1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
18 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
19 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
22 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
23 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
26 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
29 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
30 use util::config::UserConfig;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
69 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
70 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
71 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
72 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
73 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
75 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
76 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
79 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
80 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
81 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
82 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
85 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
86 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
87 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
88 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
92 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
95 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
96 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
97 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
100 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102 pub enum HTLCSource {
103 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
106 session_priv: SecretKey,
107 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
108 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
109 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
114 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
115 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
116 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
117 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
118 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
126 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
134 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
136 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
137 err: msgs::HandleError,
138 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
140 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
142 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
146 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
147 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
149 data: err.to_string()
153 needs_channel_force_close: false,
157 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
161 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
162 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
164 data: err.to_string()
168 needs_channel_force_close: true,
172 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
173 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
176 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
179 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
181 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
183 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
185 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
186 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
188 data: msg.to_string()
193 needs_channel_force_close: false,
197 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
200 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
202 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
204 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
206 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
207 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
209 data: msg.to_string()
214 needs_channel_force_close: true,
219 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
220 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
222 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
223 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
225 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
229 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
230 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
231 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
232 /// probably increase this significantly.
233 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
235 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
236 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
238 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
241 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
242 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
243 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
244 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
245 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
246 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
247 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
249 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
253 struct ChannelHolder {
254 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
255 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
256 next_forward: Instant,
257 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
258 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
259 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
260 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
261 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
262 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
263 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
265 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
266 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
267 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
268 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
270 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
271 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
272 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
273 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
274 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
275 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
276 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
279 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
281 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
282 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
283 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
284 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
285 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
286 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
291 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
292 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
294 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
295 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
297 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
298 /// to individual Channels.
300 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
301 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
302 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
303 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
305 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
306 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
307 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
308 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
309 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
310 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
311 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
313 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
314 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
315 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
316 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
318 pub struct ChannelManager {
319 default_configuration: UserConfig,
320 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
321 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
322 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
323 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
324 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
326 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
327 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
328 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
330 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
331 our_network_key: SecretKey,
333 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
334 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
335 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
336 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
337 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
339 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
344 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
345 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
346 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
347 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
348 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
349 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
350 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
352 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
353 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
354 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
355 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
358 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
360 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
361 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
364 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
366 macro_rules! secp_call {
367 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
370 Err(_) => return Err($err),
377 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
379 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
380 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
385 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
386 pub struct ChannelDetails {
387 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
388 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
389 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
390 /// lifetime of the channel.
391 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
392 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
393 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
394 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
395 /// The node_id of our counterparty
396 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
397 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
398 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
399 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
403 macro_rules! handle_error {
404 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
407 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
408 if needs_channel_force_close {
410 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
411 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
412 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
414 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
417 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
418 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
419 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
420 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
421 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
423 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
435 impl ChannelManager {
436 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
438 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
439 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
441 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
443 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
444 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
445 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
447 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
448 default_configuration: config.clone(),
449 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
450 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
451 monitor: monitor.clone(),
455 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
456 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
459 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
460 by_id: HashMap::new(),
461 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
462 next_forward: Instant::now(),
463 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
464 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
465 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
467 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
469 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
470 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
476 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
477 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
481 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
483 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
484 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
485 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
486 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
488 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
489 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
491 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
492 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
493 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
494 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
495 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
498 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
499 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
501 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
502 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
503 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
504 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
505 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
506 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
508 panic!("RNG is bad???");
511 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
513 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
514 node_id: their_network_key,
520 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
521 /// more information.
522 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
523 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
524 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
525 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
526 res.push(ChannelDetails {
527 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
528 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
529 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
530 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
531 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
537 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
538 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
539 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
540 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
541 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
542 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
543 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
544 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
545 // really wanted anyway.
546 if channel.is_live() {
547 res.push(ChannelDetails {
548 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
549 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
550 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
551 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
552 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
559 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
560 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
561 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
563 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
564 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
565 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
567 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
568 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
569 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
570 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
571 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
572 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
573 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
574 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
577 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
578 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
579 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
581 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
582 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
584 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
587 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
588 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
589 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
591 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
592 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
597 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
598 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
599 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
608 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
609 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
610 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
611 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
612 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
614 for tx in local_txn {
615 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
617 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
618 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
619 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
620 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
621 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
622 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
623 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
626 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
627 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
628 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
629 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
632 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
633 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
634 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
635 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
636 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
643 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
644 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
645 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
646 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
652 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
653 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
654 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
655 for chan in self.list_channels() {
656 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
660 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
662 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
664 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
665 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
666 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
667 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
671 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
672 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
673 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
674 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
675 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
680 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
681 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
682 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
688 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
689 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
691 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
692 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
693 let mut res = [0; 32];
694 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
698 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
699 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
700 let mut res = [0; 32];
701 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
707 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
708 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
709 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
710 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
711 let mut res = [0; 32];
712 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
717 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
718 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
719 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
720 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
721 let mut res = [0; 32];
722 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
726 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
728 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
729 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
730 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
732 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
733 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
735 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
736 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
737 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
738 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
739 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
741 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
743 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
744 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
746 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
752 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
753 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
754 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
756 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
757 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
763 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
773 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
774 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
775 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
776 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
777 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
778 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
779 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
780 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
782 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
783 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
784 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
785 // the intended recipient).
786 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
787 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
788 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
790 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
791 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
792 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
793 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
797 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
798 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
799 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
801 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
802 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
803 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
805 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
807 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
811 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
813 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
821 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
822 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
824 for i in 0..dst.len() {
829 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
830 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
831 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
832 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
835 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
836 let end_len = iters * 65;
837 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
838 res.resize(end_len, 0);
840 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
841 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
842 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
843 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
844 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
849 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
850 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
852 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
853 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
854 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
855 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
857 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
858 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
859 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
862 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
865 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
866 hmac.input(&packet_data);
867 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
868 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
873 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
874 hop_data: packet_data,
879 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
880 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
881 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
882 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
884 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
885 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
886 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
887 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
888 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
889 data: packet_crypted,
893 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
894 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
895 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
897 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
900 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
901 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
902 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
903 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
907 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
908 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
911 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
913 failuremsg: failuremsg,
917 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
918 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
919 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
925 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
926 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
927 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
930 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
931 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
934 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
935 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
936 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
937 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
943 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
944 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
945 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
946 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
947 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
948 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
949 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
950 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
953 let shared_secret = {
954 let mut arr = [0; 32];
955 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
958 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
960 let mut channel_state = None;
961 macro_rules! return_err {
962 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
964 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
965 if channel_state.is_none() {
966 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
968 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
969 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
970 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
971 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
972 })), channel_state.unwrap());
977 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
978 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
979 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
980 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
981 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
982 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
983 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
984 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
987 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
988 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
989 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
990 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
991 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
994 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
995 let next_hop_data = {
996 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
997 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
998 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
1000 let error_code = match err {
1001 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1002 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1004 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1010 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1012 // final_expiry_too_soon
1013 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1014 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1016 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1017 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1018 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1020 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1021 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1022 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1025 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1026 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1027 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1028 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1030 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1032 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1033 short_channel_id: 0,
1034 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1035 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1036 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1039 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1040 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1041 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1043 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1045 let blinding_factor = {
1046 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1047 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1048 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1049 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1050 sha.result(&mut res);
1051 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1053 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1059 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1060 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1063 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1065 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1066 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1067 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1070 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1071 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1072 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1073 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1074 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1075 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1076 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1080 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1081 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1082 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1083 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1084 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1085 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1086 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1088 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1090 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1091 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1093 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1094 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1095 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1096 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1097 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1098 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1099 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1101 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1102 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1104 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1105 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1106 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1108 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1109 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1111 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1112 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1113 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1114 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1116 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1117 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1122 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1123 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1124 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1126 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1127 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1129 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1130 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1132 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1137 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1140 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1141 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1142 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1143 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1144 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1148 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1150 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1151 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1152 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1153 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1154 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1155 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1156 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1157 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1158 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1159 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1162 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1163 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1165 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1171 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1173 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1174 /// fields for more info.
1176 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1177 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1178 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1179 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1180 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1181 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1183 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1185 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1186 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1187 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1188 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1189 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1191 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1192 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1193 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1194 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1198 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1199 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1200 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1202 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1204 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1206 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1207 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1208 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1209 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1211 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1212 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1214 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1215 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1216 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1220 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1221 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1222 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1224 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1225 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1227 if !chan.is_live() {
1228 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1230 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1231 route: route.clone(),
1232 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1233 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1234 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he|
1236 ChannelError::Close(err) => {
1237 // TODO: We need to close the channel here, but for that to be safe we have
1238 // to do all channel closure inside the channel_state lock which is a
1239 // somewhat-larger refactor, so we leave that for later.
1240 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }
1242 ChannelError::Ignore(err) => APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err },
1247 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1248 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1249 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1250 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1253 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1254 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1255 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1256 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1257 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1258 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1259 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1271 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1273 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1274 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1276 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1278 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1279 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1280 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1281 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1283 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1285 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1286 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1288 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1289 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, chan.channel_id()))
1295 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1296 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1297 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1300 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1301 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1302 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1303 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1310 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1311 // lock before add_update_monitor
1312 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1316 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1317 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1318 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1321 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1322 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1323 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1325 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1331 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1332 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1334 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1336 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1338 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1339 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1341 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1342 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1343 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1344 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1345 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1349 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1351 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1352 /// Will likely generate further events.
1353 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1354 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1356 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1357 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1359 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1360 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1362 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1366 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1367 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1368 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1369 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1371 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1372 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1373 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1374 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1375 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1376 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1378 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1383 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1385 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1386 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1387 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1388 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1389 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1390 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1392 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1394 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1395 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1400 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1402 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1403 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1404 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1405 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1406 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1407 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1408 // this channel currently :/.
1415 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1416 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1419 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1420 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1422 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1426 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1427 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1429 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1430 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1431 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1432 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1433 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1434 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1435 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1437 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1442 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1443 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1444 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1445 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1446 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1448 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1449 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1450 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1452 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1453 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1454 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1461 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1463 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1464 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1468 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1469 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1470 events.append(&mut new_events);
1473 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1474 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1475 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1477 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1478 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1479 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1480 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1481 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1482 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1488 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1489 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1490 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1491 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1492 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1493 /// still-available channels.
1494 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1496 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1497 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1498 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1499 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1500 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1501 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1502 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1507 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1508 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1509 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1512 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1515 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1516 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1517 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1518 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1519 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1521 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1522 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1526 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1528 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1529 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1533 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1534 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1535 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1536 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1539 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1540 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1541 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1542 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1543 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1544 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1545 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1547 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1553 //TODO: Do something with e?
1561 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1562 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1563 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1565 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1566 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1567 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1568 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1569 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1570 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1572 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1574 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1575 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1576 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1577 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1578 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1579 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1584 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1586 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1587 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1588 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1589 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1593 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1594 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1595 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1597 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1598 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1600 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1601 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1607 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1608 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1609 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1610 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1611 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1612 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1615 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1616 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1617 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1618 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1619 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1620 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1621 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1622 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1630 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1631 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1632 //TODO: Do something with e?
1640 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1641 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1642 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1645 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1646 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1648 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1649 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1650 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1651 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1652 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1655 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1656 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1657 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1658 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1659 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1660 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1661 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1662 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1664 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1665 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1666 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1668 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1669 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1670 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1676 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1679 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1680 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1681 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1683 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1685 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1686 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1687 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1688 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1693 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1694 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1695 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1696 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1697 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1702 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1706 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1717 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1718 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1720 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1722 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1723 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1727 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1728 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1729 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1732 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1733 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1734 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1735 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1736 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1737 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1738 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1739 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1740 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1741 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1743 entry.insert(channel);
1749 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1750 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1751 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1752 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1754 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1755 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1756 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1758 chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration)
1759 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1760 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1762 //TODO: same as above
1763 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1766 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1767 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1768 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1769 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1770 output_script: output_script,
1771 user_channel_id: user_id,
1776 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1777 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1778 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1779 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1781 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1782 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1783 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1785 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1786 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1787 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1790 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))
1794 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1797 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1798 // lock before add_update_monitor
1799 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1802 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1803 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1804 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1805 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1806 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1808 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1809 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1810 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1819 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1820 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1821 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1822 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1824 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1825 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1826 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1828 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1829 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1832 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1834 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1837 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1838 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1839 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1840 user_channel_id: user_id,
1845 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1846 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1847 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1848 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1850 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1851 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1852 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1854 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1855 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1856 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan) {
1857 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1858 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1859 msg: announcement_sigs,
1864 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1868 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1869 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1870 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1871 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1873 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1874 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1875 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1876 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1877 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1879 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1880 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1881 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1882 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1886 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1887 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1888 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1892 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1893 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1894 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1896 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1897 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1899 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1902 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1903 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1904 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1906 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1907 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1908 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1909 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1917 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1918 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1919 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1920 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1921 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1922 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1923 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1924 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1925 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1927 let (closing_signed, tx) = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1928 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1929 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1930 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1935 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1936 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1937 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1938 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1939 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1940 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1941 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1943 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1944 } else { (tx, None) }
1946 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1949 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1950 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1952 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1953 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1954 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1955 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1963 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1964 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1965 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1966 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1968 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1969 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1970 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1971 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1973 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1974 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1976 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1978 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1979 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1980 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1982 if !chan.is_usable() {
1983 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1984 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1985 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1986 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1987 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan);
1988 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1989 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1990 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1991 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
1992 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &update.encode_with_len()[..])
1994 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
1995 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
1996 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
1997 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
1998 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
1999 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2004 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2006 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2010 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2011 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2012 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2014 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2015 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2016 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2018 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
2019 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?
2021 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2023 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2027 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
2028 // indicating that the payment itself failed
2029 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
2030 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
2031 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
2032 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
2033 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
2035 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
2036 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
2040 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
2041 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
2042 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
2045 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
2047 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
2048 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
2049 if res.is_some() { return; }
2051 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
2052 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2053 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2055 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2057 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2058 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2059 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2060 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2061 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2063 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2065 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2066 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2067 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2068 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2069 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2070 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2072 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2073 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
2074 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2075 // definitely came from the peer in question
2076 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
2078 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
2080 match error_code & 0xff {
2082 // either from an intermediate or final node
2083 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
2084 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
2085 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
2086 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
2087 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2088 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2089 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
2090 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2091 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
2092 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2093 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2099 if is_from_final_node {
2100 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2101 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2102 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2103 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2104 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2105 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2108 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2109 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2113 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2114 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2115 // does not coform to the spec.
2116 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2117 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2118 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2124 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2128 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2130 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2131 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2132 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2136 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2137 let offset = match error_code {
2138 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2139 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2140 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2141 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2142 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2143 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2145 // node sending unknown code
2146 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2147 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2154 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2155 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2156 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2157 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2158 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2159 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2160 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2161 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2164 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2165 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2166 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2167 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2169 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2170 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2171 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2172 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2173 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2175 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2176 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2177 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2178 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2180 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2181 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2182 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2183 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2185 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2186 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2189 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2190 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2194 res = Some((msg, true));
2200 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2203 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2204 res = Some((None, true));
2208 // node sending unknown code
2209 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2210 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2219 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2220 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2221 } else { ((None, true)) }
2224 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2225 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2226 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2228 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2229 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2230 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2232 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2233 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2235 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2240 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2241 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2242 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2244 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2245 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2246 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2248 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2249 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set", msg.channel_id));
2251 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2252 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2255 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2259 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2260 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2261 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2262 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2264 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2265 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2266 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2268 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator)
2269 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2270 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2273 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2274 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2275 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2277 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2278 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2279 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2280 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2281 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2282 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2283 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2284 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2286 commitment_signed: msg,
2290 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2291 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2292 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2298 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2303 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2304 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2305 let mut forward_event = None;
2306 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2307 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2308 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2309 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2310 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2312 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2313 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2314 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2315 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2317 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2318 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2323 match forward_event {
2325 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2326 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2327 time_forwardable: time
2335 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2336 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2337 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2338 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2339 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2341 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2342 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2343 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2345 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator)
2346 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2347 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2350 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2351 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2352 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2356 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2357 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2358 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2362 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2364 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2367 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2368 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2370 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2375 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2376 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2377 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2379 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2380 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2381 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2383 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2385 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2389 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2390 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2391 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2393 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2395 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2396 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2398 if !chan.is_usable() {
2399 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2402 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2403 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2404 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2406 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2407 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2408 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2409 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2410 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2412 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2414 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2415 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2416 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2417 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2418 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2419 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2420 contents: announcement,
2422 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2425 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2430 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2431 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2432 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2434 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2436 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2437 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2439 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order, shutdown) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2440 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2441 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2442 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2446 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2447 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2448 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2452 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2453 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2454 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2455 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2460 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2461 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2462 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2463 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2469 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2473 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2478 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2479 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2480 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2486 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2490 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2491 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2492 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2493 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2495 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2496 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2497 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2498 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2500 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2501 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2503 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2504 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2506 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2507 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2509 if !chan.is_live() {
2510 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2512 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw)
2513 .map_err(|e| match e {
2514 ChannelError::Ignore(err) => APIError::APIMisuseError{err},
2515 ChannelError::Close(err) => {
2516 // TODO: We need to close the channel here, but for that to be safe we have
2517 // to do all channel closure inside the channel_state lock which is a
2518 // somewhat-larger refactor, so we leave that for later.
2519 APIError::APIMisuseError{err}
2522 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2525 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2526 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2527 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2528 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2529 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2530 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2531 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2532 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2543 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2544 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2545 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2546 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2547 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2552 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2553 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2554 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2555 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2556 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2561 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2562 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2563 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2564 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2566 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2567 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2568 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2569 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2570 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2571 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2572 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2573 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2574 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2575 msg: funding_locked,
2577 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2578 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2579 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2580 msg: announcement_sigs,
2583 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2584 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2585 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2586 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2587 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2591 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2592 for tx in txn_matched {
2593 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2594 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2595 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2596 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2598 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2599 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2600 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2601 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2602 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2603 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2612 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2613 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2614 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2616 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2617 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2618 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2619 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2620 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2621 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2622 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2631 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2632 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2634 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2635 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2638 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2639 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2640 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2641 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2643 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2644 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2645 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2646 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2647 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2648 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2649 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2650 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2652 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2653 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2654 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2664 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2665 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2667 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2668 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2672 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2673 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2674 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2675 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2676 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2679 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2680 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2681 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2684 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2685 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2686 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2689 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2690 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2691 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2694 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2695 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2696 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2699 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2700 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2701 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2704 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2705 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2706 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2709 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2710 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2711 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2714 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2715 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2716 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2719 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2720 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2721 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2724 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2725 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2726 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2729 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2730 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2731 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2734 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2735 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2736 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2739 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2740 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2741 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2744 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2745 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2746 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2749 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2750 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2751 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2754 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2755 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2756 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2757 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2759 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2760 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2761 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2762 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2763 if no_connection_possible {
2764 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2765 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2766 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2767 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2768 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2770 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2771 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2772 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2782 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2783 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2784 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2785 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2786 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2787 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2788 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2789 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2791 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2792 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2793 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2802 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2803 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2805 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2806 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2807 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2812 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2813 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2815 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2816 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2817 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2818 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2819 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2820 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2821 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2822 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2823 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2824 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2828 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2829 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2830 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2836 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2839 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2840 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2842 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2843 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2844 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2845 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2849 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2854 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2855 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2857 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2858 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2859 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2861 onion.write(writer)?;
2865 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2866 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2867 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2868 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2869 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2874 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2875 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2876 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2878 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2879 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2881 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2883 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2884 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2885 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2886 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2887 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2892 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2893 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2895 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2897 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2899 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2901 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2908 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2909 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2910 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2911 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2912 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2913 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2918 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2919 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2921 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2923 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2925 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2927 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2934 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2935 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2936 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2937 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2938 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2939 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2944 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2947 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2950 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2951 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2953 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2955 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2957 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2959 route.write(writer)?;
2960 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2961 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2968 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2969 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2970 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2971 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2972 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2973 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2974 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2975 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2977 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2982 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2983 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2985 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2989 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2991 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2992 data.write(writer)?;
2999 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3000 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3001 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3002 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3003 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3004 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3005 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3007 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3012 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
3013 prev_short_channel_id,
3018 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3019 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3020 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3022 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3023 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3025 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3026 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3027 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3029 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3030 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3031 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3032 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3033 unfunded_channels += 1;
3036 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3037 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3038 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3039 channel.write(writer)?;
3043 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3044 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3045 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3046 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3047 for forward in pending_forwards {
3048 forward.write(writer)?;
3052 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3053 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3054 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3055 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3056 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3057 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3065 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3067 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3069 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3070 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3071 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3072 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3073 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3074 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3075 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3076 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3077 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3078 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3079 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3080 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3081 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3082 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3083 /// deserialization.
3084 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3086 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3088 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3089 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3090 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3092 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3093 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3094 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3095 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3096 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3098 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3099 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3100 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3101 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3102 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3103 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3104 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3105 /// deserialization.
3106 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3107 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3108 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3109 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3111 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3112 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3114 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3115 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3116 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3117 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3119 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3121 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3124 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3125 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3126 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3127 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3128 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3129 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3132 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3133 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3134 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3136 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3138 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3139 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3140 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3141 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3142 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3143 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3144 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3145 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3148 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3149 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3150 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3151 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3152 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3153 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3154 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3155 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3156 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3158 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3159 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3161 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3164 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3168 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3169 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3170 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3174 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3175 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3176 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3177 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3178 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3179 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3180 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3181 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3183 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3186 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3187 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3188 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3189 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3190 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3191 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3192 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3193 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3195 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3198 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3200 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3201 monitor: args.monitor,
3202 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3203 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3205 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3206 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3207 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3209 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3212 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3215 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3217 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3219 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3220 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3221 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3222 logger: args.logger,
3223 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3226 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3227 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3228 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3229 //connection or two.
3232 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3238 use chain::chaininterface;
3239 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3240 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3241 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
3242 use chain::keysinterface;
3243 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
3244 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
3245 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3246 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3248 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
3249 use util::test_utils;
3250 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3251 use util::errors::APIError;
3252 use util::logger::Logger;
3253 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3254 use util::config::UserConfig;
3256 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3257 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3258 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
3259 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
3260 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3261 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
3262 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
3263 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3264 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3265 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3269 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3270 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3272 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3273 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3275 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3277 use std::cell::RefCell;
3278 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
3279 use std::default::Default;
3281 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3282 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3283 use std::time::Instant;
3286 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3287 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3288 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3293 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3294 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3297 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3298 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3301 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3302 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3305 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3306 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3309 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3310 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3315 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3317 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3318 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3323 fn onion_vectors() {
3324 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3325 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3327 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3328 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3329 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3330 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3331 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3333 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3334 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3335 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3336 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3337 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3339 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3340 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3341 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3342 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3343 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3345 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3346 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3347 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3348 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3349 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3351 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3352 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3353 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3354 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3355 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3357 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3358 let payloads = vec!(
3359 msgs::OnionHopData {
3361 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3362 short_channel_id: 0,
3364 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3368 msgs::OnionHopData {
3370 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3371 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3372 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3373 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3377 msgs::OnionHopData {
3379 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3380 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3381 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3382 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3386 msgs::OnionHopData {
3388 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3389 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3390 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3391 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3395 msgs::OnionHopData {
3397 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3398 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3399 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3400 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3406 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
3407 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3409 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3413 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3414 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3416 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3417 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3418 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3420 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3421 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3423 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3424 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3426 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3427 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3429 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3430 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3432 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3433 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3436 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3437 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3438 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3439 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3441 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3442 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3447 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3448 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3449 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3450 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3452 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3453 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3454 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3456 impl Drop for Node {
3457 fn drop(&mut self) {
3458 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3459 // Check that we processed all pending events
3460 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3461 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3462 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3467 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3468 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3471 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3472 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3473 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3474 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3477 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3478 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3480 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3481 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3483 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3484 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3487 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3488 }, match events[1] {
3489 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3490 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3491 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3492 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3493 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3494 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3495 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3496 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3498 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3504 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3505 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3507 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3508 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3510 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3511 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3514 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3520 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3521 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3523 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3524 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3526 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3527 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3530 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3536 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3537 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
3539 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3540 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3547 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3548 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3549 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3550 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3552 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3556 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3557 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3559 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3560 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3561 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3563 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3564 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3566 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3568 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3569 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3570 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3571 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3572 added_monitors.clear();
3574 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3577 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3579 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3580 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3581 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3582 added_monitors.clear();
3585 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3587 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3588 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3589 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3590 added_monitors.clear();
3593 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3594 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3596 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3597 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3598 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3600 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3606 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3607 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3608 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3612 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3613 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3614 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3615 ((match events_6[0] {
3616 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3617 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3618 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3621 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3622 }, match events_6[1] {
3623 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3624 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3627 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3631 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3632 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3633 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3637 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3638 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3639 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3640 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3642 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3643 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3644 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3645 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3648 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3651 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3652 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3653 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3654 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3655 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3656 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3659 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3662 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3664 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3667 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3668 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3671 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3672 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3674 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3675 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3676 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3678 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3681 macro_rules! check_spends {
3682 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3684 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3685 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3686 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3687 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3692 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3693 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3695 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3696 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3697 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3698 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3699 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3702 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3703 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3705 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3706 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3709 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3716 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
3717 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3718 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3721 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3722 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3724 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3725 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3726 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3727 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3728 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3731 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3734 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3735 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3738 Some(match events_1[1] {
3739 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3740 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3743 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3747 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3748 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3749 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3750 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3751 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3752 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3753 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3755 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3756 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3757 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3758 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3759 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3760 (as_update, bs_update)
3762 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3764 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3765 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3766 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3767 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3769 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3770 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3771 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3772 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3773 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3774 (as_update, bs_update)
3776 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3777 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3779 (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
3784 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3785 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3788 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3789 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3790 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3791 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3792 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3793 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3796 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3798 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3799 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3804 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3805 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3807 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3808 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3809 added_monitors.clear();
3814 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3815 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3817 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3818 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3819 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3820 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3821 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3824 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
3826 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3827 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3828 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3829 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3830 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3831 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3832 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3833 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3834 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3835 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3837 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3838 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3841 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3842 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3844 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3845 if $fail_backwards {
3846 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3847 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3849 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3851 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3852 if $fail_backwards {
3853 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3854 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3856 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3858 added_monitors.clear();
3863 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
3865 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
3868 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3870 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
3871 if $fail_backwards {
3872 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3873 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3874 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
3875 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3876 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
3878 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3884 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3887 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3888 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3889 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3890 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3891 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3892 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3893 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3898 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3899 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3901 let mut payment_event = {
3902 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3903 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3905 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3906 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3907 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3909 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3911 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3912 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3914 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3915 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3916 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3918 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3919 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3921 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3922 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3925 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3926 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3928 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3929 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3930 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3932 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3933 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3934 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3936 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3939 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3940 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3941 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3942 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3943 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3949 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3952 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3953 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3954 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3956 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3957 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3958 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
3961 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3962 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3964 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3965 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3966 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3967 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3968 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3969 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3970 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3971 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
3973 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3979 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
3980 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
3982 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3983 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3984 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3985 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3989 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
3990 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
3992 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3993 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3994 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
3995 get_next_msgs!($node)
3997 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4000 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4001 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
4006 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4007 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4008 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4009 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
4010 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4011 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
4012 } else if update_next_msgs {
4013 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
4015 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4017 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4018 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4025 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
4026 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4027 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4029 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4030 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4032 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4037 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
4038 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
4041 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
4043 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
4044 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4045 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4046 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4047 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4050 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4053 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4054 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4055 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4056 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4057 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4060 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4062 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4064 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4065 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4069 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4070 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4071 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4074 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4075 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
4076 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4078 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4079 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4080 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4082 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4083 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4088 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4089 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4090 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4091 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4092 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4093 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4094 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4095 // second-to-last node!
4096 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4099 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4100 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4101 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4103 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4104 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4105 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4106 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4107 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4108 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4109 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4110 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4112 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4115 assert!(events.is_empty());
4117 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4118 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4125 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4127 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4128 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4130 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
4131 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4132 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4134 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4139 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4140 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4143 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4144 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4145 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4146 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4147 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4149 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4150 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4152 for _ in 0..node_count {
4153 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4154 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4155 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4156 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4157 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4158 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4159 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4160 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4161 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4162 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4163 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4164 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4165 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
4166 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4167 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4175 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4176 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4177 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4178 let channel_id = chan.2;
4181 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4185 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4186 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4187 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4188 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4189 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4190 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4191 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4192 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4193 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4194 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4196 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4198 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4200 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4201 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4204 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4205 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4206 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4207 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4208 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4210 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4213 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4215 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4216 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4217 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4220 let payment_event = {
4221 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4222 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4223 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4225 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4226 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4228 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4229 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4230 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4231 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4232 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4235 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4236 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4237 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4238 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4241 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4242 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4243 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4244 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4245 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4246 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4247 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4250 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4251 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4252 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4253 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4254 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4255 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4256 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4259 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4260 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4261 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4264 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4265 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4268 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4271 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4272 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4274 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4275 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4278 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4283 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4284 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4285 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4286 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4287 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4288 let channel_id = chan.2;
4291 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4293 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4294 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4297 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4298 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4299 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4300 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4306 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4308 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4309 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4310 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4313 let payment_event = {
4314 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4315 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4316 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4318 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4319 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4321 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4322 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4323 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4324 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4325 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4328 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4331 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4335 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4336 let nodes = create_network(2);
4337 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4338 let channel_id = chan.2;
4341 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4342 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4343 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4344 // (3) update_fee ->
4345 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4346 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4347 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4348 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4349 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4350 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4351 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4352 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4353 // revoke_and_ack ->
4354 // B should send no response here
4355 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4356 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4357 // revoke_and_ack ->
4359 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4360 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4361 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4364 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4365 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4366 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4367 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4368 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4370 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4373 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4374 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4375 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4376 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4379 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4381 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4382 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4383 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4385 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4386 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4387 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4388 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4391 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4393 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4395 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4397 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4398 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4399 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4401 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4402 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4403 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4404 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4405 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4406 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4407 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4409 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4410 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4411 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4413 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4415 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4416 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4420 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4421 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4424 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4425 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4428 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4429 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4430 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4431 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4433 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4434 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4439 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4440 let nodes = create_network(2);
4441 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4442 let channel_id = chan.2;
4444 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4445 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
4446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4448 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4449 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4450 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4451 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4452 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4454 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4456 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4458 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4459 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4462 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4463 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4466 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4467 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4468 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4471 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4472 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4477 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
4478 let nodes = create_network(2);
4479 let channel_value = 1888;
4480 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
4481 let channel_id = chan.2;
4484 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
4485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4486 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4488 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4490 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
4492 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
4493 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
4495 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4496 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4498 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
4499 let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
4500 let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
4501 let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
4502 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
4503 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
4506 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
4507 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
4508 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
4509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4511 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4513 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4515 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
4516 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
4517 //Should produce and error.
4518 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
4520 assert!(match err.err {
4521 "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
4525 //clear the message we could not handle
4526 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4530 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4531 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4532 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4533 let channel_id = chan.2;
4536 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4538 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4539 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4542 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4543 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4544 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4545 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4546 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4548 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4550 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4551 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4552 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4555 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4557 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4559 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4560 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4562 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4563 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4564 added_monitors.clear();
4566 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4567 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4568 // node[1] has nothing to do
4570 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4571 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4574 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4575 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4576 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4578 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4580 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4582 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4583 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4584 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4585 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4586 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4587 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4589 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4590 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4592 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4594 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4596 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4598 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4600 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4601 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4603 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4605 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4607 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4608 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4610 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4611 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4613 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4614 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4616 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4617 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4619 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4620 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4623 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4625 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4626 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4627 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4631 fn test_update_fee() {
4632 let nodes = create_network(2);
4633 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4634 let channel_id = chan.2;
4637 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4638 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4639 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4640 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4641 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4642 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4643 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4644 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4645 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4646 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4647 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4648 // revoke_and_ack ->
4650 // Create and deliver (1)...
4651 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4652 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4655 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4656 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4657 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4658 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4659 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4661 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4663 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4665 // Generate (2) and (3):
4666 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4667 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4671 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4672 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4675 // Create and deliver (4)...
4676 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4677 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4678 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4679 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4680 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4681 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4682 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4684 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4687 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4688 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4691 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4692 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4694 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4695 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4697 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4698 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4701 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4702 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4705 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4706 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4707 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4708 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4709 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4710 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4711 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4712 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4716 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4718 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4719 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4721 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4722 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4723 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4725 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4726 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4727 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4731 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4732 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4733 let nodes = create_network(2);
4734 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4735 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4736 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4737 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4739 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4740 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4741 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4742 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4743 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4745 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4746 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4747 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4748 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4749 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4750 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4752 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4753 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4757 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4758 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4759 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4760 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4761 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4762 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4763 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4765 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4767 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4768 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4769 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4770 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4771 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4773 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4774 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4776 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4777 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4778 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4779 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4780 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4782 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4784 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4785 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4786 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4787 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4788 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4789 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4790 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4792 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4793 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4795 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4796 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4797 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4798 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4799 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4800 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4801 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4803 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4804 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4806 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4807 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4809 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4812 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4813 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4814 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4815 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4816 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4817 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4819 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4821 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4822 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4823 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4824 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4825 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4829 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
4830 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
4831 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4832 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4833 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4835 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4836 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4837 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4839 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4840 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4841 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4842 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4843 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4844 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4846 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4847 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4848 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4849 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4851 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4852 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4854 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4855 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
4857 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4858 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4859 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4860 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4861 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4862 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4864 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4865 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4867 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4868 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4870 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest } => {
4871 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4872 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
4874 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4877 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4878 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4879 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4880 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4881 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4882 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4883 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4885 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4887 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4888 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4889 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4890 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4891 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4895 fn update_fee_async_shutdown() {
4896 // Test update_fee works after shutdown start if messages are delivered out-of-order
4897 let nodes = create_network(2);
4898 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4900 let starting_feerate = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().get_feerate();
4901 nodes[0].node.update_fee(chan_1.2.clone(), starting_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4903 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4904 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4905 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4906 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4907 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4908 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_some());
4910 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4911 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4912 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4913 // Note that we don't actually test normative behavior here. The spec indicates we could
4914 // actually send a closing_signed here, but is kinda unclear and could possibly be amended
4915 // to require waiting on the full commitment dance before doing so (see
4916 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/499). In any case, to avoid
4917 // ambiguity, we should wait until after the full commitment dance to send closing_signed.
4918 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4920 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4921 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4923 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4924 let node_0_closing_signed = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, true);
4926 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4927 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), match node_0_closing_signed.unwrap() {
4928 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
4929 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4934 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4935 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4936 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4937 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4940 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
4941 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
4942 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
4943 let nodes = create_network(3);
4944 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4945 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4947 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4949 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4950 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4952 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4953 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4955 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4959 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4960 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4962 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4963 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4964 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4965 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4967 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
4968 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4969 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
4971 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
4972 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
4973 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4974 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
4977 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4978 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
4979 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
4981 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
4983 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4984 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4986 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4988 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4989 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4990 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4991 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4992 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4993 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4994 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4996 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4997 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4999 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5000 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5001 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5002 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5003 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5004 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5005 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5007 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5008 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5010 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5011 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
5013 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5016 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5018 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5019 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5020 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
5023 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5024 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5026 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5027 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5028 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5029 if recv_count == 0 {
5030 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
5031 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5033 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5034 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5035 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
5037 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5038 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5039 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5041 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5042 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5044 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5045 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5046 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
5048 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
5049 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5050 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5051 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5052 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5054 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5055 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5056 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5057 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5058 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5059 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5061 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5063 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5064 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5065 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5066 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5067 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5068 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5070 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5071 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5072 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5073 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5074 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5076 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5077 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5079 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5083 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5085 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5086 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5087 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5088 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5089 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5093 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5094 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5095 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5096 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5100 fn fake_network_test() {
5101 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5102 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5103 let nodes = create_network(4);
5105 // Create some initial channels
5106 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5107 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5108 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5110 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5111 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5112 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5113 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5114 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5116 // Send some more payments
5117 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5118 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5119 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5121 // Test failure packets
5122 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5123 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5125 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5126 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5128 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5129 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5130 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5131 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5132 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5133 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5134 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5136 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5137 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5138 hops.push(RouteHop {
5139 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5140 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5142 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5144 hops.push(RouteHop {
5145 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5146 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5148 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5150 hops.push(RouteHop {
5151 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5152 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5154 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5156 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5157 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5158 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5160 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5161 hops.push(RouteHop {
5162 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5163 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5165 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5167 hops.push(RouteHop {
5168 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5169 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5171 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5173 hops.push(RouteHop {
5174 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5175 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5177 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5179 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5180 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5181 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5183 // Claim the rebalances...
5184 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5185 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5187 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5188 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5190 // Send some payments across both channels
5191 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5192 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5193 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5195 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5197 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5199 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5200 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5201 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5203 // Close down the channels...
5204 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5205 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5206 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5207 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5208 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5212 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5213 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5214 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5215 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5217 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5218 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5219 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5220 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5221 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5222 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5224 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5226 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5227 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5229 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5230 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5232 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5233 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5234 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5237 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5238 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5239 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5241 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5242 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5243 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5245 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5246 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5248 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5250 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5251 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5252 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5254 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5255 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5256 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5257 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5258 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5259 res.push(tx.clone());
5264 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5265 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5268 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5270 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5271 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5272 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5273 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5274 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5275 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5277 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5279 res.push(tx.clone());
5283 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
5286 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5290 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5291 /// HTLC transaction.
5292 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5293 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5294 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5295 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5296 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5297 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5301 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5304 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5305 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5307 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5308 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5309 let mut found_prev = false;
5311 for tx in prev_txn {
5312 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5313 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5314 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5315 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5321 assert!(found_prev);
5323 let mut res = Vec::new();
5324 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5328 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5329 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5330 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5331 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5332 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5338 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5339 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5340 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5341 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5344 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5348 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5349 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5353 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5355 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5356 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5358 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5359 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5361 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5362 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5366 fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
5368 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5369 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5371 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5372 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5373 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5374 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5375 chan.get_value_stat()
5379 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5380 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5381 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5383 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5384 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5386 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5387 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5389 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5390 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5391 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5392 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5393 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5397 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5399 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5400 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5401 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5402 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5407 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5408 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5409 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5410 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5412 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5413 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5414 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5416 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5421 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5422 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5424 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5426 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5428 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5429 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5430 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5432 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5433 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5437 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5438 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5439 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5441 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5442 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5445 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5448 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5449 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5450 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5451 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5452 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5455 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5456 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5457 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5458 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5459 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5463 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5464 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5465 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5466 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5468 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5469 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5473 // adding pending output
5474 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5475 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5477 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5478 let payment_event_1 = {
5479 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5482 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5483 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5484 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5486 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5488 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5489 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5491 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5492 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5493 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5494 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5499 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5500 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5502 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5503 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5504 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5505 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5506 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5508 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5510 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5511 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5512 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5513 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5514 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5515 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5517 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5518 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5519 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5520 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5524 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5526 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5528 // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
5529 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5530 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5531 let channel_close_broadcast = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5532 assert_eq!(channel_close_broadcast.len(), 1);
5533 match channel_close_broadcast[0] {
5534 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5535 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5537 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5543 // split the rest to test holding cell
5544 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5545 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5547 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5548 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5551 // now see if they go through on both sides
5552 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5553 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5554 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5556 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5557 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5559 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5561 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5562 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5563 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5564 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5568 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5569 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5570 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5572 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5573 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5575 // flush the pending htlc
5576 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5577 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5580 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5582 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5584 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5585 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5586 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5589 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5590 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5593 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5595 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5596 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5597 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5599 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5600 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5602 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5603 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5604 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5605 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5606 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5607 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5609 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5610 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5611 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5612 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5614 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5615 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5617 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5618 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5620 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5621 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5622 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5624 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5627 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5628 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5629 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5631 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5634 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5635 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5636 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5638 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5639 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5640 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5641 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5643 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5644 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5648 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5649 do_channel_reserve_test(false);
5650 do_channel_reserve_test(true);
5654 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5655 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5656 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5657 let nodes = create_network(5);
5659 // Create some initial channels
5660 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5661 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5662 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5663 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5665 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5666 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5667 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5668 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5669 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5671 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5672 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5674 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5675 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5676 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5677 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5679 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5680 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5681 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5683 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5684 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5686 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5687 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5689 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5690 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5691 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5692 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5694 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5695 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5696 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5698 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5699 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5701 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5702 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5704 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5705 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5707 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5708 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5709 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5710 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5712 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5718 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5719 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5720 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5722 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5724 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5725 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5727 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5728 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5730 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5732 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5733 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5734 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5736 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5737 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5738 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5741 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5742 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5743 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5744 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5745 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5749 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5750 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5751 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5752 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5753 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5756 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5758 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5759 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5761 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5762 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5763 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5764 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5765 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5768 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5770 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5771 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5773 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5775 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5776 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5777 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5781 fn test_justice_tx() {
5782 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5784 let nodes = create_network(2);
5785 // Create some new channels:
5786 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5788 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5789 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5790 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5791 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5792 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5793 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5794 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5795 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5796 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5797 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5798 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5799 // Revoke the old state
5800 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5803 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5804 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5806 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5807 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5808 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5809 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5811 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5812 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5814 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5816 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5817 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5818 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5819 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5820 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5822 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5824 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5825 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5827 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5828 // Create some new channels:
5829 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5831 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5832 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5833 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5834 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5835 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5836 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5837 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5838 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5839 // Revoke the old state
5840 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5842 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5843 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5845 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5846 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5847 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5848 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5850 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5851 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5853 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5855 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5856 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5857 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5858 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5859 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5861 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5862 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5863 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5867 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5868 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5869 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5870 let nodes = create_network(2);
5871 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5872 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5873 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5874 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5875 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5876 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5877 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5878 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5880 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5881 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5882 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5883 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5884 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
5886 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5888 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5889 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
5891 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
5892 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5893 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5897 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
5898 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
5899 let nodes = create_network(2);
5901 // Create some new channel:
5902 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5904 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5905 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5906 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
5907 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5908 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5910 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5911 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5912 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
5913 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5914 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5915 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5916 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5917 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5918 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5920 //Revoke the old state
5921 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5924 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5926 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5928 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5929 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5930 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5932 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
5933 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5935 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
5937 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5938 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5939 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5940 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5941 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5942 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5943 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5944 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
5946 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
5947 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5948 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
5950 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5951 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
5952 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
5953 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
5954 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5955 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
5957 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5958 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5959 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5963 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
5964 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
5965 let nodes = create_network(2);
5967 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5969 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5970 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5971 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
5972 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
5973 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5974 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5976 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5977 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5979 //Revoke the old state
5980 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5983 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5985 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
5987 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
5988 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5989 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
5991 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
5992 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
5993 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
5994 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
5995 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
5996 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
5997 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
5999 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6000 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6001 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6003 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
6004 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6005 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6006 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6007 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6009 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6010 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6011 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6012 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6013 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6014 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6015 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
6016 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
6018 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
6019 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
6021 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
6022 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
6023 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
6024 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
6025 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6026 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6028 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6029 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6030 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6034 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
6035 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
6036 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
6037 let nodes = create_network(2);
6038 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6040 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
6041 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
6043 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6044 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6046 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6047 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6049 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6053 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6054 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
6056 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6057 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6060 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6061 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6063 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6064 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6066 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6070 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6071 // registering new transactions
6072 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6076 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6077 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6078 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6079 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6080 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6082 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6084 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6086 let mut payment_event = {
6087 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6090 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6091 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6092 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6095 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6096 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6098 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6099 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6101 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6102 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6105 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6106 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6108 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6109 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6110 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6111 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6114 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6115 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6117 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6119 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6120 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6121 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6123 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6124 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6125 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6127 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6128 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6130 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6134 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6135 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6136 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6137 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6138 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6142 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6143 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6145 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6146 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6147 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6149 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6150 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6152 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6155 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6157 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6158 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6159 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6161 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6162 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6163 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6164 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6165 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6166 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6167 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6169 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6173 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6174 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6175 let nodes = create_network(2);
6176 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6178 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6179 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6180 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6181 mem::drop(channel_state);
6183 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6184 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6185 headers.push(header.clone());
6187 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6188 headers.push(header.clone());
6190 while !headers.is_empty() {
6191 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6194 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6195 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6197 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6198 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6200 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6203 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6204 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6205 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6208 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6209 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6211 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6212 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6213 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6214 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6215 res.push(msg.clone());
6217 panic!("Unexpected event")
6225 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6226 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6228 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6230 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6232 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6238 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6239 let mut commitment_update = None;
6240 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6243 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6244 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6245 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6246 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6248 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6249 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6250 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6251 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6253 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6256 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6259 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6261 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6262 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6263 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6264 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6266 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6267 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6268 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6269 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6271 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6275 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6280 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6281 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6282 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6283 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6284 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6285 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6286 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6288 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
6289 for msg in reestablish_1 {
6290 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6291 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
6293 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6294 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6296 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
6299 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
6300 for msg in reestablish_2 {
6301 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6302 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
6304 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6305 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6307 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
6310 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
6311 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
6312 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
6314 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
6315 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6316 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6317 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6318 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6319 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6320 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6321 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6322 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6325 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6328 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6329 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6330 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6331 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6333 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6335 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6336 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6337 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6338 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
6340 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6342 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6343 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6344 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6345 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6346 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6348 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6349 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6351 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6352 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6355 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6356 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6358 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6359 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6360 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6361 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6362 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6363 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6364 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6367 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6371 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
6372 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6373 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6374 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6375 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6376 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6377 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6378 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6379 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6382 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6385 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6386 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6387 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6388 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6390 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6392 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6393 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6394 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6395 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
6397 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6398 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6399 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6400 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6401 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6403 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6404 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6406 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6407 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6410 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6411 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6413 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6414 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6415 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6416 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6417 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6418 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6419 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6422 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6428 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
6429 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
6430 let nodes = create_network(3);
6431 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6432 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6434 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6435 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6436 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6438 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6439 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6440 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
6441 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
6443 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6444 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6445 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6447 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6448 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6449 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6450 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6452 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6453 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6455 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
6456 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
6458 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
6460 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6461 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6463 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6464 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
6466 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6469 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
6470 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
6471 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
6473 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6477 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
6478 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
6481 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
6482 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
6483 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6484 if messages_delivered == 0 {
6485 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6486 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
6488 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6491 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6492 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6494 let payment_event = {
6495 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
6496 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6498 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6499 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6500 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6502 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
6504 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6505 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
6507 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6508 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6509 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6511 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6513 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6514 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6515 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6518 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6519 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6520 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6521 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6524 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
6525 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6526 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6534 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6535 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6536 if messages_delivered < 3 {
6537 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
6538 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
6539 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6540 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6541 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6542 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6543 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6544 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6545 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6546 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6547 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6548 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6549 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
6550 // Everything was delivered...
6551 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6554 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6555 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6557 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6558 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6561 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6562 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6563 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6565 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6566 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6568 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6569 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6571 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6572 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6573 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6575 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6578 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6581 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6582 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6583 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
6584 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6585 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6586 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6587 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6588 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6589 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6590 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6591 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6593 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6596 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
6597 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
6599 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6600 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6602 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6603 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6605 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6608 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
6609 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
6610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6611 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6613 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6614 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6615 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6618 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6619 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6620 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6621 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6624 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6625 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6626 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6634 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6635 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6636 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6637 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6638 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
6639 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
6640 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6641 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6643 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6644 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6646 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6649 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
6650 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6651 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6652 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6653 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6654 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6655 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6656 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6657 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6658 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6659 // Everything was delivered...
6660 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6663 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6664 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6665 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6667 // Channel should still work fine...
6668 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
6669 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6673 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
6674 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
6675 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
6676 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
6677 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
6681 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
6682 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
6683 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
6684 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
6688 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
6689 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
6690 let nodes = create_network(2);
6691 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6693 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6694 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6696 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6697 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6698 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6700 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6701 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6703 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6706 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6708 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6709 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6711 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6712 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6713 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
6715 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6716 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6718 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6721 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6722 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6724 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6727 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6729 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
6730 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
6732 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6733 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6734 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
6738 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
6739 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
6740 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
6741 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6742 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6744 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6746 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6747 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6748 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6750 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
6751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6753 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6754 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6756 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
6757 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6760 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6763 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6764 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6766 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6767 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6768 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6769 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6770 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6771 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6772 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6774 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6775 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6776 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6778 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6779 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6781 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6784 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6785 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6786 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6789 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6792 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6793 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6795 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6796 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6797 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6798 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6799 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6800 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6802 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6803 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6804 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6805 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6807 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6808 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6810 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6811 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6813 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6815 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6816 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6817 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6818 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6819 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6820 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6821 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6822 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6823 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6826 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
6827 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6828 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6829 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6830 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6831 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6832 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6835 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6836 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6837 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6838 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6839 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6840 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6841 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6844 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6845 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6846 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6849 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6850 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6851 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6854 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6855 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6858 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6859 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6861 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6862 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6865 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6866 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6868 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6869 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6871 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
6872 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6874 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6877 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6878 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6881 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6885 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
6886 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
6887 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6888 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6890 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6891 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6893 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6894 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6897 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6898 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6900 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6901 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6904 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6905 // PaymentFailed event
6907 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6910 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
6911 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
6912 // a disconnect in between
6913 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6914 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6916 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6917 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6919 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6920 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6923 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6924 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6925 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6928 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6929 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6930 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6933 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
6934 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6937 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6938 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6939 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
6940 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6941 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6942 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6944 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6946 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6947 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6949 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6950 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6951 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6953 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6956 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
6958 // Now set it to failed again...
6959 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6960 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6961 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
6962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6964 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6965 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6966 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6969 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6970 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6971 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6974 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
6975 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6976 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6979 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6980 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6982 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6983 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6986 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6987 // PaymentFailed event
6989 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6993 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
6994 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
6995 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
6998 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
6999 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
7001 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
7002 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
7003 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
7004 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
7005 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
7006 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
7007 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
7008 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
7009 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
7010 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
7011 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
7012 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
7013 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
7014 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
7015 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
7016 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
7017 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
7018 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7019 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7021 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7023 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7024 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7025 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7027 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7028 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7031 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7032 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7033 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7035 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
7036 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
7037 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7039 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7040 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7041 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
7042 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7043 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7044 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7045 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7046 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7047 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7048 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7050 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7051 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7052 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7053 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7055 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7056 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7058 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7061 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
7062 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7063 } else { panic!(); }
7066 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7071 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7072 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7073 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7076 // Now fix monitor updating...
7077 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7078 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7081 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7082 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7083 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7085 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7086 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7087 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7088 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7089 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7090 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7092 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7093 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7094 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7095 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7097 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7098 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7100 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7103 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7104 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7105 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7107 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7108 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7109 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7110 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7111 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7112 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7114 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7116 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7117 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7119 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7121 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7122 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7124 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7125 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7126 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7128 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7129 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7130 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7132 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7133 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7134 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7135 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7136 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7137 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7139 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7141 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7142 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7143 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7145 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7146 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7148 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7151 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7152 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7153 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7156 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7160 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7161 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7163 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7164 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7165 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7167 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7168 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7171 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7173 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7174 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7175 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7176 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7177 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7180 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7184 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7186 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7187 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7188 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7189 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7192 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7193 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7195 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7196 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7198 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7199 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7202 let as_commitment_update;
7203 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7205 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7206 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7207 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7208 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7209 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7210 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7211 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7212 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7216 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7217 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7218 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7219 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7220 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7221 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7222 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7223 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7227 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7230 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7231 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7233 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7234 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7236 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7237 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7239 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7242 handle_initial_raa!();
7244 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7245 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7247 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7248 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7250 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7251 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7254 handle_initial_raa!();
7256 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7257 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7259 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7260 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7262 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7263 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7265 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7270 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7271 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7273 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7274 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7276 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7277 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7281 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7282 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7283 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7286 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7287 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7288 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7291 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7292 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7295 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7296 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7299 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7301 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7302 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7304 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7305 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7306 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7308 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7311 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7315 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
7316 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
7317 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
7318 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
7319 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
7320 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
7321 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
7325 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
7326 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
7327 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
7328 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
7329 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
7333 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
7334 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
7335 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
7336 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
7337 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
7338 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
7342 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
7343 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
7344 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7345 let nodes = create_network(2);
7347 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7349 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7350 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7351 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7352 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7354 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7356 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7357 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7359 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7360 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7362 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
7364 let mut chan_announcement;
7366 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
7368 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
7369 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
7370 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
7371 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
7372 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
7373 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
7374 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
7375 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
7376 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7381 macro_rules! sign_msg {
7382 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
7383 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
7384 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7385 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7386 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
7387 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
7388 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
7389 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
7390 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
7391 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
7392 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
7393 contents: $unsigned_msg
7398 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7399 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7400 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
7401 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7403 // Configured with Network::Testnet
7404 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7405 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
7406 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7407 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7409 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7410 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
7411 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7412 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7415 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
7416 impl Writer for VecWriter {
7417 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
7418 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
7421 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
7422 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
7427 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7428 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7430 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7432 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7434 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7435 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7436 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7438 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7439 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7440 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7441 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7443 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7444 let config = UserConfig::new();
7445 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7446 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7447 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7448 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7449 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7450 default_config: config,
7452 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7453 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7454 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7455 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7456 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7457 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7460 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7462 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7463 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7464 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
7465 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
7466 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7469 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7470 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7471 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7472 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7474 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7475 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7476 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7477 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7479 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7480 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
7481 for node in nodes.iter() {
7482 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
7483 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
7484 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
7487 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7491 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7492 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7493 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7495 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7496 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7498 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7500 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7501 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7502 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7504 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7505 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7506 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7507 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7509 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7510 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7511 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7512 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7513 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7514 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7515 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7517 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7518 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7519 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7520 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7521 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7522 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7525 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7527 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7528 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7531 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7533 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
7534 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7538 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
7539 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
7540 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
7541 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7542 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
7543 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
7545 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
7547 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
7548 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7550 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
7551 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7552 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7553 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7555 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
7557 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
7558 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
7559 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7560 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
7561 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
7564 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7565 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
7566 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
7567 let mut read = &serialized[..];
7568 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7569 assert!(read.is_empty());
7570 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
7573 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7574 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7575 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7576 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7578 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7579 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7580 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7581 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7582 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7583 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
7585 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7587 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
7588 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7589 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7590 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
7591 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
7594 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
7595 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
7596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7598 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7600 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
7601 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7602 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7603 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
7604 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7606 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7607 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7608 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
7609 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
7610 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
7611 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
7614 macro_rules! check_dynamic_output_p2wsh {
7617 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7618 let mut txn = Vec::new();
7619 for event in events {
7621 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7622 for outp in outputs {
7624 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
7626 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7627 script_sig: Script::new(),
7628 sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
7629 witness: Vec::new(),
7632 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7633 value: output.value,
7635 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7641 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7642 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7643 let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
7644 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7645 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7646 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
7647 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
7650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7654 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7662 macro_rules! check_dynamic_output_p2wpkh {
7665 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7666 let mut txn = Vec::new();
7667 for event in events {
7669 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7670 for outp in outputs {
7672 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
7674 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7675 script_sig: Script::new(),
7677 witness: Vec::new(),
7680 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7681 value: output.value,
7683 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7689 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7690 let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
7691 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
7692 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7693 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
7694 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7695 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7696 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
7699 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7703 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7711 macro_rules! check_static_output {
7712 ($event: expr, $node: expr, $event_idx: expr, $output_idx: expr, $der_idx: expr, $idx_node: expr) => {
7713 match $event[$event_idx] {
7714 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7715 match outputs[$output_idx] {
7716 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
7717 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7719 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7720 script_sig: Script::new(),
7722 witness: Vec::new(),
7725 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7726 value: output.value,
7728 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7732 output: vec![outp.clone()],
7735 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node[$idx_node].node_seed) {
7737 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
7739 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
7742 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
7745 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
7746 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
7747 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7748 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
7749 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7750 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7751 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
7754 _ => panic!("Unexpected event !"),
7757 _ => panic!("Unexpected event !"),
7763 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
7764 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
7765 let nodes = create_network(2);
7767 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
7768 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
7769 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7771 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7772 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7774 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7775 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7776 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
7777 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
7779 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7780 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
7781 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wsh!(nodes[1]);
7782 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7783 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7787 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
7788 // Same test as precedent, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
7789 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
7791 let nodes = create_network(2);
7793 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
7794 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
7795 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7797 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7798 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7800 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7801 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7802 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
7803 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
7805 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7806 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
7807 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7809 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7810 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7812 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wpkh!(nodes[1]);
7813 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
7814 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
7815 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7819 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
7820 let nodes = create_network(2);
7822 // Create some initial channels
7823 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7825 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7827 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7828 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
7829 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7831 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
7832 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7833 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7835 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
7836 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7838 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7839 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7842 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7843 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
7846 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
7847 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
7848 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
7849 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
7850 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
7851 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
7853 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7854 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 1, 1);
7855 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[0].clone());
7859 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
7860 let nodes = create_network(2);
7862 // Create some initial channels
7863 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7865 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7866 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7867 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7868 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7870 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7872 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7873 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7874 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7876 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7877 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7879 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7880 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7881 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
7882 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7883 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7885 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7886 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 1, 1);
7887 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[0].clone());
7891 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
7892 let nodes = create_network(2);
7894 // Create some initial channels
7895 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7897 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7898 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7899 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7900 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7902 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7904 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7905 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
7906 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7907 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7909 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7910 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7912 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7913 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7914 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7915 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
7916 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7918 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
7919 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7920 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7922 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7926 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7927 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
7928 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
7929 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
7931 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7932 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
7933 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 1, 1, 1, 1);
7934 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[3].clone());
7938 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
7939 let nodes = create_network(2);
7941 // Create some initial channels
7942 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7944 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7945 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7946 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7947 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7949 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7951 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7952 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
7953 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7954 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7956 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7957 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7959 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7961 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7962 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7963 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
7964 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7966 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
7967 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7968 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7970 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7971 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7974 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7975 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
7976 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
7977 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
7979 let events = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7980 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
7981 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 1, 2, 1, 0);
7982 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[3].clone());
7986 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
7987 let nodes = create_network(2);
7989 // Create some initial channels
7990 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7992 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
7993 let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7994 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7995 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
7997 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
7998 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8000 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8001 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8002 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8004 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
8005 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8008 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8009 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8011 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8012 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8013 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
8014 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8016 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8017 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wsh!(nodes[1]);
8018 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8019 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8023 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
8024 let nodes = create_network(2);
8026 // Create some initial channels
8027 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8029 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
8030 let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8031 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8032 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
8034 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8035 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8036 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
8037 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8039 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8040 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8042 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8043 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8044 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
8045 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8047 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8048 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wsh!(nodes[0]);
8049 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
8050 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
8051 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
8052 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8053 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8057 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
8058 let nodes = create_network(2);
8060 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8062 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
8063 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
8065 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8066 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8067 let events = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8068 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 2, 0);
8069 check_spends!(spend_tx, closing_tx.clone());
8071 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8072 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8073 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 2, 1);
8074 check_spends!(spend_tx, closing_tx);