_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - src/ln/channelmanager.rs

   1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
   2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
   3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
   4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
   5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
   6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
   7
   8 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
   9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
  10 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
  11 use secp256k1;
  12
  13 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
  14 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  15 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
  16 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
  17 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
  18 use ln::msgs;
  19 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable};
  20 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
  21 use util::sha2::Sha256;
  22 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
  23 use util::logger::Logger;
  24 use util::errors::APIError;
  25
  26 use crypto;
  27 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
  28 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
  29 use crypto::digest::Digest;
  30 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
  31
  32 use std::{ptr, mem};
  33 use std::collections::HashMap;
  34 use std::collections::hash_map;
  35 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
  36 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
  37 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
  38
  39 mod channel_held_info {
  40         use ln::msgs;
  41
  42         /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
  43         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  44         pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
  45                 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
  46                 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
  47                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
  48                 pub(super) prev_short_channel_id: u64,
  49                 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
  50                 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
  51         }
  52
  53         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  54         pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
  55                 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
  56                 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
  57         }
  58
  59         /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
  60         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  61         pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
  62                 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
  63                 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
  64         }
  65
  66         #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
  67         impl PendingHTLCStatus {
  68                 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
  69                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
  70                                 onion_packet: None,
  71                                 payment_hash: [0; 32],
  72                                 short_channel_id: 0,
  73                                 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
  74                                 amt_to_forward: 0,
  75                                 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
  76                         })
  77                 }
  78         }
  79
  80         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  81         pub enum HTLCFailReason {
  82                 ErrorPacket {
  83                         err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
  84                 },
  85                 Reason {
  86                         failure_code: u16,
  87                         data: Vec<u8>,
  88                 }
  89         }
  90
  91         #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
  92         impl HTLCFailReason {
  93                 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
  94                         HTLCFailReason::Reason {
  95                                 failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(),
  96                         }
  97                 }
  98         }
  99 }
 100 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
 101 pub use self::channel_held_info::*;
 102 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 103 pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*;
 104
 105 enum PendingOutboundHTLC {
 106         IntermediaryHopData {
 107                 source_short_channel_id: u64,
 108                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
 109         },
 110         OutboundRoute {
 111                 route: Route,
 112                 session_priv: SecretKey,
 113         },
 114         /// Used for channel rebalancing
 115         CycledRoute {
 116                 source_short_channel_id: u64,
 117                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
 118                 route: Route,
 119                 session_priv: SecretKey,
 120         }
 121 }
 122
 123 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
 124 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
 125 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
 126 /// probably increase this significantly.
 127 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
 128
 129 struct ChannelHolder {
 130         by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
 131         short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
 132         next_forward: Instant,
 133         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
 134         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
 135         /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
 136         /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
 137         forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
 138         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
 139         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
 140         /// go to read them!
 141         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
 142 }
 143 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
 144         by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
 145         short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
 146         next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
 147         forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
 148         claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
 149 }
 150 impl ChannelHolder {
 151         fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
 152                 MutChannelHolder {
 153                         by_id: &mut self.by_id,
 154                         short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
 155                         next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
 156                         forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
 157                         claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
 158                 }
 159         }
 160 }
 161
 162 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
 163 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
 164
 165 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
 166 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
 167 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
 168 /// to individual Channels.
 169 pub struct ChannelManager {
 170         genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
 171         fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
 172         monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
 173         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
 174         tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
 175
 176         announce_channels_publicly: bool,
 177         fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
 178         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
 179         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 180
 181         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
 182         our_network_key: SecretKey,
 183
 184         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
 185
 186         logger: Arc<Logger>,
 187 }
 188
 189 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
 190
 191 macro_rules! secp_call {
 192         ( $res: expr, $err_msg: expr, $action: expr ) => {
 193                 match $res {
 194                         Ok(key) => key,
 195                         Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: $err_msg, action: Some($action)})
 196                 }
 197         };
 198 }
 199
 200 struct OnionKeys {
 201         #[cfg(test)]
 202         shared_secret: SharedSecret,
 203         #[cfg(test)]
 204         blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
 205         ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
 206         rho: [u8; 32],
 207         mu: [u8; 32],
 208 }
 209
 210 pub struct ChannelDetails {
 211         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
 212         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
 213         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
 214         /// lifetime of the channel.
 215         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
 216         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
 217         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
 218         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 219         pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
 220         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 221         /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
 222         pub user_id: u64,
 223 }
 224
 225 impl ChannelManager {
 226         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
 227         /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
 228         /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
 229         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
 230         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
 231         pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
 232                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 233
 234                 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
 235                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
 236                         fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
 237                         monitor: monitor.clone(),
 238                         chain_monitor,
 239                         tx_broadcaster,
 240
 241                         announce_channels_publicly,
 242                         fee_proportional_millionths,
 243                         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
 244                         secp_ctx,
 245
 246                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
 247                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
 248                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
 249                                 next_forward: Instant::now(),
 250                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
 251                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
 252                         }),
 253                         our_network_key,
 254
 255                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
 256
 257                         logger,
 258                 });
 259                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
 260                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
 261                 Ok(res)
 262         }
 263
 264         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
 265         /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
 266         /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
 267         /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
 268         /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
 269         /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
 270         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
 271         /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
 272         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
 273                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
 274                         ChannelKeys {
 275                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 276                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 277                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 278                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 279                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 280                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 281                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 282                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
 283                         }
 284                 } else {
 285                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
 286                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
 287                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
 288                                 Ok(key) => key,
 289                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
 290                         }
 291                 };
 292
 293                 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
 294                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?;
 295                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 296                 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
 297                         Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
 298                         None => {}
 299                 }
 300
 301                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 302                 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
 303                         node_id: their_network_key,
 304                         msg: res,
 305                 });
 306                 Ok(())
 307         }
 308
 309         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
 310         /// more information.
 311         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
 312                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 313                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
 314                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
 315                         res.push(ChannelDetails {
 316                                 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
 317                                 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
 318                                 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
 319                                 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
 320                                 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
 321                         });
 322                 }
 323                 res
 324         }
 325
 326         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
 327         /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
 328         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
 329                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 330                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
 331                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
 332                         if channel.is_usable() {
 333                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
 334                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
 335                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
 336                                         remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
 337                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
 338                                         user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
 339                                 });
 340                         }
 341                 }
 342                 res
 343         }
 344
 345         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
 346         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
 347         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
 348         /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
 349         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 350                 let (res, node_id, chan_option) = {
 351                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 352                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 353                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
 354                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
 355                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
 356                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
 357                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
 358                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
 359                                                 }
 360                                                 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
 361                                         } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
 362                                 },
 363                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
 364                         }
 365                 };
 366                 for payment_hash in res.1 {
 367                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
 368                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
 369                 }
 370                 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
 371                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
 372                                 Some(update)
 373                         } else { None }
 374                 } else { None };
 375
 376                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 377                 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
 378                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
 379                                 msg: update
 380                         });
 381                 }
 382                 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
 383                         node_id,
 384                         msg: res.0
 385                 });
 386
 387                 Ok(())
 388         }
 389
 390         #[inline]
 391         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<[u8; 32]>)) {
 392                 let (local_txn, failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
 393                 for payment_hash in failed_htlcs {
 394                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
 395                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
 396                 }
 397                 for tx in local_txn {
 398                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
 399                 }
 400                 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
 401                 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
 402                 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
 403                 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
 404                 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
 405         }
 406
 407         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
 408         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
 409         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
 410                 let mut chan = {
 411                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 412                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 413                         if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
 414                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
 415                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
 416                                 }
 417                                 chan
 418                         } else {
 419                                 return;
 420                         }
 421                 };
 422                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
 423                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 424                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
 425                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
 426                                 msg: update
 427                         });
 428                 }
 429         }
 430
 431         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
 432         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
 433         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
 434                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
 435                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
 436                 }
 437         }
 438
 439         #[inline]
 440         fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
 441                 ({
 442                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
 443                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 444                         let mut res = [0; 32];
 445                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 446                         res
 447                 },
 448                 {
 449                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
 450                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 451                         let mut res = [0; 32];
 452                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 453                         res
 454                 })
 455         }
 456
 457         #[inline]
 458         fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
 459                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
 460                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 461                 let mut res = [0; 32];
 462                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 463                 res
 464         }
 465
 466         #[inline]
 467         fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
 468                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
 469                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 470                 let mut res = [0; 32];
 471                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 472                 res
 473         }
 474
 475         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
 476         #[inline]
 477         fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
 478                 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
 479                 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
 480
 481                 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
 482                         let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
 483
 484                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 485                         sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
 486                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 487                         let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
 488                         sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
 489
 490                         let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
 491
 492                         blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
 493                         blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
 494
 495                         callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
 496                 }
 497
 498                 Ok(())
 499         }
 500
 501         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
 502         fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
 503                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
 504
 505                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
 506                         let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 507
 508                         res.push(OnionKeys {
 509                                 #[cfg(test)]
 510                                 shared_secret,
 511                                 #[cfg(test)]
 512                                 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
 513                                 ephemeral_pubkey,
 514                                 rho,
 515                                 mu,
 516                         });
 517                 })?;
 518
 519                 Ok(res)
 520         }
 521
 522         /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
 523         fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
 524                 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
 525                 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
 526                 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
 527                 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
 528                 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
 529                 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
 530
 531                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
 532                         // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
 533                         // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
 534                         // the intended recipient).
 535                         let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
 536                         let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
 537                         res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
 538                                 realm: 0,
 539                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
 540                                         short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
 541                                         amt_to_forward: value_msat,
 542                                         outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
 543                                 },
 544                                 hmac: [0; 32],
 545                         };
 546                         cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
 547                         if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
 548                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", action: None});
 549                         }
 550                         cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
 551                         if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
 552                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", action: None});
 553                         }
 554                         last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
 555                 }
 556                 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
 557         }
 558
 559         #[inline]
 560         fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
 561                 unsafe {
 562                         ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
 563                 }
 564                 for i in 0..65 {
 565                         arr[i] = 0;
 566                 }
 567         }
 568
 569         #[inline]
 570         fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
 571                 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
 572
 573                 for i in 0..dst.len() {
 574                         dst[i] ^= src[i];
 575                 }
 576         }
 577
 578         const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
 579         fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, HandleError> {
 580                 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
 581                 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
 582
 583                 let filler = {
 584                         let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
 585                         let end_len = iters * 65;
 586                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
 587                         res.resize(end_len, 0);
 588
 589                         for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
 590                                 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
 591                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 592                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
 593                                 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
 594                         }
 595                         res
 596                 };
 597
 598                 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
 599                 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
 600
 601                 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
 602                         ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
 603                         payload.hmac = hmac_res;
 604                         packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
 605
 606                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 607                         chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
 608                         packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
 609
 610                         if i == 0 {
 611                                 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
 612                         }
 613
 614                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
 615                         hmac.input(&packet_data);
 616                         hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
 617                         hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
 618                 }
 619
 620                 Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{
 621                         version: 0,
 622                         public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
 623                         hop_data: packet_data,
 624                         hmac: hmac_res,
 625                 })
 626         }
 627
 628         /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
 629         /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
 630         fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 631                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 632
 633                 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
 634                 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
 635                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
 636                 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
 637                 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 638                         data: packet_crypted,
 639                 }
 640         }
 641
 642         fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
 643                 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
 644
 645                 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 646
 647                 let failuremsg = {
 648                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
 649                         res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
 650                         res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
 651                         res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
 652                         res
 653                 };
 654                 let pad = {
 655                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
 656                         res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
 657                         res
 658                 };
 659                 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
 660                         hmac: [0; 32],
 661                         failuremsg: failuremsg,
 662                         pad: pad,
 663                 };
 664
 665                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
 666                 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
 667                 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
 668
 669                 packet
 670         }
 671
 672         #[inline]
 673         fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 674                 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
 675                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
 676         }
 677
 678         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, Option<SharedSecret>, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
 679                 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
 680                         () => {
 681                                 {
 682                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 683                                         sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
 684                                         let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
 685                                         sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
 686                                         onion_hash
 687                                 }
 688                         }
 689                 }
 690
 691                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
 692                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
 693                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
 694                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 695                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 696                                 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
 697                                 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
 698                         })), None, self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 699                 }
 700
 701                 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
 702                 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 703
 704                 let mut channel_state = None;
 705                 macro_rules! return_err {
 706                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
 707                                 {
 708                                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
 709                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
 710                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 711                                         }
 712                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
 713                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 714                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 715                                                 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
 716                                         })), Some(shared_secret), channel_state.unwrap());
 717                                 }
 718                         }
 719                 }
 720
 721                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
 722                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
 723                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
 724                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
 725                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
 726                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
 727                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
 728                         return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
 729                 }
 730
 731                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
 732                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
 733                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
 734                 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
 735                         return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
 736                 }
 737
 738                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 739                 let next_hop_data = {
 740                         let mut decoded = [0; 65];
 741                         chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
 742                         match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
 743                                 Err(err) => {
 744                                         let error_code = match err {
 745                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
 746                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
 747                                         };
 748                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
 749                                 },
 750                                 Ok(msg) => msg
 751                         }
 752                 };
 753
 754                 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
 755
 756                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
 757                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
 758                                 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
 759                                         return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
 760                                 }
 761                                 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
 762                                         return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
 763                                 }
 764
 765                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
 766                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
 767                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
 768                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
 769
 770                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
 771                                         onion_packet: None,
 772                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
 773                                         short_channel_id: 0,
 774                                         prev_short_channel_id: 0,
 775                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
 776                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
 777                                 })
 778                         } else {
 779                                 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
 780                                 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
 781                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
 782
 783                                 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
 784
 785                                 let blinding_factor = {
 786                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 787                                         sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
 788                                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 789                                         let mut res = [0u8; 32];
 790                                         sha.result(&mut res);
 791                                         match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
 792                                                 Err(_) => {
 793                                                         return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
 794                                                 },
 795                                                 Ok(key) => key
 796                                         }
 797                                 };
 798
 799                                 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
 800                                         return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
 801                                 }
 802
 803                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
 804                                         version: 0,
 805                                         public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
 806                                         hop_data: new_packet_data,
 807                                         hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
 808                                 };
 809
 810                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
 811                                         onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
 812                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
 813                                         short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
 814                                         prev_short_channel_id: 0,
 815                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
 816                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
 817                                 })
 818                         };
 819
 820                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 821                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
 822                         if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
 823                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
 824                                 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
 825                                         None => {
 826                                                 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
 827                                         },
 828                                         Some(id) => id.clone(),
 829                                 };
 830                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
 831                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
 832                                         if !chan.is_live() {
 833                                                 Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 834                                         } else {
 835                                                 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
 836                                                 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
 837                                                         Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 838                                                 } else {
 839                                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
 840                                                                 Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 841                                                         } else {
 842                                                                 None
 843                                                         }
 844                                                 }
 845                                         }
 846                                 } {
 847                                         return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
 848                                 }
 849                         }
 850                 }
 851
 852                 (pending_forward_info, Some(shared_secret), channel_state.unwrap())
 853         }
 854
 855         /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
 856         fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
 857                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
 858                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
 859                         Some(id) => id,
 860                 };
 861
 862                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
 863
 864                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
 865                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
 866                         short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
 867                         timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
 868                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
 869                         cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
 870                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
 871                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
 872                         fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
 873                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
 874                 };
 875
 876                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
 877                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
 878
 879                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
 880                         signature: sig,
 881                         contents: unsigned
 882                 })
 883         }
 884
 885         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
 886         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
 887         /// fields for more info.
 888         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
 889         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
 890         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
 891         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
 892         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
 893         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
 894         /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
 895         /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
 896         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 897                 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
 898                         return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", action: None});
 899                 }
 900                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
 901                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
 902                         if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
 903                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", action: None});
 904                         }
 905                 }
 906
 907                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
 908                         let mut session_key = [0; 32];
 909                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
 910                         session_key
 911                 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
 912
 913                 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
 914
 915                 //TODO: This should return something other than HandleError, that's really intended for
 916                 //p2p-returns only.
 917                 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv), "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected", msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError);
 918                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
 919                 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash)?;
 920
 921                 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
 922                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 923                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 924
 925                         let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
 926                                 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", action: None}),
 927                                 Some(id) => id.clone()
 928                         };
 929
 930                         let claimable_htlc_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash.clone());
 931                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) = claimable_htlc_entry {
 932                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Already had pending HTLC with the same payment_hash", action: None});
 933                         }
 934
 935                         let res = {
 936                                 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
 937                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
 938                                         return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", action: None});
 939                                 }
 940                                 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash, htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
 941                         };
 942
 943                         let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
 944
 945                         claimable_htlc_entry.or_insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
 946                                 route,
 947                                 session_priv,
 948                         });
 949
 950                         match res {
 951                                 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
 952                                 None => return Ok(()),
 953                         }
 954                 };
 955
 956                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
 957                         unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
 958                 }
 959
 960                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 961                 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
 962                         node_id: first_hop_node_id,
 963                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
 964                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
 965                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 966                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 967                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 968                                 commitment_signed,
 969                         },
 970                 });
 971                 Ok(())
 972         }
 973
 974         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
 975         /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
 976         /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
 977         /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
 978         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
 979
 980                 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
 981                         ($event: expr) => {
 982                                 {
 983                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 984                                         pending_events.push($event);
 985                                 }
 986                         }
 987                 }
 988
 989                 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
 990                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 991                         match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
 992                                 Some(mut chan) => {
 993                                         match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
 994                                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
 995                                                         (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
 996                                                 },
 997                                                 Err(e) => {
 998                                                         log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
 999                                                         mem::drop(channel_state);
1000                                                         add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1001                                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1002                                                                 action: e.action,
1003                                                         });
1004                                                         return;
1005                                                 },
1006                                         }
1007                                 },
1008                                 None => return
1009                         }
1010                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1011                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1012                         unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
1013                 }
1014                 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1015                         node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1016                         msg: msg,
1017                 });
1018
1019                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1020                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1021                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1022                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1023                         },
1024                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1025                                 e.insert(chan);
1026                         }
1027                 }
1028         }
1029
1030         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1031                 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1032
1033                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1034                         Ok(res) => res,
1035                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1036                 };
1037                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1038                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1039
1040                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1041                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1042                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1043                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
1044                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1045                 })
1046         }
1047
1048         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1049         /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1050         /// Will likely generate further events.
1051         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1052                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1053                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1054                 {
1055                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1056                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1057
1058                         if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1059                                 return;
1060                         }
1061
1062                         for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1063                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1064                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1065                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1066                                                 None => {
1067                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1068                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards {
1069                                                                 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1070                                                         }
1071                                                         continue;
1072                                                 }
1073                                         };
1074                                         let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1075
1076                                         let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1077                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards {
1078                                                 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1079                                                         Err(_e) => {
1080                                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1081                                                                 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1082                                                                 continue;
1083                                                         },
1084                                                         Ok(update_add) => {
1085                                                                 match update_add {
1086                                                                         Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1087                                                                         None => {
1088                                                                                 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1089                                                                                 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1090                                                                                 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1091                                                                                 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1092                                                                                 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1093                                                                                 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1094                                                                                 // this channel currently :/.
1095                                                                         }
1096                                                                 }
1097                                                         }
1098                                                 }
1099                                         }
1100
1101                                         if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1102                                                 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1103                                                         Ok(res) => res,
1104                                                         Err(_e) => {
1105                                                                 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1106                                                                 continue;
1107                                                         },
1108                                                 };
1109                                                 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1110                                                         node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1111                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1112                                                                 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1113                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1114                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1115                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1116                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1117                                                         },
1118                                                 }));
1119                                         }
1120                                 } else {
1121                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards {
1122                                                 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1123                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1124                                                         amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1125                                                 }));
1126                                         }
1127                                 }
1128                         }
1129                 }
1130
1131                 for failed_forward in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1132                         match failed_forward.2 {
1133                                 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: Vec::new() }),
1134                                 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1135                         };
1136                 }
1137
1138                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1139
1140                 new_events.retain(|event| {
1141                         if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1142                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1143                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1144                                 }
1145                         }
1146                         true
1147                 });
1148
1149                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1150                 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1151                 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1152                         events.push(event.1);
1153                 }
1154         }
1155
1156         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1157         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1158                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() })
1159         }
1160
1161         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1162         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1163         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1164         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1165         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1166         /// still-available channels.
1167         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool {
1168                 let mut pending_htlc = {
1169                         match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) {
1170                                 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
1171                                 None => return false,
1172                         }
1173                 };
1174
1175                 match pending_htlc {
1176                         PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
1177                                 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.clone(), PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
1178                                         route,
1179                                         session_priv,
1180                                 });
1181                                 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
1182                         },
1183                         _ => {}
1184                 }
1185
1186                 match pending_htlc {
1187                         PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => unreachable!(),
1188                         PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1189                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1190
1191                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1192                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1193                                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1194                                 });
1195                                 false
1196                         },
1197                         PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => {
1198                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1199                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1200                                                 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1201                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1202                                         },
1203                                         HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1204                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1205                                         }
1206                                 };
1207
1208                                 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1209                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
1210                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1211                                                 None => return false
1212                                         };
1213
1214                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1215                                         match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(payment_hash, err_packet) {
1216                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1217                                                 Err(_e) => {
1218                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1219                                                         return false;
1220                                                 },
1221                                         }
1222                                 };
1223
1224                                 match fail_msgs {
1225                                         Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1226                                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1227
1228                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1229                                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1230                                                 }
1231
1232                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1233                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1234                                                         node_id,
1235                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1236                                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1237                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1238                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1239                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1240                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1241                                                         },
1242                                                 });
1243                                         },
1244                                         None => {},
1245                                 }
1246
1247                                 true
1248                         },
1249                 }
1250         }
1251
1252         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1253         /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1254         /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1255         /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1256         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1257                 self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true)
1258         }
1259         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
1260                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1261                 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1262                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1263                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1264
1265                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1266                 let mut pending_htlc = {
1267                         match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
1268                                 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
1269                                 None => return false,
1270                         }
1271                 };
1272
1273                 match pending_htlc {
1274                         PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
1275                                 if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us
1276                                         pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
1277                                         channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv });
1278                                 } else { // This came from the first upstream node
1279                                         // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow???
1280                                         pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv };
1281                                         channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret });
1282                                 }
1283                         },
1284                         _ => {},
1285                 }
1286
1287                 match pending_htlc {
1288                         PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => unreachable!(),
1289                         PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1290                                 if from_user {
1291                                         panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this...");
1292                                 }
1293                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1294                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1295                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1296                                         payment_preimage
1297                                 });
1298                                 false
1299                         },
1300                         PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => {
1301                                 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1302                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
1303                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1304                                                 None => {
1305                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1306                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1307                                                         // why its missing.
1308                                                         return false
1309                                                 }
1310                                         };
1311
1312                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1313                                         match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(payment_preimage) {
1314                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1315                                                 Err(_e) => {
1316                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1317                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1318                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1319                                                         return false;
1320                                                 },
1321                                         }
1322                                 };
1323
1324                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1325                                 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1326                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1327                                                 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1328                                         }
1329                                 }
1330
1331                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1332                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1333                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1334                                                 node_id: node_id,
1335                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1336                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1337                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1338                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1339                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1340                                                         commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1341                                                 }
1342                                         });
1343                                 }
1344                                 true
1345                         },
1346                 }
1347         }
1348
1349         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1350         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1351                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1352         }
1353
1354         /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1355         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1356         /// operation.
1357         pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1358                 unimplemented!();
1359         }
1360 }
1361
1362 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1363         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1364                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1365                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1366                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1367                 ret
1368         }
1369 }
1370
1371 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1372         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1373                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1374                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1375                 {
1376                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1377                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1378                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1379                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1380                                 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
1381                                 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
1382                                         let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
1383                                         new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1384                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1385                                                 msg: funding_locked,
1386                                                 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1387                                         });
1388                                         short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1389                                 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
1390                                         new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
1391                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1392                                                 action: e.action,
1393                                         });
1394                                         if channel.is_shutdown() {
1395                                                 return false;
1396                                         }
1397                                 }
1398                                 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1399                                         for tx in txn_matched {
1400                                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1401                                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
1402                                                                 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1403                                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1404                                                                 }
1405                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
1406                                                                 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
1407                                                                 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
1408                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1409                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1410                                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1411                                                                                 msg: update
1412                                                                         });
1413                                                                 }
1414                                                                 return false;
1415                                                         }
1416                                                 }
1417                                         }
1418                                 }
1419                                 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1420                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1421                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1422                                         }
1423                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1424                                         // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
1425                                         // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
1426                                         // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
1427                                         failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
1428                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1429                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1430                                                         msg: update
1431                                                 });
1432                                         }
1433                                         return false;
1434                                 }
1435                                 true
1436                         });
1437                 }
1438                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
1439                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
1440                 }
1441                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1442                 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1443                         pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1444                 }
1445                 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
1446         }
1447
1448         /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
1449         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
1450                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1451                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1452                 {
1453                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1454                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1455                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1456                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_,  v| {
1457                                 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
1458                                         if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
1459                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1460                                         }
1461                                         failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
1462                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
1463                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1464                                                         msg: update
1465                                                 });
1466                                         }
1467                                         false
1468                                 } else {
1469                                         true
1470                                 }
1471                         });
1472                 }
1473                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
1474                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
1475                 }
1476                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
1477                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1478                         for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1479                                 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1480                         }
1481                 }
1482                 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
1483         }
1484 }
1485
1486 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
1487         //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
1488         fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
1489                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1490                         return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown genesis block hash", action: None});
1491                 }
1492                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1493                 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1494                         return Err(HandleError{err: "temporary_channel_id collision!", action: None});
1495                 }
1496
1497                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1498                         ChannelKeys {
1499                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1500                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1501                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1502                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1503                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1504                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1505                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1506                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1507                         }
1508                 } else {
1509                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1510                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1511                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1512                                 Ok(key) => key,
1513                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1514                         }
1515                 };
1516
1517                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
1518                 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel()?;
1519                 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1520                 Ok(accept_msg)
1521         }
1522
1523         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1524                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1525                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1526                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1527                                 Some(chan) => {
1528                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1529                                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1530                                         }
1531                                         chan.accept_channel(&msg)?;
1532                                         (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1533                                 },
1534                                 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1535                         }
1536                 };
1537                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1538                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1539                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1540                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
1541                         output_script: output_script,
1542                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1543                 });
1544                 Ok(())
1545         }
1546
1547         fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
1548                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1549                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1550                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1551                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1552                                         if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1553                                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1554                                         }
1555                                         match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1556                                                 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1557                                                         (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1558                                                 },
1559                                                 Err(e) => {
1560                                                         //TODO: Possibly remove the channel depending on e.action
1561                                                         return Err(e);
1562                                                 }
1563                                         }
1564                                 },
1565                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1566                         }
1567                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1568                    // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1569                    // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1570                    // for a bogus channel.
1571                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1572                         unimplemented!();
1573                 }
1574                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1575                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1576                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1577                                 return Err(HandleError {
1578                                         err: "Duplicate channel_id!",
1579                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: funding_msg.channel_id, data: "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned() } })
1580                                 });
1581                         },
1582                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1583                                 e.insert(chan);
1584                         }
1585                 }
1586                 Ok(funding_msg)
1587         }
1588
1589         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1590                 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1591                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1592                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1593                                 Some(chan) => {
1594                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1595                                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1596                                         }
1597                                         let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg)?;
1598                                         (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1599                                 },
1600                                 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1601                         }
1602                 };
1603                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1604                         unimplemented!();
1605                 }
1606                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1607                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1608                         funding_txo: funding_txo,
1609                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1610                 });
1611                 Ok(())
1612         }
1613
1614         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
1615                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1616                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1617                         Some(chan) => {
1618                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1619                                         return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1620                                 }
1621                                 chan.funding_locked(&msg)?;
1622                                 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1623                         },
1624                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1625                 };
1626         }
1627
1628         fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
1629                 let (res, chan_option) = {
1630                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1631                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1632
1633                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1634                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1635                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1636                                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1637                                         }
1638                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1639                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1640                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1641                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1642                                                 }
1643                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1644                                         } else { (res, None) }
1645                                 },
1646                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1647                         }
1648                 };
1649                 for payment_hash in res.2 {
1650                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1651                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1652                 }
1653                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1654                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1655                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1656                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1657                                         msg: update
1658                                 });
1659                         }
1660                 }
1661                 Ok((res.0, res.1))
1662         }
1663
1664         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
1665                 let (res, chan_option) = {
1666                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1667                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1668                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1669                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1670                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1671                                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1672                                         }
1673                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1674                                         if res.1.is_some() {
1675                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1676                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1677                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1678                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1679                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1680                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1681                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1682                                                 }
1683                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1684                                         } else { (res, None) }
1685                                 },
1686                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1687                         }
1688                 };
1689                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1690                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1691                 }
1692                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1693                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1694                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1695                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1696                                         msg: update
1697                                 });
1698                         }
1699                 }
1700                 Ok(res.0)
1701         }
1702
1703         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
1704                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1705                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1706                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1707                 //
1708                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1709                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1710                 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1711                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1712
1713                 let (mut pending_forward_info, shared_secret, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1714                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1715
1716                 let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
1717
1718                 // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
1719                 // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
1720                 // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
1721                 // we send permanent_node_failure.
1722                 let mut will_forward = false;
1723                 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { short_channel_id, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1724                         if let &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) = &claimable_htlcs_entry {
1725                                 let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
1726                                 if let &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } = e.get() {
1727                                         acceptable_cycle = short_channel_id == 0;
1728                                 }
1729                                 if !acceptable_cycle {
1730                                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept incoming HTLC: Payment looped through us twice");
1731                                         pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1732                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1733                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1734                                                 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret.unwrap(), 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]),
1735                                         }));
1736                                 } else {
1737                                         will_forward = true;
1738                                 }
1739                         } else {
1740                                 will_forward = true;
1741                         }
1742                 }
1743
1744                 let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1745                         Some(chan) => {
1746                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1747                                         return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1748                                 }
1749                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
1750                                         return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: None});
1751                                 }
1752                                 let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
1753                                 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref mut forward_info) = pending_forward_info {
1754                                         forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1755                                 }
1756                                 (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
1757                         },
1758                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}),
1759                 };
1760
1761                 if will_forward {
1762                         match claimable_htlcs_entry {
1763                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
1764                                         let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
1765                                         let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route {
1766                                                 &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1767                                                         (route.clone(), session_priv.clone())
1768                                                 },
1769                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
1770                                         };
1771                                         *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
1772                                                 source_short_channel_id,
1773                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret.unwrap(),
1774                                                 route,
1775                                                 session_priv,
1776                                         };
1777                                 },
1778                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1779                                         e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
1780                                                 source_short_channel_id,
1781                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret.unwrap(),
1782                                         });
1783                                 }
1784                         }
1785                 }
1786
1787                 Ok(res)
1788         }
1789
1790         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1791                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1792                 // Claim funds first, cause we don't really care if the channel we received the message on
1793                 // is broken, we may have enough info to get our own money!
1794                 self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false);
1795
1796                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1797                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1798                         Some(chan) => {
1799                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1800                                         return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1801                                 }
1802                                 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1803                         },
1804                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1805                 }
1806         }
1807
1808         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
1809                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1810                 let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1811                         Some(chan) => {
1812                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1813                                         return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1814                                 }
1815                                 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1816                         },
1817                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1818                 }?;
1819
1820                 if let Some(pending_htlc) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.get(&payment_hash) {
1821                         match pending_htlc {
1822                                 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1823                                         // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1824                                         let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1825                                         let mut res = None;
1826                                         Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1827                                                 if res.is_some() { return; }
1828
1829                                                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1830
1831                                                 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1832                                                 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1833                                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1834                                                 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1835                                                 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1836
1837                                                 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::decode(&packet_decrypted) {
1838                                                         if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1839                                                                 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1840
1841                                                                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1842                                                                 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1843                                                                 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1844                                                                 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1845                                                                 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1846                                                                         const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1847                                                                         const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1848                                                                         match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1849                                                                                 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1850                                                                                         if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1851                                                                                                 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1852                                                                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1853                                                                                                         if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::decode(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len]) {
1854                                                                                                                 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1855                                                                                                                         msg: chan_update,
1856                                                                                                                 });
1857                                                                                                         }
1858                                                                                                 }
1859                                                                                         }
1860                                                                                 },
1861                                                                                 UNKNOWN_CHAN => {
1862                                                                                         // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1863                                                                                         // current node as the HMAC validated.
1864                                                                                         res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1865                                                                                                 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1866                                                                                         });
1867                                                                                 },
1868                                                                                 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1869                                                                         }
1870                                                                 }
1871                                                         }
1872                                                 }
1873                                         }).unwrap();
1874                                         Ok(res)
1875                                 },
1876                                 _ => { Ok(None) },
1877                         }
1878                 } else {
1879                         Ok(None)
1880                 }
1881         }
1882
1883         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1884                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1885                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1886                         Some(chan) => {
1887                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1888                                         return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1889                                 }
1890                                 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1891                         },
1892                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1893                 }
1894         }
1895
1896         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
1897                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1898                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1899                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1900                                 Some(chan) => {
1901                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1902                                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1903                                         }
1904                                         chan.commitment_signed(&msg)?
1905                                 },
1906                                 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1907                         }
1908                 };
1909                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1910                         unimplemented!();
1911                 }
1912
1913                 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1914         }
1915
1916         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
1917                 let (res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor) = {
1918                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1919                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1920                                 Some(chan) => {
1921                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1922                                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1923                                         }
1924                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)?
1925                                 },
1926                                 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1927                         }
1928                 };
1929                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1930                         unimplemented!();
1931                 }
1932                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1933                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failure.0, failure.1);
1934                 }
1935
1936                 let mut forward_event = None;
1937                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1938                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1939                         if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1940                                 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1941                                 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1942                         }
1943                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1944                                 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1945                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1946                                                 entry.get_mut().push(forward_info);
1947                                         },
1948                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1949                                                 entry.insert(vec!(forward_info));
1950                                         }
1951                                 }
1952                         }
1953                 }
1954                 match forward_event {
1955                         Some(time) => {
1956                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1957                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1958                                         time_forwardable: time
1959                                 });
1960                         }
1961                         None => {},
1962                 }
1963
1964                 Ok(res)
1965         }
1966
1967         fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1968                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1969                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1970                         Some(chan) => {
1971                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1972                                         return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1973                                 }
1974                                 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)
1975                         },
1976                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1977                 }
1978         }
1979
1980         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1981                 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1982                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1983                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1984                                 Some(chan) => {
1985                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1986                                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) })
1987                                         }
1988                                         if !chan.is_usable() {
1989                                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) });
1990                                         }
1991
1992                                         let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1993                                         let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
1994
1995                                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1996                                         let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1997                                         let bad_sig_action = msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: msg.channel_id.clone(), data: "Invalid signature in announcement_signatures".to_string() } };
1998                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), "Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", bad_sig_action);
1999                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), "Bad announcement_signatures bitcoin_signature", bad_sig_action);
2000
2001                                         let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2002
2003                                         (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2004                                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2005                                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2006                                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2007                                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2008                                                 contents: announcement,
2009                                         }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2010                                 },
2011                                 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)})
2012                         }
2013                 };
2014                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2015                 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
2016                 Ok(())
2017         }
2018
2019         fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2020                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2021                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2022                 {
2023                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2024                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2025                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2026                         if no_connection_possible {
2027                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2028                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2029                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2030                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2031                                                 }
2032                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2033                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2034                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2035                                                                 msg: update
2036                                                         });
2037                                                 }
2038                                                 false
2039                                         } else {
2040                                                 true
2041                                         }
2042                                 });
2043                         } else {
2044                                 for chan in channel_state.by_id {
2045                                         if chan.1.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2046                                                 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). Also
2047                                                 //fail and wipe any uncommitted outbound HTLCs as those are considered after
2048                                                 //reconnect.
2049                                         }
2050                                 }
2051                         }
2052                 }
2053                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2054                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2055                 }
2056                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2057                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2058                         for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2059                                 pending_events.push(event);
2060                         }
2061                 }
2062         }
2063
2064         fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2065                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2066                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
2067                                 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2068                                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2069                                 }
2070                         }
2071                 } else {
2072                         self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2073                 }
2074         }
2075 }
2076
2077 #[cfg(test)]
2078 mod tests {
2079         use chain::chaininterface;
2080         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2081         use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2082         use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2083         use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2084         use ln::msgs;
2085         use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2086         use util::test_utils;
2087         use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2088         use util::logger::Logger;
2089
2090         use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2091         use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2092         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2093         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2094         use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2095         use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2096
2097         use hex;
2098
2099         use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2100         use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2101
2102         use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2103         use crypto::digest::Digest;
2104
2105         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2106
2107         use std::collections::HashMap;
2108         use std::default::Default;
2109         use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2110         use std::time::Instant;
2111         use std::mem;
2112
2113         fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2114                 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2115                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2116
2117                 let route = Route {
2118                         hops: vec!(
2119                                         RouteHop {
2120                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2121                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2122                                         },
2123                                         RouteHop {
2124                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2125                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2126                                         },
2127                                         RouteHop {
2128                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2129                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2130                                         },
2131                                         RouteHop {
2132                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2133                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2134                                         },
2135                                         RouteHop {
2136                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2137                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2138                                         },
2139                         ),
2140                 };
2141
2142                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2143
2144                 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2145                 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2146                 onion_keys
2147         }
2148
2149         #[test]
2150         fn onion_vectors() {
2151                 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2152                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2153
2154                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2155                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2156                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2157                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2158                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2159
2160                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2161                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2162                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2163                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2164                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2165
2166                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2167                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2168                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2169                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2170                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2171
2172                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2173                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2174                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2175                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2176                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2177
2178                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2179                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2180                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2181                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2182                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2183
2184                 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2185                 let payloads = vec!(
2186                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2187                                 realm: 0,
2188                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2189                                         short_channel_id: 0,
2190                                         amt_to_forward: 0,
2191                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2192                                 },
2193                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2194                         },
2195                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2196                                 realm: 0,
2197                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2198                                         short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2199                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2200                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2201                                 },
2202                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2203                         },
2204                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2205                                 realm: 0,
2206                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2207                                         short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2208                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2209                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2210                                 },
2211                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2212                         },
2213                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2214                                 realm: 0,
2215                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2216                                         short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2217                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2218                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2219                                 },
2220                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2221                         },
2222                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2223                                 realm: 0,
2224                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2225                                         short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2226                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2227                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2228                                 },
2229                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2230                         },
2231                 );
2232
2233                 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]).unwrap();
2234                 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2235                 // anyway...
2236                 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2237         }
2238
2239         #[test]
2240         fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2241                 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2242
2243                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2244                 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2245                 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2246
2247                 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2248                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2249
2250                 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2251                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2252
2253                 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2254                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2255
2256                 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2257                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2258
2259                 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2260                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2261         }
2262
2263         fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2264                 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2265                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2266                 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2267                 for i in 2..100 {
2268                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2269                         chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2270                 }
2271         }
2272
2273         struct Node {
2274                 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2275                 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2276                 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2277                 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2278                 router: Router,
2279         }
2280
2281         static mut CHAN_COUNT: u32 = 0;
2282         fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2283                 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42).unwrap();
2284
2285                 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2286                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2287                 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2288                         Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2289                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2290                                 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2291                         },
2292                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2293                 };
2294
2295                 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2296
2297                 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
2298                 let tx;
2299                 let funding_output;
2300
2301                 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2302                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2303                 match events_2[0] {
2304                         Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2305                                 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2306                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2307
2308                                 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2309                                         value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2310                                 }]};
2311                                 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2312
2313                                 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2314                                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2315                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2316                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2317                                 added_monitors.clear();
2318                         },
2319                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2320                 }
2321
2322                 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2323                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2324                 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2325                         Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2326                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2327                                 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2328                                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2329                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2330                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2331                                 added_monitors.clear();
2332                                 res
2333                         },
2334                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2335                 };
2336
2337                 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2338                 {
2339                         let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2340                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2341                         assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2342                         added_monitors.clear();
2343                 }
2344
2345                 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2346                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2347                 match events_4[0] {
2348                         Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2349                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2350                                 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2351                         },
2352                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2353                 };
2354
2355                 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2356                 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2357                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2358                 match events_5[0] {
2359                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2360                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2361                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2362                                 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2363                         },
2364                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2365                 };
2366
2367                 let channel_id;
2368
2369                 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2370                 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2371                 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2372                 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2373                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2374                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2375                                 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2376                                 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2377                                 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2378                                 as_announcement_sigs
2379                         },
2380                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2381                 };
2382
2383                 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2384                 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2385                 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2386                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2387                                 (msg, update_msg)
2388                         },
2389                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2390                 };
2391
2392                 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2393                 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2394                 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2395                 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2396                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2397                                 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2398                                 update_msg
2399                         },
2400                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2401                 };
2402
2403                 unsafe {
2404                         CHAN_COUNT += 1;
2405                 }
2406
2407                 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2408         }
2409
2410         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2411                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2412                 for node in nodes {
2413                         assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2414                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2415                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2416                 }
2417                 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2418         }
2419
2420         fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2421                 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2422                 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2423                 let (tx_a, tx_b);
2424
2425                 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2426                 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2427                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2428                 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2429                         Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2430                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2431                                 msg.clone()
2432                         },
2433                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2434                 };
2435
2436                 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2437                 if !close_inbound_first {
2438                         assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2439                 }
2440                 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2441                 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2442                 if close_inbound_first {
2443                         assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2444                         closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2445                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2446                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2447
2448                         let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2449                         assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2450                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2451                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2452                 } else {
2453                         closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2454                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2455                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2456
2457                         let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2458                         assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2459                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2460                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2461                 }
2462                 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2463                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2464                 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2465                 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2466
2467                 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2468                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2469                 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2470                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2471                                 msg.clone()
2472                         },
2473                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2474                 };
2475
2476                 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2477                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2478                 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2479                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2480                                 msg.clone()
2481                         },
2482                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2483                 };
2484
2485                 (as_update, bs_update)
2486         }
2487
2488         struct SendEvent {
2489                 node_id: PublicKey,
2490                 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2491                 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2492         }
2493         impl SendEvent {
2494                 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2495                         match event {
2496                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, commitment_signed } } => {
2497                                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2498                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2499                                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2500                                         SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2501                                 },
2502                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2503                         }
2504                 }
2505         }
2506
2507         static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0;
2508         fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2509                 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2510                 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2511                 let our_payment_hash = {
2512                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2513                         sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2514                         let mut ret = [0; 32];
2515                         sha.result(&mut ret);
2516                         ret
2517                 };
2518
2519                 let mut payment_event = {
2520                         origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2521                         {
2522                                 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2523                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2524                                 added_monitors.clear();
2525                         }
2526
2527                         let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2528                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2529                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2530                 };
2531                 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2532
2533                 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2534                         assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2535
2536                         node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2537                         {
2538                                 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2539                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2540                         }
2541
2542                         let revoke_and_ack = node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
2543                         {
2544                                 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2545                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2546                                 added_monitors.clear();
2547                         }
2548                         assert!(prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2549                         let prev_revoke_and_ack = prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2550                         {
2551                                 let mut added_monitors = prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2552                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2553                                 added_monitors.clear();
2554                         }
2555                         assert!(node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &prev_revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2556                         assert!(prev_revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2557                         {
2558                                 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2559                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2560                                 added_monitors.clear();
2561                         }
2562
2563                         let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2564                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2565                         match events_1[0] {
2566                                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2567                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2568                         };
2569
2570                         node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2571                         node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2572
2573                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2574                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2575                         if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2576                                 match events_2[0] {
2577                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2578                                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2579                                                 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2580                                         },
2581                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2582                                 }
2583                         } else {
2584                                 {
2585                                         let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2586                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2587                                         added_monitors.clear();
2588                                 }
2589                                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2590                                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2591                         }
2592
2593                         prev_node = node;
2594                 }
2595
2596                 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2597         }
2598
2599         fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2600                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2601                 {
2602                         let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2603                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2604                         added_monitors.clear();
2605                 }
2606
2607                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2608                 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2609                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2610                                 {
2611                                         $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2612                                         {
2613                                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2614                                                 if $last_node {
2615                                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2616                                                 } else {
2617                                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2618                                                 }
2619                                                 added_monitors.clear();
2620                                         }
2621                                         let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2622                                         {
2623                                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2624                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2625                                                 added_monitors.clear();
2626                                         }
2627                                         assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2628                                         let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2629                                         assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2630                                         {
2631                                                 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2632                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2633                                                 added_monitors.clear();
2634                                         }
2635                                         assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2636                                         {
2637                                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2638                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2639                                                 added_monitors.clear();
2640                                         }
2641                                 }
2642                         }
2643                 }
2644
2645                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2646                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2647                 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2648                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2649                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
2650                                 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2651                         }
2652
2653                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2654                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2655                         match events[0] {
2656                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2657                                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2658                                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2659                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2660                                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2661                                         expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2662                                         next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2663                                 },
2664                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2665                         };
2666
2667                         prev_node = node;
2668                 }
2669
2670                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2671                 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2672
2673                 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2674                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2675                 match events[0] {
2676                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2677                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2678                         },
2679                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2680                 }
2681         }
2682
2683         const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2684
2685         fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2686                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2687                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2688                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2689                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2690                 }
2691
2692                 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2693         }
2694
2695         fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2696                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2697                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2698                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2699                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2700                 }
2701
2702                 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2703                 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2704                 let our_payment_hash = {
2705                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2706                         sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2707                         let mut ret = [0; 32];
2708                         sha.result(&mut ret);
2709                         ret
2710                 };
2711
2712                 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2713                 assert_eq!(err.err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight");
2714         }
2715
2716         fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2717                 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2718                 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2719         }
2720
2721         fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2722                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2723                 {
2724                         let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2725                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2726                         added_monitors.clear();
2727                 }
2728
2729                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2730                 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2731                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2732                                 {
2733                                         $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2734                                         let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2735
2736                                         {
2737                                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2738                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2739                                                 added_monitors.clear();
2740                                         }
2741                                         assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2742                                         {
2743                                                 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2744                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2745                                                 added_monitors.clear();
2746                                         }
2747                                         let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2748                                         {
2749                                                 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2750                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2751                                                 added_monitors.clear();
2752                                         }
2753                                         assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2754                                         assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2755                                         assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2756                                         {
2757                                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2758                                                 if $last_node {
2759                                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2760                                                 } else {
2761                                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2762                                                         assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2763                                                 }
2764                                                 added_monitors.clear();
2765                                         }
2766                                 }
2767                         }
2768                 }
2769
2770                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2771                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2772                 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2773                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2774                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
2775                                 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2776                         }
2777
2778                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2779                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2780                         match events[0] {
2781                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2782                                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2783                                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2784                                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2785                                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2786                                         expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2787                                         next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2788                                 },
2789                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2790                         };
2791
2792                         prev_node = node;
2793                 }
2794
2795                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2796                 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2797
2798                 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2799                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2800                 match events[0] {
2801                         Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2802                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2803                         },
2804                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2805                 }
2806         }
2807
2808         fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2809                 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2810                 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2811                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2812                 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2813
2814                 for _ in 0..node_count {
2815                         let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
2816                         let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Arc::clone(&logger)));
2817                         let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2818                         let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
2819                         let node_id = {
2820                                 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2821                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2822                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2823                         };
2824                         let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
2825                         let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), Arc::clone(&logger));
2826                         nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router });
2827                 }
2828
2829                 nodes
2830         }
2831
2832         #[test]
2833         fn fake_network_test() {
2834                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2835                 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
2836                 let nodes = create_network(4);
2837
2838                 // Create some initial channels
2839                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2840                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2841                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2842
2843                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2844                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2845                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2846                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2847                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2848
2849                 // Send some more payments
2850                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2851                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
2852                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
2853
2854                 // Test failure packets
2855                 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
2856                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
2857
2858                 // Add a new channel that skips 3
2859                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2860
2861                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2862                 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2863                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2864                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2865                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2866                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2867                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2868
2869                 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
2870                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2871                 hops.push(RouteHop {
2872                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2873                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2874                         fee_msat: 0,
2875                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2876                 });
2877                 hops.push(RouteHop {
2878                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2879                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2880                         fee_msat: 0,
2881                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2882                 });
2883                 hops.push(RouteHop {
2884                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2885                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2886                         fee_msat: 1000000,
2887                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2888                 });
2889                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2890                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2891                 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
2892
2893                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2894                 hops.push(RouteHop {
2895                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2896                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2897                         fee_msat: 0,
2898                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2899                 });
2900                 hops.push(RouteHop {
2901                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2902                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2903                         fee_msat: 0,
2904                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2905                 });
2906                 hops.push(RouteHop {
2907                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2908                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2909                         fee_msat: 1000000,
2910                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2911                 });
2912                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2913                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2914                 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
2915
2916                 // Claim the rebalances...
2917                 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
2918                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2919
2920                 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
2921                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2922
2923                 // Send some payments across both channels
2924                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2925                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2926                 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2927
2928                 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
2929
2930                 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
2931
2932                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2933                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2934                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
2935
2936                 // Close down the channels...
2937                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
2938                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
2939                 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
2940                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
2941                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
2942
2943                 // Check that we processed all pending events
2944                 for node in nodes {
2945                         assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2946                         assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2947                 }
2948         }
2949
2950         #[derive(PartialEq)]
2951         enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
2952         fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2953                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2954                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
2955
2956                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2957
2958                 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
2959                         res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
2960                 } else {
2961                         for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2962                                 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
2963                                         let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2964                                         funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
2965                                         tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2966                                         res.push(tx.clone());
2967                                 }
2968                         }
2969                 }
2970                 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
2971
2972                 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
2973                         for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2974                                 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
2975                                         let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2976                                         funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
2977                                         tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2978                                         if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
2979                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
2980                                         } else {
2981                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
2982                                         }
2983                                         res.push(tx.clone());
2984                                         break;
2985                                 }
2986                         }
2987                         assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
2988                 }
2989                 node_txn.clear();
2990                 res
2991         }
2992
2993         fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2994                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2995
2996                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
2997                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2998                 let mut found_prev = false;
2999
3000                 for tx in prev_txn {
3001                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3002                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3003                                 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
3004                                 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3005
3006                                 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3007                                 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3008
3009                                 found_prev = true;
3010                                 break;
3011                         }
3012                 }
3013                 assert!(found_prev);
3014
3015                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3016                 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3017                 res
3018         }
3019
3020         fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3021                 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3022                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3023                 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3024                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3025                                 msg.clone()
3026                         },
3027                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3028                 };
3029
3030                 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3031                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3032                 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3033                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3034                                 msg.clone()
3035                         },
3036                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3037                 };
3038
3039                 for node in nodes {
3040                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3041                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3042                 }
3043         }
3044
3045         #[test]
3046         fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
3047                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3048                 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
3049                 let nodes = create_network(5);
3050
3051                 // Create some initial channels
3052                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3053                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3054                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3055                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3056
3057                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3058                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3059                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3060                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3061                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3062
3063                 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
3064                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3065                 {
3066                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3067                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3068                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3069                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3070                 }
3071                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3072                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3073                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3074
3075                 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
3076                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3077
3078                 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
3079                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3080                 {
3081                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3082                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3083                         nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3084                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3085                 }
3086                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
3087                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3088                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3089
3090                 macro_rules! claim_funds {
3091                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
3092                                 {
3093                                         assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
3094                                         {
3095                                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3096                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3097                                                 added_monitors.clear();
3098                                         }
3099
3100                                         let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3101                                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3102                                         match events[0] {
3103                                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
3104                                                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3105                                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3106                                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3107                                                 },
3108                                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3109                                         };
3110                                 }
3111                         }
3112                 }
3113
3114                 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
3115                 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
3116                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3117                 {
3118                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3119
3120                         // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3121                         claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
3122
3123                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3124                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3125
3126                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
3127                 }
3128                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
3129                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3130                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3131
3132                 // One pending HTLC to time out:
3133                 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
3134
3135                 {
3136                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3137                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3138                         for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3139                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3140                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3141                         }
3142
3143                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3144
3145                         // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3146                         claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
3147
3148                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3149                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3150                         for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3151                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3152                                 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3153                         }
3154
3155                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
3156
3157                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3158                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
3159
3160                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
3161                 }
3162                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
3163                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3164                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3165
3166                 // Create some new channels:
3167                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3168
3169                 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
3170                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
3171                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
3172                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3173                 // Revoke the old state
3174                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3175
3176                 {
3177                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3178                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3179                         {
3180                                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3181                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3182                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3183
3184                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3185                                 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
3186                                 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3187                                 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
3188                         }
3189                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3190
3191                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3192                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3193                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3194                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
3195
3196                         //TODO: At this point nodes[1] should claim the revoked HTLC-Timeout output, but that's
3197                         //not yet implemented in ChannelMonitor
3198                 }
3199                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3200                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3201                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3202
3203                 // Check that we processed all pending events
3204                 for node in nodes {
3205                         assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3206                         assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3207                 }
3208         }
3209
3210         #[test]
3211         fn test_unconf_chan() {
3212                 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
3213                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3214                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3215
3216                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3217                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
3218                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
3219                 mem::drop(channel_state);
3220
3221                 let mut headers = Vec::new();
3222                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3223                 headers.push(header.clone());
3224                 for _i in 2..100 {
3225                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3226                         headers.push(header.clone());
3227                 }
3228                 while !headers.is_empty() {
3229                         nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
3230                 }
3231                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3232                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
3233                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
3234         }
3235 }