1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
7 use bitcoin::util::uint::Uint256;
9 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
10 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
11 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
14 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
15 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
16 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
17 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
19 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable};
20 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
21 use util::sha2::Sha256;
24 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
25 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
26 use crypto::digest::Digest;
27 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
28 use crypto::chacha20::ChaCha20;
30 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
31 use std::collections::HashMap;
32 use std::collections::hash_map;
34 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
36 mod channel_held_info {
39 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
40 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
41 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
42 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
43 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
44 pub(super) prev_short_channel_id: u64,
45 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
46 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
49 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
50 impl PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
51 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
54 payment_hash: [0; 32],
56 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
58 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
63 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
64 pub enum HTLCFailReason {
66 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
74 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
76 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
77 HTLCFailReason::Reason {
78 failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(),
83 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
84 pub use self::channel_held_info::*;
85 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
86 pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*;
88 enum PendingOutboundHTLC {
90 source_short_channel_id: u64,
91 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
95 session_priv: SecretKey,
97 /// Used for channel rebalancing
99 source_short_channel_id: u64,
100 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
102 session_priv: SecretKey,
106 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
107 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
108 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
109 /// probably increase this significantly.
110 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
112 struct ChannelHolder {
113 by_id: HashMap<Uint256, Channel>,
114 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, Uint256>,
115 next_forward: Instant,
116 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
117 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
118 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
120 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
121 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<Uint256, Channel>,
122 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Uint256>,
123 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
124 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
125 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
126 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
129 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
131 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
132 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
133 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
134 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
135 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
136 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
141 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
142 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
143 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
144 /// to individual Channels.
145 pub struct ChannelManager {
146 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
147 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
148 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
149 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
150 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
152 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
153 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
156 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
157 our_network_key: SecretKey,
159 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
162 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
164 macro_rules! secp_call {
168 //TODO: Make the err a parameter!
169 Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Key error", msg: None})
176 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
178 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
179 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
184 pub struct ChannelDetails {
185 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
186 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
187 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
188 /// lifetime of the channel.
189 pub channel_id: Uint256,
190 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
191 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
192 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
193 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
194 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
195 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
199 impl ChannelManager {
200 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
201 /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
202 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
203 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
204 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= (1 << 24)!
205 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
206 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
208 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
209 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
210 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
211 monitor: monitor.clone(),
215 announce_channels_publicly,
216 fee_proportional_millionths,
219 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
220 by_id: HashMap::new(),
221 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
222 next_forward: Instant::now(),
223 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
224 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
228 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
230 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
231 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
235 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, HandleError> {
236 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
238 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
239 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
240 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
241 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
242 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
243 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
244 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
245 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
248 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
249 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
250 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
252 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
256 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id);
257 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?;
258 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
259 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
260 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
265 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
266 /// more information.
267 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
268 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
269 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
270 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
271 res.push(ChannelDetails {
272 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
273 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
274 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
275 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
276 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
282 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
283 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
284 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
285 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &Uint256) -> Result<msgs::Shutdown, HandleError> {
287 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
288 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
290 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
291 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
292 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
293 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
294 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
295 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
297 chan_entry.remove_entry();
301 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", msg: None})
304 for payment_hash in res.1 {
305 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
306 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
312 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
314 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
315 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
316 let mut res = [0; 32];
317 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
321 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
322 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
323 let mut res = [0; 32];
324 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
330 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
331 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
332 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
333 let mut res = [0; 32];
334 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
339 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
340 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
341 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
342 let mut res = [0; 32];
343 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
347 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
349 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
350 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
351 let mut blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
352 let mut first_iteration = true;
354 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
355 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
357 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
358 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
359 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
360 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
361 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
364 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
365 first_iteration = false;
367 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
369 secp_call!(blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor))));
370 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
372 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
378 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
379 fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, HandleError> {
380 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
382 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
383 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
389 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
399 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
400 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
401 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
402 let mut cur_cltv = 0u32;
403 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
404 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
405 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
406 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
408 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
409 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
410 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
411 // the intended recipient).
412 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
413 let cltv = if cur_cltv == 0 { hop.cltv_expiry_delta } else { cur_cltv };
414 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
416 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
417 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
418 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
419 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
423 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
424 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
425 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", msg: None});
427 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
428 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
429 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", msg: None});
431 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
433 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
437 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
439 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
447 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
448 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
450 for i in 0..dst.len() {
455 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
456 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, HandleError> {
457 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
458 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
461 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
462 let end_len = iters * 65;
463 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
464 res.resize(end_len, 0);
466 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
467 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
468 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
469 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
470 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
475 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
476 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
478 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
479 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
480 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
481 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
483 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
484 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
485 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
488 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
491 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
492 hmac.input(&packet_data);
493 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
494 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
497 Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{
499 public_key: onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey,
500 hop_data: packet_data,
505 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
506 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
507 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
508 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
510 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
511 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
512 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
513 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
514 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
515 data: packet_crypted,
519 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
520 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
522 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
525 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
526 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
527 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
528 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
532 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
533 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
536 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
538 failuremsg: failuremsg,
542 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
543 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
544 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
550 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
551 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
552 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
555 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
556 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &mut Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
557 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
558 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", msg: None}),
562 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap().serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
564 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
565 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
566 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
567 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
568 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
569 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
570 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
571 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
572 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
575 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
576 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).unwrap(); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
578 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
584 /// Sends a payment along a given route, returning the UpdateAddHTLC message to give to the
585 /// first hop in route. Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see
586 /// documentation for RouteHop fields for more info.
587 /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
588 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, HandleError> {
589 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
590 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", msg: None});
592 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
593 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
594 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
595 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", msg: None});
599 let session_priv = secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
600 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
601 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
605 let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here?
607 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv)?;
608 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route)?;
609 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, associated_data)?;
611 let (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
612 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
613 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
614 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", msg: None}),
615 Some(id) => id.clone()
618 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
619 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
620 return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", msg: None});
622 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
625 if channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
629 // TODO: We need to track these better, we're not generating these, so a
630 // third-party might make this happen:
631 panic!("payment_hash was repeated! Don't let this happen");
636 None => return Ok(None),
640 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
641 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
643 Ok(Some((update_add, commitment_signed)))
646 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
647 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
648 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &Uint256, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16)) {
649 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
650 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
651 match channel_state.by_id.remove(&temporary_channel_id) {
653 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo.0, funding_txo.1) {
655 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
658 //TODO: Push e to pendingevents
665 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
666 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
667 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
670 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
671 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
672 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
677 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
678 channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan);
681 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
682 if !chan.is_usable() { return Ok(None) }
684 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
685 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
686 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
688 Ok(Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
689 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
690 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
691 node_signature: our_node_sig,
692 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
696 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forward(&self) {
697 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
698 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
700 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
701 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
703 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
707 for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
708 if short_chan_id != 0 {
709 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
710 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
712 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
713 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
714 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
716 // TODO: Send a failure packet back on each pending_forward
720 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
722 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
723 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
724 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
726 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
727 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
732 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
734 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
735 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
736 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
737 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
738 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
739 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
740 // this channel currently :/.
747 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
748 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
751 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
755 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::SendHTLCs {
756 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
758 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
762 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
763 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
764 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
765 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
772 for failed_forward in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
773 match failed_forward.2 {
774 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: Vec::new() }),
775 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
779 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
781 new_events.retain(|event| {
782 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
783 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
784 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
790 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
791 events.reserve(new_events.len());
792 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
793 events.push(event.1);
797 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
798 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
799 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() })
802 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool {
803 let mut pending_htlc = {
804 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) {
805 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
806 None => return false,
811 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
812 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.clone(), PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
816 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
822 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
823 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
824 mem::drop(channel_state);
826 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
827 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
828 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
832 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => {
833 let err_packet = match onion_error {
834 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
835 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
836 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
838 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
839 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
843 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
844 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
845 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
849 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
850 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(payment_hash, err_packet) {
851 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
853 //TODO: Do something with e?
860 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
861 mem::drop(channel_state);
863 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
864 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
867 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
868 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFailHTLC {
871 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
882 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
883 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
884 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
885 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
886 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
887 self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true)
889 pub fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
890 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
891 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
892 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
893 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
895 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
896 let mut pending_htlc = {
897 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
898 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
899 None => return false,
904 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
905 if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us
906 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
907 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv });
908 } else { // This came from the first upstream node
909 // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow???
910 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv };
911 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret });
918 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
919 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
921 panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this...");
923 mem::drop(channel_state);
924 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
925 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
930 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => {
931 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
932 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
933 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
937 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
938 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(payment_preimage) {
939 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
941 //TODO: Do something with e?
947 mem::drop(channel_state);
949 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
950 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
951 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
954 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
955 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFulfillHTLC {
968 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
969 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
970 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap()
973 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
974 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
976 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
981 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
982 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
983 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
984 let mut ret = Vec::new();
985 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
990 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
991 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
992 let mut new_funding_locked_messages = Vec::new();
994 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
995 let mut short_to_ids_to_insert = Vec::new();
996 let mut short_to_ids_to_remove = Vec::new();
997 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
998 if let Some(funding_locked) = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched) {
999 let announcement_sigs = match self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1002 //TODO: push e on events and blow up the channel (it has bad keys)
1006 new_funding_locked_messages.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1007 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1008 msg: funding_locked,
1009 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1011 short_to_ids_to_insert.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()));
1013 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1014 for tx in txn_matched {
1015 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1016 if inp.prev_hash == funding_txo.0 && inp.prev_index == funding_txo.1 as u32 {
1017 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1018 short_to_ids_to_remove.push(short_id);
1020 channel.force_shutdown();
1026 if channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1027 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1028 short_to_ids_to_remove.push(short_id);
1030 channel.force_shutdown();
1035 for to_remove in short_to_ids_to_remove {
1036 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&to_remove);
1038 for to_insert in short_to_ids_to_insert {
1039 channel_state.short_to_id.insert(to_insert.0, to_insert.1);
1042 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1043 for funding_locked in new_funding_locked_messages.drain(..) {
1044 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1048 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
1049 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1050 for channel in channel_state.by_id.values_mut() {
1051 if channel.block_disconnected(header) {
1052 //TODO Close channel here
1058 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
1059 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
1060 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
1061 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1062 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown genesis block hash", msg: None});
1064 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1065 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1066 return Err(HandleError{err: "temporary_channel_id collision!", msg: None});
1069 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1071 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1072 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1073 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1074 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1075 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1076 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1077 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1078 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1081 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1082 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1083 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1085 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1089 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, self.announce_channels_publicly)?;
1090 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel()?;
1091 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1095 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1096 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1097 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1098 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1100 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1101 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1103 chan.accept_channel(&msg)?;
1104 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1106 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1109 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1110 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1111 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1112 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1113 output_script: output_script,
1114 user_channel_id: user_id,
1119 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
1120 //TODO: broke this - a node shouldn't be able to get their channel removed by sending a
1121 //funding_created a second time, or long after the first, or whatever (note this also
1122 //leaves the short_to_id map in a busted state.
1123 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1124 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1125 match channel_state.by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1127 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1128 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1130 match chan.funding_created(msg) {
1131 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1132 (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update)
1139 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1141 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1142 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1143 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1144 // for a bogus channel.
1145 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1148 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1149 channel_state.by_id.insert(funding_msg.channel_id, chan);
1153 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1154 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1155 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1156 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1158 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1159 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1161 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg)?;
1162 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1164 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1167 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1170 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1171 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1172 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1173 user_channel_id: user_id,
1178 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
1179 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1180 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1182 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1183 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1185 chan.funding_locked(&msg)?;
1186 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan)?);
1188 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1192 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
1194 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1195 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1197 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1198 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1199 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1200 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1202 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1203 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1204 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1205 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1207 chan_entry.remove_entry();
1211 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1214 for payment_hash in res.2 {
1215 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1216 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1221 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
1223 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1224 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1225 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1226 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1227 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1228 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1230 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1231 if res.1.is_some() {
1232 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1233 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1234 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1235 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1236 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1237 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1238 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1240 chan_entry.remove_entry();
1244 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1247 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1248 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1253 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
1254 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1255 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1256 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1258 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1259 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1260 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1261 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1263 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key);
1264 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1266 let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here?
1268 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
1271 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1272 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1273 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
1274 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
1280 macro_rules! return_err {
1281 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1282 return Err(msgs::HandleError {
1284 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::UpdateFailHTLC {
1285 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1286 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1287 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1288 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1295 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1296 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1297 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1298 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1299 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1300 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1301 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1302 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1305 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1306 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1307 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
1308 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1309 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1312 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1313 let next_hop_data = {
1314 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1315 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1316 match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
1318 let error_code = match err {
1319 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
1320 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1322 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1328 let mut pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1330 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
1331 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1333 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1334 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1337 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1338 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1339 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1340 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1342 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1344 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1345 short_channel_id: 0,
1346 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1347 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1348 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1351 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1352 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1353 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1355 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone();
1357 let blinding_factor = {
1358 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1359 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1360 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
1361 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1362 sha.result(&mut res);
1363 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1365 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1367 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1373 match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1375 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1377 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1382 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1384 public_key: new_pubkey,
1385 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1386 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1389 //TODO: Check amt_to_forward and outgoing_cltv_value are within acceptable ranges!
1391 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1392 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1393 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1394 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1395 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1396 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1397 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1401 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1402 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1404 if pending_forward_info.onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1405 let forwarding_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&pending_forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1407 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1409 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1411 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1412 if !chan.is_live() {
1413 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap();
1414 return_err!("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x4000 | 7, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1418 let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
1420 // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
1421 // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
1422 // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
1423 // we send permanent_node_failure.
1424 match &claimable_htlcs_entry {
1425 &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) => {
1426 let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
1428 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1429 acceptable_cycle = pending_forward_info.short_channel_id == 0;
1433 if !acceptable_cycle {
1434 return_err!("Payment looped through us twice", 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1440 let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1442 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1443 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1445 if !chan.is_usable() {
1446 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", msg: None});
1448 let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
1449 pending_forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1450 (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
1452 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}), //TODO: panic?
1455 match claimable_htlcs_entry {
1456 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
1457 let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
1458 let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route {
1459 &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1460 (route.clone(), session_priv.clone())
1462 _ => { panic!("WAT") },
1464 *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
1465 source_short_channel_id,
1466 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1471 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1472 e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
1473 source_short_channel_id,
1474 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1482 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1483 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1484 // Claim funds first, cause we don't really care if the channel we received the message on
1485 // is broken, we may have enough info to get our own money!
1486 self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false);
1489 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1490 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1492 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1493 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1495 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)?
1497 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1500 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1506 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
1507 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1508 let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1510 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1511 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1513 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1515 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1518 if let Some(pending_htlc) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.get(&payment_hash) {
1519 match pending_htlc {
1520 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1521 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1522 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1524 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1525 if res.is_some() { return; }
1527 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1529 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1530 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1531 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1532 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1533 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1535 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::decode(&packet_decrypted) {
1536 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1537 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1539 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1540 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1541 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1542 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1543 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1544 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1545 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1546 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1547 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1548 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1549 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1550 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1551 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::decode(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len]) {
1552 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1560 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1561 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1562 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1563 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1566 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1581 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1582 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1583 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1585 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1586 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1588 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1590 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1594 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
1595 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1596 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1597 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1599 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1600 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1602 chan.commitment_signed(&msg)?
1604 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1607 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1611 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1614 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
1615 let (res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor) = {
1616 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1617 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1619 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1620 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1622 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)?
1624 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1627 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1630 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1631 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failure.0, failure.1);
1634 let mut forward_event = None;
1635 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1636 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1637 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1638 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1639 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1641 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1642 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1643 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1644 entry.get_mut().push(forward_info);
1646 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1647 entry.insert(vec!(forward_info));
1652 match forward_event {
1654 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1655 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1656 time_forwardable: time
1665 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1666 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1667 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1669 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1670 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1672 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)
1674 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1678 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1679 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1680 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1681 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1683 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1684 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1686 if !chan.is_usable() {
1687 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", msg: None });
1690 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1691 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
1693 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1694 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1695 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }));
1696 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }));
1698 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
1700 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1701 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1702 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1703 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1704 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1705 contents: announcement,
1706 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1708 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1711 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1712 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1716 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
1717 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1718 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1719 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1720 if no_connection_possible {
1721 channel_state.by_id.retain(move |_, chan| {
1722 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1723 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1724 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1726 let txn_to_broadcast = chan.force_shutdown();
1727 for tx in txn_to_broadcast {
1728 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1736 for chan in channel_state.by_id {
1737 if chan.1.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1738 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). Also
1739 //fail and wipe any uncommitted outbound HTLCs as those are considered after
1749 use chain::chaininterface;
1750 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
1751 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
1753 use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
1754 use util::test_utils;
1755 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1757 use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
1758 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
1759 use bitcoin::util::uint::Uint256;
1760 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
1761 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
1762 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1763 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
1764 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
1766 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
1767 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
1769 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
1770 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1772 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1774 use std::collections::HashMap;
1775 use std::default::Default;
1776 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
1777 use std::time::Instant;
1780 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
1781 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
1782 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1787 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1788 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1791 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1792 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1795 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1796 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1799 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1800 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1803 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1804 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1809 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1811 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
1812 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
1817 fn onion_vectors() {
1818 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
1819 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1821 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
1822 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
1823 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
1824 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex_bytes("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
1825 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex_bytes("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
1827 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
1828 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
1829 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
1830 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex_bytes("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
1831 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex_bytes("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
1833 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
1834 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
1835 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
1836 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex_bytes("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
1837 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex_bytes("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
1839 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
1840 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
1841 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
1842 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex_bytes("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
1843 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex_bytes("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
1845 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
1846 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
1847 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
1848 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex_bytes("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
1849 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex_bytes("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
1851 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
1852 let payloads = vec!(
1853 msgs::OnionHopData {
1855 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1856 short_channel_id: 0,
1858 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1862 msgs::OnionHopData {
1864 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1865 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
1866 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
1867 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1871 msgs::OnionHopData {
1873 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1874 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
1875 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
1876 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1880 msgs::OnionHopData {
1882 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1883 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
1884 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
1885 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1889 msgs::OnionHopData {
1891 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1892 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
1893 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
1894 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1900 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, hex_bytes("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()).unwrap();
1901 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
1903 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1907 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
1908 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
1910 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1911 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
1912 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1914 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
1915 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1917 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
1918 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1920 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
1921 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1923 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
1924 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1926 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
1927 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1930 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
1931 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
1932 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
1934 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
1935 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
1940 feeest: Arc<test_utils::TestFeeEstimator>,
1941 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
1942 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
1943 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
1945 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
1949 static mut CHAN_COUNT: u32 = 0;
1950 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Uint256, Transaction) {
1951 let open_chan = node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42).unwrap();
1952 let accept_chan = node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan).unwrap();
1953 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
1955 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
1959 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1960 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
1962 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
1963 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
1964 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1966 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
1967 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
1969 funding_output = (Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
1971 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output.clone());
1972 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
1973 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
1974 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
1975 added_monitors.clear();
1977 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1980 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1981 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
1982 let funding_signed = match events_2[0] {
1983 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
1984 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
1985 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
1986 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
1987 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
1988 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
1989 added_monitors.clear();
1992 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1995 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
1997 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
1998 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
1999 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2000 added_monitors.clear();
2003 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2004 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2006 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2007 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2008 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2010 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2013 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2014 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2015 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2017 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2018 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2019 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2020 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2022 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2027 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2028 let events_5 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2029 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2030 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_5[0] {
2031 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2032 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2033 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2034 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2035 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2036 as_announcement_sigs
2038 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2041 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2042 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2043 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_6[0] {
2044 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2047 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2050 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2051 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2052 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2053 let bs_update = match events_7[0] {
2054 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2055 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2058 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2065 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2068 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Uint256, Transaction) {
2069 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2071 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2072 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2073 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2075 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2078 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &Uint256, funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) {
2079 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2080 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2083 let shutdown_a = node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2084 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2085 if !close_inbound_first {
2086 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2088 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2089 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2090 if close_inbound_first {
2091 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2092 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2093 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2094 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2096 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2097 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2098 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2099 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2101 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2102 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2103 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2105 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2106 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2107 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2108 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2110 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2111 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2112 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2113 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2118 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2119 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2122 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2124 Event::SendHTLCs { node_id, msgs, commitment_msg } => {
2125 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: msgs, commitment_msg: commitment_msg }
2127 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2132 static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0;
2133 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2134 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2135 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2136 let our_payment_hash = {
2137 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2138 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2139 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2140 sha.result(&mut ret);
2144 let mut payment_event = {
2145 let msgs = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap().unwrap();
2147 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2148 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2149 added_monitors.clear();
2152 node_id: expected_route[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
2154 commitment_msg: msgs.1,
2157 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2159 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2160 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2162 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2164 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2165 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2168 let revoke_and_ack = node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
2170 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2171 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2172 added_monitors.clear();
2174 assert!(prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2175 let prev_revoke_and_ack = prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2177 let mut added_monitors = prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2178 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2179 added_monitors.clear();
2181 assert!(node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &prev_revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2182 assert!(prev_revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2184 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2185 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2186 added_monitors.clear();
2189 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2190 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2192 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2193 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2196 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2197 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forward();
2199 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2200 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2201 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2203 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2204 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2205 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2207 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2211 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2212 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2213 added_monitors.clear();
2215 for event in events_2.drain(..) {
2216 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(event);
2218 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2224 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2227 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2228 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2230 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2231 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2232 added_monitors.clear();
2235 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2236 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2237 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2239 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2241 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2243 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2245 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2246 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2248 added_monitors.clear();
2250 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2252 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2253 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2254 added_monitors.clear();
2256 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2257 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2258 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2260 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2261 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2262 added_monitors.clear();
2264 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2266 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2267 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2268 added_monitors.clear();
2274 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2275 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2276 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2277 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2278 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2279 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2282 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2283 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2285 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2286 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2287 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2289 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2295 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2296 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2298 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2299 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2301 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2302 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2304 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2308 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2310 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2311 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2312 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2313 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2314 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2317 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2320 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2321 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2322 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2323 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2324 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2327 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2328 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2329 let our_payment_hash = {
2330 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2331 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2332 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2333 sha.result(&mut ret);
2337 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2338 assert_eq!(err.err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight");
2341 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2342 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2343 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2346 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2347 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2349 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2350 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2351 added_monitors.clear();
2354 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2355 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2356 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2358 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2359 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2362 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2363 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2364 added_monitors.clear();
2366 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2368 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2369 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2370 added_monitors.clear();
2372 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2374 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2375 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2376 added_monitors.clear();
2378 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2379 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2380 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2382 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2384 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2386 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2387 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2389 added_monitors.clear();
2395 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2396 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2397 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2398 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2399 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2400 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2403 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2404 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2406 Event::SendFailHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2407 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2408 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2410 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2416 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2417 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2419 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2420 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2422 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2423 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2425 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2429 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2430 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2431 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2432 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2434 for _ in 0..node_count {
2435 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
2436 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
2437 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2438 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
2440 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2441 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2442 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2444 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()).unwrap();
2445 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id).unwrap());
2446 nodes.push(Node { feeest, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node_id, node, router });
2453 fn fake_network_test() {
2454 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2455 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
2456 let nodes = create_network(4);
2458 // Create some initial channels
2459 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2460 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2461 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2463 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2464 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2465 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2466 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2467 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2469 // Send some more payments
2470 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2471 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
2472 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
2474 // Test failure packets
2475 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
2476 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
2478 // Add a new channel that skips 3
2479 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2481 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2482 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2483 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2484 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2485 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2486 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2487 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2489 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
2490 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2491 hops.push(RouteHop {
2492 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2493 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2495 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2497 hops.push(RouteHop {
2498 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2499 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2501 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2503 hops.push(RouteHop {
2504 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2505 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2507 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2509 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2510 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2511 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
2513 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2514 hops.push(RouteHop {
2515 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2516 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2518 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2520 hops.push(RouteHop {
2521 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2522 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2524 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2526 hops.push(RouteHop {
2527 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2528 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2530 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2532 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2533 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2534 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
2536 // Claim the rebalances...
2537 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
2538 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2540 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
2541 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2543 // Send some payments across both channels
2544 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2545 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2546 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2548 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
2550 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
2552 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2553 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2554 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
2556 // Close down the channels...
2557 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
2558 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
2559 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
2560 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
2561 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
2563 // Check that we processed all pending events
2565 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2566 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2570 #[derive(PartialEq)]
2571 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
2572 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Uint256, Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2573 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2574 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
2576 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2578 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
2579 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
2581 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2582 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == chan.3.txid() {
2583 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2584 funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
2585 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2586 res.push(tx.clone());
2590 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
2592 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
2593 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2594 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == res[0].txid() {
2595 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2596 funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
2597 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2598 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
2599 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
2601 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
2603 res.push(tx.clone());
2607 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
2613 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2614 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2616 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
2617 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2618 let mut found_prev = false;
2620 for tx in prev_txn {
2621 if node_txn[0].input[0].prev_hash == tx.txid() {
2622 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2623 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
2624 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2626 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
2627 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
2633 assert!(found_prev);
2635 let mut res = Vec::new();
2636 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
2641 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2642 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2643 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2644 let nodes = create_network(5);
2646 // Create some initial channels
2647 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2648 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2649 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2650 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2652 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2653 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2654 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2655 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2656 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2658 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2659 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2661 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2662 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2663 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0]; 1], &[4; 1]);
2664 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2666 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2667 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2669 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2670 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2672 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
2673 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2675 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2676 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2677 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0]; 1], &[4; 1]);
2678 assert_eq!(nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2680 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2681 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2683 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2684 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2686 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2688 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2689 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2690 added_monitors.clear();
2693 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2694 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2696 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, .. } => {
2697 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2699 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2705 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2706 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2707 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2709 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2711 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2712 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2714 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2715 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0]; 1], &[4; 1]);
2717 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2719 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2720 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2722 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2723 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2726 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2727 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2728 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5 {
2729 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2730 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2733 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2735 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2736 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2738 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2739 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2740 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5 {
2741 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2742 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2745 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2747 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2748 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5, &[&node_txn[0]; 1], &[4; 1]);
2750 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2752 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2753 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2755 // TODO: Need to reenable this when we fix local route tracking
2756 // Create some new channels:
2757 /*let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2759 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2760 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2761 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2762 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
2763 // Revoke the old state
2764 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2767 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2768 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &vec![&revoked_local_txn[0]; 1], &[4; 1]);
2770 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2771 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2772 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2774 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2775 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2776 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2780 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &vec![&revoked_local_txn[0]; 1], &[4; 0]);
2781 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2782 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2783 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[1]; 1], &[4; 1]);
2785 //TODO: At this point nodes[1] should claim the revoked HTLC-Timeout output, but that's
2786 //not yet implemented in ChannelMonitor
2788 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2789 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2790 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);*/
2792 // Check that we processed all pending events
2794 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2795 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);