1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
30 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
69 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
70 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
71 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
72 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
73 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
75 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
76 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
79 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
80 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
81 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
82 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
85 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
86 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
87 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
88 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
92 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
95 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
96 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
97 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
100 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102 pub enum HTLCSource {
103 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
106 session_priv: SecretKey,
107 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
108 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
109 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
114 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
115 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
116 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
117 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
118 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
126 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
134 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
136 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
137 err: msgs::HandleError,
138 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
140 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
142 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
146 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
147 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
149 data: err.to_string()
153 needs_channel_force_close: false,
157 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
161 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
162 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
164 data: err.to_string()
168 needs_channel_force_close: true,
172 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
173 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
176 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
177 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
180 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
183 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
185 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
187 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
189 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
190 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
192 data: msg.to_string()
197 needs_channel_force_close: false,
201 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
204 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
206 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
208 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
210 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
211 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
213 data: msg.to_string()
218 needs_channel_force_close: true,
223 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
224 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
226 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
227 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
229 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
233 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
234 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
235 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
236 /// probably increase this significantly.
237 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
239 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
240 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
242 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
245 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
246 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
247 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
248 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
249 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
250 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
251 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
253 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
257 struct ChannelHolder {
258 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
259 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
260 next_forward: Instant,
261 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
262 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
263 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
264 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
265 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
266 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
267 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
269 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
270 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
271 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
272 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
274 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
275 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
276 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
277 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
278 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
279 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
280 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
283 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
285 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
286 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
287 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
288 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
289 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
290 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
295 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
296 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
298 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
299 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
301 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
302 /// to individual Channels.
304 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
305 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
306 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
307 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
309 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
310 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
311 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
312 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
313 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
314 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
315 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
317 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
318 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
319 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
320 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
322 pub struct ChannelManager {
323 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
324 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
325 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
326 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
327 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
329 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
330 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
331 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
332 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
333 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
335 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
336 our_network_key: SecretKey,
338 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
339 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
340 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
341 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
342 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
344 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
349 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
350 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
351 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
352 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
353 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
354 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
355 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
357 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
358 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
359 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
360 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
363 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
365 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
366 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
369 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
371 macro_rules! secp_call {
372 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
375 Err(_) => return Err($err),
382 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
384 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
385 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
390 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
391 pub struct ChannelDetails {
392 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
393 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
394 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
395 /// lifetime of the channel.
396 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
397 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
398 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
399 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
400 /// The node_id of our counterparty
401 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
402 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
403 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
404 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
408 impl ChannelManager {
409 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
411 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
412 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
414 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
415 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
417 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
418 pub fn new(fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
419 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
421 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
422 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
423 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
424 monitor: monitor.clone(),
428 announce_channels_publicly,
429 fee_proportional_millionths,
430 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
431 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
434 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
435 by_id: HashMap::new(),
436 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
437 next_forward: Instant::now(),
438 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
439 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
440 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
442 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
444 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
445 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
451 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
452 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
456 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
458 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
459 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
460 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
461 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
463 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
464 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
466 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
467 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
468 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
469 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
471 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
472 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
473 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
474 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
475 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
476 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
478 panic!("RNG is bad???");
481 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
483 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
484 node_id: their_network_key,
490 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
491 /// more information.
492 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
493 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
494 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
495 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
496 res.push(ChannelDetails {
497 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
498 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
499 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
500 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
501 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
507 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
508 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
509 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
510 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
511 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
512 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
513 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
514 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
515 // really wanted anyway.
516 if channel.is_live() {
517 res.push(ChannelDetails {
518 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
519 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
520 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
521 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
522 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
529 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
530 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
531 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
533 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
534 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
535 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
537 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
538 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
539 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
540 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
541 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
542 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
543 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
544 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
547 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
548 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
549 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
551 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
552 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
554 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
557 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
558 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
559 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
561 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
562 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
567 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
568 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
569 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
578 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
579 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
580 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
581 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
582 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
584 for tx in local_txn {
585 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
587 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
588 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
589 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
590 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
591 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
592 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
593 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
596 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
597 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
598 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
599 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
602 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
603 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
604 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
605 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
606 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
613 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
614 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
615 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
616 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
622 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
623 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
624 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
625 for chan in self.list_channels() {
626 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
630 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
632 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
634 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
635 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
636 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
637 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
641 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
642 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
643 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
644 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
645 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
650 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
651 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
652 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
658 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
659 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
661 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
662 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
663 let mut res = [0; 32];
664 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
668 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
669 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
670 let mut res = [0; 32];
671 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
677 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
678 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
679 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
680 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
681 let mut res = [0; 32];
682 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
687 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
688 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
689 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
690 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
691 let mut res = [0; 32];
692 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
696 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
698 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
699 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
700 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
702 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
703 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
705 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
706 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
707 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
708 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
709 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
711 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
713 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
714 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
716 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
722 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
723 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
724 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
726 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
727 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
733 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
743 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
744 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
745 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
746 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
747 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
748 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
749 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
750 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
752 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
753 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
754 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
755 // the intended recipient).
756 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
757 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
758 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
760 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
761 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
762 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
763 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
767 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
768 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
769 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
771 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
772 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
773 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
775 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
777 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
781 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
783 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
791 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
792 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
794 for i in 0..dst.len() {
799 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
800 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
801 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
802 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
805 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
806 let end_len = iters * 65;
807 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
808 res.resize(end_len, 0);
810 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
811 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
812 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
813 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
814 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
819 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
820 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
822 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
823 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
824 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
825 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
827 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
828 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
829 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
832 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
835 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
836 hmac.input(&packet_data);
837 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
838 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
843 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
844 hop_data: packet_data,
849 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
850 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
851 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
852 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
854 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
855 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
856 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
857 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
858 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
859 data: packet_crypted,
863 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
864 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
865 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
867 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
870 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
871 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
872 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
873 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
877 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
878 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
881 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
883 failuremsg: failuremsg,
887 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
888 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
889 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
895 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
896 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
897 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
900 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
901 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
904 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
905 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
906 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
907 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
913 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
914 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
915 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
916 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
917 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
918 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
919 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
920 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
923 let shared_secret = {
924 let mut arr = [0; 32];
925 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
928 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
930 let mut channel_state = None;
931 macro_rules! return_err {
932 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
934 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
935 if channel_state.is_none() {
936 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
938 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
939 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
940 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
941 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
942 })), channel_state.unwrap());
947 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
948 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
949 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
950 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
951 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
952 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
953 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
954 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
957 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
958 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
959 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
960 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
961 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
964 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
965 let next_hop_data = {
966 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
967 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
968 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
970 let error_code = match err {
971 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
972 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
974 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
980 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
982 // final_expiry_too_soon
983 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
984 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
986 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
987 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
988 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
990 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
991 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
992 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
995 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
996 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
997 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
998 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1000 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1002 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1003 short_channel_id: 0,
1004 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1005 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1006 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1009 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1010 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1011 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1013 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1015 let blinding_factor = {
1016 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1017 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1018 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1019 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1020 sha.result(&mut res);
1021 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1023 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1029 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1030 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1033 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1035 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1036 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1037 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1040 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1041 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1042 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1043 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1044 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1045 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1046 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1050 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1051 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1052 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1053 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1054 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1055 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1056 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1058 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1060 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1061 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1063 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1064 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1065 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1066 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1067 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1068 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1069 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1071 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1072 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1074 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1075 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1076 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1078 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1079 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1081 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1082 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1083 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1084 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1086 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1087 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1092 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1093 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1094 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1096 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1097 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1099 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1100 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1102 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1107 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1110 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1111 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1112 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1113 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1114 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1118 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1120 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1121 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1122 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1123 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1124 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1125 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1126 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1127 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1128 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1129 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1132 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1133 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1135 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1141 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1143 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1144 /// fields for more info.
1146 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1147 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1148 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1149 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1150 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1151 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1153 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1155 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1156 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1157 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1158 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1159 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1161 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1162 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1163 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1164 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1168 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1169 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1170 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1172 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1174 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1176 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1177 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1178 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1179 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1181 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1182 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1184 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1185 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1186 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1190 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1191 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1192 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1194 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1195 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1197 if !chan.is_live() {
1198 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1200 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1201 route: route.clone(),
1202 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1203 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1204 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1207 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1208 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1209 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1210 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1213 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1214 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1215 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1216 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1217 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1218 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1219 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1231 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1233 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1235 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1236 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1237 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1238 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1240 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1241 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1242 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1244 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1245 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1246 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1249 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1250 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1251 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1261 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1262 // lock before add_update_monitor
1263 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1267 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1268 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1269 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1272 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1273 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1274 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1276 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1282 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1283 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1285 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1287 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1289 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1290 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1292 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1293 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1294 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1295 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1296 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1300 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1302 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1303 /// Will likely generate further events.
1304 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1305 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1307 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1308 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1310 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1311 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1313 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1317 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1318 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1319 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1320 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1322 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1323 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1324 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1325 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1326 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1327 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1329 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1334 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1336 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1337 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1338 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1339 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1340 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1341 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1343 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1345 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1346 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1351 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1353 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1354 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1355 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1356 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1357 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1358 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1359 // this channel currently :/.
1366 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1367 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1370 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1371 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1373 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1375 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1379 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1380 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1382 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1383 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1384 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1385 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1386 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1387 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1388 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1390 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1395 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1396 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1397 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1398 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1399 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1401 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1402 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1403 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1405 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1406 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1407 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1414 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1416 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1417 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1421 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1422 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1423 events.append(&mut new_events);
1426 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1427 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1428 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1430 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1431 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1432 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1433 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1434 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1435 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1441 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1442 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1443 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1444 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1445 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1446 /// still-available channels.
1447 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1449 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1450 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1451 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1452 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1453 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1454 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1455 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1460 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1461 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1462 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1465 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1468 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1469 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1470 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1471 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1472 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1474 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1475 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1479 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1481 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1482 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1486 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1487 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1488 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1489 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1492 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1493 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1494 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1495 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1496 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1497 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1498 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1500 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1506 //TODO: Do something with e?
1514 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1515 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1516 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1518 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1519 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1520 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1521 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1522 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1523 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1525 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1527 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1528 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1529 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1530 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1531 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1532 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1537 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1539 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1540 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1541 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1542 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1546 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1547 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1548 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1550 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1551 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1553 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1554 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1560 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1561 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1562 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1563 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1564 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1565 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1568 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1569 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1570 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1571 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1572 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1573 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1574 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1575 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1583 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1584 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1585 //TODO: Do something with e?
1593 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1594 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1595 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1598 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1599 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1601 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1602 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1603 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1604 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1605 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1608 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1609 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1610 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1611 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1612 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1613 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1614 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1615 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1617 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1618 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1619 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1621 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1622 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1623 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1629 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1632 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1633 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1634 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1636 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1638 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1639 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1640 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1641 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1646 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1647 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1648 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1649 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1650 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1655 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1659 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1670 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1671 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1673 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1675 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1676 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1680 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1681 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1682 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1685 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1686 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1687 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1688 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1689 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1690 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1691 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1692 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1693 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1694 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1696 entry.insert(channel);
1702 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1703 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1704 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1705 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1707 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1708 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1709 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1711 chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1712 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1713 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1715 //TODO: same as above
1716 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1719 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1720 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1721 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1722 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1723 output_script: output_script,
1724 user_channel_id: user_id,
1729 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1730 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1731 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1732 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1733 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1734 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1735 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1736 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1738 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1739 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1740 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1743 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1747 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1750 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1751 // lock before add_update_monitor
1752 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1755 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1756 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1757 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1758 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1759 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1761 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1762 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1763 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1772 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1773 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1774 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1775 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1777 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1778 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1779 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1781 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1782 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1785 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1787 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1790 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1791 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1792 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1793 user_channel_id: user_id,
1798 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1799 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1800 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1801 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1803 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1804 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1805 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1807 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1808 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1809 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan) {
1810 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1811 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1812 msg: announcement_sigs,
1817 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1821 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1822 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1823 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1824 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1826 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1827 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1828 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1829 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1830 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1832 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1833 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1834 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1835 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1839 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1840 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1841 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1845 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1846 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1847 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1849 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1850 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1852 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1855 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1856 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1857 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1859 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1860 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1861 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1862 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1870 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1871 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1872 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1873 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1874 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1875 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1876 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1877 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1878 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1880 let (closing_signed, tx) = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1881 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1882 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1883 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1888 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1889 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1890 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1891 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1892 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1893 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1894 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1896 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1897 } else { (tx, None) }
1899 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1902 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1903 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1905 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1906 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1907 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1908 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1916 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1917 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1918 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1919 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1921 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1922 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1923 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1924 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1926 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1927 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1929 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1931 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1932 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1933 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1935 if !chan.is_usable() {
1936 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1938 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1940 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1944 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1945 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1946 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1948 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1949 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1950 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1952 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1953 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1955 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1957 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1961 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
1962 // indicating that the payment itself failed
1963 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
1964 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
1965 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
1966 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
1967 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
1969 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
1970 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
1974 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
1975 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
1976 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
1979 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
1981 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1982 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1983 if res.is_some() { return; }
1985 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
1986 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
1987 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
1989 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
1991 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1992 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1993 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1994 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1995 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1997 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
1999 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2000 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2001 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2002 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2003 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2004 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2006 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2007 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
2008 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2009 // definitely came from the peer in question
2010 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
2012 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
2014 match error_code & 0xff {
2016 // either from an intermediate or final node
2017 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
2018 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
2019 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
2020 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
2021 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2022 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2023 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
2024 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2025 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
2026 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2027 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2033 if is_from_final_node {
2034 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2035 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2036 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2037 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2038 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2039 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2042 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2043 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2047 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2048 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2049 // does not coform to the spec.
2050 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2051 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2052 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2058 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2062 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2064 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2065 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2066 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2070 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2071 let offset = match error_code {
2072 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2073 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2074 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2075 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2076 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2077 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2079 // node sending unknown code
2080 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2081 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2088 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2089 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2090 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2091 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2092 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2093 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2094 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2095 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2098 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2099 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2100 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2101 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2103 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2104 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2105 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2106 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2107 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2109 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2110 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2111 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2112 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2114 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2115 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2116 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2117 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2119 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2120 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2123 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2124 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2128 res = Some((msg, true));
2134 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2137 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2138 res = Some((None, true));
2142 // node sending unknown code
2143 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2144 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2153 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2154 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2155 } else { ((None, true)) }
2158 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2159 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2160 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2162 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2163 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2164 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2166 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2167 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2169 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2174 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2175 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2176 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2178 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2179 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2180 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2182 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
2183 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
2185 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2186 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2189 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2193 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2194 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2195 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2196 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2198 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2199 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2200 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2202 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2203 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2206 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2207 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2208 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2210 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2211 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2212 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2213 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2214 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2215 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2216 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2217 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2219 commitment_signed: msg,
2225 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2230 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2231 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2232 let mut forward_event = None;
2233 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2234 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2235 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2236 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2237 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2239 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2240 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2241 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2242 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2244 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2245 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2250 match forward_event {
2252 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2253 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2254 time_forwardable: time
2262 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2263 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2264 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2265 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2266 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2268 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2269 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2270 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2272 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2273 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2276 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2277 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2278 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2282 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2284 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2287 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2288 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2290 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2295 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2296 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2297 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2299 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2300 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2301 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2303 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2305 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2309 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2310 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2311 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2313 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2315 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2316 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2318 if !chan.is_usable() {
2319 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2322 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2323 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2324 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2326 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2327 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2328 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2329 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2330 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2332 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2334 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2335 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2336 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2337 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2338 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2339 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2340 contents: announcement,
2342 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2345 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2350 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2351 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2352 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2354 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2356 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2357 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2359 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2360 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2361 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2362 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2366 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2367 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2368 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2372 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2373 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2374 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2375 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2380 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2381 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2382 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2383 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2389 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2393 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2400 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2404 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2405 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2406 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2407 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2409 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2410 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2411 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2412 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2414 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2415 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2417 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2418 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2420 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2421 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2423 if !chan.is_live() {
2424 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2426 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2427 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2430 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2431 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2432 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2433 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2434 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2435 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2436 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2437 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2448 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2449 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2450 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2451 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2452 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2457 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2458 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2459 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2460 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2461 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2466 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2467 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2468 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2469 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2471 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2472 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2473 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2474 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2475 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2476 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2477 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2478 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2479 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2480 msg: funding_locked,
2482 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2483 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2484 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2485 msg: announcement_sigs,
2488 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2489 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2490 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2491 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2494 if channel.is_shutdown() {
2498 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2499 for tx in txn_matched {
2500 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2501 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2502 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2503 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2505 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2506 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2507 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2508 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2509 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2510 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2519 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2520 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2521 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2523 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2524 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2525 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2526 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2527 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2528 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2529 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2538 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2539 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2541 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2542 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2545 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2546 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2547 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2548 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2550 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2551 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2552 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2553 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2554 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2555 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2556 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2557 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2559 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2560 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2561 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2571 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2572 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2574 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2575 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2579 macro_rules! handle_error {
2580 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2583 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2584 if needs_channel_force_close {
2586 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2587 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2588 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2590 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2593 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2594 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2595 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2596 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2597 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2599 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2611 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2612 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2613 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2614 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2615 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2618 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2619 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2620 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2623 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2624 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2625 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2628 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2629 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2630 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2633 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2634 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2635 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2638 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2639 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2640 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2643 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2644 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2645 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2648 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2649 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2650 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2653 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2654 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2655 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2658 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2659 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2660 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2663 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2664 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2665 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2668 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2669 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2670 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2673 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2674 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2675 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2678 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2679 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2680 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2683 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2684 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2685 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2688 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2689 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2690 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2693 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2694 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2695 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2696 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2698 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2699 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2700 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2701 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2702 if no_connection_possible {
2703 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2704 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2705 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2706 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2708 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2709 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2710 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2720 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2721 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2722 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2723 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2724 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2725 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2726 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2728 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2729 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2730 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2739 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2740 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2742 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2743 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2744 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2749 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2750 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2751 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2752 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2753 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2754 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2755 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2756 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2757 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2758 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2759 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2763 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2764 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2765 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2771 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2774 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2775 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2777 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2778 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2779 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2780 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2784 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2789 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2790 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2792 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2793 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2794 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2796 onion.write(writer)?;
2800 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2801 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2802 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2803 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2804 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2809 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2810 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2811 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2813 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2814 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2816 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2818 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2819 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2820 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2821 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2822 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2827 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2828 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2830 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2832 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2834 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2836 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2843 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2844 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2845 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2846 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2847 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2848 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2853 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2854 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2856 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2858 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2860 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2862 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2869 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2870 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2871 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2872 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2873 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2874 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2879 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2882 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2885 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2886 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2888 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2890 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2892 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2894 route.write(writer)?;
2895 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2896 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2903 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2904 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2905 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2906 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2907 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2908 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2909 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2910 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2912 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2917 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2918 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2920 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2924 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2926 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2927 data.write(writer)?;
2934 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
2935 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
2936 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2937 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
2938 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2939 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
2940 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
2942 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2947 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
2948 prev_short_channel_id,
2953 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
2954 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2955 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
2957 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2958 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2960 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
2961 self.announce_channels_publicly.write(writer)?;
2962 self.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
2963 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
2964 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
2966 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2967 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
2968 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2969 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2970 unfunded_channels += 1;
2973 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
2974 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2975 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2976 channel.write(writer)?;
2980 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2981 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
2982 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2983 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2984 for forward in pending_forwards {
2985 forward.write(writer)?;
2989 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2990 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
2991 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2992 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2993 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
2994 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3002 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3004 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3006 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3007 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3008 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3009 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3010 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3011 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3012 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3013 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3014 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3015 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3016 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3017 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3018 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3019 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3020 /// deserialization.
3021 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3023 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3025 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3026 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3027 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3029 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3030 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3031 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3032 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3033 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3035 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3036 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3037 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3038 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3039 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3040 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3041 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3042 /// deserialization.
3043 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3046 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3047 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3049 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3050 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3051 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3052 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3054 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3056 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3059 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3060 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3061 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3062 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3063 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3064 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3067 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3068 let announce_channels_publicly: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3069 let fee_proportional_millionths: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3070 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3071 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3073 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3075 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3076 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3077 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3078 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3079 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3080 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3081 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3082 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3085 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3086 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3087 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3088 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3089 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3090 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3091 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3092 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3093 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3095 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3096 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3098 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3101 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3105 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3106 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3107 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3111 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3112 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3113 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3114 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3115 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3116 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3117 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3118 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3120 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3123 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3124 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3125 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3126 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3127 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3128 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3129 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3130 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3132 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3135 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3137 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3138 monitor: args.monitor,
3139 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3140 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3142 announce_channels_publicly,
3143 fee_proportional_millionths,
3144 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3145 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3146 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3148 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3151 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3154 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3156 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3158 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3159 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3160 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3161 logger: args.logger,
3164 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3165 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3166 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3167 //connection or two.
3170 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3176 use chain::chaininterface;
3177 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3178 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
3179 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
3180 use chain::keysinterface;
3181 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
3182 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
3183 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3185 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
3186 use util::test_utils;
3187 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3188 use util::errors::APIError;
3189 use util::logger::Logger;
3190 use util::ser::Writeable;
3192 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
3193 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3194 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
3195 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3196 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3197 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
3198 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
3202 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3203 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3205 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3206 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3208 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3210 use std::cell::RefCell;
3211 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
3212 use std::default::Default;
3214 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3215 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3216 use std::time::Instant;
3219 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3220 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3221 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3226 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3227 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3230 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3231 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3234 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3235 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3238 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3239 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3242 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3243 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3248 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3250 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3251 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3256 fn onion_vectors() {
3257 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3258 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3260 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3261 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3262 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3263 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3264 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3266 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3267 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3268 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3269 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3270 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3272 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3273 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3274 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3275 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3276 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3278 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3279 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3280 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3281 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3282 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3284 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3285 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3286 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3287 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3288 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3290 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3291 let payloads = vec!(
3292 msgs::OnionHopData {
3294 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3295 short_channel_id: 0,
3297 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3301 msgs::OnionHopData {
3303 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3304 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3305 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3306 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3310 msgs::OnionHopData {
3312 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3313 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3314 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3315 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3319 msgs::OnionHopData {
3321 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3322 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3323 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3324 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3328 msgs::OnionHopData {
3330 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3331 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3332 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3333 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3339 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
3340 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3342 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3346 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3347 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3349 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3350 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3351 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3353 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3354 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3356 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3357 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3359 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3360 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3362 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3363 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3365 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3366 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3369 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3370 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3371 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3372 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3374 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3375 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3380 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3381 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3382 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3383 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3385 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3386 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3388 impl Drop for Node {
3389 fn drop(&mut self) {
3390 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3391 // Check that we processed all pending events
3392 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3393 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3394 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3399 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3400 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3403 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3404 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3405 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3406 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3409 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3410 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3412 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3413 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3415 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3416 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3419 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3420 }, match events[1] {
3421 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3422 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3423 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3424 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3425 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3426 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3427 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3428 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3430 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3436 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3437 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3439 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3440 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3442 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3443 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3446 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3452 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3453 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3455 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3456 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3458 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3459 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3462 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3468 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3469 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3470 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3471 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3473 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3477 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3478 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3480 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3481 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3482 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3484 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3485 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3487 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
3489 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3490 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3491 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3492 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3493 added_monitors.clear();
3495 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3498 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3500 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3501 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3502 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3503 added_monitors.clear();
3506 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3508 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3509 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3510 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3511 added_monitors.clear();
3514 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3515 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3517 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3518 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3519 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3521 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3527 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3528 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3529 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3533 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3534 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3535 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3536 ((match events_6[0] {
3537 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3538 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3539 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3542 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3543 }, match events_6[1] {
3544 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3545 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3548 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3552 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3553 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3554 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3558 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3559 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3560 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3561 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3563 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3564 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3565 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3566 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3569 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3572 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3573 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3574 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3575 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3576 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3577 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3580 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3583 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3585 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3588 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3589 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3592 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3593 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3595 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3596 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3597 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3599 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3602 macro_rules! check_spends {
3603 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3605 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3606 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3607 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3608 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3613 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3614 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3615 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3618 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3619 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3621 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3622 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3623 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3624 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3625 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3628 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3631 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3632 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3635 Some(match events_1[1] {
3636 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3637 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3640 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3644 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3645 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3647 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3648 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3649 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3650 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3653 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3654 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3656 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3657 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3660 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3667 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3668 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3669 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3670 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3671 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3672 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3673 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3675 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3676 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3677 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3678 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3679 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3680 (as_update, bs_update)
3682 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3684 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3685 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3686 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3687 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3689 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3690 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3691 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3692 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3693 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3694 (as_update, bs_update)
3696 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3697 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3699 (as_update, bs_update)
3704 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3705 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3708 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3709 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3710 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3711 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3712 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3713 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3716 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3718 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3719 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3724 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3725 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3727 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3728 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3729 added_monitors.clear();
3734 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3735 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3737 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3738 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3739 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3740 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3741 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3742 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3743 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3744 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3745 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3746 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3747 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3748 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!($node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3749 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3750 if $fail_backwards {
3751 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3752 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3754 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3755 if $fail_backwards {
3756 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3757 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3758 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
3759 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3760 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
3762 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3765 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3766 if $fail_backwards {
3767 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3768 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3770 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3772 added_monitors.clear();
3778 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3781 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3782 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3783 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3784 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3785 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3786 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3787 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3792 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3793 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3795 let mut payment_event = {
3796 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3797 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3799 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3800 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3801 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3803 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3805 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3806 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3808 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3809 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3810 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3812 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3813 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3815 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3816 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3819 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3820 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3822 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3823 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3824 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3826 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3827 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3828 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3830 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3833 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3834 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3835 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3836 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3837 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3843 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3846 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3847 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3848 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3850 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3851 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3852 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
3855 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3856 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3858 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3859 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3860 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3861 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3862 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3863 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3864 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3865 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
3867 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3873 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
3874 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
3876 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3877 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3878 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3879 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3883 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
3884 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
3886 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3887 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3888 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
3889 get_next_msgs!($node)
3891 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3894 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3895 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
3900 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3901 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3902 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3903 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
3904 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3905 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
3906 } else if update_next_msgs {
3907 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
3909 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3911 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3912 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3919 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
3920 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3921 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3923 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3924 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3926 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3931 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3932 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3935 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3937 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3938 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3939 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3940 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3941 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3944 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3947 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3948 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3949 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3950 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3951 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3954 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3956 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3958 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3959 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3963 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3964 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3965 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3968 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3969 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
3970 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3972 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3973 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3974 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3976 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3977 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3982 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3983 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3984 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3985 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3986 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3987 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3988 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3989 // second-to-last node!
3990 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3993 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3994 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3995 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3997 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3998 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3999 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4000 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4001 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4002 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4003 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4004 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4006 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4009 assert!(events.is_empty());
4011 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4012 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4019 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4021 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4022 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4024 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
4025 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4026 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4033 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4034 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4037 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4038 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4039 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4040 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4041 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4043 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4044 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4046 for _ in 0..node_count {
4047 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4048 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4049 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4050 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4051 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4052 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4053 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
4054 let node = ChannelManager::new(0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone()).unwrap();
4055 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4056 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
4057 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4058 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4066 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4067 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4068 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4069 let channel_id = chan.2;
4071 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4073 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4074 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4080 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4084 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4085 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4086 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4087 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4088 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4089 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4090 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4091 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4092 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4093 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4095 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4097 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4099 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4100 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
4101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4103 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4104 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4105 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4106 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4107 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4109 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4112 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4114 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4115 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4116 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4119 let payment_event = {
4120 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4121 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4122 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4124 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4125 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4127 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4128 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4129 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4130 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4131 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4134 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4135 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4136 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4137 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4140 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4141 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4142 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4143 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4144 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4145 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4146 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4149 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4150 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4151 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4152 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4153 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4154 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4155 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4158 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4159 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4160 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4163 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4164 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4167 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4170 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4171 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4173 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4174 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4177 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4182 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4183 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4184 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4185 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4186 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4187 let channel_id = chan.2;
4189 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4191 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4192 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4198 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4200 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4201 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
4202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4204 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4205 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4206 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4207 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4210 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4213 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4215 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4216 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4217 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4220 let payment_event = {
4221 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4222 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4223 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4225 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4226 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4228 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4229 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4230 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4231 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4232 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4235 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4238 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4242 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4243 let nodes = create_network(2);
4244 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4245 let channel_id = chan.2;
4247 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4249 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4250 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4256 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4257 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4258 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4259 // (3) update_fee ->
4260 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4261 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4262 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4263 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4264 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4265 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4266 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4267 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4268 // revoke_and_ack ->
4269 // B should send no response here
4270 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4271 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4272 // revoke_and_ack ->
4274 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4275 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4276 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4279 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4280 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4281 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4282 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4283 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4285 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4288 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4289 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4290 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4291 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4294 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4296 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4297 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4298 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4300 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4301 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4302 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4303 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4306 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4308 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4310 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4312 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4313 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4314 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4316 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4317 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4318 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4319 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4320 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4321 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4322 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4324 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4325 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4326 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4328 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4330 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4331 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4335 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4336 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4339 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4340 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4343 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4344 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4345 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4348 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4349 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4354 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4355 let nodes = create_network(2);
4356 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4357 let channel_id = chan.2;
4359 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4361 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4362 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4367 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4368 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4371 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4372 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4373 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4374 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4375 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4377 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4379 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4381 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4382 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4385 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4386 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4389 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4390 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4391 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4394 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4395 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4400 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4401 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4402 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4403 let channel_id = chan.2;
4405 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4407 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4408 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4414 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4416 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4417 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4420 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4421 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4422 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4423 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4424 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4426 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4428 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4429 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4430 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4431 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4433 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4435 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4437 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4438 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4440 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4441 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4442 added_monitors.clear();
4444 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4445 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4446 // node[1] has nothing to do
4448 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4449 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4452 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4453 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4454 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4456 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4458 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4460 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4461 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4462 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4463 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4464 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4465 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4467 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4468 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4470 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4472 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4474 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4476 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4478 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4479 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4481 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4483 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4485 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4486 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4488 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4489 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4491 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4492 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4494 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4495 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4497 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4498 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4501 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4503 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4504 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4505 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4509 fn test_update_fee() {
4510 let nodes = create_network(2);
4511 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4512 let channel_id = chan.2;
4514 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4516 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4517 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4523 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4524 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4525 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4526 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4527 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4528 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4529 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4530 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4531 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4532 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4533 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4534 // revoke_and_ack ->
4536 // Create and deliver (1)...
4537 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4538 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4541 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4542 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4543 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4544 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4545 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4547 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4549 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4551 // Generate (2) and (3):
4552 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4553 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4554 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4557 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4558 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4561 // Create and deliver (4)...
4562 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4564 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4565 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4566 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4567 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4568 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4570 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4573 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4574 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4577 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4578 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4580 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4581 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4583 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4584 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4587 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4588 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4591 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4592 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4593 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4594 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4595 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4596 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4597 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4598 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4602 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4604 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4605 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4607 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4609 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4611 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
4612 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
4613 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4617 fn fake_network_test() {
4618 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4619 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
4620 let nodes = create_network(4);
4622 // Create some initial channels
4623 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4624 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4625 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4627 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4628 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4629 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4630 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4631 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4633 // Send some more payments
4634 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4635 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
4636 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
4638 // Test failure packets
4639 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
4640 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
4642 // Add a new channel that skips 3
4643 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4645 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4646 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4647 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4648 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4649 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4650 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4651 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4653 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
4654 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4655 hops.push(RouteHop {
4656 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4657 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4659 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4661 hops.push(RouteHop {
4662 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4663 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4665 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4667 hops.push(RouteHop {
4668 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4669 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4671 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4673 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4674 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4675 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
4677 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4678 hops.push(RouteHop {
4679 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4680 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4682 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4684 hops.push(RouteHop {
4685 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4686 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4688 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4690 hops.push(RouteHop {
4691 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4692 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4694 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4696 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4697 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4698 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
4700 // Claim the rebalances...
4701 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
4702 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4704 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
4705 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4707 // Send some payments across both channels
4708 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4709 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4710 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4712 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
4714 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
4716 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4717 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
4718 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
4720 // Close down the channels...
4721 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
4722 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
4723 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
4724 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
4725 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
4729 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
4730 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
4731 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
4732 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
4734 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
4735 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
4736 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4737 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4738 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4739 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4741 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
4743 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4744 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4746 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4747 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4749 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
4750 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
4751 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
4754 #[derive(PartialEq)]
4755 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
4756 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
4758 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
4759 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
4760 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
4762 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
4763 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
4765 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
4767 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4768 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4769 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
4771 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
4772 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4773 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
4774 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
4775 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
4776 res.push(tx.clone());
4781 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
4782 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
4785 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
4787 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
4788 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4789 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
4790 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
4791 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
4792 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
4794 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
4796 res.push(tx.clone());
4800 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
4803 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4807 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
4808 /// HTLC transaction.
4809 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
4810 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4811 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4812 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4813 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
4814 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
4818 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4821 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4822 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4824 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
4825 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4826 let mut found_prev = false;
4828 for tx in prev_txn {
4829 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
4830 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
4831 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
4832 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
4838 assert!(found_prev);
4840 let mut res = Vec::new();
4841 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
4845 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
4846 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4847 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4848 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
4849 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4852 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4855 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4856 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4857 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
4858 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4861 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4865 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4866 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4870 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
4872 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4873 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4875 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4876 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4878 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4879 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4884 fn channel_reserve_test() {
4886 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
4887 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
4889 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
4890 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
4891 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4892 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
4893 chan.get_value_stat()
4897 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4898 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
4899 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
4901 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4902 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4904 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
4905 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4907 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
4908 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
4909 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4910 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4911 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
4915 macro_rules! expect_forward {
4917 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4918 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4919 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4920 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
4925 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
4926 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
4927 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4928 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4930 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4931 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4932 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
4934 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4939 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4940 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4942 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4944 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4946 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4947 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4948 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4950 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4951 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4955 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4956 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4957 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4959 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4960 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4963 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4966 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4967 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4968 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4969 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4970 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4973 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4974 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4975 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4976 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4977 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4981 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4982 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4983 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4984 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4986 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4987 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4991 // adding pending output
4992 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4993 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4995 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4996 let payment_event_1 = {
4997 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5000 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5001 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5002 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5004 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5006 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5007 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5009 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5010 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5011 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5012 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5017 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5018 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5020 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5021 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5022 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5023 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5024 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5026 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5028 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5029 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5030 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5031 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5032 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5033 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5035 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5036 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5037 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5038 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5041 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5043 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5047 // split the rest to test holding cell
5048 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5049 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5051 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5052 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5055 // now see if they go through on both sides
5056 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5057 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5058 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5060 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5061 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5063 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5065 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5066 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5067 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5068 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5072 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5073 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5074 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5076 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5077 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5079 // flush the pending htlc
5080 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5081 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5084 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5086 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5088 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5089 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5090 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5093 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5094 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5097 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5099 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5100 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5101 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5103 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5104 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5106 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5107 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5108 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5109 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5110 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5111 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5113 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5114 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5115 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5116 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5118 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5119 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5121 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5122 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5124 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5125 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5126 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5131 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5132 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5133 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5135 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5138 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5139 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5140 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5142 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5143 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5144 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5145 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5147 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5148 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5152 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5153 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5154 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5155 let nodes = create_network(5);
5157 // Create some initial channels
5158 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5159 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5160 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5161 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5163 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5164 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5165 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5166 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5167 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5169 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5170 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5172 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5173 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5174 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5175 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5177 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5178 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5179 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5181 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5182 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5184 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5185 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5187 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5188 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5189 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5190 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5192 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5193 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5194 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5196 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5197 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5199 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5200 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5202 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5203 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5205 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5206 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5207 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5208 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5210 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5216 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5217 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5218 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5220 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5222 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5223 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5225 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5226 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5228 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5230 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5231 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5232 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5234 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5235 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5236 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5239 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5240 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5241 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5242 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5243 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5247 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5248 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5249 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5250 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5251 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5254 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5256 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5257 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5259 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5260 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5261 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5262 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5263 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5266 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5268 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5269 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5271 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5273 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5274 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5275 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5277 // Create some new channels:
5278 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5280 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5281 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5282 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5283 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5284 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5285 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5286 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5287 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5288 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5289 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5290 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5291 // Revoke the old state
5292 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5295 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5296 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5298 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5299 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5300 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5301 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5303 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5304 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5306 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5308 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5309 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5310 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5311 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5312 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5314 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5315 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5316 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5320 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5321 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5322 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5323 let nodes = create_network(2);
5324 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5325 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5326 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5327 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5328 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5329 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5330 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5331 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5333 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5334 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5335 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5336 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5337 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
5339 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5341 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5342 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
5344 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
5345 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5346 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5350 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
5351 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
5352 let nodes = create_network(2);
5354 // Create some new channel:
5355 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5357 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5358 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5359 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
5360 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5361 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5363 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5364 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5365 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
5366 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5367 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5368 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5369 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5370 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5371 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5373 //Revoke the old state
5374 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5377 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5379 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5381 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5382 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5383 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5385 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
5386 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5388 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
5390 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5391 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5392 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5393 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5394 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5395 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5396 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5397 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
5399 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
5400 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5401 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
5403 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5404 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
5405 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
5406 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
5407 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5408 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
5410 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5411 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5412 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5416 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
5417 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
5418 let nodes = create_network(2);
5420 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5422 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5423 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5424 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
5425 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
5426 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5427 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5429 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5430 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5432 //Revoke the old state
5433 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5436 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5438 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
5440 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
5441 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5442 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
5444 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
5445 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
5446 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
5447 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
5448 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
5449 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
5450 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
5452 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5453 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5454 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5456 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
5457 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5458 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5459 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5460 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5462 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5463 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5464 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5465 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5466 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5467 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5468 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5469 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
5471 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
5472 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
5474 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
5475 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
5476 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
5477 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
5478 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5479 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5481 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5482 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5483 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5487 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
5488 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
5489 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
5490 let nodes = create_network(2);
5491 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5493 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
5494 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
5496 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5497 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5499 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5500 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5502 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5506 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5507 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5509 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5510 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
5513 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5514 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5516 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5517 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5519 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5523 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
5524 // registering new transactions
5525 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
5529 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
5530 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
5531 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5532 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5533 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5535 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
5537 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5539 let mut payment_event = {
5540 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
5541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5543 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5544 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5545 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5548 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5549 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5551 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5552 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5554 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5555 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5558 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5559 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5561 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5562 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5563 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
5564 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
5566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5567 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5568 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5570 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5572 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
5573 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
5574 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
5576 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
5577 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5578 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5580 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5581 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5583 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5587 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5588 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
5589 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
5590 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
5591 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5595 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5596 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
5598 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5599 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
5600 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5602 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5603 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5605 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5608 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
5610 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
5611 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
5612 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
5614 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
5615 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5616 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5617 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5618 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
5619 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
5620 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
5622 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
5626 fn test_unconf_chan() {
5627 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
5628 let nodes = create_network(2);
5629 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5631 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5632 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
5633 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
5634 mem::drop(channel_state);
5636 let mut headers = Vec::new();
5637 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5638 headers.push(header.clone());
5640 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5641 headers.push(header.clone());
5643 while !headers.is_empty() {
5644 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
5647 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5648 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5650 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5651 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5653 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5656 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5657 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
5658 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
5661 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
5662 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
5664 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
5665 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
5666 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
5667 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5668 res.push(msg.clone());
5670 panic!("Unexpected event")
5678 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
5679 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
5681 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5683 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
5685 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5691 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
5692 let mut commitment_update = None;
5693 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
5696 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5697 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5698 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
5699 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
5701 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5702 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5703 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
5704 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
5706 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5709 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
5712 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
5714 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5715 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5716 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
5717 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
5719 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5720 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5721 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
5722 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
5724 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5728 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
5733 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
5734 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
5735 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
5736 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5737 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
5738 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5739 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
5741 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
5742 for msg in reestablish_1 {
5743 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
5744 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
5746 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5747 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5749 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
5752 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
5753 for msg in reestablish_2 {
5754 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
5755 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
5757 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5758 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5760 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
5763 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
5764 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
5765 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
5767 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
5769 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5770 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5771 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
5772 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
5773 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
5774 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
5775 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
5778 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5781 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5782 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
5783 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5784 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5786 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5788 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5789 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5790 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5791 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
5793 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5795 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5796 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5797 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5798 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5799 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5801 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5802 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5804 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5805 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5808 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5809 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5811 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5812 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5813 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5814 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5815 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5816 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5817 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5820 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5824 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
5826 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5827 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5828 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
5829 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
5830 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
5831 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
5832 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
5835 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5838 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5839 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
5840 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5841 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5843 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5845 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5846 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5847 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5848 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
5850 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5851 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5852 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5853 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5854 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5856 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5857 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5859 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5860 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5863 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5864 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5866 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5867 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5868 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5869 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5870 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5871 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5872 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5875 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5881 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
5882 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
5883 let nodes = create_network(3);
5884 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5885 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5887 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5888 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5889 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5891 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5892 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5893 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
5894 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
5896 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5897 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5898 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5900 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5901 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5902 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5903 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5905 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5906 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5908 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
5909 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
5911 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
5913 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5914 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5916 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
5917 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
5919 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5922 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
5923 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
5924 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
5926 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5930 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
5931 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
5934 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
5935 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
5936 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5937 if messages_delivered == 0 {
5938 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5939 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
5941 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5944 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5945 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5947 let payment_event = {
5948 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5951 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5952 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5953 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5955 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
5957 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5958 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
5960 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5961 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5962 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5964 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5966 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5967 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5968 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5971 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5972 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5973 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5974 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5977 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
5978 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5979 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5987 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5988 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5989 if messages_delivered < 3 {
5990 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
5991 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
5992 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5993 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5994 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5995 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5996 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5997 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5998 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5999 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6000 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6001 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6002 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
6003 // Everything was delivered...
6004 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6007 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6008 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6010 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6011 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6014 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6015 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6016 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6018 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6019 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6021 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6022 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6024 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6025 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6026 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6031 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6034 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6035 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6036 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
6037 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6038 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6039 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6040 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6041 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6042 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6043 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6044 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6046 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6049 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
6050 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
6052 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6053 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6055 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6056 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6058 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6061 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
6062 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
6063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6064 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6066 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6067 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6068 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6069 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6071 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6072 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6073 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6074 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6077 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6078 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6079 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6087 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6088 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6089 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6090 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6091 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
6092 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
6093 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6094 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6096 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6097 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6099 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6102 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
6103 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6104 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6105 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6106 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6107 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6108 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6109 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6110 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6111 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6112 // Everything was delivered...
6113 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6116 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6117 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6118 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6120 // Channel should still work fine...
6121 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
6122 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6126 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
6127 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
6128 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
6129 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
6130 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
6134 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
6135 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
6136 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
6137 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
6141 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
6142 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
6143 let nodes = create_network(2);
6144 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6146 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6147 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6149 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6150 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6151 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6153 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6154 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6156 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6159 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6160 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6161 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6163 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6164 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6166 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6169 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6170 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6171 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6172 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6174 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
6175 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
6177 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6178 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6179 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
6183 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
6184 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
6185 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
6186 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6187 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6189 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6191 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6192 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6193 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6195 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
6196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6198 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6199 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6201 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
6202 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6205 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6208 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6209 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6211 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6212 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6213 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6214 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6215 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6216 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6217 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6219 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6220 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6221 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6223 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6224 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6226 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6229 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6230 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6231 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6234 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6237 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6238 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6240 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6241 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6242 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6243 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6244 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6245 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6247 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6248 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6249 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6250 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6252 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6253 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6255 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6256 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6258 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6260 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6261 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6262 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6263 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6264 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6265 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6266 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6267 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6268 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6271 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
6272 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6273 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6274 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6275 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6276 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6277 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6280 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6281 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6282 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6283 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6284 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6285 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6286 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6289 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6290 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6291 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6294 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6295 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6296 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6299 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6300 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6303 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6304 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6306 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6307 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6310 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6311 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6313 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6314 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6316 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
6317 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6319 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6322 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6323 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6326 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6330 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
6331 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
6332 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6333 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6335 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6336 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6338 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6339 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6342 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6343 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6345 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6346 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6349 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6350 // PaymentFailed event
6352 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6355 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
6356 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
6357 // a disconnect in between
6358 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6359 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6361 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6362 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6364 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6365 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6366 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6368 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6369 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6370 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6373 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6374 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6375 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6378 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
6379 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6382 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6383 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6384 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
6385 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6386 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6387 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6389 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6391 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6392 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6394 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6395 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6396 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6398 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6401 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
6403 // Now set it to failed again...
6404 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6405 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6406 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
6407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6409 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6410 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6411 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6414 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6415 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6416 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6419 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
6420 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6421 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6424 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6425 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6427 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6428 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6431 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6432 // PaymentFailed event
6434 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6438 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
6439 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
6440 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
6443 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
6444 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
6446 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
6447 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
6448 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
6449 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
6450 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
6451 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
6452 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
6453 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
6454 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
6455 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
6456 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
6457 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
6458 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
6459 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
6460 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
6461 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
6462 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
6463 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6464 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6466 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6468 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6469 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6470 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6472 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6473 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
6474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6476 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6477 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6478 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6480 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
6481 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
6482 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6484 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6485 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6486 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
6487 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6488 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6489 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6490 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6491 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6492 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6493 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6495 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6496 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6497 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6498 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6500 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6501 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6503 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6506 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
6507 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
6508 } else { panic!(); }
6511 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6513 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6516 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
6517 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6518 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6521 // Now fix monitor updating...
6522 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
6523 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6526 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
6527 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6528 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6530 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6531 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6532 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6533 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6534 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6535 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6537 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6538 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6539 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6540 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6542 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6543 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6545 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
6548 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
6549 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6550 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6552 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6553 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6554 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6555 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6556 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6557 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6559 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
6561 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6562 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6564 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6566 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6567 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6569 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6570 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6571 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6573 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
6574 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
6575 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6577 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6578 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6579 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6580 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6581 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
6582 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
6584 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6586 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6587 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6588 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6590 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6591 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6593 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6596 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6597 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6598 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6601 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
6605 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
6606 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6608 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6609 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
6610 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
6612 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
6613 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
6616 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
6618 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6619 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
6620 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
6621 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6622 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6625 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6629 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6631 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6632 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6633 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6634 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6635 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6637 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
6638 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6640 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
6641 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
6643 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
6644 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6647 let as_commitment_update;
6648 let bs_second_commitment_update;
6650 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
6651 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6652 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6653 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6654 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6655 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6656 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6657 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
6658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6661 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
6662 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6663 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6664 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6665 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6666 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6667 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6668 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
6669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6672 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
6675 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
6676 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6678 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
6679 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6681 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6682 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6684 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6687 handle_initial_raa!();
6689 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
6690 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6692 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6693 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6695 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6696 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6699 handle_initial_raa!();
6701 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
6702 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6704 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6705 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
6707 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
6708 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6710 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6715 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
6716 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6718 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6719 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6721 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6722 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6726 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6727 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6728 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6731 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6732 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6733 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6736 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6737 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6740 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6741 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6744 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6746 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6747 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6749 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6750 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6751 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6753 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6756 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6760 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
6761 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
6762 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
6763 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
6764 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
6765 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
6766 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
6770 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
6771 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
6772 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
6773 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
6774 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
6778 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
6779 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
6780 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
6781 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
6782 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
6783 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
6787 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
6788 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
6789 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6790 let nodes = create_network(2);
6792 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
6794 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6795 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6796 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6797 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6799 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6801 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6802 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6804 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6805 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6807 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
6809 let mut chan_announcement;
6811 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
6813 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6814 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
6815 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
6816 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
6817 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
6818 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
6819 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
6820 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
6821 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6826 macro_rules! sign_msg {
6827 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
6828 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
6829 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6830 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6831 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
6832 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
6833 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6834 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
6835 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
6836 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
6837 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
6838 contents: $unsigned_msg
6843 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6844 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6845 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
6846 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6848 // Configured with Network::Testnet
6849 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6850 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
6851 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6852 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6854 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6855 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
6856 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6857 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());