1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
18 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
19 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
22 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
23 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
26 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
29 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
30 use util::config::UserConfig;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use ln::channelmanager::PaymentHash;
67 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
69 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
70 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
72 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
73 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
75 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
76 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
77 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
82 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
83 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
86 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
87 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
89 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
93 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
95 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
96 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
97 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
98 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
101 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
103 pub enum HTLCSource {
104 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
107 session_priv: SecretKey,
108 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
109 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
110 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
115 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
116 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
117 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
118 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
119 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
127 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
135 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
137 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
138 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
139 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
140 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
141 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
142 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
144 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
146 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
147 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
148 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
149 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
150 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
152 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
153 err: msgs::HandleError,
154 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
156 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
158 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
162 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
163 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
165 data: err.to_string()
169 shutdown_finish: None,
173 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
174 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
177 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
181 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
182 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
184 data: err.to_string()
188 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
192 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
195 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
197 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
199 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
201 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
202 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
204 data: msg.to_string()
209 shutdown_finish: None,
214 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
215 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
217 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
218 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
220 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
224 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
225 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
226 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
227 /// probably increase this significantly.
228 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
230 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
231 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
233 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
236 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
237 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
238 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
239 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
240 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
241 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
242 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
244 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
248 struct ChannelHolder {
249 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
250 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
251 next_forward: Instant,
252 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
253 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
254 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
255 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
256 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
257 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
258 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
260 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
261 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
262 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
263 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
265 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
266 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
267 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
268 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
269 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
270 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
271 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
274 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
276 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
277 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
278 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
279 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
280 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
281 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
286 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
287 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
289 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
290 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
292 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
293 /// to individual Channels.
295 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
296 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
297 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
298 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
300 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
301 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
302 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
303 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
304 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
305 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
306 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
308 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
309 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
310 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
311 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
313 pub struct ChannelManager {
314 default_configuration: UserConfig,
315 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
316 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
317 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
318 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
319 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
321 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
322 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
323 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
325 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
326 our_network_key: SecretKey,
328 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
329 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
330 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
331 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
332 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
334 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
339 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
340 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
341 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
342 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
343 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
344 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
345 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
347 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
348 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
349 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
350 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
353 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
355 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
356 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
359 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
361 macro_rules! secp_call {
362 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
365 Err(_) => return Err($err),
372 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
374 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
375 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
380 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
381 pub struct ChannelDetails {
382 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
383 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
384 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
385 /// lifetime of the channel.
386 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
387 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
388 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
389 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
390 /// The node_id of our counterparty
391 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
392 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
393 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
394 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
398 macro_rules! handle_error {
399 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
402 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
403 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
404 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
405 if let Some(update) = update_option {
406 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
407 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
418 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
419 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
422 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
423 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
425 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
426 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
427 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
428 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
429 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
431 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
437 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
438 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
441 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
442 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
444 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
445 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
446 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
447 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
448 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
450 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
456 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
457 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
458 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
460 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
461 if $action_type != RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst { panic!("Bad return_monitor_err call!"); }
462 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $raa_first_dropped_cs)
464 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
465 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, false)
467 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
469 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
470 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
471 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
472 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
474 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
475 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
476 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
477 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
478 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
479 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
480 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
481 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
482 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
483 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
485 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
486 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $raa_first_dropped_cs);
487 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()));
493 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
494 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
495 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
497 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
498 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
499 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
500 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
502 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
504 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
505 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), false);
511 impl ChannelManager {
512 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
514 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
515 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
517 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
519 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
520 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
521 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
523 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
524 default_configuration: config.clone(),
525 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
526 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
527 monitor: monitor.clone(),
531 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
532 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
535 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
536 by_id: HashMap::new(),
537 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
538 next_forward: Instant::now(),
539 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
540 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
541 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
543 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
545 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
546 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
552 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
553 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
557 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
559 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
560 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
561 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
562 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
564 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
565 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
567 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
568 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
569 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
570 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
571 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
574 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
575 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
577 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
578 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
579 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
580 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
581 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
582 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
584 panic!("RNG is bad???");
587 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
589 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
590 node_id: their_network_key,
596 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
597 /// more information.
598 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
599 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
600 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
601 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
602 res.push(ChannelDetails {
603 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
604 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
605 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
606 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
607 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
613 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
614 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
615 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
616 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
617 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
618 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
619 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
620 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
621 // really wanted anyway.
622 if channel.is_live() {
623 res.push(ChannelDetails {
624 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
625 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
626 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
627 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
628 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
635 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
636 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
637 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
639 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
640 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
641 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
643 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
644 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
645 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
646 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
647 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
648 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
649 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
650 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
653 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
654 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
655 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
657 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
658 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
660 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
663 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
664 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
665 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
667 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
668 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
673 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
674 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
675 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
684 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
685 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
686 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
687 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
688 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
689 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
691 for tx in local_txn {
692 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
696 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
697 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
698 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
699 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
702 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
703 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
704 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
705 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
706 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
713 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
714 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
715 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
716 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
717 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
723 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
724 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
725 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
726 for chan in self.list_channels() {
727 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
732 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
733 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
735 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
736 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
737 let mut res = [0; 32];
738 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
742 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
743 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
744 let mut res = [0; 32];
745 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
751 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
752 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
753 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
754 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
755 let mut res = [0; 32];
756 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
761 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
762 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
763 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
764 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
765 let mut res = [0; 32];
766 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
770 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
772 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
773 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
774 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
776 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
777 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
779 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
780 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
781 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
782 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
783 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
785 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
787 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
788 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
790 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
796 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
797 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
798 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
800 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
801 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
807 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
817 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
818 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
819 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
820 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
821 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
822 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
823 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
824 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
826 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
827 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
828 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
829 // the intended recipient).
830 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
831 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
832 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
834 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
835 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
836 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
837 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
841 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
842 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
843 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
845 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
846 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
847 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
849 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
851 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
855 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
857 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
865 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
866 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
868 for i in 0..dst.len() {
873 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
874 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
875 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
876 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
879 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
880 let end_len = iters * 65;
881 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
882 res.resize(end_len, 0);
884 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
885 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
886 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
887 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
888 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
893 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
894 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
896 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
897 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
898 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
899 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
901 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
902 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
903 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
906 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
909 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
910 hmac.input(&packet_data);
911 hmac.input(&associated_data.0[..]);
912 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
917 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
918 hop_data: packet_data,
923 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
924 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
925 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
926 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
928 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
929 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
930 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
931 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
932 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
933 data: packet_crypted,
937 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
938 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
939 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
941 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
944 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
945 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
946 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
947 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
951 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
952 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
955 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
957 failuremsg: failuremsg,
961 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
962 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
963 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
969 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
970 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
971 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
974 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
975 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
978 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
979 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
980 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
981 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
987 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
988 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
989 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
990 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
991 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
992 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
993 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
994 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
997 let shared_secret = {
998 let mut arr = [0; 32];
999 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1002 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1004 let mut channel_state = None;
1005 macro_rules! return_err {
1006 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1008 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1009 if channel_state.is_none() {
1010 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1012 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1013 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1014 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1015 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1016 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1021 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1022 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1023 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1024 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1025 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1026 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1027 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1028 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1031 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1032 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1033 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1034 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1035 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1038 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1039 let next_hop_data = {
1040 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1041 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1042 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
1044 let error_code = match err {
1045 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1046 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1048 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1054 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1056 // final_expiry_too_soon
1057 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1058 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1060 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1061 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1062 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1064 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1065 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1066 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1069 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1070 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1071 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1072 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1074 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1076 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1077 short_channel_id: 0,
1078 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1079 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1080 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1083 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1084 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1085 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1087 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1089 let blinding_factor = {
1090 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1091 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1092 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1093 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1094 sha.result(&mut res);
1095 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1097 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1103 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1104 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1107 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1109 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1110 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1111 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1114 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1115 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1116 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1117 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1118 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1119 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1120 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1124 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1125 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1126 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1127 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1128 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1129 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1130 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1132 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1134 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1135 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1137 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1138 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1139 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1140 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1141 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1142 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1143 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1145 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1146 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1148 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1149 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1150 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1152 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1153 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1155 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1156 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1157 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1158 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1160 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1161 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1166 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1167 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1168 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1170 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1171 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1173 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1174 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1176 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1181 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1184 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1185 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1186 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1187 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1188 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1192 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1194 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1195 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1196 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1197 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1198 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1199 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1200 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1201 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1202 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1203 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1206 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1207 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1209 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1215 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1217 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1218 /// fields for more info.
1220 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1221 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1222 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1223 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1224 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1225 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1227 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1229 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1230 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1231 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1232 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1233 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1234 /// relevant updates.
1236 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1237 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1238 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1239 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1240 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1241 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1242 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1243 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1245 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1246 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1247 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1248 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1252 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1254 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1256 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1257 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1258 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1259 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1261 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1263 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1264 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1266 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1267 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1268 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1271 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1272 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1274 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1275 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1277 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1278 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1280 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1281 route: route.clone(),
1282 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1283 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1284 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1286 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1287 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1288 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1289 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1290 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1291 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1292 // something else in case we will resend later!
1293 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1296 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1297 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1298 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1299 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1300 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1301 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1302 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1310 } else { unreachable!(); }
1314 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1315 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1317 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1319 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1320 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1321 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1322 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1326 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1331 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1333 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1334 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1336 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1338 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1339 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1340 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1341 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1343 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1345 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1346 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1348 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1349 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1350 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1351 } else { unreachable!(); })
1357 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1358 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1359 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1362 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1363 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1364 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1365 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1372 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1373 // lock before add_update_monitor
1374 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1378 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1379 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1380 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1383 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1384 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1385 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1387 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1393 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1394 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1396 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1398 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1400 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1401 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1403 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1404 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1405 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1406 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1407 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1411 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1413 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1414 /// Will likely generate further events.
1415 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1416 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1418 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1419 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1421 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1422 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1424 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1428 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1429 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1430 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1431 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1433 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1434 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1435 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1436 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1437 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1438 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1440 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1445 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1447 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1448 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1449 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1450 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1451 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1452 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1454 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1456 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1457 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1462 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1464 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1465 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1466 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1467 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1468 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1469 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1470 // this channel currently :/.
1477 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1478 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1481 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1482 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1484 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1488 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1491 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1492 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1493 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1494 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1495 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1496 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1497 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1499 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1504 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1505 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1506 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1507 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1508 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1510 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1511 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1512 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1514 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1515 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1516 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1523 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1525 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1526 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1530 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1531 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1532 events.append(&mut new_events);
1535 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1536 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1537 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1539 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1540 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1541 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1542 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1543 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1544 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1550 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1551 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1552 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1553 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1554 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1555 /// still-available channels.
1556 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1558 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1559 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1560 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1561 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1562 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1563 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1564 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1565 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1570 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1571 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1572 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1575 //TODO: Pass this back (see GH #243)
1576 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1577 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1578 rejected_by_dest: false, // We failed it ourselves, can't blame them
1582 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1583 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1584 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1585 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1586 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1587 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1589 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1590 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1591 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1595 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1597 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1598 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1602 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1603 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1604 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1605 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1608 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1609 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1610 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1611 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1612 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1613 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1614 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1616 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1622 //TODO: Do something with e?
1630 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1631 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1632 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1634 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1635 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1636 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1637 sha.input(&payment_preimage.0[..]);
1638 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
1639 sha.result(&mut payment_hash.0[..]);
1641 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1643 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1644 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1645 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1646 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1647 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1648 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1653 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1655 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1656 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1657 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1658 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1662 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1663 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1664 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1666 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1667 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1669 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1670 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1676 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1677 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1678 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1679 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1680 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1681 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1684 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1685 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1686 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1687 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1688 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1689 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1690 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1691 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1699 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1700 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1701 //TODO: Do something with e?
1709 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1710 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1711 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1714 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1715 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1717 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1718 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1719 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1720 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1721 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1724 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1725 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1726 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1727 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1728 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1729 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1730 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1731 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1733 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1734 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1735 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1736 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1737 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1738 // on-chain confirmations.
1739 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once its merged a test
1740 // should be written.
1741 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1742 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1744 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1745 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1746 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1752 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1755 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1756 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1757 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1759 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1761 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1762 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1763 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1764 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1769 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1770 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1771 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1772 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1773 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1778 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1782 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1793 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1794 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1796 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1798 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1799 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1803 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1804 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1805 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1808 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1809 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1810 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1811 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1812 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1813 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1814 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1815 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1816 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1817 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1819 entry.insert(channel);
1825 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1826 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1827 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1828 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1829 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1830 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1831 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1832 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1833 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1835 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1836 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1838 //TODO: same as above
1839 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1842 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1843 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1844 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1845 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1846 output_script: output_script,
1847 user_channel_id: user_id,
1852 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1853 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1854 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1855 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1856 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1857 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1858 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1859 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1860 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1862 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1864 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1867 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1868 // lock before add_update_monitor
1869 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1872 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1873 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1874 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1875 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1876 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1878 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1879 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1880 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1889 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1890 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1891 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1892 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1893 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1894 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1895 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1896 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1897 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1899 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1900 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1903 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1905 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1908 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1909 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1910 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1911 user_channel_id: user_id,
1916 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1917 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1918 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1919 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1920 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1921 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1922 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1923 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1925 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1926 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1927 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1928 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1929 msg: announcement_sigs,
1934 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1938 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1939 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1940 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1941 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1943 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1944 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1945 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1946 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1947 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1949 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1950 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1951 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1952 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1956 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1957 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1958 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1962 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1963 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1964 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1966 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1967 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1969 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1972 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1973 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1974 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1976 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1977 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1978 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1979 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1987 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1988 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1989 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1990 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1991 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1992 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1993 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1994 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1995 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1997 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1998 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1999 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2000 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2005 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2006 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2007 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2008 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2009 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2010 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2011 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2013 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2014 } else { (tx, None) }
2016 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2019 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2020 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2022 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2023 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2024 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2025 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2033 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2034 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2035 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2036 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2038 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2039 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2040 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2041 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2043 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2044 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2046 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2047 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2048 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2049 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2050 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2052 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2053 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2054 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2055 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2056 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2057 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2058 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2059 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2060 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2061 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2062 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &update.encode_with_len()[..])
2064 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2065 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2066 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2067 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2068 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2069 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2074 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2076 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2081 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2082 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2084 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2085 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2086 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2087 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2088 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2089 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2091 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2093 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2096 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2100 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
2101 // indicating that the payment itself failed
2102 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
2103 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
2104 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
2105 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
2106 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
2108 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
2109 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
2113 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
2114 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
2115 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
2118 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
2120 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
2121 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
2122 if res.is_some() { return; }
2124 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
2125 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2126 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2128 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2130 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2131 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2132 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2133 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2134 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2136 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2138 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2139 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2140 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2141 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2142 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2143 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2145 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2146 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
2147 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2148 // definitely came from the peer in question
2149 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
2151 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
2153 match error_code & 0xff {
2155 // either from an intermediate or final node
2156 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
2157 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
2158 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
2159 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
2160 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2161 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2162 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
2163 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2164 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
2165 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2166 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2172 if is_from_final_node {
2173 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2174 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2175 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2176 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2177 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2178 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2181 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2182 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2186 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2187 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2188 // does not coform to the spec.
2189 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2190 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2191 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2197 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2201 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2203 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2204 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2205 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2209 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2210 let offset = match error_code {
2211 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2212 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2213 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2214 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2215 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2216 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2218 // node sending unknown code
2219 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2220 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2227 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2228 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2229 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2230 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2231 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2232 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2233 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2234 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2237 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2238 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2239 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2240 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2242 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2243 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2244 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2245 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2246 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2248 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2249 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2250 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2251 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2253 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2254 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2255 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2256 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2258 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2259 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2262 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2263 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2267 res = Some((msg, true));
2273 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2276 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2277 res = Some((None, true));
2281 // node sending unknown code
2282 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2283 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2292 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2293 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2294 } else { ((None, true)) }
2297 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2298 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2299 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2300 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2301 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2302 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2303 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2304 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2306 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2308 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2313 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2314 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2315 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2316 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2317 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2318 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2319 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2320 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2322 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2323 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2325 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2332 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2333 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2334 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2335 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2336 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2337 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2338 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2339 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2341 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2342 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2343 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2344 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, commitment_signed.is_some());
2345 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2347 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2348 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2349 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2351 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2352 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2353 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2354 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2355 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2356 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2357 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2358 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2360 commitment_signed: msg,
2364 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2365 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2366 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2372 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2377 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2378 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2379 let mut forward_event = None;
2380 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2381 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2382 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2383 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2384 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2386 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2387 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2388 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2389 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2391 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2392 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2397 match forward_event {
2399 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2400 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2401 time_forwardable: time
2409 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2410 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2411 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2412 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2413 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2414 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2415 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2416 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2417 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2419 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2420 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2421 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2422 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2424 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2425 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2426 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2430 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2431 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2432 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2436 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2438 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2441 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2442 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2444 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2449 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2450 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2451 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2452 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2453 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2454 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2455 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2456 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2458 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2460 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2465 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2466 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2467 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2469 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2471 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2472 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2474 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2475 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2478 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2479 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2480 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2482 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2483 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2484 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2485 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2486 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2489 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2491 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2492 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2493 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2494 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2495 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2496 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2497 contents: announcement,
2499 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2502 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2507 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2508 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2509 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2511 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2512 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2513 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2514 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2516 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2517 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2518 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2519 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2520 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2521 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2522 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2523 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2524 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2526 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2527 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2529 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order);
2530 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2533 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2534 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2535 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2539 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2540 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2541 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2542 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2547 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2548 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2549 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2550 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2556 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2560 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2565 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2566 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2567 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2573 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2577 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2578 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2579 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2580 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2582 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2583 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2585 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2586 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2587 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2589 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2590 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2591 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2592 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2593 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2595 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2596 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2598 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2599 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2601 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2602 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2603 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2605 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2608 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2609 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2610 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2611 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2612 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2613 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2614 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2615 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2625 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2626 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2628 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2630 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2631 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2632 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2633 node_id: their_node_id,
2637 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2643 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2644 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2645 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2646 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2647 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2649 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2650 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2651 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2652 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2653 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2655 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2656 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
2661 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2662 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2663 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2668 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2669 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2670 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2671 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2672 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2674 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2675 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2676 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2677 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2678 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2680 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2681 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
2686 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2687 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2688 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2693 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2694 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2695 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2696 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2697 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2698 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2700 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2701 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2702 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2703 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2704 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2705 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2706 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2707 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2708 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2709 msg: funding_locked,
2711 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2712 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2713 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2714 msg: announcement_sigs,
2717 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2718 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2719 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2720 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2721 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2725 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2726 for tx in txn_matched {
2727 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2728 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2729 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2730 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2731 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2733 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2734 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2735 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2736 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2737 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2738 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2747 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2748 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2749 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2751 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2752 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2753 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2754 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2755 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2756 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2757 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2766 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2767 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2769 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2770 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2773 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2774 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2775 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2776 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2778 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2779 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2780 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2781 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2782 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2783 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2784 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2785 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2787 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2788 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2789 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2799 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2800 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2802 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2803 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2807 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2808 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2809 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2810 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2811 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2814 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2815 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2816 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2819 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2820 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2821 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2824 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2825 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2826 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2829 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2830 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2831 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2834 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2835 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2836 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2839 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2840 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2841 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2844 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2845 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2846 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2849 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2850 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2851 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2854 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2855 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2856 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2859 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2860 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2861 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2864 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2865 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2866 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2869 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2870 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2871 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2874 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2875 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2876 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2879 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2880 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2881 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2884 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2885 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2886 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2889 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2890 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2891 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2892 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2894 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2895 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2896 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2897 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2898 if no_connection_possible {
2899 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2900 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2901 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2902 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2903 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2905 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2906 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2907 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2917 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2918 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2919 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2920 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2921 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2922 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2923 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2924 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2926 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2927 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2928 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2937 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2938 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2940 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2941 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2942 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2947 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2948 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2950 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2951 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2952 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2953 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2954 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2955 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2956 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2957 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2958 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2959 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2963 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2964 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2965 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2971 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2974 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2975 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2977 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2978 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2979 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2980 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2984 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2989 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2990 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2992 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2993 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2994 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2996 onion.write(writer)?;
3000 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3001 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3002 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3003 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3004 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3009 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
3010 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3011 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3013 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
3014 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3016 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
3018 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3019 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3020 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3021 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3022 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3027 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3028 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3030 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3032 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3034 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3036 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3043 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3044 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3045 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3046 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3047 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3048 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3053 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3054 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3056 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3058 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3060 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3062 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3069 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3070 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3071 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3072 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3073 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3074 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3079 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3082 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3085 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3086 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3088 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3090 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3092 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3094 route.write(writer)?;
3095 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3096 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3103 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3104 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3105 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3106 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3107 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3108 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3109 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3110 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3112 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3117 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3118 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3120 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
3124 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3126 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3127 data.write(writer)?;
3134 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3135 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3136 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3137 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3138 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3139 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3140 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3142 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3147 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
3148 prev_short_channel_id,
3153 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3154 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3155 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3157 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3158 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3160 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3161 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3162 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3164 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3165 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3166 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3167 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3168 unfunded_channels += 1;
3171 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3172 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3173 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3174 channel.write(writer)?;
3178 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3179 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3180 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3181 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3182 for forward in pending_forwards {
3183 forward.write(writer)?;
3187 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3188 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3189 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3190 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3191 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3192 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3200 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3202 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3204 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3205 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3206 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3207 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3208 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3209 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3210 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3211 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3212 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3213 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3214 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3215 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3216 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3217 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3218 /// deserialization.
3219 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3221 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3223 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3224 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3225 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3227 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3228 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3229 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3230 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3231 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3233 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3234 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3235 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3236 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3237 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3238 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3239 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3240 /// deserialization.
3241 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3242 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3243 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3244 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3246 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3247 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3249 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3250 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3251 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3252 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3254 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3256 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3259 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3260 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3261 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3262 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3263 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3264 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3267 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3268 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3269 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3271 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3273 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3274 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3275 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3276 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3277 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3278 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3279 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3280 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3283 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3284 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3285 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3286 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3287 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3288 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3289 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3290 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3291 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3293 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3294 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3296 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3299 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3303 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3304 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3305 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3309 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3310 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3311 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3312 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3313 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3314 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3315 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3316 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3318 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3321 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3322 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3323 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3324 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3325 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3326 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3327 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3328 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3330 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3333 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3335 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3336 monitor: args.monitor,
3337 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3338 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3340 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3341 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3342 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3344 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3347 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3350 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3352 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3354 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3355 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3356 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3357 logger: args.logger,
3358 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3361 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3362 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3363 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3364 //connection or two.
3367 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3373 use chain::chaininterface;
3374 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3375 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3376 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
3377 use chain::keysinterface;
3378 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
3379 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3380 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3381 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
3382 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3384 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
3385 use util::test_utils;
3386 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3387 use util::errors::APIError;
3388 use util::logger::Logger;
3389 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3390 use util::config::UserConfig;
3392 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3393 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3394 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
3395 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
3396 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3397 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
3398 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
3399 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3400 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3401 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3405 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3406 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3408 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3409 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3411 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3413 use std::cell::RefCell;
3414 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap, HashSet};
3415 use std::default::Default;
3417 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3418 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3419 use std::time::Instant;
3422 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3423 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3424 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3429 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3430 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3433 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3434 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3437 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3438 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3441 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3442 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3445 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3446 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3451 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3453 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3454 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3459 fn onion_vectors() {
3460 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3461 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3463 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3464 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3465 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3466 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3467 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3469 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3470 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3471 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3472 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3473 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3475 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3476 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3477 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3478 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3479 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3481 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3482 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3483 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3484 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3485 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3487 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3488 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3489 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3490 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3491 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3493 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3494 let payloads = vec!(
3495 msgs::OnionHopData {
3497 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3498 short_channel_id: 0,
3500 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3504 msgs::OnionHopData {
3506 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3507 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3508 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3509 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3513 msgs::OnionHopData {
3515 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3516 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3517 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3518 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3522 msgs::OnionHopData {
3524 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3525 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3526 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3527 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3531 msgs::OnionHopData {
3533 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3534 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3535 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3536 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3542 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &PaymentHash([0x42; 32]));
3543 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3545 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3549 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3550 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3552 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3553 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3554 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3556 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3557 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3559 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3560 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3562 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3563 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3565 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3566 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3568 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3569 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3572 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3573 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3574 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3575 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3577 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3578 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3583 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3584 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3585 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3586 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3588 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3589 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3590 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3592 impl Drop for Node {
3593 fn drop(&mut self) {
3594 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3595 // Check that we processed all pending events
3596 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3597 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3598 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3603 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3604 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3607 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3608 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3609 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3610 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3613 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3614 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3616 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3617 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3619 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3620 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3623 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3624 }, match events[1] {
3625 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3626 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3627 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3628 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3629 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3630 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3631 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3632 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3634 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3640 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3641 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3643 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3644 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3646 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3647 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3656 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3657 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3659 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3660 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3662 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3663 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3666 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3672 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3673 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
3675 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3676 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3683 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3684 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3685 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3686 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3688 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3692 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3693 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3695 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3696 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3697 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3699 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3700 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3702 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3704 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3705 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3706 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3707 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3708 added_monitors.clear();
3710 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3713 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3715 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3716 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3717 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3718 added_monitors.clear();
3721 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3723 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3724 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3725 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3726 added_monitors.clear();
3729 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3730 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3732 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3733 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3734 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3736 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3742 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3743 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3744 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3748 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3749 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3750 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3751 ((match events_6[0] {
3752 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3753 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3754 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3757 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3758 }, match events_6[1] {
3759 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3760 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3763 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3767 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3768 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3769 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3773 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3774 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3775 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3776 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3778 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3779 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3780 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3781 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3784 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3787 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3788 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3789 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3790 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3791 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3792 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3795 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3798 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3800 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3803 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3804 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3807 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3808 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3810 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3811 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3812 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3814 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3817 macro_rules! check_spends {
3818 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3820 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3821 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3822 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3823 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3828 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3829 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3831 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3832 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3833 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3834 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3835 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3838 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3839 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3841 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3842 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3845 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3852 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
3853 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3854 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3857 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3858 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3860 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3861 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3862 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3863 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3864 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3867 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3870 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3871 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3874 Some(match events_1[1] {
3875 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3876 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3879 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3883 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3884 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3885 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3886 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3887 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3888 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3889 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3891 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3892 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3893 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3894 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3895 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3896 (as_update, bs_update)
3898 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3900 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3901 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3902 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3903 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3905 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3906 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3907 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3908 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3909 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3910 (as_update, bs_update)
3912 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3913 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3915 (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
3920 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3921 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3924 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3925 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3926 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3927 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3928 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3929 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3932 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3934 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3935 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3939 fn from_node(node: &Node) -> SendEvent {
3940 let mut events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3941 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3942 SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap())
3946 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3947 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3949 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3950 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3951 added_monitors.clear();
3956 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3957 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3959 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3960 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3961 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3962 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3963 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3966 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
3968 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3969 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3970 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3971 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3972 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3973 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3974 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3975 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3976 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3977 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3979 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3980 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3983 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3984 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3986 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3987 if $fail_backwards {
3988 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3989 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3991 (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack)
3994 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
3996 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3997 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3998 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3999 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
4000 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
4001 assert!(extra_msg_option.is_none());
4005 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
4007 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
4008 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
4010 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4011 if $fail_backwards {
4012 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
4013 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
4015 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4017 added_monitors.clear();
4022 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
4024 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
4027 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
4029 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
4030 if $fail_backwards {
4031 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4032 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
4033 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
4034 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4035 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4037 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4043 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
4046 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32]);
4047 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
4048 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
4049 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
4050 sha.input(&payment_preimage.0[..]);
4051 sha.result(&mut payment_hash.0[..]);
4052 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
4057 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
4058 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4060 let mut payment_event = {
4061 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4062 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
4064 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4065 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4066 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4068 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
4070 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
4071 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
4073 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4074 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
4075 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4077 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4078 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4080 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4081 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4084 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4085 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4087 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4088 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4089 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4091 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4092 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4093 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
4095 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4098 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4099 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4100 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
4101 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4102 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4108 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
4111 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4112 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4113 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4115 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4116 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4117 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
4120 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4121 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4123 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4124 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4125 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4126 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4127 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4128 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4129 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4130 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
4132 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4138 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
4139 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
4141 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4142 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
4143 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4144 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4148 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
4149 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
4151 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4152 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4153 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
4154 get_next_msgs!($node)
4156 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4159 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4160 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
4165 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4166 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4167 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4168 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
4169 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4170 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
4171 } else if update_next_msgs {
4172 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
4174 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4176 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4177 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4184 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
4185 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4186 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4188 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4189 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4191 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4196 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4197 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
4200 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
4202 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
4203 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4204 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4205 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4206 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4209 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4212 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4213 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4214 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4215 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4216 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4219 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4221 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4223 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4224 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4228 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4229 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4230 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4233 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
4234 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
4235 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4237 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4238 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4239 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4241 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4242 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4247 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4248 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4249 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4250 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4251 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4252 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4253 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4254 // second-to-last node!
4255 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4258 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4259 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4260 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4262 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4263 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4264 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4265 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4266 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4267 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4268 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4269 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4271 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4274 assert!(events.is_empty());
4276 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4277 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4284 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4286 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4287 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4289 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
4290 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4291 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4293 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4298 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
4299 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4302 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4303 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4304 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4305 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4307 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4308 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4310 for i in 0..node_count {
4311 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", i)));
4312 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4313 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4314 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4315 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4316 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4317 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4318 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4319 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4320 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4321 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4322 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4323 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4324 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
4325 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4326 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4334 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4335 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4336 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4337 let channel_id = chan.2;
4340 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4344 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4345 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4346 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4347 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4348 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4349 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4350 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4351 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4352 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4353 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4355 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4357 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4359 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4360 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4363 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4364 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4365 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4366 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4367 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4369 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4372 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4374 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4375 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4376 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4379 let payment_event = {
4380 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4381 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4382 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4384 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4385 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4387 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4388 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4389 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4390 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4391 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4394 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4395 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4396 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4397 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4400 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4401 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4402 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4403 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4404 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4405 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4406 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4409 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4410 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4411 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4412 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4413 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4414 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4415 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4416 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4418 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4419 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4420 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4423 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4424 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4427 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4430 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4431 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4433 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4434 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4437 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4442 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4443 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4444 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4445 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4446 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4447 let channel_id = chan.2;
4450 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4452 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4453 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4456 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4457 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4458 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4459 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4462 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4465 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4467 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4468 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4469 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4472 let payment_event = {
4473 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4474 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4475 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4477 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4478 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4480 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4481 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4482 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4483 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4484 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4487 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4490 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4494 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4495 let nodes = create_network(2);
4496 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4497 let channel_id = chan.2;
4500 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4501 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4502 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4503 // (3) update_fee ->
4504 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4505 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4506 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4507 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4508 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4509 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4510 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4511 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4512 // revoke_and_ack ->
4513 // B should send no response here
4514 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4515 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4516 // revoke_and_ack ->
4518 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4519 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4520 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4523 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4524 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4525 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4526 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4527 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4529 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4532 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4533 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4534 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4535 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4538 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4540 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4541 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4542 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4544 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4545 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4546 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4547 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4550 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4552 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4554 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4556 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4557 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4558 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4560 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4561 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4562 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4563 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4564 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4565 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4566 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4568 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4569 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4570 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4572 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4574 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4575 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4579 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4580 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4583 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4584 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4587 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4588 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4589 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4592 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4593 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4598 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4599 let nodes = create_network(2);
4600 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4601 let channel_id = chan.2;
4603 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4604 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
4605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4607 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4608 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4609 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4610 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4611 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4613 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4615 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4617 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4618 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4621 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4622 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4625 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4626 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4627 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4630 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4631 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4632 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4636 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
4637 let nodes = create_network(2);
4638 let channel_value = 1888;
4639 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
4640 let channel_id = chan.2;
4643 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
4644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4645 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4647 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4649 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
4651 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
4652 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
4654 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4655 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4657 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
4658 let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
4659 let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
4660 let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
4661 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
4662 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
4665 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
4666 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
4667 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
4668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4670 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4672 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4674 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
4675 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
4676 //Should produce and error.
4677 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
4679 assert!(match err.err {
4680 "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
4684 //clear the message we could not handle
4685 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4689 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4690 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4691 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4692 let channel_id = chan.2;
4695 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4697 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4698 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4701 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4702 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4703 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4704 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4705 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4707 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4709 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4710 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4711 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4712 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4714 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4716 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4718 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4719 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4721 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4722 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4723 added_monitors.clear();
4725 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4726 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4727 // node[1] has nothing to do
4729 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4730 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4733 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4734 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4735 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4737 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4739 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4741 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4742 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4743 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4744 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4745 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4746 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4748 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4749 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4751 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4753 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4755 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4757 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4759 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4760 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4762 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4764 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4766 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4767 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4769 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4770 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4772 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4773 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4775 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4776 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4778 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4779 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4782 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4784 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4785 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4786 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4790 fn test_update_fee() {
4791 let nodes = create_network(2);
4792 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4793 let channel_id = chan.2;
4796 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4797 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4798 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4799 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4800 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4801 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4802 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4803 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4804 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4805 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4806 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4807 // revoke_and_ack ->
4809 // Create and deliver (1)...
4810 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4811 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4814 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4815 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4816 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4817 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4818 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4820 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4822 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4824 // Generate (2) and (3):
4825 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4826 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4830 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4831 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4834 // Create and deliver (4)...
4835 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4837 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4838 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4839 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4840 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4841 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4846 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4847 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4850 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4851 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4853 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4854 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4856 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4857 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4860 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4861 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4864 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4865 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4866 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4867 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4868 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4869 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4870 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4871 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4875 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4877 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4878 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4880 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4882 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4884 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4885 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4886 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4890 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4891 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4892 let nodes = create_network(2);
4893 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4894 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4895 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4896 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4898 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4899 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4900 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4901 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4902 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4904 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4905 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4906 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4907 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4908 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4909 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4911 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4912 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4916 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4917 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4918 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4919 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4920 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4921 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4922 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4924 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4926 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4927 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4928 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4929 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4930 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4932 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4933 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4935 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4936 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4937 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4938 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4939 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4941 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4943 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4944 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4945 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4946 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4947 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4948 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4949 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4951 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4952 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4954 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4955 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4956 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4957 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4958 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4959 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4960 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4962 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4963 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4965 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4966 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4968 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4971 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4972 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4973 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4974 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4975 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4976 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4978 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4980 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4981 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4982 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4983 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4984 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4988 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
4989 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
4990 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4991 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4992 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4994 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4995 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4996 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4998 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4999 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5000 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5001 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5002 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5003 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5005 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
5006 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5007 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
5008 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5010 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5011 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5013 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5014 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
5016 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5017 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5018 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5019 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5020 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5021 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5023 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5024 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5026 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5027 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5029 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest } => {
5030 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5031 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5033 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5036 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5037 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5038 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5039 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5040 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5041 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5042 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5044 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5046 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5047 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5048 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5049 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5050 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5053 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
5054 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
5055 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
5056 let nodes = create_network(3);
5057 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5058 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5060 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
5062 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
5063 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5065 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
5066 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5068 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5072 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5073 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5075 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5076 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5077 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5078 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5080 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
5081 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5082 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5084 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
5085 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
5086 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5087 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5090 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5091 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5092 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
5094 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5096 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5097 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5099 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5101 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5102 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5103 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5104 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5105 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5106 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5107 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5109 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5110 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
5112 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5113 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5114 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5115 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5116 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5117 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5118 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5120 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5121 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5123 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5124 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
5126 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5129 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5131 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5132 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5133 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
5136 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5137 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5139 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5140 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5141 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5142 if recv_count == 0 {
5143 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
5144 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5146 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5147 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5148 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
5150 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5151 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5152 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5154 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5155 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5157 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5158 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5159 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
5161 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
5162 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5163 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5164 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5165 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5167 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5168 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5169 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5170 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5171 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5172 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5174 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5176 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5177 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5178 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5179 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5180 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5181 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5183 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5184 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5185 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5186 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5187 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5189 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5190 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5192 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5196 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5198 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5199 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5200 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5201 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5202 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5206 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5207 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5208 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5209 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5213 fn fake_network_test() {
5214 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5215 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5216 let nodes = create_network(4);
5218 // Create some initial channels
5219 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5220 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5221 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5223 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5224 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5225 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5226 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5227 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5229 // Send some more payments
5230 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5231 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5232 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5234 // Test failure packets
5235 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5236 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5238 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5239 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5241 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5242 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5243 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5244 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5245 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5246 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5247 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5249 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5250 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5251 hops.push(RouteHop {
5252 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5253 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5255 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5257 hops.push(RouteHop {
5258 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5259 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5261 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5263 hops.push(RouteHop {
5264 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5265 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5267 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5269 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5270 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5271 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5273 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5274 hops.push(RouteHop {
5275 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5276 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5278 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5280 hops.push(RouteHop {
5281 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5282 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5284 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5286 hops.push(RouteHop {
5287 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5288 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5290 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5292 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5293 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5294 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5296 // Claim the rebalances...
5297 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5298 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5300 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5301 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5303 // Send some payments across both channels
5304 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5305 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5306 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5308 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5310 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5312 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5313 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5314 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5316 // Close down the channels...
5317 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5318 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5319 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5320 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5321 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5325 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5326 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5327 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5328 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5330 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5331 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5332 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5333 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5334 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5335 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5337 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5339 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5340 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5342 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5343 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5345 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5346 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5347 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5350 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5351 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5352 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5354 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5355 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5356 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5358 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5359 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5361 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5363 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5364 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5365 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5367 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5368 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5369 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5370 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5371 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5372 res.push(tx.clone());
5377 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5378 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5381 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5383 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5384 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5385 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5386 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5387 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5388 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5390 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5392 res.push(tx.clone());
5396 assert!(res.len() == 2 || res.len() == 3);
5398 assert_eq!(res[1], res[2]);
5402 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5406 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5407 /// HTLC transaction.
5408 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5409 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5410 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5411 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5412 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5413 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5417 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5420 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5421 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5423 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5424 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5425 let mut found_prev = false;
5427 for tx in prev_txn {
5428 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5429 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5430 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5431 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5437 assert!(found_prev);
5439 let mut res = Vec::new();
5440 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5444 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5445 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5446 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5447 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5448 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5451 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5454 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5455 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5456 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5457 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5460 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5464 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5465 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5469 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5471 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5472 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5474 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5475 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5477 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5478 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5482 fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
5484 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5485 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5487 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5488 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5489 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5490 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5491 chan.get_value_stat()
5495 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5496 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5497 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5499 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5500 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5502 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5503 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5505 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5506 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5507 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5508 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5509 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5513 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5515 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5516 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5517 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5518 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5523 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5524 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5525 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5526 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5528 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5529 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5530 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5532 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5537 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5538 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5540 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5542 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5544 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5545 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5546 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5548 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5549 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5553 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5554 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5555 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5557 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5558 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5561 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5564 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5565 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5566 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5567 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5568 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5571 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5572 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5573 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5574 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5575 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5579 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5580 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5581 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5582 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5584 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5585 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5589 // adding pending output
5590 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5591 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5593 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5594 let payment_event_1 = {
5595 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5598 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5599 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5600 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5602 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5604 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5605 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5607 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5608 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5609 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5610 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5615 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5616 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5618 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5619 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5620 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5621 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5622 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5624 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5626 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5627 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5628 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5629 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5630 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5631 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5633 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5634 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5635 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5636 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5640 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5642 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5644 // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
5645 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5646 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5647 let channel_close_broadcast = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5648 assert_eq!(channel_close_broadcast.len(), 1);
5649 match channel_close_broadcast[0] {
5650 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5651 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5653 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5659 // split the rest to test holding cell
5660 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5661 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5663 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5664 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5667 // now see if they go through on both sides
5668 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5669 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5670 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5672 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5673 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5675 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5677 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5678 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5679 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5680 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5684 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5685 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5686 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5688 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5689 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5691 // flush the pending htlc
5692 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5693 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5696 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5698 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5700 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5701 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5702 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5705 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5706 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5709 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5711 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5712 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5713 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5715 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5716 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5718 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5719 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5720 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5721 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5722 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5723 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5725 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5726 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5727 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5728 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5730 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5731 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5733 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5734 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5736 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5737 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5738 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5743 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5744 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5745 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5747 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5750 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5751 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5752 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5754 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5755 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5756 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5757 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5759 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5760 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5764 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5765 do_channel_reserve_test(false);
5766 do_channel_reserve_test(true);
5770 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5771 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5772 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5773 let nodes = create_network(5);
5775 // Create some initial channels
5776 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5777 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5778 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5779 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5781 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5782 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5783 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5784 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5785 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5787 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5788 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5790 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5791 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5792 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5793 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5795 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5796 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5797 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5799 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5800 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5802 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5803 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5805 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5806 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5807 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5808 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5810 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5811 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5812 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5814 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5815 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5817 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5818 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5820 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5821 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5823 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5824 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5825 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5826 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5828 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5834 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5835 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5836 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5838 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5840 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5841 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5843 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5844 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5846 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5848 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5849 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5850 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5852 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5853 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5854 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5857 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5858 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5859 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5860 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5861 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5865 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5866 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5867 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5868 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5869 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5872 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5874 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5875 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5877 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5878 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5879 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5880 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5881 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5884 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5886 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5887 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5889 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5891 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5892 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5893 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5897 fn test_justice_tx() {
5898 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5900 let nodes = create_network(2);
5901 // Create some new channels:
5902 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5904 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5905 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5906 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5907 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5908 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5909 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5910 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5911 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5912 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5913 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5914 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
5915 // Revoke the old state
5916 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5919 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5920 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5922 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5923 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5924 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5925 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5927 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5928 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5930 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5932 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5933 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5934 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5935 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5936 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5938 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5940 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5941 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5943 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5944 // Create some new channels:
5945 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5947 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5948 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5949 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5950 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5951 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5952 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5953 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5954 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5955 // Revoke the old state
5956 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5958 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5959 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5961 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5962 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5963 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5964 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5966 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5967 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5969 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5971 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5972 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5973 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5974 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5975 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5977 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5978 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5979 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5983 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5984 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5985 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5986 let nodes = create_network(2);
5987 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5988 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5989 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5990 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5991 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5992 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5993 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5994 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5996 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5997 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5998 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5999 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6000 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
6002 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6004 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6005 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6007 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
6008 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6009 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6013 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
6014 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
6015 let nodes = create_network(2);
6017 // Create some new channel:
6018 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6020 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6021 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6022 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
6023 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6024 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
6026 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6027 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6028 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
6029 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6030 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
6031 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6032 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
6033 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
6034 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6036 //Revoke the old state
6037 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6040 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6041 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6042 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6044 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6045 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6047 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6048 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6050 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6053 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6054 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6056 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
6057 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6059 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
6061 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6062 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6063 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6064 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6065 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6066 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6067 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
6068 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
6070 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
6071 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6072 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
6074 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6075 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
6076 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
6077 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
6078 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6079 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
6081 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6082 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6083 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6087 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
6088 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
6089 let nodes = create_network(2);
6091 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6093 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6094 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6095 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
6096 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
6097 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6098 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
6100 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6101 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6103 //Revoke the old state
6104 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6107 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6108 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6109 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6111 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6112 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6114 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6115 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6117 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6120 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6121 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6123 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
6124 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
6125 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
6126 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
6127 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
6128 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
6129 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
6131 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6132 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6133 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6135 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
6136 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6137 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6138 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6139 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6141 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6142 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6143 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6144 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6145 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6146 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6147 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
6148 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
6150 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
6151 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
6153 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
6154 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
6155 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
6156 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
6157 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6158 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6160 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6161 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6162 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6166 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
6167 // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
6168 // ChainWatchInterface and pass the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
6169 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
6170 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
6171 // First, C should claim the HTLC output via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
6172 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
6173 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
6175 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
6176 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
6177 // the HTLC output via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
6178 // PaymentSent event).
6180 let nodes = create_network(3);
6182 // Create some initial channels
6183 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6184 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6186 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
6187 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6188 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6190 let (our_payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
6191 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6193 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
6194 // Broadcast HTLC Success transation by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
6195 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6196 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
6197 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6198 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6200 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6201 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6202 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6203 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6204 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6206 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6207 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6208 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6210 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6211 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6213 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
6214 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
6215 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
6216 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6217 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6218 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6219 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6220 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6222 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
6223 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: node_txn}, 1);
6224 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6226 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
6227 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
6228 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
6229 added_monitors.clear();
6231 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6233 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6234 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6237 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6238 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6239 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6240 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6241 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6242 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6244 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6247 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
6248 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transaction, as well as a
6249 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
6250 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6251 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6252 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6253 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6254 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6255 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6256 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
6257 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
6258 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6259 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6260 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6261 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6262 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
6266 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
6267 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
6268 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6269 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
6270 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6271 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6272 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6274 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6275 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6277 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success) * 2 (block-rescan)
6278 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
6279 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6280 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6281 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6282 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6283 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
6284 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6285 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6286 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
6287 // we already checked the same situation with A.
6289 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
6290 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6291 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6292 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6294 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6295 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6297 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6298 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6300 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6301 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
6303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6305 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6306 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6307 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6308 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6309 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6310 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6311 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6312 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6313 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6314 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6315 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6316 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6317 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
6321 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
6322 // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
6323 // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC bacward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
6324 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
6325 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
6326 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
6328 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
6330 let nodes = create_network(3);
6332 // Create some intial channels
6333 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6334 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6336 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
6337 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6338 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6340 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
6341 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6343 // Brodacast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
6344 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6345 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6346 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown);
6348 let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
6349 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
6350 added_monitors.clear();
6352 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6353 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6355 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6356 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6357 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6358 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6359 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6360 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6362 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6364 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6365 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6366 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6368 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6369 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6371 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
6372 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6373 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6374 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6376 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output fron C's commitment tx on B's chain
6377 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
6378 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
6381 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6382 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 6 (HTLC-Timeout tx, commitment tx, timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6383 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
6384 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
6385 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[7]);
6386 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6387 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6388 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
6389 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6390 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6391 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6392 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_2.3.clone());
6393 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone());
6394 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6395 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6396 timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone();
6400 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1);
6401 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6403 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6405 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6406 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6409 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6410 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6411 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6412 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6413 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6414 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6416 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6418 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // Well... here we detect our own htlc_timeout_tx so no tx to be generated
6419 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
6421 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
6422 let commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6423 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
6425 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
6426 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6427 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6429 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6430 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6432 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 block-rescan
6433 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6434 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6435 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6436 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6437 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6438 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6439 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6440 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6444 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
6445 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
6446 // and fail backward accordingly.
6448 let nodes = create_network(3);
6450 // Create some initial channels
6451 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6452 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6454 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6455 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
6456 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6457 // Revoke the old state
6458 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
6460 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6462 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6463 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6464 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6466 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6468 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6469 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6472 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
6473 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6474 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6475 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6476 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6477 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6479 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6480 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6482 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6483 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6485 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6486 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6488 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6489 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6491 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
6492 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6495 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6499 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool) {
6500 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
6501 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
6502 // commitment transaction anymore.
6503 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
6504 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
6505 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
6506 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
6507 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
6508 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
6510 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
6511 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
6512 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
6513 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
6514 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
6515 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6517 // Create some initial channels
6518 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6519 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6521 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6522 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
6523 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6524 // Revoke the old state
6525 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
6527 let (_, first_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6528 let (_, second_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6529 let (_, third_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6531 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
6532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6533 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6534 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6535 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6536 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6537 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6538 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6539 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6540 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
6541 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
6543 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
6544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6545 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6546 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6547 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6548 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6549 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6550 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6551 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6552 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6554 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
6555 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
6556 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
6557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6559 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
6560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6561 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6562 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6563 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6564 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6565 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6566 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6567 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6568 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
6569 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
6570 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6572 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
6573 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
6574 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
6575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6577 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
6578 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
6579 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6580 let (_, fourth_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6581 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, fourth_payment_hash).unwrap();
6582 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6583 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6587 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
6588 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, one as we generate a commitment for
6589 // nodes[0] to fail first_payment_hash backwards.
6590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6593 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
6594 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6596 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6597 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6599 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6600 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6602 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6603 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
6605 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6608 if !deliver_bs_raa {
6609 // If we delivered the RAA already then we already failed first_payment_hash backwards.
6610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6613 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6614 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 });
6615 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 0 }] {
6616 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6617 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6621 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6622 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6623 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6624 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6625 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6626 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6628 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6631 // Due to the way backwards-failing occurs we do the updates in two steps.
6632 let updates = match events[1] {
6633 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
6634 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6635 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6636 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6637 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6638 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6640 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6641 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6643 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6644 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6646 let bs_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6647 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6649 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6650 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6653 if !deliver_bs_raa {
6654 // If we delievered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
6655 // that we should update our routing table for.
6656 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6657 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6659 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6660 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6663 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6664 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6666 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6667 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6669 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6674 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6677 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6678 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
6679 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6680 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6681 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6682 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
6683 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6685 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6686 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6687 for event in events {
6689 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6690 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6694 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6695 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6697 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6698 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6700 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6703 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6704 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6706 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6709 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
6710 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
6711 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
6715 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive() {
6716 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false);
6717 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true);
6721 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
6722 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
6723 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
6724 let nodes = create_network(2);
6725 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6727 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
6728 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
6730 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6731 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6733 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6734 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6736 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6740 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6741 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
6743 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6744 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6747 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6748 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6750 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6751 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6753 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6757 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6758 // registering new transactions
6759 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6763 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6764 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6765 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6766 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6767 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6769 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6771 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6773 let mut payment_event = {
6774 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6777 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6778 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6779 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6782 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6783 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6785 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6786 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6788 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6789 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6792 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6793 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6795 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6796 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6797 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6798 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6800 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6801 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6802 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6804 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6806 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6807 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6808 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6810 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6811 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6812 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6814 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6815 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6817 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6821 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6822 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6823 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6824 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6825 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6829 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6830 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6832 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6833 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6834 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6836 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6837 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6839 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6842 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6844 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6845 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6846 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6848 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6849 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6850 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6851 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6852 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6853 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6854 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6856 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6860 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6861 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6862 let nodes = create_network(2);
6863 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6865 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6866 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6867 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6868 mem::drop(channel_state);
6870 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6871 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6872 headers.push(header.clone());
6874 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6875 headers.push(header.clone());
6877 while !headers.is_empty() {
6878 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6881 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6882 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6884 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6885 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6887 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6890 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6891 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6892 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6895 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6896 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6898 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6899 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6900 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6901 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6902 res.push(msg.clone());
6904 panic!("Unexpected event")
6912 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6913 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6915 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6917 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6919 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6925 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6926 let mut commitment_update = None;
6927 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6930 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6931 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6932 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6933 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6935 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6936 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6937 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6938 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6940 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6943 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6946 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6948 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6949 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6950 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6951 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6953 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6954 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6955 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6956 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6958 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6962 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6967 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6968 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6969 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6970 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6971 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6972 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6973 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6975 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6976 // If a expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6978 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6979 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6982 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6983 // If b expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6985 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6986 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6989 if send_funding_locked.0 || send_funding_locked.1 {
6990 // If we expect any funding_locked's, both sides better have set
6991 // next_local_commitment_number to 1
6992 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6993 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
6995 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6996 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
7000 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
7001 for msg in reestablish_1 {
7002 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
7003 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
7005 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
7006 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7008 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
7011 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
7012 for msg in reestablish_2 {
7013 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
7014 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
7016 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
7017 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7019 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
7022 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
7023 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
7024 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
7026 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
7027 if send_funding_locked.0 {
7028 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
7029 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7030 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
7031 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
7032 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
7033 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
7034 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7037 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
7040 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7041 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
7042 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7043 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7045 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
7047 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
7048 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
7049 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7050 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
7052 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7054 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
7055 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
7056 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7057 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
7058 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
7060 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
7061 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
7063 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
7064 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
7067 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7068 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
7070 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7071 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7072 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
7073 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7074 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7075 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7076 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7079 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
7083 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
7084 if send_funding_locked.1 {
7085 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
7086 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7087 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
7088 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
7089 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
7090 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
7091 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7094 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
7097 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7098 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
7099 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7100 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7102 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
7104 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
7105 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
7106 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7107 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
7109 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
7110 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
7111 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7112 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
7113 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
7115 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
7116 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
7118 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
7119 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
7122 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7123 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
7125 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7126 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7127 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
7128 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7129 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7130 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7131 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7134 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
7140 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
7141 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
7142 let nodes = create_network(3);
7143 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7144 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
7146 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7147 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7148 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7150 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7151 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7152 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
7153 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
7155 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7156 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7157 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7159 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7160 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7161 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7162 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7164 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7165 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7167 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
7168 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
7170 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
7172 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7173 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7175 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
7176 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
7178 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7181 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
7182 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
7183 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
7185 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7189 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
7190 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
7193 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
7194 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
7195 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7196 if messages_delivered == 0 {
7197 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7198 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
7200 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7203 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7204 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7206 let payment_event = {
7207 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
7208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7210 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7211 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7212 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7214 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
7216 if messages_delivered < 2 {
7217 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
7219 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7220 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
7221 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7223 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7225 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
7226 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7227 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7230 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
7231 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
7232 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7233 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7236 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
7237 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7238 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7246 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7247 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7248 if messages_delivered < 3 {
7249 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
7250 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
7251 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7252 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
7253 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
7254 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
7255 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
7256 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
7257 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7258 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
7259 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
7260 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
7261 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
7262 // Everything was delivered...
7263 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7266 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7267 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7269 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7270 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7273 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7274 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7275 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7277 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7278 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7280 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7281 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7283 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7284 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7285 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7287 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7290 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
7291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7293 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7294 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7295 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
7296 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
7297 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7298 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7299 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7300 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7301 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7302 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7303 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
7305 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7308 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
7309 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
7311 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7312 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7314 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7315 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
7317 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7320 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
7321 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
7322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7323 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7325 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
7326 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7327 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7330 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
7331 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
7332 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7333 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7336 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
7337 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7338 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7346 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7347 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7348 if messages_delivered < 2 {
7349 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7350 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
7351 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
7352 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7353 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7355 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7356 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
7358 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7361 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
7362 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
7363 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
7364 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
7365 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
7366 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7367 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
7368 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
7369 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
7370 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
7371 // Everything was delivered...
7372 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7375 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7376 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7377 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7379 // Channel should still work fine...
7380 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
7381 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7385 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
7386 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
7387 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
7388 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
7389 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
7393 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
7394 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
7395 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
7396 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
7400 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
7401 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
7402 let nodes = create_network(2);
7403 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7405 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7406 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7408 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
7409 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7410 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7412 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7413 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7415 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7418 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7420 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7421 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7423 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
7424 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7425 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
7427 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7428 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7430 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7433 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7434 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7436 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7439 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7441 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
7442 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
7444 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7445 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7446 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
7450 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
7451 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
7452 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
7453 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7454 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7456 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7458 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7459 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7460 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7462 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
7463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7465 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7466 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7468 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7469 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7472 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7475 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7476 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7478 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7479 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7480 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7481 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7482 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7483 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7484 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7486 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7487 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7488 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7490 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7491 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7493 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7496 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
7497 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7498 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7501 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7504 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7505 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7507 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7508 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7509 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7510 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7511 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7512 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7514 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7515 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7516 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7517 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7519 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7520 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7522 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7523 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7525 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7527 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7528 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7529 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7530 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7531 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7532 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7533 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7534 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7535 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7538 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
7539 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7540 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7541 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7542 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7543 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7544 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
7545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7547 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7548 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7549 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7550 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7551 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7552 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7553 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
7554 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7556 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7557 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7558 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7561 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7562 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7563 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7566 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7567 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7570 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7571 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7573 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7574 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7577 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7578 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7580 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7581 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7583 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
7584 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7586 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7589 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7590 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7593 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7597 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
7598 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
7599 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7600 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7602 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7603 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7605 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7606 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7609 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7610 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
7612 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7613 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7616 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, .. } => assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
7617 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7620 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7621 // PaymentFailed event
7623 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7626 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
7627 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
7628 // a disconnect in between
7629 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7630 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7632 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7633 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7635 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7636 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7639 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7640 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7641 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7644 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7645 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7646 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7649 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7650 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7653 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7654 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7655 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
7656 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7657 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7658 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7660 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7662 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7663 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7665 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7666 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7667 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7669 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7672 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
7674 // Now set it to failed again...
7675 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7676 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7677 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7680 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7681 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7682 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7685 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7686 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7687 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7690 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
7691 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7692 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7695 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7696 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7698 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7699 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7702 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7703 // PaymentFailed event
7705 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7709 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
7710 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
7711 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
7714 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
7715 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
7717 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
7718 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
7719 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
7720 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
7721 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
7722 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
7723 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
7724 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
7725 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
7726 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
7727 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
7728 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
7729 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
7730 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
7731 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
7732 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
7733 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
7734 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7735 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7737 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7739 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7740 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7741 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7743 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7744 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7747 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7748 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7749 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7751 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
7752 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
7753 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7755 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7756 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7757 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
7758 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7759 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7760 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7761 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7762 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7763 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7764 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7766 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7767 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7768 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7769 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7771 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7772 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7777 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
7778 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7779 } else { panic!(); }
7782 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7784 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7787 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7788 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7789 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7792 // Now fix monitor updating...
7793 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7794 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7797 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7798 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7799 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7801 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7802 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7803 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7804 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7805 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7806 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7808 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7809 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7810 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7811 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7813 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7814 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7816 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7819 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7820 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7821 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7823 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7824 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7825 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7826 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7827 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7828 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7830 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7831 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7832 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7833 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7835 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7837 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7838 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7840 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7841 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7842 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7844 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7845 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7846 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7848 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7849 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7850 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7851 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7852 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7853 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7855 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7857 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7858 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7859 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7861 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7862 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7864 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7867 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7868 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7869 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7872 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7876 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7877 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7879 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7880 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7881 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7883 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7884 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7887 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7889 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7890 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7891 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7892 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7893 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7896 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7900 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7902 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7903 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7904 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7905 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7908 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7909 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7911 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7912 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7914 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7915 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7918 let as_commitment_update;
7919 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7921 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7922 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7923 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7924 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7925 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7926 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7927 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7928 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7932 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7933 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7934 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7935 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7936 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7937 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7938 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7939 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7943 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7946 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7947 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7949 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7950 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7952 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7953 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7955 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7958 handle_initial_raa!();
7960 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7961 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7963 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7964 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7966 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7967 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7970 handle_initial_raa!();
7972 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7973 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7975 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7976 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7978 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7979 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7981 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7986 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7987 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7989 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7990 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7992 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7993 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7997 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7998 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7999 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
8000 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8002 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8003 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8004 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
8005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8007 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8008 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8011 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8012 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8015 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8017 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8018 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
8020 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
8021 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
8022 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
8024 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8027 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
8031 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
8032 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
8033 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
8034 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
8035 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
8036 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
8037 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
8041 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
8042 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
8043 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
8044 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
8045 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
8049 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
8050 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
8051 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
8052 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
8053 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
8054 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
8058 fn test_monitor_update_fail_cs() {
8059 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming commitment_signed
8060 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8061 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8063 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8064 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8065 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8068 let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8069 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8071 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8072 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
8073 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8074 } else { panic!(); }
8075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8076 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8078 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8079 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8081 let responses = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8082 assert_eq!(responses.len(), 2);
8084 match responses[0] {
8085 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, ref node_id } => {
8086 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8087 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
8088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8090 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8092 match responses[1] {
8093 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, ref node_id } => {
8094 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8095 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8096 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8097 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8098 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8099 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8101 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8102 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap_err() {
8103 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8104 } else { panic!(); }
8105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8106 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8108 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8111 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8112 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8115 let final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8116 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &final_raa).unwrap();
8117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8119 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8120 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8122 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8123 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8125 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8126 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8128 events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8129 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8131 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, amt } => {
8132 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
8133 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
8135 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8138 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
8141 fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) {
8142 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming RAA
8143 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
8144 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8145 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8147 // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 2 to 1.
8148 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000);
8150 // Route a first payment that we'll fail backwards
8151 let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
8153 // Fail the payment backwards, failing the monitor update on nodes[1]'s receipt of the RAA
8154 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
8155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8157 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8158 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8159 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8160 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8161 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8162 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8163 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8165 let bs_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
8166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8168 // While the second channel is AwaitingRAA, forward a second payment to get it into the
8170 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8171 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8172 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
8173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8175 let mut send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8176 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8177 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
8179 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8180 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
8182 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8186 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8187 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8189 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8191 // Now fail monitor updating.
8192 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8193 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap_err() {
8194 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8195 } else { panic!(); }
8196 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8197 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8200 // Attempt to forward a third payment but fail due to the second channel being unavailable
8203 let (_, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8204 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8205 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap();
8206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8208 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); // We succeed in updating the monitor for the first channel
8209 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8210 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8211 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
8212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8214 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8215 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8216 match events_2.remove(0) {
8217 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8218 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8219 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8220 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8221 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8222 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8223 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8225 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8226 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8228 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8229 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8230 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } = events[0] {
8231 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
8232 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
8233 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
8235 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
8238 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = if test_ignore_second_cs {
8239 // Try to route another payment backwards from 2 to make sure 1 holds off on responding
8240 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8241 let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8242 nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap();
8243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8245 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8246 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8247 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg) {
8248 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
8249 } else { panic!(); }
8250 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8251 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8252 (Some(payment_preimage_4), Some(payment_hash_4))
8253 } else { (None, None) };
8255 // Restore monitor updating, ensuring we immediately get a fail-back update and a
8256 // update_add update.
8257 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8258 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8261 let mut events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8262 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8263 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 3);
8265 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
8268 // Note that the ordering of the events for different nodes is non-prescriptive, though the
8269 // ordering of the two events that both go to nodes[2] have to stay in the same order.
8270 let messages_a = match events_3.pop().unwrap() {
8271 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } => {
8272 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8273 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8274 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8275 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8276 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8277 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8278 (updates.update_fail_htlcs.remove(0), updates.commitment_signed)
8280 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
8282 let raa = if test_ignore_second_cs {
8283 match events_3.remove(1) {
8284 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg } => {
8285 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8288 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8291 let send_event_b = SendEvent::from_event(events_3.remove(0));
8292 assert_eq!(send_event_b.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8294 // Now deliver the new messages...
8296 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &messages_a.0).unwrap();
8297 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], messages_a.1, false);
8298 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8299 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
8300 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } = events_4[0] {
8301 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
8302 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
8303 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
8305 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8306 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8307 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.commitment_msg).unwrap();
8308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8309 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8310 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa.unwrap()).unwrap();
8311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8312 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8313 assert!(bs_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8314 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8315 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8316 assert!(bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8317 assert!(bs_cs.update_fee.is_none());
8319 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8321 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8322 assert!(as_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8323 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8324 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8325 assert!(as_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8326 assert!(as_cs.update_fee.is_none());
8328 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8330 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8332 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8334 let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8336 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
8337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8338 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8340 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa).unwrap();
8341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8342 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8344 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], send_event_b.commitment_msg, false);
8347 let events_5 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8348 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
8350 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8351 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8354 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8355 nodes[2].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8357 let events_6 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8358 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
8360 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); },
8361 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8364 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8365 let events_7 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8366 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
8368 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8369 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8372 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8373 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8376 send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
8377 assert_eq!(send_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8378 assert_eq!(send_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8379 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8380 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
8382 let events_8 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8383 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
8385 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8386 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8389 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8390 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8392 let events_9 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8393 assert_eq!(events_9.len(), 1);
8395 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_4.unwrap()),
8396 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8398 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4.unwrap());
8401 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
8405 fn test_monitor_update_fail_raa() {
8406 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(false);
8407 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(true);
8411 fn test_monitor_update_fail_reestablish() {
8412 // Simple test for message retransmission after monitor update failure on
8413 // channel_reestablish generating a monitor update (which comes from freeing holding cell
8415 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
8416 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8417 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8419 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
8421 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8422 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8424 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
8425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8426 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8427 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8428 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8429 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8430 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8431 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8432 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8434 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8435 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8437 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8438 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8439 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8441 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8442 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8444 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
8446 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap_err() {
8447 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8448 } else { panic!(); }
8449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8451 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8452 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8454 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8455 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8457 assert!(as_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8458 assert!(bs_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8460 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
8462 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap();
8463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8464 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8466 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8467 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8470 updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8471 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8472 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8473 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8474 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8475 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8476 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8477 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8479 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8480 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8482 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage),
8483 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8488 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
8489 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
8490 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8491 let nodes = create_network(2);
8493 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8495 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8496 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8497 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
8498 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
8500 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
8502 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8503 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8505 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8506 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8508 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
8510 let mut chan_announcement;
8512 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
8514 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
8515 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
8516 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
8517 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
8518 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
8519 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
8520 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
8521 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
8522 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8527 macro_rules! sign_msg {
8528 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
8529 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
8530 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8531 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8532 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
8533 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
8534 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
8535 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
8536 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
8537 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
8538 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
8539 contents: $unsigned_msg
8544 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8545 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8546 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
8547 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
8549 // Configured with Network::Testnet
8550 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8551 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
8552 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8553 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
8555 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8556 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
8557 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8558 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
8561 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
8562 impl Writer for VecWriter {
8563 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
8564 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
8567 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
8568 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
8573 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
8574 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8576 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
8578 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8580 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8581 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8582 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8584 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8585 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8586 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8587 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8589 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8590 let config = UserConfig::new();
8591 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8592 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
8593 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
8594 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
8595 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8596 default_config: config,
8598 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8599 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8600 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8601 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8602 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8603 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8606 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8608 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8609 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8610 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
8611 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
8612 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
8613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8615 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8616 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
8617 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8618 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
8620 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
8621 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8622 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
8623 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8625 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8626 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8627 for node in nodes.iter() {
8628 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
8629 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
8630 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
8633 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8637 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
8638 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8639 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8641 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8642 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8644 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8646 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8647 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8648 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8650 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8651 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8652 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8653 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8655 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8656 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8657 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
8658 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
8659 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
8660 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8661 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8663 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8664 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8665 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8666 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8667 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8668 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8671 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8673 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8674 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8677 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8679 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
8680 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8684 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
8685 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
8686 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
8687 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8688 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
8689 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
8691 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
8693 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
8694 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8696 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
8697 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8698 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8699 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8701 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
8703 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
8704 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
8705 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8706 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
8707 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
8710 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8711 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
8712 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
8713 let mut read = &serialized[..];
8714 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8715 assert!(read.is_empty());
8716 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
8719 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8720 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8721 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8722 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8724 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8725 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8726 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8727 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8728 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8729 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
8731 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8733 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
8734 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8735 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8736 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
8737 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
8740 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
8741 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
8742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8744 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8746 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
8747 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8748 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8749 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
8750 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8752 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8753 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8754 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
8755 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
8756 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8757 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
8760 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
8761 ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => {
8763 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8764 let mut txn = Vec::new();
8765 for event in events {
8767 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
8768 for outp in outputs {
8770 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
8772 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8773 script_sig: Script::new(),
8775 witness: Vec::new(),
8778 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8779 value: output.value,
8781 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8787 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8788 let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
8789 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8790 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8791 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8792 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8793 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8794 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8797 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
8799 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8800 script_sig: Script::new(),
8801 sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
8802 witness: Vec::new(),
8805 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8806 value: output.value,
8808 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8814 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8815 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8816 let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8817 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8818 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8819 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
8820 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
8823 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
8824 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8826 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8827 script_sig: Script::new(),
8829 witness: Vec::new(),
8832 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8833 value: output.value,
8835 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8839 output: vec![outp.clone()],
8842 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) {
8844 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
8846 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
8849 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
8852 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
8853 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8854 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8855 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
8856 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8857 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8858 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8864 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8873 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
8874 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
8875 let nodes = create_network(2);
8877 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8878 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8879 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8881 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8882 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8884 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8885 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8886 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8887 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8889 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8890 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8891 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8892 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8893 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8897 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
8898 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8899 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8901 let nodes = create_network(2);
8903 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8904 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8905 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8907 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8908 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8910 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8911 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8912 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8913 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8915 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8916 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8917 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8919 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8920 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8922 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8923 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
8924 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
8925 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8929 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
8930 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8931 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8933 let nodes = create_network(2);
8935 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
8936 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8937 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8938 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8939 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8941 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8942 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8943 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8944 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8946 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8947 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8949 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8950 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8951 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
8952 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
8953 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
8954 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx
8955 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8959 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
8960 let nodes = create_network(2);
8962 // Create some initial channels
8963 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8965 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8967 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8968 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
8969 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8971 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
8972 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8973 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8975 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
8976 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8978 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
8979 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8982 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8983 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8986 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
8987 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
8988 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
8989 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
8990 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8991 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
8993 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1);
8994 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
8995 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
8996 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9000 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
9001 let nodes = create_network(2);
9003 // Create some initial channels
9004 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9006 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9007 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9008 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9009 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9011 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9013 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9014 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9015 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9017 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9018 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9020 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9021 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
9022 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
9023 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
9024 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9026 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9027 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9028 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9029 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9033 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
9034 let nodes = create_network(2);
9036 // Create some initial channels
9037 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9039 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9040 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9041 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9042 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9044 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9046 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9047 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
9048 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9049 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9051 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9052 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9054 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9055 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
9056 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
9057 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9058 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9059 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9060 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
9062 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
9063 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9064 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9066 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9067 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9070 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9071 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
9072 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
9073 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
9075 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
9076 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9077 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
9078 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9079 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9080 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone());
9084 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
9085 let nodes = create_network(2);
9087 // Create some initial channels
9088 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9090 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9091 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9092 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9093 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9095 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9097 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9098 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
9099 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9100 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9102 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9103 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9105 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9107 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
9108 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
9109 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9110 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9111 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9113 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
9114 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9115 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9117 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9118 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9121 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9122 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
9123 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
9124 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
9126 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
9127 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
9128 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5);
9129 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
9130 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
9131 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
9132 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
9133 check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
9137 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
9138 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output thanks to
9139 // ChainWatchInterface and claim HTLC on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
9140 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
9141 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
9143 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
9146 let nodes = create_network(3);
9148 // Create some initial channels
9149 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9150 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9152 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
9153 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
9154 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
9156 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
9157 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9158 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9159 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
9160 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9162 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9163 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9164 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9165 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9166 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9168 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
9169 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9170 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9172 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9173 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9176 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
9177 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
9178 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
9179 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
9180 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
9181 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1].clone());
9182 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
9183 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9184 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
9185 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
9187 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
9188 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1);
9190 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9191 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4);
9192 assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]);
9193 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9194 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone()); // HTLC-Timeout on B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9195 assert_eq!(b_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9196 assert!(b_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
9197 assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
9198 check_spends!(b_txn[0], c_txn[1].clone()); // timeout tx on C remote commitment tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
9199 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9200 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
9201 assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
9204 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9206 match msg_events[0] {
9207 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9208 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9210 match msg_events[1] {
9211 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
9212 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9213 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9214 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9215 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9216 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
9218 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9220 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
9221 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9222 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
9223 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9224 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
9225 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9226 assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[2]); // HTLC-Success tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
9227 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
9228 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9229 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
9230 assert_eq!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
9231 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9232 match msg_events[0] {
9233 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9234 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9239 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
9240 // Topology : A --> B --> C
9241 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
9242 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
9244 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9245 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9247 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
9248 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
9249 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000).1, duplicate_payment_hash);
9251 let commitment_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9252 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9253 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
9255 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9256 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9257 let htlc_timeout_tx;
9258 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
9259 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9260 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
9261 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
9262 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
9263 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9264 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9265 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9266 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9267 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0], node_txn[1].input[0]);
9268 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
9269 check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone());
9270 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone());
9271 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
9274 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9276 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9277 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9280 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
9281 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
9283 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9285 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
9286 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9289 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9290 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9292 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9293 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5);
9294 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
9295 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0], htlc_success_txn[3]);
9296 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9297 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9298 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1], htlc_success_txn[4]);
9299 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9300 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9301 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0], htlc_success_txn[1].input[0]);
9302 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9303 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9305 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200);
9306 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9307 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9308 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9309 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 1);
9310 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9311 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9314 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9315 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9317 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9318 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9319 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9321 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { .. } } => {
9323 _ => { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
9326 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9328 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
9329 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
9331 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9334 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
9335 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
9336 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9337 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9338 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9339 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9340 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 0);
9341 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9344 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9345 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
9347 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9349 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
9350 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
9352 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9357 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
9358 let nodes = create_network(2);
9360 // Create some initial channels
9361 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9363 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
9364 let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9365 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9366 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
9368 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
9369 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9371 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9372 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9373 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9375 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
9376 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9379 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9380 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9382 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9383 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9384 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9385 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9387 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
9388 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9389 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9390 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9391 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone());
9395 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
9396 let nodes = create_network(2);
9398 // Create some initial channels
9399 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9401 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
9402 let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9403 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9404 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
9406 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9407 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9408 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
9409 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9411 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9412 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9414 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9415 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9416 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9417 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9419 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
9420 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
9421 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 8);
9422 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
9423 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[4]);
9424 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[6]);
9425 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
9426 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[5]);
9427 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[7]);
9428 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9429 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
9433 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
9434 let nodes = create_network(2);
9436 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9438 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
9439 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
9441 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9442 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
9443 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2);
9444 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
9445 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx.clone());
9447 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
9448 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2);
9449 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
9450 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);