1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
8 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
10 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
13 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
14 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
16 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
17 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
19 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable};
20 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
21 use util::sha2::Sha256;
22 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
23 use util::logger::{Logger, Record};
26 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
27 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
28 use crypto::digest::Digest;
29 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
32 use std::collections::HashMap;
33 use std::collections::hash_map;
34 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
35 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
36 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
38 mod channel_held_info {
41 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
42 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
43 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
44 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
45 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
46 pub(super) prev_short_channel_id: u64,
47 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
48 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
51 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
52 impl PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
53 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
56 payment_hash: [0; 32],
58 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
60 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
65 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
66 pub enum HTLCFailReason {
68 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
76 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
78 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
79 HTLCFailReason::Reason {
80 failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(),
85 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
86 pub use self::channel_held_info::*;
87 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
88 pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*;
90 enum PendingOutboundHTLC {
92 source_short_channel_id: u64,
93 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
97 session_priv: SecretKey,
99 /// Used for channel rebalancing
101 source_short_channel_id: u64,
102 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
104 session_priv: SecretKey,
108 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
109 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
110 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
111 /// probably increase this significantly.
112 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
114 struct ChannelHolder {
115 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
116 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
117 next_forward: Instant,
118 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
119 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
120 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
121 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
122 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
123 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
124 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
126 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
128 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
129 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
130 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
131 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
132 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
133 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
136 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
138 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
139 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
140 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
141 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
142 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
147 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
148 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
150 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
151 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
152 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
153 /// to individual Channels.
154 pub struct ChannelManager {
155 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
156 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
157 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
158 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
159 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
161 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
162 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
163 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
166 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
167 our_network_key: SecretKey,
169 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
174 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
176 macro_rules! secp_call {
180 //TODO: Make the err a parameter!
181 Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Key error", action: None})
188 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
190 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
191 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
196 pub struct ChannelDetails {
197 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
198 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
199 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
200 /// lifetime of the channel.
201 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
202 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
203 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
204 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
205 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
206 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
207 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
211 impl ChannelManager {
212 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
213 /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
214 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
215 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
216 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
217 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
218 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
220 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
221 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
222 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
223 monitor: monitor.clone(),
227 announce_channels_publicly,
228 fee_proportional_millionths,
229 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
232 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
233 by_id: HashMap::new(),
234 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
235 next_forward: Instant::now(),
236 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
237 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
241 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
245 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
246 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
250 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
251 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
252 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
253 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
254 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
255 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
256 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
257 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
258 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
260 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
261 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
262 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
263 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
264 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
265 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
266 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
267 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
270 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
271 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
272 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
274 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
278 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger));
279 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?;
280 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
281 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
282 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
286 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
287 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
288 node_id: their_network_key,
294 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
295 /// more information.
296 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
297 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
298 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
299 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
300 res.push(ChannelDetails {
301 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
302 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
303 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
304 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
305 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
311 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
312 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
313 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
314 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
315 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
316 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
317 if channel.is_usable() {
318 res.push(ChannelDetails {
319 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
320 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
321 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
322 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
323 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
330 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
331 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
332 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
333 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
334 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
335 let (res, node_id, chan_option) = {
336 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
337 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
338 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
339 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
340 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
341 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
342 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
343 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
345 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
346 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
348 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
351 for payment_hash in res.1 {
352 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
353 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
355 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
356 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
361 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
362 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
363 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
367 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
376 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<[u8; 32]>)) {
377 let (local_txn, failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
378 for payment_hash in failed_htlcs {
379 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
380 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
382 for tx in local_txn {
383 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
385 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
386 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
387 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
388 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
389 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
392 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
393 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
394 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
396 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
397 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
398 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
399 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
400 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
407 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
408 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
409 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
410 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
417 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
419 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
420 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
421 let mut res = [0; 32];
422 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
426 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
427 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
428 let mut res = [0; 32];
429 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
435 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
436 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
437 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
438 let mut res = [0; 32];
439 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
444 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
445 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
446 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
447 let mut res = [0; 32];
448 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
452 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
454 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
455 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
456 let mut blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
457 let mut first_iteration = true;
459 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
460 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
462 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
463 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
464 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
465 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
466 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
469 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
470 first_iteration = false;
472 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
474 secp_call!(blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor))));
475 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
477 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
483 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
484 fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, HandleError> {
485 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
487 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
488 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
494 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
504 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
505 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
506 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
507 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
508 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
509 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
510 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
511 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
513 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
514 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
515 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
516 // the intended recipient).
517 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
518 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
519 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
521 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
522 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
523 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
524 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
528 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
529 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
530 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", action: None});
532 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
533 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
534 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", action: None});
536 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
538 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
542 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
544 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
552 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
553 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
555 for i in 0..dst.len() {
560 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
561 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, HandleError> {
562 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
563 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
566 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
567 let end_len = iters * 65;
568 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
569 res.resize(end_len, 0);
571 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
572 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
573 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
574 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
575 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
580 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
581 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
583 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
584 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
585 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
586 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
588 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
589 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
590 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
593 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
596 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
597 hmac.input(&packet_data);
598 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
599 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
602 Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{
604 public_key: onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey,
605 hop_data: packet_data,
610 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
611 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
612 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
613 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
615 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
616 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
617 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
618 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
619 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
620 data: packet_crypted,
624 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
625 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
627 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
630 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
631 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
632 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
633 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
637 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
638 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
641 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
643 failuremsg: failuremsg,
647 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
648 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
649 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
655 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
656 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
657 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
660 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
661 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
662 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
663 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
667 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap().serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
669 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
670 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
671 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
672 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
673 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
674 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
675 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
676 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
677 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
680 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
681 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).unwrap(); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
683 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
689 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
690 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
691 /// fields for more info.
692 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
693 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
694 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
695 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
696 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
697 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
698 /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
699 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
700 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
701 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
702 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", action: None});
704 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
705 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
706 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
707 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", action: None});
711 let session_priv = secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
712 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
713 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
717 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
719 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv)?;
720 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
721 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash)?;
723 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
724 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
725 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
727 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
728 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", action: None}),
729 Some(id) => id.clone()
732 let claimable_htlc_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash.clone());
733 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) = claimable_htlc_entry {
734 return Err(HandleError{err: "Already had pending HTLC with the same payment_hash", action: None});
738 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
739 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
740 return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", action: None});
742 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash, htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
745 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
747 claimable_htlc_entry.or_insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
753 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
754 None => return Ok(()),
758 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
759 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
762 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
763 events.push(events::Event::SendHTLCs {
764 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
765 msgs: vec![update_add],
766 commitment_msg: commitment_signed,
771 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
772 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
773 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
774 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
775 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
777 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
780 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
781 pending_events.push($event);
786 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
787 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
788 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
790 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
792 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
795 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
796 mem::drop(channel_state);
797 add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
798 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
807 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
808 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
809 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
811 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
812 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
816 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
817 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
818 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
819 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
821 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
827 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
828 if !chan.is_usable() || !chan.should_announce() { return Ok(None) }
830 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
831 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
832 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
834 Ok(Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
835 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
836 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
837 node_signature: our_node_sig,
838 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
842 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
843 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
844 /// Will likely generate further events.
845 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
846 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
847 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
849 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
850 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
852 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
856 for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
857 if short_chan_id != 0 {
858 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
859 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
861 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
862 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
863 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
868 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
870 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
871 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
872 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
874 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
875 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
880 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
882 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
883 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
884 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
885 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
886 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
887 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
888 // this channel currently :/.
895 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
896 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
899 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
903 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::SendHTLCs {
904 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
906 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
910 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
911 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
912 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
913 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
920 for failed_forward in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
921 match failed_forward.2 {
922 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: Vec::new() }),
923 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
927 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
929 new_events.retain(|event| {
930 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
931 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
932 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
938 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
939 events.reserve(new_events.len());
940 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
941 events.push(event.1);
945 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
946 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
947 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() })
950 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
951 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
952 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
953 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
954 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
955 /// still-available channels.
956 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool {
957 let mut pending_htlc = {
958 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) {
959 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
960 None => return false,
965 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
966 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.clone(), PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
970 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
976 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => unreachable!(),
977 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
978 mem::drop(channel_state);
980 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
981 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
982 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
986 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => {
987 let err_packet = match onion_error {
988 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
989 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
990 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
992 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
993 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
997 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
998 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
999 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1000 None => return false
1003 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1004 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(payment_hash, err_packet) {
1005 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1007 //TODO: Do something with e?
1014 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1015 mem::drop(channel_state);
1017 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1018 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1021 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1022 //TODO: replace by HandleError ? UpdateFailHTLC in handle_update_add_htlc need also to build a CommitmentSigned
1023 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFailHTLC {
1026 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
1037 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1038 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1039 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1040 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1041 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1042 self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true)
1044 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
1045 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1046 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1047 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1048 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1050 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1051 let mut pending_htlc = {
1052 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
1053 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
1054 None => return false,
1058 match pending_htlc {
1059 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
1060 if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us
1061 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
1062 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv });
1063 } else { // This came from the first upstream node
1064 // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow???
1065 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv };
1066 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret });
1072 match pending_htlc {
1073 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => unreachable!(),
1074 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1076 panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this...");
1078 mem::drop(channel_state);
1079 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1080 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1085 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => {
1086 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1087 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
1088 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1090 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1091 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1097 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1098 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(payment_preimage) {
1099 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1101 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1102 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1103 //TODO: Do something with e?
1109 mem::drop(channel_state);
1110 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1111 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1112 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1116 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1117 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1118 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFulfillHTLC {
1129 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1130 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1131 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap()
1134 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1135 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1137 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1142 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1143 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1144 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1145 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1146 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1151 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1152 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1153 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1154 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1156 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1157 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1158 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1159 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1160 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
1161 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
1162 let announcement_sigs = match self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1165 log_error!(self, "Got error handling message: {}!", e.err);
1166 //TODO: push e on events and blow up the channel (it has bad keys)
1170 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1171 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1172 msg: funding_locked,
1173 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1175 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1176 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
1177 new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
1178 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1181 if channel.is_shutdown() {
1185 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1186 for tx in txn_matched {
1187 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1188 if inp.prev_hash == funding_txo.txid && inp.prev_index == funding_txo.index as u32 {
1189 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1190 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1192 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
1193 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
1194 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
1195 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1196 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1197 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1206 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1207 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1208 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1210 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1211 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
1212 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
1213 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
1214 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
1215 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1216 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1225 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
1226 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
1228 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1229 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1230 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1232 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
1235 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
1236 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
1237 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1238 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1240 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1241 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1242 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1243 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
1244 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
1245 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
1246 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1248 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
1249 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
1250 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1260 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
1261 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
1263 if !new_events.is_empty() {
1264 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1265 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1266 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1269 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
1273 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
1274 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
1275 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
1276 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1277 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown genesis block hash", action: None});
1279 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1280 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1281 return Err(HandleError{err: "temporary_channel_id collision!", action: None});
1284 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1286 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1287 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1288 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1289 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1290 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1291 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1292 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1293 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1296 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1297 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1298 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1300 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1304 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
1305 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel()?;
1306 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1310 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1311 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1312 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1313 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1315 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1316 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1318 chan.accept_channel(&msg)?;
1319 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1321 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1324 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1325 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1326 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1327 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1328 output_script: output_script,
1329 user_channel_id: user_id,
1334 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
1335 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1336 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1337 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1338 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1339 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1340 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1342 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1343 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1344 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1347 //TODO: Possibly remove the channel depending on e.action
1352 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1354 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1355 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1356 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1357 // for a bogus channel.
1358 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1361 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1362 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1363 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1364 return Err(HandleError {
1365 err: "Duplicate channel_id!",
1366 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: funding_msg.channel_id, data: "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned() } })
1369 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1376 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1377 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1378 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1379 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1381 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1382 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1384 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg)?;
1385 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1387 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1390 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1393 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1394 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1395 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1396 user_channel_id: user_id,
1401 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
1402 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1403 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1405 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1406 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1408 chan.funding_locked(&msg)?;
1409 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan)?);
1411 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1415 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
1416 let (res, chan_option) = {
1417 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1418 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1420 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1421 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1422 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1423 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1425 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1426 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1427 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1428 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1430 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1431 } else { (res, None) }
1433 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1436 for payment_hash in res.2 {
1437 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1438 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1440 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1441 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1442 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1443 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1451 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
1452 let (res, chan_option) = {
1453 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1454 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1455 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1456 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1457 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1458 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1460 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1461 if res.1.is_some() {
1462 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1463 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1464 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1465 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1466 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1467 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1468 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1470 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1471 } else { (res, None) }
1473 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1476 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1477 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1479 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1480 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1481 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1482 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1490 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
1491 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1492 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1493 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1495 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1496 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1497 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1498 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1500 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key);
1501 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1503 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
1506 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1507 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1508 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
1509 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
1515 macro_rules! return_err {
1516 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1517 return Err(msgs::HandleError {
1519 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::UpdateFailHTLC {
1520 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1521 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1522 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1523 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1530 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1531 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1532 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1533 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1534 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1535 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1536 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1537 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1540 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1541 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1542 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
1543 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1544 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1547 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1548 let next_hop_data = {
1549 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1550 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1551 match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
1553 let error_code = match err {
1554 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
1555 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1557 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1563 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
1565 let mut pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1567 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
1568 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1570 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1571 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1574 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1575 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1576 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1577 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1579 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1581 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1582 short_channel_id: 0,
1583 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1584 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1585 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1588 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1589 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1590 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1592 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone();
1594 let blinding_factor = {
1595 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1596 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1597 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
1598 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1599 sha.result(&mut res);
1600 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1602 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1604 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1610 match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1612 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1614 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1619 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1621 public_key: new_pubkey,
1622 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1623 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1626 //TODO: Check amt_to_forward and outgoing_cltv_value are within acceptable ranges!
1628 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1629 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1630 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1631 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1632 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1633 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1634 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1638 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1639 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1641 if pending_forward_info.onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1642 let forwarding_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&pending_forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1644 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1646 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1648 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1649 if !chan.is_live() {
1650 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap();
1651 return_err!("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1655 let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
1657 // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
1658 // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
1659 // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
1660 // we send permanent_node_failure.
1661 if let &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) = &claimable_htlcs_entry {
1662 let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
1663 if let &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } = e.get() {
1664 acceptable_cycle = pending_forward_info.short_channel_id == 0;
1666 if !acceptable_cycle {
1667 return_err!("Payment looped through us twice", 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1671 let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1673 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1674 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1676 if !chan.is_usable() {
1677 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: None});
1679 let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
1680 pending_forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1681 (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
1683 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}),
1686 match claimable_htlcs_entry {
1687 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
1688 let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
1689 let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route {
1690 &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1691 (route.clone(), session_priv.clone())
1693 _ => unreachable!(),
1695 *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
1696 source_short_channel_id,
1697 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1702 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1703 e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
1704 source_short_channel_id,
1705 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1713 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1714 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1715 // Claim funds first, cause we don't really care if the channel we received the message on
1716 // is broken, we may have enough info to get our own money!
1717 self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false);
1719 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1720 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1722 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1723 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1725 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1727 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1731 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
1732 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1733 let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1735 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1736 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1738 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1740 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1743 if let Some(pending_htlc) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.get(&payment_hash) {
1744 match pending_htlc {
1745 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1746 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1747 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1749 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1750 if res.is_some() { return; }
1752 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1754 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1755 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1756 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1757 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1758 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1760 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::decode(&packet_decrypted) {
1761 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1762 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1764 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1765 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1766 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1767 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1768 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1769 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1770 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1771 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1772 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1773 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1774 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1775 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1776 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::decode(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len]) {
1777 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1785 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1786 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1787 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1788 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1791 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1806 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1807 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1808 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1810 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1811 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1813 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1815 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1819 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
1820 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1821 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1822 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1824 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1825 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1827 chan.commitment_signed(&msg)?
1829 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1832 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1836 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1839 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
1840 let (res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor) = {
1841 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1842 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1844 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1845 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1847 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)?
1849 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1852 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1855 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1856 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failure.0, failure.1);
1859 let mut forward_event = None;
1860 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1861 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1862 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1863 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1864 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1866 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1867 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1868 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1869 entry.get_mut().push(forward_info);
1871 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1872 entry.insert(vec!(forward_info));
1877 match forward_event {
1879 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1880 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1881 time_forwardable: time
1890 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1891 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1892 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1894 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1895 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1897 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)
1899 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1903 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1904 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1905 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1906 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1908 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1909 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1911 if !chan.is_usable() {
1912 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: None });
1915 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1916 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
1918 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1919 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1920 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }));
1921 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }));
1923 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
1925 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1926 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1927 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1928 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1929 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1930 contents: announcement,
1931 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1933 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1936 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1937 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1941 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
1942 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1943 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1945 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1946 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1947 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1948 if no_connection_possible {
1949 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
1950 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1951 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1952 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1954 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
1955 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1956 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1966 for chan in channel_state.by_id {
1967 if chan.1.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1968 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). Also
1969 //fail and wipe any uncommitted outbound HTLCs as those are considered after
1975 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
1976 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
1978 if !new_events.is_empty() {
1979 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1980 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1981 pending_events.push(event);
1989 use chain::chaininterface;
1990 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
1991 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
1992 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
1993 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
1995 use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
1996 use util::test_utils;
1997 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1998 use util::logger::Logger;
2000 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2001 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2002 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2003 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2004 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2005 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2009 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2010 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2012 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2013 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2015 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2017 use std::collections::HashMap;
2018 use std::default::Default;
2019 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2020 use std::time::Instant;
2023 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2024 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2025 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2030 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2031 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2034 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2035 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2038 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2039 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2042 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2043 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2046 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2047 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2052 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2054 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2055 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2060 fn onion_vectors() {
2061 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2062 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2064 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2065 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2066 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2067 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2068 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2070 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2071 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2072 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2073 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2074 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2076 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2077 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2078 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2079 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2080 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2082 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2083 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2084 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2085 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2086 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2088 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2089 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2090 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2091 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2092 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2094 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2095 let payloads = vec!(
2096 msgs::OnionHopData {
2098 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2099 short_channel_id: 0,
2101 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2105 msgs::OnionHopData {
2107 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2108 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2109 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2110 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2114 msgs::OnionHopData {
2116 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2117 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2118 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2119 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2123 msgs::OnionHopData {
2125 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2126 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2127 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2128 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2132 msgs::OnionHopData {
2134 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2135 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2136 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2137 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2143 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]).unwrap();
2144 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2146 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2150 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2151 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2153 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2154 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2155 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2157 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2158 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2160 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2161 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2163 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2164 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2166 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2167 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("aac3200c4968f56b21f53e5e374e3a2383ad2b1b6501bbcc45abc31e59b26881b7dfadbb56ec8dae8857add94e6702fb4c3a4de22e2e669e1ed926b04447fc73034bb730f4932acd62727b75348a648a1128744657ca6a4e713b9b646c3ca66cac02cdab44dd3439890ef3aaf61708714f7375349b8da541b2548d452d84de7084bb95b3ac2345201d624d31f4d52078aa0fa05a88b4e20202bd2b86ac5b52919ea305a8949de95e935eed0319cf3cf19ebea61d76ba92532497fcdc9411d06bcd4275094d0a4a3c5d3a945e43305a5a9256e333e1f64dbca5fcd4e03a39b9012d197506e06f29339dfee3331995b21615337ae060233d39befea925cc262873e0530408e6990f1cbd233a150ef7b004ff6166c70c68d9f8c853c1abca640b8660db2921").unwrap());
2169 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2170 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2173 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2174 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2175 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2176 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2178 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2179 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2184 feeest: Arc<test_utils::TestFeeEstimator>,
2185 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2186 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2187 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2189 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2193 static mut CHAN_COUNT: u32 = 0;
2194 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2195 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42).unwrap();
2197 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2198 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2199 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2200 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2201 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2202 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2204 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2207 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2209 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
2213 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2214 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2216 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2217 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2218 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2220 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2221 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2223 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2225 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2226 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2227 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2228 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2229 added_monitors.clear();
2231 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2234 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2235 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2236 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2237 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2238 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2239 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2240 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2241 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2242 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2243 added_monitors.clear();
2246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2249 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2251 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2252 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2253 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2254 added_monitors.clear();
2257 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2258 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2260 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2261 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2262 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2267 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2268 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2269 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2271 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2272 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2273 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2274 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2276 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2281 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2282 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2283 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2284 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2285 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2286 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2287 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2288 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2289 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2290 as_announcement_sigs
2292 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2295 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2296 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2297 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2298 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2301 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2304 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2305 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2306 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2307 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2308 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2309 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2312 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2319 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2322 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2323 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2325 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2326 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2327 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2329 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2332 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2333 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2334 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2337 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2338 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2339 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2340 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2341 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2342 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2345 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2348 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2349 if !close_inbound_first {
2350 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2352 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2353 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2354 if close_inbound_first {
2355 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2356 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2357 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2358 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2360 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2361 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2362 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2363 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2365 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2366 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2367 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2369 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2370 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2371 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2372 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2374 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2375 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2376 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2377 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2379 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2380 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2381 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2382 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2385 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2388 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2389 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2390 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2391 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2394 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2397 (as_update, bs_update)
2402 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2403 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2406 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2408 Event::SendHTLCs { node_id, msgs, commitment_msg } => {
2409 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: msgs, commitment_msg: commitment_msg }
2411 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2416 static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0;
2417 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2418 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2419 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2420 let our_payment_hash = {
2421 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2422 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2423 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2424 sha.result(&mut ret);
2428 let mut payment_event = {
2429 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2431 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2432 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2433 added_monitors.clear();
2436 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2437 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2438 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2440 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2442 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2443 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2445 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2447 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2448 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2451 let revoke_and_ack = node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
2453 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2454 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2455 added_monitors.clear();
2457 assert!(prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2458 let prev_revoke_and_ack = prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2460 let mut added_monitors = prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2461 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2462 added_monitors.clear();
2464 assert!(node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &prev_revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2465 assert!(prev_revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2467 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2468 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2469 added_monitors.clear();
2472 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2473 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2475 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2476 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2479 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2480 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2482 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2483 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2484 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2486 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2487 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2488 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2490 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2494 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2495 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2496 added_monitors.clear();
2498 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2499 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2505 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2508 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2509 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2511 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2512 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2513 added_monitors.clear();
2516 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2517 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2518 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2520 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2522 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2524 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2526 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2528 added_monitors.clear();
2530 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2532 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2533 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2534 added_monitors.clear();
2536 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2537 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2538 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2540 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2541 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2542 added_monitors.clear();
2544 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2546 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2547 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2548 added_monitors.clear();
2554 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2555 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2556 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2557 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2558 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2559 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2562 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2563 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2565 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2566 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2567 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2569 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2575 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2576 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2578 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2579 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2581 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2582 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2584 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2588 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2590 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2591 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2592 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2593 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2594 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2597 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2600 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2601 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2602 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2603 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2604 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2607 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2608 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2609 let our_payment_hash = {
2610 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2611 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2612 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2613 sha.result(&mut ret);
2617 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2618 assert_eq!(err.err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight");
2621 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2622 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2623 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2626 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2627 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2629 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2630 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2631 added_monitors.clear();
2634 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2635 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2636 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2638 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2639 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2642 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2643 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2644 added_monitors.clear();
2646 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2648 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2649 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2650 added_monitors.clear();
2652 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2654 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2655 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2656 added_monitors.clear();
2658 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2659 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2660 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2662 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2664 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2666 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2667 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2669 added_monitors.clear();
2675 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2676 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2677 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2678 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2679 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2680 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2683 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2684 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2686 Event::SendFailHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2687 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2688 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2690 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2696 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2697 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2699 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2700 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2702 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2703 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2705 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2709 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2710 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2711 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2712 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2713 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2715 for _ in 0..node_count {
2716 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
2717 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Arc::clone(&logger)));
2718 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2719 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
2721 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2722 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2723 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2725 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
2726 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id).unwrap(), Arc::clone(&logger));
2727 nodes.push(Node { feeest, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node_id, node, router });
2734 fn fake_network_test() {
2735 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2736 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
2737 let nodes = create_network(4);
2739 // Create some initial channels
2740 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2741 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2742 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2744 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2745 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2746 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2747 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2748 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2750 // Send some more payments
2751 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2752 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
2753 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
2755 // Test failure packets
2756 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
2757 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
2759 // Add a new channel that skips 3
2760 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2762 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2763 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2764 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2765 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2766 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2767 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2768 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2770 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
2771 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2772 hops.push(RouteHop {
2773 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2774 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2776 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2778 hops.push(RouteHop {
2779 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2780 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2782 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2784 hops.push(RouteHop {
2785 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2786 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2788 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2790 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2791 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2792 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
2794 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2795 hops.push(RouteHop {
2796 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2797 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2799 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2801 hops.push(RouteHop {
2802 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2803 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2805 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2807 hops.push(RouteHop {
2808 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2809 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2811 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2813 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2814 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2815 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
2817 // Claim the rebalances...
2818 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
2819 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2821 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
2822 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2824 // Send some payments across both channels
2825 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2826 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2827 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2829 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
2831 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
2833 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2834 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2835 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
2837 // Close down the channels...
2838 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
2839 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
2840 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
2841 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
2842 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
2844 // Check that we processed all pending events
2846 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2847 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2851 #[derive(PartialEq)]
2852 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
2853 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2854 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2855 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
2857 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2859 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
2860 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
2862 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2863 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == chan.3.txid() {
2864 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2865 funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
2866 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2867 res.push(tx.clone());
2871 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
2873 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
2874 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2875 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == res[0].txid() {
2876 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2877 funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
2878 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2879 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
2880 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
2882 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
2884 res.push(tx.clone());
2888 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
2894 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2895 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2897 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
2898 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2899 let mut found_prev = false;
2901 for tx in prev_txn {
2902 if node_txn[0].input[0].prev_hash == tx.txid() {
2903 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2904 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
2905 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2907 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
2908 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
2914 assert!(found_prev);
2916 let mut res = Vec::new();
2917 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
2921 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
2922 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2923 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2924 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
2925 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2928 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2931 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2932 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2933 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
2934 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2937 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2941 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
2942 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
2947 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2948 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2949 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2950 let nodes = create_network(5);
2952 // Create some initial channels
2953 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2954 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2955 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2956 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2958 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2959 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2960 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2961 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2962 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2964 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2965 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2967 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2968 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2969 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
2970 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2972 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2973 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2974 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2976 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2977 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2979 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
2980 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2982 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2983 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2984 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
2985 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2987 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
2988 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2989 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2991 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2992 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2994 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2996 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2997 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2998 added_monitors.clear();
3001 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3002 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3004 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, .. } => {
3005 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3007 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3013 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
3014 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
3015 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3017 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3019 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3020 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
3022 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3023 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3025 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
3027 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
3028 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3029 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3031 // One pending HTLC to time out:
3032 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
3035 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3036 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3037 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3038 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3039 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3042 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3044 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3045 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
3047 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3048 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3049 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3050 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3051 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3054 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
3056 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3057 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
3059 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
3061 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
3062 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3063 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3065 // Create some new channels:
3066 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3068 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
3069 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
3070 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
3071 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3072 // Revoke the old state
3073 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3076 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3077 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3079 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3080 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3081 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3083 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3084 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
3085 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3086 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
3088 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3090 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3091 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3092 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3093 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
3095 //TODO: At this point nodes[1] should claim the revoked HTLC-Timeout output, but that's
3096 //not yet implemented in ChannelMonitor
3098 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3099 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3100 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3102 // Check that we processed all pending events
3104 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3105 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3110 fn test_unconf_chan() {
3111 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
3112 let nodes = create_network(2);
3113 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3115 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3116 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
3117 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
3118 mem::drop(channel_state);
3120 let mut headers = Vec::new();
3121 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3122 headers.push(header.clone());
3124 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3125 headers.push(header.clone());
3127 while !headers.is_empty() {
3128 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
3130 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3131 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
3132 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);