1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HandleError, RAACommitmentOrder};
30 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
45 use std::collections::HashMap;
46 use std::collections::hash_map;
48 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
52 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
54 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
58 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 mod channel_held_info {
66 use ln::router::Route;
67 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
70 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
73 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
74 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
75 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
76 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
77 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
78 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
83 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
84 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
87 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
88 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
89 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
90 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
94 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
96 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
97 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
98 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
99 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
102 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
104 pub enum HTLCSource {
105 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
108 session_priv: SecretKey,
109 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
110 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
111 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
116 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
117 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
118 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
119 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
120 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
125 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
126 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
128 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
136 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
138 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
139 err: msgs::HandleError,
140 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
142 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
144 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
148 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
149 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
151 data: err.to_string()
155 needs_channel_force_close: false,
159 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
163 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
164 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
166 data: err.to_string()
170 needs_channel_force_close: true,
174 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
175 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
178 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
179 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
182 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
185 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
187 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
189 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
191 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
192 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
194 data: msg.to_string()
199 needs_channel_force_close: false,
203 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
206 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
208 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
210 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
212 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
213 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
215 data: msg.to_string()
220 needs_channel_force_close: true,
225 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
226 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
228 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
229 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
231 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
235 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
236 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
237 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
238 /// probably increase this significantly.
239 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
241 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
242 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
244 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
247 struct ChannelHolder {
248 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
249 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
250 next_forward: Instant,
251 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
252 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
253 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
254 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
255 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
256 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
257 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
259 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
260 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
261 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
262 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
264 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
265 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
266 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
267 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
268 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
269 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
270 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
273 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
275 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
276 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
277 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
278 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
279 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
280 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
285 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
286 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
288 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
289 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
291 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
292 /// to individual Channels.
293 pub struct ChannelManager {
294 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
295 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
296 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
297 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
298 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
300 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
301 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
302 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
303 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
305 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
306 our_network_key: SecretKey,
308 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
310 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
315 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
316 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
317 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
318 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
319 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
320 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
321 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
323 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
324 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
325 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
326 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
329 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
331 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
332 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
335 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
337 macro_rules! secp_call {
338 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
341 Err(_) => return Err($err),
348 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
350 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
351 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
356 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
357 pub struct ChannelDetails {
358 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
359 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
360 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
361 /// lifetime of the channel.
362 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
363 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
364 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
365 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
366 /// The node_id of our counterparty
367 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
368 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
369 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
370 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
374 impl ChannelManager {
375 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
377 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
378 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
380 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
381 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
383 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
384 pub fn new(fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
385 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
387 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
388 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
389 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
390 monitor: monitor.clone(),
394 announce_channels_publicly,
395 fee_proportional_millionths,
396 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
399 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
400 by_id: HashMap::new(),
401 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
402 next_forward: Instant::now(),
403 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
404 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
405 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
407 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
409 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
415 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
416 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
420 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
422 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
423 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
424 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
425 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
427 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
428 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
430 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
431 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
432 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
433 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
434 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
435 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
436 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
437 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
438 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
440 panic!("RNG is bad???");
443 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
445 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
446 node_id: their_network_key,
452 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
453 /// more information.
454 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
455 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
456 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
457 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
458 res.push(ChannelDetails {
459 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
460 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
461 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
462 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
463 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
469 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
470 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
471 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
472 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
473 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
474 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
475 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
476 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
477 // really wanted anyway.
478 if channel.is_live() {
479 res.push(ChannelDetails {
480 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
481 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
482 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
483 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
484 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
491 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
492 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
493 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
495 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
496 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
497 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
498 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
499 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
500 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
501 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
502 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
503 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
504 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
507 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
508 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
509 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
511 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
512 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
514 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
517 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
518 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
519 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
521 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
522 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
527 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
528 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
529 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
538 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
539 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
540 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
541 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
542 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
544 for tx in local_txn {
545 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
547 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
548 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
549 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
550 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
551 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
552 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
553 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
556 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
557 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
558 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
560 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
561 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
562 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
563 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
564 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
571 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
572 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
573 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
574 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
580 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
581 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
582 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
583 for chan in self.list_channels() {
584 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
588 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
590 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
592 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
593 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
594 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
595 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
599 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
600 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
601 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
602 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
603 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
608 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
609 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
610 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
616 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
618 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
619 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
620 let mut res = [0; 32];
621 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
625 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
626 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
627 let mut res = [0; 32];
628 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
634 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
635 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
636 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
637 let mut res = [0; 32];
638 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
643 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
644 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
645 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
646 let mut res = [0; 32];
647 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
651 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
653 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
654 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
655 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
657 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
658 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
660 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
661 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
662 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
663 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
664 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
666 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
668 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
669 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
671 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
677 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
678 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
679 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
681 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
682 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
688 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
698 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
699 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
700 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
701 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
702 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
703 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
704 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
705 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
707 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
708 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
709 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
710 // the intended recipient).
711 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
712 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
713 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
715 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
716 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
717 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
718 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
722 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
723 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
724 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
726 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
727 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
728 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
730 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
732 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
736 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
738 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
746 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
747 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
749 for i in 0..dst.len() {
754 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
755 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
756 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
757 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
760 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
761 let end_len = iters * 65;
762 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
763 res.resize(end_len, 0);
765 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
766 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
767 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
768 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
769 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
774 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
775 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
777 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
778 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
779 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
780 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
782 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
783 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
784 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
787 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
790 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
791 hmac.input(&packet_data);
792 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
793 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
798 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
799 hop_data: packet_data,
804 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
805 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
806 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
807 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
809 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
810 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
811 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
812 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
813 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
814 data: packet_crypted,
818 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
819 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
821 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
824 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
825 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
826 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
827 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
831 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
832 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
835 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
837 failuremsg: failuremsg,
841 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
842 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
843 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
849 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
850 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
851 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
854 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
855 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
858 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
859 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
860 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
861 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
867 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
868 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
869 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
870 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
871 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
872 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
873 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
874 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
877 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
878 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
880 let mut channel_state = None;
881 macro_rules! return_err {
882 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
884 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
885 if channel_state.is_none() {
886 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
888 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
889 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
890 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
891 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
892 })), channel_state.unwrap());
897 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
898 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
899 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
900 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
901 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
902 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
903 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
904 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
907 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
908 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
909 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
910 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
911 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
914 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
915 let next_hop_data = {
916 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
917 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
918 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
920 let error_code = match err {
921 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
922 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
924 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
930 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
932 // final_expiry_too_soon
933 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
934 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
936 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
937 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
938 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
940 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
941 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
942 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
945 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
946 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
947 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
948 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
950 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
952 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
954 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
955 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
956 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
959 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
960 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
961 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
963 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
965 let blinding_factor = {
966 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
967 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
968 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
969 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
970 sha.result(&mut res);
971 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
973 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
979 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
980 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
983 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
985 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
986 hop_data: new_packet_data,
987 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
990 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
991 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
992 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
993 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
994 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
995 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
996 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1000 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1001 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1002 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1003 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1004 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1005 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1006 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1008 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1010 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1011 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1013 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1014 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1015 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1016 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1017 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1018 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1019 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1021 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1022 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1024 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1025 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1026 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1028 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1029 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1031 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1032 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1033 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1034 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1036 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1037 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1042 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1043 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1044 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1046 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1047 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1049 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1050 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1052 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1057 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1060 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1061 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1062 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1063 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1064 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1068 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1070 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1071 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1072 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1073 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1074 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1075 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1076 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1077 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1078 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1079 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1082 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1083 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1085 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1091 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1093 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1094 /// fields for more info.
1096 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1097 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1098 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1099 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1100 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1101 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1103 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1105 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1106 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1107 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1108 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1109 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1111 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1112 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1113 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1114 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1118 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1119 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1120 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1122 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1124 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1126 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1127 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1128 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1129 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1131 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1133 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1134 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1135 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1139 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1140 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1141 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1143 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1144 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1146 if !chan.is_live() {
1147 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1149 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1150 route: route.clone(),
1151 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1152 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1153 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1156 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1157 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1158 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1159 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1162 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1163 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1164 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1165 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1166 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1167 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1168 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1180 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1182 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1184 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1185 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1186 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1187 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1188 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1189 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1191 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1192 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1193 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1196 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1197 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1198 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1208 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1209 // lock before add_update_monitor
1210 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1214 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1215 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1216 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1219 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1220 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1221 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1223 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1229 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1230 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1232 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1234 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1236 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1237 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1239 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1240 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1241 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1242 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1243 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1247 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1249 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1250 /// Will likely generate further events.
1251 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1252 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1253 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1255 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1256 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1258 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1262 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1263 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1264 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1265 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1267 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1268 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1269 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1270 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1271 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1272 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1274 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1279 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1281 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1282 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1283 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1284 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1285 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1286 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1288 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1290 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1291 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1296 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1298 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1299 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1300 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1301 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1302 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1303 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1304 // this channel currently :/.
1311 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1312 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1315 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1316 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1318 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1320 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1324 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1325 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1327 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1328 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1329 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1330 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1331 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1332 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1333 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1335 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1340 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1341 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1342 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1343 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1344 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1346 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1347 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1348 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1350 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1351 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1352 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1359 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1361 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1362 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1366 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1367 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1368 events.append(&mut new_events);
1371 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1372 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1373 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1374 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1375 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1376 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1377 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1378 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1384 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1385 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1386 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1387 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1388 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1389 /// still-available channels.
1390 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1392 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1393 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1394 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1395 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1396 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1397 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1398 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1403 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1404 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1405 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1408 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1411 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1412 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1413 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1414 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1415 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1417 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1418 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1422 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1424 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1425 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1429 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1430 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1431 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1432 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1435 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1436 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1437 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1438 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1439 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1440 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1441 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1443 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1449 //TODO: Do something with e?
1457 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1458 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1459 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1461 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1462 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1463 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1464 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1465 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1466 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1468 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1469 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1470 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1471 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1472 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1473 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1478 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1480 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1481 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1482 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1483 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1487 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1488 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1489 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1491 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1492 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1494 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1495 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1501 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1502 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1503 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1504 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1505 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1506 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1509 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1510 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1511 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1512 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1513 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1514 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1515 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1516 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1524 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1525 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1526 //TODO: Do something with e?
1534 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1535 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1536 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1539 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1540 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1542 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1543 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1544 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1545 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1548 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1549 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1550 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1551 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1552 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1553 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1554 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1555 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1557 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1558 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1559 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1561 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1562 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1563 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1569 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1572 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1573 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1574 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1576 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1578 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1579 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1580 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1581 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1586 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1587 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1588 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1589 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1590 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1595 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1599 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1610 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1611 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1613 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1615 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1616 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1620 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1621 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1622 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1624 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1625 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1626 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1629 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1630 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1631 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1632 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1636 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1637 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1638 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1639 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1641 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1642 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1643 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1645 chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1646 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1647 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1649 //TODO: same as above
1650 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1653 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1654 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1655 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1656 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1657 output_script: output_script,
1658 user_channel_id: user_id,
1663 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1664 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1665 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1666 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1667 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1668 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1669 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1670 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1672 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1673 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1674 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1677 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1681 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1684 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1685 // lock before add_update_monitor
1686 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1689 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1690 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1691 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1692 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1694 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1701 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1702 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1703 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1704 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1706 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1707 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1708 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1710 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1711 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1714 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1716 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1719 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1720 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1721 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1722 user_channel_id: user_id,
1727 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1728 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1729 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1731 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1732 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1733 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1735 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1736 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1737 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1739 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1743 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1744 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1745 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1746 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1748 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1749 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1750 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1751 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1752 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1754 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1755 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1756 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1757 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1759 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1760 } else { (res, None) }
1762 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1765 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1766 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1767 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1769 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1770 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1771 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1772 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1780 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1781 let (res, chan_option) = {
1782 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1783 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1784 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1785 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1786 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1787 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1788 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1790 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1791 if res.1.is_some() {
1792 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1793 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1794 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1795 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1796 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1797 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1798 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1800 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1801 } else { (res, None) }
1803 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1806 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1807 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1809 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1810 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1811 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1812 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1820 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1821 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1822 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1823 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1825 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1826 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1827 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1828 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1830 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1831 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1833 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1835 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1836 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1837 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1839 if !chan.is_usable() {
1840 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1842 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1844 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1848 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1849 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1850 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1852 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1853 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1854 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1856 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1857 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1859 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1861 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1865 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
1866 // indicating that the payment itself failed
1867 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
1868 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
1869 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
1870 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
1871 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
1873 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
1874 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
1878 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
1879 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
1880 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
1883 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
1885 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1886 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1887 if res.is_some() { return; }
1889 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
1890 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
1891 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
1893 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1895 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1896 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1897 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1898 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1899 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1901 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
1903 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1904 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1905 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1906 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1907 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1908 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1910 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1911 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
1912 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
1913 // definitely came from the peer in question
1914 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
1916 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
1918 match error_code & 0xff {
1920 // either from an intermediate or final node
1921 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
1922 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
1923 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
1924 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
1925 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1926 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1927 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
1928 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
1929 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
1930 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
1931 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
1937 if is_from_final_node {
1938 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
1939 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
1940 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
1941 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
1942 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1943 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
1946 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1947 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
1951 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
1952 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
1953 // does not coform to the spec.
1954 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
1955 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1956 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1962 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
1966 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
1968 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
1969 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1970 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
1974 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
1975 let offset = match error_code {
1976 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
1977 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
1978 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
1979 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1980 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
1981 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
1983 // node sending unknown code
1984 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1985 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1992 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
1993 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
1994 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
1995 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
1996 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
1997 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
1998 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
1999 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2002 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2003 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2004 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2005 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2007 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2008 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2009 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2010 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2011 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2013 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2014 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2015 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2016 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2018 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2019 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2020 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2021 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2023 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2024 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2027 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2028 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2032 res = Some((msg, true));
2038 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2041 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2042 res = Some((None, true));
2046 // node sending unknown code
2047 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2048 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2057 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2058 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2059 } else { ((None, true)) }
2062 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2063 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2064 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2066 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2067 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2068 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2070 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2071 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2073 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2078 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2079 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2080 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2082 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2083 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2084 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2086 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
2087 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
2089 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2090 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2093 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2097 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2098 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = {
2099 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2100 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2102 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2103 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2104 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2106 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2107 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2110 (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed)
2112 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2115 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
2119 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2120 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2121 let mut forward_event = None;
2122 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2123 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2124 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2125 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2126 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2128 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2129 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2130 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2131 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2133 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2134 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2139 match forward_event {
2141 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2142 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2143 time_forwardable: time
2151 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2152 let ((res, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures), short_channel_id) = {
2153 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2154 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2156 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2157 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2158 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2160 let (res, pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2161 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2164 ((res, pending_forwards, pending_failures), chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2166 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2169 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2170 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2172 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2177 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2178 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2179 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2181 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2182 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2183 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2185 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2187 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2191 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2192 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2193 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2195 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2197 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2198 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2200 if !chan.is_usable() {
2201 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2204 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2205 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2206 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2208 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2209 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2210 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2211 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2212 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2214 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2216 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2217 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2218 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2219 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2220 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2221 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2222 contents: announcement,
2224 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2227 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2232 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2234 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2235 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2237 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2238 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2240 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2241 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2242 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2243 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2247 Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order))
2249 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2256 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2257 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2258 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2259 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2261 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2262 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2263 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2265 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2266 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2268 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2269 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2271 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2272 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2274 if !chan.is_live() {
2275 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2277 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2278 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2281 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2282 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2283 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2284 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2285 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2286 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2287 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2288 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2299 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2300 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2301 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2302 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2303 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2308 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2309 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2310 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2311 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2312 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2317 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2318 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2319 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2321 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2322 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2323 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2324 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2325 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2326 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2327 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2328 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
2329 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2330 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2331 msg: funding_locked,
2332 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2334 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2335 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2336 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2337 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2340 if channel.is_shutdown() {
2344 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2345 for tx in txn_matched {
2346 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2347 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2348 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2349 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2351 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2352 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2353 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2354 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2355 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2356 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2365 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2366 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2367 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2369 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2370 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2371 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2372 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2373 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2374 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2375 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2384 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2385 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2387 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2390 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2391 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2392 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2394 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2395 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2396 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2397 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2398 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2399 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2400 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2401 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2403 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2404 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2405 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2415 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2416 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2418 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2422 macro_rules! handle_error {
2423 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2426 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2427 if needs_channel_force_close {
2429 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2430 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2431 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2433 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2436 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2437 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2438 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2439 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2440 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2442 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2454 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2455 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2456 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2457 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2460 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2461 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2464 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2465 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2468 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2469 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2472 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2473 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2476 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2477 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2480 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2481 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2484 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2485 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2488 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2489 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2492 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2493 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2496 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2497 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2500 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2501 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2504 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2505 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2508 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2509 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2512 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2513 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2516 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), HandleError> {
2517 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2520 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2521 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2522 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2524 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2525 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2526 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2527 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2528 if no_connection_possible {
2529 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2530 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2531 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2532 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2534 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2535 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2536 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2546 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2547 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2548 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2549 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2550 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2551 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2552 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2554 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2555 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2556 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2565 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2566 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2568 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2569 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2570 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2575 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2576 let mut res = Vec::new();
2577 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2578 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2579 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2580 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2581 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2582 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2583 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2587 res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2592 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2596 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2597 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2598 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2599 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2600 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2604 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2611 use chain::chaininterface;
2612 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2613 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2614 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
2615 use chain::keysinterface;
2616 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason};
2617 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
2618 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2620 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2621 use util::test_utils;
2622 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
2623 use util::errors::APIError;
2624 use util::logger::Logger;
2625 use util::ser::Writeable;
2627 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2628 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2629 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2630 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2631 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2632 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2633 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2637 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2638 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2640 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2641 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2643 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2645 use std::cell::RefCell;
2646 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2647 use std::default::Default;
2649 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2650 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
2651 use std::time::Instant;
2654 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2655 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2656 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2661 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2662 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2665 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2666 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2669 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2670 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2673 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2674 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2677 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2678 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2683 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2685 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2686 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2691 fn onion_vectors() {
2692 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2693 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2695 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2696 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2697 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2698 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2699 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2701 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2702 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2703 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2704 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2705 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2707 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2708 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2709 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2710 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2711 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2713 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2714 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2715 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2716 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2717 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2719 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2720 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2721 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2722 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2723 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2725 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2726 let payloads = vec!(
2727 msgs::OnionHopData {
2729 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2730 short_channel_id: 0,
2732 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2736 msgs::OnionHopData {
2738 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2739 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2740 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2741 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2745 msgs::OnionHopData {
2747 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2748 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2749 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2750 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2754 msgs::OnionHopData {
2756 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2757 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2758 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2759 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2763 msgs::OnionHopData {
2765 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2766 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2767 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2768 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2774 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2775 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2777 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2781 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2782 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2784 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2785 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2786 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2788 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2789 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2791 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2792 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2794 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2795 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2797 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2798 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2800 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2801 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2804 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2805 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2806 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2807 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2809 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2810 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2815 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2816 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2817 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2818 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2820 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2821 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2823 impl Drop for Node {
2824 fn drop(&mut self) {
2825 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2826 // Check that we processed all pending events
2827 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
2828 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2829 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2834 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2835 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2838 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2839 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2840 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
2841 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
2844 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
2845 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
2847 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2848 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2849 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2850 MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2851 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2852 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2854 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2857 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2859 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2863 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2864 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2866 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2867 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
2868 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2870 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2871 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2873 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2875 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2876 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2877 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2878 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2879 added_monitors.clear();
2881 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2884 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2885 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2886 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2887 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2888 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2889 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2890 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2891 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2892 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2893 added_monitors.clear();
2896 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2899 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2901 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2902 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2903 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2904 added_monitors.clear();
2907 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2908 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2910 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2911 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2912 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2914 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2920 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
2921 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2922 let events_5 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2923 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2925 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2926 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2927 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2928 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2930 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2935 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2936 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2937 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2938 (match events_6[0] {
2939 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2940 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2941 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2942 (msg.clone(), announcement_sigs.clone().unwrap())
2944 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2948 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2949 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2950 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
2954 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2955 let bs_announcement_sigs = {
2956 let bs_announcement_sigs = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap().unwrap();
2957 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
2958 bs_announcement_sigs
2961 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2962 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2963 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
2964 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2967 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2970 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2971 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2972 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2973 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
2974 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2975 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2981 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2983 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
2986 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2987 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
2990 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2991 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
2993 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2994 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2995 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2997 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3000 macro_rules! check_spends {
3001 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3003 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3004 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3005 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3006 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3011 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3012 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3013 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3016 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3017 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3018 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3019 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
3020 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3021 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
3024 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3027 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
3028 if !close_inbound_first {
3029 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
3031 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3032 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
3033 if close_inbound_first {
3034 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
3035 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3036 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3037 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3039 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3040 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
3041 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3042 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3044 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3045 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3046 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3048 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3049 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
3050 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3051 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3053 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3054 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3056 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3057 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3058 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
3059 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3062 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3065 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3066 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3067 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
3068 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3071 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3074 (as_update, bs_update)
3079 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3080 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3083 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3084 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3085 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3086 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3087 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3088 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3091 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3093 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3094 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3099 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3100 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3102 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3103 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3104 added_monitors.clear();
3109 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3110 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3112 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3113 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3114 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3115 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3116 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3117 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3118 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
3119 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
3120 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3121 if $fail_backwards {
3122 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3123 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3125 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3127 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3128 if $fail_backwards {
3129 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3130 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3132 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3134 added_monitors.clear();
3140 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3143 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3144 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3145 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3146 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3147 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3148 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3149 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3154 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3155 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3157 let mut payment_event = {
3158 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3159 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3161 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3162 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3163 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3165 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3167 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3168 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3170 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3171 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3172 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3174 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3175 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3177 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3178 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3181 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3182 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3184 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3185 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3186 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3188 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3189 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3190 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3192 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3195 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3196 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3197 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3198 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3199 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3205 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3208 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3209 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3210 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3212 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3213 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
3214 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3216 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3218 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3220 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3222 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3227 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3228 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3229 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3230 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3231 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3232 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
3235 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3236 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3237 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3239 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3240 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3241 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3242 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3243 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3244 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3245 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3246 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3248 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3251 assert!(events.is_empty());
3253 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3254 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3261 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3262 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3263 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3265 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3266 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3268 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3273 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3274 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3277 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3279 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3280 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3281 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3282 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3283 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3286 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3289 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3290 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3291 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3292 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3293 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3296 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3298 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3300 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3301 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3305 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3306 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3307 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3310 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3311 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
3312 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3314 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3315 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3316 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3318 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3319 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3324 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3325 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3326 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3327 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3328 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3329 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3330 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3331 // second-to-last node!
3332 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3335 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3336 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3337 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3339 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3340 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3341 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3342 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3343 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3344 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3345 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3346 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3351 assert!(events.is_empty());
3353 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3354 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3361 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3363 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3364 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3366 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
3367 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3368 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3370 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3375 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3376 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3379 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3380 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3381 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3382 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3383 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3385 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3386 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3388 for _ in 0..node_count {
3389 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3390 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3391 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3392 let mut seed = [0; 32];
3393 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
3394 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3395 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3396 let node = ChannelManager::new(0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone()).unwrap();
3397 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3398 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3399 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3400 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3408 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3409 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3410 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3411 let channel_id = chan.2;
3413 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3415 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3416 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3422 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3426 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
3427 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3428 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3429 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3430 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3431 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
3432 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
3433 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
3434 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
3435 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3437 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3439 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
3441 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3442 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3445 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3446 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3447 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3448 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3449 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3451 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3454 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3456 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3457 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3458 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3461 let payment_event = {
3462 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3463 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3464 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3466 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3467 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3469 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3470 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3471 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3472 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3475 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3476 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3477 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3480 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3481 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3482 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3483 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3484 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3485 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3488 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3489 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3490 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3491 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3492 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3493 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3496 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3497 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3500 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3501 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3504 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3507 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3508 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3510 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3511 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3514 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3519 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3520 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3521 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3522 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3523 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3524 let channel_id = chan.2;
3526 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3528 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3529 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3535 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3537 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3538 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3541 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3542 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3543 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3544 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3547 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3550 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3552 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3553 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3554 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3557 let payment_event = {
3558 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3559 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3560 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3562 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3563 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3565 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3566 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3567 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3568 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3571 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3574 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3578 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3579 let nodes = create_network(2);
3580 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3581 let channel_id = chan.2;
3583 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3585 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3586 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3592 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3593 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3594 // update_fee (never committed) ->
3595 // (3) update_fee ->
3596 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3597 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3598 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3599 // <- (1) RAA delivered
3600 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
3601 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3602 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3603 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3604 // revoke_and_ack ->
3605 // B should send no response here
3606 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
3607 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3608 // revoke_and_ack ->
3610 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3611 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3612 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3615 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3616 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3617 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3618 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3619 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3621 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3624 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3625 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3626 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3629 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3631 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3632 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3633 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3635 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3636 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3637 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3638 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3641 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3643 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3645 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3647 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3648 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3650 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3651 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3652 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3653 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3654 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3655 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3656 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3658 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3659 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3661 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3663 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3667 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3670 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3673 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3674 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3677 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3682 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3683 let nodes = create_network(2);
3684 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3685 let channel_id = chan.2;
3687 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3689 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3690 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3695 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3696 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3698 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3699 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3700 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3701 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3702 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3704 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3706 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3708 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3709 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3713 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3714 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3717 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3718 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3721 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3722 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3727 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3728 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3729 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3730 let channel_id = chan.2;
3732 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3734 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3735 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3741 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3743 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3744 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3746 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3747 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3748 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3749 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3750 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3752 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3754 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3756 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3757 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3760 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3762 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3764 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3765 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3767 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3768 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3769 added_monitors.clear();
3771 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3772 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3773 // node[1] has nothing to do
3775 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3776 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3777 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3779 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3780 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3782 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3783 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3785 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3786 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3787 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3788 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3789 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3790 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3792 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3793 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3796 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3797 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3799 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3801 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3803 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3804 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3806 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3808 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3809 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3811 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3812 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3814 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3815 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3817 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3818 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3820 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3821 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3824 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3826 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3827 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3828 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3832 fn test_update_fee() {
3833 let nodes = create_network(2);
3834 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3835 let channel_id = chan.2;
3837 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3839 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3840 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3846 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3847 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3848 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
3849 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3850 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3851 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3852 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
3853 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3854 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
3855 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3856 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3857 // revoke_and_ack ->
3859 // Create and deliver (1)...
3860 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3861 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3863 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3864 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3865 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3866 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3867 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3869 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3871 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3873 // Generate (2) and (3):
3874 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3875 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3877 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3880 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3881 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3884 // Create and deliver (4)...
3885 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3886 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3887 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3888 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3889 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3890 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3892 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3894 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3896 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3898 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3902 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3903 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3904 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3908 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3909 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3912 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3913 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3914 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3918 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3919 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3921 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3922 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3925 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3926 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3927 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3931 fn fake_network_test() {
3932 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3933 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3934 let nodes = create_network(4);
3936 // Create some initial channels
3937 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3938 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3939 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3941 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3942 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3943 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3944 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3945 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3947 // Send some more payments
3948 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3949 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3950 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3952 // Test failure packets
3953 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3954 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3956 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3957 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3959 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3960 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3961 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3962 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3963 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3964 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3965 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3967 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3968 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3969 hops.push(RouteHop {
3970 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3971 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3973 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3975 hops.push(RouteHop {
3976 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3977 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3979 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3981 hops.push(RouteHop {
3982 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3983 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3985 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3987 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3988 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3989 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3991 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3992 hops.push(RouteHop {
3993 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3994 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3996 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3998 hops.push(RouteHop {
3999 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4000 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4002 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4004 hops.push(RouteHop {
4005 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4006 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4008 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4010 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4011 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4012 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
4014 // Claim the rebalances...
4015 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
4016 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4018 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
4019 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4021 // Send some payments across both channels
4022 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4023 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4024 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4026 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
4028 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
4030 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4031 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
4032 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
4034 // Close down the channels...
4035 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
4036 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
4037 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
4038 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
4039 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
4043 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
4044 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
4045 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
4046 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
4048 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
4049 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
4050 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4051 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4052 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4053 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4055 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
4057 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4058 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4060 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4061 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4063 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
4064 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
4065 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
4068 #[derive(PartialEq)]
4069 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
4070 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
4072 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
4073 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
4074 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
4076 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
4077 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
4079 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
4081 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4082 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4083 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
4085 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
4086 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4087 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
4088 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
4089 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
4090 res.push(tx.clone());
4095 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
4096 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
4099 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
4101 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
4102 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4103 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
4104 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
4105 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
4106 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
4108 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
4110 res.push(tx.clone());
4114 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
4117 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4121 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
4122 /// HTLC transaction.
4123 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
4124 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4125 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4126 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4127 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
4128 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
4132 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4135 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4136 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4138 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
4139 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4140 let mut found_prev = false;
4142 for tx in prev_txn {
4143 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
4144 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
4145 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
4146 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
4152 assert!(found_prev);
4154 let mut res = Vec::new();
4155 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
4159 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
4160 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4161 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4162 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
4163 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4166 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4169 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4170 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4171 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
4172 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4175 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4179 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4180 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4184 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
4186 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4187 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4189 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4190 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4192 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4193 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4198 fn channel_reserve_test() {
4200 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
4201 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
4203 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
4204 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
4205 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4206 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
4207 chan.get_value_stat()
4211 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4212 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
4213 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
4215 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4216 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4218 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
4219 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4221 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
4222 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
4223 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4224 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4225 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
4229 macro_rules! expect_forward {
4231 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4232 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4233 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4234 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
4239 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
4240 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
4241 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4242 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4244 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4245 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4246 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
4248 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4253 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4254 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4256 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4258 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4260 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4261 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4262 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4264 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4265 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4269 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4270 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4271 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4273 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4274 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4277 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4280 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4281 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4282 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4283 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4284 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4287 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4288 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4289 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4290 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4291 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4295 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4296 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4297 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4298 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4300 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4301 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4305 // adding pending output
4306 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4307 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4309 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4310 let payment_event_1 = {
4311 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4314 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4315 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4316 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4318 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4320 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4321 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4323 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4324 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4325 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4326 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4331 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4332 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4334 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4335 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4336 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4337 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4338 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4340 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4342 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4343 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4344 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4345 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4346 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4347 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4349 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4350 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4351 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4352 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4355 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4357 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4361 // split the rest to test holding cell
4362 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4363 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4365 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4366 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4369 // now see if they go through on both sides
4370 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4371 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4372 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4374 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4375 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4377 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4379 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4380 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4381 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4382 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4386 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4387 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4388 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4390 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4391 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4393 // flush the pending htlc
4394 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4397 let commitment_update_2 = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
4398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4399 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4400 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
4401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4402 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4405 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4407 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4408 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4409 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4411 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4412 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4414 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4415 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4416 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4417 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4418 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4419 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4421 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4422 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4423 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4424 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4426 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4427 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4429 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4430 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4432 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4433 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4434 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4436 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4439 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4440 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4441 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4443 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4446 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4447 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4448 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4450 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4451 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4452 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4453 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4455 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4456 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4460 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4461 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4462 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4463 let nodes = create_network(5);
4465 // Create some initial channels
4466 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4467 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4468 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4469 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4471 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4472 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4473 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4474 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4475 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4477 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4478 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4480 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4481 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4482 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4483 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4485 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4486 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4487 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4489 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4490 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4492 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4493 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4495 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4496 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4497 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4498 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4500 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4501 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4502 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4504 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4505 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4507 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4508 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4510 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4511 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4513 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4514 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4515 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4516 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4518 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4524 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4525 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4526 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4528 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4530 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4531 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4533 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4534 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4536 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4538 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4539 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4540 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4542 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
4543 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4544 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
4547 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4548 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4549 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4550 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4551 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
4555 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4556 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4557 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
4558 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4559 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4562 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4564 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4565 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4567 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4568 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4569 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
4570 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4571 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4574 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4576 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4577 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4579 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4581 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4582 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4583 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4585 // Create some new channels:
4586 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4588 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4589 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4590 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4591 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4592 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4593 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4594 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4595 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4596 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4597 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4598 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4599 // Revoke the old state
4600 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4603 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4604 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4606 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4607 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4608 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4609 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4611 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4612 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4614 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4616 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4617 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4618 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4619 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4620 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4622 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4623 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4624 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4628 fn revoked_output_claim() {
4629 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4630 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4631 let nodes = create_network(2);
4632 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4633 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4634 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4635 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4636 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4637 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4638 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4639 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4641 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4642 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4643 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4644 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4645 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4647 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4649 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4650 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4652 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4653 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4654 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4658 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4659 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4660 let nodes = create_network(2);
4662 // Create some new channel:
4663 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4665 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4666 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4667 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4668 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4669 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4671 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4672 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4673 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4674 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4675 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4676 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4677 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4678 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4679 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4681 //Revoke the old state
4682 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4685 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4687 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4689 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4690 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4691 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4693 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4694 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4696 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4698 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4699 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4700 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4701 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4702 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4703 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4704 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4705 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4707 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4708 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4709 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4711 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4712 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4713 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4714 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4715 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4716 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4718 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4719 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4720 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4724 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4725 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4726 let nodes = create_network(2);
4728 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4730 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4731 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4732 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4733 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4734 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4735 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4737 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4738 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4740 //Revoke the old state
4741 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4744 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4746 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4748 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4749 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4750 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4752 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4753 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4754 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4755 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4756 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4757 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4758 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4760 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4761 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4762 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4764 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4765 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4766 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4767 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4768 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4770 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4771 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4772 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4773 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4774 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4775 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4776 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4777 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4779 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4780 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4782 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4783 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4784 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4785 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4786 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4787 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4789 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4790 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4791 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4795 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4796 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4797 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4798 let nodes = create_network(2);
4799 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4801 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4802 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4804 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4805 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4807 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4808 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4810 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4814 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4815 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4817 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4818 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4821 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4822 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4824 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4825 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4827 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4831 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4832 // registering new transactions
4833 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4837 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4838 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4839 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4840 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4841 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4843 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4845 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4847 let mut payment_event = {
4848 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4851 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4852 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4853 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4856 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4857 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4859 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4860 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4862 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4863 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4866 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4867 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4869 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4870 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4871 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4872 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4875 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4876 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4877 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4879 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4880 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4881 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4883 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4884 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4885 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4887 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4888 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4890 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4894 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4895 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4896 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4897 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4898 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4902 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4903 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4905 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4906 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4907 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4909 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4910 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4912 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4915 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4917 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4918 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4919 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4921 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4922 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4923 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4924 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4925 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4926 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4927 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4929 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
4933 fn test_unconf_chan() {
4934 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
4935 let nodes = create_network(2);
4936 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4938 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4939 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
4940 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
4941 mem::drop(channel_state);
4943 let mut headers = Vec::new();
4944 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4945 headers.push(header.clone());
4947 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4948 headers.push(header.clone());
4950 while !headers.is_empty() {
4951 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
4954 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4955 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4957 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4958 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4960 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4963 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4964 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
4965 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
4968 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
4969 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
4970 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
4971 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4972 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4974 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
4975 for msg in reestablish_1 {
4976 resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4978 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4979 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4981 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
4984 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
4985 for msg in reestablish_2 {
4986 resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4988 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4989 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4991 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4994 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
4995 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
4996 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
4998 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
5000 let a = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap());
5001 let _announcement_sigs_opt = a.unwrap();
5002 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
5004 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5007 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5008 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
5009 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5011 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5013 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5014 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5015 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5016 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
5018 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5020 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5021 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5022 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5023 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5024 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5026 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5027 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5029 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5030 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5033 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5034 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5036 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5037 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5038 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5039 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5040 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5043 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5047 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
5049 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5050 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
5052 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5055 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5056 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
5057 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5059 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5061 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5062 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5063 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5064 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
5066 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5067 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5068 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5069 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5070 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5072 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5073 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5075 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5076 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5079 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5080 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5082 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5083 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5084 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5085 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5086 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5089 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5095 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
5096 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
5097 let nodes = create_network(3);
5098 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5099 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5101 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5102 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5103 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5105 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5106 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5107 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
5108 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
5110 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5111 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5112 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5114 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5115 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5116 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5117 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5119 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5120 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5122 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
5123 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
5125 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
5127 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5128 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5130 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
5131 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
5133 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5136 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
5137 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
5138 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
5140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5144 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
5145 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
5148 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
5149 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
5150 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5151 if messages_delivered == 0 {
5152 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5153 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
5155 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5158 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5159 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5161 let payment_event = {
5162 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5165 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5166 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5167 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5169 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
5171 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5172 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
5174 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5175 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5178 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5179 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5182 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5183 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5184 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5187 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5188 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5195 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5196 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5197 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5198 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
5199 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
5200 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5201 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5202 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5203 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5204 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5205 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5206 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5207 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5208 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5209 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5210 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5211 // Everything was delivered...
5212 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5215 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5216 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5218 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5222 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5223 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5224 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5226 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5227 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5229 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5230 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5232 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5233 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5234 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5239 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5242 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5243 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5244 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
5245 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5246 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5247 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5248 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5249 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5250 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5251 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5252 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5254 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5257 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
5258 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
5260 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5261 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5263 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5264 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5266 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5269 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
5270 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
5271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5273 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5274 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5277 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5278 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5279 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5282 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5283 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5291 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5292 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5293 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5294 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5295 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
5296 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
5297 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5298 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5300 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5301 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5306 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5307 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5308 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5309 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5310 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5311 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5312 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5313 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5314 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5315 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5316 // Everything was delivered...
5317 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5320 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5321 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5322 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5324 // Channel should still work fine...
5325 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
5326 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5330 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
5331 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
5332 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
5333 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
5337 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
5338 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
5339 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
5340 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
5344 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
5345 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
5346 let nodes = create_network(2);
5347 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5349 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5350 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5352 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5353 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5354 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5356 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5357 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5358 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5360 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5363 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5364 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5365 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5367 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5368 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5369 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5371 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5374 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5375 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5376 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5377 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5379 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
5380 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
5382 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5383 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5384 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
5388 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
5389 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
5390 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
5391 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5392 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5394 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5396 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5397 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5398 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5400 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
5401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5403 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5404 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5406 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5407 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5410 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5413 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5414 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5416 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5417 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5418 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5419 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5420 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5421 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5422 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5424 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5425 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5426 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5428 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5429 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5431 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5434 let (_, commitment_update) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
5435 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
5436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5438 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5441 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5442 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5444 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5445 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5446 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5447 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5449 let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5450 let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5452 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5453 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5455 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5456 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5458 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5460 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5461 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5462 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5463 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5464 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5465 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5466 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5467 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5470 let bs_second_commitment_signed = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap().unwrap();
5471 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5472 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5473 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5474 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5475 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5478 let as_commitment_signed = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5479 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5480 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5481 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5482 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5483 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5486 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5487 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
5488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5490 let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5491 assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none());
5492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5494 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5497 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5498 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5500 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5501 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5504 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5505 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5507 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5508 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5510 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
5511 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5513 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5516 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5519 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5523 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
5524 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
5525 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5526 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5528 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5529 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5531 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5532 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5535 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5536 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5538 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5539 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5542 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5543 // PaymentFailed event
5545 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5548 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
5549 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
5550 // a disconnect in between
5551 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5552 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5554 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5555 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5557 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5558 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5561 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5562 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5563 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5566 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5567 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5568 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5571 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
5572 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5575 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5576 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5577 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
5578 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5579 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5580 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5582 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5584 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5585 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5587 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5588 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5589 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5591 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5594 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
5596 // Now set it to failed again...
5597 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5598 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5599 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
5600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5602 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5603 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5604 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5607 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5608 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5609 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5612 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
5613 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5614 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5617 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5618 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5620 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5621 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5624 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5625 // PaymentFailed event
5627 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5631 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
5632 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
5633 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
5636 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
5637 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
5639 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
5640 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
5641 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
5642 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
5643 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
5644 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
5645 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
5646 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
5647 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
5648 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
5649 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
5650 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
5651 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
5652 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
5653 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
5654 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
5655 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
5656 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5657 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5659 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5661 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5662 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5663 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5665 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5666 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
5667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5669 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5670 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5671 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5673 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
5674 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
5675 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5677 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5678 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5679 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
5680 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5681 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5682 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5683 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5684 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5685 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5686 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5688 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5689 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5690 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5691 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5693 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5694 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5696 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5699 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
5700 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
5701 } else { panic!(); }
5704 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
5706 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5709 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
5710 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5711 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5714 // Now fix monitor updating...
5715 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
5716 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5719 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
5720 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5721 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5723 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5724 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5725 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5726 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5728 let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5729 let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5731 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5732 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5734 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
5737 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
5738 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5739 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5741 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5742 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5743 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5744 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5746 let mut as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5747 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5748 let mut bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5751 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5752 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5754 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5755 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5756 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5758 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
5759 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
5760 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5762 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5763 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5764 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5765 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5766 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
5767 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
5769 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5771 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5772 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5773 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5775 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5776 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5778 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5781 let (as_resp_raa, as_resp_cu) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5782 assert!(as_resp_cu.is_none());
5783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5785 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
5789 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
5790 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5792 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5793 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
5794 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
5796 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
5797 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
5800 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
5802 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5803 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
5804 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
5805 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5806 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5809 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5813 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5815 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5816 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5817 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still
5818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5820 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
5821 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5823 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
5824 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
5826 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
5827 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5830 let as_commitment_update;
5831 let bs_second_commitment_update;
5833 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
5834 as_commitment_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5835 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5836 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5837 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5838 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5839 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
5840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5843 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
5844 bs_second_commitment_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5845 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5846 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5847 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5848 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5849 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
5850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5853 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
5856 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
5857 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5859 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
5860 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5862 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5863 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5865 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5868 handle_initial_raa!();
5870 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
5871 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5873 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5874 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5876 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5877 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5880 handle_initial_raa!();
5882 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
5883 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5885 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5886 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
5888 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
5889 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5891 assert!(bs_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5896 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
5897 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5899 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5900 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5902 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5903 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5907 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5908 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5911 let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5912 assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none());
5913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5915 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5918 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5921 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5923 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5924 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5926 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5927 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5928 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5930 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5933 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5937 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
5938 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
5939 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
5940 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
5941 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
5942 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
5943 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
5947 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
5948 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
5949 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
5950 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
5951 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
5955 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
5956 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
5957 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
5958 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
5959 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
5960 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
5964 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
5965 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
5966 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5967 let nodes = create_network(2);
5969 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
5971 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5972 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5973 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5974 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5976 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
5978 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5979 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5981 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5982 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5984 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
5986 let mut chan_announcement;
5988 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
5990 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5991 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
5992 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
5993 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5994 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
5995 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
5996 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
5997 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
5998 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6003 macro_rules! sign_msg {
6004 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
6005 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
6006 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6007 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6008 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
6009 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
6010 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6011 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
6012 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
6013 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
6014 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
6015 contents: $unsigned_msg
6020 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6021 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6022 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
6023 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6025 // Configured with Network::Testnet
6026 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6027 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
6028 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6029 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6031 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6032 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
6033 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6034 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());