1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
7 use bitcoin::util::uint::Uint256;
9 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
10 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
11 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
14 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
15 use ln::channel::Channel;
16 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
17 use ln::router::Route;
19 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable};
20 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
21 use util::sha2::Sha256;
23 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
24 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
25 use crypto::digest::Digest;
26 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
27 use crypto::chacha20::ChaCha20;
29 use std::sync::{Mutex,Arc};
30 use std::collections::HashMap;
31 use std::collections::hash_map;
34 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
36 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
37 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
38 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
39 payment_hash: [u8; 32],
40 short_channel_id: u64,
41 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
43 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
45 //TODO: This is public, and needed to call Channel::update_add_htlc, so there needs to be a way to
46 //initialize it usefully...probably make it optional in Channel instead).
47 impl PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
48 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
51 payment_hash: [0; 32],
53 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
55 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
60 enum PendingOutboundHTLC {
62 source_short_channel_id: u64,
63 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
68 /// Used for channel rebalancing
70 source_short_channel_id: u64,
71 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
76 enum HTLCFailReason<'a> {
78 err: &'a msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
85 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
86 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
87 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
88 /// probably increase this significantly.
89 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
91 struct ChannelHolder {
92 by_id: HashMap<Uint256, Channel>,
93 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, Uint256>,
94 next_forward: Instant,
95 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
96 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
97 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
99 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
100 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<Uint256, Channel>,
101 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Uint256>,
102 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
103 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
104 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
105 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
108 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
110 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
111 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
112 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
113 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
114 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
115 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
120 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
121 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
122 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
123 /// to individual Channels.
124 pub struct ChannelManager {
125 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
126 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
127 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
128 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
130 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
131 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
134 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
135 our_network_key: SecretKey,
137 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
140 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
142 macro_rules! secp_call {
146 //TODO: Make the err a parameter!
147 Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Key error", msg: None})
154 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
156 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
157 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
162 impl ChannelManager {
163 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
164 /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
165 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
166 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
167 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= (1 << 24)!
168 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
169 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
171 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
172 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
173 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
174 monitor: monitor.clone(),
175 chain_monitor: chain_monitor,
177 announce_channels_publicly: announce_channels_publicly,
178 fee_proportional_millionths: fee_proportional_millionths,
181 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
182 by_id: HashMap::new(),
183 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
184 next_forward: Instant::now(),
185 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
186 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
188 our_network_key: our_network_key,
190 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
192 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
193 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
197 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, HandleError> {
198 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id);
199 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?;
200 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
201 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
202 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
208 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
210 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
211 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
212 let mut res = [0; 32];
213 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
217 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
218 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
219 let mut res = [0; 32];
220 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
226 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
227 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
228 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
229 let mut res = [0; 32];
230 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
234 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
235 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
236 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
237 let mut res = [0; 32];
238 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
242 fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, HandleError> {
243 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
244 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
245 let mut blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
246 let mut first_iteration = true;
248 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
249 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
251 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
252 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
253 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
254 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
255 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
258 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
259 first_iteration = false;
261 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
263 secp_call!(blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor))));
264 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
266 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
270 shared_secret: shared_secret,
272 blinding_factor: blinding_factor,
273 ephemeral_pubkey: ephemeral_pubkey,
282 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
283 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
284 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
285 let mut cur_cltv = 0u32;
286 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
287 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
288 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
289 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
291 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
292 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
293 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
294 // the intended recipient).
295 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
296 let cltv = if cur_cltv == 0 { hop.cltv_expiry_delta } else { cur_cltv };
297 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
299 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
300 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
301 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
302 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
306 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
307 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
308 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", msg: None});
310 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
311 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
312 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", msg: None});
314 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
316 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
320 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
322 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
330 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
331 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
333 for i in 0..dst.len() {
338 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
339 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, HandleError> {
340 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
341 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
344 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
345 let end_len = iters * 65;
346 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
347 res.resize(end_len, 0);
349 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
350 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
351 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
352 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
353 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
358 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
359 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
361 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
362 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
363 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
364 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
366 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
367 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
368 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
371 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
374 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
375 hmac.input(&packet_data);
376 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
377 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
380 Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{
382 public_key: onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey,
383 hop_data: packet_data,
388 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
389 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
390 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
391 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
393 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
394 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
395 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
396 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
397 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
398 data: packet_crypted,
402 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
403 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
405 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
408 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
409 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
410 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
411 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
415 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
416 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
419 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
421 failuremsg: failuremsg,
425 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
426 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
427 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
432 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
433 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
434 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
437 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
438 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &mut Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
439 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
440 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", msg: None}),
444 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap().serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
446 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
447 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
448 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
449 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
450 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
451 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
452 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
453 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
454 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
457 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
458 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).unwrap(); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
460 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
466 /// Sends a payment along a given route, returning the UpdateAddHTLC message to give to the
467 /// first hop in route. Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see
468 /// documentation for RouteHop fields for more info.
469 /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
470 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, HandleError> {
471 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
472 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", msg: None});
474 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
475 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
476 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
477 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", msg: None});
481 let session_priv = secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
482 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
483 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
487 let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here?
489 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv)?;
490 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route)?;
491 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, associated_data)?;
493 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
494 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
495 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", msg: None}),
496 Some(id) => id.clone()
499 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
500 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
501 return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", msg: None});
503 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
506 if channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
509 // TODO: We need to track these better, we're not generating these, so a
510 // third-party might make this happen:
511 panic!("payment_hash was repeated! Don't let this happen");
517 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
518 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
519 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &Uint256, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16)) {
521 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
522 match channel_state.by_id.remove(&temporary_channel_id) {
524 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo.0, funding_txo.1) {
529 //TODO: Push e to pendingevents
536 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
537 let chan_monitor = chan.channel_monitor();
538 match self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
541 //TODO: Push e to pendingevents?
547 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
548 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
549 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
554 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
555 channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan);
558 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
559 if !chan.is_usable() { return Ok(None) }
561 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
562 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
563 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
565 Ok(Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
566 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
567 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
568 node_signature: our_node_sig,
569 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
573 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forward(&self) {
574 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
576 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
577 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
579 if Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
583 for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
584 if short_chan_id != 0 {
585 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
586 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
588 // TODO: Send a failure packet back on each pending_forward
592 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
594 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
595 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
596 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
598 // TODO: Send a failure packet back
603 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
605 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
606 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
607 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
608 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
609 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
610 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
611 // this channel currently :/.
618 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
619 let commitment_msg = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
622 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
626 new_events.push(events::Event::SendHTLCs {
627 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
629 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
633 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
634 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
635 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
636 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
643 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
645 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
646 events.reserve(new_events.len());
647 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
652 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
653 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
654 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15 })
657 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool {
658 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
659 let mut pending_htlc = {
660 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) {
661 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
662 None => return false,
667 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. } => {
668 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
674 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
675 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
676 //TODO: DECRYPT route from OutboundRoute
677 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
678 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
679 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
683 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => {
684 let err_packet = match onion_error {
685 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code } => {
686 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &[0; 0]).encode();
687 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
689 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
690 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
694 let (node_id, fail_msg) = {
695 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
696 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
700 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
701 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc(payment_hash, err_packet) {
702 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
704 //TODO: Do something with e?
710 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
711 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFailHTLC {
721 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
722 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
723 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
724 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
725 self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true)
727 pub fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
728 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
729 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
730 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
731 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
733 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
734 let mut pending_htlc = {
735 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
736 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
737 None => return false,
742 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route } => {
743 if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us
744 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
745 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route });
746 } else { // This came from the first upstream node
747 // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow???
748 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route };
749 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret });
756 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
757 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
759 panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this...");
761 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
762 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
767 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => {
768 let (node_id, fulfill_msg) = {
769 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
770 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
774 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
775 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc(payment_preimage) {
776 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
778 //TODO: Do something with e?
784 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
785 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFulfillHTLC {
795 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
796 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
797 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap()
801 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
802 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
803 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
804 let mut ret = Vec::new();
805 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
810 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
811 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
812 let mut new_funding_locked_messages = Vec::new();
814 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
815 let mut short_to_ids_to_insert = Vec::new();
816 for channel in channel_state.by_id.values_mut() {
817 match channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched) {
818 Some(funding_locked) => {
819 let announcement_sigs = match self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
822 //TODO: push e on events and blow up the channel (it has bad keys)
826 new_funding_locked_messages.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
827 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
829 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
831 short_to_ids_to_insert.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()));
836 for to_insert in short_to_ids_to_insert {
837 channel_state.short_to_id.insert(to_insert.0, to_insert.1);
840 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
841 for funding_locked in new_funding_locked_messages.drain(..) {
842 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
846 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
847 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
848 for channel in channel_state.by_id.values_mut() {
849 if channel.block_disconnected(header) {
850 //TODO Close channel here
856 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
857 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
858 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
859 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
860 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown genesis block hash", msg: None});
862 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
863 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
864 return Err(HandleError{err: "temporary_channel_id collision!", msg: None});
866 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, self.announce_channels_publicly)?;
867 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel()?;
868 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
872 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
873 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
874 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
875 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
877 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
878 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
880 chan.accept_channel(&msg)?;
881 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
883 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
886 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
887 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
888 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
889 channel_value_satoshis: value,
890 output_script: output_script,
891 user_channel_id: user_id,
896 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
897 //TODO: broke this - a node shouldn't be able to get their channel removed by sending a
898 //funding_created a second time, or long after the first, or whatever (note this also
899 //leaves the short_to_id map in a busted state.
901 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
902 match channel_state.by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
904 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
905 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
907 match chan.funding_created(msg) {
916 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
918 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
919 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
920 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
921 // for a bogus channel.
922 let chan_monitor = chan.0.channel_monitor();
923 self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor)?;
924 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
925 channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.1.channel_id, chan.0);
929 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
930 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
931 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
932 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
934 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
935 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
937 chan.funding_signed(&msg)?;
938 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
940 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
943 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
944 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
945 funding_txo: funding_txo,
946 user_channel_id: user_id,
951 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
952 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
953 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
955 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
956 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
958 chan.funding_locked(&msg)?;
959 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan)?);
961 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
965 fn handle_shutdown(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
969 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
973 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
974 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
975 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
976 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
978 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
979 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
980 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
981 //but we should prevent it anyway.
983 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key);
984 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
986 let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here?
988 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
989 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
990 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
991 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
992 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
993 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
994 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
995 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
996 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
997 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
998 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
999 return Err(msgs::HandleError {
1000 err: "Unknown onion packet version",
1001 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage::UpdateFailHTLC {
1002 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1003 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1004 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1005 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &onion_hash),
1011 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1012 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1013 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
1014 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1015 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1016 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1017 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
1018 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
1019 return Err(HandleError{err: "HMAC Check failed",
1020 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage::UpdateFailHTLC {
1021 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1022 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1023 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1024 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &onion_hash),
1030 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1031 let next_hop_data = {
1032 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1033 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1034 match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
1036 let error_code = match err {
1037 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
1038 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1040 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to decode our hop data",
1041 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage::UpdateFailHTLC {
1042 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1043 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1044 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1045 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, error_code, &[0;0]),
1054 let mut pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1056 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
1057 return Err(HandleError{err: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
1058 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage::UpdateFailHTLC {
1059 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1060 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1061 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1062 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat)),
1067 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1068 return Err(HandleError{err: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1069 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage::UpdateFailHTLC {
1070 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1071 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1072 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1073 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry)),
1079 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1080 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1081 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1082 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1084 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1086 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1087 short_channel_id: 0,
1088 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1089 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1090 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1093 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1094 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1095 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1097 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone();
1099 let blinding_factor = {
1100 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1101 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1102 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
1103 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1104 sha.result(&mut res);
1105 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1107 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1109 return Err(HandleError{err: "Blinding factor is an invalid private key",
1110 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage::UpdateFailHTLC {
1111 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1112 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1113 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1114 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]),
1123 match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1125 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1127 return Err(HandleError{err: "New blinding factor is an invalid private key",
1128 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage::UpdateFailHTLC {
1129 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1130 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1131 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1132 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]),
1140 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1142 public_key: new_pubkey,
1143 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1144 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1147 //TODO: Check amt_to_forward and outgoing_cltv_value are within acceptable ranges!
1149 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1150 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1151 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1152 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1153 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1154 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1155 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1159 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1160 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1162 if pending_forward_info.onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1163 let forwarding_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&pending_forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1165 return Err(HandleError{err: "Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.",
1166 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage::UpdateFailHTLC {
1167 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1168 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1169 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1170 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]),
1175 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1177 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1178 if !chan.is_live() {
1179 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap();
1180 return Err(HandleError{err: "Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.",
1181 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage::UpdateFailHTLC {
1182 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1183 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1184 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1185 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, 0x4000 | 10, &chan_update.encode()[..]),
1192 let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
1194 // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
1195 // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
1196 // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
1197 // we send permanent_node_failure.
1198 match &claimable_htlcs_entry {
1199 &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) => {
1200 let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
1202 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1203 acceptable_cycle = pending_forward_info.short_channel_id == 0;
1207 if !acceptable_cycle {
1208 return Err(HandleError{err: "Payment looped through us twice",
1209 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage::UpdateFailHTLC {
1210 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1211 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1212 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1213 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, 0x4000 | 0x2000|2, &[0;0]),
1222 let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1224 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1225 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1227 if !chan.is_usable() {
1228 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", msg: None});
1230 let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
1231 pending_forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1232 (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
1234 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}), //TODO: panic?
1237 match claimable_htlcs_entry {
1238 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
1239 let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
1240 let route = match outbound_route {
1241 &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route } => {
1244 _ => { panic!("WAT") },
1246 *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
1247 source_short_channel_id,
1248 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1252 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1253 e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
1254 source_short_channel_id,
1255 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1263 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<Option<(Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, HandleError> {
1265 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1266 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1268 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1269 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1271 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1273 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1276 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1277 self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false);
1281 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<(Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, HandleError> {
1283 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1284 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1286 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1287 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1289 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg)?
1291 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1294 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&res.0, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: &msg.reason });
1298 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<Option<(Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, HandleError> {
1300 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1301 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1303 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1304 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1306 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg)?
1308 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1311 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&res.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code });
1315 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<msgs::RevokeAndACK, HandleError> {
1316 let mut forward_event = None;
1317 let (res, monitor) = {
1318 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1320 let ((res, mut forwarding_infos), monitor) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1322 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1323 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1325 (chan.commitment_signed(&msg)?, chan.channel_monitor())
1327 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1330 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1331 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1332 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1334 for forward_info in forwarding_infos.drain(..) {
1335 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1336 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1337 entry.get_mut().push(forward_info);
1339 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1340 entry.insert(vec!(forward_info));
1347 //TODO: Only if we store HTLC sigs
1348 self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor)?;
1350 match forward_event {
1352 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1353 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1354 time_forwardable: time
1363 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1365 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1366 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1368 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1369 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1371 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)?;
1372 chan.channel_monitor()
1374 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1377 self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor)?;
1381 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1382 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1383 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1385 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1386 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1388 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)
1390 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1394 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1395 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1396 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1397 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1399 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1400 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1402 if !chan.is_usable() {
1403 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", msg: None });
1406 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1407 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
1409 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1410 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1411 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }));
1412 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }));
1414 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
1416 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1417 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1418 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1419 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1420 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1421 contents: announcement,
1422 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1424 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1427 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1428 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1435 use chain::chaininterface;
1436 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
1437 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
1439 use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
1440 use util::test_utils;
1441 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1443 use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
1444 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
1445 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
1446 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1447 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1448 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
1449 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
1451 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
1452 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
1454 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
1455 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1457 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1460 use std::default::Default;
1461 use std::time::Instant;
1463 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
1464 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
1465 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1470 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1471 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1474 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1475 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1478 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1479 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1482 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1483 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1486 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1487 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1492 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1494 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
1495 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
1500 fn onion_vectors() {
1501 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
1502 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1504 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
1505 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
1506 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
1507 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex_bytes("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
1508 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex_bytes("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
1510 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
1511 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
1512 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
1513 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex_bytes("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
1514 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex_bytes("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
1516 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
1517 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
1518 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
1519 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex_bytes("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
1520 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex_bytes("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
1522 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
1523 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
1524 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
1525 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex_bytes("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
1526 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex_bytes("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
1528 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
1529 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
1530 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
1531 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex_bytes("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
1532 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex_bytes("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
1534 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
1535 let payloads = vec!(
1536 msgs::OnionHopData {
1538 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1539 short_channel_id: 0,
1541 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1545 msgs::OnionHopData {
1547 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1548 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
1549 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
1550 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1554 msgs::OnionHopData {
1556 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1557 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
1558 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
1559 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1563 msgs::OnionHopData {
1565 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1566 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
1567 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
1568 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1572 msgs::OnionHopData {
1574 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1575 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
1576 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
1577 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1583 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, hex_bytes("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()).unwrap();
1584 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
1586 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1590 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
1591 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
1593 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1594 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
1595 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1597 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
1598 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1600 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
1601 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1603 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
1604 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1606 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
1607 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1609 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
1610 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1613 static mut CHAN_COUNT: u16 = 0;
1614 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction) {
1615 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
1616 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
1617 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id as u32; 1]);
1619 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
1620 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
1624 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &ChannelManager, chain_a: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, node_b: &ChannelManager, chain_b: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
1625 let open_chan = node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), (1 << 24) - 1, 42).unwrap();
1626 let accept_chan = node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan).unwrap();
1627 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
1629 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
1630 let tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new(), witness: Vec::new() };
1631 let funding_output = (Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), chan_id);
1633 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1634 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
1636 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, output_script: _, user_channel_id } => {
1637 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, (1 << 24) - 1);
1638 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1640 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output.clone());
1641 //TODO: Check that we got added to chan_monitor_a!
1643 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1646 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1647 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
1648 let funding_signed = match events_2[0] {
1649 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
1650 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
1651 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
1652 //TODO: Check that we got added to chan_monitor_b!
1654 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1657 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
1659 let events_3 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1660 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
1662 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
1663 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1664 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
1666 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1669 confirm_transaction(&chain_a, &tx);
1670 let events_4 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1671 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
1673 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
1674 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
1675 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
1676 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
1678 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1681 confirm_transaction(&chain_b, &tx);
1682 let events_5 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1683 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
1684 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_5[0] {
1685 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
1686 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
1687 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
1688 node_a.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
1689 as_announcement_sigs
1691 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1694 let events_6 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1695 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
1696 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_6[0] {
1697 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
1700 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1703 node_b.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
1704 let events_7 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1705 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
1706 let bs_update = match events_7[0] {
1707 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
1708 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
1711 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1718 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
1723 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1724 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
1727 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
1729 Event::SendHTLCs{ node_id, msgs, commitment_msg } => {
1730 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: msgs, commitment_msg: commitment_msg }
1732 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
1737 static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0;
1738 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &ChannelManager, route: Route, expected_route: &[&ChannelManager], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
1739 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
1740 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
1741 let our_payment_hash = {
1742 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1743 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
1744 let mut ret = [0; 32];
1745 sha.result(&mut ret);
1749 let mut payment_event = {
1750 let msgs = origin_node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap().unwrap();
1752 node_id: expected_route[0].get_our_node_id(),
1754 commitment_msg: msgs.1,
1757 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
1759 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
1760 assert_eq!(node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
1762 node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
1763 let revoke_and_ack = node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
1764 prev_node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
1766 let events_1 = node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1767 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
1769 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
1770 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1773 node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
1774 node.process_pending_htlc_forward();
1776 let mut events_2 = node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1777 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
1778 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
1780 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
1781 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
1782 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
1784 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1787 for event in events_2.drain(..) {
1788 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(event);
1790 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
1796 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
1799 fn send_payment(origin_node: &ChannelManager, origin_router: &Router, expected_route: &[&ChannelManager], recv_value: u64) {
1800 let route = origin_router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), recv_value, 142).unwrap();
1801 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
1802 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
1803 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.get_our_node_id());
1806 let our_payment_preimage = send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value).0;
1808 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
1810 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().get_our_node_id();
1811 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
1812 let mut next_msg = None;
1813 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
1814 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.get_our_node_id());
1817 assert!(node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&prev_node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap().is_none());
1821 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1822 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1824 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
1825 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
1826 next_msg = Some(msg.clone());
1828 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1834 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.get_our_node_id());
1835 assert!(origin_node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&expected_route.first().unwrap().get_our_node_id(), &next_msg.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
1837 let events = origin_node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1838 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1840 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
1841 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
1843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1847 fn send_failed_payment(origin_node: &ChannelManager, origin_router: &Router, expected_route: &[&ChannelManager]) {
1848 let route = origin_router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), 1000000, 142).unwrap();
1849 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
1850 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
1851 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.get_our_node_id());
1853 let our_payment_hash = send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, 1000000).1;
1855 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
1857 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().get_our_node_id();
1858 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
1859 let mut next_msg = None;
1860 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
1861 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.get_our_node_id());
1864 assert!(node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&prev_node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap().is_none());
1868 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1869 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1871 Event::SendFailHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
1872 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
1873 next_msg = Some(msg.clone());
1875 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1881 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.get_our_node_id());
1882 assert!(origin_node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&expected_route.first().unwrap().get_our_node_id(), &next_msg.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
1884 let events = origin_node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1885 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1887 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
1888 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
1890 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1895 fn fake_network_test() {
1896 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
1897 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
1898 let mut rng = thread_rng();
1899 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1901 let feeest_1 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
1902 let chain_monitor_1 = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
1903 let chan_monitor_1 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor{});
1905 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
1906 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
1907 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
1909 let node_1 = ChannelManager::new(node_id_1.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest_1.clone(), chan_monitor_1.clone(), chain_monitor_1.clone()).unwrap();
1910 let router_1 = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id_1).unwrap());
1912 let feeest_2 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
1913 let chain_monitor_2 = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
1914 let chan_monitor_2 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor{});
1916 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
1917 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
1918 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
1920 let node_2 = ChannelManager::new(node_id_2.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest_2.clone(), chan_monitor_2.clone(), chain_monitor_2.clone()).unwrap();
1921 let router_2 = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id_2).unwrap());
1923 let feeest_3 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
1924 let chain_monitor_3 = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
1925 let chan_monitor_3 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor{});
1927 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
1928 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
1929 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
1931 let node_3 = ChannelManager::new(node_id_3.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest_3.clone(), chan_monitor_3.clone(), chain_monitor_3.clone()).unwrap();
1932 let router_3 = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id_3).unwrap());
1934 let feeest_4 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
1935 let chain_monitor_4 = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
1936 let chan_monitor_4 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor{});
1938 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
1939 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
1940 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
1942 let node_4 = ChannelManager::new(node_id_4.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest_4.clone(), chan_monitor_4.clone(), chain_monitor_4.clone()).unwrap();
1943 let router_4 = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id_4).unwrap());
1945 // Create some initial channels
1946 let chan_announcement_1 = create_chan_between_nodes(&node_1, &chain_monitor_1, &node_2, &chain_monitor_2);
1947 for router in vec!(&router_1, &router_2, &router_3, &router_4) {
1948 assert!(router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement_1.0).unwrap());
1949 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_1.1).unwrap();
1950 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_1.2).unwrap();
1952 let chan_announcement_2 = create_chan_between_nodes(&node_2, &chain_monitor_2, &node_3, &chain_monitor_3);
1953 for router in vec!(&router_1, &router_2, &router_3, &router_4) {
1954 assert!(router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement_2.0).unwrap());
1955 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_2.1).unwrap();
1956 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_2.2).unwrap();
1958 let chan_announcement_3 = create_chan_between_nodes(&node_3, &chain_monitor_3, &node_4, &chain_monitor_4);
1959 for router in vec!(&router_1, &router_2, &router_3, &router_4) {
1960 assert!(router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement_3.0).unwrap());
1961 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_3.1).unwrap();
1962 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_3.2).unwrap();
1965 // Send some payments
1966 send_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_3, &*node_4)[..], 1000000);
1967 send_payment(&node_2, &router_2, &vec!(&*node_3, &*node_4)[..], 1000000);
1968 send_payment(&node_4, &router_4, &vec!(&*node_3, &*node_2, &*node_1)[..], 1000000);
1969 send_payment(&node_4, &router_4, &vec!(&*node_3, &*node_2)[..], 250000);
1971 // Test failure packets
1972 send_failed_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_3, &*node_4)[..]);
1974 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1975 let chan_announcement_4 = create_chan_between_nodes(&node_2, &chain_monitor_2, &node_4, &chain_monitor_4);
1976 for router in vec!(&router_1, &router_2, &router_3, &router_4) {
1977 assert!(router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement_4.0).unwrap());
1978 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_4.1).unwrap();
1979 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_4.2).unwrap();
1982 send_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_4)[..], 1000000);
1985 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1986 hops.push(RouteHop {
1987 pubkey: node_3.get_our_node_id(),
1988 short_channel_id: chan_announcement_2.1.contents.short_channel_id,
1990 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_announcement_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1992 hops.push(RouteHop {
1993 pubkey: node_4.get_our_node_id(),
1994 short_channel_id: chan_announcement_3.1.contents.short_channel_id,
1996 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_announcement_4.2.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1998 hops.push(RouteHop {
1999 pubkey: node_2.get_our_node_id(),
2000 short_channel_id: chan_announcement_4.1.contents.short_channel_id,
2002 cltv_expiry_delta: 142,
2004 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_announcement_4.2.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_announcement_4.2.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2005 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_announcement_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_announcement_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2006 send_along_route(&node_2, Route { hops }, &vec!(&*node_3, &*node_4, &*node_2)[..], 250000);
2008 // Check that we processed all pending events
2009 for node in vec!(&node_1, &node_2, &node_3, &node_4) {
2010 assert_eq!(node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);