_res,
 810                 }
 811         }
 812
 813         /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
 814         /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
 815         fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 816                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 817
 818                 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
 819                 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
 820                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
 821                 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
 822                 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 823                         data: packet_crypted,
 824                 }
 825         }
 826
 827         fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
 828                 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
 829
 830                 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 831
 832                 let failuremsg = {
 833                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
 834                         res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
 835                         res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
 836                         res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
 837                         res
 838                 };
 839                 let pad = {
 840                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
 841                         res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
 842                         res
 843                 };
 844                 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
 845                         hmac: [0; 32],
 846                         failuremsg: failuremsg,
 847                         pad: pad,
 848                 };
 849
 850                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
 851                 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
 852                 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
 853
 854                 packet
 855         }
 856
 857         #[inline]
 858         fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 859                 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
 860                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
 861         }
 862
 863         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
 864                 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
 865                         () => {
 866                                 {
 867                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 868                                         sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
 869                                         let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
 870                                         sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
 871                                         onion_hash
 872                                 }
 873                         }
 874                 }
 875
 876                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
 877                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
 878                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
 879                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 880                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 881                                 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
 882                                 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
 883                         })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 884                 }
 885
 886                 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
 887                 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 888
 889                 let mut channel_state = None;
 890                 macro_rules! return_err {
 891                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
 892                                 {
 893                                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
 894                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
 895                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 896                                         }
 897                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
 898                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 899                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 900                                                 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
 901                                         })), channel_state.unwrap());
 902                                 }
 903                         }
 904                 }
 905
 906                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
 907                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
 908                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
 909                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
 910                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
 911                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
 912                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
 913                         return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
 914                 }
 915
 916                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
 917                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
 918                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
 919                 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
 920                         return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
 921                 }
 922
 923                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 924                 let next_hop_data = {
 925                         let mut decoded = [0; 65];
 926                         chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
 927                         match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
 928                                 Err(err) => {
 929                                         let error_code = match err {
 930                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
 931                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
 932                                         };
 933                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
 934                                 },
 935                                 Ok(msg) => msg
 936                         }
 937                 };
 938
 939                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
 940                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
 941                                 // final_expiry_too_soon
 942                                 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
 943                                         return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
 944                                 }
 945                                 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
 946                                 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
 947                                         return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
 948                                 }
 949                                 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
 950                                 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
 951                                         return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
 952                                 }
 953
 954                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
 955                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
 956                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
 957                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
 958
 959                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
 960                                         onion_packet: None,
 961                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
 962                                         short_channel_id: 0,
 963                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
 964                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
 965                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
 966                                 })
 967                         } else {
 968                                 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
 969                                 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
 970                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
 971
 972                                 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
 973
 974                                 let blinding_factor = {
 975                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 976                                         sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
 977                                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 978                                         let mut res = [0u8; 32];
 979                                         sha.result(&mut res);
 980                                         match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
 981                                                 Err(_) => {
 982                                                         return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
 983                                                 },
 984                                                 Ok(key) => key
 985                                         }
 986                                 };
 987
 988                                 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
 989                                         return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
 990                                 }
 991
 992                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
 993                                         version: 0,
 994                                         public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
 995                                         hop_data: new_packet_data,
 996                                         hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
 997                                 };
 998
 999                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1000                                         onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1001                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1002                                         short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1003                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
1004                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1005                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1006                                 })
1007                         };
1008
1009                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1010                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1011                         if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1012                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1013                                 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1014                                         None => { // unknown_next_peer
1015                                                 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1016                                         },
1017                                         Some(id) => id.clone(),
1018                                 };
1019                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1020                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1021
1022                                         // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1023                                         // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1024                                         // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1025                                         // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1026                                         // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1027                                         if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1028                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1029                                         }
1030                                         if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1031                                                 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1032                                         }
1033                                         let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1034                                         if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1035                                                 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1036                                         }
1037                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1038                                                 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1039                                         }
1040                                         let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1041                                         // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1042                                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1043                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1044                                         }
1045                                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1046                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1047                                         }
1048                                         break None;
1049                                 }
1050                                 {
1051                                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1052                                         if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1053                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1054                                         }
1055                                         else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1056                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1057                                         }
1058                                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1059                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1060                                         }
1061                                         return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1062                                 }
1063                         }
1064                 }
1065
1066                 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1067         }
1068
1069         /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1070         /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1071         fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1072                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1073                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1074                         Some(id) => id,
1075                 };
1076
1077                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1078
1079                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1080                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1081                         short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1082                         timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1083                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1084                         cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1085                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1086                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1087                         fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1088                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
1089                 };
1090
1091                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1092                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1093
1094                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1095                         signature: sig,
1096                         contents: unsigned
1097                 })
1098         }
1099
1100         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1101         ///
1102         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1103         /// fields for more info.
1104         ///
1105         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1106         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1107         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1108         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1109         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1110         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1111         ///
1112         /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
1113         ///
1114         /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1115         /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1116         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1117                 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1118                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1119                 }
1120                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1121                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1122                         if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1123                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1124                         }
1125                 }
1126
1127                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1128                         let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1129                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1130                         session_key
1131                 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1132
1133                 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1134
1135                 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1136                                 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1137                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1138                 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1139
1140                 let (first_hop_node_id, update_add, commitment_signed) = {
1141                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1142
1143                         let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1144                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1145                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1146                         };
1147
1148                         let res = {
1149                                 let res = {
1150                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1151                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1152                                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1153                                         }
1154                                         if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1155                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1156                                         }
1157                                         if !chan.is_live() {
1158                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1159                                         }
1160                                         chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1161                                                 route: route.clone(),
1162                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1163                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1164                                         }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1165                                 };
1166                                 match res {
1167                                         Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1168                                                 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1169                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1170                                                         return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1171                                                 }
1172                                                 Some((update_add, commitment_signed))
1173                                         },
1174                                         None => None,
1175                                 }
1176                         };
1177
1178                         let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1179
1180                         match res {
1181                                 Some((update_add, commitment_signed)) => {
1182                                         (first_hop_node_id, update_add, commitment_signed)
1183                                 },
1184                                 None => return Ok(()),
1185                         }
1186                 };
1187
1188                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1189                 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1190                         node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1191                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1192                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1193                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1194                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1195                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1196                                 update_fee: None,
1197                                 commitment_signed,
1198                         },
1199                 });
1200                 Ok(())
1201         }
1202
1203         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1204         ///
1205         /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1206         ///
1207         /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1208         /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1209         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1210                 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1211                         ($event: expr) => {
1212                                 {
1213                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1214                                         pending_events.push($event);
1215                                 }
1216                         }
1217                 }
1218
1219                 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1220                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1221                         match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1222                                 Some(mut chan) => {
1223                                         match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1224                                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1225                                                         (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1226                                                 },
1227                                                 Err(e) => {
1228                                                         log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1229                                                         mem::drop(channel_state);
1230                                                         add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1231                                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1232                                                                 action: e.action,
1233                                                         });
1234                                                         return;
1235                                                 },
1236                                         }
1237                                 },
1238                                 None => return
1239                         }
1240                 };
1241                 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1242                 // lock before add_update_monitor
1243                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1244                         unimplemented!();
1245                 }
1246                 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1247                         node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1248                         msg: msg,
1249                 });
1250
1251                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1252                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1253                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1254                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1255                         },
1256                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1257                                 e.insert(chan);
1258                         }
1259                 }
1260         }
1261
1262         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1263                 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1264
1265                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1266                         Ok(res) => res,
1267                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1268                 };
1269                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1270                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1271
1272                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1273                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1274                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1275                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
1276                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1277                 })
1278         }
1279
1280         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1281         ///
1282         /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1283         /// Will likely generate further events.
1284         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1285                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1286                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1287                 {
1288                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1289                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1290
1291                         if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1292                                 return;
1293                         }
1294
1295                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1296                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1297                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1298                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1299                                                 None => {
1300                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1301                                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1302                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1303                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1304                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1305                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1306                                                                 });
1307                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1308                                                         }
1309                                                         continue;
1310                                                 }
1311                                         };
1312                                         let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1313
1314                                         let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1315                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1316                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1317                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1318                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1319                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1320                                                 });
1321                                                 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1322                                                         Err(_e) => {
1323                                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1324                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1325                                                                 continue;
1326                                                         },
1327                                                         Ok(update_add) => {
1328                                                                 match update_add {
1329                                                                         Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1330                                                                         None => {
1331                                                                                 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1332                                                                                 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1333                                                                                 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1334                                                                                 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1335                                                                                 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1336                                                                                 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1337                                                                                 // this channel currently :/.
1338                                                                         }
1339                                                                 }
1340                                                         }
1341                                                 }
1342                                         }
1343
1344                                         if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1345                                                 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1346                                                         Ok(res) => res,
1347                                                         Err(e) => {
1348                                                                 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1349                                                                 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1350                                                                 } else {
1351                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1352                                                                 }
1353                                                                 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1354                                                                 continue;
1355                                                         },
1356                                                 };
1357                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1358                                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1359                                                 }
1360                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1361                                                         node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1362                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1363                                                                 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1364                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1365                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1366                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1367                                                                 update_fee: None,
1368                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1369                                                         },
1370                                                 });
1371                                         }
1372                                 } else {
1373                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1374                                                 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1375                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1376                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1377                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1378                                                 };
1379                                                 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1380                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1381                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1382                                                 };
1383                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1384                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1385                                                         amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1386                                                 });
1387                                         }
1388                                 }
1389                         }
1390                 }
1391
1392                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1393                         match update {
1394                                 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1395                                 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1396                         };
1397                 }
1398
1399                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1400                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1401                 events.append(&mut new_events);
1402         }
1403
1404         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1405         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1406                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1407                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1408                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1409                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1410                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1411                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1412                         }
1413                         true
1414                 } else { false }
1415         }
1416
1417         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1418         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1419         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1420         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1421         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1422         /// still-available channels.
1423         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1424                 match source {
1425                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1426                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1427                                 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1428                                         let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1429                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1430                                         if let Some(channel_update) = channel_update {
1431                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1432                                                         update: channel_update,
1433                                                 });
1434                                         }
1435                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1436                                                 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1437                                                 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1438                                         });
1439                                 } else {
1440                                         panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1441                                 }
1442                         },
1443                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1444                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1445                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1446                                                 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1447                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1448                                         },
1449                                         HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1450                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1451                                         }
1452                                 };
1453
1454                                 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1455                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1456                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1457                                                 None => return
1458                                         };
1459
1460                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1461                                         match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1462                                                 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1463                                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1464                                                                 unimplemented!();
1465                                                         }
1466                                                         (chan.get_their_node_id(), Some((msg, commitment_msg)))
1467                                                 },
1468                                                 Ok(None) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), None),
1469                                                 Err(_e) => {
1470                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1471                                                         return;
1472                                                 },
1473                                         }
1474                                 };
1475
1476                                 match fail_msgs {
1477                                         Some((msg, commitment_msg)) => {
1478                                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1479
1480                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1481                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1482                                                         node_id,
1483                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1484                                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1485                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1486                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1487                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1488                                                                 update_fee: None,
1489                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1490                                                         },
1491                                                 });
1492                                         },
1493                                         None => {},
1494                                 }
1495                         },
1496                 }
1497         }
1498
1499         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1500         /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1501         /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1502         ///
1503         /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1504         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1505                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1506                 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1507                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1508                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1509
1510                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1511                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1512                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1513                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1514                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1515                                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1516                         }
1517                         true
1518                 } else { false }
1519         }
1520         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1521                 match source {
1522                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1523                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1524                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1525                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1526                                         payment_preimage
1527                                 });
1528                         },
1529                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1530                                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1531                                 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1532                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1533                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1534                                                 None => {
1535                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1536                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1537                                                         // why its missing.
1538                                                         return
1539                                                 }
1540                                         };
1541
1542                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1543                                         match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1544                                                 Ok((msgs, Some(chan_monitor))) => {
1545                                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1546                                                                 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1547                                                         }
1548                                                         (chan.get_their_node_id(), msgs)
1549                                                 },
1550                                                 Ok((msgs, None)) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msgs),
1551                                                 Err(_e) => {
1552                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1553                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1554                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1555                                                         return
1556                                                 },
1557                                         }
1558                                 };
1559
1560                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1561                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs {
1562                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1563                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1564                                                 node_id: node_id,
1565                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1566                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1567                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1568                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1569                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1570                                                         update_fee: None,
1571                                                         commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1572                                                 }
1573                                         });
1574                                 }
1575                         },
1576                 }
1577         }
1578
1579         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1580         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1581                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1582         }
1583
1584         /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1585         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1586         /// operation.
1587         pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1588                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1589                 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1590                 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1591                 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1592
1593                 {
1594                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1595                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1596                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1597                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1598                                 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1599                                         let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1600                                         if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1601                                                 match e {
1602                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1603                                                                 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1604                                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1605                                                                 }
1606                                                                 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1607                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1608                                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1609                                                                                 msg: update
1610                                                                         });
1611                                                                 }
1612                                                                 false
1613                                                         },
1614                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1615                                                 }
1616                                         } else {
1617                                                 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1618                                                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1619                                                         htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1620                                                 }
1621                                                 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1622
1623                                                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1624                                                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1625                                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1626                                                                         node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1627                                                                         updates: update,
1628                                                                 });
1629                                                         }
1630                                                 } }
1631                                                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1632                                                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1633                                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::SendRevokeAndACK {
1634                                                                         node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1635                                                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
1636                                                                 });
1637                                                         }
1638                                                 } }
1639                                                 match order {
1640                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1641                                                                 handle_cs!();
1642                                                                 handle_raa!();
1643                                                         },
1644                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1645                                                                 handle_raa!();
1646                                                                 handle_cs!();
1647                                                         },
1648                                                 }
1649                                                 true
1650                                         }
1651                                 } else { true }
1652                         });
1653                 }
1654
1655                 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1656                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1657                 }
1658                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1659
1660                 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1661                         self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1662                 }
1663
1664                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut new_events);
1665         }
1666
1667         fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1668                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1669                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1670                 }
1671                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1672                 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1673                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1674                 }
1675
1676                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1677                         ChannelKeys {
1678                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1679                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1680                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1681                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1682                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1683                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1684                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1685                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1686                         }
1687                 } else {
1688                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1689                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1690                         ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed)
1691                 };
1692
1693                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1694                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1695                 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1696                 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1697                 Ok(accept_msg)
1698         }
1699
1700         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1701                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1702                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1703                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1704                                 Some(chan) => {
1705                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1706                                                 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1707                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1708                                         }
1709                                         chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1710                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1711                                         (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1712                                 },
1713                                 //TODO: same as above
1714                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1715                         }
1716                 };
1717                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1718                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1719                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1720                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
1721                         output_script: output_script,
1722                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1723                 });
1724                 Ok(())
1725         }
1726
1727         fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1728                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1729                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1730                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1731                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1732                                         if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1733                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1734                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1735                                         }
1736                                         match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1737                                                 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1738                                                         (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1739                                                 },
1740                                                 Err(e) => {
1741                                                         return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1742                                                 }
1743                                         }
1744                                 },
1745                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1746                         }
1747                 };
1748                 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1749                 // lock before add_update_monitor
1750                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1751                         unimplemented!();
1752                 }
1753                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1754                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1755                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1756                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1757                         },
1758                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1759                                 e.insert(chan);
1760                         }
1761                 }
1762                 Ok(funding_msg)
1763         }
1764
1765         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1766                 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1767                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1768                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1769                                 Some(chan) => {
1770                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1771                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1772                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1773                                         }
1774                                         let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1775                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1776                                                 unimplemented!();
1777                                         }
1778                                         (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1779                                 },
1780                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1781                         }
1782                 };
1783                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1784                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1785                         funding_txo: funding_txo,
1786                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1787                 });
1788                 Ok(())
1789         }
1790
1791         fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1792                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1793                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1794                         Some(chan) => {
1795                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1796                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1797                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1798                                 }
1799                                 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1800                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1801                                 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1802                         },
1803                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1804                 };
1805         }
1806
1807         fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1808                 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1809                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1810                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1811
1812                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1813                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1814                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1815                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1816                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1817                                         }
1818                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1819                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1820                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1821                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1822                                                 }
1823                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1824                                         } else { (res, None) }
1825                                 },
1826                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1827                         }
1828                 };
1829                 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1830                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1831                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1832                 }
1833                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1834                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1835                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1836                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1837                                         msg: update
1838                                 });
1839                         }
1840                 }
1841                 Ok((res.0, res.1))
1842         }
1843
1844         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1845                 let (res, chan_option) = {
1846                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1847                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1848                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1849                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1850                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1851                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1852                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1853                                         }
1854                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1855                                         if res.1.is_some() {
1856                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1857                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1858                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1859                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1860                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1861                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1862                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1863                                                 }
1864                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1865                                         } else { (res, None) }
1866                                 },
1867                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1868                         }
1869                 };
1870                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1871                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1872                 }
1873                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1874                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1875                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1876                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1877                                         msg: update
1878                                 });
1879                         }
1880                 }
1881                 Ok(res.0)
1882         }
1883
1884         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1885                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1886                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1887                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1888                 //
1889                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1890                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1891                 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1892                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1893
1894                 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1895                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1896
1897                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1898                         Some(chan) => {
1899                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1900                                         //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1901                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1902                                 }
1903                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
1904                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1905                                 }
1906                                 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1907                         },
1908                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1909                 }
1910         }
1911
1912         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1913                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1914                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1915                         Some(chan) => {
1916                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1917                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1918                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1919                                 }
1920                                 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1921                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1922                         },
1923                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1924                 };
1925                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1926                 Ok(())
1927         }
1928
1929         // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
1930         // indicating that the payment itself failed
1931         fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
1932                 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
1933                         macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
1934                                 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
1935                                         log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
1936                                 };
1937                                 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
1938                                         log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
1939                                 };
1940                         }
1941
1942                         const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
1943                         const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
1944                         const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
1945
1946                         let mut res = None;
1947                         let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
1948
1949                         // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1950                         Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1951                                 if res.is_some() { return; }
1952
1953                                 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
1954                                 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
1955                                 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
1956
1957                                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1958
1959                                 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1960                                 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1961                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1962                                 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1963                                 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1964
1965                                 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
1966
1967                                 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1968                                         let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1969                                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1970                                         hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1971                                         let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1972                                         hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1973
1974                                         if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1975                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
1976                                                         // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
1977                                                         // definitely came from the peer in question
1978                                                         res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
1979                                                 } else {
1980                                                         let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
1981
1982                                                         match error_code & 0xff {
1983                                                                 1|2|3 => {
1984                                                                         // either from an intermediate or final node
1985                                                                         //   invalid_realm(PERM|1),
1986                                                                         //   temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
1987                                                                         //   permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
1988                                                                         //   required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
1989                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1990                                                                                 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1991                                                                                 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
1992                                                                         }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
1993                                                                         // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
1994                                                                         // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
1995                                                                         // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
1996                                                                         return;
1997                                                                 },
1998                                                                 _ => {}
1999                                                         }
2000
2001                                                         if is_from_final_node {
2002                                                                 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2003                                                                         c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2004                                                                         c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2005                                                                         17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2006                                                                         18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2007                                                                                 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2008                                                                                 true
2009                                                                         },
2010                                                                         19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2011                                                                                 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2012                                                                                 true
2013                                                                         },
2014                                                                         _ => {
2015                                                                                 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2016                                                                                 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2017                                                                                 // does not coform to the spec.
2018                                                                                 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2019                                                                                 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2020                                                                                         node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2021                                                                                         is_permanent: true,
2022                                                                                 }), false));
2023                                                                                 return;
2024                                                                         }
2025                                                                 };
2026                                                                 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2027                                                                 return;
2028                                                         }
2029
2030                                                         // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2031                                                         match error_code {
2032                                                                 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2033                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2034                                                                                 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2035                                                                                 is_permanent: true,
2036                                                                         }), false));
2037                                                                 },
2038                                                                 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2039                                                                         let offset = match error_code {
2040                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|7  => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2041                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2042                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2043                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2044                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2045                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2046                                                                                 _ =>  {
2047                                                                                         // node sending unknown code
2048                                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2049                                                                                                 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2050                                                                                                 is_permanent: true,
2051                                                                                         }), false));
2052                                                                                         return;
2053                                                                                 }
2054                                                                         };
2055
2056                                                                         if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2057                                                                                 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2058                                                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2059                                                                                         if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2060                                                                                                 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2061                                                                                                 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2062                                                                                                 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2063                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2064                                                                                                                 false
2065                                                                                                         },
2066                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2067                                                                                                                 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2068                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2069                                                                                                                 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2070                                                                                                         },
2071                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2072                                                                                                                 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2073                                                                                                                 let new_fee =  amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2074                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2075                                                                                                                 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2076                                                                                                         }
2077                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2078                                                                                                                 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2079                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2080                                                                                                                 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2081                                                                                                         },
2082                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2083                                                                                                                 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2084                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2085                                                                                                                 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2086                                                                                                         },
2087                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2088                                                                                                         _ => { unreachable!(); },
2089                                                                                                 };
2090
2091                                                                                                 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2092                                                                                                         Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2093                                                                                                                 msg: chan_update,
2094                                                                                                         })
2095                                                                                                 };
2096                                                                                                 res = Some((msg, true));
2097                                                                                                 return;
2098                                                                                         }
2099                                                                                 }
2100                                                                         }
2101                                                                 },
2102                                                                 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2103                                                                         //TODO
2104                                                                 },
2105                                                                 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2106                                                                         res = Some((None, true));
2107                                                                         return;
2108                                                                 }
2109                                                                 _ => {
2110                                                                         // node sending unknown code
2111                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2112                                                                                 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2113                                                                                 is_permanent: true,
2114                                                                         }), false));
2115                                                                         return;
2116                                                                 }
2117                                                         }
2118                                                 }
2119                                         }
2120                                 }
2121                         }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2122                         res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2123                 } else { ((None, true)) }
2124         }
2125
2126         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2127                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2128                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2129                         Some(chan) => {
2130                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2131                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2132                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2133                                 }
2134                                 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2135                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2136                         },
2137                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2138                 }?;
2139                 Ok(())
2140         }
2141
2142         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2143                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2144                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2145                         Some(chan) => {
2146                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2147                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2148                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2149                                 }
2150                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
2151                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
2152                                 }
2153                                 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2154                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2155                                 Ok(())
2156                         },
2157                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2158                 }
2159         }
2160
2161         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2162                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = {
2163                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2164                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2165                                 Some(chan) => {
2166                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2167                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2168                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2169                                         }
2170                                         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2171                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2172                                                 unimplemented!();
2173                                         }
2174                                         (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed)
2175                                 },
2176                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2177                         }
2178                 };
2179                 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
2180         }
2181
2182         #[inline]
2183         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2184                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2185                         let mut forward_event = None;
2186                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2187                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2188                                 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2189                                         forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2190                                         channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2191                                 }
2192                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2193                                         match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2194                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2195                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2196                                                 },
2197                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2198                                                         entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2199                                                 }
2200                                         }
2201                                 }
2202                         }
2203                         match forward_event {
2204                                 Some(time) => {
2205                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2206                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2207                                                 time_forwardable: time
2208                                         });
2209                                 }
2210                                 None => {},
2211                         }
2212                 }
2213         }
2214
2215         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2216                 let ((res, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures), short_channel_id) = {
2217                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2218                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2219                                 Some(chan) => {
2220                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2221                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2222                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2223                                         }
2224                                         let (res, pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2225                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2226                                                 unimplemented!();
2227                                         }
2228                                         ((res, pending_forwards, pending_failures), chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2229                                 },
2230                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2231                         }
2232                 };
2233                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2234                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2235                 }
2236                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2237
2238                 Ok(res)
2239         }
2240
2241         fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2242                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2243                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2244                         Some(chan) => {
2245                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2246                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2247                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2248                                 }
2249                                 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2250                         },
2251                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2252                 }
2253         }
2254
2255         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2256                 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
2257                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2258                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2259                                 Some(chan) => {
2260                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2261                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2262                                         }
2263                                         if !chan.is_usable() {
2264                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2265                                         }
2266
2267                                         let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2268                                         let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2269                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2270
2271                                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2272                                         let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2273                                         let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2274                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2275                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2276
2277                                         let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2278
2279                                         (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2280                                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2281                                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2282                                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2283                                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2284                                                 contents: announcement,
2285                                         }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2286                                 },
2287                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2288                         }
2289                 };
2290                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2291                 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
2292                 Ok(())
2293         }
2294
2295         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2296                 let res = {
2297                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2298                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2299                                 Some(chan) => {
2300                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2301                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2302                                         }
2303                                         let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2304                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2305                                         if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2306                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2307                                                         unimplemented!();
2308                                                 }
2309                                         }
2310                                         Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order))
2311                                 },
2312                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2313                         }
2314                 };
2315
2316                 res
2317         }
2318
2319         /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2320         /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2321         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2322         /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2323         #[doc(hidden)]
2324         pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2325                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2326                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2327                         None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2328                         Some(chan) => {
2329                                 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2330                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2331                                 }
2332                                 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2333                                         return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2334                                 }
2335                                 if !chan.is_live() {
2336                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2337                                 }
2338                                 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2339                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2340                                                 unimplemented!();
2341                                         }
2342                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2343                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
2344                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2345                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2346                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2347                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2348                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2349                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2350                                                         update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2351                                                         commitment_signed,
2352                                                 },
2353                                         });
2354                                 }
2355                         },
2356                 }
2357                 Ok(())
2358         }
2359 }
2360
2361 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2362         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2363                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2364                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2365                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2366                 ret
2367         }
2368 }
2369
2370 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2371         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2372                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2373                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2374                 {
2375                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2376                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2377                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2378                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2379                                 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2380                                 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2381                                         let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
2382                                         new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
2383                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2384                                                 msg: funding_locked,
2385                                                 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2386                                         });
2387                                         short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2388                                 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2389                                         new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
2390                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2391                                                 action: e.action,
2392                                         });
2393                                         if channel.is_shutdown() {
2394                                                 return false;
2395                                         }
2396                                 }
2397                                 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2398                                         for tx in txn_matched {
2399                                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2400                                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2401                                                                 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2402                                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2403                                                                 }
2404                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2405                                                                 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2406                                                                 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2407                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2408                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2409                                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2410                                                                                 msg: update
2411                                                                         });
2412                                                                 }
2413                                                                 return false;
2414                                                         }
2415                                                 }
2416                                         }
2417                                 }
2418                                 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2419                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2420                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2421                                         }
2422                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2423                                         // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2424                                         // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2425                                         // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2426                                         failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2427                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2428                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2429                                                         msg: update
2430                                                 });
2431                                         }
2432                                         return false;
2433                                 }
2434                                 true
2435                         });
2436                 }
2437                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2438                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2439                 }
2440                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2441                 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2442                         pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2443                 }
2444                 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2445         }
2446
2447         /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2448         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2449                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2450                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2451                 {
2452                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2453                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2454                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2455                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_,  v| {
2456                                 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2457                                         if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2458                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2459                                         }
2460                                         failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2461                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2462                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2463                                                         msg: update
2464                                                 });
2465                                         }
2466                                         false
2467                                 } else {
2468                                         true
2469                                 }
2470                         });
2471                 }
2472                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2473                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2474                 }
2475                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2476                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2477                         for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2478                                 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2479                         }
2480                 }
2481                 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2482         }
2483 }
2484
2485 macro_rules! handle_error {
2486         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2487                 match $internal {
2488                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2489                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2490                                 if needs_channel_force_close {
2491                                         match &err.action {
2492                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2493                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2494                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2495                                                         } else {
2496                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2497                                                         }
2498                                                 },
2499                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2500                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2501                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2502                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2503                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2504                                                         } else {
2505                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2506                                                         }
2507                                                 },
2508                                                 &None => {},
2509                                         }
2510                                 }
2511                                 Err(err)
2512                         },
2513                 }
2514         }
2515 }
2516
2517 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2518         //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2519         fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2520                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2521         }
2522
2523         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2524                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2525         }
2526
2527         fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2528                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2529         }
2530
2531         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2532                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2533         }
2534
2535         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2536                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2537         }
2538
2539         fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2540                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2541         }
2542
2543         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2544                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2545         }
2546
2547         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2548                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2549         }
2550
2551         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2552                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2553         }
2554
2555         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2556                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2557         }
2558
2559         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2560                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2561         }
2562
2563         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2564                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2565         }
2566
2567         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2568                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2569         }
2570
2571         fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2572                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2573         }
2574
2575         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2576                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2577         }
2578
2579         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), HandleError> {
2580                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2581         }
2582
2583         fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2584                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2585                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2586                 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2587                 {
2588                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2589                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2590                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2591                         if no_connection_possible {
2592                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2593                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2594                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2595                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2596                                                 }
2597                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2598                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2599                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2600                                                                 msg: update
2601                                                         });
2602                                                 }
2603                                                 false
2604                                         } else {
2605                                                 true
2606                                         }
2607                                 });
2608                         } else {
2609                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2610                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2611                                                 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2612                                                 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2613                                                 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2614                                                         let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2615                                                         failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2616                                                 }
2617                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2618                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2619                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2620                                                         }
2621                                                         return false;
2622                                                 }
2623                                         }
2624                                         true
2625                                 })
2626                         }
2627                 }
2628                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2629                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2630                 }
2631                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2632                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2633                         for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2634                                 pending_events.push(event);
2635                         }
2636                 }
2637                 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2638                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2639                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2640                         }
2641                 }
2642         }
2643
2644         fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2645                 let mut res = Vec::new();
2646                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2647                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2648                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2649                                 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2650                                         // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2651                                         // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2652                                         // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2653                                         // drop it.
2654                                         false
2655                                 } else {
2656                                         res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2657                                         true
2658                                 }
2659                         } else { true }
2660                 });
2661                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2662                 res
2663         }
2664
2665         fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2666                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2667                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
2668                                 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2669                                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2670                                 }
2671                         }
2672                 } else {
2673                         self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2674                 }
2675         }
2676 }
2677
2678 #[cfg(test)]
2679 mod tests {
2680         use chain::chaininterface;
2681         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2682         use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2683         use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason};
2684         use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
2685         use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2686         use ln::msgs;
2687         use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2688         use util::test_utils;
2689         use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2690         use util::errors::APIError;
2691         use util::logger::Logger;
2692         use util::ser::Writeable;
2693
2694         use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2695         use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2696         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2697         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2698         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2699         use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2700         use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2701
2702         use hex;
2703
2704         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2705         use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2706
2707         use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2708         use crypto::digest::Digest;
2709
2710         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2711
2712         use std::cell::RefCell;
2713         use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2714         use std::default::Default;
2715         use std::rc::Rc;
2716         use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2717         use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
2718         use std::time::Instant;
2719         use std::mem;
2720
2721         fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2722                 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2723                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2724
2725                 let route = Route {
2726                         hops: vec!(
2727                                         RouteHop {
2728                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2729                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2730                                         },
2731                                         RouteHop {
2732                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2733                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2734                                         },
2735                                         RouteHop {
2736                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2737                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2738                                         },
2739                                         RouteHop {
2740                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2741                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2742                                         },
2743                                         RouteHop {
2744                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2745                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2746                                         },
2747                         ),
2748                 };
2749
2750                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2751
2752                 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2753                 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2754                 onion_keys
2755         }
2756
2757         #[test]
2758         fn onion_vectors() {
2759                 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2760                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2761
2762                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2763                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2764                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2765                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2766                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2767
2768                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2769                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2770                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2771                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2772                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2773
2774                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2775                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2776                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2777                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2778                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2779
2780                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2781                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2782                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2783                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2784                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2785
2786                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2787                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2788                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2789                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2790                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2791
2792                 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2793                 let payloads = vec!(
2794                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2795                                 realm: 0,
2796                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2797                                         short_channel_id: 0,
2798                                         amt_to_forward: 0,
2799                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2800                                 },
2801                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2802                         },
2803                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2804                                 realm: 0,
2805                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2806                                         short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2807                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2808                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2809                                 },
2810                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2811                         },
2812                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2813                                 realm: 0,
2814                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2815                                         short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2816                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2817                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2818                                 },
2819                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2820                         },
2821                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2822                                 realm: 0,
2823                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2824                                         short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2825                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2826                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2827                                 },
2828                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2829                         },
2830                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2831                                 realm: 0,
2832                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2833                                         short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2834                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2835                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2836                                 },
2837                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2838                         },
2839                 );
2840
2841                 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2842                 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2843                 // anyway...
2844                 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2845         }
2846
2847         #[test]
2848         fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2849                 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2850
2851                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2852                 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2853                 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2854
2855                 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2856                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2857
2858                 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2859                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("c49a1ce81680f78f5f2000cda36268de34a3f0a0662f55b4e837c83a8773c22aa081bab1616a0011585323930fa5b9fae0c85770a2279ff59ec427ad1bbff9001c0cd1497004bd2a0f68b50704cf6d6a4bf3c8b6a0833399a24b3456961ba00736785112594f65b6b2d44d9f5ea4e49b5e1ec2af978cbe31c67114440ac51a62081df0ed46d4a3df295da0b0fe25c0115019f03f15ec86fabb4c852f83449e812f141a9395b3f70b766ebbd4ec2fae2b6955bd8f32684c15abfe8fd3a6261e52650e8807a92158d9f1463261a925e4bfba44bd20b166d532f0017185c3a6ac7957adefe45559e3072c8dc35abeba835a8cb01a71a15c736911126f27d46a36168ca5ef7dccd4e2886212602b181463e0dd30185c96348f9743a02aca8ec27c0b90dca270").unwrap());
2860
2861                 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2862                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2863
2864                 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2865                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2866
2867                 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2868                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2869         }
2870
2871         fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2872                 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2873                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2874                 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2875                 for i in 2..100 {
2876                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2877                         chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2878                 }
2879         }
2880
2881         struct Node {
2882                 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2883                 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2884                 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2885                 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2886                 router: Router,
2887                 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2888                 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2889         }
2890         impl Drop for Node {
2891                 fn drop(&mut self) {
2892                         if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2893                                 // Check that we processed all pending events
2894                                 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2895                                 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2896                         }
2897                 }
2898         }
2899
2900         fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2901                 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2902         }
2903
2904         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2905                 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2906                 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
2907                 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
2908         }
2909
2910         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
2911                 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
2912
2913                 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2914                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2915                 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2916                         Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2917                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2918                                 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2919                         },
2920                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2921                 };
2922
2923                 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2924
2925                 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2926                 let tx;
2927                 let funding_output;
2928
2929                 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2930                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2931                 match events_2[0] {
2932                         Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2933                                 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
2934                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2935
2936                                 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2937                                         value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2938                                 }]};
2939                                 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2940
2941                                 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2942                                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2943                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2944                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2945                                 added_monitors.clear();
2946                         },
2947                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2948                 }
2949
2950                 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2951                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2952                 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2953                         Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2954                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2955                                 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2956                                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2957                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2958                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2959                                 added_monitors.clear();
2960                                 res
2961                         },
2962                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2963                 };
2964
2965                 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2966                 {
2967                         let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2968                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2969                         assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2970                         added_monitors.clear();
2971                 }
2972
2973                 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2974                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2975                 match events_4[0] {
2976                         Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2977                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2978                                 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2979                         },
2980                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2981                 };
2982
2983                 tx
2984         }
2985
2986         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
2987                 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2988                 let events_5 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2989                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2990                 match events_5[0] {
2991                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2992                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2993                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2994                                 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2995                         },
2996                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2997                 };
2998
2999                 let channel_id;
3000
3001                 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3002                 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3003                 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3004                 (match events_6[0] {
3005                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
3006                                 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3007                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3008                                 (msg.clone(), announcement_sigs.clone().unwrap())
3009                         },
3010                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3011                 }, channel_id)
3012         }
3013
3014         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3015                 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3016                 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3017                 (msgs, chan_id, tx)
3018         }
3019
3020         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3021                 let bs_announcement_sigs = {
3022                         let bs_announcement_sigs = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap().unwrap();
3023                         node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3024                         bs_announcement_sigs
3025                 };
3026
3027                 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3028                 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3029                 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3030                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3031                                 (msg, update_msg)
3032                         },
3033                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3034                 };
3035
3036                 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3037                 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3038                 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3039                 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3040                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3041                                 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3042                                 update_msg
3043                         },
3044                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3045                 };
3046
3047                 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3048
3049                 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3050         }
3051
3052         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3053                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3054         }
3055
3056         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3057                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3058                 for node in nodes {
3059                         assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3060                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3061                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3062                 }
3063                 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3064         }
3065
3066         macro_rules! check_spends {
3067                 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3068                         {
3069                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3070                                 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3071                                 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3072                                 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3073                         }
3074                 }
3075         }
3076
3077         fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3078                 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3079                 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3080                 let (tx_a, tx_b);
3081
3082                 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3083                 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3084                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3085                 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
3086                         Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3087                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
3088                                 msg.clone()
3089                         },
3090                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3091                 };
3092
3093                 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
3094                 if !close_inbound_first {
3095                         assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
3096                 }
3097                 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3098                 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
3099                 if close_inbound_first {
3100                         assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
3101                         closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3102                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3103                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3104
3105                         let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3106                         assert!(empty_b.is_none());
3107                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3108                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3109                 } else {
3110                         closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3111                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3112                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3113
3114                         let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3115                         assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
3116                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3117                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3118                 }
3119                 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3120                 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3121
3122                 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3123                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3124                 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
3125                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3126                                 msg.clone()
3127                         },
3128                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3129                 };
3130
3131                 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3132                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3133                 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
3134                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3135                                 msg.clone()
3136                         },
3137                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3138                 };
3139
3140                 (as_update, bs_update)
3141         }
3142
3143         struct SendEvent {
3144                 node_id: PublicKey,
3145                 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3146                 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3147         }
3148         impl SendEvent {
3149                 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3150                         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3151                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3152                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3153                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3154                         SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3155                 }
3156
3157                 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
3158                         match event {
3159                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3160                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3161                         }
3162                 }
3163         }
3164
3165         macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3166                 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3167                         {
3168                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3169                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3170                                 added_monitors.clear();
3171                         }
3172                 }
3173         }
3174
3175         macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3176                 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3177                         {
3178                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3179                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3180                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3181                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3182                                 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3183                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3184                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
3185                                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
3186                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3187                                 if $fail_backwards {
3188                                         assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3189                                 }
3190                                 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3191                                 {
3192                                         let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3193                                         if $fail_backwards {
3194                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3195                                                 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3196                                         } else {
3197                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3198                                         }
3199                                         added_monitors.clear();
3200                                 }
3201                         }
3202                 }
3203         }
3204
3205         macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3206                 ($node: expr) => {
3207                         {
3208                                 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3209                                 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3210                                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3211                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3212                                 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3213                                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3214                                 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3215                         }
3216                 }
3217         }
3218
3219         fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3220                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3221
3222                 let mut payment_event = {
3223                         origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3224                         check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3225
3226                         let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3227                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3228                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3229                 };
3230                 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3231
3232                 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3233                         assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3234
3235                         node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3236                         check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3237                         commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3238
3239                         let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3240                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3241                         match events_1[0] {
3242                                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3243                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3244                         };
3245
3246                         node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3247                         node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3248
3249                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3250                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3251                         if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3252                                 match events_2[0] {
3253                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3254                                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3255                                                 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3256                                         },
3257                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3258                                 }
3259                         } else {
3260                                 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3261                                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3262                                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3263                         }
3264
3265                         prev_node = node;
3266                 }
3267
3268                 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3269         }
3270
3271         fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3272                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3273                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3274
3275                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3276                 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
3277                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3278                                 {
3279                                         $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3280                                         if $last_node {
3281                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3282                                         } else {
3283                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3284                                         }
3285                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3286                                 }
3287                         }
3288                 }
3289
3290                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3291                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3292                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3293                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3294                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
3295                                 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
3296                         }
3297
3298                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3299                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3300                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3301                                 match events[0] {
3302                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3303                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3304                                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3305                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3306                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3307                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3308                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3309                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3310                                         },
3311                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3312                                 }
3313                         } else {
3314                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
3315                         }
3316                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3317                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3318                         }
3319
3320                         prev_node = node;
3321                 }
3322
3323                 if !skip_last {
3324                         update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3325                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3326                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3327                         match events[0] {
3328                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3329                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3330                                 },
3331                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3332                         }
3333                 }
3334         }
3335
3336         fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3337                 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3338         }
3339
3340         const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3341
3342         fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3343                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3344                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3345                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3346                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3347                 }
3348
3349                 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3350         }
3351
3352         fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3353                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3354                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3355                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3356                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3357                 }
3358
3359                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3360
3361                 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3362                 match err {
3363                         APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3364                         _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3365                 };
3366         }
3367
3368         fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3369                 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3370                 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3371         }
3372
3373         fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3374                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
3375                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3376
3377                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3378                 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3379                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3380                                 {
3381                                         $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3382                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3383                                 }
3384                         }
3385                 }
3386
3387                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3388                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3389                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3390                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3391                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
3392                                 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3393                                 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3394                                 // second-to-last node!
3395                                 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3396                         }
3397
3398                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3399                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3400                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3401                                 match events[0] {
3402                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3403                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3404                                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3405                                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3406                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3407                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3408                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3409                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3410                                         },
3411                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3412                                 }
3413                         } else {
3414                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
3415                         }
3416                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3417                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3418                         }
3419
3420                         prev_node = node;
3421                 }
3422
3423                 if !skip_last {
3424                         update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3425
3426                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3427                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3428                         match events[0] {
3429                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
3430                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3431                                         assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3432                                 },
3433                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3434                         }
3435                 }
3436         }
3437
3438         fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3439                 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3440         }
3441
3442         fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3443                 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3444                 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3445                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3446                 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3447
3448                 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3449                 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3450
3451                 for _ in 0..node_count {
3452                         let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3453                         let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3454                         let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3455                         let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3456                         let node_id = {
3457                                 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3458                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3459                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3460                         };
3461                         let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3462                         let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3463                         nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3464                                 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3465                                 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3466                         });
3467                 }
3468
3469                 nodes
3470         }
3471
3472         #[test]
3473         fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3474                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3475                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3476                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3477
3478                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3479                         ($node: expr) => {{
3480                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3481                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3482                                 chan.get_feerate()
3483                         }}
3484                 }
3485
3486                 // balancing
3487                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3488
3489                 // A                                        B
3490                 // update_fee                            ->
3491                 // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
3492                 //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3493                 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3494                 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3495                 //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3496                 // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
3497                 //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
3498                 //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
3499                 // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
3500                 //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3501                 // send (6) RAA                          -.
3502                 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3503                 //                                       <- RAA
3504                 // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
3505
3506                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3507                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3508                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3509
3510                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3511                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3512                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3513                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3514                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3515                         },
3516                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3517                 };
3518
3519                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3520
3521                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3522                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3523                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3524                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3525
3526                 let payment_event = {
3527                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3528                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3529                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3530                 };
3531                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3532                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3533
3534                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3535                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3536                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3537                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3538                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3539
3540                 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3541                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3542                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3543                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3544
3545                 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3546                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3547                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3548                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3549                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3550                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3551                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3552
3553                 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3554                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3555                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3556                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3557                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3558                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3559                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3560
3561                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3562                 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3563                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3564
3565                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3566                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3567                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3568
3569                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3570                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3571
3572                 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3573                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3574                 match events_2[0] {
3575                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3576                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3577                 }
3578
3579                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3580                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3581         }
3582
3583         #[test]
3584         fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3585                 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3586                 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3587                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3588                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3589                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3590
3591                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3592                         ($node: expr) => {{
3593                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3594                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3595                                 chan.get_feerate()
3596                         }}
3597                 }
3598
3599                 // balancing
3600                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3601
3602                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3603                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3604                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3605
3606                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3607                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3608                 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3609                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3610                                 update_fee.as_ref()
3611                         },
3612                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3613                 };
3614
3615                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3616
3617                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3618                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3619                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3620                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3621
3622                 let payment_event = {
3623                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3624                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3625                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3626                 };
3627                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3628                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3629
3630                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3631                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3632                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3633                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3634                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3635
3636                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3637                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3638
3639                 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3640         }
3641
3642         #[test]
3643         fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3644                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3645                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3646                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3647
3648                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3649                         ($node: expr) => {{
3650                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3651                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3652                                 chan.get_feerate()
3653                         }}
3654                 }
3655
3656                 // A                                        B
3657                 // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
3658                 //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3659                 // update_fee (never committed)          ->
3660                 // (3) update_fee                        ->
3661                 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3662                 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3663                 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3664                 //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
3665                 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
3666                 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3667                 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3668                 //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3669                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3670                 //                                          B should send no response here
3671                 // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
3672                 //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3673                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3674
3675                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3676                 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3677                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3678                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3679
3680                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3681                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3682                 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3683                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3684                                 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3685                         },
3686                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3687                 };
3688
3689                 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3690                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3691                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3692                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3693
3694                 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3695                 // transaction:
3696                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3697                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3698
3699                 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3700                 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3701                         channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3702                         feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3703                 };
3704
3705                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3706
3707                 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3708                 // Deliver (3)
3709                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3710
3711                 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3712                 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3713                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3714                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3715                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3716                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3717                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3718                 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3719                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3720                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3721
3722                 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3723                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3724                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3725                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3726
3727                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3728                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3729
3730                 // Delever (4)
3731                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3732                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3733
3734                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3735                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3736
3737                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3738                 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3739                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3740
3741                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3742                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3743         }
3744
3745         #[test]
3746         fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3747                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3748                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3749                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3750
3751                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3752                         ($node: expr) => {{
3753                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3754                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3755                                 chan.get_feerate()
3756                         }}
3757                 }
3758
3759                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3760                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3761
3762                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3763                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3764                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3765                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3766                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3767                         },
3768                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3769                 };
3770                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3771
3772                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3773                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3774                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3775                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3776
3777                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3778                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3779                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3780
3781                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3782                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3783                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3784
3785                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3786                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3787                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3788         }
3789
3790         #[test]
3791         fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3792                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3793                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3794                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3795
3796                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3797                         ($node: expr) => {{
3798                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3799                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3800                                 chan.get_feerate()
3801                         }}
3802                 }
3803
3804                 // balancing
3805                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3806
3807                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3808                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3809
3810                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3811                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3812                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3813                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3814                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3815                         },
3816                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3817                 };
3818                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3819                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3820                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3821                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3822                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3823
3824                 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3825
3826                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3827
3828                 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3829                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3830                 {
3831                         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3832                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3833                         added_monitors.clear();
3834                 }
3835                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3836                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3837                 // node[1] has nothing to do
3838
3839                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3840                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3841                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3842
3843                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3844                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3845                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3846                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3847                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3848
3849                 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3850                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3851                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3852                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3853                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3854                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3855
3856                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3857                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3858                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3859                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3860                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3861                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3862                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3863                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3864
3865                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3866                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3867                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3868                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3869                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3870                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3871
3872                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3873                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3874                 match events[0] {
3875                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3876                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3877                 };
3878                 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3879                 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3880
3881                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3882                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3883                 match events[0] {
3884                         Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3885                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3886                 };
3887
3888                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3889
3890                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3891                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3892                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3893         }
3894
3895         #[test]
3896         fn test_update_fee() {
3897                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3898                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3899                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3900
3901                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3902                         ($node: expr) => {{
3903                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3904                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3905                                 chan.get_feerate()
3906                         }}
3907                 }
3908
3909                 // A                                        B
3910                 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3911                 //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3912                 //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
3913                 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3914                 //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3915                 //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3916                 // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
3917                 //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3918                 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
3919                 //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3920                 //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3921                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3922
3923                 // Create and deliver (1)...
3924                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3925                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3926
3927                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3928                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3929                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3930                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3931                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3932                         },
3933                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3934                 };
3935                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3936
3937                 // Generate (2) and (3):
3938                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3939                 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3940                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3941                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3942
3943                 // Deliver (2):
3944                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3945                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3946                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3947
3948                 // Create and deliver (4)...
3949                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3950                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3951                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3952                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3953                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3954                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3955                         },
3956                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3957                 };
3958                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3959
3960                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3961                 // ... creating (5)
3962                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3963                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3964                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3965
3966                 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3967                 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3968                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3969                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3970
3971                 // Deliver (5):
3972                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3973                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3974                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3975
3976                 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3977                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3978                 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3979                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3980
3981                 // Deliver (7)
3982                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3983                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3984                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3985                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3986                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3987                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3988
3989                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3990                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3991                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3992         }
3993
3994         #[test]
3995         fn fake_network_test() {
3996                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3997                 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3998                 let nodes = create_network(4);
3999
4000                 // Create some initial channels
4001                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4002                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4003                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4004
4005                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4006                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4007                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4008                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4009                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4010
4011                 // Send some more payments
4012                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4013                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
4014                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
4015
4016                 // Test failure packets
4017                 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
4018                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
4019
4020                 // Add a new channel that skips 3
4021                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4022
4023                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4024                 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4025                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4026                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4027                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4028                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4029                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4030
4031                 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
4032                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4033                 hops.push(RouteHop {
4034                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4035                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4036                         fee_msat: 0,
4037                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4038                 });
4039                 hops.push(RouteHop {
4040                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4041                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4042                         fee_msat: 0,
4043                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4044                 });
4045                 hops.push(RouteHop {
4046                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4047                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4048                         fee_msat: 1000000,
4049                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4050                 });
4051                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4052                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4053                 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
4054
4055                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4056                 hops.push(RouteHop {
4057                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4058                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4059                         fee_msat: 0,
4060                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4061                 });
4062                 hops.push(RouteHop {
4063                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4064                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4065                         fee_msat: 0,
4066                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4067                 });
4068                 hops.push(RouteHop {
4069                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4070                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4071                         fee_msat: 1000000,
4072                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4073                 });
4074                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4075                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4076                 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
4077
4078                 // Claim the rebalances...
4079                 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
4080                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4081
4082                 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
4083                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4084
4085                 // Send some payments across both channels
4086                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4087                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4088                 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4089
4090                 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
4091
4092                 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
4093
4094                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4095                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
4096                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
4097
4098                 // Close down the channels...
4099                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
4100                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
4101                 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
4102                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
4103                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
4104         }
4105
4106         #[test]
4107         fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
4108                 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
4109                 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
4110                 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
4111
4112                 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
4113                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
4114                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4115                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4116                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4117                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4118
4119                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
4120
4121                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4122                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4123
4124                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4125                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4126
4127                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
4128                 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
4129                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
4130         }
4131
4132         #[derive(PartialEq)]
4133         enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
4134         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
4135         ///
4136         /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
4137         /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
4138         /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
4139         ///
4140         /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
4141         /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
4142         ///
4143         /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
4144         /// also fail.
4145         fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4146                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4147                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
4148
4149                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
4150                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4151                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
4152                                 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
4153                                 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
4154                                         res.push(tx.clone());
4155                                 }
4156                                 false
4157                         } else { true }
4158                 });
4159                 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
4160                         res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
4161                 }
4162
4163                 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
4164
4165                 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
4166                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4167                                 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
4168                                         check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
4169                                         if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
4170                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
4171                                         } else {
4172                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
4173                                         }
4174                                         res.push(tx.clone());
4175                                         false
4176                                 } else { true }
4177                         });
4178                         assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
4179                 }
4180
4181                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4182                 res
4183         }
4184
4185         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
4186         /// HTLC transaction.
4187         fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
4188                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4189                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4190                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4191                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
4192                                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
4193                                 false
4194                         } else { true }
4195                 });
4196                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4197         }
4198
4199         fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4200                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4201
4202                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
4203                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4204                 let mut found_prev = false;
4205
4206                 for tx in prev_txn {
4207                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
4208                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
4209                                 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
4210                                 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
4211
4212                                 found_prev = true;
4213                                 break;
4214                         }
4215                 }
4216                 assert!(found_prev);
4217
4218                 let mut res = Vec::new();
4219                 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
4220                 res
4221         }
4222
4223         fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
4224                 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4225                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4226                 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
4227                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4228                                 msg.clone()
4229                         },
4230                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4231                 };
4232
4233                 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4234                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4235                 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
4236                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4237                                 msg.clone()
4238                         },
4239                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4240                 };
4241
4242                 for node in nodes {
4243                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4244                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4245                 }
4246         }
4247
4248         macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
4249                 ($node: expr) => {{
4250                         let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4251                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4252                         match events[0] {
4253                                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4254                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4255                         };
4256                         $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4257                         $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4258                 }}
4259         }
4260
4261         #[test]
4262         fn channel_reserve_test() {
4263                 use util::rng;
4264                 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
4265                 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
4266
4267                 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
4268                         ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
4269                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4270                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
4271                                 chan.get_value_stat()
4272                         }}
4273                 }
4274
4275                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4276                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
4277                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
4278
4279                 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4280                 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4281
4282                 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
4283                 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4284
4285                 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
4286                         ($recv_value: expr) => {{
4287                                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4288                                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4289                                 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
4290                         }}
4291                 };
4292
4293                 macro_rules! expect_forward {
4294                         ($node: expr) => {{
4295                                 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4296                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4297                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4298                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
4299                                 payment_event
4300                         }}
4301                 }
4302
4303                 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
4304                         ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
4305                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4306                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4307                                 match events[0] {
4308                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4309                                                 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4310                                                 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
4311                                         },
4312                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4313                                 }
4314                         }
4315                 };
4316
4317                 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4318                 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4319
4320                 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4321
4322                 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4323                 {
4324                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4325                         assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4326                         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4327                         match err {
4328                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4329                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4330                         }
4331                 }
4332
4333                 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4334                 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4335                 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4336                 loop {
4337                         let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4338                         if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4339                                 break;
4340                         }
4341                         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4342                         htlc_id += 1;
4343
4344                         let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4345                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4346                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4347                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4348                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4349                         );
4350
4351                         assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4352                         assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4353                         assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4354                         assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4355                         stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4356                 }
4357
4358                 {
4359                         let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4360                         // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4361                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4362                         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4363                         match err {
4364                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4365                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4366                         }
4367                 }
4368
4369                 // adding pending output
4370                 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4371                 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4372
4373                 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4374                 let payment_event_1 = {
4375                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4376                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4377
4378                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4379                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4380                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4381                 };
4382                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4383
4384                 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4385                 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4386                 {
4387                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4388                         match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4389                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4390                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4391                         }
4392                 }
4393
4394                 {
4395                         // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4396                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4397
4398                         // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4399                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4400                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4401                                 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4402                                 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4403                                 session_key
4404                         }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4405
4406                         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4407                         let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4408                         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4409                         let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4410                         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4411                                 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4412                                 htlc_id,
4413                                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4414                                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4415                                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4416                                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4417                         };
4418
4419                         let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4420                         match err {
4421                                 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4422                         }
4423                 }
4424
4425                 // split the rest to test holding cell
4426                 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4427                 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4428                 {
4429                         let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4430                         assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4431                 }
4432
4433                 // now see if they go through on both sides
4434                 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4435                 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4436                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4437                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4438                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4439                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4440
4441                 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4442                 {
4443                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4444                         match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4445                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4446                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4447                         }
4448                 }
4449
4450                 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4451                 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4452                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4453                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4454                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4455                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4456
4457                 // flush the pending htlc
4458                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4459                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4460
4461                 let commitment_update_2 = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
4462                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4463                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4464                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
4465                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4466                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4467                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4468
4469                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4470
4471                 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4472                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4473                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4474
4475                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4476                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4477
4478                 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4479                 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4480                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4481                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4482                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4483                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4484
4485                 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4486                 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4487                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4488                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4489
4490                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4491                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4492
4493                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4494                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4495                 match events[0] {
4496                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4497                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4498                                 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4499                         },
4500                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4501                 }
4502                 match events[1] {
4503                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4504                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4505                                 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4506                         },
4507                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4508                 }
4509
4510                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4511                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4512                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4513
4514                 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4515                 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4516                 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4517                 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4518
4519                 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4520                 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4521         }
4522
4523         #[test]
4524         fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4525                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4526                 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4527                 let nodes = create_network(5);
4528
4529                 // Create some initial channels
4530                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4531                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4532                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4533                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4534
4535                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4536                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4537                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4538                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4539                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4540
4541                 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4542                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4543                 {
4544                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4545                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4546                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4547                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4548                 }
4549                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4550                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4551                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4552
4553                 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4554                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4555
4556                 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4557                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4558                 {
4559                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4560                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4561                         nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4562                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4563                 }
4564                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4565                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4566                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4567
4568                 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4569                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4570                                 {
4571                                         assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4572                                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4573
4574                                         let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4575                                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4576                                         match events[0] {
4577                                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4578                                                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4579                                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4580                                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4581                                                 },
4582                                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4583                                         };
4584                                 }
4585                         }
4586                 }
4587
4588                 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4589                 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4590                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4591                 {
4592                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4593
4594                         // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4595                         claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4596
4597                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4598                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4599
4600                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4601                 }
4602                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4603                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4604                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4605
4606                 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
4607                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4608                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
4609                 }
4610
4611                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4612                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4613                 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4614                 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4615                 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
4616                 // buffer space).
4617
4618                 {
4619                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4620                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4621                         for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
4622                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4623                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4624                         }
4625
4626                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4627
4628                         // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4629                         claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4630
4631                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4632                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4633                         for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
4634                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4635                                 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4636                         }
4637
4638                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4639
4640                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4641                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4642
4643                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4644                 }
4645                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4646                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4647                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4648
4649                 // Create some new channels:
4650                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4651
4652                 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4653                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4654                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4655                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4656                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4657                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4658                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4659                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4660                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4661                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4662                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4663                 // Revoke the old state
4664                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4665
4666                 {
4667                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4668                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4669                         {
4670                                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4671                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4672                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4673                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4674
4675                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4676                                 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4677                         }
4678                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4679
4680                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4681                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4682                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4683                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4684                         test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4685                 }
4686                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4687                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4688                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4689         }
4690
4691         #[test]
4692         fn revoked_output_claim() {
4693                 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4694                 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4695                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4696                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4697                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4698                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4699                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4700                 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4701                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4702                 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4703                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4704
4705                 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4706                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4707                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4708                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4709                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4710
4711                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4712
4713                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4714                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4715
4716                 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4717                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4718                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4719         }
4720
4721         #[test]
4722         fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4723                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4724                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4725
4726                 // Create some new channel:
4727                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4728
4729                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4730                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4731                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4732                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4733                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4734
4735                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4736                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4737                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4738                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4739                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4740                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4741                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4742                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4743                 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4744
4745                 //Revoke the old state
4746                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4747
4748                 {
4749                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4750
4751                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4752
4753                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4754                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4755                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4756
4757                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4758                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4759
4760                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4761
4762                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4763                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4764                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4765                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4766                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4767                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4768                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4769                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4770
4771                         // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4772                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4773                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4774
4775                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4776                         let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4777                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4778                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4779                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4780                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4781                 }
4782                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4783                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4784                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4785         }
4786
4787         #[test]
4788         fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4789                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4790                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4791
4792                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4793
4794                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4795                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4796                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4797                 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4798                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4799                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4800
4801                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4802                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4803
4804                 //Revoke the old state
4805                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4806
4807                 {
4808                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4809
4810                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4811
4812                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4813                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4814                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4815
4816                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4817                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4818                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4819                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4820                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4821                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4822                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4823
4824                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4825                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4826                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4827
4828                         let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4829                         revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4830                         node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4831                         node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4832                         node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4833
4834                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4835                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4836                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4837                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4838                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4839                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4840                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4841                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4842
4843                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4844                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4845
4846                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4847                         let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4848                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4849                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4850                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4851                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4852                 }
4853                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4854                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4855                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4856         }
4857
4858         #[test]
4859         fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4860                 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4861                 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4862                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4863                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4864
4865                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4866                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4867                 {
4868                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4869                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4870                         match events[0] {
4871                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4872                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4873                                 },
4874                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4875                         }
4876                 }
4877
4878                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4879                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4880
4881                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4882                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4883
4884                 {
4885                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4886                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4887                         match events[0] {
4888                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4889                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4890                                 },
4891                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4892                         }
4893                 }
4894
4895                 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4896                 // registering new transactions
4897                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4898         }
4899
4900         #[test]
4901         fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4902                 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4903                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4904                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4905                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4906
4907                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4908
4909                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4910
4911                 let mut payment_event = {
4912                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4913                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4914
4915                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4916                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4917                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4918                 };
4919
4920                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4921                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4922
4923                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4924                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4925                 match events_1[0] {
4926                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4927                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4928                 };
4929
4930                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4931                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4932
4933                 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4934                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4935                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4936                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4937
4938                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4939                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4940                 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4941                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4942
4943                 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4944                 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4945                 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4946
4947                 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4948                 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4949                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4950                 match events_3[0] {
4951                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4952                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4953                         },
4954                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4955                 }
4956
4957                 let tx = {
4958                         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4959                         // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4960                         // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4961                         // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4962                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4963                         node_txn.remove(0)
4964                 };
4965
4966                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4967                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4968
4969                 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4970                 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4971                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4972                 match events_4[0] {
4973                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4974                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4975                         },
4976                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4977                 }
4978
4979                 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4980                 {
4981                         let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4982                         monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4983                                 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4984                 }
4985                 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4986                 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4987                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4988                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4989                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4990                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4991                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4992
4993                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
4994         }
4995
4996         #[test]
4997         fn test_unconf_chan() {
4998                 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
4999                 let nodes = create_network(2);
5000                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5001
5002                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5003                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
5004                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
5005                 mem::drop(channel_state);
5006
5007                 let mut headers = Vec::new();
5008                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5009                 headers.push(header.clone());
5010                 for _i in 2..100 {
5011                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5012                         headers.push(header.clone());
5013                 }
5014                 while !headers.is_empty() {
5015                         nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
5016                 }
5017                 {
5018                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5019                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5020                         match events[0] {
5021                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5022                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5023                                 },
5024                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5025                         }
5026                 }
5027                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5028                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
5029                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
5030         }
5031
5032         /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
5033         /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
5034         fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
5035                 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5036                 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5037
5038                 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
5039                 for msg in reestablish_1 {
5040                         resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
5041                 }
5042                 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5043                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5044                 } else {
5045                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
5046                 }
5047
5048                 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
5049                 for msg in reestablish_2 {
5050                         resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
5051                 }
5052                 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5053                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5054                 } else {
5055                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
5056                 }
5057
5058                 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
5059                 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
5060                         (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
5061
5062                 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
5063                         if pre_all_htlcs {
5064                                 let a = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap());
5065                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = a.unwrap();
5066                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
5067                         } else {
5068                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5069                         }
5070                         if pending_raa.0 {
5071                                 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5072                                 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
5073                                 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5074                         } else {
5075                                 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5076                         }
5077                         if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5078                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5079                                 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5080                                         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
5081                                 } else {
5082                                         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5083                                 }
5084                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5085                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5086                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5087                                 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5088                                         node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5089                                 }
5090                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5091                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5092                                 }
5093                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5094                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5095                                 }
5096
5097                                 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5098                                         commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5099                                 } else {
5100                                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5101                                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5102                                         assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5103                                         assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5104                                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5105                                 }
5106                         } else {
5107                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5108                         }
5109                 }
5110
5111                 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
5112                         if pre_all_htlcs {
5113                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5114                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
5115                         } else {
5116                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5117                         }
5118                         if pending_raa.1 {
5119                                 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5120                                 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
5121                                 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5122                         } else {
5123                                 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5124                         }
5125                         if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5126                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5127                                 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5128                                         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
5129                                 }
5130                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5131                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5132                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5133                                 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5134                                         node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5135                                 }
5136                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5137                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5138                                 }
5139                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5140                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5141                                 }
5142
5143                                 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5144                                         commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5145                                 } else {
5146                                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5147                                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5148                                         assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5149                                         assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5150                                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5151                                 }
5152                         } else {
5153                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5154                         }
5155                 }
5156         }
5157
5158         #[test]
5159         fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
5160                 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
5161                 let nodes = create_network(3);
5162                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5163                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5164
5165                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5166                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5167                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5168
5169                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5170                 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5171                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
5172                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
5173
5174                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5175                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5176                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5177
5178                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5179                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5180                 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5181                 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5182
5183                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5184                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5185
5186                 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
5187                 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
5188
5189                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
5190                 {
5191                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5192                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5193                         match events[0] {
5194                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
5195                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
5196                                 },
5197                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5198                         }
5199                         match events[1] {
5200                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
5201                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
5202                                         assert!(rejected_by_dest);
5203                                 },
5204                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5205                         }
5206                 }
5207
5208                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
5209                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
5210         }
5211
5212         fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
5213                 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
5214                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5215                 if messages_delivered == 0 {
5216                         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5217                         // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
5218                 } else {
5219                         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5220                 }
5221
5222                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5223                 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5224
5225                 let payment_event = {
5226                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5227                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5228
5229                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5230                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5231                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5232                 };
5233                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
5234
5235                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5236                         // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
5237                 } else {
5238                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5239                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5240                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5241
5242                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5243                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5244                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5245
5246                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5247                                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5248                                         assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5249                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5250
5251                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5252                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5253                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5254                                         }
5255                                 }
5256                         }
5257                 }
5258
5259                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5260                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5261                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5262                         // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
5263                         // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
5264                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5265                 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5266                         // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5267                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5268                 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5269                         // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5270                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5271                 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5272                         // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5273                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5274                 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5275                         // Everything was delivered...
5276                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5277                 }
5278
5279                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5280                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5281                 match events_1[0] {
5282                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5283                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5284                 };
5285
5286                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5287                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5288                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5289
5290                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5291                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5292
5293                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5294                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5295                 match events_2[0] {
5296                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5297                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5298                                 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5299                         },
5300                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5301                 }
5302
5303                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5304                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5305
5306                 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5307                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5308                 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
5309                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5310                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5311                                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5312                                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5313                                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5314                                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5315                                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5316                                 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5317                         },
5318                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5319                 };
5320
5321                 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
5322                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
5323
5324                         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5325                         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5326                         match events_4[0] {
5327                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5328                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5329                                 },
5330                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5331                         }
5332
5333                         if messages_delivered >= 2 {
5334                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
5335                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5336
5337                                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5338                                         assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5339                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5340
5341                                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5342                                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5343                                                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5344                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5345
5346                                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5347                                                         assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5348                                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5349                                                 }
5350                                         }
5351                                 }
5352                         }
5353                 }
5354
5355                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5356                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5357                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5358                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5359                         //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
5360                         //if messages_delivered < 1 {
5361                                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5362                                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5363                                 match events_4[0] {
5364                                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5365                                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5366                                         },
5367                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5368                                 }
5369                         //}
5370                 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5371                         // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5372                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5373                 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5374                         // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5375                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5376                 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5377                         // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5378                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5379                 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5380                         // Everything was delivered...
5381                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5382                 }
5383
5384                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5385                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5386                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5387
5388                 // Channel should still work fine...
5389                 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
5390                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5391         }
5392
5393         #[test]
5394         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
5395                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
5396                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
5397                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
5398         }
5399
5400         #[test]
5401         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
5402                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
5403                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
5404                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
5405         }
5406
5407         #[test]
5408         fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
5409                 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
5410                 let nodes = create_network(2);
5411                 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5412
5413                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5414                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5415
5416                 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5417                 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5418                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5419                 match events_1[0] {
5420                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5421                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5422                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5423                         },
5424                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5425                 }
5426
5427                 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5428                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5429                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5430                 match events_2[0] {
5431                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5432                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5433                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5434                         },
5435                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5436                 }
5437
5438                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5439                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5440                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5441                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5442
5443                 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
5444                 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
5445
5446                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5447                 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5448                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
5449         }
5450
5451         #[test]
5452         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
5453                 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
5454                 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
5455                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5456                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5457
5458                 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5459
5460                 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5461                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5462                 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5463
5464                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
5465                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5466
5467                 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5468                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5469                 match events_1[0] {
5470                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5471                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5472                 }
5473
5474                 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5475                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5476
5477                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5478                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5479                 match events_2[0] {
5480                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5481                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5482                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5483                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5484                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5485                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5486                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5487
5488                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5489                                 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5490                                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5491                                 match events_3[0] {
5492                                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5493                                                 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5494                                         },
5495                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5496                                 }
5497
5498                                 let (_, commitment_update) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
5499                                 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
5500                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5501                         },
5502                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5503                 }
5504
5505                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5506                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5507
5508                 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5509                 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5510                 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5511                 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5512
5513                 let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5514                 let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5515
5516                 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5517                 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5518
5519                 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5520                 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5521
5522                 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5523
5524                 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5525                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5526                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5527                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5528                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5529                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5530                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5531                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5532                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5533
5534                 let bs_second_commitment_signed = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap().unwrap();
5535                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5536                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5537                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5538                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5539                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5540                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5541
5542                 let as_commitment_signed = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5543                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5544                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5545                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5546                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5547                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5548                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5549
5550                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5551                 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
5552                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5553
5554                 let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5555                 assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none());
5556                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5557
5558                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5559                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5560
5561                 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5562                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5563                 match events_4[0] {
5564                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5565                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5566                 };
5567
5568                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5569                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5570
5571                 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5572                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5573                 match events_5[0] {
5574                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
5575                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5576                         },
5577                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5578                 }
5579
5580                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5581                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5582
5583                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5584         }
5585
5586         #[test]
5587         fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
5588                 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
5589                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5590                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5591
5592                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5593                 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5594
5595                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5596                 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5597                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5598
5599                 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5600                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5601                 match events_1[0] {
5602                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5603                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5604                 };
5605
5606                 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5607                 // PaymentFailed event
5608
5609                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5610         }
5611
5612         fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
5613                 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
5614                 // a disconnect in between
5615                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5616                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5617
5618                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5619                 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5620
5621                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5622                 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5623                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5624
5625                 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5626                 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
5627                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5628
5629                 if disconnect {
5630                         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5631                         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5632                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5633                 }
5634
5635                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
5636                 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5637                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5638
5639                 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5640                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5641                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
5642                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5643                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5644                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5645
5646                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5647
5648                 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5649                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5650                 match events_3[0] {
5651                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5652                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5653                                 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5654                         },
5655                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5656                 }
5657
5658                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
5659
5660                 // Now set it to failed again...
5661                 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5662                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5663                 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
5664                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5665
5666                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5667                 assert!(events_4.is_empty());
5668                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5669
5670                 if disconnect {
5671                         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5672                         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5673                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5674                 }
5675
5676                 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
5677                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5678                 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5679                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5680
5681                 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5682                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5683                 match events_5[0] {
5684                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5685                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5686                 }
5687
5688                 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5689                 // PaymentFailed event
5690
5691                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5692         }
5693
5694         #[test]
5695         fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
5696                 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
5697                 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
5698         }
5699
5700         fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
5701                 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
5702
5703                 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
5704                 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
5705                 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
5706                 //   route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
5707                 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
5708                 //   TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
5709                 //   the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
5710                 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
5711                 //   immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
5712                 //   channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
5713                 //   disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
5714                 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
5715                 //   through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
5716                 //   disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
5717                 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
5718                 //   through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
5719                 //   disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
5720                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5721                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5722
5723                 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5724
5725                 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5726                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5727                 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5728
5729                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5730                 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
5731                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5732
5733                 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5734                 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
5735                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5736
5737                 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
5738                 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
5739                 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5740                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5741                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5742                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5743                 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
5744                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5745                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5746                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5747                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5748                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5749                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5750                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5751
5752                                 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5753                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5754                                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5755                                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5756                                         match events_3[0] {
5757                                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5758                                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5759                                                 },
5760                                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5761                                         }
5762
5763                                         if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
5764                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
5765                                         } else { panic!(); }
5766                                 }
5767
5768                                 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
5769                         },
5770                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5771                 };
5772
5773                 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
5774                         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5775                         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5776                 }
5777
5778                 // Now fix monitor updating...
5779                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
5780                 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5781                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5782
5783                 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
5784                         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5785                         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5786
5787                         let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5788                         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5789                         let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5790                         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5791
5792                         let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5793                         let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5794
5795                         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5796                         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5797
5798                         (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
5799                 } } }
5800
5801                 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
5802                         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5803                         assert!(events_4.is_empty());
5804
5805                         let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5806                         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5807                         let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5808                         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5809
5810                         let mut as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5811                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5812                         let mut bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5813                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5814
5815                         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5816                         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5817
5818                         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5819                         if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5820                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5821
5822                                 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
5823                                 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
5824                                 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5825                         } else {
5826                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5827                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5828                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5829                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5830                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
5831                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
5832
5833                                 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5834
5835                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5836                                 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5837                                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5838                                 match events_3[0] {
5839                                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5840                                                 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5841                                         },
5842                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5843                                 }
5844
5845                                 let (as_resp_raa, as_resp_cu) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5846                                 assert!(as_resp_cu.is_none());
5847                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5848
5849                                 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
5850                                 bs_resp.2 = None;
5851                         }
5852
5853                         if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
5854                                 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5855
5856                                 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5857                                         assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
5858                                         assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
5859                                 }
5860                                 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
5861                                 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
5862                         }
5863
5864                         (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
5865                 } else {
5866                         let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5867                         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
5868                         (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
5869                                 Event::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5870                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5871                                         msg.clone()
5872                                 },
5873                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5874                         })
5875                 };
5876
5877                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5878
5879                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5880                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5881                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still
5882                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5883
5884                 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
5885                         let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5886
5887                         assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
5888                         assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
5889
5890                         assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
5891                         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5892                 }
5893
5894                 let as_commitment_update;
5895                 let bs_second_commitment_update;
5896
5897                 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
5898                         as_commitment_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5899                         assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5900                         assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5901                         assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5902                         assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5903                         assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
5904                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5905                 } }
5906
5907                 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
5908                         bs_second_commitment_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5909                         assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5910                         assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5911                         assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5912                         assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5913                         assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
5914                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5915                 } }
5916
5917                 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
5918                         handle_bs_raa!();
5919
5920                         if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
5921                                 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5922
5923                                 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
5924                                 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5925
5926                                 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5927                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5928
5929                                 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5930                         }
5931
5932                         handle_initial_raa!();
5933
5934                         if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
5935                                 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5936
5937                                 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5938                                 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5939
5940                                 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5941                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5942                         }
5943                 } else {
5944                         handle_initial_raa!();
5945
5946                         if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
5947                                 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5948
5949                                 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5950                                 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
5951
5952                                 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
5953                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5954
5955                                 assert!(bs_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5956                         }
5957
5958                         handle_bs_raa!();
5959
5960                         if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
5961                                 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5962
5963                                 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5964                                 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5965
5966                                 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5967                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5968                         }
5969                 }
5970
5971                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5972                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5973                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5974
5975                 let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5976                 assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none());
5977                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5978
5979                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5980                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5981
5982                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5983                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5984
5985                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5986
5987                 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5988                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5989                 match events_5[0] {
5990                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5991                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5992                                 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5993                         },
5994                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5995                 }
5996
5997                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5998         }
5999
6000         #[test]
6001         fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
6002                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
6003                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
6004                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
6005                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
6006                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
6007                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
6008         }
6009
6010         #[test]
6011         fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
6012                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
6013                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
6014                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
6015                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
6016         }
6017
6018         #[test]
6019         fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
6020                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
6021                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
6022                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
6023                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
6024                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
6025         }
6026
6027         #[test]
6028         fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
6029                 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
6030                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6031                 let nodes = create_network(2);
6032
6033                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
6034
6035                 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6036                 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6037                 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6038                 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6039
6040                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6041
6042                 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6043                 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6044
6045                 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6046                 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6047
6048                 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
6049
6050                 let mut chan_announcement;
6051
6052                 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
6053                         () => {
6054                                 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6055                                         features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
6056                                         chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
6057                                         short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
6058                                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
6059                                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
6060                                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
6061                                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
6062                                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
6063                                 };
6064                         }
6065                 }
6066
6067                 macro_rules! sign_msg {
6068                         ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
6069                                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
6070                                 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6071                                 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6072                                 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
6073                                 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
6074                                 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6075                                         node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
6076                                         node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
6077                                         bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
6078                                         bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
6079                                         contents: $unsigned_msg
6080                                 }
6081                         }
6082                 }
6083
6084                 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6085                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6086                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
6087                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6088
6089                 // Configured with Network::Testnet
6090                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6091                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
6092                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6093                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6094
6095                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6096                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
6097                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6098                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6099         }
6100 }