1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
22 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
23 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
24 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
27 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
28 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
29 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
30 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
31 use ln::router::Route;
34 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
35 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
37 use util::{byte_utils, events, rng};
38 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
39 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::errors::APIError;
44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
46 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
47 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
48 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
50 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
52 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
53 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
54 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
56 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
57 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
58 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
59 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
60 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
61 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
62 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
63 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
64 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
65 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
66 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
67 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
68 short_channel_id: u64,
69 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
70 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
73 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
74 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
75 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
76 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
79 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
82 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
86 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
87 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
88 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
89 short_channel_id: u64,
91 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
94 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
96 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
97 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
100 session_priv: SecretKey,
101 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
102 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
103 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
108 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
109 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
110 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
111 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
112 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
120 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
128 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
129 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
130 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
131 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
132 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
133 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
135 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
137 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
138 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
139 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
140 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
141 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
143 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
144 err: msgs::HandleError,
145 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
147 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
149 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
153 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
154 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
156 data: err.to_string()
160 shutdown_finish: None,
164 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
165 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
168 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
172 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
173 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
175 data: err.to_string()
179 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
183 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
186 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
188 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
190 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
192 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
193 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
195 data: msg.to_string()
200 shutdown_finish: None,
205 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
206 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
207 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
208 /// probably increase this significantly.
209 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
211 pub(super) struct HTLCForwardInfo {
212 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
215 pub(super) forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
217 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
220 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
221 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
222 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
223 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
224 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
225 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
226 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
228 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
232 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
233 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
234 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
235 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
236 pub(super) next_forward: Instant,
237 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
238 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
239 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
240 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
241 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
242 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
243 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
245 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
246 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
247 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
248 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
250 pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
251 pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
252 pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
253 pub(super) next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
254 pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
255 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
256 pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
259 pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
261 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
262 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
263 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
264 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
265 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
266 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
271 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
272 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
274 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
275 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
277 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
278 /// to individual Channels.
280 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
281 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
282 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
283 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
285 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
286 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
287 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
288 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
289 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
290 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
291 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
293 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
294 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
295 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
296 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
298 pub struct ChannelManager {
299 default_configuration: UserConfig,
300 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
301 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
302 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
303 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
304 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
307 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
309 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
310 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
311 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
314 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
316 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
317 our_network_key: SecretKey,
319 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
320 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
321 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
322 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
323 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
325 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
330 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
331 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
332 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
333 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
334 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
335 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
336 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
338 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS +
339 // HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
340 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it
341 // backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel
342 // on-chain to time out the HTLC.
345 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
347 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
348 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
351 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
353 macro_rules! secp_call {
354 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
357 Err(_) => return Err($err),
362 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
363 pub struct ChannelDetails {
364 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
365 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
366 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
367 /// lifetime of the channel.
368 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
369 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
370 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
371 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
372 /// The node_id of our counterparty
373 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
374 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
375 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
376 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
380 macro_rules! handle_error {
381 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
384 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
385 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
386 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
387 if let Some(update) = update_option {
388 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
389 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
400 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
401 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
404 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
405 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
407 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
408 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
409 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
410 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
411 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
413 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
419 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
420 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
423 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
424 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
426 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
427 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
428 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
429 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
430 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
432 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
438 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
439 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
440 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
442 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
443 if $action_type != RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst { panic!("Bad return_monitor_err call!"); }
444 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $raa_first_dropped_cs)
446 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
447 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, false)
449 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
451 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
452 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
453 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
454 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
456 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
457 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
458 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
459 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
460 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
461 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
462 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
463 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
464 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
465 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
467 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
468 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $raa_first_dropped_cs);
469 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()));
475 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
476 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
477 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
479 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
480 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
481 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
482 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
484 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
486 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
487 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), false);
493 impl ChannelManager {
494 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
496 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
497 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
499 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
501 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
502 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
503 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
505 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
506 default_configuration: config.clone(),
507 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
508 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
509 monitor: monitor.clone(),
513 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
514 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
517 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
518 by_id: HashMap::new(),
519 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
520 next_forward: Instant::now(),
521 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
522 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
523 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
525 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
527 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
528 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
534 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
535 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
539 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
541 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
542 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
543 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
544 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
546 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
547 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
549 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
550 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
551 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
552 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
553 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
556 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
557 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
559 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
560 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
561 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
562 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
563 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
564 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
566 panic!("RNG is bad???");
569 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
571 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
572 node_id: their_network_key,
578 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
579 /// more information.
580 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
581 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
582 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
583 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
584 res.push(ChannelDetails {
585 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
586 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
587 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
588 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
589 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
595 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
596 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
597 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
598 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
599 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
600 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
601 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
602 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
603 // really wanted anyway.
604 if channel.is_live() {
605 res.push(ChannelDetails {
606 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
607 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
608 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
609 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
610 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
617 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
618 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
619 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
621 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
622 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
623 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
625 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
626 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
627 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
628 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
629 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
630 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
631 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
632 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
635 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
636 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
637 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
639 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
640 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
642 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
645 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
646 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
648 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
649 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
654 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
655 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
656 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
665 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
666 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
667 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
668 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
669 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
671 for tx in local_txn {
672 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
676 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
677 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
678 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
679 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
682 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
683 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
684 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
685 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
686 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
693 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
694 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
695 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
696 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
697 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
703 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
704 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
705 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
706 for chan in self.list_channels() {
707 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
711 const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
712 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
713 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
714 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
716 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
717 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
718 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
719 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
720 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
721 failure_code: $err_code,
722 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
727 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
728 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
731 let shared_secret = {
732 let mut arr = [0; 32];
733 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
736 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
738 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
739 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
740 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
741 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
742 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
743 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
744 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
745 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
748 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
749 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
750 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
751 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
752 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
755 let mut channel_state = None;
756 macro_rules! return_err {
757 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
759 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
760 if channel_state.is_none() {
761 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
763 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
764 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
765 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
766 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
767 })), channel_state.unwrap());
772 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
773 let next_hop_data = {
774 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
775 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
776 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
778 let error_code = match err {
779 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
780 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
782 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
788 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
790 // final_expiry_too_soon
791 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
792 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
794 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
795 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
796 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
798 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
799 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
800 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
803 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
804 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
805 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
806 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
808 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
810 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
812 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
813 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
814 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
817 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
818 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
819 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
821 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
823 let blinding_factor = {
824 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
825 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
826 sha.input(&shared_secret);
827 SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()).expect("SHA-256 is broken?")
830 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
832 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
834 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
837 hop_data: new_packet_data,
838 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
841 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
842 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
843 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
844 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
845 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
846 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
847 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
851 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
852 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
853 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
854 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
855 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
856 None => { // unknown_next_peer
857 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
859 Some(id) => id.clone(),
861 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
862 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
864 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
865 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
866 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
867 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
868 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
869 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
870 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
872 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
873 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
875 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
876 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
877 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
879 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
880 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
882 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
883 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
884 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
885 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
887 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
888 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
893 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
894 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
895 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
896 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
898 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
899 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
901 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
902 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
904 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
906 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
911 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
914 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
915 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
916 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
917 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
918 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
922 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
924 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
925 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
926 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
927 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
928 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
929 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
930 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
931 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
932 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
933 excess_data: Vec::new(),
936 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
937 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
939 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
945 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
947 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
948 /// fields for more info.
950 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
951 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
952 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
953 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
954 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
955 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
957 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
959 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
960 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
961 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
962 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
963 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
964 /// relevant updates.
966 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
967 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
968 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
969 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
970 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
971 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
972 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
973 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
975 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
976 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
977 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
978 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
982 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
984 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
986 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
987 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
988 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
989 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
991 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
993 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
994 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
996 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
997 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
998 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1001 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1002 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1004 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1005 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1007 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1008 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1010 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1011 route: route.clone(),
1012 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1013 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1014 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1016 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1017 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1018 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1019 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1020 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1021 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1022 // something else in case we will resend later!
1023 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1026 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1027 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1028 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1029 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1030 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1031 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1032 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1040 } else { unreachable!(); }
1044 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1045 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1047 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1049 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1050 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1051 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1052 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1056 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1061 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1063 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1064 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1066 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1068 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1069 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1070 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1071 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1073 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1075 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1076 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1078 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1079 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1080 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1081 } else { unreachable!(); })
1087 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1088 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1089 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1092 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1093 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1094 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1095 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1102 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1103 // lock before add_update_monitor
1104 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1108 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1109 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1110 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1113 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1114 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1115 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1117 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1123 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1124 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1126 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1128 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1130 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1131 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1133 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1134 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1135 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1136 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1137 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1141 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1143 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1144 /// Will likely generate further events.
1145 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1146 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1148 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1149 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1151 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1152 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1154 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1158 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1159 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1160 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1161 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1163 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1164 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1165 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1166 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1167 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1168 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1170 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1175 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1177 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1178 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1179 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1180 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1181 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1182 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1184 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1186 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1187 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1192 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1194 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1195 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1196 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1197 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1198 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1199 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1200 // this channel currently :/.
1207 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1208 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1211 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1212 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1214 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1218 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1221 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1222 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1223 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1224 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1225 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1226 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1227 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1229 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1234 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1235 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1236 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1237 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1238 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1240 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1241 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1242 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1244 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1245 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1246 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1253 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1255 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1256 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1260 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1261 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1262 events.append(&mut new_events);
1265 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1266 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
1267 /// expected_value is the value you expected the payment to be for (not the amount it actually
1268 /// was for from the PaymentReceived event).
1269 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, expected_value: u64) -> bool {
1270 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1272 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1273 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1274 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1275 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1276 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1277 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1278 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1279 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(expected_value).to_vec() });
1285 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1286 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1287 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1288 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1289 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1290 /// still-available channels.
1291 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1293 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1294 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1295 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1296 match &onion_error {
1297 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1299 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1301 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1302 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1303 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1304 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1305 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1306 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1307 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1312 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1313 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1314 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1315 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1317 error_code: onion_error_code
1321 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1325 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1326 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1327 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1328 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1330 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1331 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1332 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1333 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1334 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1335 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1337 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1343 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1344 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1345 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1346 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1347 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1348 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1350 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1351 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1352 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1356 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1358 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1359 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1363 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1364 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1365 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1366 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1369 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1370 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1371 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1372 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1373 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1374 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1375 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1377 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1383 //TODO: Do something with e?
1391 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1392 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1393 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1395 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1396 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1397 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1399 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1401 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1402 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1403 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1404 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1405 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1406 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1411 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1413 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1414 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1415 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1416 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1420 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1421 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1422 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1424 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1425 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1427 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1428 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1434 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1435 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1436 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1437 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1438 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1439 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1442 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1443 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1444 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1445 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1446 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1447 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1448 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1449 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1457 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1458 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1459 //TODO: Do something with e?
1467 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1468 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1469 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1472 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1473 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1475 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1476 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1477 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1478 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1479 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1482 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1483 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1484 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1485 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1486 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1487 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1488 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1489 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1491 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1492 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1493 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1494 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1495 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1496 // on-chain confirmations.
1497 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once its merged a test
1498 // should be written.
1499 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1500 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1502 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1503 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1504 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1510 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1513 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1514 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1515 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1517 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1519 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1520 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1521 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1522 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1527 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1528 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1529 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1530 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1531 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1536 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1540 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1551 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1552 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1554 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1556 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1557 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1561 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1562 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1563 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1566 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1567 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1568 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1569 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1570 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1571 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1572 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1573 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1574 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1575 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1577 entry.insert(channel);
1583 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1584 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1585 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1586 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1587 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1588 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1589 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1590 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1591 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1593 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1594 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1596 //TODO: same as above
1597 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1600 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1601 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1602 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1603 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1604 output_script: output_script,
1605 user_channel_id: user_id,
1610 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1611 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1612 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1613 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1614 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1615 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1616 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1617 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1618 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1620 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1622 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1625 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1626 // lock before add_update_monitor
1627 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1630 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1631 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1632 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1633 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1634 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1636 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1637 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1638 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1647 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1648 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1649 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1650 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1651 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1652 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1653 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1654 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1655 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1657 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1658 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1661 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1663 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1666 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1667 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1668 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1669 user_channel_id: user_id,
1674 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1675 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1676 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1677 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1678 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1679 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1680 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1681 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1683 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1684 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1685 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1686 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1687 msg: announcement_sigs,
1692 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1696 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1697 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1698 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1699 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1701 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1702 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1703 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1704 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1705 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1707 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1708 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1709 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1710 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1714 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1715 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1716 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1720 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1721 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1722 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1724 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1725 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1727 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1730 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1731 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1733 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1734 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1735 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1736 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1744 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1745 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1746 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1747 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1748 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1749 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1750 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1751 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1752 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1754 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1755 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1756 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1757 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1762 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1763 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1764 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1765 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1766 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1767 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1768 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1770 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1771 } else { (tx, None) }
1773 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1776 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1777 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1779 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1780 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1781 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1782 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1790 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1791 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1792 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1793 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1795 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1796 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1797 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1798 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1800 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1801 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1803 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1804 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1805 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1806 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1807 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1809 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
1810 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1811 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1812 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1813 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1814 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
1815 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1816 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1817 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1818 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
1819 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
1820 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
1821 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
1822 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
1824 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
1825 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1826 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
1827 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1831 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
1832 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
1833 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
1834 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
1835 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
1836 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
1841 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
1843 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1848 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1849 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1851 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1852 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1853 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1854 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1855 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1856 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1858 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
1860 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1863 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1867 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1868 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1869 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1870 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1871 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1872 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1873 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1874 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1876 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
1878 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1883 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1884 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1885 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1886 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1887 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1888 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1889 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1890 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1892 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
1893 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
1895 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
1898 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1902 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1903 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1904 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1905 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1906 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1907 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1908 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1909 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1911 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
1912 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
1913 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1914 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, commitment_signed.is_some());
1915 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
1917 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1918 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1919 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1921 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
1922 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1923 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1924 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1925 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1926 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1927 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1928 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1930 commitment_signed: msg,
1934 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1935 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1936 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1942 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1947 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
1948 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
1949 let mut forward_event = None;
1950 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1951 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1952 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1953 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1954 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1956 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1957 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1958 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1959 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
1961 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1962 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
1967 match forward_event {
1969 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1970 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1971 time_forwardable: time
1979 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1980 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
1981 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1982 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1983 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1984 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1985 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1986 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1987 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1989 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
1990 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
1991 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1992 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, pending_forwards, pending_failures);
1994 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
1995 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1996 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2000 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2001 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2002 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2006 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2008 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2011 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2012 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2014 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2019 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2020 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2021 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2022 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2023 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2024 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2025 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2026 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2028 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2030 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2035 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2036 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2037 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2039 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2040 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2041 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2042 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2044 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2045 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2048 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2049 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2050 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2052 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2053 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2054 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2055 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2056 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2059 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2061 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2062 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2063 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2064 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2065 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2066 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2067 contents: announcement,
2069 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2072 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2077 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2078 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2079 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2081 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2082 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2083 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2084 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2086 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2087 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2088 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2089 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2090 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2091 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2092 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2093 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2094 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2096 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2097 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2099 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order);
2100 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2103 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2104 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2105 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2109 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2110 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2111 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2112 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2117 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2118 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2119 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2120 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2126 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2130 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2135 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2136 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2137 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2143 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2147 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2148 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2149 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2150 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2152 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2153 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2155 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2156 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2157 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2159 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2160 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2161 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2162 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2163 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2165 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2166 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2168 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2169 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2171 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2172 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2173 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2175 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2178 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2179 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2180 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2181 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2182 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2183 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2184 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2185 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2195 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2196 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2198 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2200 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2201 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2202 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2203 node_id: their_node_id,
2207 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2213 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2214 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2215 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2216 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2217 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2219 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2220 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2221 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2222 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2223 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2225 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2226 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2231 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2232 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2233 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2238 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2239 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2240 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2241 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2242 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2244 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2245 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2246 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2247 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2248 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2250 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2251 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2256 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2257 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2258 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2263 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2264 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2265 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2266 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2267 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2268 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2270 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2271 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2272 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2273 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2274 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2275 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2276 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2277 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2278 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2279 msg: funding_locked,
2281 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2282 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2283 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2284 msg: announcement_sigs,
2287 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2288 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2289 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2290 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2291 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2295 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2296 for tx in txn_matched {
2297 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2298 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2299 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2300 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2301 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2303 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2304 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2305 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2306 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2307 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2308 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2317 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2318 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2319 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2321 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2322 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2323 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2324 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2325 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2326 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2327 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2336 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2337 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2339 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2340 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2343 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2344 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2345 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2346 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2348 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2349 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2350 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2351 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2352 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2353 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2354 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2355 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2357 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2358 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2359 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2369 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2370 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2372 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2373 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2377 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2378 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2379 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2380 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2381 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2384 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2385 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2386 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2389 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2390 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2391 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2394 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2395 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2396 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2399 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2400 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2401 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2404 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2405 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2406 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2409 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2410 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2411 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2414 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2415 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2416 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2419 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2420 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2421 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2424 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2425 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2426 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2429 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2430 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2431 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2434 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2435 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2436 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2439 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2440 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2441 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2444 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2445 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2446 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2449 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2450 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2451 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2454 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2455 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2456 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2459 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2460 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2461 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2462 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2464 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2465 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2466 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2467 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2468 if no_connection_possible {
2469 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2470 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2471 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2472 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2473 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2475 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2476 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2477 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2487 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2488 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2489 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2490 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2491 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2492 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2493 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2494 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2496 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2497 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2498 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2507 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2508 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2510 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2511 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2512 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2517 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2518 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2520 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2521 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2522 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2523 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2524 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2525 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2526 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2527 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2528 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2529 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2533 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2534 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2535 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2541 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2544 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2545 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2547 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2548 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2549 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2550 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2554 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2559 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2560 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2562 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2563 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2564 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2566 onion.write(writer)?;
2570 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2571 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2572 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2573 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2574 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2579 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2580 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2581 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2583 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2584 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2586 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2588 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2589 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2590 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2591 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2592 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2597 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2598 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2600 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2602 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2604 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2606 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2613 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2614 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2615 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2616 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2617 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2618 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2623 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2624 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2626 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2628 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2630 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2632 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2639 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2640 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2641 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2642 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2643 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2644 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2649 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2652 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2655 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2656 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2658 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2660 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2662 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2664 route.write(writer)?;
2665 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2666 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2673 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2674 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2675 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2676 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2677 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2678 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2679 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2680 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2682 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2687 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2688 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2690 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2694 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2696 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2697 data.write(writer)?;
2704 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
2705 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
2706 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2707 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
2708 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2709 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
2710 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
2712 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2717 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
2718 prev_short_channel_id,
2723 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
2724 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2725 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
2727 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2728 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2730 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
2731 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
2732 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
2734 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2735 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
2736 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2737 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2738 unfunded_channels += 1;
2741 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
2742 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2743 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2744 channel.write(writer)?;
2748 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2749 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
2750 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2751 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2752 for forward in pending_forwards {
2753 forward.write(writer)?;
2757 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2758 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
2759 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2760 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2761 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
2762 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
2770 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
2772 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
2774 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
2775 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
2776 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
2777 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
2778 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
2779 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
2780 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
2781 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
2782 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
2783 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
2784 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
2785 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
2786 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
2787 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
2788 /// deserialization.
2789 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
2791 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2793 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
2794 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
2795 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2797 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
2798 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
2799 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
2800 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
2801 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2803 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
2804 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
2805 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
2806 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
2807 /// force-closed during deserialization.
2808 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
2809 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
2810 /// deserialization.
2811 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
2812 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
2813 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
2814 pub default_config: UserConfig,
2816 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
2817 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
2819 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
2820 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
2821 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
2822 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
2824 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
2826 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
2829 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
2830 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2831 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2832 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2833 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2834 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2837 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2838 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2839 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2841 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
2843 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2844 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
2845 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
2846 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
2847 for _ in 0..channel_count {
2848 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
2849 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
2850 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2853 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
2854 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
2855 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
2856 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
2857 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
2858 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
2859 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
2860 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
2861 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
2863 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2864 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
2866 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
2869 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2873 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
2874 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
2875 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
2879 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2880 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
2881 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
2882 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
2883 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2884 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
2885 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
2886 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2888 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
2891 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2892 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
2893 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
2894 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2895 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2896 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
2897 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
2898 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2900 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
2903 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
2905 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
2906 monitor: args.monitor,
2907 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
2908 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
2910 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
2911 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
2912 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
2914 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
2917 next_forward: Instant::now(),
2920 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
2922 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
2924 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2925 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2926 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
2927 logger: args.logger,
2928 default_configuration: args.default_config,
2931 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
2932 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
2933 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
2934 //connection or two.
2937 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))