1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
18 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
19 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
22 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
23 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
26 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
29 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
30 use util::config::UserConfig;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
69 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
70 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
71 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
72 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
73 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
75 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
76 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
79 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
80 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
81 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
82 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
85 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
86 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
87 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
88 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
92 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
95 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
96 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
97 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
100 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102 pub enum HTLCSource {
103 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
106 session_priv: SecretKey,
107 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
108 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
109 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
114 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
115 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
116 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
117 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
118 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
126 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
134 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
136 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
137 err: msgs::HandleError,
138 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
140 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
142 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
146 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
147 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
149 data: err.to_string()
153 needs_channel_force_close: false,
157 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
161 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
162 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
164 data: err.to_string()
168 needs_channel_force_close: true,
172 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
173 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
176 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
177 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
180 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
183 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
185 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
187 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
189 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
190 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
192 data: msg.to_string()
197 needs_channel_force_close: false,
201 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
204 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
206 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
208 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
210 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
211 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
213 data: msg.to_string()
218 needs_channel_force_close: true,
223 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
224 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
226 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
227 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
229 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
233 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
234 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
235 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
236 /// probably increase this significantly.
237 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
239 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
240 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
242 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
245 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
246 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
247 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
248 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
249 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
250 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
251 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
253 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
257 struct ChannelHolder {
258 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
259 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
260 next_forward: Instant,
261 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
262 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
263 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
264 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
265 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
266 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
267 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
269 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
270 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
271 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
272 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
274 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
275 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
276 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
277 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
278 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
279 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
280 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
283 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
285 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
286 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
287 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
288 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
289 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
290 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
295 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
296 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
298 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
299 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
301 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
302 /// to individual Channels.
304 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
305 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
306 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
307 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
309 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
310 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
311 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
312 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
313 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
314 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
315 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
317 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
318 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
319 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
320 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
322 pub struct ChannelManager {
323 default_configuration: UserConfig,
324 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
325 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
326 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
327 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
328 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
330 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
331 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
332 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
334 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
335 our_network_key: SecretKey,
337 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
338 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
339 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
340 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
341 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
343 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
348 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
349 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
350 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
351 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
352 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
353 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
354 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
356 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
357 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
358 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
359 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
362 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
364 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
365 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
368 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
370 macro_rules! secp_call {
371 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
374 Err(_) => return Err($err),
381 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
383 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
384 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
389 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
390 pub struct ChannelDetails {
391 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
392 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
393 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
394 /// lifetime of the channel.
395 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
396 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
397 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
398 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
399 /// The node_id of our counterparty
400 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
401 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
402 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
403 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
407 macro_rules! handle_error {
408 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
411 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
412 if needs_channel_force_close {
414 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
415 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
416 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
418 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
421 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
422 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
423 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
424 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
425 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
427 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
439 impl ChannelManager {
440 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
442 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
443 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
445 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
447 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
448 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
449 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
451 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
452 default_configuration: config.clone(),
453 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
454 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
455 monitor: monitor.clone(),
459 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
460 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
463 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
464 by_id: HashMap::new(),
465 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
466 next_forward: Instant::now(),
467 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
468 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
469 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
471 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
473 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
474 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
480 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
481 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
485 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
487 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
488 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
489 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
490 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
492 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
493 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
495 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
496 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
497 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
498 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
499 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
502 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
503 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
505 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
506 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
507 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
508 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
509 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
510 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
512 panic!("RNG is bad???");
515 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
517 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
518 node_id: their_network_key,
524 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
525 /// more information.
526 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
527 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
528 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
529 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
530 res.push(ChannelDetails {
531 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
532 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
533 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
534 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
535 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
541 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
542 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
543 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
544 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
545 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
546 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
547 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
548 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
549 // really wanted anyway.
550 if channel.is_live() {
551 res.push(ChannelDetails {
552 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
553 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
554 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
555 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
556 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
563 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
564 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
565 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
567 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
568 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
569 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
571 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
572 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
573 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
574 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
575 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
576 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
577 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
578 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
581 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
582 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
583 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
585 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
586 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
588 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
591 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
592 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
593 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
595 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
596 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
601 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
602 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
603 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
612 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
613 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
614 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
615 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
616 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
618 for tx in local_txn {
619 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
621 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
622 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
623 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
624 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
625 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
626 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
627 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
630 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
631 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
632 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
633 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
636 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
637 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
638 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
639 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
640 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
647 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
648 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
649 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
650 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
656 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
657 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
658 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
659 for chan in self.list_channels() {
660 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
664 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
666 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
668 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
669 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
670 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
671 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
675 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
676 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
677 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
678 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
679 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
684 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
685 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
686 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
692 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
693 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
695 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
696 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
697 let mut res = [0; 32];
698 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
702 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
703 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
704 let mut res = [0; 32];
705 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
711 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
712 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
713 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
714 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
715 let mut res = [0; 32];
716 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
721 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
722 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
723 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
724 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
725 let mut res = [0; 32];
726 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
730 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
732 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
733 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
734 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
736 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
737 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
739 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
740 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
741 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
742 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
743 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
745 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
747 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
748 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
750 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
756 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
757 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
758 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
760 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
761 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
767 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
777 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
778 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
779 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
780 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
781 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
782 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
783 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
784 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
786 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
787 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
788 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
789 // the intended recipient).
790 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
791 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
792 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
794 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
795 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
796 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
797 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
801 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
802 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
803 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
805 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
806 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
807 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
809 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
811 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
815 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
817 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
825 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
826 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
828 for i in 0..dst.len() {
833 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
834 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
835 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
836 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
839 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
840 let end_len = iters * 65;
841 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
842 res.resize(end_len, 0);
844 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
845 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
846 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
847 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
848 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
853 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
854 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
856 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
857 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
858 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
859 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
861 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
862 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
863 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
866 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
869 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
870 hmac.input(&packet_data);
871 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
872 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
877 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
878 hop_data: packet_data,
883 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
884 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
885 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
886 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
888 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
889 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
890 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
891 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
892 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
893 data: packet_crypted,
897 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
898 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
899 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
901 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
904 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
905 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
906 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
907 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
911 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
912 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
915 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
917 failuremsg: failuremsg,
921 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
922 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
923 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
929 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
930 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
931 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
934 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
935 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
938 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
939 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
940 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
941 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
947 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
948 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
949 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
950 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
951 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
952 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
953 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
954 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
957 let shared_secret = {
958 let mut arr = [0; 32];
959 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
962 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
964 let mut channel_state = None;
965 macro_rules! return_err {
966 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
968 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
969 if channel_state.is_none() {
970 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
972 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
973 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
974 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
975 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
976 })), channel_state.unwrap());
981 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
982 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
983 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
984 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
985 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
986 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
987 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
988 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
991 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
992 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
993 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
994 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
995 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
998 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
999 let next_hop_data = {
1000 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1001 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1002 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
1004 let error_code = match err {
1005 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1006 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1008 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1014 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1016 // final_expiry_too_soon
1017 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1018 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1020 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1021 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1022 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1024 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1025 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1026 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1029 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1030 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1031 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1032 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1034 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1036 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1037 short_channel_id: 0,
1038 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1039 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1040 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1043 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1044 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1045 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1047 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1049 let blinding_factor = {
1050 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1051 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1052 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1053 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1054 sha.result(&mut res);
1055 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1057 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1063 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1064 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1067 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1069 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1070 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1071 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1074 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1075 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1076 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1077 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1078 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1079 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1080 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1084 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1085 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1086 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1087 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1088 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1089 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1090 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1092 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1094 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1095 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1097 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1098 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1099 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1100 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1101 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1102 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1103 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1105 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1106 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1108 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1109 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1110 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1112 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1113 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1115 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1116 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1117 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1118 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1120 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1121 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1126 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1127 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1128 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1130 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1131 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1133 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1134 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1136 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1141 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1144 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1145 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1146 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1147 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1148 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1152 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1154 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1155 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1156 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1157 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1158 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1159 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1160 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1161 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1162 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1163 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1166 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1167 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1169 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1175 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1177 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1178 /// fields for more info.
1180 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1181 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1182 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1183 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1184 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1185 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1187 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1189 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1190 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1191 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1192 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1193 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1195 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1196 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1197 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1198 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1202 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1203 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1204 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1206 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1208 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1210 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1211 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1212 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1213 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1215 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1216 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1218 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1219 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1220 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1224 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1225 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1226 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1228 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1229 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1231 if !chan.is_live() {
1232 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1234 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1235 route: route.clone(),
1236 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1237 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1238 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he|
1240 ChannelError::Close(err) => {
1241 // TODO: We need to close the channel here, but for that to be safe we have
1242 // to do all channel closure inside the channel_state lock which is a
1243 // somewhat-larger refactor, so we leave that for later.
1244 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }
1246 ChannelError::Ignore(err) => APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err },
1251 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1252 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1253 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1254 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1257 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1258 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1259 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1260 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1261 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1262 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1263 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1275 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1277 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1278 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1280 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1282 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1283 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1284 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1285 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1287 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1289 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1290 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1292 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1293 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, chan.channel_id()))
1299 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1300 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1301 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1304 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1305 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1306 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1307 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1314 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1315 // lock before add_update_monitor
1316 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1320 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1321 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1322 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1325 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1326 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1327 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1335 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1336 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1338 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1340 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1342 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1343 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1345 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1346 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1347 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1348 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1349 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1353 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1355 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1356 /// Will likely generate further events.
1357 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1358 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1360 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1361 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1363 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1364 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1366 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1370 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1371 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1372 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1373 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1375 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1376 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1377 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1378 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1379 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1380 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1382 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1387 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1389 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1390 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1391 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1392 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1393 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1394 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1396 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1398 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1399 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1404 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1406 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1407 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1408 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1409 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1410 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1411 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1412 // this channel currently :/.
1419 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1420 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1423 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1424 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1426 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1430 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1431 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1433 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1434 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1435 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1436 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1437 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1438 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1439 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1441 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1446 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1447 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1448 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1449 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1450 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1452 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1453 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1454 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1456 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1457 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1458 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1465 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1467 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1468 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1472 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1473 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1474 events.append(&mut new_events);
1477 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1478 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1479 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1481 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1482 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1483 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1484 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1485 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1486 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1492 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1493 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1494 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1495 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1496 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1497 /// still-available channels.
1498 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1500 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1501 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1502 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1503 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1504 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1505 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1506 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1511 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1512 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1513 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1516 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1519 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1520 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1521 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1522 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1523 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1525 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1526 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1530 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1532 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1533 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1537 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1538 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1539 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1540 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1543 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1544 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1545 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1546 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1547 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1548 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1549 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1551 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1557 //TODO: Do something with e?
1565 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1566 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1567 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1569 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1570 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1571 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1572 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1573 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1574 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1576 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1578 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1579 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1580 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1581 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1582 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1583 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1588 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1590 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1591 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1592 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1593 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1597 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1598 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1599 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1601 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1602 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1604 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1605 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1611 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1612 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1613 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1614 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1615 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1616 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1619 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1620 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1621 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1622 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1623 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1624 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1625 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1626 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1634 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1635 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1636 //TODO: Do something with e?
1644 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1645 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1646 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1649 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1650 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1652 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1653 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1654 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1655 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1656 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1659 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1660 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1661 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1662 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1663 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1664 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1665 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1666 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1668 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1669 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1670 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1672 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1673 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1674 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1680 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1683 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1684 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1685 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1687 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1689 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1690 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1691 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1692 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1697 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1698 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1699 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1700 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1701 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1706 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1710 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1721 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1722 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1724 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1726 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1727 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1731 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1732 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1733 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1736 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1737 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1738 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1739 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1740 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1741 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1743 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1744 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1745 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1747 entry.insert(channel);
1753 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1754 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1755 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1756 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1758 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1759 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1760 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1762 chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration)
1763 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1764 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1766 //TODO: same as above
1767 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1770 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1771 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1772 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1773 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1774 output_script: output_script,
1775 user_channel_id: user_id,
1780 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1781 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1782 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1783 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1784 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1785 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1786 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1787 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1789 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1790 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1791 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1794 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))
1798 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1801 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1802 // lock before add_update_monitor
1803 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1806 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1807 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1808 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1809 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1810 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1812 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1813 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1814 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1823 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1824 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1825 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1826 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1828 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1829 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1830 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1832 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1833 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1836 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1838 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1841 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1842 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1843 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1844 user_channel_id: user_id,
1849 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1850 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1851 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1852 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1854 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1855 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1856 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1858 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1859 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1860 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan) {
1861 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1862 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1863 msg: announcement_sigs,
1868 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1872 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1873 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1874 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1875 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1877 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1878 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1879 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1880 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1881 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1883 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1884 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1885 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1886 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1890 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1891 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1892 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1896 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1897 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1898 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1900 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1901 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1903 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1906 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1907 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1908 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1910 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1911 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1912 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1913 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1921 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1922 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1923 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1924 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1925 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1926 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1927 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1928 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1929 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1931 let (closing_signed, tx) = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1932 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1933 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1934 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1939 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1940 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1941 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1942 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1943 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1944 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1945 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1947 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1948 } else { (tx, None) }
1950 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1953 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1954 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1956 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1957 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1958 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1959 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1967 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1968 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1969 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1970 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1972 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1973 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1974 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1975 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1977 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1978 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1980 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1982 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1983 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1984 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1986 if !chan.is_usable() {
1987 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1988 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1989 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1990 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1991 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan);
1992 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1993 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1994 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1995 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
1996 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &update.encode_with_len()[..])
1998 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
1999 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2000 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2001 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2002 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2003 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2008 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
2010 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2014 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2015 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2016 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2018 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2019 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2020 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2022 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
2023 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
2025 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2027 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2031 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
2032 // indicating that the payment itself failed
2033 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
2034 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
2035 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
2036 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
2037 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
2039 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
2040 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
2044 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
2045 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
2046 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
2049 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
2051 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
2052 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
2053 if res.is_some() { return; }
2055 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
2056 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2057 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2059 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2061 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2062 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2063 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2064 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2065 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2067 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2069 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2070 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2071 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2072 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2073 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2074 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2076 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2077 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
2078 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2079 // definitely came from the peer in question
2080 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
2082 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
2084 match error_code & 0xff {
2086 // either from an intermediate or final node
2087 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
2088 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
2089 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
2090 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
2091 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2092 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2093 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
2094 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2095 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
2096 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2097 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2103 if is_from_final_node {
2104 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2105 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2106 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2107 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2108 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2109 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2112 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2113 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2117 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2118 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2119 // does not coform to the spec.
2120 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2121 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2122 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2128 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2132 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2134 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2135 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2136 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2140 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2141 let offset = match error_code {
2142 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2143 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2144 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2145 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2146 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2147 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2149 // node sending unknown code
2150 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2151 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2158 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2159 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2160 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2161 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2162 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2163 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2164 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2165 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2168 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2169 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2170 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2171 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2173 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2174 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2175 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2176 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2177 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2179 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2180 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2181 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2182 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2184 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2185 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2186 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2187 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2189 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2190 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2193 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2194 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2198 res = Some((msg, true));
2204 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2207 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2208 res = Some((None, true));
2212 // node sending unknown code
2213 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2214 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2223 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2224 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2225 } else { ((None, true)) }
2228 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2229 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2230 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2232 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2233 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2234 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2236 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2237 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2239 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2244 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2245 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2246 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2248 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2249 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2250 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2252 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2253 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set", msg.channel_id));
2255 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2256 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2259 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2263 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2264 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2265 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2266 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2268 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2269 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2270 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2272 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator)
2273 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2274 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2277 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2278 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2279 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2281 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2282 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2283 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2284 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2285 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2286 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2287 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2288 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2290 commitment_signed: msg,
2294 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2295 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2296 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2302 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2307 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2308 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2309 let mut forward_event = None;
2310 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2311 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2312 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2313 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2314 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2316 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2317 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2318 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2319 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2321 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2322 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2327 match forward_event {
2329 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2330 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2331 time_forwardable: time
2339 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2340 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2341 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2342 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2343 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2345 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2346 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2347 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2349 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator)
2350 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2351 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2354 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2355 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2356 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2360 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2361 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2362 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2366 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2368 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2371 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2372 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2374 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2379 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2380 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2381 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2383 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2384 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2385 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2387 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2389 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2393 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2394 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2395 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2397 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2399 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2400 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2402 if !chan.is_usable() {
2403 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2406 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2407 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2408 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2410 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2411 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2412 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2413 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2414 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2416 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2418 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2419 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2420 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2421 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2422 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2423 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2424 contents: announcement,
2426 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2429 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2434 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2435 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2436 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2438 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2440 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2441 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2443 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order, shutdown) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2444 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2445 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2446 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2450 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2451 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2452 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2456 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2457 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2458 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2459 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2464 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2465 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2466 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2467 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2473 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2477 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2482 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2483 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2484 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2490 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2494 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2495 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2496 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2497 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2499 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2500 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2501 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2502 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2504 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2505 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2507 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2508 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2510 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2511 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2513 if !chan.is_live() {
2514 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2516 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw)
2517 .map_err(|e| match e {
2518 ChannelError::Ignore(err) => APIError::APIMisuseError{err},
2519 ChannelError::Close(err) => {
2520 // TODO: We need to close the channel here, but for that to be safe we have
2521 // to do all channel closure inside the channel_state lock which is a
2522 // somewhat-larger refactor, so we leave that for later.
2523 APIError::APIMisuseError{err}
2526 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2529 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2530 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2531 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2532 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2533 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2534 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2535 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2536 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2547 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2548 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2549 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2550 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2551 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2556 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2557 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2558 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2559 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2560 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2565 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2566 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2567 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2568 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2570 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2571 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2572 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2573 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2574 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2575 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2576 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2577 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2578 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2579 msg: funding_locked,
2581 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2582 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2583 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2584 msg: announcement_sigs,
2587 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2588 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2589 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2590 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2593 if channel.is_shutdown() {
2597 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2598 for tx in txn_matched {
2599 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2600 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2601 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2602 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2604 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2605 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2606 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2607 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2608 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2609 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2618 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2619 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2620 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2622 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2623 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2624 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2625 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2626 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2627 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2628 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2637 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2638 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2640 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2641 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2644 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2645 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2646 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2647 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2649 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2650 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2651 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2652 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2653 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2654 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2655 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2656 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2658 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2659 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2660 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2670 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2671 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2673 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2674 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2678 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2679 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2680 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2681 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2682 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2685 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2686 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2687 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2690 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2691 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2692 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2695 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2696 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2697 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2700 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2701 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2702 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2705 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2706 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2707 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2710 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2711 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2712 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2715 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2716 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2717 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2720 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2721 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2722 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2725 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2726 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2727 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2730 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2731 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2732 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2735 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2736 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2737 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2740 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2741 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2742 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2745 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2746 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2747 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2750 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2751 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2752 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2755 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2756 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2757 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2760 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2761 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2762 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2763 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2765 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2766 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2767 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2768 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2769 if no_connection_possible {
2770 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2771 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2772 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2773 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2774 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2776 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2777 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2778 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2788 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2789 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2790 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2791 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2792 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2793 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2794 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2795 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2797 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2798 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2799 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2808 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2809 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2811 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2812 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2813 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2818 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2819 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2821 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2822 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2823 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2824 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2825 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2826 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2827 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2828 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2829 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2830 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2834 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2835 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2836 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2842 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2845 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2846 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2848 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2849 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2850 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2851 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2855 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2860 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2861 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2863 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2864 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2865 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2867 onion.write(writer)?;
2871 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2872 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2873 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2874 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2875 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2880 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2881 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2882 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2884 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2885 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2887 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2889 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2890 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2891 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2892 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2893 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2898 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2899 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2901 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2903 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2905 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2907 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2914 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2915 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2916 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2917 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2918 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2919 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2924 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2925 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2927 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2929 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2931 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2933 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2940 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2941 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2942 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2943 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2944 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2945 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2950 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2953 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2956 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2957 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2959 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2961 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2963 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2965 route.write(writer)?;
2966 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2967 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2974 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2975 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2976 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2977 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2978 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2979 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2980 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2981 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2983 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2988 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2989 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2991 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2995 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2997 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2998 data.write(writer)?;
3005 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3006 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3007 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3008 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3009 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3010 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3011 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3013 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3018 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
3019 prev_short_channel_id,
3024 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3025 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3026 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3028 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3029 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3031 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3032 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3033 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3035 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3036 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3037 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3038 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3039 unfunded_channels += 1;
3042 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3043 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3044 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3045 channel.write(writer)?;
3049 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3050 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3051 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3052 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3053 for forward in pending_forwards {
3054 forward.write(writer)?;
3058 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3059 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3060 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3061 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3062 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3063 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3071 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3073 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3075 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3076 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3077 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3078 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3079 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3080 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3081 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3082 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3083 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3084 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3085 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3086 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3087 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3088 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3089 /// deserialization.
3090 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3092 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3094 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3095 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3096 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3098 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3099 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3100 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3101 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3102 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3104 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3105 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3106 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3107 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3108 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3109 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3110 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3111 /// deserialization.
3112 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3113 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3114 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3115 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3117 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3118 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3120 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3121 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3122 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3123 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3125 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3127 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3130 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3131 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3132 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3133 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3134 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3135 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3138 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3139 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3140 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3142 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3144 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3145 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3146 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3147 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3148 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3149 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3150 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3151 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3154 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3155 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3156 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3157 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3158 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3159 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3160 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3161 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3162 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3164 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3165 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3167 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3170 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3174 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3175 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3176 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3180 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3181 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3182 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3183 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3184 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3185 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3186 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3187 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3189 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3192 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3193 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3194 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3195 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3196 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3197 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3198 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3199 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3201 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3204 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3206 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3207 monitor: args.monitor,
3208 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3209 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3211 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3212 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3213 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3215 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3218 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3221 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3223 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3225 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3226 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3227 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3228 logger: args.logger,
3229 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3232 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3233 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3234 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3235 //connection or two.
3238 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3244 use chain::chaininterface;
3245 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3246 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3247 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
3248 use chain::keysinterface;
3249 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
3250 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
3251 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3252 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3254 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
3255 use util::test_utils;
3256 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3257 use util::errors::APIError;
3258 use util::logger::Logger;
3259 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3260 use util::config::UserConfig;
3262 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3263 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3264 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
3265 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
3266 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3267 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
3268 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
3269 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3270 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3271 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3275 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3276 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3278 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3279 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3281 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3283 use std::cell::RefCell;
3284 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
3285 use std::default::Default;
3287 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3288 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3289 use std::time::Instant;
3292 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3293 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3294 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3299 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3300 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3303 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3304 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3307 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3308 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3311 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3312 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3315 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3316 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3321 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3323 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3324 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3329 fn onion_vectors() {
3330 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3331 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3333 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3334 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3335 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3336 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3337 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3339 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3340 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3341 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3342 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3343 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3345 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3346 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3347 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3348 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3349 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3351 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3352 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3353 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3354 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3355 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3357 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3358 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3359 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3360 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3361 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3363 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3364 let payloads = vec!(
3365 msgs::OnionHopData {
3367 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3368 short_channel_id: 0,
3370 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3374 msgs::OnionHopData {
3376 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3377 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3378 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3379 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3383 msgs::OnionHopData {
3385 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3386 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3387 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3388 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3392 msgs::OnionHopData {
3394 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3395 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3396 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3397 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3401 msgs::OnionHopData {
3403 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3404 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3405 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3406 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3412 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
3413 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3415 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3419 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3420 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3422 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3423 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3424 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3426 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3427 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3429 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3430 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3432 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3433 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("a5d3e8634cfe78b2307d87c6d90be6fe7855b4f2cc9b1dfb19e92e4b79103f61ff9ac25f412ddfb7466e74f81b3e545563cdd8f5524dae873de61d7bdfccd496af2584930d2b566b4f8d3881f8c043df92224f38cf094cfc09d92655989531524593ec6d6caec1863bdfaa79229b5020acc034cd6deeea1021c50586947b9b8e6faa83b81fbfa6133c0af5d6b07c017f7158fa94f0d206baf12dda6b68f785b773b360fd0497e16cc402d779c8d48d0fa6315536ef0660f3f4e1865f5b38ea49c7da4fd959de4e83ff3ab686f059a45c65ba2af4a6a79166aa0f496bf04d06987b6d2ea205bdb0d347718b9aeff5b61dfff344993a275b79717cd815b6ad4c0beb568c4ac9c36ff1c315ec1119a1993c4b61e6eaa0375e0aaf738ac691abd3263bf937e3").unwrap());
3435 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3436 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3438 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3439 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("9c5add3963fc7f6ed7f148623c84134b5647e1306419dbe2174e523fa9e2fbed3a06a19f899145610741c83ad40b7712aefaddec8c6baf7325d92ea4ca4d1df8bce517f7e54554608bf2bd8071a4f52a7a2f7ffbb1413edad81eeea5785aa9d990f2865dc23b4bc3c301a94eec4eabebca66be5cf638f693ec256aec514620cc28ee4a94bd9565bc4d4962b9d3641d4278fb319ed2b84de5b665f307a2db0f7fbb757366067d88c50f7e829138fde4f78d39b5b5802f1b92a8a820865af5cc79f9f30bc3f461c66af95d13e5e1f0381c184572a91dee1c849048a647a1158cf884064deddbf1b0b88dfe2f791428d0ba0f6fb2f04e14081f69165ae66d9297c118f0907705c9c4954a199bae0bb96fad763d690e7daa6cfda59ba7f2c8d11448b604d12d").unwrap());
3442 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3443 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3444 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3445 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3447 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3448 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3453 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3454 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3455 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3456 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3458 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3459 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3460 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3462 impl Drop for Node {
3463 fn drop(&mut self) {
3464 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3465 // Check that we processed all pending events
3466 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3467 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3468 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3473 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3474 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3477 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3478 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3479 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3480 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3483 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3484 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3486 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3487 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3489 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3490 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3493 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3494 }, match events[1] {
3495 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3496 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3497 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3498 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3499 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3500 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3501 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3502 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3504 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3510 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3511 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3513 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3514 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3516 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3517 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3520 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3526 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3527 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3529 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3530 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3532 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3533 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3536 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3542 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3543 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
3545 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3546 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3553 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3554 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3555 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3556 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3558 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3562 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3563 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3565 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3566 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3567 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3569 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3570 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3572 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3574 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3575 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3576 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3577 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3578 added_monitors.clear();
3580 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3583 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3585 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3586 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3587 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3588 added_monitors.clear();
3591 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3593 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3594 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3595 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3596 added_monitors.clear();
3599 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3600 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3602 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3603 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3604 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3606 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3612 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3613 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3614 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3618 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3619 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3620 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3621 ((match events_6[0] {
3622 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3623 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3624 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3627 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3628 }, match events_6[1] {
3629 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3630 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3637 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3638 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3639 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3643 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3644 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3645 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3646 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3648 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3649 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3650 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3651 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3654 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3657 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3658 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3659 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3660 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3661 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3662 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3665 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3668 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3670 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3673 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3674 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3677 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3678 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3680 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3681 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3682 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3684 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3687 macro_rules! check_spends {
3688 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3690 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3691 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3692 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3693 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3698 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3699 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3701 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3702 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3703 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3704 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3705 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3708 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3709 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3711 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3712 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3715 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3722 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
3723 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3724 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3727 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3728 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3730 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3731 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3732 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3733 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3734 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3737 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3740 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3741 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3744 Some(match events_1[1] {
3745 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3746 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3749 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3753 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3754 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3755 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3756 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3757 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3758 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3759 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3761 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3762 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3763 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3764 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3765 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3766 (as_update, bs_update)
3768 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3770 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3771 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3772 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3773 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3775 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3776 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3777 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3778 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3779 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3780 (as_update, bs_update)
3782 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3783 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3785 (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
3790 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3791 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3794 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3795 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3796 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3797 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3798 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3799 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3802 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3804 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3805 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3810 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3811 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3813 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3814 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3815 added_monitors.clear();
3820 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3821 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3823 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3824 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3825 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3826 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3827 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3830 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
3832 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3833 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3834 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3835 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3836 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3837 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3838 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3839 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3840 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3841 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3843 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3844 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3847 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3848 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3850 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3851 if $fail_backwards {
3852 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3853 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3855 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3857 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3858 if $fail_backwards {
3859 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3860 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3862 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3864 added_monitors.clear();
3869 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
3871 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
3874 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3876 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
3877 if $fail_backwards {
3878 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3879 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3880 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
3881 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3882 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
3884 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3890 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3893 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3894 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3895 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3896 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3897 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3898 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3899 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3904 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3905 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3907 let mut payment_event = {
3908 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3909 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3911 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3912 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3913 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3915 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3917 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3918 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3920 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3921 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3922 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3924 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3925 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3927 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3928 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3931 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3932 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3934 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3935 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3936 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3938 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3939 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3940 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3942 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3945 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3946 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3947 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3948 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3949 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3955 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3958 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3959 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3960 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3962 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3963 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3964 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
3967 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3968 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3970 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3971 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3972 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3973 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3974 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3975 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3976 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3977 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
3979 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3985 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
3986 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
3988 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3989 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3990 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3991 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3995 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
3996 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
3998 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3999 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4000 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
4001 get_next_msgs!($node)
4003 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4006 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4007 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
4012 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4013 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4014 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4015 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
4016 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4017 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
4018 } else if update_next_msgs {
4019 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
4021 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4023 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4024 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4031 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
4032 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4033 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4035 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4036 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4038 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4043 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
4044 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
4047 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
4049 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
4050 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4051 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4052 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4053 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4056 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4059 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4060 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4061 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4062 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4063 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4066 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4068 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4070 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4071 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4075 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4076 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4077 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4080 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4081 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
4082 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4084 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4085 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4086 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4088 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4089 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4094 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4095 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4096 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4097 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4098 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4099 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4100 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4101 // second-to-last node!
4102 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4105 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4106 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4107 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4109 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4110 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4111 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4112 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4113 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4114 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4115 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4116 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4118 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4121 assert!(events.is_empty());
4123 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4124 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4131 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4133 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4134 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4136 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
4137 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4138 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4145 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4146 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4149 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4150 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4151 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4152 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4153 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4155 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4156 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4158 for _ in 0..node_count {
4159 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4160 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4161 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4162 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4163 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4164 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4165 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4166 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4167 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4168 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4169 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4170 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4171 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
4172 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4173 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4181 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4182 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4183 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4184 let channel_id = chan.2;
4187 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4191 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4192 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4193 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4194 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4195 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4196 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4197 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4198 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4199 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4200 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4202 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4204 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4206 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4207 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4210 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4211 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4212 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4213 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4214 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4216 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4219 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4221 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4222 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4223 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4226 let payment_event = {
4227 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4228 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4229 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4231 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4232 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4234 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4235 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4236 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4237 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4238 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4241 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4242 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4243 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4244 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4247 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4248 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4249 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4250 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4251 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4252 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4253 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4256 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4257 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4258 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4259 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4260 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4261 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4262 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4265 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4266 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4267 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4270 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4271 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4274 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4277 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4278 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4280 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4281 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4284 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4289 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4290 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4291 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4292 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4293 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4294 let channel_id = chan.2;
4297 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4299 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4300 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4303 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4304 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4305 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4306 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4309 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4312 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4314 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4315 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4316 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4319 let payment_event = {
4320 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4321 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4322 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4324 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4325 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4327 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4328 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4329 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4330 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4331 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4334 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4337 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4341 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4342 let nodes = create_network(2);
4343 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4344 let channel_id = chan.2;
4347 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4348 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4349 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4350 // (3) update_fee ->
4351 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4352 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4353 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4354 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4355 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4356 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4357 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4358 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4359 // revoke_and_ack ->
4360 // B should send no response here
4361 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4362 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4363 // revoke_and_ack ->
4365 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4366 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4367 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4370 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4371 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4372 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4373 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4374 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4376 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4379 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4380 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4381 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4382 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4385 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4387 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4388 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4389 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4391 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4392 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4393 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4394 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4397 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4399 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4401 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4403 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4404 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4405 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4407 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4408 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4409 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4410 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4411 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4412 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4413 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4415 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4416 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4417 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4419 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4421 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4422 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4426 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4427 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4430 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4431 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4434 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4435 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4436 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4439 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4440 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4445 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4446 let nodes = create_network(2);
4447 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4448 let channel_id = chan.2;
4450 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4451 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
4452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4454 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4455 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4456 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4457 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4458 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4460 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4462 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4464 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4465 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4468 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4469 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4472 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4473 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4474 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4477 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4478 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4483 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
4484 let nodes = create_network(2);
4485 let channel_value = 1888;
4486 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
4487 let channel_id = chan.2;
4490 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
4491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4492 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4494 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4496 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
4498 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
4499 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
4501 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4502 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4504 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
4505 let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
4506 let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
4507 let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
4508 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
4509 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
4512 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
4513 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
4514 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
4515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4517 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4519 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4521 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
4522 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
4523 //Should produce and error.
4524 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
4526 assert!(match err.err {
4527 "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
4531 //clear the message we could not handle
4532 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4536 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4537 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4538 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4539 let channel_id = chan.2;
4542 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4544 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4545 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4548 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4549 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4550 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4551 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4552 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4554 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4556 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4557 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4558 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4561 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4563 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4565 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4566 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4568 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4569 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4570 added_monitors.clear();
4572 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4573 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4574 // node[1] has nothing to do
4576 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4577 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4580 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4581 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4582 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4584 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4586 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4588 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4589 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4590 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4591 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4592 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4593 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4595 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4596 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4598 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4600 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4602 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4604 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4606 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4607 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4609 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4611 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4613 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4614 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4616 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4617 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4619 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4620 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4622 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4623 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4625 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4626 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4629 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4631 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4632 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4633 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4637 fn test_update_fee() {
4638 let nodes = create_network(2);
4639 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4640 let channel_id = chan.2;
4643 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4644 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4645 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4646 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4647 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4648 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4649 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4650 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4651 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4652 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4653 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4654 // revoke_and_ack ->
4656 // Create and deliver (1)...
4657 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4658 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4661 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4662 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4663 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4664 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4665 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4667 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4669 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4671 // Generate (2) and (3):
4672 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4673 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4677 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4678 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4681 // Create and deliver (4)...
4682 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4683 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4684 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4685 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4686 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4687 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4688 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4690 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4693 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4694 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4697 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4698 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4700 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4701 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4703 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4704 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4707 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4708 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4711 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4712 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4713 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4714 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4715 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4716 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4717 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4718 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4722 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4724 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4725 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4727 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4729 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4731 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4732 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4733 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4737 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4738 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4739 let nodes = create_network(2);
4740 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4741 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4742 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4743 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4745 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4746 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4747 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4748 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4749 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4751 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4752 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4753 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4754 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4755 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4756 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4758 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4759 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4763 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4764 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4765 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4766 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4767 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4768 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4769 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4771 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4773 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4774 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4775 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4776 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4777 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4779 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4780 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4782 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4783 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4784 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4785 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4786 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4788 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4790 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4791 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4792 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4793 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4794 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4795 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4796 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4797 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4798 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4799 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4801 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4802 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4803 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4804 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4805 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4806 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4807 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4809 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4810 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4812 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4813 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4815 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4818 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4819 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4820 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4821 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4822 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4823 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4825 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4827 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4828 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4829 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4830 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4831 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4835 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
4836 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
4837 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4838 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4839 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4841 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4842 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4843 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4845 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4846 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4847 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4848 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4849 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4850 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4852 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4853 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4854 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4855 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4857 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4858 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4860 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4861 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
4863 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4864 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4865 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4866 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4867 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4868 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4870 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4871 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4873 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4874 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4876 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest } => {
4877 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4878 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
4880 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4883 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4884 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4885 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4886 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4887 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4888 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4889 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4891 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4893 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4894 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4895 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4896 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4897 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4901 fn update_fee_async_shutdown() {
4902 // Test update_fee works after shutdown start if messages are delivered out-of-order
4903 let nodes = create_network(2);
4904 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4906 let starting_feerate = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().get_feerate();
4907 nodes[0].node.update_fee(chan_1.2.clone(), starting_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4909 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4910 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4911 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4912 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4913 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4914 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_some());
4916 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4917 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4918 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4919 // Note that we don't actually test normative behavior here. The spec indicates we could
4920 // actually send a closing_signed here, but is kinda unclear and could possibly be amended
4921 // to require waiting on the full commitment dance before doing so (see
4922 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/499). In any case, to avoid
4923 // ambiguity, we should wait until after the full commitment dance to send closing_signed.
4924 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4926 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4927 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4929 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4930 let node_0_closing_signed = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, true);
4932 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4933 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), match node_0_closing_signed.unwrap() {
4934 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
4935 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4940 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4941 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4942 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4943 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4946 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
4947 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
4948 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
4949 let nodes = create_network(3);
4950 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4951 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4953 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4955 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4956 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4958 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4959 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4961 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4965 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4966 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4968 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4969 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4970 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4971 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4973 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
4974 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4975 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
4977 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
4978 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
4979 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4980 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
4983 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4984 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
4985 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
4987 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
4989 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4990 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4992 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4994 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4995 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4996 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4997 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4998 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4999 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5000 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5002 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5003 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
5005 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5006 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5007 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5008 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5009 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5010 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5011 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5013 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5014 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5016 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5017 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
5019 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5022 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5024 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5025 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5026 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
5029 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5030 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5032 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5033 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5034 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5035 if recv_count == 0 {
5036 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
5037 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5039 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5040 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5041 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
5043 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5044 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5045 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5047 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5048 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5050 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5051 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5052 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
5054 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
5055 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5056 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5057 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5058 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5060 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5061 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5062 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5063 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5064 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5065 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5067 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5069 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5070 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5071 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5072 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5073 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5074 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5076 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5077 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5078 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5079 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5080 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5082 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5083 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5085 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5089 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5091 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5092 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5093 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5094 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5095 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5099 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5100 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5101 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5102 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5106 fn fake_network_test() {
5107 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5108 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5109 let nodes = create_network(4);
5111 // Create some initial channels
5112 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5113 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5114 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5116 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5117 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5118 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5119 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5120 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5122 // Send some more payments
5123 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5124 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5125 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5127 // Test failure packets
5128 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5129 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5131 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5132 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5134 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5135 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5136 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5137 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5138 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5139 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5140 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5142 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5143 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5144 hops.push(RouteHop {
5145 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5146 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5148 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5150 hops.push(RouteHop {
5151 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5152 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5154 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5156 hops.push(RouteHop {
5157 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5158 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5160 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5162 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5163 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5164 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5166 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5167 hops.push(RouteHop {
5168 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5169 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5171 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5173 hops.push(RouteHop {
5174 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5175 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5177 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5179 hops.push(RouteHop {
5180 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5181 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5183 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5185 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5186 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5187 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5189 // Claim the rebalances...
5190 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5191 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5193 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5194 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5196 // Send some payments across both channels
5197 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5198 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5199 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5201 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5203 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5205 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5206 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5207 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5209 // Close down the channels...
5210 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5211 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5212 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5213 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5214 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5218 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5219 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5220 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5221 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5223 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5224 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5225 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5226 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5227 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5228 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5230 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5232 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5233 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5235 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5236 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5238 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5239 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5240 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5243 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5244 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5245 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5247 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5248 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5249 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5251 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5252 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5254 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5256 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5257 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5258 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5260 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5261 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5262 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5263 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5264 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5265 res.push(tx.clone());
5270 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5271 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5274 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5276 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5277 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5278 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5279 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5280 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5281 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5283 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5285 res.push(tx.clone());
5289 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
5292 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5296 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5297 /// HTLC transaction.
5298 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5299 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5300 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5301 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5302 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5303 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5307 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5310 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5311 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5313 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5314 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5315 let mut found_prev = false;
5317 for tx in prev_txn {
5318 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5319 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5320 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5321 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5327 assert!(found_prev);
5329 let mut res = Vec::new();
5330 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5334 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5335 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5336 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5337 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5338 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5344 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5345 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5346 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5347 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5350 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5354 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5355 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5359 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5361 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5362 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5364 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5365 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5367 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5368 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5373 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5375 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5376 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5378 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5379 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5380 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5381 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5382 chan.get_value_stat()
5386 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5387 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5388 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5390 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5391 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5393 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5394 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5396 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5397 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5398 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5399 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5400 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5404 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5406 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5407 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5408 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5409 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5414 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5415 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5416 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5417 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5419 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5420 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5421 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5423 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5428 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5429 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5431 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5433 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5435 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5436 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5437 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5439 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5440 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5444 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5445 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5446 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5448 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5449 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5452 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5455 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5456 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5457 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5458 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5459 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5462 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5463 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5464 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5465 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5466 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5470 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5471 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5472 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5473 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5475 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5476 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5480 // adding pending output
5481 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5482 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5484 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5485 let payment_event_1 = {
5486 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5489 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5490 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5491 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5493 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5495 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5496 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5498 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5499 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5500 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5501 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5506 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5507 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5509 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5510 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5511 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5512 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5513 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5515 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5517 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5518 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5519 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5520 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5521 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5522 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5524 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5525 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5526 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5527 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5530 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5532 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5536 // split the rest to test holding cell
5537 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5538 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5540 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5541 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5544 // now see if they go through on both sides
5545 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5546 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5547 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5549 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5550 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5552 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5554 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5555 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5556 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5557 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5561 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5562 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5563 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5565 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5566 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5568 // flush the pending htlc
5569 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5570 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5573 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5575 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5577 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5578 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5579 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5582 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5583 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5586 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5588 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5589 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5590 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5592 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5593 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5595 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5596 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5597 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5598 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5599 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5600 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5602 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5603 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5604 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5605 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5607 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5608 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5610 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5611 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5613 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5614 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5615 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5617 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5620 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5621 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5622 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5624 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5627 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5628 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5629 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5631 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5632 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5633 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5634 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5636 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5637 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5641 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5642 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5643 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5644 let nodes = create_network(5);
5646 // Create some initial channels
5647 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5648 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5649 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5650 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5652 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5653 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5654 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5655 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5656 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5658 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5659 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5661 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5662 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5663 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5664 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5666 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5667 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5668 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5670 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5671 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5673 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5674 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5676 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5677 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5678 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5679 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5681 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5682 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5683 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5685 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5686 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5688 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5689 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5691 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5692 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5694 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5695 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5696 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5697 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5699 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5705 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5706 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5707 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5709 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5711 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5712 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5714 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5715 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5717 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5719 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5720 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5721 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5723 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5724 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5725 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5728 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5729 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5730 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5731 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5732 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5736 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5737 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5738 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5739 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5740 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5743 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5745 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5746 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5748 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5749 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5750 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5751 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5752 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5755 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5757 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5758 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5760 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5762 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5763 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5764 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5768 fn test_justice_tx() {
5769 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5771 let nodes = create_network(2);
5772 // Create some new channels:
5773 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5775 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5776 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5777 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5778 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5779 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5780 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5781 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5782 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5783 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5784 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5785 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5786 // Revoke the old state
5787 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5790 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5791 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5793 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5794 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5795 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5796 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5798 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5799 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5801 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5803 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5804 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5805 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5806 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5807 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5809 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5811 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5812 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5814 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5815 // Create some new channels:
5816 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5818 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5819 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5820 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5821 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5822 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5823 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5824 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5825 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5826 // Revoke the old state
5827 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5829 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5830 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5832 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5833 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5834 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5835 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5837 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5838 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5840 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5842 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5843 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5844 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5845 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5846 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5848 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5849 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5850 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5854 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5855 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5856 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5857 let nodes = create_network(2);
5858 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5859 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5860 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5861 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5862 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5863 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5864 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5865 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5867 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5868 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5869 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5870 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5871 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
5873 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5875 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5876 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
5878 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
5879 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5880 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5884 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
5885 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
5886 let nodes = create_network(2);
5888 // Create some new channel:
5889 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5891 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5892 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5893 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
5894 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5895 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5897 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5898 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5899 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
5900 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5901 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5902 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5903 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5904 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5905 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5907 //Revoke the old state
5908 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5911 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5913 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5915 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5916 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5917 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5919 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
5920 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5922 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
5924 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5925 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5926 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5927 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5928 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5929 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5930 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5931 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
5933 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
5934 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5935 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
5937 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5938 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
5939 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
5940 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
5941 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5942 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
5944 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5945 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5946 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5950 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
5951 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
5952 let nodes = create_network(2);
5954 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5956 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5957 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5958 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
5959 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
5960 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5961 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5963 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5964 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5966 //Revoke the old state
5967 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5970 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5972 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
5974 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
5975 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5976 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
5978 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
5979 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
5980 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
5981 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
5982 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
5983 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
5984 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
5986 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5987 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5988 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5990 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
5991 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5992 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5993 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5994 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5996 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5997 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5998 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5999 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6000 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6001 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6002 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
6003 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
6005 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
6006 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
6008 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
6009 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
6010 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
6011 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
6012 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6013 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6015 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6016 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6017 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6021 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
6022 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
6023 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
6024 let nodes = create_network(2);
6025 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6027 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
6028 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
6030 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6031 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6033 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6034 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6036 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6040 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6041 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
6043 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6044 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6047 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6048 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6050 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6051 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6053 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6057 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6058 // registering new transactions
6059 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6063 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6064 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6065 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6066 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6067 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6069 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6071 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6073 let mut payment_event = {
6074 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6077 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6078 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6079 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6082 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6083 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6085 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6086 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6088 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6089 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6092 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6093 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6095 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6096 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6097 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6098 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6101 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6102 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6104 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6106 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6107 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6108 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6110 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6111 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6112 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6114 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6115 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6117 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6121 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6122 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6123 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6124 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6125 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6129 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6130 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6132 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6133 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6134 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6136 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6137 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6139 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6142 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6144 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6145 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6146 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6148 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6149 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6150 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6151 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6152 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6153 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6154 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6156 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6160 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6161 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6162 let nodes = create_network(2);
6163 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6165 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6166 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6167 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6168 mem::drop(channel_state);
6170 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6171 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6172 headers.push(header.clone());
6174 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6175 headers.push(header.clone());
6177 while !headers.is_empty() {
6178 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6181 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6182 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6184 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6185 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6187 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6190 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6191 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6192 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6195 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6196 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6198 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6199 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6200 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6201 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6202 res.push(msg.clone());
6204 panic!("Unexpected event")
6212 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6213 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6215 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6217 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6219 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6225 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6226 let mut commitment_update = None;
6227 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6230 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6231 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6232 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6233 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6235 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6236 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6237 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6238 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6240 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6243 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6246 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6248 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6249 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6250 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6251 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6253 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6254 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6255 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6256 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6262 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6267 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6268 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6269 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6270 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6271 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6272 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6273 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6275 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
6276 for msg in reestablish_1 {
6277 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6278 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
6280 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6281 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6283 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
6286 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
6287 for msg in reestablish_2 {
6288 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6289 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
6291 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6292 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6294 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
6297 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
6298 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
6299 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
6301 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
6302 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6303 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6304 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6305 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6306 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6307 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6308 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6309 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6312 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6315 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6316 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6317 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6318 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6320 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6322 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6323 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6324 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6325 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
6327 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6329 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6330 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6331 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6332 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6333 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6335 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6336 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6338 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6339 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6342 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6343 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6345 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6346 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6347 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6348 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6349 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6350 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6351 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6354 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6358 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
6359 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6360 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6361 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6362 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6363 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6364 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6365 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6366 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6369 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6372 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6373 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6374 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6375 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6377 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6379 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6380 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6381 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6382 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
6384 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6385 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6386 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6387 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6388 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6390 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6391 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6393 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6394 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6397 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6398 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6400 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6401 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6402 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6403 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6404 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6405 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6406 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6409 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6415 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
6416 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
6417 let nodes = create_network(3);
6418 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6419 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6421 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6422 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6423 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6425 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6426 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6427 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
6428 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
6430 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6431 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6432 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6434 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6435 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6436 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6437 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6439 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6440 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6442 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
6443 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
6445 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
6447 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6448 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6450 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6451 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
6453 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6456 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
6457 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
6458 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
6460 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6464 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
6465 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
6468 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
6469 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
6470 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6471 if messages_delivered == 0 {
6472 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6473 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
6475 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6478 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6479 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6481 let payment_event = {
6482 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
6483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6485 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6486 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6487 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6489 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
6491 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6492 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
6494 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6495 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6496 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6498 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6500 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6501 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6502 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6503 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6505 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6506 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6507 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6508 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6511 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
6512 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6513 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6521 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6522 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6523 if messages_delivered < 3 {
6524 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
6525 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
6526 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6527 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6528 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6529 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6530 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6531 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6532 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6533 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6534 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6535 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6536 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
6537 // Everything was delivered...
6538 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6541 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6542 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6544 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6545 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6548 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6549 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6550 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6552 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6553 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6555 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6556 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6558 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6559 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6560 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6562 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6565 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6568 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6569 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6570 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
6571 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6572 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6573 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6574 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6575 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6576 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6577 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6578 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6580 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6583 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
6584 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
6586 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6587 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6589 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6590 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6592 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6595 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
6596 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
6597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6598 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6600 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6601 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6602 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6605 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6606 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6607 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6608 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6611 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6612 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6613 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6621 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6622 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6623 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6624 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6625 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
6626 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
6627 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6628 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6630 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6631 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6636 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
6637 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6638 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6639 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6640 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6641 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6642 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6643 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6644 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6645 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6646 // Everything was delivered...
6647 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6650 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6651 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6652 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6654 // Channel should still work fine...
6655 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
6656 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6660 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
6661 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
6662 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
6663 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
6664 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
6668 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
6669 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
6670 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
6671 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
6675 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
6676 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
6677 let nodes = create_network(2);
6678 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6680 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6681 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6683 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6684 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6685 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6687 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6688 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6690 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6693 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6695 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6696 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6698 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6699 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6700 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
6702 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6703 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6705 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6708 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6709 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6711 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6714 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6716 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
6717 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
6719 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6720 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6721 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
6725 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
6726 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
6727 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
6728 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6729 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6731 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6733 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6734 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6735 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6737 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
6738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6740 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6741 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6743 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
6744 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6747 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6750 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6751 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6753 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6754 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6755 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6756 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6757 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6758 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6759 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6761 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6762 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6763 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6765 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6766 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6768 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6771 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6772 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6773 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6776 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6779 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6780 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6782 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6783 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6784 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6785 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6786 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6787 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6789 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6790 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6791 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6792 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6794 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6795 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6797 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6798 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6800 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6802 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6803 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6804 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6805 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6806 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6807 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6808 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6809 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6810 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6813 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
6814 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6815 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6816 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6817 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6818 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6819 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6822 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6823 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6824 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6825 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6826 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6827 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6828 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6831 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6832 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6833 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6836 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6837 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6838 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6841 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6842 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6845 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6846 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6848 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6849 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6852 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6853 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6855 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6856 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6858 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
6859 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6861 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6864 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6865 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6868 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6872 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
6873 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
6874 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6875 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6877 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6878 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6880 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6881 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6884 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6885 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6887 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6891 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6892 // PaymentFailed event
6894 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6897 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
6898 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
6899 // a disconnect in between
6900 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6901 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6903 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6904 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6906 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6907 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6910 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6911 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6912 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6915 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6916 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6917 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6920 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
6921 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6924 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6925 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6926 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
6927 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6928 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6929 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6931 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6933 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6934 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6936 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6937 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6938 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6940 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6943 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
6945 // Now set it to failed again...
6946 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6947 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6948 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
6949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6951 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6952 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6953 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6956 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6957 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6958 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6961 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
6962 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6963 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6966 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6967 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6969 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6970 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6973 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6974 // PaymentFailed event
6976 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6980 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
6981 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
6982 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
6985 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
6986 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
6988 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
6989 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
6990 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
6991 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
6992 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
6993 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
6994 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
6995 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
6996 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
6997 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
6998 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
6999 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
7000 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
7001 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
7002 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
7003 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
7004 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
7005 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7006 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7008 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7010 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7011 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7012 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7014 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7015 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7018 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7019 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7020 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7022 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
7023 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
7024 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7026 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7027 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7028 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
7029 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7030 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7031 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7032 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7033 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7034 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7035 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7037 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7038 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7039 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7040 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7042 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7043 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7045 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7048 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
7049 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7050 } else { panic!(); }
7053 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7055 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7058 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7059 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7060 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7063 // Now fix monitor updating...
7064 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7065 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7068 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7069 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7070 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7072 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7073 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7074 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7075 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7076 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7077 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7079 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7080 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7081 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7082 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7084 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7085 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7087 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7090 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7091 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7092 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7094 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7095 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7096 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7097 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7098 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7099 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7101 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7103 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7104 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7106 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7108 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7109 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7111 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7112 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7113 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7115 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7116 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7117 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7119 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7120 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7121 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7122 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7123 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7124 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7126 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7128 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7129 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7130 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7132 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7133 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7135 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7138 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7139 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7140 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7143 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7147 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7148 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7150 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7151 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7152 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7154 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7155 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7158 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7160 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7161 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7162 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7163 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7164 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7167 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7171 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7173 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7174 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7175 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7176 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7179 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7180 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7182 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7183 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7185 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7186 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7189 let as_commitment_update;
7190 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7192 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7193 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7194 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7195 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7196 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7197 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7198 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7199 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7203 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7204 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7205 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7206 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7207 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7208 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7209 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7210 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7214 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7217 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7218 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7220 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7221 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7223 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7224 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7226 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7229 handle_initial_raa!();
7231 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7232 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7234 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7235 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7237 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7238 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7241 handle_initial_raa!();
7243 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7244 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7246 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7247 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7249 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7250 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7252 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7257 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7258 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7260 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7261 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7263 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7264 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7268 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7269 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7270 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7273 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7274 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7275 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7278 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7279 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7282 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7283 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7286 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7288 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7289 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7291 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7292 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7293 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7295 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7298 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7302 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
7303 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
7304 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
7305 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
7306 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
7307 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
7308 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
7312 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
7313 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
7314 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
7315 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
7316 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
7320 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
7321 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
7322 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
7323 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
7324 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
7325 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
7329 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
7330 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
7331 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7332 let nodes = create_network(2);
7334 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7336 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7337 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7338 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7339 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7341 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7343 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7344 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7346 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7347 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7349 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
7351 let mut chan_announcement;
7353 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
7355 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
7356 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
7357 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
7358 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
7359 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
7360 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
7361 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
7362 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
7363 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7368 macro_rules! sign_msg {
7369 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
7370 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
7371 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7372 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7373 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
7374 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
7375 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
7376 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
7377 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
7378 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
7379 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
7380 contents: $unsigned_msg
7385 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7386 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7387 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
7388 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7390 // Configured with Network::Testnet
7391 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7392 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
7393 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7394 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7396 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7397 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
7398 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7399 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7402 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
7403 impl Writer for VecWriter {
7404 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
7405 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
7408 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
7409 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
7414 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7415 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7417 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7419 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7421 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7422 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7423 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7425 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7426 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7427 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7428 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7430 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7431 let config = UserConfig::new();
7432 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7433 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7434 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7435 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7436 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7437 default_config: config,
7439 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7440 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7441 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7442 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7443 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7444 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7447 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7449 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7450 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7451 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
7452 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
7453 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7456 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7457 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7458 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7459 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7461 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7462 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7463 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7464 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7466 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7467 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
7468 for node in nodes.iter() {
7469 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
7470 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
7471 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
7474 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7478 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7479 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7480 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7482 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7483 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7485 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7487 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7488 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7489 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7491 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7492 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7493 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7494 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7496 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7497 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7498 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7499 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7500 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7501 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7502 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7504 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7505 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7506 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7507 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7508 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7509 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7512 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7514 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7515 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7518 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7520 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
7521 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7525 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
7526 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
7527 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
7528 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7529 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
7530 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
7532 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
7534 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
7535 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7537 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
7538 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7539 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7540 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7542 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
7544 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
7545 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
7546 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7547 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
7548 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
7551 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7552 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
7553 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
7554 let mut read = &serialized[..];
7555 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7556 assert!(read.is_empty());
7557 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
7560 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7561 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7562 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7563 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7565 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7566 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7567 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7568 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7569 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7570 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
7572 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7574 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
7575 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7576 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7577 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
7578 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
7581 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
7582 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
7583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7585 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7587 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
7588 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7589 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7590 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
7591 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7593 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7594 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7595 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
7596 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
7597 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
7598 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
7601 macro_rules! check_dynamic_output_p2wsh {
7604 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7605 let mut txn = Vec::new();
7606 for event in events {
7608 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7609 for outp in outputs {
7611 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
7613 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7614 script_sig: Script::new(),
7615 sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
7616 witness: Vec::new(),
7619 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7620 value: output.value,
7622 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7628 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7629 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7630 let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
7631 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7632 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7633 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
7634 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
7637 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7641 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7649 macro_rules! check_dynamic_output_p2wpkh {
7652 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7653 let mut txn = Vec::new();
7654 for event in events {
7656 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7657 for outp in outputs {
7659 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
7661 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7662 script_sig: Script::new(),
7664 witness: Vec::new(),
7667 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7668 value: output.value,
7670 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7676 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7677 let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
7678 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
7679 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7680 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
7681 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7682 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7683 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
7686 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7690 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7698 macro_rules! check_static_output {
7699 ($event: expr, $node: expr, $event_idx: expr, $output_idx: expr, $der_idx: expr, $idx_node: expr) => {
7700 match $event[$event_idx] {
7701 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7702 match outputs[$output_idx] {
7703 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
7704 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7706 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7707 script_sig: Script::new(),
7709 witness: Vec::new(),
7712 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7713 value: output.value,
7715 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7719 output: vec![outp.clone()],
7722 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node[$idx_node].node_seed) {
7724 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
7726 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
7729 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
7732 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
7733 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
7734 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7735 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
7736 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7737 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7738 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
7741 _ => panic!("Unexpected event !"),
7744 _ => panic!("Unexpected event !"),
7750 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
7751 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
7752 let nodes = create_network(2);
7754 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
7755 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
7756 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7758 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7759 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7761 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7762 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7763 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
7764 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
7766 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7767 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
7768 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wsh!(nodes[1]);
7769 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7770 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7774 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
7775 // Same test as precedent, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
7776 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
7778 let nodes = create_network(2);
7780 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
7781 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
7782 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7784 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7785 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7787 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7788 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7789 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
7790 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
7792 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7793 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
7794 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7796 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7797 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7799 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wpkh!(nodes[1]);
7800 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
7801 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
7802 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7806 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
7807 let nodes = create_network(2);
7809 // Create some initial channels
7810 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7812 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7814 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7815 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
7816 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7818 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
7819 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7820 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7822 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
7823 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7825 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7829 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7830 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
7833 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
7834 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
7835 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
7836 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
7837 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
7838 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
7840 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7841 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 1, 1);
7842 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[0].clone());
7846 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
7847 let nodes = create_network(2);
7849 // Create some initial channels
7850 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7852 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7853 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7854 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7855 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7857 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7859 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7860 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7861 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7863 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7864 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7866 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7867 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7868 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
7869 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7870 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7872 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7873 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 1, 1);
7874 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[0].clone());
7878 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
7879 let nodes = create_network(2);
7881 // Create some initial channels
7882 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7884 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7885 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7886 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7887 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7889 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7891 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7892 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
7893 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7894 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7896 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7897 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7899 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7900 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7901 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7902 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
7903 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7905 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
7906 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7907 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7909 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7910 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7913 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7914 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
7915 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
7916 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
7918 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7919 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
7920 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 1, 1, 1, 1);
7921 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[3].clone());
7925 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
7926 let nodes = create_network(2);
7928 // Create some initial channels
7929 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7931 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7932 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7933 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7934 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7936 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7938 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7939 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
7940 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7941 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7943 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7944 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7946 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7948 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7949 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7950 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
7951 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7953 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
7954 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7955 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7957 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7958 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7961 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7962 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
7963 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
7964 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
7966 let events = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7967 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
7968 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 1, 2, 1, 0);
7969 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[3].clone());
7973 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
7974 let nodes = create_network(2);
7976 // Create some initial channels
7977 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7979 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
7980 let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7981 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7982 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
7984 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
7985 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7987 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7988 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7989 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7991 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7992 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7995 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7996 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
7998 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7999 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8000 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
8001 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8003 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8004 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wsh!(nodes[1]);
8005 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8006 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8010 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
8011 let nodes = create_network(2);
8013 // Create some initial channels
8014 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8016 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
8017 let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8018 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8019 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
8021 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8022 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8023 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
8024 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8026 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8027 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8029 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8030 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8031 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
8032 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8034 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8035 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wsh!(nodes[0]);
8036 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
8037 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
8038 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
8039 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8040 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8044 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
8045 let nodes = create_network(2);
8047 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8049 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
8050 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
8052 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8053 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8054 let events = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8055 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 2, 0);
8056 check_spends!(spend_tx, closing_tx.clone());
8058 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8059 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8060 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 2, 1);
8061 check_spends!(spend_tx, closing_tx);