1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
18 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
19 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
22 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
23 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
26 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
29 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
30 use util::config::UserConfig;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use ln::channelmanager::PaymentHash;
67 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
69 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
70 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
72 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
73 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
75 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
76 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
77 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
82 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
83 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
86 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
87 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
89 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
93 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
95 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
96 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
97 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
98 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
101 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
103 pub enum HTLCSource {
104 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
107 session_priv: SecretKey,
108 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
109 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
110 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
115 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
116 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
117 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
118 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
119 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
127 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
135 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
137 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
138 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
139 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
140 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
141 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
142 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
144 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
146 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
147 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
148 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
149 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
150 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
152 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
153 err: msgs::HandleError,
154 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
156 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
158 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
162 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
163 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
165 data: err.to_string()
169 shutdown_finish: None,
173 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
174 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
177 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
181 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
182 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
184 data: err.to_string()
188 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
192 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
195 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
197 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
199 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
201 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
202 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
204 data: msg.to_string()
209 shutdown_finish: None,
214 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
215 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
217 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
218 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
220 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
224 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
225 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
226 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
227 /// probably increase this significantly.
228 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
230 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
231 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
233 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
236 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
237 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
238 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
239 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
240 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
241 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
242 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
244 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
248 struct ChannelHolder {
249 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
250 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
251 next_forward: Instant,
252 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
253 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
254 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
255 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
256 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
257 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
258 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
260 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
261 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
262 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
263 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
265 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
266 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
267 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
268 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
269 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
270 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
271 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
274 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
276 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
277 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
278 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
279 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
280 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
281 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
286 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
287 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
289 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
290 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
292 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
293 /// to individual Channels.
295 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
296 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
297 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
298 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
300 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
301 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
302 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
303 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
304 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
305 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
306 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
308 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
309 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
310 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
311 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
313 pub struct ChannelManager {
314 default_configuration: UserConfig,
315 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
316 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
317 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
318 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
319 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
321 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
322 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
323 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
325 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
326 our_network_key: SecretKey,
328 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
329 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
330 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
331 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
332 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
334 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
339 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
340 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
341 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
342 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
343 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
344 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
345 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
347 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS +
348 // HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
349 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it
350 // backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel
351 // on-chain to time out the HTLC.
354 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
356 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
357 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
360 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
362 macro_rules! secp_call {
363 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
366 Err(_) => return Err($err),
373 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
375 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
376 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
381 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
382 pub struct ChannelDetails {
383 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
384 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
385 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
386 /// lifetime of the channel.
387 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
388 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
389 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
390 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
391 /// The node_id of our counterparty
392 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
393 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
394 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
395 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
399 macro_rules! handle_error {
400 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
403 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
404 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
405 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
406 if let Some(update) = update_option {
407 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
408 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
419 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
420 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
423 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
424 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
426 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
427 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
428 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
429 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
430 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
432 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
438 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
439 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
442 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
443 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
445 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
446 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
447 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
448 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
449 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
451 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
457 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
458 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
459 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
461 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
462 if $action_type != RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst { panic!("Bad return_monitor_err call!"); }
463 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $raa_first_dropped_cs)
465 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
466 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, false)
468 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
470 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
471 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
472 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
473 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
475 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
476 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
477 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
478 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
479 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
480 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
481 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
482 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
483 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
484 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
486 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
487 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $raa_first_dropped_cs);
488 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()));
494 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
495 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
496 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
498 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
499 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
500 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
501 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
503 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
505 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
506 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), false);
512 impl ChannelManager {
513 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
515 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
516 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
518 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
520 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
521 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
522 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
524 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
525 default_configuration: config.clone(),
526 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
527 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
528 monitor: monitor.clone(),
532 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
533 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
536 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
537 by_id: HashMap::new(),
538 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
539 next_forward: Instant::now(),
540 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
541 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
542 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
544 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
546 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
547 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
553 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
554 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
558 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
560 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
561 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
562 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
563 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
565 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
566 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
568 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
569 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
570 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
571 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
572 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
575 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
576 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
578 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
579 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
580 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
581 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
582 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
583 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
585 panic!("RNG is bad???");
588 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
590 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
591 node_id: their_network_key,
597 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
598 /// more information.
599 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
600 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
601 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
602 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
603 res.push(ChannelDetails {
604 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
605 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
606 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
607 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
608 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
614 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
615 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
616 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
617 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
618 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
619 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
620 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
621 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
622 // really wanted anyway.
623 if channel.is_live() {
624 res.push(ChannelDetails {
625 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
626 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
627 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
628 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
629 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
636 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
637 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
638 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
640 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
641 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
642 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
644 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
645 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
646 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
647 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
648 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
649 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
650 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
651 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
654 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
655 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
656 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
658 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
659 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
661 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
664 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
665 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
667 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
668 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
673 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
674 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
675 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
684 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
685 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
686 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
687 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
688 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
690 for tx in local_txn {
691 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
695 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
696 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
697 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
698 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
701 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
702 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
703 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
704 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
705 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
712 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
713 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
714 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
715 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
716 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
722 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
723 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
724 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
725 for chan in self.list_channels() {
726 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
731 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
732 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
734 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
735 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
736 let mut res = [0; 32];
737 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
741 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
742 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
743 let mut res = [0; 32];
744 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
750 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
751 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
752 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
753 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
754 let mut res = [0; 32];
755 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
760 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
761 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
762 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
763 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
764 let mut res = [0; 32];
765 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
769 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
771 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
772 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
773 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
775 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
776 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
778 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
779 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
780 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
781 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
782 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
784 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
786 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
787 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
789 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
795 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
796 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
797 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
799 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
800 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
806 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
816 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
817 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
818 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
819 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
820 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
821 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
822 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
823 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
825 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
826 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
827 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
828 // the intended recipient).
829 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
830 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
831 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
833 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
834 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
835 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
836 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
840 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
841 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
842 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
844 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
845 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
846 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
848 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
850 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
854 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
856 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
864 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
865 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
867 for i in 0..dst.len() {
872 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
873 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
874 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
875 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
878 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
879 let end_len = iters * 65;
880 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
881 res.resize(end_len, 0);
883 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
884 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
885 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
886 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
887 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
892 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
893 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
895 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
896 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
897 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
898 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
900 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
901 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
902 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
905 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
908 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
909 hmac.input(&packet_data);
910 hmac.input(&associated_data.0[..]);
911 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
916 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
917 hop_data: packet_data,
922 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
923 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
924 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
925 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
927 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
928 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
929 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
930 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
931 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
932 data: packet_crypted,
936 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
937 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
938 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
940 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
943 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
944 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
945 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
946 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
950 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
951 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
954 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
956 failuremsg: failuremsg,
960 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
961 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
962 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
968 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
969 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
970 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
973 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
974 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
977 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
978 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
979 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
980 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
986 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
987 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
988 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
989 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
990 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
991 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
992 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
993 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
996 let shared_secret = {
997 let mut arr = [0; 32];
998 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1001 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1003 let mut channel_state = None;
1004 macro_rules! return_err {
1005 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1007 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1008 if channel_state.is_none() {
1009 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1011 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1012 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1013 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1014 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1015 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1020 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1021 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1022 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1023 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1024 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1025 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1026 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1027 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1030 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1031 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1032 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1033 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1034 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1037 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1038 let next_hop_data = {
1039 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1040 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1041 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
1043 let error_code = match err {
1044 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1045 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1047 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1053 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1055 // final_expiry_too_soon
1056 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1057 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1059 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1060 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1061 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1063 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1064 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1065 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1068 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1069 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1070 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1071 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1073 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1075 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1076 short_channel_id: 0,
1077 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1078 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1079 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1082 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1083 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1084 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1086 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1088 let blinding_factor = {
1089 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1090 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1091 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1092 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1093 sha.result(&mut res);
1094 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1096 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1102 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1103 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1106 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1108 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1109 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1110 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1113 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1114 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1115 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1116 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1117 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1118 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1119 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1123 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1124 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1125 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1126 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1127 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1128 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1129 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1131 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1133 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1134 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1136 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1137 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1138 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1139 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1140 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1141 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1142 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1144 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1145 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1147 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1148 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1149 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1151 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1152 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1154 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1155 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1156 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1157 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1159 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1160 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1165 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1166 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1167 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1169 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1170 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1172 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1173 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1175 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1180 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1183 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1184 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1185 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1186 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1187 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1191 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1193 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1194 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1195 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1196 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1197 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1198 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1199 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1200 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1201 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1202 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1205 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1206 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1208 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1214 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1216 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1217 /// fields for more info.
1219 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1220 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1221 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1222 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1223 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1224 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1226 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1228 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1229 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1230 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1231 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1232 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1233 /// relevant updates.
1235 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1236 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1237 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1238 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1239 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1240 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1241 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1242 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1244 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1245 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1246 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1247 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1251 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1253 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1255 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1256 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1257 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1258 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1260 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1262 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1263 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1265 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1266 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1267 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1270 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1271 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1273 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1274 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1276 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1277 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1279 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1280 route: route.clone(),
1281 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1282 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1283 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1285 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1286 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1287 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1288 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1289 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1290 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1291 // something else in case we will resend later!
1292 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1295 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1296 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1297 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1298 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1299 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1300 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1301 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1309 } else { unreachable!(); }
1313 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1314 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1316 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1318 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1319 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1320 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1321 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1325 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1330 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1332 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1333 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1335 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1337 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1338 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1339 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1340 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1342 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1344 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1345 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1347 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1348 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1349 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1350 } else { unreachable!(); })
1356 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1357 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1358 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1361 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1362 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1363 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1364 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1371 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1372 // lock before add_update_monitor
1373 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1377 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1378 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1379 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1382 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1383 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1384 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1386 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1392 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1393 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1395 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1397 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1399 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1400 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1402 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1403 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1404 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1405 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1406 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1410 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1412 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1413 /// Will likely generate further events.
1414 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1415 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1417 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1418 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1420 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1421 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1423 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1427 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1428 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1429 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1430 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1432 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1433 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1434 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1435 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1436 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1437 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1439 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1444 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1446 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1447 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1448 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1449 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1450 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1451 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1453 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1455 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1456 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1461 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1463 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1464 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1465 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1466 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1467 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1468 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1469 // this channel currently :/.
1476 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1477 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1480 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1481 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1483 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1487 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1490 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1491 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1492 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1493 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1494 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1495 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1496 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1498 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1503 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1504 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1505 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1506 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1507 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1509 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1510 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1511 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1513 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1514 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1515 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1522 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1524 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1525 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1529 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1530 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1531 events.append(&mut new_events);
1534 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1535 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1536 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1538 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1539 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1540 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1541 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1542 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1543 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1549 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1550 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1551 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1552 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1553 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1554 /// still-available channels.
1555 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1557 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1558 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1559 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1560 match &onion_error {
1561 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1562 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1563 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1564 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1565 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1570 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1571 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1572 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1573 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1577 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { .. } => {
1578 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1579 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1580 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1581 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1583 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1584 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1585 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1586 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1587 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1588 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1594 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1595 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1596 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1597 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1598 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1599 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1601 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1602 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1603 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1607 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1609 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1610 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1614 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1615 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1616 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1617 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1620 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1621 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1622 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1623 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1624 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1625 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1626 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1628 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1634 //TODO: Do something with e?
1642 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1643 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1644 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1646 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1647 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1648 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1649 sha.input(&payment_preimage.0[..]);
1650 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
1651 sha.result(&mut payment_hash.0[..]);
1653 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1655 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1656 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1657 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1658 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1659 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1660 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1665 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1667 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1668 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1669 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1670 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1674 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1675 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1676 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1678 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1679 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1681 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1682 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1688 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1689 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1690 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1691 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1692 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1693 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1696 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1697 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1698 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1699 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1700 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1701 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1702 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1703 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1711 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1712 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1713 //TODO: Do something with e?
1721 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1722 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1723 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1726 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1727 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1729 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1730 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1731 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1732 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1733 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1736 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1737 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1738 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1739 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1740 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1741 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1742 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1743 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1745 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1746 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1747 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1748 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1749 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1750 // on-chain confirmations.
1751 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once its merged a test
1752 // should be written.
1753 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1754 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1756 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1757 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1758 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1764 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1767 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1768 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1769 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1771 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1773 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1774 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1775 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1776 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1781 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1782 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1783 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1784 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1785 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1790 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1794 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1805 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1806 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1808 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1810 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1811 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1815 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1816 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1817 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1820 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1821 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1822 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1823 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1824 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1825 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1826 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1827 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1828 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1829 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1831 entry.insert(channel);
1837 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1838 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1839 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1840 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1841 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1842 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1843 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1844 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1845 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1847 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1848 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1850 //TODO: same as above
1851 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1854 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1855 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1856 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1857 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1858 output_script: output_script,
1859 user_channel_id: user_id,
1864 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1865 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1866 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1867 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1868 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1869 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1870 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1871 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1872 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1874 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1879 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1880 // lock before add_update_monitor
1881 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1884 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1885 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1886 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1887 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1888 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1890 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1891 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1892 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1901 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1902 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1903 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1904 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1905 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1906 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1907 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1908 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1909 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1911 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1912 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1915 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1917 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1920 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1921 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1922 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1923 user_channel_id: user_id,
1928 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1929 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1930 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1931 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1932 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1933 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1934 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1935 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1937 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1938 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1939 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1940 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1941 msg: announcement_sigs,
1946 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1950 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1951 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1952 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1953 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1955 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1956 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1957 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1958 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1959 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1961 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1962 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1963 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1964 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1968 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1969 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1970 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1974 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1975 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1976 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1978 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1979 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1981 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1984 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1985 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1987 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1988 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1989 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1990 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1998 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1999 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2000 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2001 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2002 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2003 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2004 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2005 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2006 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2008 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2009 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2010 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2011 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2016 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2017 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2018 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2019 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2020 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2021 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2022 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2024 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2025 } else { (tx, None) }
2027 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2030 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2031 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2033 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2034 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2035 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2036 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2044 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2045 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2046 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2047 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2049 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2050 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2051 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2052 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2054 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2055 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2057 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2058 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2059 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2060 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2061 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2063 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2064 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2065 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2066 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2067 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2068 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2069 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2070 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2071 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2072 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2073 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &update.encode_with_len()[..])
2075 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2076 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2077 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2078 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2079 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2080 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2085 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2087 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2092 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2093 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2095 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2096 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2097 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2098 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2099 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2100 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2102 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2104 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2107 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2111 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
2112 // indicating that the payment itself failed
2113 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
2114 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
2115 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
2116 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
2117 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
2119 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
2120 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
2124 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
2125 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
2126 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
2129 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
2131 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
2132 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
2133 if res.is_some() { return; }
2135 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
2136 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2137 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2139 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2141 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2142 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2143 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2144 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2145 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2147 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2149 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2150 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2151 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2152 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2153 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2154 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2156 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2157 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
2158 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2159 // definitely came from the peer in question
2160 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
2162 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
2164 match error_code & 0xff {
2166 // either from an intermediate or final node
2167 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
2168 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
2169 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
2170 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
2171 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2172 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2173 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
2174 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2175 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
2176 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2177 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2183 if is_from_final_node {
2184 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2185 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2186 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2187 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2188 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2189 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2192 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2193 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2197 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2198 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2199 // does not coform to the spec.
2200 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2201 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2202 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2208 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2212 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2214 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2215 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2216 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2220 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2221 let offset = match error_code {
2222 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2223 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2224 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2225 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2226 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2227 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2229 // node sending unknown code
2230 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2231 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2238 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2239 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2240 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2241 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2242 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2243 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2244 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2245 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2248 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2249 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2250 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2251 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2253 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2254 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2255 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2256 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2257 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2259 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2260 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2261 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2262 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2264 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2265 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2266 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2267 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2269 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2270 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2273 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2274 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2278 res = Some((msg, true));
2284 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2287 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2288 res = Some((None, true));
2292 // node sending unknown code
2293 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2294 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2303 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2304 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2305 } else { ((None, true)) }
2308 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2309 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2310 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2311 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2312 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2313 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2314 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2315 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2317 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2319 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2324 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2325 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2326 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2327 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2328 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2329 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2330 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2331 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2333 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2334 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2336 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2339 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2343 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2344 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2345 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2346 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2347 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2348 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2349 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2350 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2352 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2353 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2354 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2355 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, commitment_signed.is_some());
2356 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2358 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2359 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2360 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2362 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2363 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2364 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2365 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2366 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2367 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2368 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2369 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2371 commitment_signed: msg,
2375 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2376 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2377 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2383 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2388 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2389 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2390 let mut forward_event = None;
2391 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2392 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2393 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2394 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2395 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2397 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2398 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2399 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2400 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2402 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2403 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2408 match forward_event {
2410 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2411 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2412 time_forwardable: time
2420 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2421 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2422 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2423 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2424 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2425 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2426 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2427 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2428 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2430 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2431 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2432 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2433 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2435 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2436 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2437 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2441 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2442 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2443 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2447 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2449 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2452 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2453 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2455 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2460 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2461 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2462 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2463 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2464 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2465 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2466 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2467 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2469 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2471 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2476 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2477 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2478 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2480 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2481 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2482 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2483 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2485 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2486 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2489 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2490 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2491 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2493 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2494 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2495 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2496 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2497 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2500 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2502 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2503 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2504 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2505 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2506 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2507 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2508 contents: announcement,
2510 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2513 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2518 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2519 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2520 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2522 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2523 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2524 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2525 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2527 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2528 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2529 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2530 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2531 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2532 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2533 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2534 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2535 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2537 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2538 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2540 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order);
2541 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2544 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2545 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2546 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2550 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2551 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2552 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2553 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2558 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2559 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2560 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2561 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2567 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2571 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2576 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2577 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2578 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2584 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2588 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2589 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2590 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2591 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2593 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2594 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2596 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2597 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2598 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2600 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2601 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2602 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2603 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2604 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2606 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2607 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2609 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2610 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2612 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2613 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2614 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2616 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2619 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2620 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2621 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2622 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2623 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2624 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2625 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2626 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2636 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2637 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2639 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2641 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2642 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2643 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2644 node_id: their_node_id,
2648 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2654 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2655 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2656 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2657 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2658 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2660 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2661 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2662 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2663 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2664 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2666 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2667 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2672 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2673 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2674 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2679 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2680 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2681 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2682 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2683 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2685 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2686 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2687 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2688 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2689 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2691 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2692 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2697 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2698 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2699 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2704 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2705 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2706 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2707 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2708 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2709 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2711 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2712 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2713 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2714 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2715 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2716 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2717 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2718 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2719 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2720 msg: funding_locked,
2722 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2723 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2724 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2725 msg: announcement_sigs,
2728 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2729 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2730 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2731 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2732 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2736 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2737 for tx in txn_matched {
2738 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2739 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2740 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2741 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2742 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2744 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2745 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2746 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2747 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2748 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2749 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2758 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2759 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2760 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2762 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2763 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2764 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2765 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2766 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2767 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2768 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2777 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2778 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2780 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2781 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2784 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2785 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2786 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2787 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2789 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2790 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2791 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2792 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2793 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2794 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2795 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2796 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2798 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2799 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2800 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2810 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2811 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2813 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2814 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2818 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2819 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2820 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2821 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2822 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2825 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2826 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2827 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2830 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2831 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2832 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2835 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2836 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2837 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2840 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2841 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2842 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2845 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2846 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2847 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2850 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2851 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2852 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2855 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2856 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2857 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2860 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2861 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2862 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2865 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2866 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2867 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2870 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2871 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2872 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2875 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2876 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2877 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2880 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2881 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2882 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2885 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2886 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2887 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2890 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2891 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2892 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2895 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2896 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2897 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2900 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2901 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2902 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2903 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2905 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2906 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2907 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2908 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2909 if no_connection_possible {
2910 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2911 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2912 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2913 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2914 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2916 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2917 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2918 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2928 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2929 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2930 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2931 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2932 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2933 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2934 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2935 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2937 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2938 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2939 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2948 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2949 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2951 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2952 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2953 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2958 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2959 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2961 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2962 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2963 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2964 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2965 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2966 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2967 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2968 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2969 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2970 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2974 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2975 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2976 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2982 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2985 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2986 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2988 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2989 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2990 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2991 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2995 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3000 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3001 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3003 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
3004 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3005 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
3007 onion.write(writer)?;
3011 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3012 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3013 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3014 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3015 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3020 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
3021 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3022 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3024 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
3025 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3027 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
3029 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3030 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3031 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3032 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3033 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3038 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3039 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3041 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3043 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3045 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3047 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3054 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3055 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3056 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3057 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3058 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3059 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3064 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3065 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3067 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3069 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3071 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3073 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3080 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3081 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3082 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3083 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3084 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3085 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3090 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3093 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3096 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3097 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3099 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3101 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3103 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3105 route.write(writer)?;
3106 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3107 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3114 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3115 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3116 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3117 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3118 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3119 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3120 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3121 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3123 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3128 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3129 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3131 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
3135 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3137 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3138 data.write(writer)?;
3145 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3146 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3147 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3148 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3149 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3150 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3151 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3153 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3158 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
3159 prev_short_channel_id,
3164 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3165 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3166 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3168 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3169 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3171 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3172 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3173 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3175 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3176 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3177 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3178 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3179 unfunded_channels += 1;
3182 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3183 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3184 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3185 channel.write(writer)?;
3189 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3190 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3191 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3192 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3193 for forward in pending_forwards {
3194 forward.write(writer)?;
3198 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3199 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3200 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3201 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3202 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3203 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3211 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3213 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3215 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3216 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3217 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3218 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3219 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3220 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3221 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3222 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3223 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3224 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3225 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3226 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3227 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3228 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3229 /// deserialization.
3230 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3232 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3234 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3235 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3236 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3238 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3239 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3240 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3241 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3242 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3244 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3245 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3246 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3247 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3248 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3249 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3250 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3251 /// deserialization.
3252 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3253 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3254 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3255 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3257 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3258 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3260 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3261 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3262 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3263 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3265 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3267 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3270 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3271 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3272 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3273 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3274 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3275 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3278 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3279 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3280 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3282 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3284 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3285 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3286 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3287 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3288 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3289 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3290 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3291 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3294 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3295 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3296 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3297 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3298 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3299 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3300 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3301 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3302 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3304 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3305 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3307 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3310 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3314 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3315 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3316 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3320 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3321 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3322 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3323 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3324 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3325 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3326 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3327 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3329 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3332 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3333 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3334 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3335 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3336 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3337 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3338 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3339 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3341 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3344 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3346 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3347 monitor: args.monitor,
3348 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3349 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3351 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3352 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3353 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3355 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3358 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3361 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3363 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3365 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3366 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3367 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3368 logger: args.logger,
3369 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3372 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3373 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3374 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3375 //connection or two.
3378 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3384 use chain::chaininterface;
3385 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3386 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3387 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
3388 use chain::keysinterface;
3389 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
3390 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3391 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3392 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
3393 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3395 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
3396 use util::test_utils;
3397 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3398 use util::errors::APIError;
3399 use util::logger::Logger;
3400 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3401 use util::config::UserConfig;
3403 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3404 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3405 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
3406 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
3407 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3408 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
3409 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
3410 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3411 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3412 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3416 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3417 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3419 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3420 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3422 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3424 use std::cell::RefCell;
3425 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap, HashSet};
3426 use std::default::Default;
3428 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3429 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3430 use std::time::Instant;
3433 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3434 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3435 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3440 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3441 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3444 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3445 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3448 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3449 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3452 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3453 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3456 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3457 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3462 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3464 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3465 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3470 fn onion_vectors() {
3471 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3472 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3474 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3475 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3476 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3477 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3478 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3480 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3481 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3482 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3483 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3484 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3486 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3487 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3488 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3489 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3490 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3492 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3493 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3494 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3495 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3496 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3498 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3499 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3500 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3501 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3502 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3504 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3505 let payloads = vec!(
3506 msgs::OnionHopData {
3508 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3509 short_channel_id: 0,
3511 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3515 msgs::OnionHopData {
3517 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3518 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3519 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3520 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3524 msgs::OnionHopData {
3526 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3527 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3528 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3529 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3533 msgs::OnionHopData {
3535 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3536 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3537 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3538 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3542 msgs::OnionHopData {
3544 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3545 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3546 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3547 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3553 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &PaymentHash([0x42; 32]));
3554 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3556 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3560 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3561 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3563 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3564 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3565 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3567 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3568 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3570 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3571 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3573 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3574 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3576 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3577 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3579 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3580 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3583 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3584 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3585 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3586 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3588 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3589 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3594 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3595 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3596 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3597 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3599 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3600 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3601 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3603 impl Drop for Node {
3604 fn drop(&mut self) {
3605 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3606 // Check that we processed all pending events
3607 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3608 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3609 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3614 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3615 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3618 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3619 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3620 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3621 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3624 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3625 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3627 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3628 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3630 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3631 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3634 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3635 }, match events[1] {
3636 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3637 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3638 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3639 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3640 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3641 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3642 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3643 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3645 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3651 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3652 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3654 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3655 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3657 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3658 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3661 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3667 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3668 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3670 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3671 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3673 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3674 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3677 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3683 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3684 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
3686 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3687 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3694 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3695 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3696 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3697 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3699 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3703 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3704 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3706 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3707 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3708 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3710 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3711 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3713 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3715 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3716 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3717 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3718 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3719 added_monitors.clear();
3721 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3724 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3726 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3727 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3728 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3729 added_monitors.clear();
3732 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3734 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3735 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3736 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3737 added_monitors.clear();
3740 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3741 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3743 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3744 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3745 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3747 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3753 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3754 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3755 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3759 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3760 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3761 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3762 ((match events_6[0] {
3763 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3764 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3765 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3768 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3769 }, match events_6[1] {
3770 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3771 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3778 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3779 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3780 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3784 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3785 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3786 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3787 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3789 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3790 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3791 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3792 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3795 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3798 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3799 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3800 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3801 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3802 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3803 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3806 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3809 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3811 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3814 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3815 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3818 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3819 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3821 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3822 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3823 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3825 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3828 macro_rules! check_spends {
3829 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3831 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3832 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3833 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3834 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3839 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3840 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3842 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3843 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3844 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3845 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3846 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3849 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3850 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3852 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3853 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3856 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3863 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
3864 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3865 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3868 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3869 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3871 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3872 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3873 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3874 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3875 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3878 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3881 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3882 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3885 Some(match events_1[1] {
3886 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3887 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3890 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3894 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3895 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3896 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3897 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3898 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3899 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3900 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3902 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3903 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3904 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3905 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3906 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3907 (as_update, bs_update)
3909 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3911 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3912 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3913 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3914 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3916 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3917 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3918 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3919 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3920 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3921 (as_update, bs_update)
3923 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3924 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3926 (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
3931 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3932 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3935 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3936 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3937 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3938 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3939 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3940 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3943 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3945 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3946 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3950 fn from_node(node: &Node) -> SendEvent {
3951 let mut events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3952 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3953 SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap())
3957 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3958 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3960 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3961 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3962 added_monitors.clear();
3967 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3968 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3970 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3971 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3972 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3973 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3974 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3977 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
3979 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3980 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3981 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3982 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3983 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3984 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3985 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3986 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3987 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3988 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3990 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3991 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3995 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3997 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3998 if $fail_backwards {
3999 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4000 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4002 (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack)
4005 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
4007 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
4008 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4009 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
4010 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
4011 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
4012 assert!(extra_msg_option.is_none());
4016 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
4018 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
4019 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
4021 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4022 if $fail_backwards {
4023 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
4024 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
4026 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4028 added_monitors.clear();
4033 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
4035 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
4038 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
4040 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
4041 if $fail_backwards {
4042 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4043 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
4044 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
4045 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4046 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4048 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4054 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
4057 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32]);
4058 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
4059 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
4060 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
4061 sha.input(&payment_preimage.0[..]);
4062 sha.result(&mut payment_hash.0[..]);
4063 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
4068 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
4069 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4071 let mut payment_event = {
4072 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4073 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
4075 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4076 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4077 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4079 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
4081 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
4082 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
4084 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4085 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
4086 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4088 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4089 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4091 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4092 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4095 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4096 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4098 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4099 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4100 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4102 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4103 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4104 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
4106 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4109 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4110 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4111 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
4112 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4113 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4119 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
4122 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4123 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4124 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4126 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4127 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4128 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
4131 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4132 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4134 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4135 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4136 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4137 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4138 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4139 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4140 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4141 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
4143 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4149 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
4150 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
4152 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4153 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
4154 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4155 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4159 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
4160 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
4162 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4163 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4164 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
4165 get_next_msgs!($node)
4167 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4170 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4171 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
4176 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4177 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4178 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4179 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
4180 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4181 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
4182 } else if update_next_msgs {
4183 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
4185 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4187 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4188 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4195 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
4196 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4197 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4199 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4200 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4202 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4207 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4208 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
4211 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
4213 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
4214 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4215 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4216 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4217 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4220 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4223 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4224 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4225 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4226 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4227 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4230 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4232 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4234 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4235 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4239 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4240 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4241 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4244 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
4245 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
4246 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4248 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4249 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4250 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4252 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4253 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4258 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4259 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4260 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4261 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4262 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4263 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4264 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4265 // second-to-last node!
4266 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4269 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4270 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4271 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4273 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4274 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4275 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4276 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4277 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4278 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4279 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4280 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4282 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4285 assert!(events.is_empty());
4287 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4288 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4295 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4297 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4298 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4300 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
4301 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4302 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4304 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4309 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
4310 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4313 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4314 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4315 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4316 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4318 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4319 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4321 for i in 0..node_count {
4322 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", i)));
4323 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4324 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4325 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4326 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4327 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4328 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4329 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4330 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4331 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4332 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4333 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4334 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4335 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
4336 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4337 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4345 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4346 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4347 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4348 let channel_id = chan.2;
4351 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4355 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4356 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4357 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4358 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4359 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4360 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4361 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4362 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4363 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4364 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4366 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4368 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4370 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4371 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4374 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4375 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4376 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4377 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4378 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4380 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4383 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4385 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4386 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4387 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4390 let payment_event = {
4391 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4392 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4393 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4395 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4396 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4398 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4399 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4400 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4401 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4402 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4405 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4406 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4407 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4408 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4411 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4412 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4413 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4414 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4415 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4416 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4417 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4420 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4421 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4422 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4423 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4424 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4425 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4426 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4429 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4430 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4431 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4434 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4435 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4438 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4441 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4442 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4444 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4445 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4448 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4453 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4454 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4455 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4456 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4457 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4458 let channel_id = chan.2;
4461 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4463 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4464 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4467 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4468 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4469 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4470 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4473 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4476 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4478 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4479 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4480 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4483 let payment_event = {
4484 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4485 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4486 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4488 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4489 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4491 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4492 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4493 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4494 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4495 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4496 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4498 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4501 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4505 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4506 let nodes = create_network(2);
4507 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4508 let channel_id = chan.2;
4511 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4512 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4513 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4514 // (3) update_fee ->
4515 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4516 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4517 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4518 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4519 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4520 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4521 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4522 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4523 // revoke_and_ack ->
4524 // B should send no response here
4525 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4526 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4527 // revoke_and_ack ->
4529 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4530 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4531 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4534 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4535 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4536 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4537 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4538 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4540 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4543 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4544 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4545 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4546 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4549 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4551 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4552 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4553 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4555 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4556 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4557 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4558 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4561 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4563 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4565 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4567 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4568 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4569 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4571 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4572 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4573 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4574 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4575 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4576 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4577 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4579 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4580 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4581 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4583 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4585 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4586 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4590 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4591 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4594 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4595 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4598 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4599 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4600 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4603 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4604 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4609 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4610 let nodes = create_network(2);
4611 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4612 let channel_id = chan.2;
4614 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4615 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
4616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4618 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4619 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4620 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4621 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4622 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4624 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4626 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4628 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4629 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4632 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4633 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4636 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4637 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4638 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4641 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4642 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4647 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
4648 let nodes = create_network(2);
4649 let channel_value = 1888;
4650 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
4651 let channel_id = chan.2;
4654 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
4655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4656 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4658 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4660 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
4662 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
4663 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
4665 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4666 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4668 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
4669 let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
4670 let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
4671 let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
4672 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
4673 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
4676 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
4677 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
4678 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
4679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4681 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4683 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4685 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
4686 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
4687 //Should produce and error.
4688 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
4690 assert!(match err.err {
4691 "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
4695 //clear the message we could not handle
4696 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4700 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4701 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4702 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4703 let channel_id = chan.2;
4706 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4708 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4709 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4712 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4713 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4714 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4715 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4716 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4718 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4720 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4721 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4722 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4725 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4727 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4729 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4730 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4732 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4733 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4734 added_monitors.clear();
4736 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4737 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4738 // node[1] has nothing to do
4740 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4741 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4744 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4745 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4746 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4747 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4748 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4750 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4752 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4753 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4754 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4755 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4756 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4757 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4759 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4760 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4762 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4764 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4766 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4768 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4770 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4771 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4773 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4775 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4777 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4778 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4780 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4781 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4783 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4784 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4786 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4787 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4789 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4790 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4793 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4795 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4796 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4797 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4801 fn test_update_fee() {
4802 let nodes = create_network(2);
4803 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4804 let channel_id = chan.2;
4807 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4808 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4809 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4810 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4811 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4812 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4813 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4814 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4815 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4816 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4817 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4818 // revoke_and_ack ->
4820 // Create and deliver (1)...
4821 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4822 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4825 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4826 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4827 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4828 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4829 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4831 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4833 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4835 // Generate (2) and (3):
4836 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4837 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4841 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4842 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4845 // Create and deliver (4)...
4846 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4848 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4849 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4850 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4851 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4852 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4854 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4857 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4858 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4861 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4862 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4864 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4865 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4867 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4868 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4871 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4872 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4875 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4876 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4877 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4878 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4879 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4880 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4881 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4882 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4883 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4886 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4888 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4889 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4891 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4893 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4895 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4896 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4897 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4901 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4902 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4903 let nodes = create_network(2);
4904 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4905 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4906 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4907 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4909 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4910 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4911 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4912 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4913 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4915 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4916 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4917 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4918 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4919 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4920 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4922 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4923 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4927 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4928 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4929 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4930 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4931 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4932 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4933 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4935 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4937 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4938 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4939 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4940 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4941 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4943 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4944 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4946 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4947 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4948 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4949 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4950 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4952 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4954 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4955 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4956 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4957 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4958 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4959 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4960 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4962 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4963 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4965 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4966 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4967 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4968 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4969 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4970 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4971 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4973 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4974 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4976 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4977 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4979 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4982 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4983 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4984 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4985 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4986 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4987 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4989 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4991 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4992 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4993 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4994 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4995 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4999 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
5000 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
5001 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5002 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5003 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5005 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5006 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5007 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
5008 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5009 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5010 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5011 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5012 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5013 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5014 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5016 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
5017 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5018 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
5019 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5021 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5022 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5024 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5025 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
5027 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5028 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5029 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5030 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5031 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5032 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5034 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5035 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5037 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5038 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5040 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest } => {
5041 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5042 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5044 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5047 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5048 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5049 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5050 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5051 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5052 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5053 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5055 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5057 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5058 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5059 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5060 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5061 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5064 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
5065 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
5066 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
5067 let nodes = create_network(3);
5068 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5069 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5071 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
5073 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
5074 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5076 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
5077 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5079 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5083 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5084 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5086 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5087 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5088 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5089 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5091 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
5092 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5093 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5095 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
5096 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
5097 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5098 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5101 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5102 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5103 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
5105 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5107 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5108 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5110 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5112 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5113 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5114 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5115 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5116 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5117 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5118 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5120 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5121 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
5123 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5124 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5125 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5126 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5127 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5128 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5129 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5131 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5132 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5134 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5135 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
5137 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5140 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5142 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5143 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5144 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
5147 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5148 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5150 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5151 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5152 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5153 if recv_count == 0 {
5154 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
5155 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5157 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5158 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5159 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
5161 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5162 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5163 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5165 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5166 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5168 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5169 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5170 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
5172 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
5173 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5174 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5175 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5176 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5178 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5179 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5180 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5181 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5182 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5183 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5185 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5187 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5188 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5189 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5190 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5191 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5192 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5194 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5195 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5196 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5197 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5198 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5200 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5201 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5203 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5207 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5209 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5210 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5211 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5212 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5213 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5217 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5218 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5219 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5220 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5224 fn fake_network_test() {
5225 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5226 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5227 let nodes = create_network(4);
5229 // Create some initial channels
5230 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5231 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5232 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5234 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5235 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5236 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5237 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5238 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5240 // Send some more payments
5241 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5242 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5243 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5245 // Test failure packets
5246 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5247 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5249 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5250 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5252 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5253 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5254 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5255 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5256 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5257 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5258 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5260 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5261 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5262 hops.push(RouteHop {
5263 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5264 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5266 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5268 hops.push(RouteHop {
5269 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5270 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5272 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5274 hops.push(RouteHop {
5275 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5276 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5278 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5280 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5281 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5282 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5284 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5285 hops.push(RouteHop {
5286 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5287 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5289 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5291 hops.push(RouteHop {
5292 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5293 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5295 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5297 hops.push(RouteHop {
5298 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5299 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5301 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5303 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5304 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5305 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5307 // Claim the rebalances...
5308 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5309 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5311 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5312 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5314 // Send some payments across both channels
5315 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5316 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5317 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5319 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5321 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5323 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5324 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5325 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5327 // Close down the channels...
5328 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5329 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5330 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5331 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5332 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5336 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5337 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5338 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5339 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5341 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5342 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5343 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5344 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5345 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5346 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5348 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5350 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5351 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5353 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5354 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5356 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5357 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5358 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5361 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5362 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5363 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5365 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5366 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5367 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5369 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5370 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5372 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5374 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5375 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5376 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5378 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5379 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5380 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5381 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5382 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5383 res.push(tx.clone());
5388 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5389 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5392 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5394 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5395 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5396 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5397 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5398 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5399 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5401 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5403 res.push(tx.clone());
5407 assert!(res.len() == 2 || res.len() == 3);
5409 assert_eq!(res[1], res[2]);
5413 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5417 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5418 /// HTLC transaction.
5419 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5420 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5421 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5422 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5423 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5424 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5428 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5431 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5432 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5434 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5435 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5436 let mut found_prev = false;
5438 for tx in prev_txn {
5439 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5440 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5441 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5442 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5448 assert!(found_prev);
5450 let mut res = Vec::new();
5451 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5455 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5456 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5457 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5458 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5459 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5462 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5465 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5466 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5467 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5468 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5471 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5475 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5476 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5480 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5482 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5483 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5485 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5486 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5488 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5489 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5493 fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
5495 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5496 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5498 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5499 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5500 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5501 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5502 chan.get_value_stat()
5506 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5507 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5508 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5510 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5511 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5513 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5514 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5516 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5517 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5518 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5519 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5520 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5524 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5526 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5527 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5528 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5529 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5534 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5535 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5536 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5537 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5539 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5540 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5541 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5543 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5548 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5549 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5551 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5553 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5555 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5556 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5557 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5559 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5560 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5564 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5565 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5566 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5568 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5569 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5572 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5575 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5576 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5577 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5578 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5579 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5582 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5583 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5584 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5585 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5586 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5590 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5591 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5592 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5593 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5595 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5596 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5600 // adding pending output
5601 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5602 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5604 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5605 let payment_event_1 = {
5606 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5609 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5610 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5611 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5613 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5615 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5616 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5618 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5619 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5620 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5621 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5626 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5627 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5629 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5630 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5631 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5632 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5633 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5635 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5637 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5638 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5639 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5640 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5641 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5642 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5644 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5645 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5646 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5647 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5651 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5653 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5655 // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
5656 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5657 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5658 let channel_close_broadcast = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5659 assert_eq!(channel_close_broadcast.len(), 1);
5660 match channel_close_broadcast[0] {
5661 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5662 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5664 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5670 // split the rest to test holding cell
5671 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5672 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5674 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5675 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5678 // now see if they go through on both sides
5679 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5680 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5681 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5683 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5684 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5686 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5688 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5689 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5690 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5691 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5695 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5696 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5697 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5699 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5700 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5702 // flush the pending htlc
5703 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5704 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5707 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5709 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5711 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5712 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5713 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5714 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5716 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5717 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5720 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5722 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5723 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5724 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5726 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5727 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5729 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5730 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5731 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5732 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5733 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5734 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5736 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5737 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5738 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5739 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5741 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5742 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5744 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5745 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5747 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5748 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5749 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5754 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5755 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5756 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5761 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5762 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5763 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5765 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5766 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5767 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5768 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5770 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5771 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5775 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5776 do_channel_reserve_test(false);
5777 do_channel_reserve_test(true);
5781 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5782 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5783 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5784 let nodes = create_network(5);
5786 // Create some initial channels
5787 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5788 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5789 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5790 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5792 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5793 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5794 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5795 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5796 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5798 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5799 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5801 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5802 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5803 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5804 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5806 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5807 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5808 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5810 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5811 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5813 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5814 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5816 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5817 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5818 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5819 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5821 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5822 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5823 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5825 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5826 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5828 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5829 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5831 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5832 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5834 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5835 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5836 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5837 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5839 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5845 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5846 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5847 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5849 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5851 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5852 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5854 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5855 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5857 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5859 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5860 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5861 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5863 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5864 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5865 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5868 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5869 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5870 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5871 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5872 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5876 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5877 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5878 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5879 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5880 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5883 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5885 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5886 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5888 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5889 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5890 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5891 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5892 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5895 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5897 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5898 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5900 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5902 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5903 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5904 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5908 fn test_justice_tx() {
5909 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5911 let nodes = create_network(2);
5912 // Create some new channels:
5913 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5915 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5916 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5917 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5918 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5919 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5920 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5921 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5922 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5923 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5924 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5925 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
5926 // Revoke the old state
5927 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5930 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5931 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5933 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5934 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5935 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5936 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5938 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5939 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5941 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5943 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5944 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5945 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5946 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5947 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5949 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5951 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5952 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5954 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5955 // Create some new channels:
5956 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5958 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5959 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5960 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5961 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5962 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5963 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5964 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5965 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5966 // Revoke the old state
5967 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5969 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5970 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5972 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5973 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5974 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5975 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5977 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5978 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5980 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5982 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5983 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5984 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5985 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5986 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5988 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5989 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5990 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5994 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5995 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5996 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5997 let nodes = create_network(2);
5998 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5999 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
6000 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6001 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
6002 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
6003 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
6004 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
6005 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
6007 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
6008 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6009 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6010 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6011 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
6013 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6015 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6016 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6018 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
6019 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6020 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6024 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
6025 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
6026 let nodes = create_network(2);
6028 // Create some new channel:
6029 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6031 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6032 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6033 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
6034 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6035 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
6037 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6038 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6039 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
6040 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6041 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
6042 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6043 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
6044 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
6045 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6047 //Revoke the old state
6048 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6051 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6052 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6053 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6055 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6056 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6058 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6059 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6061 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6064 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6065 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6067 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
6068 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6070 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
6072 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6073 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6074 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6075 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6076 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6077 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6078 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
6079 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
6081 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
6082 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6083 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
6085 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6086 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
6087 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
6088 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
6089 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6090 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
6092 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6093 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6094 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6098 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
6099 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
6100 let nodes = create_network(2);
6102 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6104 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6105 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6106 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
6107 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
6108 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6109 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
6111 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6112 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6114 //Revoke the old state
6115 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6118 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6119 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6120 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6122 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6123 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6125 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6126 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6131 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6132 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6134 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
6135 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
6136 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
6137 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
6138 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
6139 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
6140 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
6142 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6143 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6144 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6146 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
6147 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6148 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6149 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6150 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6152 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6153 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6154 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6155 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6156 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6157 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6158 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
6159 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
6161 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
6162 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
6164 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
6165 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
6166 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
6167 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
6168 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6169 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6171 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6172 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6173 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6177 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
6178 // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
6179 // ChainWatchInterface and pass the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
6180 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
6181 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
6182 // First, C should claim the HTLC output via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
6183 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
6184 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
6186 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
6187 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
6188 // the HTLC output via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
6189 // PaymentSent event).
6191 let nodes = create_network(3);
6193 // Create some initial channels
6194 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6195 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6197 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
6198 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6199 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6201 let (our_payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
6202 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6204 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
6205 // Broadcast HTLC Success transation by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
6206 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6207 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
6208 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6209 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6211 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6212 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6213 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6214 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6215 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6217 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6218 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6219 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6221 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6222 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6224 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
6225 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
6226 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
6227 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6228 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6229 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6230 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6231 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6233 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
6234 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: node_txn}, 1);
6235 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6237 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
6238 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
6239 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
6240 added_monitors.clear();
6242 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6244 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6245 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6248 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6249 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6250 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6251 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6252 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6253 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6255 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6258 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
6259 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transaction, as well as a
6260 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
6261 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6262 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6263 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6264 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6265 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6266 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6267 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
6268 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
6269 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6270 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6271 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6272 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6273 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
6277 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
6278 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
6279 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6280 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
6281 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6282 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6283 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6285 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6286 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6288 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success) * 2 (block-rescan)
6289 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
6290 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6291 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6292 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6293 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6294 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
6295 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6296 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6297 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
6298 // we already checked the same situation with A.
6300 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
6301 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6302 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6303 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6305 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6306 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6308 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6309 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6311 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6312 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
6314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6316 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6317 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6318 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6319 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6320 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6321 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6322 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6323 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6324 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6325 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6326 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6327 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6328 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
6332 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
6333 // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
6334 // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC bacward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
6335 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
6336 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
6337 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
6339 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
6341 let nodes = create_network(3);
6343 // Create some intial channels
6344 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6345 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6347 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
6348 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6349 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6351 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
6352 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6354 // Brodacast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
6355 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6356 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6357 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown);
6359 let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
6360 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
6361 added_monitors.clear();
6363 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6364 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6366 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6367 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6368 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6369 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6370 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6371 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6373 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6375 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6376 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6377 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6379 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6380 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6382 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
6383 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6384 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6385 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6387 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output fron C's commitment tx on B's chain
6388 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
6389 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
6392 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6393 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 6 (HTLC-Timeout tx, commitment tx, timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6394 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
6395 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
6396 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[7]);
6397 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6398 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6399 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
6400 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6401 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6402 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6403 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_2.3.clone());
6404 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone());
6405 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6406 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6407 timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone();
6411 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1);
6412 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6414 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6416 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6417 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6420 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6421 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6422 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6423 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6424 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6425 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6427 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6429 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // Well... here we detect our own htlc_timeout_tx so no tx to be generated
6430 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
6432 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
6433 let commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6434 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
6436 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
6437 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6438 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6440 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6441 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6443 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 block-rescan
6444 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6445 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6446 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6447 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6448 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6449 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6450 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6451 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6455 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
6456 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
6457 // and fail backward accordingly.
6459 let nodes = create_network(3);
6461 // Create some initial channels
6462 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6463 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6465 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6466 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
6467 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6468 // Revoke the old state
6469 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
6471 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6473 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6474 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6475 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6477 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6479 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6480 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6483 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
6484 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6485 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6486 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6487 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6488 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6490 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6491 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6493 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6494 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6496 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6497 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6499 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6500 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6502 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
6503 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6506 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6510 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool) {
6511 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
6512 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
6513 // commitment transaction anymore.
6514 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
6515 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
6516 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
6517 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
6518 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
6519 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
6521 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
6522 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
6523 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
6524 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
6525 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
6526 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6528 // Create some initial channels
6529 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6530 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6532 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6533 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
6534 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6535 // Revoke the old state
6536 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
6538 let (_, first_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6539 let (_, second_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6540 let (_, third_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6542 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
6543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6544 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6545 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6546 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6547 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6548 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6549 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6550 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6551 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
6552 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
6554 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
6555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6556 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6557 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6558 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6559 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6560 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6561 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6562 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6563 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6565 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
6566 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
6567 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
6568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6570 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
6571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6572 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6573 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6574 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6575 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6576 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6577 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6578 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6579 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
6580 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
6581 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6583 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
6584 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
6585 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
6586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6588 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
6589 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
6590 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6591 let (_, fourth_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6592 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, fourth_payment_hash).unwrap();
6593 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6594 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6598 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
6599 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, one as we generate a commitment for
6600 // nodes[0] to fail first_payment_hash backwards.
6601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6604 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
6605 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6607 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6608 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6610 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6611 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6613 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6614 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
6616 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6619 if !deliver_bs_raa {
6620 // If we delivered the RAA already then we already failed first_payment_hash backwards.
6621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6624 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6625 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 });
6626 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 0 }] {
6627 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6628 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6632 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6633 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6634 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6635 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6636 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6637 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6639 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6642 // Due to the way backwards-failing occurs we do the updates in two steps.
6643 let updates = match events[1] {
6644 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
6645 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6646 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6647 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6648 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6649 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6651 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6652 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6654 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6655 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6657 let bs_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6658 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6660 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6661 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6664 if !deliver_bs_raa {
6665 // If we delievered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
6666 // that we should update our routing table for.
6667 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6668 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6670 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6671 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6674 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6675 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6677 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6678 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6680 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6685 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6688 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6689 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
6690 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6691 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6692 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6693 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
6694 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6696 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6697 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6698 for event in events {
6700 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6701 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6705 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6706 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6708 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6709 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6711 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6714 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6715 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6717 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6720 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
6721 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
6722 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
6726 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive() {
6727 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false);
6728 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true);
6732 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
6733 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
6734 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
6735 let nodes = create_network(2);
6736 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6738 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
6739 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
6741 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6742 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6744 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6745 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6747 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6751 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6752 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
6754 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6755 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6758 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6759 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6761 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6762 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6764 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6768 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6769 // registering new transactions
6770 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6774 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6775 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6776 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6777 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6778 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6780 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6782 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6784 let mut payment_event = {
6785 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6788 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6789 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6790 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6793 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6794 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6796 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6797 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6799 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6800 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6803 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6804 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6806 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6807 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6808 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6809 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6812 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6813 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6815 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6817 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6818 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6819 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6821 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6822 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6823 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6825 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6826 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6828 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6832 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6833 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6834 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6835 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6836 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6840 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6841 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6843 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6844 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6845 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6847 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6848 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6850 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6853 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6855 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6856 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6857 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6859 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6860 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6861 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6862 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6863 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6864 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6865 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6867 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6871 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6872 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6873 let nodes = create_network(2);
6874 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6876 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6877 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6878 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6879 mem::drop(channel_state);
6881 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6882 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6883 headers.push(header.clone());
6885 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6886 headers.push(header.clone());
6888 while !headers.is_empty() {
6889 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6892 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6893 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6895 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6896 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6898 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6901 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6902 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6903 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6906 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6907 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6909 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6910 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6911 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6912 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6913 res.push(msg.clone());
6915 panic!("Unexpected event")
6923 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6924 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6926 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6928 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6930 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6936 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6937 let mut commitment_update = None;
6938 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6941 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6942 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6943 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6944 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6946 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6947 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6948 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6949 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6951 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6954 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6957 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6959 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6960 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6961 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6962 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6964 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6965 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6966 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6967 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6973 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6978 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6979 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6980 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6981 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6982 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6983 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6984 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6986 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6987 // If a expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6989 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6990 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6993 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6994 // If b expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6996 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6997 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
7000 if send_funding_locked.0 || send_funding_locked.1 {
7001 // If we expect any funding_locked's, both sides better have set
7002 // next_local_commitment_number to 1
7003 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
7004 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
7006 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
7007 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
7011 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
7012 for msg in reestablish_1 {
7013 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
7014 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
7016 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
7017 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7019 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
7022 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
7023 for msg in reestablish_2 {
7024 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
7025 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
7027 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
7028 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7030 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
7033 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
7034 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
7035 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
7037 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
7038 if send_funding_locked.0 {
7039 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
7040 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7041 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
7042 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
7043 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
7044 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
7045 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7048 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
7051 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7052 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
7053 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7054 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7056 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
7058 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
7059 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
7060 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7061 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
7063 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7065 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
7066 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
7067 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7068 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
7069 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
7071 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
7072 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
7074 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
7075 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
7078 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7079 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
7081 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7082 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7083 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
7084 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7085 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7086 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7087 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7090 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
7094 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
7095 if send_funding_locked.1 {
7096 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
7097 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7098 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
7099 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
7100 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
7101 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
7102 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7105 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
7108 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7109 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
7110 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7111 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7113 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
7115 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
7116 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
7117 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7118 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
7120 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
7121 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
7122 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7123 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
7124 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
7126 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
7127 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
7129 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
7130 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
7133 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7134 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
7136 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7137 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7138 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
7139 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7140 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7141 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7142 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7145 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
7151 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
7152 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
7153 let nodes = create_network(3);
7154 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7155 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
7157 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7158 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7159 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7161 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7162 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7163 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
7164 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
7166 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7167 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7168 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7170 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7171 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7172 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7173 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7175 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7176 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7178 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
7179 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
7181 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
7183 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7184 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7186 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
7187 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
7189 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7192 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
7193 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
7194 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
7196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7200 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
7201 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
7204 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
7205 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
7206 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7207 if messages_delivered == 0 {
7208 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7209 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
7211 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7214 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7215 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7217 let payment_event = {
7218 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
7219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7221 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7222 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7223 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7225 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
7227 if messages_delivered < 2 {
7228 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
7230 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7231 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
7232 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7234 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7236 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
7237 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7238 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7241 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
7242 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
7243 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7244 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7247 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
7248 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7249 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7257 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7258 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7259 if messages_delivered < 3 {
7260 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
7261 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
7262 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7263 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
7264 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
7265 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
7266 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
7267 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
7268 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7269 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
7270 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
7271 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
7272 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
7273 // Everything was delivered...
7274 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7277 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7278 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7280 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7281 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7284 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7285 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7286 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7288 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7289 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7291 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7292 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7294 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7295 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7296 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7298 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7301 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
7302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7304 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7305 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7306 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
7307 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
7308 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7309 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7310 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7311 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7312 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7313 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7314 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
7316 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7319 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
7320 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
7322 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7323 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7325 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7326 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
7328 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7331 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
7332 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
7333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7334 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7336 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
7337 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7338 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7341 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
7342 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
7343 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7344 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7347 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
7348 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7349 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7357 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7358 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7359 if messages_delivered < 2 {
7360 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7361 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
7362 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
7363 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7364 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7366 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7367 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
7369 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7372 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
7373 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
7374 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
7375 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
7376 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
7377 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7378 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
7379 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
7380 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
7381 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
7382 // Everything was delivered...
7383 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7386 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7387 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7388 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7390 // Channel should still work fine...
7391 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
7392 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7396 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
7397 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
7398 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
7399 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
7400 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
7404 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
7405 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
7406 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
7407 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
7411 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
7412 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
7413 let nodes = create_network(2);
7414 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7416 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7417 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7419 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
7420 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7421 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7423 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7424 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7426 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7429 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7431 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7432 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7434 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
7435 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7436 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
7438 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7439 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7441 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7444 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7445 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7447 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7450 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7452 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
7453 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
7455 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7456 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7457 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
7461 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
7462 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
7463 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
7464 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7465 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7467 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7469 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7470 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7471 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7473 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
7474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7476 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7477 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7479 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7480 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7483 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7486 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7487 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7489 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7490 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7491 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7492 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7493 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7494 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7495 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7497 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7498 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7499 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7501 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7502 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7504 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7507 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
7508 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7509 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7512 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7515 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7516 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7518 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7519 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7520 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7521 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7522 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7523 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7525 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7526 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7527 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7528 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7530 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7531 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7533 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7534 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7536 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7538 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7539 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7540 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7541 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7542 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7543 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7544 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7545 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7546 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7549 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
7550 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7551 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7552 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7553 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7554 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7555 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
7556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7558 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7559 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7560 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7561 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7562 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7563 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7564 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
7565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7567 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7568 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7569 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7572 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7573 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7574 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7577 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7578 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7581 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7582 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7584 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7585 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7588 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7589 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7591 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7592 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7594 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
7595 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7597 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7600 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7601 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7604 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7608 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
7609 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
7610 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7611 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7613 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7614 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7616 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7617 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7620 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7621 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
7623 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7624 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7627 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, .. } => assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
7628 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7631 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7632 // PaymentFailed event
7634 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7637 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
7638 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
7639 // a disconnect in between
7640 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7641 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7643 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7644 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7646 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7647 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7650 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7651 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7652 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7655 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7656 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7657 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7660 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7661 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7664 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7665 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7666 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
7667 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7668 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7669 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7671 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7673 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7674 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7676 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7677 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7678 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7680 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7683 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
7685 // Now set it to failed again...
7686 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7687 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7688 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7691 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7692 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7693 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7696 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7697 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7698 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7701 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
7702 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7703 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7706 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7707 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7709 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7710 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7713 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7714 // PaymentFailed event
7716 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7720 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
7721 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
7722 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
7725 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
7726 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
7728 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
7729 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
7730 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
7731 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
7732 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
7733 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
7734 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
7735 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
7736 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
7737 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
7738 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
7739 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
7740 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
7741 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
7742 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
7743 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
7744 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
7745 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7746 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7748 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7750 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7751 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7752 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7754 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7755 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7758 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7759 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7760 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7762 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
7763 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
7764 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7766 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7767 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7768 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
7769 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7770 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7771 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7772 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7773 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7774 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7775 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7777 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7778 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7779 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7780 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7782 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7783 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7785 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7788 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
7789 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7790 } else { panic!(); }
7793 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7795 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7798 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7799 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7800 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7803 // Now fix monitor updating...
7804 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7805 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7808 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7809 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7810 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7812 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7813 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7814 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7815 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7816 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7817 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7819 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7820 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7821 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7822 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7824 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7825 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7827 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7830 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7831 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7832 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7834 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7835 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7836 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7837 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7838 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7839 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7841 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7843 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7844 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7846 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7848 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7849 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7851 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7852 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7853 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7855 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7856 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7857 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7859 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7860 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7861 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7862 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7863 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7864 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7866 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7868 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7869 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7870 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7872 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7873 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7875 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7878 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7879 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7880 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7883 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7887 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7888 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7890 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7891 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7892 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7894 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7895 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7898 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7900 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7901 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7902 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7903 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7904 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7907 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7911 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7913 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7914 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7915 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7916 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7919 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7920 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7922 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7923 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7925 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7926 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7929 let as_commitment_update;
7930 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7932 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7933 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7934 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7935 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7936 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7937 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7938 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7939 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7943 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7944 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7945 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7946 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7947 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7948 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7949 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7950 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7954 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7957 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7958 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7960 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7961 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7963 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7964 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7966 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7969 handle_initial_raa!();
7971 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7972 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7974 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7975 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7977 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7978 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7981 handle_initial_raa!();
7983 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7984 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7986 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7987 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7989 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7990 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7992 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7997 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7998 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
8000 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
8001 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
8003 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
8004 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
8008 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8009 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8010 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
8011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8013 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8014 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8015 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
8016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8018 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8019 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8022 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8023 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8026 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8028 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8029 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
8031 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
8032 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
8033 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
8035 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8038 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
8042 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
8043 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
8044 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
8045 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
8046 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
8047 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
8048 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
8052 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
8053 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
8054 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
8055 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
8056 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
8060 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
8061 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
8062 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
8063 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
8064 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
8065 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
8069 fn test_monitor_update_fail_cs() {
8070 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming commitment_signed
8071 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8072 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8074 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8075 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8076 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8079 let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8080 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8082 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8083 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
8084 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8085 } else { panic!(); }
8086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8087 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8089 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8090 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8092 let responses = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8093 assert_eq!(responses.len(), 2);
8095 match responses[0] {
8096 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, ref node_id } => {
8097 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8098 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
8099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8101 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8103 match responses[1] {
8104 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, ref node_id } => {
8105 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8106 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8107 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8108 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8109 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8110 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8112 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8113 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap_err() {
8114 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8115 } else { panic!(); }
8116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8117 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8119 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8122 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8123 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8126 let final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8127 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &final_raa).unwrap();
8128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8130 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8131 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8133 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8134 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8136 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8137 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8139 events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8140 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8142 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, amt } => {
8143 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
8144 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
8146 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8149 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
8152 fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) {
8153 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming RAA
8154 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
8155 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8156 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8158 // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 2 to 1.
8159 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000);
8161 // Route a first payment that we'll fail backwards
8162 let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
8164 // Fail the payment backwards, failing the monitor update on nodes[1]'s receipt of the RAA
8165 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
8166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8168 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8169 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8170 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8171 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8172 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8173 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8174 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8176 let bs_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
8177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8179 // While the second channel is AwaitingRAA, forward a second payment to get it into the
8181 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8182 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8183 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
8184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8186 let mut send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8187 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8188 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
8190 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8191 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
8193 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8194 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8197 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8198 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8200 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8202 // Now fail monitor updating.
8203 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8204 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap_err() {
8205 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8206 } else { panic!(); }
8207 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8208 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8211 // Attempt to forward a third payment but fail due to the second channel being unavailable
8214 let (_, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8215 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8216 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap();
8217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8219 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); // We succeed in updating the monitor for the first channel
8220 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8221 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8222 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
8223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8225 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8226 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8227 match events_2.remove(0) {
8228 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8229 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8230 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8231 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8232 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8233 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8234 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8236 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8237 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8239 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8240 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8241 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } = events[0] {
8242 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
8243 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
8244 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
8246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
8249 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = if test_ignore_second_cs {
8250 // Try to route another payment backwards from 2 to make sure 1 holds off on responding
8251 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8252 let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8253 nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap();
8254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8256 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8257 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8258 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg) {
8259 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
8260 } else { panic!(); }
8261 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8262 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8263 (Some(payment_preimage_4), Some(payment_hash_4))
8264 } else { (None, None) };
8266 // Restore monitor updating, ensuring we immediately get a fail-back update and a
8267 // update_add update.
8268 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8269 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8272 let mut events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8273 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8274 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 3);
8276 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
8279 // Note that the ordering of the events for different nodes is non-prescriptive, though the
8280 // ordering of the two events that both go to nodes[2] have to stay in the same order.
8281 let messages_a = match events_3.pop().unwrap() {
8282 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } => {
8283 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8284 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8285 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8286 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8287 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8288 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8289 (updates.update_fail_htlcs.remove(0), updates.commitment_signed)
8291 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
8293 let raa = if test_ignore_second_cs {
8294 match events_3.remove(1) {
8295 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg } => {
8296 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8299 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8302 let send_event_b = SendEvent::from_event(events_3.remove(0));
8303 assert_eq!(send_event_b.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8305 // Now deliver the new messages...
8307 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &messages_a.0).unwrap();
8308 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], messages_a.1, false);
8309 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8310 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
8311 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } = events_4[0] {
8312 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
8313 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
8314 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
8316 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8317 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8318 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.commitment_msg).unwrap();
8319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8320 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8321 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa.unwrap()).unwrap();
8322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8323 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8324 assert!(bs_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8325 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8326 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8327 assert!(bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8328 assert!(bs_cs.update_fee.is_none());
8330 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8332 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8333 assert!(as_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8334 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8335 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8336 assert!(as_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8337 assert!(as_cs.update_fee.is_none());
8339 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8341 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8343 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8345 let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8347 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
8348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8349 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8351 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa).unwrap();
8352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8353 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8355 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], send_event_b.commitment_msg, false);
8358 let events_5 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8359 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
8361 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8362 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8365 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8366 nodes[2].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8368 let events_6 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8369 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
8371 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); },
8372 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8375 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8376 let events_7 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8377 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
8379 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8380 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8383 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8384 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8387 send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
8388 assert_eq!(send_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8389 assert_eq!(send_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8390 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8391 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
8393 let events_8 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8394 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
8396 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8397 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8400 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8401 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8403 let events_9 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8404 assert_eq!(events_9.len(), 1);
8406 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_4.unwrap()),
8407 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8409 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4.unwrap());
8412 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
8416 fn test_monitor_update_fail_raa() {
8417 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(false);
8418 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(true);
8422 fn test_monitor_update_fail_reestablish() {
8423 // Simple test for message retransmission after monitor update failure on
8424 // channel_reestablish generating a monitor update (which comes from freeing holding cell
8426 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
8427 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8428 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8430 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
8432 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8433 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8435 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
8436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8437 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8438 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8439 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8440 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8441 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8442 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8443 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8445 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8446 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8448 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8449 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8450 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8452 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8453 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8455 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
8457 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap_err() {
8458 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8459 } else { panic!(); }
8460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8462 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8463 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8465 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8466 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8468 assert!(as_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8469 assert!(bs_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8471 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
8473 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap();
8474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8475 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8477 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8478 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8481 updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8482 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8483 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8484 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8485 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8486 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8487 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8488 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8490 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8491 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8493 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage),
8494 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8499 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
8500 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
8501 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8502 let nodes = create_network(2);
8504 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8506 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8507 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8508 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
8509 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
8511 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
8513 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8514 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8516 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8517 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8519 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
8521 let mut chan_announcement;
8523 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
8525 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
8526 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
8527 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
8528 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
8529 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
8530 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
8531 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
8532 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
8533 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8538 macro_rules! sign_msg {
8539 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
8540 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
8541 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8542 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8543 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
8544 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
8545 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
8546 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
8547 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
8548 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
8549 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
8550 contents: $unsigned_msg
8555 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8556 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8557 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
8558 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
8560 // Configured with Network::Testnet
8561 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8562 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
8563 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8564 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
8566 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8567 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
8568 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8569 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
8572 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
8573 impl Writer for VecWriter {
8574 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
8575 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
8578 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
8579 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
8584 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
8585 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8587 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
8589 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8591 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8592 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8593 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8595 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8596 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8597 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8598 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8600 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8601 let config = UserConfig::new();
8602 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8603 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
8604 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
8605 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
8606 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8607 default_config: config,
8609 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8610 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8611 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8612 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8613 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8614 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8617 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8619 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8620 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8621 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
8622 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
8623 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
8624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8626 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8627 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
8628 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8629 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
8631 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
8632 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8633 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
8634 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8636 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8637 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8638 for node in nodes.iter() {
8639 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
8640 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
8641 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
8644 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8648 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
8649 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8650 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8652 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8653 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8655 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8657 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8658 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8659 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8661 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8662 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8663 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8664 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8666 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8667 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8668 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
8669 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
8670 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
8671 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8672 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8674 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8675 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8676 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8677 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8678 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8679 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8682 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8684 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8685 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8688 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8690 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
8691 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8695 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
8696 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
8697 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
8698 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8699 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
8700 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
8702 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
8704 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
8705 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8707 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
8708 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8709 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8710 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8712 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
8714 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
8715 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
8716 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8717 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
8718 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
8721 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8722 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
8723 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
8724 let mut read = &serialized[..];
8725 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8726 assert!(read.is_empty());
8727 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
8730 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8731 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8732 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8733 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8735 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8736 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8737 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8738 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8739 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8740 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
8742 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8744 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
8745 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8746 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8747 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
8748 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
8751 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
8752 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
8753 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8755 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8757 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
8758 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8759 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8760 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
8761 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8763 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8764 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8765 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
8766 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
8767 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8768 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
8771 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
8772 ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => {
8774 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8775 let mut txn = Vec::new();
8776 for event in events {
8778 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
8779 for outp in outputs {
8781 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
8783 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8784 script_sig: Script::new(),
8786 witness: Vec::new(),
8789 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8790 value: output.value,
8792 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8798 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8799 let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
8800 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8801 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8802 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8803 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8804 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8805 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8808 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
8810 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8811 script_sig: Script::new(),
8812 sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
8813 witness: Vec::new(),
8816 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8817 value: output.value,
8819 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8825 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8826 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8827 let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8828 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8829 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8830 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
8831 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
8834 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
8835 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8837 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8838 script_sig: Script::new(),
8840 witness: Vec::new(),
8843 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8844 value: output.value,
8846 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8850 output: vec![outp.clone()],
8853 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) {
8855 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
8857 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
8860 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
8863 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
8864 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8865 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8866 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
8867 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8868 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8869 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8875 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8884 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
8885 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
8886 let nodes = create_network(2);
8888 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8889 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8890 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8892 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8893 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8895 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8896 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8897 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8898 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8900 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8901 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8902 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8903 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8904 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8908 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
8909 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8910 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8912 let nodes = create_network(2);
8914 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8915 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8916 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8918 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8919 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8921 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8922 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8923 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8924 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8926 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8927 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8928 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8930 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8931 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8933 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8934 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
8935 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
8936 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8940 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
8941 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8942 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8944 let nodes = create_network(2);
8946 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
8947 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8948 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8949 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8950 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8952 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8953 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8954 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8955 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8957 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8958 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8960 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8961 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8962 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
8963 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
8964 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
8965 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx
8966 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8970 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
8971 let nodes = create_network(2);
8973 // Create some initial channels
8974 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8976 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8978 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8979 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
8980 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8982 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
8983 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8984 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8986 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
8987 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8989 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
8990 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8993 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8994 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8997 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
8998 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
8999 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
9000 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
9001 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9002 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
9004 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1);
9005 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9006 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9007 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9011 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
9012 let nodes = create_network(2);
9014 // Create some initial channels
9015 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9017 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9018 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9019 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9020 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9022 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9024 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9025 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9026 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9028 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9029 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9031 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9032 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
9033 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
9034 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
9035 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9037 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9038 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9039 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9040 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9044 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
9045 let nodes = create_network(2);
9047 // Create some initial channels
9048 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9050 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9051 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9052 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9053 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9055 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9057 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9058 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
9059 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9060 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9062 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9063 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9065 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9066 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
9067 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
9068 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9069 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9070 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9071 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
9073 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
9074 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9075 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9077 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9078 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9081 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9082 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
9083 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
9084 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
9086 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
9087 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9088 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
9089 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9090 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9091 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone());
9095 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
9096 let nodes = create_network(2);
9098 // Create some initial channels
9099 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9101 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9102 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9103 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9104 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9106 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9108 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9109 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
9110 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9111 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9113 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9114 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9116 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9118 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
9119 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
9120 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9121 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9122 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9124 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
9125 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9126 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9128 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9129 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9132 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9133 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
9134 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
9135 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
9137 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
9138 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
9139 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5);
9140 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
9141 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
9142 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
9143 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
9144 check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
9148 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
9149 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output thanks to
9150 // ChainWatchInterface and claim HTLC on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
9151 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
9152 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
9154 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
9157 let nodes = create_network(3);
9159 // Create some initial channels
9160 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9161 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9163 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
9164 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
9165 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
9167 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
9168 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9169 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9170 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
9171 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9173 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9174 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9175 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9176 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9177 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9179 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
9180 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9181 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9183 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9184 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9187 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
9188 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
9189 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
9190 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
9191 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
9192 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1].clone());
9193 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
9194 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9195 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
9196 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
9198 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
9199 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1);
9201 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9202 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4);
9203 assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]);
9204 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9205 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone()); // HTLC-Timeout on B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9206 assert_eq!(b_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9207 assert!(b_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
9208 assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
9209 check_spends!(b_txn[0], c_txn[1].clone()); // timeout tx on C remote commitment tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
9210 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9211 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
9212 assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
9215 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9217 match msg_events[0] {
9218 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9221 match msg_events[1] {
9222 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
9223 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9224 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9225 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9226 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9227 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
9229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9231 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
9232 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9233 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
9234 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9235 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
9236 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9237 assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[2]); // HTLC-Success tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
9238 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
9239 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9240 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
9241 assert_eq!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
9242 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9243 match msg_events[0] {
9244 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9245 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9250 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
9251 // Topology : A --> B --> C
9252 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
9253 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
9255 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9256 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9258 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
9259 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
9260 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000).1, duplicate_payment_hash);
9262 let commitment_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9263 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9264 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
9266 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9267 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9268 let htlc_timeout_tx;
9269 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
9270 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9271 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
9272 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
9273 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
9274 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9275 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9276 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9277 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9278 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0], node_txn[1].input[0]);
9279 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
9280 check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone());
9281 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone());
9282 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
9285 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9287 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9288 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9291 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
9292 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
9294 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9296 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
9297 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9300 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9301 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9303 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9304 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5);
9305 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
9306 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0], htlc_success_txn[3]);
9307 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9308 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9309 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1], htlc_success_txn[4]);
9310 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9311 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9312 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0], htlc_success_txn[1].input[0]);
9313 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9314 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9316 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200);
9317 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9318 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9319 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9320 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 1);
9321 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9322 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9325 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9326 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9328 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9329 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9330 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9332 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { .. } } => {
9334 _ => { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
9337 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9339 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
9340 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
9342 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9345 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
9346 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
9347 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9348 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9349 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9350 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9351 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 0);
9352 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9355 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9356 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
9358 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9360 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
9361 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
9363 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9368 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
9369 let nodes = create_network(2);
9371 // Create some initial channels
9372 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9374 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
9375 let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9376 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9377 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
9379 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
9380 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9382 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9383 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9384 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9386 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
9387 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9390 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9391 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9393 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9394 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9395 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9396 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9398 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
9399 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9400 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9401 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9402 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone());
9406 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
9407 let nodes = create_network(2);
9409 // Create some initial channels
9410 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9412 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
9413 let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9414 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9415 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
9417 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9418 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9419 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
9420 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9422 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9423 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9425 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9426 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9427 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9428 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9430 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
9431 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
9432 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 8);
9433 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
9434 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[4]);
9435 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[6]);
9436 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
9437 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[5]);
9438 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[7]);
9439 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9440 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
9444 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
9445 let nodes = create_network(2);
9447 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9449 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
9450 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
9452 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9453 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
9454 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2);
9455 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
9456 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx.clone());
9458 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
9459 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2);
9460 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
9461 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);