1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
8 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
10 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
13 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
14 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
16 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
17 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
19 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable};
20 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
21 use util::sha2::Sha256;
24 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
25 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
26 use crypto::digest::Digest;
27 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
28 use crypto::chacha20::ChaCha20;
30 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
31 use std::collections::HashMap;
32 use std::collections::hash_map;
34 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
36 mod channel_held_info {
39 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
40 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
41 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
42 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
43 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
44 pub(super) prev_short_channel_id: u64,
45 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
46 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
49 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
50 impl PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
51 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
54 payment_hash: [0; 32],
56 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
58 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
63 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
64 pub enum HTLCFailReason {
66 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
74 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
76 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
77 HTLCFailReason::Reason {
78 failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(),
83 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
84 pub use self::channel_held_info::*;
85 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
86 pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*;
88 enum PendingOutboundHTLC {
90 source_short_channel_id: u64,
91 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
95 session_priv: SecretKey,
97 /// Used for channel rebalancing
99 source_short_channel_id: u64,
100 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
102 session_priv: SecretKey,
106 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
107 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
108 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
109 /// probably increase this significantly.
110 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
112 struct ChannelHolder {
113 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
114 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
115 next_forward: Instant,
116 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
117 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
118 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
120 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
121 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
122 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
123 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
124 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
125 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
126 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
129 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
131 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
132 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
133 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
134 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
135 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
136 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
141 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
142 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
143 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
144 /// to individual Channels.
145 pub struct ChannelManager {
146 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
147 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
148 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
149 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
150 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
152 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
153 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
156 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
157 our_network_key: SecretKey,
159 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
162 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
164 macro_rules! secp_call {
168 //TODO: Make the err a parameter!
169 Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Key error", action: None})
176 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
178 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
179 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
184 pub struct ChannelDetails {
185 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
186 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
187 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
188 /// lifetime of the channel.
189 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
190 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
191 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
192 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
193 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
194 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
195 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
199 impl ChannelManager {
200 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
201 /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
202 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
203 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
204 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
205 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
206 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
208 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
209 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
210 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
211 monitor: monitor.clone(),
215 announce_channels_publicly,
216 fee_proportional_millionths,
219 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
220 by_id: HashMap::new(),
221 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
222 next_forward: Instant::now(),
223 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
224 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
228 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
230 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
231 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
235 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
236 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
237 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
238 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
239 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
240 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
241 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
242 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
243 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
245 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
246 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
247 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
248 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
249 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
250 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
251 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
252 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
255 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
256 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
257 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
259 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
263 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id);
264 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?;
265 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
266 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
267 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
271 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
272 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
273 node_id: their_network_key,
279 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
280 /// more information.
281 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
282 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
283 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
284 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
285 res.push(ChannelDetails {
286 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
287 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
288 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
289 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
290 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
296 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
297 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
298 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
299 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
300 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
301 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
302 if channel.is_usable() {
303 res.push(ChannelDetails {
304 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
305 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
306 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
307 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
308 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
315 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
316 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
317 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
318 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
319 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
320 let (res, node_id, chan_option) = {
321 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
322 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
323 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
324 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
325 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
326 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
327 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
328 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
330 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
331 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
333 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
336 for payment_hash in res.1 {
337 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
338 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
340 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
341 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
346 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
347 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
348 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
352 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
361 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
363 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
364 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
365 let mut res = [0; 32];
366 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
370 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
371 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
372 let mut res = [0; 32];
373 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
379 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
380 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
381 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
382 let mut res = [0; 32];
383 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
388 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
389 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
390 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
391 let mut res = [0; 32];
392 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
396 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
398 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
399 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
400 let mut blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
401 let mut first_iteration = true;
403 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
404 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
406 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
407 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
408 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
409 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
410 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
413 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
414 first_iteration = false;
416 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
418 secp_call!(blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor))));
419 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
421 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
427 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
428 fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, HandleError> {
429 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
431 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
432 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
438 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
448 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
449 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
450 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
451 let mut cur_cltv = 0u32;
452 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
453 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
454 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
455 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
457 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
458 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
459 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
460 // the intended recipient).
461 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
462 let cltv = if cur_cltv == 0 { hop.cltv_expiry_delta } else { cur_cltv };
463 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
465 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
466 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
467 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
468 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
472 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
473 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
474 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", action: None});
476 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
477 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
478 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", action: None});
480 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
482 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
486 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
488 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
496 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
497 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
499 for i in 0..dst.len() {
504 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
505 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, HandleError> {
506 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
507 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
510 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
511 let end_len = iters * 65;
512 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
513 res.resize(end_len, 0);
515 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
516 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
517 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
518 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
519 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
524 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
525 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
527 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
528 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
529 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
530 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
532 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
533 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
534 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
537 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
540 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
541 hmac.input(&packet_data);
542 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
543 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
546 Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{
548 public_key: onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey,
549 hop_data: packet_data,
554 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
555 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
556 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
557 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
559 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
560 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
561 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
562 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
563 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
564 data: packet_crypted,
568 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
569 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
571 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
574 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
575 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
576 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
577 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
581 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
582 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
585 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
587 failuremsg: failuremsg,
591 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
592 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
593 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
599 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
600 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
601 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
604 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
605 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
606 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
607 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
611 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap().serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
613 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
614 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
615 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
616 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
617 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
618 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
619 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
620 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
621 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
624 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
625 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).unwrap(); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
627 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
633 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
634 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
635 /// fields for more info.
636 /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
637 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
638 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
639 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
640 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", action: None});
642 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
643 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
644 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
645 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", action: None});
649 let session_priv = secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
650 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
651 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
655 let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here?
657 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv)?;
658 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route)?;
659 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, associated_data)?;
661 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
662 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
663 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
664 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", action: None}),
665 Some(id) => id.clone()
668 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
669 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
670 return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", action: None});
672 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
675 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
677 if channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
681 // TODO: We need to track these better, we're not generating these, so a
682 // third-party might make this happen:
683 panic!("payment_hash was repeated! Don't let this happen");
687 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
688 None => return Ok(()),
692 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
693 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
696 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
697 events.push(events::Event::SendHTLCs {
698 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
699 msgs: vec![update_add],
700 commitment_msg: commitment_signed,
705 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
706 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
707 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
708 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
709 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
710 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
712 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
714 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
717 //TODO: Push e to pendingevents
724 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
725 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
726 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
729 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
730 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
731 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
736 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
737 channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan);
740 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
741 if !chan.is_usable() || !chan.should_announce() { return Ok(None) }
743 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
744 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
745 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
747 Ok(Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
748 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
749 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
750 node_signature: our_node_sig,
751 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
755 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forward(&self) {
756 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
757 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
759 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
760 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
762 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
766 for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
767 if short_chan_id != 0 {
768 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
769 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
771 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
772 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
773 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
778 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
780 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
781 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
782 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
784 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
785 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
790 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
792 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
793 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
794 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
795 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
796 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
797 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
798 // this channel currently :/.
805 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
806 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
809 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
813 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::SendHTLCs {
814 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
816 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
820 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
821 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
822 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
823 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
830 for failed_forward in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
831 match failed_forward.2 {
832 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: Vec::new() }),
833 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
837 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
839 new_events.retain(|event| {
840 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
841 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
842 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
848 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
849 events.reserve(new_events.len());
850 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
851 events.push(event.1);
855 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
856 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
857 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() })
860 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool {
861 let mut pending_htlc = {
862 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) {
863 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
864 None => return false,
869 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
870 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.clone(), PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
874 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
880 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
881 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
882 mem::drop(channel_state);
884 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
885 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
886 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
890 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => {
891 let err_packet = match onion_error {
892 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
893 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
894 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
896 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
897 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
901 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
902 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
903 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
907 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
908 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(payment_hash, err_packet) {
909 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
911 //TODO: Do something with e?
918 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
919 mem::drop(channel_state);
921 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
922 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
925 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
926 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFailHTLC {
929 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
940 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
941 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
942 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
943 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
944 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
945 self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true)
947 pub fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
948 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
949 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
950 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
951 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
953 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
954 let mut pending_htlc = {
955 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
956 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
957 None => return false,
962 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
963 if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us
964 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
965 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv });
966 } else { // This came from the first upstream node
967 // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow???
968 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv };
969 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret });
976 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
977 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
979 panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this...");
981 mem::drop(channel_state);
982 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
983 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
988 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => {
989 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
990 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
991 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
995 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
996 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(payment_preimage) {
997 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
999 //TODO: Do something with e?
1005 mem::drop(channel_state);
1006 match fulfill_msgs {
1007 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1008 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1009 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1012 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1013 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFulfillHTLC {
1026 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1027 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1028 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap()
1031 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1032 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1034 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1039 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1040 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1041 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1042 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1043 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1048 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1049 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1050 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1052 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1053 let mut short_to_ids_to_insert = Vec::new();
1054 let mut short_to_ids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1055 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1056 if let Some(funding_locked) = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched) {
1057 let announcement_sigs = match self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1060 //TODO: push e on events and blow up the channel (it has bad keys)
1064 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1065 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1066 msg: funding_locked,
1067 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1069 short_to_ids_to_insert.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()));
1071 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1072 for tx in txn_matched {
1073 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1074 if inp.prev_hash == funding_txo.txid && inp.prev_index == funding_txo.index as u32 {
1075 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1076 short_to_ids_to_remove.push(short_id);
1078 channel.force_shutdown();
1079 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1080 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1089 if channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1090 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1091 short_to_ids_to_remove.push(short_id);
1093 channel.force_shutdown();
1094 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1095 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1103 for to_remove in short_to_ids_to_remove {
1104 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&to_remove);
1106 for to_insert in short_to_ids_to_insert {
1107 channel_state.short_to_id.insert(to_insert.0, to_insert.1);
1110 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1111 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1112 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1116 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
1117 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
1118 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1119 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1120 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1121 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
1122 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
1123 let tx = v.force_shutdown();
1124 for broadcast_tx in tx {
1125 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1127 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
1128 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1138 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
1139 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
1140 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
1141 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1142 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown genesis block hash", action: None});
1144 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1145 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1146 return Err(HandleError{err: "temporary_channel_id collision!", action: None});
1149 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1151 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1152 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1153 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1154 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1155 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1156 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1157 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1158 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1161 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1162 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1163 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1165 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1169 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, self.announce_channels_publicly)?;
1170 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel()?;
1171 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1175 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1176 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1177 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1178 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1180 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1181 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1183 chan.accept_channel(&msg)?;
1184 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1186 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1189 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1190 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1191 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1192 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1193 output_script: output_script,
1194 user_channel_id: user_id,
1199 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
1200 //TODO: broke this - a node shouldn't be able to get their channel removed by sending a
1201 //funding_created a second time, or long after the first, or whatever (note this also
1202 //leaves the short_to_id map in a busted state.
1203 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1204 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1205 match channel_state.by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1207 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1208 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1210 match chan.funding_created(msg) {
1211 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1212 (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update)
1219 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1221 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1222 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1223 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1224 // for a bogus channel.
1225 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1228 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1229 channel_state.by_id.insert(funding_msg.channel_id, chan);
1233 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1234 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1235 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1236 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1238 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1239 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1241 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg)?;
1242 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1244 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1247 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1250 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1251 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1252 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1253 user_channel_id: user_id,
1258 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
1259 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1260 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1262 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1263 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1265 chan.funding_locked(&msg)?;
1266 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan)?);
1268 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1272 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
1273 let (res, chan_option) = {
1274 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1275 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1277 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1278 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1279 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1280 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1282 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1283 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1284 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1285 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1287 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1288 } else { (res, None) }
1290 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1293 for payment_hash in res.2 {
1294 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1295 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1297 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1298 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1299 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1300 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1308 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
1309 let (res, chan_option) = {
1310 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1311 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1312 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1313 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1314 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1315 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1317 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1318 if res.1.is_some() {
1319 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1320 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1321 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1322 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1323 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1324 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1325 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1327 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1328 } else { (res, None) }
1330 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1333 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1334 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1336 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1337 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1338 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1339 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1347 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
1348 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1349 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1350 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1352 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1353 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1354 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1355 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1357 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key);
1358 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1360 let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here?
1362 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
1365 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1366 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1367 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
1368 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
1374 macro_rules! return_err {
1375 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1376 return Err(msgs::HandleError {
1378 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::UpdateFailHTLC {
1379 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1380 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1381 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1382 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1389 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1390 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1391 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1392 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1393 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1394 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1395 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1396 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1399 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1400 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1401 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
1402 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1403 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1406 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1407 let next_hop_data = {
1408 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1409 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1410 match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
1412 let error_code = match err {
1413 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
1414 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1416 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1422 let mut pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1424 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
1425 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1427 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1428 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1431 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1432 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1433 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1434 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1436 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1438 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1439 short_channel_id: 0,
1440 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1441 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1442 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1445 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1446 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1447 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1449 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone();
1451 let blinding_factor = {
1452 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1453 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1454 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
1455 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1456 sha.result(&mut res);
1457 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1459 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1461 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1467 match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1469 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1471 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1476 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1478 public_key: new_pubkey,
1479 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1480 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1483 //TODO: Check amt_to_forward and outgoing_cltv_value are within acceptable ranges!
1485 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1486 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1487 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1488 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1489 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1490 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1491 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1495 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1496 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1498 if pending_forward_info.onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1499 let forwarding_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&pending_forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1501 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1503 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1505 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1506 if !chan.is_live() {
1507 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap();
1508 return_err!("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1512 let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
1514 // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
1515 // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
1516 // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
1517 // we send permanent_node_failure.
1518 match &claimable_htlcs_entry {
1519 &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) => {
1520 let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
1522 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1523 acceptable_cycle = pending_forward_info.short_channel_id == 0;
1527 if !acceptable_cycle {
1528 return_err!("Payment looped through us twice", 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1534 let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1536 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1537 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1539 if !chan.is_usable() {
1540 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: None});
1542 let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
1543 pending_forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1544 (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
1546 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}), //TODO: panic?
1549 match claimable_htlcs_entry {
1550 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
1551 let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
1552 let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route {
1553 &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1554 (route.clone(), session_priv.clone())
1556 _ => { panic!("WAT") },
1558 *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
1559 source_short_channel_id,
1560 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1565 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1566 e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
1567 source_short_channel_id,
1568 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1576 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1577 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1578 // Claim funds first, cause we don't really care if the channel we received the message on
1579 // is broken, we may have enough info to get our own money!
1580 self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false);
1583 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1584 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1586 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1587 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1589 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)?
1591 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1594 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1600 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
1601 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1602 let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1604 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1605 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1607 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1609 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1612 if let Some(pending_htlc) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.get(&payment_hash) {
1613 match pending_htlc {
1614 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1615 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1616 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1618 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1619 if res.is_some() { return; }
1621 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1623 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1624 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1625 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1626 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1627 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1629 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::decode(&packet_decrypted) {
1630 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1631 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1633 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1634 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1635 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1636 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1637 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1638 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1639 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1640 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1641 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1642 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1643 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1644 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1645 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::decode(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len]) {
1646 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1654 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1655 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1656 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1657 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1660 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1675 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1676 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1677 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1679 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1680 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1682 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1684 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1688 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
1689 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1690 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1691 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1693 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1694 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1696 chan.commitment_signed(&msg)?
1698 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1701 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1705 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1708 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
1709 let (res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor) = {
1710 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1711 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1713 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1714 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1716 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)?
1718 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1721 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1724 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1725 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failure.0, failure.1);
1728 let mut forward_event = None;
1729 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1730 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1731 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1732 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1733 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1735 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1736 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1737 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1738 entry.get_mut().push(forward_info);
1740 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1741 entry.insert(vec!(forward_info));
1746 match forward_event {
1748 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1749 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1750 time_forwardable: time
1759 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1760 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1761 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1763 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1764 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1766 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)
1768 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1772 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1773 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1774 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1775 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1777 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1778 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1780 if !chan.is_usable() {
1781 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: None });
1784 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1785 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
1787 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1788 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1789 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }));
1790 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }));
1792 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
1794 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1795 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1796 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1797 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1798 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1799 contents: announcement,
1800 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1802 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1805 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1806 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1810 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
1811 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1813 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1814 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1815 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1816 if no_connection_possible {
1817 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
1818 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1819 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1820 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1822 let txn_to_broadcast = chan.force_shutdown();
1823 for tx in txn_to_broadcast {
1824 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1826 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1827 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1837 for chan in channel_state.by_id {
1838 if chan.1.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1839 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). Also
1840 //fail and wipe any uncommitted outbound HTLCs as those are considered after
1846 if !new_events.is_empty() {
1847 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1848 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1849 pending_events.push(event);
1857 use chain::chaininterface;
1858 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
1859 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
1860 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
1861 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
1863 use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
1864 use util::test_utils;
1865 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1867 use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
1868 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
1869 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
1870 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
1871 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1872 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
1873 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
1875 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
1876 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
1878 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
1879 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1881 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1883 use std::collections::HashMap;
1884 use std::default::Default;
1885 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
1886 use std::time::Instant;
1889 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
1890 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
1891 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1896 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1897 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1900 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1901 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1904 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1905 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1908 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1909 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1912 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1913 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1918 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1920 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
1921 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
1926 fn onion_vectors() {
1927 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
1928 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1930 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
1931 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
1932 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
1933 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex_bytes("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
1934 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex_bytes("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
1936 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
1937 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
1938 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
1939 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex_bytes("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
1940 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex_bytes("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
1942 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
1943 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
1944 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
1945 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex_bytes("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
1946 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex_bytes("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
1948 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
1949 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
1950 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
1951 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex_bytes("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
1952 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex_bytes("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
1954 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
1955 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
1956 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
1957 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex_bytes("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
1958 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex_bytes("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
1960 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
1961 let payloads = vec!(
1962 msgs::OnionHopData {
1964 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1965 short_channel_id: 0,
1967 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1971 msgs::OnionHopData {
1973 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1974 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
1975 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
1976 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1980 msgs::OnionHopData {
1982 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1983 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
1984 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
1985 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1989 msgs::OnionHopData {
1991 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1992 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
1993 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
1994 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1998 msgs::OnionHopData {
2000 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2001 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2002 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2003 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2009 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, hex_bytes("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()).unwrap();
2010 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2012 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2016 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2017 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2019 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2020 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2021 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2023 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2024 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2026 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2027 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2029 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2030 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2032 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2033 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2035 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2036 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2039 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2040 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2041 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2042 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2044 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2045 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2050 feeest: Arc<test_utils::TestFeeEstimator>,
2051 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2052 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2053 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2055 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2059 static mut CHAN_COUNT: u32 = 0;
2060 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2061 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42).unwrap();
2063 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2064 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2065 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2066 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2067 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2068 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2070 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2073 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2075 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
2079 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2080 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2082 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2083 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2084 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2086 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2087 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2089 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2091 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2092 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2093 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2094 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2095 added_monitors.clear();
2097 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2100 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2101 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2102 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2103 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2104 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2105 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2106 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2107 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2108 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2109 added_monitors.clear();
2112 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2115 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2117 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2118 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2119 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2120 added_monitors.clear();
2123 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2124 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2126 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2127 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2128 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2130 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2133 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2134 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2135 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2137 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2138 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2139 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2140 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2142 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2147 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2148 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2149 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2150 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2151 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2152 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2153 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2154 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2155 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2156 as_announcement_sigs
2158 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2161 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2162 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2163 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2164 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2167 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2170 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2171 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2172 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2173 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2174 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2175 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2178 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2185 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2188 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2189 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2191 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2192 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2193 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2195 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2198 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2199 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2200 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2203 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2204 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2205 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2206 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2207 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2208 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2211 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2214 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2215 if !close_inbound_first {
2216 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2218 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2219 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2220 if close_inbound_first {
2221 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2222 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2223 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2224 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2226 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2227 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2228 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2229 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2231 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2232 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2233 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2235 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2236 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2237 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2238 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2240 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2241 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2242 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2243 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2245 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2246 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2247 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2248 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2251 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2254 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2255 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2256 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2257 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2260 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2263 (as_update, bs_update)
2268 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2269 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2272 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2274 Event::SendHTLCs { node_id, msgs, commitment_msg } => {
2275 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: msgs, commitment_msg: commitment_msg }
2277 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2282 static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0;
2283 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2284 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2285 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2286 let our_payment_hash = {
2287 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2288 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2289 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2290 sha.result(&mut ret);
2294 let mut payment_event = {
2295 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2297 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2298 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2299 added_monitors.clear();
2302 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2303 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2304 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2306 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2308 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2309 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2311 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2313 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2314 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2317 let revoke_and_ack = node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
2319 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2320 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2321 added_monitors.clear();
2323 assert!(prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2324 let prev_revoke_and_ack = prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2326 let mut added_monitors = prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2327 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2328 added_monitors.clear();
2330 assert!(node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &prev_revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2331 assert!(prev_revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2333 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2334 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2335 added_monitors.clear();
2338 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2339 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2341 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2342 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2345 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2346 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forward();
2348 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2349 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2350 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2352 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2353 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2354 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2356 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2360 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2361 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2362 added_monitors.clear();
2364 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2365 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2371 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2374 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2375 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2377 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2378 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2379 added_monitors.clear();
2382 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2383 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2384 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2386 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2388 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2390 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2392 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2393 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2395 added_monitors.clear();
2397 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2399 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2400 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2401 added_monitors.clear();
2403 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2404 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2405 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2407 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2408 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2409 added_monitors.clear();
2411 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2413 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2414 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2415 added_monitors.clear();
2421 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2422 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2423 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2424 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2425 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2426 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2429 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2430 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2432 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2433 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2434 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2436 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2442 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2443 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2445 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2446 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2448 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2449 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2451 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2455 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2457 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2458 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2459 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2460 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2461 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2464 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2467 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2468 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2469 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2470 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2471 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2474 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2475 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2476 let our_payment_hash = {
2477 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2478 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2479 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2480 sha.result(&mut ret);
2484 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2485 assert_eq!(err.err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight");
2488 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2489 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2490 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2493 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2494 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2496 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2497 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2498 added_monitors.clear();
2501 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2502 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2503 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2505 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2506 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2509 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2510 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2511 added_monitors.clear();
2513 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2515 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2516 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2517 added_monitors.clear();
2519 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2521 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2522 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2523 added_monitors.clear();
2525 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2526 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2527 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2529 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2531 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2533 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2534 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2536 added_monitors.clear();
2542 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2543 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2544 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2545 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2546 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2547 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2550 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2551 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2553 Event::SendFailHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2554 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2555 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2557 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2563 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2564 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2566 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2567 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2569 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2570 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2572 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2576 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2577 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2578 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2579 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2581 for _ in 0..node_count {
2582 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
2583 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
2584 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2585 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
2587 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2588 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2589 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2591 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()).unwrap();
2592 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id).unwrap());
2593 nodes.push(Node { feeest, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node_id, node, router });
2600 fn fake_network_test() {
2601 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2602 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
2603 let nodes = create_network(4);
2605 // Create some initial channels
2606 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2607 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2608 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2610 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2611 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2612 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2613 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2614 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2616 // Send some more payments
2617 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2618 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
2619 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
2621 // Test failure packets
2622 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
2623 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
2625 // Add a new channel that skips 3
2626 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2628 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2629 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2630 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2631 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2632 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2633 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2634 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2636 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
2637 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2638 hops.push(RouteHop {
2639 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2640 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2642 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2644 hops.push(RouteHop {
2645 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2646 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2648 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2650 hops.push(RouteHop {
2651 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2652 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2654 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2656 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2657 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2658 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
2660 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2661 hops.push(RouteHop {
2662 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2663 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2665 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2667 hops.push(RouteHop {
2668 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2669 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2671 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2673 hops.push(RouteHop {
2674 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2675 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2677 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2679 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2680 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2681 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
2683 // Claim the rebalances...
2684 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
2685 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2687 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
2688 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2690 // Send some payments across both channels
2691 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2692 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2693 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2695 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
2697 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
2699 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2700 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2701 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
2703 // Close down the channels...
2704 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
2705 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
2706 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
2707 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
2708 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
2710 // Check that we processed all pending events
2712 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2713 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2717 #[derive(PartialEq)]
2718 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
2719 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2720 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2721 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
2723 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2725 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
2726 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
2728 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2729 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == chan.3.txid() {
2730 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2731 funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
2732 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2733 res.push(tx.clone());
2737 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
2739 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
2740 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2741 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == res[0].txid() {
2742 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2743 funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
2744 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2745 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
2746 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
2748 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
2750 res.push(tx.clone());
2754 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
2760 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2761 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2763 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
2764 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2765 let mut found_prev = false;
2767 for tx in prev_txn {
2768 if node_txn[0].input[0].prev_hash == tx.txid() {
2769 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2770 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
2771 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2773 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
2774 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
2780 assert!(found_prev);
2782 let mut res = Vec::new();
2783 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
2787 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
2788 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2789 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2790 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
2791 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2794 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2797 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2798 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2799 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
2800 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2803 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2807 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
2808 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
2813 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2814 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2815 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2816 let nodes = create_network(5);
2818 // Create some initial channels
2819 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2820 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2821 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2822 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2824 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2825 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2826 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2827 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2828 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2830 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2831 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2833 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2834 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2835 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
2836 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2838 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2839 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2840 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2842 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2843 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2845 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
2846 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2848 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2849 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2850 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
2851 assert_eq!(nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2853 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
2854 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2855 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2857 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2858 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2860 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2862 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2863 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2864 added_monitors.clear();
2867 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2868 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2870 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, .. } => {
2871 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2873 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2879 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2880 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2881 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2883 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2885 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2886 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2888 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2889 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
2891 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2893 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
2894 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2895 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2897 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2898 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2901 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2902 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2903 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5 {
2904 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2905 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2908 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2910 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2911 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2913 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2914 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2915 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5 {
2916 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2917 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2920 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2922 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2923 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
2925 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2927 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
2928 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2929 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2931 // Create some new channels:
2932 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2934 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2935 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2936 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2937 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
2938 // Revoke the old state
2939 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2942 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2943 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
2945 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2946 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2947 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2949 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2950 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2951 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2955 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
2956 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2957 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2958 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
2960 //TODO: At this point nodes[1] should claim the revoked HTLC-Timeout output, but that's
2961 //not yet implemented in ChannelMonitor
2963 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2964 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2965 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2967 // Check that we processed all pending events
2969 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2970 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2975 fn test_unconf_chan() {
2976 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
2977 let nodes = create_network(2);
2978 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2980 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2981 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
2982 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
2983 mem::drop(channel_state);
2985 let mut headers = Vec::new();
2986 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2987 headers.push(header.clone());
2989 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2990 headers.push(header.clone());
2992 while !headers.is_empty() {
2993 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
2995 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2996 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
2997 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);