1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
8 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
10 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
13 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
14 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
16 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
17 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
19 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable};
20 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
21 use util::sha2::Sha256;
22 use util::ser::Readable;
23 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
24 use util::logger::Logger;
25 use util::errors::APIError;
28 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
29 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
30 use crypto::digest::Digest;
31 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
34 use std::collections::HashMap;
35 use std::collections::hash_map;
37 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
38 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
39 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
41 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
43 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
44 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
45 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
47 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
48 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
49 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
50 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
51 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
52 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
53 mod channel_held_info {
55 use ln::router::Route;
56 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
57 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
59 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
60 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
61 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
62 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
63 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
64 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
65 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
66 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
67 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
70 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
72 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
73 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
76 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
77 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
78 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
79 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
83 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
84 impl PendingHTLCStatus {
85 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
86 let secp_ctx = ::secp256k1::Secp256k1::signing_only();
87 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
89 incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret::new(&secp_ctx,
90 &::secp256k1::key::PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[1; 32]).unwrap()),
91 &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[1; 32]).unwrap()),
92 payment_hash: [0; 32],
95 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
100 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
103 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
104 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
105 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
108 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
110 pub enum HTLCSource {
111 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
114 session_priv: SecretKey,
117 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
119 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
120 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
121 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
122 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub enum HTLCFailReason {
130 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
138 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
139 impl HTLCFailReason {
140 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
141 HTLCFailReason::Reason {
142 failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(),
147 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
148 pub use self::channel_held_info::*;
149 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
150 pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*;
152 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
153 err: msgs::HandleError,
154 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
156 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
158 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
162 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
163 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
165 data: err.to_string()
169 needs_channel_force_close: false,
173 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
177 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
178 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
180 data: err.to_string()
184 needs_channel_force_close: true,
188 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
189 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
192 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
193 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
197 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
198 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
199 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
200 /// probably increase this significantly.
201 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
203 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
204 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
206 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
209 struct ChannelHolder {
210 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
211 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
212 next_forward: Instant,
213 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
214 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
215 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
216 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
217 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
218 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
219 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
221 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
223 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
224 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
225 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
226 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
227 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
228 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
231 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
233 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
234 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
235 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
236 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
237 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
242 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
243 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
245 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
246 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
247 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
248 /// to individual Channels.
249 pub struct ChannelManager {
250 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
251 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
252 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
253 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
254 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
256 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
257 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
258 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
259 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
261 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
262 our_network_key: SecretKey,
264 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
269 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
271 macro_rules! secp_call {
272 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
275 Err(_) => return Err($err),
282 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
284 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
285 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
290 pub struct ChannelDetails {
291 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
292 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
293 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
294 /// lifetime of the channel.
295 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
296 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
297 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
298 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
299 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
300 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
301 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
305 impl ChannelManager {
306 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
307 /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
308 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
309 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
310 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
311 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
312 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
314 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
315 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
316 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
317 monitor: monitor.clone(),
321 announce_channels_publicly,
322 fee_proportional_millionths,
323 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
326 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
327 by_id: HashMap::new(),
328 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
329 next_forward: Instant::now(),
330 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
331 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
335 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
339 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
340 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
344 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
345 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
346 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
347 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
348 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
349 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
350 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
351 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
352 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
353 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
355 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
356 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
357 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
358 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
359 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
360 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
361 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
362 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
365 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
366 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
367 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
369 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
373 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
374 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
375 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
376 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
377 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
381 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
382 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
383 node_id: their_network_key,
389 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
390 /// more information.
391 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
392 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
393 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
394 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
395 res.push(ChannelDetails {
396 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
397 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
398 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
399 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
400 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
406 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
407 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
408 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
409 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
410 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
411 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
412 if channel.is_usable() {
413 res.push(ChannelDetails {
414 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
415 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
416 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
417 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
418 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
425 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
426 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
427 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
428 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
429 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
430 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
431 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
432 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
433 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
434 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
435 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
436 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
437 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
438 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
440 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
441 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
443 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
446 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
447 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
448 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
450 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
451 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
456 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
457 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
458 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
462 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
471 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
472 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
473 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
474 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
475 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
477 for tx in local_txn {
478 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
480 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
481 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
482 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
483 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
484 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
485 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
486 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
489 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
490 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
491 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
493 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
494 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
495 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
496 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
497 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
504 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
505 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
506 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
507 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
513 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
514 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
515 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
516 for chan in self.list_channels() {
517 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
522 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
524 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
525 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
526 let mut res = [0; 32];
527 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
531 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
532 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
533 let mut res = [0; 32];
534 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
540 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
541 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
542 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
543 let mut res = [0; 32];
544 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
549 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
550 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
551 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
552 let mut res = [0; 32];
553 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
557 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
559 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
560 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
561 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
563 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
564 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
566 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
567 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
568 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
569 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
570 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
572 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
574 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
575 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
577 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
583 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
584 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
585 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
587 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
588 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
594 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
604 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
605 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
606 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
607 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
608 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
609 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
610 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
611 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
613 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
614 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
615 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
616 // the intended recipient).
617 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
618 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
619 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
621 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
622 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
623 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
624 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
628 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
629 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
630 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
632 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
633 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
634 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
636 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
638 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
642 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
644 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
652 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
653 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
655 for i in 0..dst.len() {
660 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
661 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
662 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
663 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
666 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
667 let end_len = iters * 65;
668 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
669 res.resize(end_len, 0);
671 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
672 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
673 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
674 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
675 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
680 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
681 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
683 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
684 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
685 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
686 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
688 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
689 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
690 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
693 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
696 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
697 hmac.input(&packet_data);
698 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
699 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
704 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
705 hop_data: packet_data,
710 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
711 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
712 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
713 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
715 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
716 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
717 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
718 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
719 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
720 data: packet_crypted,
724 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
725 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
727 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
730 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
731 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
732 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
733 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
737 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
738 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
741 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
743 failuremsg: failuremsg,
747 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
748 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
749 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
755 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
756 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
757 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
760 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
761 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
764 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
765 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
766 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
767 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
773 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
774 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
775 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
776 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
777 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
778 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
779 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
780 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
783 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
784 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
786 let mut channel_state = None;
787 macro_rules! return_err {
788 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
790 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
791 if channel_state.is_none() {
792 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
794 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
795 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
796 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
797 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
798 })), channel_state.unwrap());
803 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
804 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
805 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
806 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
807 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
808 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
809 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
810 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
813 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
814 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
815 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
816 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
817 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
820 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
821 let next_hop_data = {
822 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
823 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
824 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
826 let error_code = match err {
827 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
828 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
830 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
836 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
838 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
840 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
841 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
843 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
844 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
847 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
848 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
849 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
850 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
852 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
854 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
856 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
857 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
858 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
861 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
862 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
863 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
865 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
867 let blinding_factor = {
868 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
869 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
870 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
871 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
872 sha.result(&mut res);
873 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
875 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
881 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
882 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
885 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
887 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
888 hop_data: new_packet_data,
889 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
892 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
893 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
894 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
895 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
896 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
897 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
898 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
902 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
903 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
904 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
905 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
906 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
908 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
910 Some(id) => id.clone(),
912 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
913 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
915 Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
917 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
918 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
919 Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
921 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
922 Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
929 return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
934 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
937 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
938 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
939 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
940 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
944 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
946 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
947 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
948 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
949 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
950 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
951 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
952 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
953 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
954 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
955 excess_data: Vec::new(),
958 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
959 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
961 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
967 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
968 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
969 /// fields for more info.
970 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
971 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
972 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
973 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
974 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
975 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
976 /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
977 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
978 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
979 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
980 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
981 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
982 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
984 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
985 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
986 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
987 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
991 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
992 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
993 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
995 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
997 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
999 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1000 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1001 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1002 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1004 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
1005 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1006 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1008 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1009 None => return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1010 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1014 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1015 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1016 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1018 if !chan.is_live() {
1019 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1021 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1022 route: route.clone(),
1023 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1024 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::RouteError{err: he.err})?
1027 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1030 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
1031 None => return Ok(()),
1035 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1039 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1040 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1041 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1042 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1043 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1044 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1045 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1046 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1053 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1054 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1055 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1056 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1057 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1059 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1062 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1063 pending_events.push($event);
1068 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1069 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1070 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1072 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1073 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1074 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1077 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1078 mem::drop(channel_state);
1079 add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1080 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1089 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1090 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1093 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1094 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1098 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1099 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1100 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1101 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1103 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1109 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1110 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1112 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1114 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1116 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1117 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1119 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1120 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1121 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1122 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1123 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1127 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1128 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1129 /// Will likely generate further events.
1130 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1131 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1132 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1134 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1135 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1137 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1141 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1142 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1143 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1144 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1146 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1147 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1148 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1149 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1150 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1151 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1153 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1158 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1160 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1161 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1162 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1163 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1164 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1165 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1167 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1169 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1170 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1175 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1177 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1178 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1179 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1180 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1181 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1182 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1183 // this channel currently :/.
1190 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1191 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1194 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1195 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1197 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1199 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1203 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1204 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1205 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1206 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1207 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1208 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1209 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1210 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1215 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1216 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1217 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1218 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1219 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1221 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1222 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1223 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1225 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1226 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1227 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1234 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1236 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1237 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1241 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1243 new_events.retain(|event| {
1244 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1245 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1246 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1252 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1253 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1254 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1255 events.push(event.1);
1259 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1260 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1261 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1262 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1263 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1264 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1265 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1266 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1272 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1273 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1274 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1275 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1276 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1277 /// still-available channels.
1278 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1280 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1281 mem::drop(channel_state);
1283 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1284 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1285 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1288 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1289 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1290 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1291 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1292 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1294 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1295 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1299 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1300 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1301 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1305 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1306 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1307 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1309 //TODO: Do something with e?
1316 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1317 mem::drop(channel_state);
1319 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1320 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1323 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1324 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1326 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1327 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1328 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1329 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1330 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1331 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1341 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1342 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1343 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1344 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1345 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1346 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1347 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1348 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1349 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1351 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1352 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1353 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1354 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1355 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1356 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1361 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1363 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1364 mem::drop(channel_state);
1365 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1366 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1370 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1371 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1372 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1373 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1374 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1376 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1377 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1383 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1384 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1385 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1387 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1388 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1389 //TODO: Do something with e?
1395 mem::drop(channel_state);
1396 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1397 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1398 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1402 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1403 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1404 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1406 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1407 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1408 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1409 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1410 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1411 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1419 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1420 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1421 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1424 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1425 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1427 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1431 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1432 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1433 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1435 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1436 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1437 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1440 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1442 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1443 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1444 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1445 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1446 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1447 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1448 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1449 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1452 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1453 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1454 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1456 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1460 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger)).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(e))?;
1461 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1462 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1466 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1467 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1468 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1469 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1471 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1472 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1473 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1475 chan.accept_channel(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1476 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1478 //TODO: same as above
1479 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1482 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1483 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1484 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1485 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1486 output_script: output_script,
1487 user_channel_id: user_id,
1492 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1493 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1494 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1495 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1496 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1497 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1498 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1499 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1501 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1502 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1503 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1506 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1510 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1512 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1513 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1514 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1515 // for a bogus channel.
1516 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1519 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1520 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1521 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1522 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1524 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1531 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1532 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1533 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1534 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1536 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1537 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1538 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1540 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1541 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1543 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1546 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1549 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1550 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1551 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1552 user_channel_id: user_id,
1557 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1558 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1559 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1561 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1562 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1563 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1565 chan.funding_locked(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1566 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1568 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1572 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1573 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1574 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1575 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1577 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1578 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1579 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1580 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1581 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1583 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1584 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1585 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1586 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1588 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1589 } else { (res, None) }
1591 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1594 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1595 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1596 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1598 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1599 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1600 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1601 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1609 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1610 let (res, chan_option) = {
1611 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1612 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1613 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1614 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1615 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1616 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1617 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1619 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1620 if res.1.is_some() {
1621 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1622 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1623 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1624 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1625 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1626 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1627 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1629 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1630 } else { (res, None) }
1632 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1635 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1636 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1638 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1639 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1640 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1641 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1649 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1650 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1651 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1652 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1654 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1655 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1656 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1657 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1659 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1660 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1662 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1664 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1665 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1666 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1668 if !chan.is_usable() {
1669 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1671 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1673 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1677 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1678 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1679 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1681 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1682 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1683 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1685 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?.clone()
1687 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1689 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1693 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1694 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1695 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1697 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1698 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1699 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1701 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1703 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1707 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, .. } => {
1708 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1709 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1711 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1712 if res.is_some() { return; }
1714 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1716 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1717 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1718 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1719 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1720 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1722 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1723 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1724 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1726 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1727 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1728 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1729 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1730 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1731 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1732 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1733 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1734 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1735 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1736 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1737 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1738 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len])) {
1739 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1747 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1748 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1749 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1750 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1753 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1765 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1766 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1767 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1769 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1770 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1771 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1773 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1776 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1780 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1781 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1782 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1783 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1785 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1786 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1787 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1789 chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?
1791 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1794 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1798 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1801 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1802 let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor), short_channel_id) = {
1803 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1804 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1806 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1807 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1808 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1810 (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
1812 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1815 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1818 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1819 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1822 let mut forward_event = None;
1823 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1824 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1825 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1826 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1827 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1829 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1830 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1832 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
1834 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1835 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
1840 match forward_event {
1842 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1843 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1844 time_forwardable: time
1853 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1854 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1855 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1857 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1858 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1859 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1861 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1863 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1867 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1868 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1869 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1870 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1872 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1873 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1875 if !chan.is_usable() {
1876 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1879 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1880 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
1881 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1883 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1884 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1885 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
1886 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1887 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1889 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1891 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1892 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1893 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1894 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1895 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1896 contents: announcement,
1897 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1899 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1902 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1903 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1907 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1908 let (res, chan_monitor) = {
1909 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1910 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1912 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1913 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1915 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1916 (Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update)), channel_monitor)
1918 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1921 if let Some(monitor) = chan_monitor {
1922 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1930 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1931 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1932 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1933 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1934 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1939 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1940 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1941 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1942 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1944 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1945 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1946 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1947 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1948 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
1949 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
1950 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
1951 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1952 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1953 msg: funding_locked,
1954 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1956 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1957 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
1958 new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
1959 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1962 if channel.is_shutdown() {
1966 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1967 for tx in txn_matched {
1968 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1969 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
1970 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1971 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1973 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
1974 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
1975 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
1976 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1977 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1978 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1987 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1988 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1989 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1991 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1992 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
1993 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
1994 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
1995 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
1996 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1997 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2006 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2007 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2009 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2010 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2011 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2013 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2016 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2017 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2018 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2019 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2021 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2022 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2023 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2024 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2025 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2026 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2027 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2029 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2030 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2031 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2041 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2042 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2044 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2045 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2046 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2047 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2050 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2054 macro_rules! handle_error {
2055 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2058 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2059 if needs_channel_force_close {
2061 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2062 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2063 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2065 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2068 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2069 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2070 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2071 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2072 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2074 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2086 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2087 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2088 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2089 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2092 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2093 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2096 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2097 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2100 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2101 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2104 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2105 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2108 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2109 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2112 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2113 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2116 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2117 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2120 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2121 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2124 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
2125 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2128 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2129 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2132 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2133 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2136 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2137 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2140 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2141 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2144 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2145 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2148 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), HandleError> {
2149 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2152 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2153 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2154 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2155 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2157 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2158 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2159 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2160 if no_connection_possible {
2161 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2162 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2163 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2164 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2166 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2167 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2168 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2178 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2179 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2180 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2181 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2182 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2183 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2184 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2186 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2187 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2188 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2197 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2198 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2200 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2201 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2202 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2203 pending_events.push(event);
2206 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2207 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2208 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2213 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2214 let mut res = Vec::new();
2215 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2216 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2217 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2218 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2219 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2220 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2221 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2225 res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2230 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2234 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2235 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2236 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2237 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2238 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2242 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2249 use chain::chaininterface;
2250 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2251 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2252 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2253 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2255 use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2256 use util::test_utils;
2257 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2258 use util::logger::Logger;
2259 use util::errors::APIError;
2261 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2262 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2263 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2264 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2265 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2266 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2267 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2271 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2272 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2274 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2275 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2277 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2279 use std::cell::RefCell;
2280 use std::collections::HashMap;
2281 use std::default::Default;
2283 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2284 use std::time::Instant;
2287 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2288 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2289 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2294 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2295 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2298 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2299 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2302 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2303 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2306 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2307 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2310 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2311 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2316 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2318 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2319 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2324 fn onion_vectors() {
2325 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2326 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2328 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2329 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2330 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2331 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2332 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2334 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2335 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2336 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2337 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2338 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2340 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2341 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2342 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2343 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2344 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2346 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2347 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2348 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2349 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2350 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2352 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2353 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2354 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2355 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2356 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2358 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2359 let payloads = vec!(
2360 msgs::OnionHopData {
2362 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2363 short_channel_id: 0,
2365 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2369 msgs::OnionHopData {
2371 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2372 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2373 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2374 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2378 msgs::OnionHopData {
2380 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2381 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2382 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2383 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2387 msgs::OnionHopData {
2389 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2390 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2391 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2392 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2396 msgs::OnionHopData {
2398 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2399 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2400 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2401 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2407 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2408 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2410 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2414 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2415 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2417 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2418 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2419 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2421 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2422 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2424 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2425 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2427 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2428 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2430 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2431 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2433 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2434 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2437 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2438 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2439 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2440 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2442 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2443 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2448 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2449 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2450 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2451 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2453 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2454 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2456 impl Drop for Node {
2457 fn drop(&mut self) {
2458 // Check that we processed all pending events
2459 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2460 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2464 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2465 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42).unwrap();
2467 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2468 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2469 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2470 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2471 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2472 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2474 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2477 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2479 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2483 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2484 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2486 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2487 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2488 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2490 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2491 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2493 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2495 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2496 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2497 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2498 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2499 added_monitors.clear();
2501 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2504 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2505 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2506 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2507 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2508 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2509 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2510 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2511 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2512 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2513 added_monitors.clear();
2516 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2519 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2521 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2522 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2523 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2524 added_monitors.clear();
2527 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2528 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2530 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2531 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2532 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2534 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2537 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2538 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2539 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2541 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2542 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2543 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2544 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2546 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2551 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2552 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2553 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2554 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2555 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2556 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2557 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2558 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2559 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2560 as_announcement_sigs
2562 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2565 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2566 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2567 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2568 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2571 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2574 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2575 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2576 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2577 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2578 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2579 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2582 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2585 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2587 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2590 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2591 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2593 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2594 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2595 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2597 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2600 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2601 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2602 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2605 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2606 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2607 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2608 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2609 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2610 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2613 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2616 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2617 if !close_inbound_first {
2618 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2620 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2621 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2622 if close_inbound_first {
2623 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2624 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2625 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2626 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2628 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2629 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2630 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2631 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2633 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2634 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2635 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2637 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2638 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2639 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2640 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2642 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2643 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2644 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2645 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2647 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2648 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2649 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2650 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2653 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2656 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2657 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2658 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2659 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2662 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2665 (as_update, bs_update)
2670 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2671 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2674 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2676 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, commitment_signed } } => {
2677 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2678 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2679 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2680 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2682 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2687 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
2688 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
2691 let added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2692 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
2694 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
2696 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2697 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2698 added_monitors.clear();
2701 let added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2702 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
2704 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2706 let mut added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2707 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2708 added_monitors.clear();
2710 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
2711 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
2713 let mut added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2714 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2715 added_monitors.clear();
2717 if $fail_backwards {
2718 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2720 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2722 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2723 if $fail_backwards {
2724 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2725 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2727 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2729 added_monitors.clear();
2735 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2736 let our_payment_preimage = [*origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2737 *origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2738 let our_payment_hash = {
2739 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2740 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2741 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2742 sha.result(&mut ret);
2746 let mut payment_event = {
2747 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2749 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2750 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2751 added_monitors.clear();
2754 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2755 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2756 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2758 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2760 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2761 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2763 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2765 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2766 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2769 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
2771 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2772 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2774 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2778 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2779 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2781 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2782 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2783 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2785 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2786 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2787 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2789 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2793 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2794 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2795 added_monitors.clear();
2797 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2798 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2804 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2807 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2808 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2810 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2811 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2812 added_monitors.clear();
2815 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2816 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2817 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2819 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2821 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2823 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2825 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2827 added_monitors.clear();
2829 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
2834 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2835 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2836 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2837 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2838 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2839 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2842 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2843 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2844 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2846 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2847 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2848 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2849 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2850 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2851 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2852 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2854 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2857 assert!(events.is_empty());
2859 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2860 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2867 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2868 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2869 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2871 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2872 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2874 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2879 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2880 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
2883 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2885 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2886 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2887 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2888 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2889 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2892 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2895 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2896 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2897 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2898 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2899 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2902 let our_payment_preimage = [*origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2903 *origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2904 let our_payment_hash = {
2905 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2906 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2907 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2908 sha.result(&mut ret);
2912 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2914 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
2915 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
2919 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2920 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2921 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2924 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2925 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2927 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2928 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2929 added_monitors.clear();
2932 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2933 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2934 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2936 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2937 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
2942 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2943 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2944 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2945 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2946 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2947 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
2948 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
2949 // second-to-last node!
2950 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
2953 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2954 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2955 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2957 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2958 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2959 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2960 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2961 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2962 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2963 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2965 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2968 assert!(events.is_empty());
2970 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2971 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2978 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2980 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2981 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2983 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2984 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2986 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2991 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2992 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
2995 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2996 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2997 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2998 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2999 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3001 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3002 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3004 for _ in 0..node_count {
3005 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3006 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3007 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3008 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3010 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3011 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3012 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3014 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3015 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3016 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3017 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3018 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3026 fn fake_network_test() {
3027 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3028 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3029 let nodes = create_network(4);
3031 // Create some initial channels
3032 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3033 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3034 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3036 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3037 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3038 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3039 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3040 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3042 // Send some more payments
3043 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3044 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3045 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3047 // Test failure packets
3048 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3049 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3051 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3052 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3054 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3055 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3056 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3057 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3058 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3059 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3060 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3062 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3063 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3064 hops.push(RouteHop {
3065 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3066 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3068 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3070 hops.push(RouteHop {
3071 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3072 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3074 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3076 hops.push(RouteHop {
3077 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3078 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3080 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3082 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3083 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3084 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3086 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3087 hops.push(RouteHop {
3088 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3089 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3091 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3093 hops.push(RouteHop {
3094 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3095 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3097 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3099 hops.push(RouteHop {
3100 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3101 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3103 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3105 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3106 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3107 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3109 // Claim the rebalances...
3110 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3111 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3113 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3114 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3116 // Send some payments across both channels
3117 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3118 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3119 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3121 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3123 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3125 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3126 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3127 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3129 // Close down the channels...
3130 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3131 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3132 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3133 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3134 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3138 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
3139 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
3140 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
3141 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
3143 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
3144 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
3145 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3146 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3147 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3148 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
3150 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
3152 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3153 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3155 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3156 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3158 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
3159 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
3160 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
3163 #[derive(PartialEq)]
3164 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3165 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
3167 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
3168 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
3169 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
3171 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
3172 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
3174 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
3176 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3177 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3178 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3180 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3181 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3182 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3183 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3184 funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
3185 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3186 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
3187 res.push(tx.clone());
3192 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3193 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3196 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3198 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3199 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3200 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3201 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3202 funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
3203 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3204 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3205 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3207 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3209 res.push(tx.clone());
3213 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3216 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3220 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
3221 /// HTLC transaction.
3222 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
3223 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3224 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3225 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3226 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
3227 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3228 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_tx.txid(), revoked_tx.clone());
3229 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3233 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3236 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3237 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3239 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3240 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3241 let mut found_prev = false;
3243 for tx in prev_txn {
3244 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3245 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3246 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
3247 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3249 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3250 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3256 assert!(found_prev);
3258 let mut res = Vec::new();
3259 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3263 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3264 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3265 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3266 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3267 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3270 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3273 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3274 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3275 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3276 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3279 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3283 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3284 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3289 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
3290 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3291 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
3292 let nodes = create_network(5);
3294 // Create some initial channels
3295 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3296 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3297 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3298 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3300 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3301 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3302 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3303 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3304 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3306 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
3307 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3309 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3310 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3311 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3312 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3314 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3315 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3316 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3318 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
3319 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3321 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
3322 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3324 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3325 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3326 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3327 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3329 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
3330 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3331 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3333 macro_rules! claim_funds {
3334 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
3336 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
3338 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3339 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3340 added_monitors.clear();
3343 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3344 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3346 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
3347 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3348 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3349 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3351 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3357 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
3358 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
3359 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3361 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3363 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3364 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
3366 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3367 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3369 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
3371 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
3372 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3373 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3375 // One pending HTLC to time out:
3376 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
3379 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3380 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3381 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3382 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3383 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3386 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3388 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3389 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
3391 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3392 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3393 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3394 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3395 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3398 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
3400 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3401 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
3403 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
3405 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
3406 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3407 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3409 // Create some new channels:
3410 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3412 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
3413 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
3414 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
3415 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3416 // Revoke the old state
3417 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3420 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3421 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3423 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3424 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3425 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
3426 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3428 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3429 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
3430 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3431 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
3433 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3435 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3436 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3437 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3438 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
3439 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
3441 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3442 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3443 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3447 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3448 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3449 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3450 let nodes = create_network(2);
3451 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3453 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3454 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
3456 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3457 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3459 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3460 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3462 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3466 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3467 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3469 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3470 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
3473 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3474 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3476 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3477 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3479 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3483 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
3484 // registering new transactions
3485 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
3489 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3490 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3491 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
3492 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3493 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3495 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
3497 let our_payment_preimage = [*nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3498 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3499 let our_payment_hash = {
3500 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3501 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
3502 let mut ret = [0; 32];
3503 sha.result(&mut ret);
3507 let mut payment_event = {
3508 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3510 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3511 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3512 added_monitors.clear();
3515 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3516 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3517 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3520 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3521 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3523 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3524 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3526 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3527 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3530 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3531 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3533 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3534 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3535 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3536 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3539 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3540 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3541 added_monitors.clear();
3544 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3545 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
3548 let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3549 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3550 added_monitors.clear();
3553 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3554 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3555 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3557 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
3558 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3559 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3561 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3562 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3564 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3568 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3569 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3570 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3571 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3572 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3576 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3577 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
3579 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3580 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3581 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3583 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3584 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3586 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3589 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3591 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
3592 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
3593 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
3595 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
3596 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3597 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3598 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3599 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3600 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3601 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3602 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3603 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx);
3604 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3608 fn test_unconf_chan() {
3609 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
3610 let nodes = create_network(2);
3611 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3613 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3614 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
3615 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
3616 mem::drop(channel_state);
3618 let mut headers = Vec::new();
3619 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3620 headers.push(header.clone());
3622 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3623 headers.push(header.clone());
3625 while !headers.is_empty() {
3626 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
3629 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3630 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3632 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3633 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3635 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3638 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3639 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
3640 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
3643 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_htlc_fails: (usize, usize)) {
3644 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3645 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3647 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
3648 for msg in reestablish_1 {
3649 resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
3652 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3653 if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
3654 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3656 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
3658 added_monitors.clear();
3661 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
3662 for msg in reestablish_2 {
3663 resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
3666 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3667 if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
3668 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3670 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
3672 added_monitors.clear();
3675 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
3676 assert!((pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.0 == 0) || (pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
3678 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
3680 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
3681 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
3683 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
3685 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
3686 if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
3687 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
3688 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
3689 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
3690 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
3691 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3692 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
3693 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
3695 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
3696 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
3699 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
3701 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
3705 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
3707 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
3708 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
3710 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
3712 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
3713 if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
3714 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
3715 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
3716 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
3717 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
3718 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3719 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
3720 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
3722 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
3723 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
3726 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
3728 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
3734 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3735 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3736 let nodes = create_network(3);
3737 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3738 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3740 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3741 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3742 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0));
3744 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3745 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3746 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3747 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3749 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3750 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3751 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0));
3753 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3754 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3755 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3756 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3758 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3759 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3761 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
3762 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
3764 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (1, 0), (1, 0));
3766 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3767 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3769 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3770 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3772 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3775 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
3776 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3778 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3782 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3783 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3787 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
3788 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
3789 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3790 let nodes = create_network(2);
3792 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3794 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3795 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3796 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3797 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3799 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3801 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3802 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3804 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
3805 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
3807 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
3809 let mut chan_announcement;
3811 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
3813 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3814 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
3815 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
3816 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3817 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
3818 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
3819 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
3820 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
3821 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3826 macro_rules! sign_msg {
3827 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
3828 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
3829 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3830 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3831 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
3832 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
3833 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3834 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
3835 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
3836 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
3837 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
3838 contents: $unsigned_msg
3843 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3844 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3845 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
3846 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3848 // Configured with Network::Testnet
3849 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3850 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
3851 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3852 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
3854 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3855 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
3856 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3857 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());