git.bitcoin.ninja Git - rust-lightning/blob - src/ln/channelmanager.rs

   1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
   2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
   3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
   4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
   5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
   6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
   7
   8 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
   9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
  10 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
  11 use secp256k1;
  12
  13 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
  14 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  15 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
  16 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
  17 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
  18 use ln::msgs;
  19 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable};
  20 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
  21 use util::sha2::Sha256;
  22 use util::ser::Readable;
  23 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
  24 use util::logger::Logger;
  25 use util::errors::APIError;
  26
  27 use crypto;
  28 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
  29 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
  30 use crypto::digest::Digest;
  31 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
  32
  33 use std::{ptr, mem};
  34 use std::collections::HashMap;
  35 use std::collections::hash_map;
  36 use std::io::Cursor;
  37 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
  38 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
  39 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
  40
  41 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
  42 ///
  43 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
  44 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
  45 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
  46 ///
  47 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
  48 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
  49 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
  50 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
  51 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
  52 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
  53 mod channel_held_info {
  54         use ln::msgs;
  55         use ln::router::Route;
  56         use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
  57         use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
  58
  59         /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
  60         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  61         pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
  62                 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
  63                 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
  64                 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
  65                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
  66                 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
  67                 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
  68         }
  69
  70         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  71         pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
  72                 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
  73                 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
  74         }
  75
  76         /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
  77         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  78         pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
  79                 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
  80                 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
  81         }
  82
  83         #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
  84         impl PendingHTLCStatus {
  85                 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
  86                         let secp_ctx = ::secp256k1::Secp256k1::signing_only();
  87                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
  88                                 onion_packet: None,
  89                                 incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret::new(&secp_ctx,
  90                                                 &::secp256k1::key::PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[1; 32]).unwrap()),
  91                                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[1; 32]).unwrap()),
  92                                 payment_hash: [0; 32],
  93                                 short_channel_id: 0,
  94                                 amt_to_forward: 0,
  95                                 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
  96                         })
  97                 }
  98         }
  99
 100         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
 101         #[derive(Clone)]
 102         pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
 103                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
 104                 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
 105                 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
 106         }
 107
 108         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
 109         #[derive(Clone)]
 110         pub enum HTLCSource {
 111                 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
 112                 OutboundRoute {
 113                         route: Route,
 114                         session_priv: SecretKey,
 115                 },
 116         }
 117         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 118         impl HTLCSource {
 119                 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
 120                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
 121                                 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
 122                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
 123                         }
 124                 }
 125         }
 126
 127         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
 128         pub enum HTLCFailReason {
 129                 ErrorPacket {
 130                         err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 131                 },
 132                 Reason {
 133                         failure_code: u16,
 134                         data: Vec<u8>,
 135                 }
 136         }
 137
 138         #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
 139         impl HTLCFailReason {
 140                 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
 141                         HTLCFailReason::Reason {
 142                                 failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(),
 143                         }
 144                 }
 145         }
 146 }
 147 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
 148 pub use self::channel_held_info::*;
 149 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 150 pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*;
 151
 152 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
 153         err: msgs::HandleError,
 154         needs_channel_force_close: bool,
 155 }
 156 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
 157         #[inline]
 158         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 159                 Self {
 160                         err: HandleError {
 161                                 err,
 162                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 163                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 164                                                 channel_id,
 165                                                 data: err.to_string()
 166                                         },
 167                                 }),
 168                         },
 169                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
 170                 }
 171         }
 172         #[inline]
 173         fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 174                 Self {
 175                         err: HandleError {
 176                                 err,
 177                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 178                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 179                                                 channel_id,
 180                                                 data: err.to_string()
 181                                         },
 182                                 }),
 183                         },
 184                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
 185                 }
 186         }
 187         #[inline]
 188         fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
 189                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
 190         }
 191         #[inline]
 192         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
 193                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
 194         }
 195 }
 196
 197 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
 198 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
 199 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
 200 /// probably increase this significantly.
 201 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
 202
 203 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
 204         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
 205         prev_htlc_id: u64,
 206         forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
 207 }
 208
 209 struct ChannelHolder {
 210         by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
 211         short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
 212         next_forward: Instant,
 213         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
 214         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
 215         /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
 216         /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
 217         forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
 218         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
 219         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
 220         /// go to read them!
 221         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
 222 }
 223 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
 224         by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
 225         short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
 226         next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
 227         forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
 228         claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
 229 }
 230 impl ChannelHolder {
 231         fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
 232                 MutChannelHolder {
 233                         by_id: &mut self.by_id,
 234                         short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
 235                         next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
 236                         forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
 237                         claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
 238                 }
 239         }
 240 }
 241
 242 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
 243 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
 244
 245 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
 246 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
 247 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
 248 /// to individual Channels.
 249 pub struct ChannelManager {
 250         genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
 251         fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
 252         monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
 253         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
 254         tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
 255
 256         announce_channels_publicly: bool,
 257         fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
 258         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
 259         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 260
 261         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
 262         our_network_key: SecretKey,
 263
 264         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
 265
 266         logger: Arc<Logger>,
 267 }
 268
 269 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
 270
 271 macro_rules! secp_call {
 272         ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
 273                 match $res {
 274                         Ok(key) => key,
 275                         Err(_) => return Err($err),
 276                 }
 277         };
 278 }
 279
 280 struct OnionKeys {
 281         #[cfg(test)]
 282         shared_secret: SharedSecret,
 283         #[cfg(test)]
 284         blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
 285         ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
 286         rho: [u8; 32],
 287         mu: [u8; 32],
 288 }
 289
 290 pub struct ChannelDetails {
 291         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
 292         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
 293         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
 294         /// lifetime of the channel.
 295         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
 296         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
 297         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
 298         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 299         pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
 300         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 301         /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
 302         pub user_id: u64,
 303 }
 304
 305 impl ChannelManager {
 306         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
 307         /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
 308         /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
 309         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
 310         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
 311         pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
 312                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 313
 314                 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
 315                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
 316                         fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
 317                         monitor: monitor.clone(),
 318                         chain_monitor,
 319                         tx_broadcaster,
 320
 321                         announce_channels_publicly,
 322                         fee_proportional_millionths,
 323                         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
 324                         secp_ctx,
 325
 326                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
 327                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
 328                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
 329                                 next_forward: Instant::now(),
 330                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
 331                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
 332                         }),
 333                         our_network_key,
 334
 335                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
 336
 337                         logger,
 338                 });
 339                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
 340                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
 341                 Ok(res)
 342         }
 343
 344         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
 345         /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
 346         /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
 347         /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
 348         /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
 349         /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
 350         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
 351         /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
 352         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
 353                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
 354                         ChannelKeys {
 355                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 356                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 357                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 358                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 359                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 360                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 361                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 362                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
 363                         }
 364                 } else {
 365                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
 366                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
 367                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
 368                                 Ok(key) => key,
 369                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
 370                         }
 371                 };
 372
 373                 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
 374                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
 375                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 376                 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
 377                         Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
 378                         None => {}
 379                 }
 380
 381                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 382                 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
 383                         node_id: their_network_key,
 384                         msg: res,
 385                 });
 386                 Ok(())
 387         }
 388
 389         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
 390         /// more information.
 391         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
 392                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 393                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
 394                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
 395                         res.push(ChannelDetails {
 396                                 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
 397                                 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
 398                                 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
 399                                 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
 400                                 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
 401                         });
 402                 }
 403                 res
 404         }
 405
 406         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
 407         /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
 408         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
 409                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 410                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
 411                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
 412                         if channel.is_usable() {
 413                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
 414                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
 415                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
 416                                         remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
 417                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
 418                                         user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
 419                                 });
 420                         }
 421                 }
 422                 res
 423         }
 424
 425         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
 426         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
 427         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
 428         /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
 429         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 430                 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
 431                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 432                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 433                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
 434                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
 435                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
 436                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
 437                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
 438                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
 439                                                 }
 440                                                 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
 441                                         } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
 442                                 },
 443                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
 444                         }
 445                 };
 446                 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
 447                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
 448                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
 449                 }
 450                 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
 451                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
 452                                 Some(update)
 453                         } else { None }
 454                 } else { None };
 455
 456                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 457                 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
 458                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
 459                                 msg: update
 460                         });
 461                 }
 462                 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
 463                         node_id,
 464                         msg: res.0
 465                 });
 466
 467                 Ok(())
 468         }
 469
 470         #[inline]
 471         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
 472                 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
 473                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
 474                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
 475                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
 476                 }
 477                 for tx in local_txn {
 478                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
 479                 }
 480                 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
 481                 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
 482                 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
 483                 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
 484                 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
 485                 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
 486                 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
 487         }
 488
 489         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
 490         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
 491         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
 492                 let mut chan = {
 493                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 494                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 495                         if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
 496                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
 497                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
 498                                 }
 499                                 chan
 500                         } else {
 501                                 return;
 502                         }
 503                 };
 504                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
 505                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 506                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
 507                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
 508                                 msg: update
 509                         });
 510                 }
 511         }
 512
 513         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
 514         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
 515         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
 516                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
 517                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
 518                 }
 519         }
 520
 521         #[inline]
 522         fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
 523                 ({
 524                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
 525                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 526                         let mut res = [0; 32];
 527                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 528                         res
 529                 },
 530                 {
 531                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
 532                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 533                         let mut res = [0; 32];
 534                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 535                         res
 536                 })
 537         }
 538
 539         #[inline]
 540         fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
 541                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
 542                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 543                 let mut res = [0; 32];
 544                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 545                 res
 546         }
 547
 548         #[inline]
 549         fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
 550                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
 551                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 552                 let mut res = [0; 32];
 553                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 554                 res
 555         }
 556
 557         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
 558         #[inline]
 559         fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
 560                 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
 561                 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
 562
 563                 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
 564                         let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
 565
 566                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 567                         sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
 568                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 569                         let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
 570                         sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
 571
 572                         let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
 573
 574                         blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
 575                         blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
 576
 577                         callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
 578                 }
 579
 580                 Ok(())
 581         }
 582
 583         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
 584         fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
 585                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
 586
 587                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
 588                         let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 589
 590                         res.push(OnionKeys {
 591                                 #[cfg(test)]
 592                                 shared_secret,
 593                                 #[cfg(test)]
 594                                 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
 595                                 ephemeral_pubkey,
 596                                 rho,
 597                                 mu,
 598                         });
 599                 })?;
 600
 601                 Ok(res)
 602         }
 603
 604         /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
 605         fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
 606                 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
 607                 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
 608                 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
 609                 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
 610                 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
 611                 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
 612
 613                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
 614                         // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
 615                         // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
 616                         // the intended recipient).
 617                         let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
 618                         let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
 619                         res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
 620                                 realm: 0,
 621                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
 622                                         short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
 623                                         amt_to_forward: value_msat,
 624                                         outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
 625                                 },
 626                                 hmac: [0; 32],
 627                         };
 628                         cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
 629                         if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
 630                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
 631                         }
 632                         cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
 633                         if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
 634                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
 635                         }
 636                         last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
 637                 }
 638                 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
 639         }
 640
 641         #[inline]
 642         fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
 643                 unsafe {
 644                         ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
 645                 }
 646                 for i in 0..65 {
 647                         arr[i] = 0;
 648                 }
 649         }
 650
 651         #[inline]
 652         fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
 653                 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
 654
 655                 for i in 0..dst.len() {
 656                         dst[i] ^= src[i];
 657                 }
 658         }
 659
 660         const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
 661         fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
 662                 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
 663                 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
 664
 665                 let filler = {
 666                         let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
 667                         let end_len = iters * 65;
 668                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
 669                         res.resize(end_len, 0);
 670
 671                         for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
 672                                 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
 673                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 674                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
 675                                 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
 676                         }
 677                         res
 678                 };
 679
 680                 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
 681                 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
 682
 683                 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
 684                         ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
 685                         payload.hmac = hmac_res;
 686                         packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
 687
 688                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 689                         chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
 690                         packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
 691
 692                         if i == 0 {
 693                                 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
 694                         }
 695
 696                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
 697                         hmac.input(&packet_data);
 698                         hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
 699                         hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
 700                 }
 701
 702                 msgs::OnionPacket{
 703                         version: 0,
 704                         public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
 705                         hop_data: packet_data,
 706                         hmac: hmac_res,
 707                 }
 708         }
 709
 710         /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
 711         /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
 712         fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 713                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 714
 715                 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
 716                 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
 717                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
 718                 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
 719                 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 720                         data: packet_crypted,
 721                 }
 722         }
 723
 724         fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
 725                 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
 726
 727                 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 728
 729                 let failuremsg = {
 730                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
 731                         res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
 732                         res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
 733                         res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
 734                         res
 735                 };
 736                 let pad = {
 737                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
 738                         res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
 739                         res
 740                 };
 741                 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
 742                         hmac: [0; 32],
 743                         failuremsg: failuremsg,
 744                         pad: pad,
 745                 };
 746
 747                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
 748                 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
 749                 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
 750
 751                 packet
 752         }
 753
 754         #[inline]
 755         fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 756                 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
 757                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
 758         }
 759
 760         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
 761                 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
 762                         () => {
 763                                 {
 764                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 765                                         sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
 766                                         let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
 767                                         sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
 768                                         onion_hash
 769                                 }
 770                         }
 771                 }
 772
 773                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
 774                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
 775                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
 776                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 777                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 778                                 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
 779                                 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
 780                         })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 781                 }
 782
 783                 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
 784                 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 785
 786                 let mut channel_state = None;
 787                 macro_rules! return_err {
 788                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
 789                                 {
 790                                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
 791                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
 792                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 793                                         }
 794                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
 795                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 796                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 797                                                 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
 798                                         })), channel_state.unwrap());
 799                                 }
 800                         }
 801                 }
 802
 803                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
 804                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
 805                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
 806                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
 807                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
 808                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
 809                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
 810                         return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
 811                 }
 812
 813                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
 814                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
 815                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
 816                 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
 817                         return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
 818                 }
 819
 820                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 821                 let next_hop_data = {
 822                         let mut decoded = [0; 65];
 823                         chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
 824                         match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
 825                                 Err(err) => {
 826                                         let error_code = match err {
 827                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
 828                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
 829                                         };
 830                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
 831                                 },
 832                                 Ok(msg) => msg
 833                         }
 834                 };
 835
 836                 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
 837
 838                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
 839                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
 840                                 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
 841                                         return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
 842                                 }
 843                                 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
 844                                         return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
 845                                 }
 846
 847                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
 848                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
 849                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
 850                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
 851
 852                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
 853                                         onion_packet: None,
 854                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
 855                                         short_channel_id: 0,
 856                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
 857                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
 858                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
 859                                 })
 860                         } else {
 861                                 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
 862                                 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
 863                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
 864
 865                                 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
 866
 867                                 let blinding_factor = {
 868                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 869                                         sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
 870                                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 871                                         let mut res = [0u8; 32];
 872                                         sha.result(&mut res);
 873                                         match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
 874                                                 Err(_) => {
 875                                                         return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
 876                                                 },
 877                                                 Ok(key) => key
 878                                         }
 879                                 };
 880
 881                                 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
 882                                         return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
 883                                 }
 884
 885                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
 886                                         version: 0,
 887                                         public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
 888                                         hop_data: new_packet_data,
 889                                         hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
 890                                 };
 891
 892                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
 893                                         onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
 894                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
 895                                         short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
 896                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
 897                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
 898                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
 899                                 })
 900                         };
 901
 902                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 903                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
 904                         if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
 905                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
 906                                 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
 907                                         None => {
 908                                                 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
 909                                         },
 910                                         Some(id) => id.clone(),
 911                                 };
 912                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
 913                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
 914                                         if !chan.is_live() {
 915                                                 Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 916                                         } else {
 917                                                 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
 918                                                 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
 919                                                         Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 920                                                 } else {
 921                                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
 922                                                                 Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 923                                                         } else {
 924                                                                 None
 925                                                         }
 926                                                 }
 927                                         }
 928                                 } {
 929                                         return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
 930                                 }
 931                         }
 932                 }
 933
 934                 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
 935         }
 936
 937         /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
 938         fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
 939                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
 940                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
 941                         Some(id) => id,
 942                 };
 943
 944                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
 945
 946                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
 947                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
 948                         short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
 949                         timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
 950                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
 951                         cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
 952                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
 953                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
 954                         fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
 955                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
 956                 };
 957
 958                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
 959                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
 960
 961                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
 962                         signature: sig,
 963                         contents: unsigned
 964                 })
 965         }
 966
 967         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
 968         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
 969         /// fields for more info.
 970         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
 971         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
 972         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
 973         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
 974         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
 975         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
 976         /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
 977         /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
 978         /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
 979         /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
 980         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
 981                 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
 982                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
 983                 }
 984                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
 985                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
 986                         if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
 987                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
 988                         }
 989                 }
 990
 991                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
 992                         let mut session_key = [0; 32];
 993                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
 994                         session_key
 995                 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
 996
 997                 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
 998
 999                 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1000                                 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1001                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1002                 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1003
1004                 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
1005                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1006                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1007
1008                         let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1009                                 None => return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1010                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1011                         };
1012
1013                         let res = {
1014                                 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1015                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1016                                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1017                                 }
1018                                 if !chan.is_live() {
1019                                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1020                                 }
1021                                 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1022                                         route: route.clone(),
1023                                         session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1024                                 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::RouteError{err: he.err})?
1025                         };
1026
1027                         let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1028
1029                         match res {
1030                                 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
1031                                 None => return Ok(()),
1032                         }
1033                 };
1034
1035                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1036                         unimplemented!();
1037                 }
1038
1039                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1040                 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1041                         node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1042                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1043                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1044                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1045                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1046                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1047                                 commitment_signed,
1048                         },
1049                 });
1050                 Ok(())
1051         }
1052
1053         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1054         /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1055         /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1056         /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1057         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1058
1059                 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1060                         ($event: expr) => {
1061                                 {
1062                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1063                                         pending_events.push($event);
1064                                 }
1065                         }
1066                 }
1067
1068                 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1069                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1070                         match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1071                                 Some(mut chan) => {
1072                                         match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1073                                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1074                                                         (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1075                                                 },
1076                                                 Err(e) => {
1077                                                         log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1078                                                         mem::drop(channel_state);
1079                                                         add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1080                                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1081                                                                 action: e.action,
1082                                                         });
1083                                                         return;
1084                                                 },
1085                                         }
1086                                 },
1087                                 None => return
1088                         }
1089                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1090                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1091                         unimplemented!();
1092                 }
1093                 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1094                         node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1095                         msg: msg,
1096                 });
1097
1098                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1099                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1100                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1101                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1102                         },
1103                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1104                                 e.insert(chan);
1105                         }
1106                 }
1107         }
1108
1109         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1110                 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1111
1112                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1113                         Ok(res) => res,
1114                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1115                 };
1116                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1117                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1118
1119                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1120                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1121                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1122                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
1123                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1124                 })
1125         }
1126
1127         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1128         /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1129         /// Will likely generate further events.
1130         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1131                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1132                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1133                 {
1134                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1135                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1136
1137                         if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1138                                 return;
1139                         }
1140
1141                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1142                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1143                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1144                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1145                                                 None => {
1146                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1147                                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1148                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1149                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1150                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1151                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1152                                                                 });
1153                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1154                                                         }
1155                                                         continue;
1156                                                 }
1157                                         };
1158                                         let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1159
1160                                         let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1161                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1162                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1163                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1164                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1165                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1166                                                 });
1167                                                 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1168                                                         Err(_e) => {
1169                                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1170                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1171                                                                 continue;
1172                                                         },
1173                                                         Ok(update_add) => {
1174                                                                 match update_add {
1175                                                                         Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1176                                                                         None => {
1177                                                                                 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1178                                                                                 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1179                                                                                 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1180                                                                                 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1181                                                                                 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1182                                                                                 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1183                                                                                 // this channel currently :/.
1184                                                                         }
1185                                                                 }
1186                                                         }
1187                                                 }
1188                                         }
1189
1190                                         if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1191                                                 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1192                                                         Ok(res) => res,
1193                                                         Err(e) => {
1194                                                                 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1195                                                                 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1196                                                                 } else {
1197                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1198                                                                 }
1199                                                                 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1200                                                                 continue;
1201                                                         },
1202                                                 };
1203                                                 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1204                                                         node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1205                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1206                                                                 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1207                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1208                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1209                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1210                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1211                                                         },
1212                                                 }));
1213                                         }
1214                                 } else {
1215                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1216                                                 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1217                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1218                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1219                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1220                                                 };
1221                                                 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1222                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1223                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1224                                                 };
1225                                                 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1226                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1227                                                         amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1228                                                 }));
1229                                         }
1230                                 }
1231                         }
1232                 }
1233
1234                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1235                         match update {
1236                                 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1237                                 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1238                         };
1239                 }
1240
1241                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1242
1243                 new_events.retain(|event| {
1244                         if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1245                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1246                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1247                                 }
1248                         }
1249                         true
1250                 });
1251
1252                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1253                 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1254                 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1255                         events.push(event.1);
1256                 }
1257         }
1258
1259         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1260         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1261                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1262                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1263                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1264                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1265                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1266                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1267                         }
1268                         true
1269                 } else { false }
1270         }
1271
1272         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1273         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1274         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1275         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1276         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1277         /// still-available channels.
1278         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1279                 match source {
1280                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1281                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1282
1283                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1284                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1285                                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1286                                 });
1287                         },
1288                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1289                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1290                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1291                                                 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1292                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1293                                         },
1294                                         HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1295                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1296                                         }
1297                                 };
1298
1299                                 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1300                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1301                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1302                                                 None => return
1303                                         };
1304
1305                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1306                                         match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1307                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1308                                                 Err(_e) => {
1309                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1310                                                         return;
1311                                                 },
1312                                         }
1313                                 };
1314
1315                                 match fail_msgs {
1316                                         Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1317                                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1318
1319                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1320                                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1321                                                 }
1322
1323                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1324                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1325                                                         node_id,
1326                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1327                                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1328                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1329                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1330                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1331                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1332                                                         },
1333                                                 });
1334                                         },
1335                                         None => {},
1336                                 }
1337                         },
1338                 }
1339         }
1340
1341         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1342         /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1343         /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1344         /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1345         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1346                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1347                 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1348                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1349                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1350
1351                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1352                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1353                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1354                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1355                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1356                                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1357                         }
1358                         true
1359                 } else { false }
1360         }
1361         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1362                 match source {
1363                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1364                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1365                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1366                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1367                                         payment_preimage
1368                                 });
1369                         },
1370                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1371                                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1372                                 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1373                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1374                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1375                                                 None => {
1376                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1377                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1378                                                         // why its missing.
1379                                                         return
1380                                                 }
1381                                         };
1382
1383                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1384                                         match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1385                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1386                                                 Err(_e) => {
1387                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1388                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1389                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1390                                                         return
1391                                                 },
1392                                         }
1393                                 };
1394
1395                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1396                                 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1397                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1398                                                 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1399                                         }
1400                                 }
1401
1402                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1403                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1404                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1405                                                 node_id: node_id,
1406                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1407                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1408                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1409                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1410                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1411                                                         commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1412                                                 }
1413                                         });
1414                                 }
1415                         },
1416                 }
1417         }
1418
1419         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1420         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1421                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1422         }
1423
1424         /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1425         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1426         /// operation.
1427         pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1428                 unimplemented!();
1429         }
1430
1431         fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1432                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1433                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1434                 }
1435                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1436                 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1437                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1438                 }
1439
1440                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1441                         ChannelKeys {
1442                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1443                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1444                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1445                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1446                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1447                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1448                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1449                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1450                         }
1451                 } else {
1452                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1453                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1454                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1455                                 Ok(key) => key,
1456                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1457                         }
1458                 };
1459
1460                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger)).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(e))?;
1461                 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1462                 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1463                 Ok(accept_msg)
1464         }
1465
1466         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1467                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1468                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1469                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1470                                 Some(chan) => {
1471                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1472                                                 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1473                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1474                                         }
1475                                         chan.accept_channel(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1476                                         (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1477                                 },
1478                                 //TODO: same as above
1479                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1480                         }
1481                 };
1482                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1483                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1484                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1485                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
1486                         output_script: output_script,
1487                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1488                 });
1489                 Ok(())
1490         }
1491
1492         fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1493                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1494                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1495                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1496                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1497                                         if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1498                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1499                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1500                                         }
1501                                         match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1502                                                 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1503                                                         (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1504                                                 },
1505                                                 Err(e) => {
1506                                                         return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1507                                                 }
1508                                         }
1509                                 },
1510                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1511                         }
1512                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1513                    // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1514                    // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1515                    // for a bogus channel.
1516                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1517                         unimplemented!();
1518                 }
1519                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1520                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1521                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1522                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1523                         },
1524                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1525                                 e.insert(chan);
1526                         }
1527                 }
1528                 Ok(funding_msg)
1529         }
1530
1531         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1532                 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1533                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1534                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1535                                 Some(chan) => {
1536                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1537                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1538                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1539                                         }
1540                                         let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1541                                         (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1542                                 },
1543                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1544                         }
1545                 };
1546                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1547                         unimplemented!();
1548                 }
1549                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1550                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1551                         funding_txo: funding_txo,
1552                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1553                 });
1554                 Ok(())
1555         }
1556
1557         fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1558                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1559                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1560                         Some(chan) => {
1561                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1562                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1563                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1564                                 }
1565                                 chan.funding_locked(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1566                                 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1567                         },
1568                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1569                 };
1570         }
1571
1572         fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1573                 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1574                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1575                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1576
1577                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1578                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1579                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1580                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1581                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1582                                         }
1583                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1584                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1585                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1586                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1587                                                 }
1588                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1589                                         } else { (res, None) }
1590                                 },
1591                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1592                         }
1593                 };
1594                 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1595                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1596                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1597                 }
1598                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1599                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1600                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1601                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1602                                         msg: update
1603                                 });
1604                         }
1605                 }
1606                 Ok((res.0, res.1))
1607         }
1608
1609         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1610                 let (res, chan_option) = {
1611                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1612                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1613                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1614                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1615                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1616                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1617                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1618                                         }
1619                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1620                                         if res.1.is_some() {
1621                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1622                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1623                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1624                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1625                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1626                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1627                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1628                                                 }
1629                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1630                                         } else { (res, None) }
1631                                 },
1632                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1633                         }
1634                 };
1635                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1636                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1637                 }
1638                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1639                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1640                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1641                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1642                                         msg: update
1643                                 });
1644                         }
1645                 }
1646                 Ok(res.0)
1647         }
1648
1649         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1650                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1651                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1652                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1653                 //
1654                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1655                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1656                 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1657                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1658
1659                 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1660                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1661
1662                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1663                         Some(chan) => {
1664                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1665                                         //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1666                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1667                                 }
1668                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
1669                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1670                                 }
1671                                 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1672                         },
1673                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1674                 }
1675         }
1676
1677         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1678                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1679                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1680                         Some(chan) => {
1681                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1682                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1683                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1684                                 }
1685                                 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?.clone()
1686                         },
1687                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1688                 };
1689                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1690                 Ok(())
1691         }
1692
1693         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1694                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1695                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1696                         Some(chan) => {
1697                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1698                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1699                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1700                                 }
1701                                 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1702                         },
1703                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1704                 }?;
1705
1706                 match htlc_source {
1707                         &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, .. } => {
1708                                 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1709                                 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1710                                 let mut res = None;
1711                                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1712                                         if res.is_some() { return; }
1713
1714                                         let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1715
1716                                         let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1717                                         decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1718                                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1719                                         chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1720                                         packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1721
1722                                         if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1723                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1724                                                         let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1725
1726                                                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1727                                                         hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1728                                                         let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1729                                                         hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1730                                                         if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1731                                                                 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1732                                                                 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1733                                                                 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1734                                                                         TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1735                                                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1736                                                                                         let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1737                                                                                         if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1738                                                                                                 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len])) {
1739                                                                                                         res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1740                                                                                                                 msg: chan_update,
1741                                                                                                         });
1742                                                                                                 }
1743                                                                                         }
1744                                                                                 }
1745                                                                         },
1746                                                                         UNKNOWN_CHAN => {
1747                                                                                 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1748                                                                                 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1749                                                                                 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1750                                                                                         short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1751                                                                                 });
1752                                                                         },
1753                                                                         _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1754                                                                 }
1755                                                         }
1756                                                 }
1757                                         }
1758                                 }).unwrap();
1759                                 Ok(res)
1760                         },
1761                         _ => { Ok(None) },
1762                 }
1763         }
1764
1765         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1766                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1767                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1768                         Some(chan) => {
1769                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1770                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1771                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1772                                 }
1773                                 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1774                                 Ok(())
1775                         },
1776                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1777                 }
1778         }
1779
1780         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1781                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1782                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1783                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1784                                 Some(chan) => {
1785                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1786                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1787                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1788                                         }
1789                                         chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?
1790                                 },
1791                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1792                         }
1793                 };
1794                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1795                         unimplemented!();
1796                 }
1797
1798                 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1799         }
1800
1801         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1802                 let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor), short_channel_id) = {
1803                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1804                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1805                                 Some(chan) => {
1806                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1807                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1808                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1809                                         }
1810                                         (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
1811                                 },
1812                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1813                         }
1814                 };
1815                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1816                         unimplemented!();
1817                 }
1818                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1819                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1820                 }
1821
1822                 let mut forward_event = None;
1823                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1824                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1825                         if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1826                                 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1827                                 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1828                         }
1829                         for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1830                                 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1831                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1832                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
1833                                         },
1834                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1835                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
1836                                         }
1837                                 }
1838                         }
1839                 }
1840                 match forward_event {
1841                         Some(time) => {
1842                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1843                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1844                                         time_forwardable: time
1845                                 });
1846                         }
1847                         None => {},
1848                 }
1849
1850                 Ok(res)
1851         }
1852
1853         fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1854                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1855                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1856                         Some(chan) => {
1857                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1858                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1859                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1860                                 }
1861                                 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1862                         },
1863                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1864                 }
1865         }
1866
1867         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1868                 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1869                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1870                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1871                                 Some(chan) => {
1872                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1873                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1874                                         }
1875                                         if !chan.is_usable() {
1876                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1877                                         }
1878
1879                                         let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1880                                         let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
1881                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1882
1883                                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1884                                         let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1885                                         let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
1886                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1887                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1888
1889                                         let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1890
1891                                         (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1892                                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1893                                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1894                                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1895                                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1896                                                 contents: announcement,
1897                                         }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1898                                 },
1899                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1900                         }
1901                 };
1902                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1903                 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1904                 Ok(())
1905         }
1906
1907         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1908                 let (res, chan_monitor) = {
1909                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1910                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1911                                 Some(chan) => {
1912                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1913                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1914                                         }
1915                                         let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1916                                         (Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update)), channel_monitor)
1917                                 },
1918                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1919                         }
1920                 };
1921                 if let Some(monitor) = chan_monitor {
1922                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1923                                 unimplemented!();
1924                         }
1925                 }
1926                 res
1927         }
1928 }
1929
1930 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1931         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1932                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1933                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1934                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1935                 ret
1936         }
1937 }
1938
1939 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1940         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1941                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1942                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1943                 {
1944                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1945                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1946                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1947                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1948                                 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
1949                                 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
1950                                         let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
1951                                         new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1952                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1953                                                 msg: funding_locked,
1954                                                 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1955                                         });
1956                                         short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1957                                 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
1958                                         new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
1959                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1960                                                 action: e.action,
1961                                         });
1962                                         if channel.is_shutdown() {
1963                                                 return false;
1964                                         }
1965                                 }
1966                                 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1967                                         for tx in txn_matched {
1968                                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1969                                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
1970                                                                 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1971                                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1972                                                                 }
1973                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
1974                                                                 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
1975                                                                 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
1976                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1977                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1978                                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1979                                                                                 msg: update
1980                                                                         });
1981                                                                 }
1982                                                                 return false;
1983                                                         }
1984                                                 }
1985                                         }
1986                                 }
1987                                 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1988                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1989                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1990                                         }
1991                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1992                                         // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
1993                                         // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
1994                                         // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
1995                                         failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
1996                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1997                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1998                                                         msg: update
1999                                                 });
2000                                         }
2001                                         return false;
2002                                 }
2003                                 true
2004                         });
2005                 }
2006                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2007                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2008                 }
2009                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2010                 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2011                         pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2012                 }
2013                 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2014         }
2015
2016         /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2017         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2018                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2019                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2020                 {
2021                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2022                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2023                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2024                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_,  v| {
2025                                 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2026                                         if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2027                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2028                                         }
2029                                         failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2030                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2031                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2032                                                         msg: update
2033                                                 });
2034                                         }
2035                                         false
2036                                 } else {
2037                                         true
2038                                 }
2039                         });
2040                 }
2041                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2042                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2043                 }
2044                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2045                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2046                         for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2047                                 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2048                         }
2049                 }
2050                 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2051         }
2052 }
2053
2054 macro_rules! handle_error {
2055         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2056                 match $internal {
2057                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2058                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2059                                 if needs_channel_force_close {
2060                                         match &err.action {
2061                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2062                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2063                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2064                                                         } else {
2065                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2066                                                         }
2067                                                 },
2068                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2069                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2070                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2071                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2072                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2073                                                         } else {
2074                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2075                                                         }
2076                                                 },
2077                                                 &None => {},
2078                                         }
2079                                 }
2080                                 Err(err)
2081                         },
2082                 }
2083         }
2084 }
2085
2086 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2087         //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2088         fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2089                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2090         }
2091
2092         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2093                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2094         }
2095
2096         fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2097                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2098         }
2099
2100         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2101                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2102         }
2103
2104         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2105                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2106         }
2107
2108         fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2109                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2110         }
2111
2112         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2113                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2114         }
2115
2116         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2117                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2118         }
2119
2120         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2121                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2122         }
2123
2124         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
2125                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2126         }
2127
2128         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2129                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2130         }
2131
2132         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2133                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2134         }
2135
2136         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2137                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2138         }
2139
2140         fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2141                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2142         }
2143
2144         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2145                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2146         }
2147
2148         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), HandleError> {
2149                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2150         }
2151
2152         fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2153                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2154                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2155                 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2156                 {
2157                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2158                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2159                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2160                         if no_connection_possible {
2161                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2162                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2163                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2164                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2165                                                 }
2166                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2167                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2168                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2169                                                                 msg: update
2170                                                         });
2171                                                 }
2172                                                 false
2173                                         } else {
2174                                                 true
2175                                         }
2176                                 });
2177                         } else {
2178                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2179                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2180                                                 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2181                                                 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2182                                                 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2183                                                         let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2184                                                         failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2185                                                 }
2186                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2187                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2188                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2189                                                         }
2190                                                         return false;
2191                                                 }
2192                                         }
2193                                         true
2194                                 })
2195                         }
2196                 }
2197                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2198                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2199                 }
2200                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2201                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2202                         for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2203                                 pending_events.push(event);
2204                         }
2205                 }
2206                 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2207                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2208                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2209                         }
2210                 }
2211         }
2212
2213         fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2214                 let mut res = Vec::new();
2215                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2216                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2217                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2218                                 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2219                                         // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2220                                         // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2221                                         // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2222                                         // drop it.
2223                                         false
2224                                 } else {
2225                                         res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2226                                         true
2227                                 }
2228                         } else { true }
2229                 });
2230                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2231                 res
2232         }
2233
2234         fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2235                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2236                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
2237                                 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2238                                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2239                                 }
2240                         }
2241                 } else {
2242                         self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2243                 }
2244         }
2245 }
2246
2247 #[cfg(test)]
2248 mod tests {
2249         use chain::chaininterface;
2250         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2251         use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2252         use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2253         use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2254         use ln::msgs;
2255         use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2256         use util::test_utils;
2257         use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2258         use util::logger::Logger;
2259         use util::errors::APIError;
2260
2261         use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2262         use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2263         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2264         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2265         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2266         use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2267         use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2268
2269         use hex;
2270
2271         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2272         use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2273
2274         use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2275         use crypto::digest::Digest;
2276
2277         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2278
2279         use std::cell::RefCell;
2280         use std::collections::HashMap;
2281         use std::default::Default;
2282         use std::rc::Rc;
2283         use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2284         use std::time::Instant;
2285         use std::mem;
2286
2287         fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2288                 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2289                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2290
2291                 let route = Route {
2292                         hops: vec!(
2293                                         RouteHop {
2294                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2295                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2296                                         },
2297                                         RouteHop {
2298                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2299                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2300                                         },
2301                                         RouteHop {
2302                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2303                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2304                                         },
2305                                         RouteHop {
2306                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2307                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2308                                         },
2309                                         RouteHop {
2310                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2311                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2312                                         },
2313                         ),
2314                 };
2315
2316                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2317
2318                 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2319                 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2320                 onion_keys
2321         }
2322
2323         #[test]
2324         fn onion_vectors() {
2325                 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2326                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2327
2328                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2329                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2330                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2331                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2332                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2333
2334                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2335                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2336                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2337                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2338                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2339
2340                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2341                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2342                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2343                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2344                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2345
2346                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2347                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2348                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2349                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2350                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2351
2352                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2353                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2354                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2355                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2356                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2357
2358                 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2359                 let payloads = vec!(
2360                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2361                                 realm: 0,
2362                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2363                                         short_channel_id: 0,
2364                                         amt_to_forward: 0,
2365                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2366                                 },
2367                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2368                         },
2369                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2370                                 realm: 0,
2371                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2372                                         short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2373                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2374                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2375                                 },
2376                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2377                         },
2378                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2379                                 realm: 0,
2380                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2381                                         short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2382                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2383                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2384                                 },
2385                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2386                         },
2387                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2388                                 realm: 0,
2389                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2390                                         short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2391                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2392                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2393                                 },
2394                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2395                         },
2396                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2397                                 realm: 0,
2398                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2399                                         short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2400                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2401                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2402                                 },
2403                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2404                         },
2405                 );
2406
2407                 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2408                 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2409                 // anyway...
2410                 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2411         }
2412
2413         #[test]
2414         fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2415                 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2416
2417                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2418                 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2419                 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2420
2421                 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2422                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2423
2424                 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2425                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2426
2427                 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2428                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2429
2430                 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2431                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2432
2433                 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2434                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2435         }
2436
2437         fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2438                 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2439                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2440                 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2441                 for i in 2..100 {
2442                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2443                         chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2444                 }
2445         }
2446
2447         struct Node {
2448                 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2449                 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2450                 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2451                 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2452                 router: Router,
2453                 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2454                 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2455         }
2456         impl Drop for Node {
2457                 fn drop(&mut self) {
2458                         // Check that we processed all pending events
2459                         assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2460                         assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2461                 }
2462         }
2463
2464         fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2465                 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42).unwrap();
2466
2467                 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2468                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2469                 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2470                         Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2471                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2472                                 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2473                         },
2474                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2475                 };
2476
2477                 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2478
2479                 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2480                 let tx;
2481                 let funding_output;
2482
2483                 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2484                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2485                 match events_2[0] {
2486                         Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2487                                 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2488                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2489
2490                                 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2491                                         value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2492                                 }]};
2493                                 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2494
2495                                 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2496                                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2497                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2498                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2499                                 added_monitors.clear();
2500                         },
2501                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2502                 }
2503
2504                 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2505                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2506                 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2507                         Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2508                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2509                                 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2510                                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2511                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2512                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2513                                 added_monitors.clear();
2514                                 res
2515                         },
2516                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2517                 };
2518
2519                 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2520                 {
2521                         let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2522                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2523                         assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2524                         added_monitors.clear();
2525                 }
2526
2527                 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2528                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2529                 match events_4[0] {
2530                         Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2531                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2532                                 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2533                         },
2534                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2535                 };
2536
2537                 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2538                 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2539                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2540                 match events_5[0] {
2541                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2542                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2543                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2544                                 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2545                         },
2546                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2547                 };
2548
2549                 let channel_id;
2550
2551                 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2552                 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2553                 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2554                 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2555                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2556                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2557                                 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2558                                 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2559                                 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2560                                 as_announcement_sigs
2561                         },
2562                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2563                 };
2564
2565                 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2566                 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2567                 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2568                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2569                                 (msg, update_msg)
2570                         },
2571                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2572                 };
2573
2574                 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2575                 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2576                 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2577                 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2578                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2579                                 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2580                                 update_msg
2581                         },
2582                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2583                 };
2584
2585                 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2586
2587                 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2588         }
2589
2590         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2591                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2592                 for node in nodes {
2593                         assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2594                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2595                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2596                 }
2597                 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2598         }
2599
2600         fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2601                 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2602                 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2603                 let (tx_a, tx_b);
2604
2605                 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2606                 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2607                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2608                 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2609                         Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2610                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2611                                 msg.clone()
2612                         },
2613                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2614                 };
2615
2616                 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2617                 if !close_inbound_first {
2618                         assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2619                 }
2620                 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2621                 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2622                 if close_inbound_first {
2623                         assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2624                         closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2625                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2626                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2627
2628                         let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2629                         assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2630                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2631                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2632                 } else {
2633                         closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2634                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2635                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2636
2637                         let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2638                         assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2639                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2640                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2641                 }
2642                 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2643                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2644                 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2645                 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2646
2647                 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2648                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2649                 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2650                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2651                                 msg.clone()
2652                         },
2653                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2654                 };
2655
2656                 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2657                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2658                 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2659                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2660                                 msg.clone()
2661                         },
2662                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2663                 };
2664
2665                 (as_update, bs_update)
2666         }
2667
2668         struct SendEvent {
2669                 node_id: PublicKey,
2670                 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2671                 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2672         }
2673         impl SendEvent {
2674                 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2675                         match event {
2676                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, commitment_signed } } => {
2677                                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2678                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2679                                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2680                                         SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2681                                 },
2682                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2683                         }
2684                 }
2685         }
2686
2687         macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
2688                 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
2689                         {
2690                                 {
2691                                         let added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2692                                         assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
2693                                 }
2694                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
2695                                 {
2696                                         let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2697                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2698                                         added_monitors.clear();
2699                                 }
2700                                 {
2701                                         let added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2702                                         assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
2703                                 }
2704                                 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2705                                 {
2706                                         let mut added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2707                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2708                                         added_monitors.clear();
2709                                 }
2710                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
2711                                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
2712                                 {
2713                                         let mut added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2714                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2715                                         added_monitors.clear();
2716                                 }
2717                                 if $fail_backwards {
2718                                         assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2719                                 }
2720                                 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2721                                 {
2722                                         let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2723                                         if $fail_backwards {
2724                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2725                                                 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2726                                         } else {
2727                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2728                                         }
2729                                         added_monitors.clear();
2730                                 }
2731                         }
2732                 }
2733         }
2734
2735         fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2736                 let our_payment_preimage = [*origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2737                 *origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2738                 let our_payment_hash = {
2739                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2740                         sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2741                         let mut ret = [0; 32];
2742                         sha.result(&mut ret);
2743                         ret
2744                 };
2745
2746                 let mut payment_event = {
2747                         origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2748                         {
2749                                 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2750                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2751                                 added_monitors.clear();
2752                         }
2753
2754                         let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2755                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2756                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2757                 };
2758                 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2759
2760                 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2761                         assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2762
2763                         node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2764                         {
2765                                 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2766                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2767                         }
2768
2769                         commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
2770
2771                         let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2772                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2773                         match events_1[0] {
2774                                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2775                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2776                         };
2777
2778                         node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2779                         node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2780
2781                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2782                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2783                         if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2784                                 match events_2[0] {
2785                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2786                                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2787                                                 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2788                                         },
2789                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2790                                 }
2791                         } else {
2792                                 {
2793                                         let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2794                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2795                                         added_monitors.clear();
2796                                 }
2797                                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2798                                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2799                         }
2800
2801                         prev_node = node;
2802                 }
2803
2804                 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2805         }
2806
2807         fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2808                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2809                 {
2810                         let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2811                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2812                         added_monitors.clear();
2813                 }
2814
2815                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2816                 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2817                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2818                                 {
2819                                         $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2820                                         {
2821                                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2822                                                 if $last_node {
2823                                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2824                                                 } else {
2825                                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2826                                                 }
2827                                                 added_monitors.clear();
2828                                         }
2829                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
2830                                 }
2831                         }
2832                 }
2833
2834                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2835                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2836                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2837                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2838                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
2839                                 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2840                         }
2841
2842                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2843                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2844                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2845                                 match events[0] {
2846                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2847                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2848                                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2849                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2850                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2851                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2852                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2853                                         },
2854                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2855                                 }
2856                         } else {
2857                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
2858                         }
2859                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2860                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2861                         }
2862
2863                         prev_node = node;
2864                 }
2865
2866                 if !skip_last {
2867                         update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2868                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2869                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2870                         match events[0] {
2871                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2872                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2873                                 },
2874                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2875                         }
2876                 }
2877         }
2878
2879         fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2880                 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
2881         }
2882
2883         const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2884
2885         fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2886                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2887                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2888                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2889                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2890                 }
2891
2892                 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2893         }
2894
2895         fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2896                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2897                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2898                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2899                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2900                 }
2901
2902                 let our_payment_preimage = [*origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2903                 *origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2904                 let our_payment_hash = {
2905                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2906                         sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2907                         let mut ret = [0; 32];
2908                         sha.result(&mut ret);
2909                         ret
2910                 };
2911
2912                 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2913                 match err {
2914                         APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
2915                         _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
2916                 };
2917         }
2918
2919         fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2920                 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2921                 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2922         }
2923
2924         fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2925                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2926                 {
2927                         let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2928                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2929                         added_monitors.clear();
2930                 }
2931
2932                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2933                 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2934                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2935                                 {
2936                                         $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2937                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
2938                                 }
2939                         }
2940                 }
2941
2942                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2943                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2944                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2945                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2946                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
2947                                 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
2948                                 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
2949                                 // second-to-last node!
2950                                 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
2951                         }
2952
2953                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2954                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2955                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2956                                 match events[0] {
2957                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2958                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2959                                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2960                                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2961                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2962                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2963                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2964                                         },
2965                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2966                                 }
2967                         } else {
2968                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
2969                         }
2970                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2971                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2972                         }
2973
2974                         prev_node = node;
2975                 }
2976
2977                 if !skip_last {
2978                         update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2979
2980                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2981                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2982                         match events[0] {
2983                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2984                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2985                                 },
2986                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2987                         }
2988                 }
2989         }
2990
2991         fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2992                 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
2993         }
2994
2995         fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2996                 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2997                 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2998                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2999                 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3000
3001                 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3002                 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3003
3004                 for _ in 0..node_count {
3005                         let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3006                         let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3007                         let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3008                         let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3009                         let node_id = {
3010                                 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3011                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3012                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3013                         };
3014                         let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3015                         let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3016                         nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3017                                 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3018                                 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3019                         });
3020                 }
3021
3022                 nodes
3023         }
3024
3025         #[test]
3026         fn fake_network_test() {
3027                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3028                 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3029                 let nodes = create_network(4);
3030
3031                 // Create some initial channels
3032                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3033                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3034                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3035
3036                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3037                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3038                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3039                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3040                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3041
3042                 // Send some more payments
3043                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3044                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3045                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3046
3047                 // Test failure packets
3048                 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3049                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3050
3051                 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3052                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3053
3054                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3055                 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3056                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3057                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3058                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3059                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3060                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3061
3062                 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3063                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3064                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3065                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3066                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3067                         fee_msat: 0,
3068                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3069                 });
3070                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3071                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3072                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3073                         fee_msat: 0,
3074                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3075                 });
3076                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3077                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3078                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3079                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3080                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3081                 });
3082                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3083                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3084                 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3085
3086                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3087                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3088                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3089                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3090                         fee_msat: 0,
3091                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3092                 });
3093                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3094                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3095                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3096                         fee_msat: 0,
3097                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3098                 });
3099                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3100                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3101                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3102                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3103                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3104                 });
3105                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3106                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3107                 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3108
3109                 // Claim the rebalances...
3110                 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3111                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3112
3113                 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3114                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3115
3116                 // Send some payments across both channels
3117                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3118                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3119                 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3120
3121                 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3122
3123                 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3124
3125                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3126                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3127                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3128
3129                 // Close down the channels...
3130                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3131                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3132                 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3133                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3134                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3135         }
3136
3137         #[test]
3138         fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
3139                 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
3140                 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
3141                 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
3142
3143                 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
3144                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
3145                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3146                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3147                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3148                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
3149
3150                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
3151
3152                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3153                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3154
3155                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3156                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3157
3158                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
3159                 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
3160                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
3161         }
3162
3163         #[derive(PartialEq)]
3164         enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3165         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
3166         ///
3167         /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
3168         /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
3169         /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
3170         ///
3171         /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
3172         /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
3173         ///
3174         /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
3175         /// also fail.
3176         fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3177                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3178                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3179
3180                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3181                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3182                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3183                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3184                                 funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
3185                                 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3186                                 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
3187                                         res.push(tx.clone());
3188                                 }
3189                                 false
3190                         } else { true }
3191                 });
3192                 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3193                         res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3194                 }
3195
3196                 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3197
3198                 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3199                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3200                                 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3201                                         let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3202                                         funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
3203                                         tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3204                                         if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3205                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3206                                         } else {
3207                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3208                                         }
3209                                         res.push(tx.clone());
3210                                         false
3211                                 } else { true }
3212                         });
3213                         assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3214                 }
3215
3216                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3217                 res
3218         }
3219
3220         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
3221         /// HTLC transaction.
3222         fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
3223                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3224                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3225                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3226                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
3227                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3228                                 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_tx.txid(), revoked_tx.clone());
3229                                 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3230                                 false
3231                         } else { true }
3232                 });
3233                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3234         }
3235
3236         fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3237                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3238
3239                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3240                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3241                 let mut found_prev = false;
3242
3243                 for tx in prev_txn {
3244                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3245                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3246                                 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
3247                                 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3248
3249                                 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3250                                 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3251
3252                                 found_prev = true;
3253                                 break;
3254                         }
3255                 }
3256                 assert!(found_prev);
3257
3258                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3259                 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3260                 res
3261         }
3262
3263         fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3264                 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3265                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3266                 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3267                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3268                                 msg.clone()
3269                         },
3270                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3271                 };
3272
3273                 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3274                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3275                 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3276                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3277                                 msg.clone()
3278                         },
3279                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3280                 };
3281
3282                 for node in nodes {
3283                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3284                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3285                 }
3286         }
3287
3288         #[test]
3289         fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
3290                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3291                 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
3292                 let nodes = create_network(5);
3293
3294                 // Create some initial channels
3295                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3296                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3297                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3298                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3299
3300                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3301                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3302                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3303                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3304                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3305
3306                 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
3307                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3308                 {
3309                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3310                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3311                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3312                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3313                 }
3314                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3315                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3316                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3317
3318                 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
3319                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3320
3321                 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
3322                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3323                 {
3324                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3325                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3326                         nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3327                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3328                 }
3329                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
3330                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3331                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3332
3333                 macro_rules! claim_funds {
3334                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
3335                                 {
3336                                         assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
3337                                         {
3338                                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3339                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3340                                                 added_monitors.clear();
3341                                         }
3342
3343                                         let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3344                                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3345                                         match events[0] {
3346                                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
3347                                                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3348                                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3349                                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3350                                                 },
3351                                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3352                                         };
3353                                 }
3354                         }
3355                 }
3356
3357                 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
3358                 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
3359                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3360                 {
3361                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3362
3363                         // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3364                         claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
3365
3366                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3367                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3368
3369                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
3370                 }
3371                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
3372                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3373                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3374
3375                 // One pending HTLC to time out:
3376                 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
3377
3378                 {
3379                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3380                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3381                         for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3382                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3383                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3384                         }
3385
3386                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3387
3388                         // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3389                         claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
3390
3391                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3392                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3393                         for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3394                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3395                                 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3396                         }
3397
3398                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
3399
3400                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3401                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
3402
3403                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
3404                 }
3405                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
3406                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3407                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3408
3409                 // Create some new channels:
3410                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3411
3412                 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
3413                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
3414                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
3415                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3416                 // Revoke the old state
3417                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3418
3419                 {
3420                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3421                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3422                         {
3423                                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3424                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3425                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
3426                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3427
3428                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3429                                 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
3430                                 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3431                                 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
3432                         }
3433                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3434
3435                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3436                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3437                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3438                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
3439                         test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
3440                 }
3441                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3442                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3443                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3444         }
3445
3446         #[test]
3447         fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3448                 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3449                 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3450                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3451                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3452
3453                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3454                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
3455                 {
3456                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3457                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3458                         match events[0] {
3459                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3460                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3461                                 },
3462                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3463                         }
3464                 }
3465
3466                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3467                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3468
3469                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3470                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
3471
3472                 {
3473                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3474                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3475                         match events[0] {
3476                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3477                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3478                                 },
3479                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3480                         }
3481                 }
3482
3483                 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
3484                 // registering new transactions
3485                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
3486         }
3487
3488         #[test]
3489         fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3490                 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3491                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
3492                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3493                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3494
3495                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
3496
3497                 let our_payment_preimage = [*nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3498                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3499                 let our_payment_hash = {
3500                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3501                         sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
3502                         let mut ret = [0; 32];
3503                         sha.result(&mut ret);
3504                         ret
3505                 };
3506
3507                 let mut payment_event = {
3508                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3509                         {
3510                                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3511                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3512                                 added_monitors.clear();
3513                         }
3514
3515                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3516                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3517                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3518                 };
3519
3520                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3521                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3522
3523                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3524                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3525                 match events_1[0] {
3526                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3527                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3528                 };
3529
3530                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3531                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3532
3533                 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3534                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3535                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3536                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3537
3538                 {
3539                         let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3540                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3541                         added_monitors.clear();
3542                 }
3543
3544                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3545                 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
3546
3547                 {
3548                         let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3549                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3550                         added_monitors.clear();
3551                 }
3552
3553                 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3554                 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3555                 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3556
3557                 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
3558                 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3559                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3560                 match events_3[0] {
3561                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3562                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3563                         },
3564                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3565                 }
3566
3567                 let tx = {
3568                         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3569                         // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3570                         // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3571                         // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3572                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3573                         node_txn.remove(0)
3574                 };
3575
3576                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3577                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
3578
3579                 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3580                 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3581                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3582                 match events_4[0] {
3583                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3584                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3585                         },
3586                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3587                 }
3588
3589                 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3590                 {
3591                         let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
3592                         monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
3593                                 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
3594                 }
3595                 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
3596                 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3597                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3598                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3599                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3600                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3601                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3602                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3603                 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx);
3604                 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3605         }
3606
3607         #[test]
3608         fn test_unconf_chan() {
3609                 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
3610                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3611                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3612
3613                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3614                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
3615                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
3616                 mem::drop(channel_state);
3617
3618                 let mut headers = Vec::new();
3619                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3620                 headers.push(header.clone());
3621                 for _i in 2..100 {
3622                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3623                         headers.push(header.clone());
3624                 }
3625                 while !headers.is_empty() {
3626                         nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
3627                 }
3628                 {
3629                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3630                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3631                         match events[0] {
3632                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3633                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3634                                 },
3635                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3636                         }
3637                 }
3638                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3639                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
3640                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
3641         }
3642
3643         fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_htlc_fails: (usize, usize)) {
3644                 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3645                 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3646
3647                 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
3648                 for msg in reestablish_1 {
3649                         resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
3650                 }
3651                 {
3652                         let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3653                         if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
3654                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3655                         } else {
3656                                 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
3657                         }
3658                         added_monitors.clear();
3659                 }
3660
3661                 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
3662                 for msg in reestablish_2 {
3663                         resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
3664                 }
3665                 {
3666                         let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3667                         if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
3668                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3669                         } else {
3670                                 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
3671                         }
3672                         added_monitors.clear();
3673                 }
3674
3675                 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
3676                 assert!((pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.0 == 0) || (pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
3677
3678                 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
3679                         if pre_all_htlcs {
3680                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
3681                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
3682                         } else {
3683                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
3684                         }
3685                         assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
3686                         if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
3687                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
3688                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
3689                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
3690                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
3691                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3692                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
3693                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
3694                                 }
3695                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
3696                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
3697                                 }
3698
3699                                 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
3700                         } else {
3701                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
3702                         }
3703                 }
3704
3705                 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
3706                         if pre_all_htlcs {
3707                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
3708                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
3709                         } else {
3710                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
3711                         }
3712                         assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
3713                         if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
3714                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
3715                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
3716                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
3717                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
3718                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3719                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
3720                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
3721                                 }
3722                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
3723                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
3724                                 }
3725
3726                                 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
3727                         } else {
3728                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
3729                         }
3730                 }
3731         }
3732
3733         #[test]
3734         fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3735                 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3736                 let nodes = create_network(3);
3737                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3738                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3739
3740                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3741                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3742                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0));
3743
3744                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3745                 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3746                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3747                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3748
3749                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3750                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3751                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0));
3752
3753                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3754                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3755                 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3756                 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3757
3758                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3759                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3760
3761                 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
3762                 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
3763
3764                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (1, 0), (1, 0));
3765                 {
3766                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3767                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3768                         match events[0] {
3769                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3770                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3771                                 },
3772                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3773                         }
3774                         match events[1] {
3775                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
3776                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3777                                 },
3778                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3779                         }
3780                 }
3781
3782                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3783                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3784         }
3785
3786         #[test]
3787         fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
3788                 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
3789                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3790                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3791
3792                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3793
3794                 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3795                 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3796                 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3797                 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3798
3799                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3800
3801                 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3802                 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3803
3804                 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
3805                 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
3806
3807                 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
3808
3809                 let mut chan_announcement;
3810
3811                 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
3812                         () => {
3813                                 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3814                                         features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
3815                                         chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
3816                                         short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3817                                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
3818                                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
3819                                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
3820                                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
3821                                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3822                                 };
3823                         }
3824                 }
3825
3826                 macro_rules! sign_msg {
3827                         ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
3828                                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
3829                                 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3830                                 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3831                                 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
3832                                 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
3833                                 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3834                                         node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
3835                                         node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
3836                                         bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
3837                                         bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
3838                                         contents: $unsigned_msg
3839                                 }
3840                         }
3841                 }
3842
3843                 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3844                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3845                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
3846                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3847
3848                 // Configured with Network::Testnet
3849                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3850                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
3851                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3852                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
3853
3854                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3855                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
3856                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3857                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
3858         }
3859 }