1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HandleError};
30 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
45 use std::collections::HashMap;
46 use std::collections::hash_map;
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
52 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
54 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
58 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 mod channel_held_info {
66 use ln::router::Route;
67 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
69 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
70 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
72 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
73 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
75 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
76 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
77 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
82 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
83 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
86 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
87 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
89 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
93 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
96 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
97 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
98 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
101 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
103 pub enum HTLCSource {
104 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
107 session_priv: SecretKey,
108 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
109 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
110 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
115 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
116 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
117 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
118 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
119 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
127 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
135 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
137 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
138 err: msgs::HandleError,
139 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
141 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
143 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
147 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
148 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
150 data: err.to_string()
154 needs_channel_force_close: false,
158 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
162 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
163 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
165 data: err.to_string()
169 needs_channel_force_close: true,
173 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
174 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
177 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
178 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
181 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
184 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
186 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
188 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
190 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
191 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
193 data: msg.to_string()
198 needs_channel_force_close: false,
202 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
205 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
207 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
209 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
211 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
212 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
214 data: msg.to_string()
219 needs_channel_force_close: true,
224 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
225 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
227 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
228 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
230 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
234 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
235 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
236 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
237 /// probably increase this significantly.
238 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
240 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
241 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
243 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
246 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
247 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
248 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
249 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
250 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
251 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
252 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
254 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
258 struct ChannelHolder {
259 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
260 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
261 next_forward: Instant,
262 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
263 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
264 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
265 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
266 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
267 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
268 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
270 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
271 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
272 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
273 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
275 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
276 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
277 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
278 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
279 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
280 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
281 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
284 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
286 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
287 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
288 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
289 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
290 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
291 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
296 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
297 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
299 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
300 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
302 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
303 /// to individual Channels.
304 pub struct ChannelManager {
305 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
306 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
307 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
308 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
309 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
311 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
312 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
313 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
314 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
316 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
317 our_network_key: SecretKey,
319 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
320 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
321 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
322 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
323 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
325 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
330 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
331 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
332 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
333 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
334 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
335 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
336 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
338 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
339 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
340 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
341 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
344 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
346 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
347 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
350 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
352 macro_rules! secp_call {
353 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
356 Err(_) => return Err($err),
363 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
365 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
366 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
371 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
372 pub struct ChannelDetails {
373 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
374 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
375 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
376 /// lifetime of the channel.
377 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
378 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
379 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
380 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
381 /// The node_id of our counterparty
382 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
383 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
384 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
385 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
389 impl ChannelManager {
390 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
392 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
393 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
395 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
396 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
398 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
399 pub fn new(fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
400 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
402 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
403 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
404 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
405 monitor: monitor.clone(),
409 announce_channels_publicly,
410 fee_proportional_millionths,
411 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
414 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
415 by_id: HashMap::new(),
416 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
417 next_forward: Instant::now(),
418 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
419 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
420 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
422 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
424 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
425 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
431 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
432 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
436 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
438 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
439 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
440 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
441 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
443 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
444 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
446 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
447 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
448 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
449 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
451 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
452 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
453 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
454 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
455 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
456 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
458 panic!("RNG is bad???");
461 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
463 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
464 node_id: their_network_key,
470 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
471 /// more information.
472 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
473 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
474 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
475 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
476 res.push(ChannelDetails {
477 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
478 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
479 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
480 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
481 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
487 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
488 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
489 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
490 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
491 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
492 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
493 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
494 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
495 // really wanted anyway.
496 if channel.is_live() {
497 res.push(ChannelDetails {
498 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
499 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
500 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
501 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
502 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
509 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
510 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
511 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
513 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
514 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
515 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
517 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
518 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
519 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
520 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
521 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
522 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
523 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
524 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
527 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
528 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
529 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
531 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
532 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
534 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
537 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
538 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
539 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
541 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
542 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
547 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
548 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
549 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
558 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
559 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
560 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
561 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
562 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
564 for tx in local_txn {
565 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
567 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
568 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
569 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
570 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
571 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
572 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
573 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
576 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
577 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
578 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
579 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
582 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
583 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
584 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
585 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
586 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
593 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
594 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
595 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
596 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
602 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
603 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
604 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
605 for chan in self.list_channels() {
606 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
610 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
612 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
614 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
615 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
616 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
617 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
621 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
622 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
623 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
624 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
625 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
630 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
631 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
632 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
638 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
639 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
641 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
642 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
643 let mut res = [0; 32];
644 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
648 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
649 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
650 let mut res = [0; 32];
651 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
657 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
658 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
659 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
660 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
661 let mut res = [0; 32];
662 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
667 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
668 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
669 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
670 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
671 let mut res = [0; 32];
672 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
676 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
678 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
679 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
680 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
682 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
683 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
685 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
686 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
687 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
688 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
689 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
691 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
693 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
694 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
696 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
702 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
703 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
704 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
706 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
707 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
713 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
723 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
724 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
725 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
726 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
727 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
728 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
729 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
730 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
732 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
733 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
734 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
735 // the intended recipient).
736 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
737 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
738 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
740 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
741 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
742 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
743 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
747 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
748 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
749 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
751 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
752 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
753 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
755 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
757 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
761 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
763 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
771 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
772 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
774 for i in 0..dst.len() {
779 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
780 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
781 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
782 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
785 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
786 let end_len = iters * 65;
787 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
788 res.resize(end_len, 0);
790 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
791 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
792 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
793 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
794 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
799 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
800 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
802 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
803 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
804 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
805 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
807 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
808 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
809 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
812 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
815 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
816 hmac.input(&packet_data);
817 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
818 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
823 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
824 hop_data: packet_data,
829 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
830 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
831 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
832 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
834 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
835 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
836 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
837 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
838 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
839 data: packet_crypted,
843 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
844 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
845 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
847 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
850 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
851 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
852 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
853 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
857 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
858 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
861 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
863 failuremsg: failuremsg,
867 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
868 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
869 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
875 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
876 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
877 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
880 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
881 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
884 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
885 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
886 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
887 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
893 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
894 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
895 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
896 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
897 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
898 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
899 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
900 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
903 let shared_secret = {
904 let mut arr = [0; 32];
905 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
908 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
910 let mut channel_state = None;
911 macro_rules! return_err {
912 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
914 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
915 if channel_state.is_none() {
916 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
918 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
919 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
920 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
921 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
922 })), channel_state.unwrap());
927 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
928 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
929 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
930 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
931 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
932 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
933 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
934 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
937 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
938 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
939 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
940 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
941 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
944 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
945 let next_hop_data = {
946 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
947 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
948 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
950 let error_code = match err {
951 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
952 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
954 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
960 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
962 // final_expiry_too_soon
963 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
964 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
966 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
967 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
968 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
970 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
971 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
972 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
975 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
976 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
977 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
978 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
980 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
982 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
984 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
985 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
986 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
989 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
990 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
991 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
993 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
995 let blinding_factor = {
996 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
997 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
998 sha.input(&shared_secret);
999 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1000 sha.result(&mut res);
1001 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1003 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1009 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1010 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1013 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1015 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1016 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1017 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1020 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1021 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1022 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1023 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1024 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1025 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1026 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1030 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1031 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1032 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1033 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1034 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1035 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1036 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1038 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1040 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1041 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1043 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1044 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1045 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1046 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1047 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1048 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1049 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1051 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1052 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1054 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1055 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1056 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1058 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1059 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1061 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1062 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1063 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1064 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1066 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1067 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1072 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1073 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1074 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1076 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1077 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1079 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1080 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1082 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1087 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1090 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1091 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1092 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1093 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1094 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1098 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1100 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1101 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1102 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1103 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1104 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1105 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1106 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1107 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1108 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1109 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1112 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1113 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1115 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1121 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1123 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1124 /// fields for more info.
1126 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1127 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1128 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1129 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1130 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1131 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1133 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1135 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1136 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1137 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1138 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1139 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1141 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1142 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1143 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1144 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1148 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1149 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1150 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1152 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1154 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1156 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1157 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1158 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1159 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1161 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1162 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1164 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1165 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1166 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1170 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1171 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1172 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1174 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1175 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1177 if !chan.is_live() {
1178 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1180 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1181 route: route.clone(),
1182 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1183 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1184 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1187 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1188 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1189 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1190 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1193 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1194 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1195 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1196 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1197 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1198 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1199 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1211 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1213 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1215 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1216 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1217 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1218 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1220 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1221 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1222 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1224 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1225 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1226 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1229 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1230 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1231 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1241 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1242 // lock before add_update_monitor
1243 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1247 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1248 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1249 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1252 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1253 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1254 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1256 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1262 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1263 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1265 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1267 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1269 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1270 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1272 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1273 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1274 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1275 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1276 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1280 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1282 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1283 /// Will likely generate further events.
1284 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1285 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1287 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1288 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1290 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1291 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1293 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1297 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1298 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1299 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1300 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1302 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1303 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1304 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1305 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1306 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1307 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1309 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1314 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1316 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1317 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1318 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1319 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1320 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1321 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1323 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1325 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1326 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1331 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1333 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1334 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1335 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1336 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1337 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1338 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1339 // this channel currently :/.
1346 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1347 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1350 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1351 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1353 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1355 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1359 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1360 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1362 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1363 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1364 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1365 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1366 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1367 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1368 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1370 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1375 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1376 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1377 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1378 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1379 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1381 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1382 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1383 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1385 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1386 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1387 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1394 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1396 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1397 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1401 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1402 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1403 events.append(&mut new_events);
1406 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1407 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1408 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1410 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1411 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1412 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1413 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1414 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1415 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1421 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1422 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1423 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1424 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1425 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1426 /// still-available channels.
1427 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1429 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1430 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1431 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1432 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1433 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1434 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1435 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1440 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1441 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1442 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1445 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1448 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1449 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1450 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1451 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1452 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1454 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1455 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1459 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1461 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1462 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1466 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1467 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1468 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1469 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1472 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1473 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1474 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1475 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1476 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1477 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1478 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1480 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1486 //TODO: Do something with e?
1494 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1495 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1496 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1498 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1499 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1500 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1501 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1502 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1503 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1505 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1507 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1508 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1509 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1510 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1511 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1512 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1517 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1519 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1520 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1521 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1522 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1526 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1527 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1528 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1530 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1531 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1533 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1534 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1540 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1541 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1542 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1543 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1544 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1545 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1548 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1549 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1550 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1551 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1552 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1553 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1554 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1555 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1563 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1564 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1565 //TODO: Do something with e?
1573 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1574 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1575 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1578 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1579 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1581 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1582 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1583 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1584 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1585 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1588 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1589 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1590 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1591 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1592 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1593 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1594 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1595 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1597 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1598 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1599 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1601 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1602 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1603 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1609 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1612 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1613 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1614 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1616 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1618 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1619 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1620 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1621 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1626 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1627 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1628 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1629 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1630 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1635 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1639 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1650 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1651 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1653 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1655 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1656 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1660 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1661 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1662 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1665 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1666 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1667 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1668 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1669 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1670 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1671 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1672 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1673 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1674 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1676 entry.insert(channel);
1682 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1683 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1684 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1685 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1687 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1688 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1689 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1691 chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1692 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1693 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1695 //TODO: same as above
1696 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1699 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1700 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1701 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1702 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1703 output_script: output_script,
1704 user_channel_id: user_id,
1709 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1710 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1711 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1712 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1713 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1714 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1715 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1716 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1718 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1719 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1720 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1723 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1727 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1730 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1731 // lock before add_update_monitor
1732 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1735 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1736 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1737 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1738 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1739 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1741 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1742 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1743 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1752 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1753 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1754 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1755 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1757 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1758 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1759 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1761 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1762 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1765 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1767 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1770 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1771 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1772 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1773 user_channel_id: user_id,
1778 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1779 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1780 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1781 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1783 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1784 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1785 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1787 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1788 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1789 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan) {
1790 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1791 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1792 msg: announcement_sigs,
1797 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1801 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1802 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1803 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1804 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1806 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1807 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1808 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1809 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1810 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1812 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1813 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1814 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1815 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1819 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1820 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1821 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1825 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1826 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1827 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1829 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1830 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1832 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1835 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1836 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1837 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1839 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1840 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1841 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1842 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1850 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1851 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1852 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1853 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1854 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1855 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1856 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1857 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1858 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1860 let (closing_signed, tx) = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1861 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1862 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1863 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1868 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1869 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1870 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1871 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1872 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1873 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1874 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1876 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1877 } else { (tx, None) }
1879 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1882 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1883 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1885 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1886 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1887 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1888 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1896 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1897 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1898 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1899 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1901 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1902 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1903 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1904 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1906 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1907 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1909 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1911 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1912 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1913 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1915 if !chan.is_usable() {
1916 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1918 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1920 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1924 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1925 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1926 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1928 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1929 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1930 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1932 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1933 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1935 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1937 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1941 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
1942 // indicating that the payment itself failed
1943 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
1944 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
1945 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
1946 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
1947 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
1949 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
1950 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
1954 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
1955 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
1956 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
1959 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
1961 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1962 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1963 if res.is_some() { return; }
1965 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
1966 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
1967 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
1969 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
1971 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1972 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1973 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1974 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1975 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1977 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
1979 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1980 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
1981 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1982 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1983 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1984 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1986 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1987 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
1988 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
1989 // definitely came from the peer in question
1990 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
1992 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
1994 match error_code & 0xff {
1996 // either from an intermediate or final node
1997 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
1998 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
1999 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
2000 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
2001 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2002 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2003 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
2004 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2005 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
2006 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2007 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2013 if is_from_final_node {
2014 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2015 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2016 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2017 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2018 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2019 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2022 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2023 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2027 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2028 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2029 // does not coform to the spec.
2030 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2031 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2032 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2038 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2042 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2044 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2045 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2046 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2050 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2051 let offset = match error_code {
2052 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2053 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2054 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2055 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2056 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2057 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2059 // node sending unknown code
2060 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2061 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2068 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2069 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2070 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2071 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2072 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2073 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2074 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2075 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2078 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2079 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2080 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2081 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2083 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2084 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2085 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2086 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2087 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2089 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2090 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2091 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2092 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2094 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2095 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2096 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2097 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2099 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2100 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2103 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2104 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2108 res = Some((msg, true));
2114 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2117 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2118 res = Some((None, true));
2122 // node sending unknown code
2123 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2124 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2133 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2134 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2135 } else { ((None, true)) }
2138 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2139 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2140 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2142 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2143 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2144 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2146 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2147 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2149 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2154 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2155 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2156 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2158 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2159 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2160 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2162 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
2163 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
2165 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2166 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2169 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2173 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2174 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2175 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2176 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2178 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2179 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2180 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2182 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2183 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2186 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2187 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2188 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2190 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2191 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2192 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2193 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2194 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2195 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2196 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2197 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2199 commitment_signed: msg,
2205 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2210 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2211 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2212 let mut forward_event = None;
2213 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2214 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2215 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2216 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2217 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2219 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2220 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2221 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2222 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2224 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2225 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2230 match forward_event {
2232 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2233 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2234 time_forwardable: time
2242 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2243 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2244 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2245 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2246 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2248 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2249 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2250 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2252 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2253 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2256 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2257 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2258 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2262 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2264 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2267 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2268 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2270 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2275 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2276 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2277 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2279 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2280 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2281 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2283 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2285 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2289 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2290 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2291 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2293 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2295 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2296 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2298 if !chan.is_usable() {
2299 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2302 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2303 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2304 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2306 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2307 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2308 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2309 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2310 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2312 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2314 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2315 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2316 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2317 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2318 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2319 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2320 contents: announcement,
2322 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2325 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2330 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2331 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2332 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2334 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2336 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2337 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2339 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2340 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2341 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2342 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2346 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2347 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2348 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2352 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2353 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2354 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2355 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2360 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2361 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2362 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2363 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2369 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2373 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2380 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2384 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2385 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2386 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2387 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2389 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2390 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2391 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2392 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2394 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2395 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2397 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2398 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2400 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2401 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2403 if !chan.is_live() {
2404 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2406 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2407 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2410 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2411 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2412 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2413 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2414 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2415 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2416 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2417 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2428 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2429 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2430 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2431 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2432 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2437 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2438 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2439 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2440 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2441 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2446 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2447 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2448 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2449 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2451 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2452 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2453 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2454 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2455 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2456 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2457 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2458 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2459 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2460 msg: funding_locked,
2462 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2463 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2464 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2465 msg: announcement_sigs,
2468 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2469 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2470 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2471 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2474 if channel.is_shutdown() {
2478 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2479 for tx in txn_matched {
2480 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2481 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2482 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2483 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2485 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2486 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2487 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2488 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2489 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2490 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2499 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2500 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2501 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2503 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2504 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2505 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2506 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2507 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2508 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2509 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2518 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2519 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2521 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2524 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2525 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2526 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2527 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2529 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2530 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2531 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2532 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2533 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2534 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2535 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2536 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2538 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2539 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2540 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2550 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2551 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2553 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2557 macro_rules! handle_error {
2558 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2561 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2562 if needs_channel_force_close {
2564 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2565 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2566 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2568 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2571 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2572 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2573 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2574 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2575 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2577 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2589 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2590 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2591 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2592 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2593 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2596 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2597 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2598 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2601 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2602 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2603 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2606 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2607 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2608 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2611 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2612 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2613 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2616 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2617 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2618 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2621 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2622 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2623 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2626 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2627 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2628 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2631 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2632 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2633 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2636 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2637 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2638 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2641 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2642 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2643 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2646 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2647 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2648 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2651 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2652 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2653 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2656 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2657 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2658 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2661 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2662 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2663 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2666 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2667 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2668 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2671 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2672 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2673 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2674 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2676 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2677 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2678 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2679 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2680 if no_connection_possible {
2681 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2682 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2683 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2684 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2686 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2687 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2688 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2698 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2699 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2700 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2701 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2702 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2703 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2704 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2706 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2707 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2708 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2717 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2718 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2720 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2721 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2722 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2727 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2728 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2729 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2730 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2731 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2732 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2733 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2734 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2735 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2736 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2737 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2741 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2742 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2743 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2749 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2752 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2753 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2755 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2756 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2757 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2758 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2762 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2769 use chain::chaininterface;
2770 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2771 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2772 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
2773 use chain::keysinterface;
2774 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
2775 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
2776 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2778 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2779 use util::test_utils;
2780 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
2781 use util::errors::APIError;
2782 use util::logger::Logger;
2783 use util::ser::Writeable;
2785 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2786 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2787 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2788 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2789 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2790 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2791 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2795 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2796 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2798 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2799 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2801 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2803 use std::cell::RefCell;
2804 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2805 use std::default::Default;
2807 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2808 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
2809 use std::time::Instant;
2812 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2813 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2814 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2819 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2820 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2823 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2824 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2827 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2828 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2831 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2832 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2835 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2836 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2841 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2843 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2844 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2849 fn onion_vectors() {
2850 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2851 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2853 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2854 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2855 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2856 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2857 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2859 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2860 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2861 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2862 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2863 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2865 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2866 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2867 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2868 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2869 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2871 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2872 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2873 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2874 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2875 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2877 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2878 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2879 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2880 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2881 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2883 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2884 let payloads = vec!(
2885 msgs::OnionHopData {
2887 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2888 short_channel_id: 0,
2890 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2894 msgs::OnionHopData {
2896 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2897 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2898 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2899 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2903 msgs::OnionHopData {
2905 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2906 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2907 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2908 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2912 msgs::OnionHopData {
2914 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2915 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2916 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2917 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2921 msgs::OnionHopData {
2923 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2924 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2925 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2926 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2932 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2933 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2935 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2939 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2940 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2942 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2943 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2944 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2946 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2947 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2949 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2950 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2952 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2953 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("a5d3e8634cfe78b2307d87c6d90be6fe7855b4f2cc9b1dfb19e92e4b79103f61ff9ac25f412ddfb7466e74f81b3e545563cdd8f5524dae873de61d7bdfccd496af2584930d2b566b4f8d3881f8c043df92224f38cf094cfc09d92655989531524593ec6d6caec1863bdfaa79229b5020acc034cd6deeea1021c50586947b9b8e6faa83b81fbfa6133c0af5d6b07c017f7158fa94f0d206baf12dda6b68f785b773b360fd0497e16cc402d779c8d48d0fa6315536ef0660f3f4e1865f5b38ea49c7da4fd959de4e83ff3ab686f059a45c65ba2af4a6a79166aa0f496bf04d06987b6d2ea205bdb0d347718b9aeff5b61dfff344993a275b79717cd815b6ad4c0beb568c4ac9c36ff1c315ec1119a1993c4b61e6eaa0375e0aaf738ac691abd3263bf937e3").unwrap());
2955 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2956 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2958 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2959 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2962 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2963 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2964 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2965 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2967 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2968 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2973 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2974 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2975 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2976 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2978 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2979 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2981 impl Drop for Node {
2982 fn drop(&mut self) {
2983 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2984 // Check that we processed all pending events
2985 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
2986 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2987 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2992 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2993 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2996 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2997 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2998 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
2999 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3002 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3003 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3005 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3006 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3008 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3009 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3012 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3013 }, match events[1] {
3014 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3015 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3016 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3017 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3018 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3019 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3020 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3021 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3023 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3029 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3030 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3032 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3033 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3035 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3036 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3039 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3045 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3046 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3048 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3049 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3051 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3052 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3055 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3061 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3062 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3063 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3064 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3066 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3070 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3071 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3073 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3074 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3075 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3077 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3078 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3080 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
3082 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3083 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3084 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3085 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3086 added_monitors.clear();
3088 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3091 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3093 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3094 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3095 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3096 added_monitors.clear();
3099 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3101 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3102 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3103 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3104 added_monitors.clear();
3107 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3108 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3110 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3111 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3112 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3114 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3120 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3121 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3122 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3126 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3127 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3128 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3129 ((match events_6[0] {
3130 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3131 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3132 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3135 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3136 }, match events_6[1] {
3137 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3138 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3141 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3145 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3146 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3147 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3151 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3152 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3153 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3154 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3156 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3157 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3158 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3159 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3162 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3165 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3166 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3167 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3168 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3169 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3170 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3173 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3176 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3178 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3181 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3182 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3185 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3186 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3188 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3189 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3190 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3192 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3195 macro_rules! check_spends {
3196 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3198 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3199 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3200 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3201 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3206 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3207 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3208 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3211 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3212 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3214 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3215 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3216 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3217 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3218 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3221 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3224 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3225 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3228 Some(match events_1[1] {
3229 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3230 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3233 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3237 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3238 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3240 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3241 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3242 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3243 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3247 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3249 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3250 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3253 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3260 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3261 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3262 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3263 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3264 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3265 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3266 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3268 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3269 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3270 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3271 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3272 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3273 (as_update, bs_update)
3275 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3277 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3278 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3279 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3280 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3282 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3283 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3284 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3285 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3286 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3287 (as_update, bs_update)
3289 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3290 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3292 (as_update, bs_update)
3297 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3298 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3301 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3302 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3303 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3304 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3305 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3306 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3309 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3311 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3312 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3317 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3318 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3320 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3321 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3322 added_monitors.clear();
3327 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3328 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3330 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3331 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3332 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3333 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3334 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3335 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3336 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3337 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3338 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3339 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3340 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3341 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!($node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3342 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3343 if $fail_backwards {
3344 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3345 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3347 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3348 if $fail_backwards {
3349 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3350 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3351 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
3352 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3353 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
3355 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3358 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3359 if $fail_backwards {
3360 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3361 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3363 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3365 added_monitors.clear();
3371 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3374 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3375 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3376 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3377 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3378 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3379 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3380 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3385 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3386 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3388 let mut payment_event = {
3389 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3390 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3392 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3393 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3394 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3396 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3398 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3399 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3401 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3402 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3403 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3405 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3406 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3408 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3409 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3412 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3413 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3415 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3416 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3417 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3419 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3420 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3421 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3423 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3426 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3427 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3428 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3429 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3430 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3436 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3439 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3440 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3441 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3443 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3444 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3445 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
3448 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3449 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3451 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3452 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3453 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3454 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3455 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3456 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3457 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3458 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
3460 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3466 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
3467 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
3469 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3470 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3471 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3472 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3476 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
3477 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
3479 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3480 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3481 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
3482 get_next_msgs!($node)
3484 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3487 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3488 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
3493 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3494 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3495 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3496 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
3497 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3498 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
3499 } else if update_next_msgs {
3500 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
3502 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3504 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3505 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3512 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
3513 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3514 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3516 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3517 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3519 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3524 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3525 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3528 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3530 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3531 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3532 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3533 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3534 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3537 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3540 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3541 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3542 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3543 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3544 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3547 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3549 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3551 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3552 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3556 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3557 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3558 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3561 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3562 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
3563 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3565 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3566 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3567 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3569 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3570 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3575 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3576 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3577 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3578 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3579 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3580 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3581 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3582 // second-to-last node!
3583 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3586 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3587 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3588 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3590 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3591 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3592 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3593 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3594 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3595 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3596 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3597 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3599 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3602 assert!(events.is_empty());
3604 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3605 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3612 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3614 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3615 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3617 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
3618 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3619 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3621 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3626 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3627 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3630 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3631 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3632 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3633 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3634 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3636 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3637 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3639 for _ in 0..node_count {
3640 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3641 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3642 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3643 let mut seed = [0; 32];
3644 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
3645 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3646 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3647 let node = ChannelManager::new(0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone()).unwrap();
3648 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3649 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3650 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3651 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3659 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3660 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3661 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3662 let channel_id = chan.2;
3664 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3666 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3667 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3673 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3677 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
3678 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3679 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3680 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3681 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3682 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
3683 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
3684 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
3685 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
3686 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3688 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3690 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
3692 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3693 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3696 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3697 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3698 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3699 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3700 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3702 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3705 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3707 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3708 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3709 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3712 let payment_event = {
3713 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3714 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3715 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3717 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3718 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3720 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3721 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3722 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3723 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3724 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3725 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3727 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3728 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3729 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3730 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3733 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3734 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3735 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3736 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3737 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3738 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3739 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3742 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3743 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3744 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3745 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3746 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3747 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3748 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3751 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3752 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3753 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3756 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3757 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3760 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
3761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3763 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3764 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3766 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3767 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3770 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
3771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3775 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3776 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3777 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3778 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3779 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3780 let channel_id = chan.2;
3782 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3784 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3785 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3791 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3793 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3794 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3797 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3798 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3799 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3800 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3803 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3806 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3808 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3809 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3810 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3813 let payment_event = {
3814 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3815 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3816 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3818 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3819 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3821 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3822 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3823 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3824 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3825 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3828 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3831 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3835 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3836 let nodes = create_network(2);
3837 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3838 let channel_id = chan.2;
3840 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3842 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3843 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3849 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3850 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3851 // update_fee (never committed) ->
3852 // (3) update_fee ->
3853 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3854 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3855 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3856 // <- (1) RAA delivered
3857 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
3858 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3859 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3860 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3861 // revoke_and_ack ->
3862 // B should send no response here
3863 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
3864 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3865 // revoke_and_ack ->
3867 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3868 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3869 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3872 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3873 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3874 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3875 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3876 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3878 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3881 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3882 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3883 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3884 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3887 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3889 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3890 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3891 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3893 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3894 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3895 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3896 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3899 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3901 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3903 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3905 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3906 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3907 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3909 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3910 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3911 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3912 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3913 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3914 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3915 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3917 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3918 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3919 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3921 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3923 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3924 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3928 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3929 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3932 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
3933 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3936 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
3937 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3938 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3941 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
3942 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3947 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3948 let nodes = create_network(2);
3949 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3950 let channel_id = chan.2;
3952 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3954 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3955 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3960 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3961 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3964 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3965 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3966 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3967 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3968 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3970 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3972 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3974 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3975 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3978 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3979 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3982 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3983 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3984 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3987 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3988 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3993 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3994 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3995 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3996 let channel_id = chan.2;
3998 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4000 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4001 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4007 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4009 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4010 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4013 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4014 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4015 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4016 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4017 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4019 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4021 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4022 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4023 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4026 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4028 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4030 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4031 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4033 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4034 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4035 added_monitors.clear();
4037 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4038 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4039 // node[1] has nothing to do
4041 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4042 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4045 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4046 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4047 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4049 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4051 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4053 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4054 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4055 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4056 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4057 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4058 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4060 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4061 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4063 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4065 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4067 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4069 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4071 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4072 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4074 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4076 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4078 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4079 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4081 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4082 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4084 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4085 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4087 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4088 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4090 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4091 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4094 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4096 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4097 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4098 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4102 fn test_update_fee() {
4103 let nodes = create_network(2);
4104 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4105 let channel_id = chan.2;
4107 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4109 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4110 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4116 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4117 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4118 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4119 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4120 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4121 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4122 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4123 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4124 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4125 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4126 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4127 // revoke_and_ack ->
4129 // Create and deliver (1)...
4130 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4131 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4134 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4135 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4136 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4137 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4138 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4142 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4144 // Generate (2) and (3):
4145 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4146 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4150 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4151 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4154 // Create and deliver (4)...
4155 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4157 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4158 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4159 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4160 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4161 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4163 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4166 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4167 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4170 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4171 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4173 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4174 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4176 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4177 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4180 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4181 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4184 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4185 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4186 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4187 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4188 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4189 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4190 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4191 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4195 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4197 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4198 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4200 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4202 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4204 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
4205 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
4206 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4210 fn fake_network_test() {
4211 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4212 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
4213 let nodes = create_network(4);
4215 // Create some initial channels
4216 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4217 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4218 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4220 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4221 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4222 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4223 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4224 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4226 // Send some more payments
4227 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4228 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
4229 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
4231 // Test failure packets
4232 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
4233 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
4235 // Add a new channel that skips 3
4236 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4238 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4239 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4240 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4241 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4242 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4243 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4244 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4246 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
4247 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4248 hops.push(RouteHop {
4249 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4250 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4252 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4254 hops.push(RouteHop {
4255 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4256 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4258 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4260 hops.push(RouteHop {
4261 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4262 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4264 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4266 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4267 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4268 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
4270 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4271 hops.push(RouteHop {
4272 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4273 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4275 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4277 hops.push(RouteHop {
4278 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4279 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4281 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4283 hops.push(RouteHop {
4284 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4285 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4287 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4289 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4290 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4291 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
4293 // Claim the rebalances...
4294 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
4295 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4297 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
4298 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4300 // Send some payments across both channels
4301 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4302 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4303 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4305 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
4307 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
4309 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4310 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
4311 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
4313 // Close down the channels...
4314 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
4315 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
4316 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
4317 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
4318 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
4322 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
4323 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
4324 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
4325 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
4327 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
4328 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
4329 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4330 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4331 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4332 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4334 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
4336 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4337 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4339 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4340 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4342 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
4343 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
4344 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
4347 #[derive(PartialEq)]
4348 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
4349 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
4351 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
4352 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
4353 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
4355 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
4356 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
4358 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
4360 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4361 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4362 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
4364 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
4365 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4366 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
4367 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
4368 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
4369 res.push(tx.clone());
4374 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
4375 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
4378 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
4380 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
4381 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4382 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
4383 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
4384 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
4385 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
4387 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
4389 res.push(tx.clone());
4393 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
4396 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4400 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
4401 /// HTLC transaction.
4402 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
4403 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4404 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4405 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4406 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
4407 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
4411 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4414 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4415 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4417 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
4418 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4419 let mut found_prev = false;
4421 for tx in prev_txn {
4422 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
4423 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
4424 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
4425 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
4431 assert!(found_prev);
4433 let mut res = Vec::new();
4434 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
4438 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
4439 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4440 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4441 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
4442 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4445 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4448 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4449 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4450 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
4451 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4454 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4458 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4459 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4463 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
4465 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4466 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4468 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4469 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4471 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4472 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4477 fn channel_reserve_test() {
4479 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
4480 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
4482 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
4483 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
4484 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4485 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
4486 chan.get_value_stat()
4490 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4491 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
4492 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
4494 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4495 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4497 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
4498 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4500 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
4501 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
4502 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4503 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4504 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
4508 macro_rules! expect_forward {
4510 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4511 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4512 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4513 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
4518 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
4519 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
4520 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4521 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4523 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4524 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4525 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
4527 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4532 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4533 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4535 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4537 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4539 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4540 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4541 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4543 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4544 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4548 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4549 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4550 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4552 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4553 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4556 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4559 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4560 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4561 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4562 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4563 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4566 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4567 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4568 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4569 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4570 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4574 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4575 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4576 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4577 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4579 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4580 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4584 // adding pending output
4585 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4586 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4588 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4589 let payment_event_1 = {
4590 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4593 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4594 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4595 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4597 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4599 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4600 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4602 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4603 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4604 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4605 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4610 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4611 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4613 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4614 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4615 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4616 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4617 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4619 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4621 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4622 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4623 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4624 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4625 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4626 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4628 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4629 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4630 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4631 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4634 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4636 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4640 // split the rest to test holding cell
4641 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4642 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4644 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4645 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4648 // now see if they go through on both sides
4649 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4650 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4651 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4653 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4654 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4656 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4658 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4659 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4660 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4661 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4665 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4666 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4667 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4669 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4670 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4672 // flush the pending htlc
4673 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4674 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4677 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
4678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4679 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4681 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4682 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4683 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4686 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
4687 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4690 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4692 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4693 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4694 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4696 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4697 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4699 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4700 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4701 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4702 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4703 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4704 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4706 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4707 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4708 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4709 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4711 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4712 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4714 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4715 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4717 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4718 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4719 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4721 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4724 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4725 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4726 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4731 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4732 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4733 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4735 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4736 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4737 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4738 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4740 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4741 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4745 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4746 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4747 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4748 let nodes = create_network(5);
4750 // Create some initial channels
4751 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4752 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4753 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4754 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4756 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4757 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4758 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4759 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4760 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4762 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4763 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4765 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4766 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4767 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4768 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4770 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4771 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4772 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4774 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4775 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4777 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4778 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4780 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4781 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4782 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4783 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4785 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4786 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4787 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4789 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4790 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4792 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4793 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4795 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4796 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4798 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4799 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4800 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4801 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4803 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4809 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4810 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4811 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4813 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4815 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4816 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4818 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4819 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4821 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4823 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4824 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4825 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4827 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
4828 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4829 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
4832 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4833 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4834 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4835 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4836 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
4840 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4841 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4842 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
4843 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4844 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4847 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4849 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4850 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4852 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4853 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4854 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
4855 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4856 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4859 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4861 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4862 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4864 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4866 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4867 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4868 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4870 // Create some new channels:
4871 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4873 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4874 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4875 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4876 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4877 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4878 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4879 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4880 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4881 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4882 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4883 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4884 // Revoke the old state
4885 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4888 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4889 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4891 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4892 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4893 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4894 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4896 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4897 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4899 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4901 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4902 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4903 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4904 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4905 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4907 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4908 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4909 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4913 fn revoked_output_claim() {
4914 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4915 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4916 let nodes = create_network(2);
4917 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4918 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4919 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4920 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4921 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4922 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4923 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4924 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4926 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4927 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4928 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4929 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4930 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4932 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4934 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4935 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4937 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4938 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4939 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4943 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4944 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4945 let nodes = create_network(2);
4947 // Create some new channel:
4948 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4950 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4951 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4952 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4953 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4954 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4956 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4957 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4958 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4959 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4960 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4961 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4962 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4963 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4964 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4966 //Revoke the old state
4967 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4970 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4972 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4974 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4975 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4976 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4978 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4979 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4981 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4983 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4984 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4985 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4986 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4987 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4988 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4989 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4990 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4992 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4993 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4994 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4996 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4997 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4998 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4999 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
5000 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5001 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
5003 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5004 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5005 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5009 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
5010 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
5011 let nodes = create_network(2);
5013 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5015 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5016 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5017 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
5018 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
5019 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5020 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5022 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5023 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5025 //Revoke the old state
5026 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5029 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5031 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
5033 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
5034 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5035 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
5037 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
5038 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
5039 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
5040 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
5041 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
5042 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
5043 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
5045 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5046 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5047 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5049 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
5050 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5051 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5052 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5053 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5055 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5056 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5057 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5058 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5059 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5060 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5061 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5062 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
5064 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
5065 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
5067 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
5068 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
5069 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
5070 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
5071 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5072 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5074 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5075 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5076 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5080 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
5081 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
5082 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
5083 let nodes = create_network(2);
5084 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5086 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
5087 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
5089 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5090 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5092 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5093 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5095 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5099 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5100 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5102 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5103 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
5106 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5107 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5109 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5110 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5112 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5116 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
5117 // registering new transactions
5118 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
5122 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
5123 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
5124 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5125 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5126 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5128 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
5130 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5132 let mut payment_event = {
5133 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
5134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5136 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5137 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5138 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5141 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5142 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5144 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5145 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5147 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5148 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5151 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5152 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5154 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5155 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5156 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
5157 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
5159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5160 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5161 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5163 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5165 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
5166 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
5167 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
5169 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
5170 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5171 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5173 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5174 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5176 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5180 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5181 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
5182 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
5183 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
5184 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5188 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5189 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
5191 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5192 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
5193 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5195 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5196 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5198 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5201 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
5203 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
5204 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
5205 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
5207 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
5208 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5209 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5210 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5211 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
5212 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
5213 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
5215 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
5219 fn test_unconf_chan() {
5220 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
5221 let nodes = create_network(2);
5222 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5224 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5225 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
5226 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
5227 mem::drop(channel_state);
5229 let mut headers = Vec::new();
5230 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5231 headers.push(header.clone());
5233 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5234 headers.push(header.clone());
5236 while !headers.is_empty() {
5237 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
5240 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5241 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5243 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5244 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5249 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5250 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
5251 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
5254 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
5255 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
5257 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
5258 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
5259 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
5260 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5261 res.push(msg.clone());
5263 panic!("Unexpected event")
5271 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
5272 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
5274 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5276 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
5278 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5284 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
5285 let mut commitment_update = None;
5286 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
5289 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5290 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5291 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
5292 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
5294 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5295 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5296 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
5297 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
5299 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5302 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
5305 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
5307 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5308 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5309 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
5310 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
5312 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5313 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5314 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
5315 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
5317 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5321 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
5326 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
5327 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
5328 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
5329 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5330 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
5331 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5332 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
5334 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
5335 for msg in reestablish_1 {
5336 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
5337 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
5339 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5340 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5342 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
5345 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
5346 for msg in reestablish_2 {
5347 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
5348 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
5350 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5351 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5353 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
5356 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
5357 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
5358 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
5360 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
5362 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5363 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5364 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
5365 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
5366 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
5367 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
5368 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
5371 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5374 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5375 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
5376 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5377 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5379 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5381 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5382 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5383 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5384 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
5386 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5388 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5389 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5390 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5391 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5392 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5394 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5395 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5397 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5398 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5401 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5402 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5404 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5405 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5406 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5407 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5408 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5409 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5410 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5413 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5417 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
5419 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5420 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5421 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
5422 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
5423 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
5424 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
5425 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
5428 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5431 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5432 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
5433 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5434 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5436 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5438 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5439 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5440 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5441 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
5443 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5444 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5445 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5446 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5447 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5449 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5450 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5452 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5453 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5456 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5457 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5459 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5460 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5461 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5462 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5463 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5464 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5465 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5468 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5474 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
5475 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
5476 let nodes = create_network(3);
5477 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5478 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5480 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5481 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5482 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5484 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5485 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5486 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
5487 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
5489 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5490 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5491 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5493 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5494 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5495 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5496 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5498 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5499 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5501 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
5502 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
5504 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
5506 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5507 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5509 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
5510 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
5512 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5515 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
5516 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
5517 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
5519 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5523 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
5524 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
5527 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
5528 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
5529 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5530 if messages_delivered == 0 {
5531 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5532 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
5534 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5537 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5538 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5540 let payment_event = {
5541 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5544 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5545 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5546 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5548 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
5550 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5551 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
5553 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5554 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5555 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5557 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5559 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5560 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5561 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5564 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5565 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5566 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5567 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5570 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
5571 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5572 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5580 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5581 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5582 if messages_delivered < 3 {
5583 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
5584 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
5585 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5586 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5587 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5588 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5589 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5590 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5591 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5592 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5593 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5594 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5595 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
5596 // Everything was delivered...
5597 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5600 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5601 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5603 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5604 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5607 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5608 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5609 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5611 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5612 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5614 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5615 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5617 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5618 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5619 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5621 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5624 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5627 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5628 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5629 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
5630 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5631 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5632 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5633 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5634 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5635 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5636 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5637 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5639 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5642 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
5643 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
5645 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5646 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5648 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5649 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5651 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5654 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
5655 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
5656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5657 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5659 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5660 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5661 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5664 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5665 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5666 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5667 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5670 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5671 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5672 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5680 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5681 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5682 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5683 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5684 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
5685 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
5686 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5687 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5689 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5690 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5692 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5695 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5696 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5697 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5698 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5699 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5700 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5701 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5702 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5703 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5704 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5705 // Everything was delivered...
5706 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5709 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5710 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5711 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5713 // Channel should still work fine...
5714 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
5715 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5719 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
5720 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
5721 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
5722 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
5723 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
5727 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
5728 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
5729 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
5730 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
5734 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
5735 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
5736 let nodes = create_network(2);
5737 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5739 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5740 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5742 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5743 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5744 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5746 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
5747 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5749 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5752 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5753 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5754 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5756 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
5757 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5759 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5762 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5763 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5764 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5765 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5767 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
5768 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
5770 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5771 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5772 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
5776 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
5777 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
5778 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
5779 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5780 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5782 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5784 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5785 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5786 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5788 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
5789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5791 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5792 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5794 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5795 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5798 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5801 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5802 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5804 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5805 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5806 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5807 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5808 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5809 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5810 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5812 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5813 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5814 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5816 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5817 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5819 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5822 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
5823 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5824 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5827 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5830 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5831 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5833 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5834 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
5835 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5836 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5837 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
5838 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5840 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5841 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
5842 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5843 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
5845 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5846 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5848 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5849 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5851 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5853 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5854 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5855 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5856 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5857 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5858 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5859 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5860 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5861 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5864 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
5865 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5866 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5867 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5868 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5869 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5870 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5873 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5874 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5875 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5876 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5877 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5878 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5879 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5882 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5883 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5884 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5887 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5888 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5889 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5892 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5893 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5896 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5897 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5899 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5900 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5903 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5904 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5906 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5907 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5909 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
5910 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5912 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5915 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5916 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5919 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5923 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
5924 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
5925 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5926 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5928 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5929 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5931 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5932 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5935 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5936 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5938 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5939 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5942 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5943 // PaymentFailed event
5945 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5948 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
5949 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
5950 // a disconnect in between
5951 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5952 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5954 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5955 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5957 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5958 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5961 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5962 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5963 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5966 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5967 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5968 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5971 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
5972 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5975 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5976 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5977 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
5978 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5979 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5980 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5982 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5984 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5985 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5987 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5988 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5989 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5991 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5994 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
5996 // Now set it to failed again...
5997 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5998 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5999 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
6000 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6002 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6003 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6004 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6007 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6008 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6009 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6012 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
6013 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6014 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6017 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6018 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6020 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6021 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6024 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6025 // PaymentFailed event
6027 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6031 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
6032 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
6033 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
6036 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
6037 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
6039 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
6040 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
6041 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
6042 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
6043 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
6044 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
6045 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
6046 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
6047 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
6048 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
6049 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
6050 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
6051 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
6052 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
6053 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
6054 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
6055 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
6056 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6057 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6059 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6061 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6062 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6063 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6065 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6066 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
6067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6069 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6070 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6071 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6073 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
6074 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
6075 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6077 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6078 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6079 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
6080 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6081 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6082 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6083 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6084 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6085 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6086 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6088 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6089 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6090 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6091 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6093 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6094 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6096 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6099 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
6100 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
6101 } else { panic!(); }
6104 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6106 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6109 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
6110 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6111 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6114 // Now fix monitor updating...
6115 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
6116 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6119 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
6120 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6121 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6123 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6124 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6125 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6126 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6127 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6128 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6130 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6131 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6132 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6133 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6135 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6136 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6138 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
6141 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
6142 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6143 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6145 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6146 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6147 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6148 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6149 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6150 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6152 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
6154 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6155 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6157 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6159 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6160 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6162 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6163 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6164 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6166 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
6167 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
6168 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6170 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6171 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6172 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6173 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6174 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
6175 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
6177 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6179 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6180 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6181 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6183 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6184 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6186 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6189 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6190 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6191 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6194 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
6198 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
6199 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6201 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6202 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
6203 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
6205 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
6206 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
6209 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
6211 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6212 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
6213 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
6214 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6215 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6218 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6222 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6224 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6225 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6226 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6227 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6230 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
6231 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6233 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
6234 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
6236 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
6237 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6240 let as_commitment_update;
6241 let bs_second_commitment_update;
6243 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
6244 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6245 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6246 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6247 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6248 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6249 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6250 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
6251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6254 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
6255 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6256 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6257 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6258 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6259 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6260 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6261 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
6262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6265 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
6268 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
6269 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6271 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
6272 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6274 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6275 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6277 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6280 handle_initial_raa!();
6282 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
6283 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6285 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6286 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6288 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6289 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6292 handle_initial_raa!();
6294 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
6295 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6297 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6298 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
6300 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
6301 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6303 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6308 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
6309 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6311 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6312 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6314 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6315 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6319 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6320 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6321 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6324 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6325 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6326 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6329 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6330 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6333 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6334 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6337 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6339 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6340 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6342 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6343 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6344 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6346 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6349 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6353 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
6354 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
6355 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
6356 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
6357 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
6358 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
6359 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
6363 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
6364 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
6365 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
6366 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
6367 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
6371 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
6372 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
6373 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
6374 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
6375 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
6376 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
6380 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
6381 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
6382 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6383 let nodes = create_network(2);
6385 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
6387 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6388 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6389 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6390 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6392 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6394 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6395 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6397 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6398 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6400 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
6402 let mut chan_announcement;
6404 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
6406 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6407 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
6408 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
6409 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
6410 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
6411 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
6412 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
6413 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
6414 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6419 macro_rules! sign_msg {
6420 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
6421 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
6422 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6423 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6424 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
6425 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
6426 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6427 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
6428 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
6429 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
6430 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
6431 contents: $unsigned_msg
6436 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6437 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6438 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
6439 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6441 // Configured with Network::Testnet
6442 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6443 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
6444 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6445 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6447 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6448 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
6449 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6450 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());