1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
18 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
19 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
22 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
23 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
26 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
29 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
30 use util::config::UserConfig;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
69 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
70 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
71 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
72 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
73 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
75 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
76 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
79 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
80 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
81 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
82 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
85 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
86 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
87 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
88 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
92 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
95 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
96 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
97 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
100 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102 pub enum HTLCSource {
103 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
106 session_priv: SecretKey,
107 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
108 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
109 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
114 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
115 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
116 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
117 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
118 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
126 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
134 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
136 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
137 err: msgs::HandleError,
138 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
140 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
142 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
146 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
147 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
149 data: err.to_string()
153 needs_channel_force_close: false,
157 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
161 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
162 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
164 data: err.to_string()
168 needs_channel_force_close: true,
172 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
173 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
176 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
177 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
180 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
183 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
185 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
187 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
189 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
190 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
192 data: msg.to_string()
197 needs_channel_force_close: false,
201 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
204 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
206 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
208 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
210 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
211 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
213 data: msg.to_string()
218 needs_channel_force_close: true,
223 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
224 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
226 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
227 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
229 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
233 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
234 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
235 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
236 /// probably increase this significantly.
237 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
239 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
240 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
242 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
245 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
246 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
247 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
248 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
249 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
250 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
251 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
253 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
257 struct ChannelHolder {
258 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
259 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
260 next_forward: Instant,
261 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
262 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
263 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
264 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
265 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
266 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
267 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
269 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
270 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
271 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
272 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
274 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
275 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
276 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
277 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
278 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
279 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
280 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
283 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
285 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
286 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
287 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
288 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
289 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
290 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
295 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
296 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
298 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
299 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
301 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
302 /// to individual Channels.
304 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
305 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
306 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
307 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
309 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
310 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
311 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
312 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
313 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
314 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
315 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
317 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
318 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
319 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
320 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
322 pub struct ChannelManager {
323 default_configuration: UserConfig,
324 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
325 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
326 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
327 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
328 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
330 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
331 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
332 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
334 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
335 our_network_key: SecretKey,
337 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
338 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
339 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
340 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
341 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
343 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
348 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
349 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
350 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
351 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
352 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
353 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
354 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
356 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
357 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
358 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
359 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
362 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
364 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
365 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
368 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
370 macro_rules! secp_call {
371 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
374 Err(_) => return Err($err),
381 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
383 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
384 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
389 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
390 pub struct ChannelDetails {
391 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
392 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
393 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
394 /// lifetime of the channel.
395 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
396 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
397 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
398 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
399 /// The node_id of our counterparty
400 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
401 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
402 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
403 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
407 impl ChannelManager {
408 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
410 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
411 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
413 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
415 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
416 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
417 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
419 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
420 default_configuration: config.clone(),
421 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
422 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
423 monitor: monitor.clone(),
427 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
428 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
431 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
432 by_id: HashMap::new(),
433 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
434 next_forward: Instant::now(),
435 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
436 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
437 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
439 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
441 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
442 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
448 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
449 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
453 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
455 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
456 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
457 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
458 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
460 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
461 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
463 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
464 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
465 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
466 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
467 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
470 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
471 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
473 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
474 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
475 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
476 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
477 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
478 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
480 panic!("RNG is bad???");
483 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
485 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
486 node_id: their_network_key,
492 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
493 /// more information.
494 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
495 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
496 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
497 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
498 res.push(ChannelDetails {
499 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
500 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
501 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
502 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
503 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
509 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
510 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
511 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
512 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
513 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
514 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
515 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
516 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
517 // really wanted anyway.
518 if channel.is_live() {
519 res.push(ChannelDetails {
520 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
521 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
522 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
523 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
524 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
531 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
532 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
533 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
535 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
536 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
537 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
539 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
540 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
541 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
542 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
543 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
544 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
545 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
546 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
549 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
550 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
551 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
553 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
554 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
556 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
559 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
560 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
561 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
563 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
564 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
569 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
570 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
571 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
580 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
581 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
582 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
583 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
584 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
586 for tx in local_txn {
587 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
589 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
590 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
591 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
592 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
593 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
594 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
595 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
598 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
599 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
600 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
601 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
604 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
605 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
606 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
607 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
608 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
615 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
616 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
617 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
618 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
624 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
625 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
626 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
627 for chan in self.list_channels() {
628 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
632 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
634 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
636 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
637 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
638 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
639 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
643 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
644 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
645 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
646 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
647 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
652 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
653 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
654 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
660 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
661 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
663 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
664 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
665 let mut res = [0; 32];
666 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
670 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
671 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
672 let mut res = [0; 32];
673 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
679 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
680 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
681 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
682 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
683 let mut res = [0; 32];
684 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
689 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
690 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
691 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
692 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
693 let mut res = [0; 32];
694 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
698 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
700 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
701 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
702 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
704 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
705 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
707 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
708 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
709 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
710 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
711 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
713 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
715 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
716 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
718 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
724 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
725 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
726 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
728 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
729 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
735 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
745 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
746 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
747 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
748 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
749 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
750 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
751 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
752 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
754 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
755 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
756 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
757 // the intended recipient).
758 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
759 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
760 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
762 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
763 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
764 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
765 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
769 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
770 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
771 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
773 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
774 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
775 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
777 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
779 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
783 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
785 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
793 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
794 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
796 for i in 0..dst.len() {
801 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
802 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
803 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
804 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
807 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
808 let end_len = iters * 65;
809 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
810 res.resize(end_len, 0);
812 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
813 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
814 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
815 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
816 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
821 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
822 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
824 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
825 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
826 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
827 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
829 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
830 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
831 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
834 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
837 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
838 hmac.input(&packet_data);
839 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
840 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
845 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
846 hop_data: packet_data,
851 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
852 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
853 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
854 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
856 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
857 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
858 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
859 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
860 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
861 data: packet_crypted,
865 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
866 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
867 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
869 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
872 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
873 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
874 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
875 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
879 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
880 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
883 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
885 failuremsg: failuremsg,
889 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
890 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
891 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
897 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
898 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
899 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
902 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
903 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
906 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
907 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
908 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
909 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
915 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
916 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
917 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
918 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
919 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
920 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
921 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
922 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
925 let shared_secret = {
926 let mut arr = [0; 32];
927 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
930 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
932 let mut channel_state = None;
933 macro_rules! return_err {
934 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
936 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
937 if channel_state.is_none() {
938 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
940 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
941 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
942 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
943 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
944 })), channel_state.unwrap());
949 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
950 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
951 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
952 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
953 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
954 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
955 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
956 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
959 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
960 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
961 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
962 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
963 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
966 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
967 let next_hop_data = {
968 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
969 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
970 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
972 let error_code = match err {
973 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
974 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
976 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
982 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
984 // final_expiry_too_soon
985 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
986 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
988 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
989 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
990 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
992 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
993 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
994 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
997 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
998 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
999 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1000 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1002 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1004 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1005 short_channel_id: 0,
1006 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1007 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1008 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1011 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1012 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1013 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1015 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1017 let blinding_factor = {
1018 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1019 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1020 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1021 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1022 sha.result(&mut res);
1023 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1025 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1031 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1032 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1035 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1037 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1038 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1039 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1042 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1043 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1044 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1045 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1046 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1047 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1048 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1052 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1053 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1054 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1055 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1056 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1057 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1058 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1060 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1062 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1063 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1065 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1066 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1067 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1068 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1069 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1070 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1071 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1073 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1074 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1076 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1077 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1078 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1080 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1081 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1083 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1084 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1085 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1086 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1088 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1089 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1094 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1095 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1096 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1098 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1099 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1101 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1102 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1104 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1109 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1112 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1113 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1114 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1115 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1116 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1120 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1122 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1123 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1124 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1125 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1126 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1127 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1128 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1129 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1130 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1131 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1134 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1135 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1137 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1143 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1145 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1146 /// fields for more info.
1148 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1149 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1150 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1151 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1152 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1153 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1155 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1157 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1158 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1159 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1160 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1161 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1163 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1164 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1165 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1166 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1170 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1171 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1172 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1174 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1176 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1178 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1179 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1180 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1181 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1183 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1184 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1186 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1187 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1188 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1192 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1193 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1194 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1196 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1197 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1199 if !chan.is_live() {
1200 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1202 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1203 route: route.clone(),
1204 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1205 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1206 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1209 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1210 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1211 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1212 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1215 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1216 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1217 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1218 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1219 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1220 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1221 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1233 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1235 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1236 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1238 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1240 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1241 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1242 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1243 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1245 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1246 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1247 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1249 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1250 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1251 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1254 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1255 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1256 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1266 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1267 // lock before add_update_monitor
1268 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1272 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1273 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1274 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1277 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1278 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1279 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1281 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1287 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1288 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1290 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1292 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1294 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1295 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1297 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1298 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1299 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1300 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1301 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1305 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1307 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1308 /// Will likely generate further events.
1309 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1310 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1312 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1313 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1315 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1316 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1318 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1322 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1323 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1324 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1325 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1327 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1328 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1329 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1330 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1331 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1332 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1334 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1339 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1341 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1342 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1343 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1344 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1345 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1346 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1348 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1350 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1351 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1356 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1358 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1359 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1360 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1361 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1362 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1363 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1364 // this channel currently :/.
1371 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1372 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1375 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1376 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1378 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1380 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1384 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1385 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1387 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1388 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1389 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1390 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1391 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1392 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1393 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1395 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1400 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1401 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1402 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1403 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1404 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1406 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1407 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1408 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1410 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1411 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1412 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1419 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1421 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1422 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1426 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1427 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1428 events.append(&mut new_events);
1431 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1432 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1433 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1435 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1436 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1437 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1438 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1439 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1440 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1446 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1447 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1448 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1449 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1450 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1451 /// still-available channels.
1452 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1454 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1455 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1456 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1457 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1458 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1459 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1460 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1465 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1466 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1467 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1470 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1473 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1474 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1475 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1476 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1477 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1479 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1480 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1484 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1486 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1487 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1491 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1492 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1493 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1494 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1497 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1498 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1499 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1500 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1501 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1502 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1503 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1505 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1511 //TODO: Do something with e?
1519 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1520 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1521 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1523 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1524 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1525 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1526 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1527 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1528 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1530 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1532 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1533 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1534 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1535 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1536 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1537 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1542 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1544 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1545 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1546 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1547 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1551 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1552 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1553 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1555 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1556 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1558 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1559 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1565 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1566 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1567 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1568 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1569 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1570 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1573 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1574 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1575 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1576 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1577 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1578 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1579 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1580 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1588 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1589 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1590 //TODO: Do something with e?
1598 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1599 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1600 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1603 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1604 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1606 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1607 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1608 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1609 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1610 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1613 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1614 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1615 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1616 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1617 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1618 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1619 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1620 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1622 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1623 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1624 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1626 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1627 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1628 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1634 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1637 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1638 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1639 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1641 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1643 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1644 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1645 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1646 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1651 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1652 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1653 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1654 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1655 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1660 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1664 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1675 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1676 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1678 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1680 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1681 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1685 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1686 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1687 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1690 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1691 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1692 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1693 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1694 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1695 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1696 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1697 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1698 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1699 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1701 entry.insert(channel);
1707 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1708 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1709 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1710 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1712 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1713 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1714 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1716 chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration)
1717 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1718 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1720 //TODO: same as above
1721 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1724 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1725 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1726 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1727 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1728 output_script: output_script,
1729 user_channel_id: user_id,
1734 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1735 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1736 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1737 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1738 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1739 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1740 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1741 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1743 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1744 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1745 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1748 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1752 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1755 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1756 // lock before add_update_monitor
1757 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1760 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1761 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1762 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1763 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1764 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1766 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1767 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1768 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1777 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1778 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1779 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1780 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1782 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1783 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1784 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1786 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1787 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1790 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1792 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1795 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1796 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1797 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1798 user_channel_id: user_id,
1803 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1804 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1805 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1806 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1808 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1809 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1810 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1812 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1813 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1814 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan) {
1815 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1816 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1817 msg: announcement_sigs,
1822 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1826 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1827 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1828 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1829 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1831 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1832 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1833 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1834 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1835 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1837 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1838 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1839 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1840 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1844 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1845 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1846 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1850 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1851 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1852 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1854 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1855 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1857 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1860 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1861 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1862 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1864 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1865 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1866 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1867 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1875 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1876 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1877 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1878 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1879 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1880 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1881 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1882 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1883 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1885 let (closing_signed, tx) = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1886 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1887 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1888 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1893 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1894 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1895 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1896 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1897 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1898 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1899 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1901 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1902 } else { (tx, None) }
1904 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1907 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1908 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1910 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1911 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1912 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1913 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1921 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1922 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1923 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1924 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1926 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1927 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1928 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1929 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1931 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1932 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1934 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1936 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1937 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1938 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1940 if !chan.is_usable() {
1941 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1942 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1943 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1944 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1945 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1946 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1947 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1948 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap().encode_with_len()[..]),
1952 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1954 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1958 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1959 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1960 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1962 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1963 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1964 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1966 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1967 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1969 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1971 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1975 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
1976 // indicating that the payment itself failed
1977 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
1978 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
1979 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
1980 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
1981 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
1983 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
1984 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
1988 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
1989 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
1990 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
1993 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
1995 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1996 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1997 if res.is_some() { return; }
1999 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
2000 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2001 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2003 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2005 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2006 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2007 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2008 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2009 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2011 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2013 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2014 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2015 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2016 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2017 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2018 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2020 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2021 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
2022 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2023 // definitely came from the peer in question
2024 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
2026 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
2028 match error_code & 0xff {
2030 // either from an intermediate or final node
2031 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
2032 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
2033 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
2034 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
2035 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2036 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2037 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
2038 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2039 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
2040 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2041 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2047 if is_from_final_node {
2048 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2049 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2050 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2051 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2052 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2053 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2056 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2057 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2061 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2062 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2063 // does not coform to the spec.
2064 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2065 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2066 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2072 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2076 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2078 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2079 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2080 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2084 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2085 let offset = match error_code {
2086 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2087 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2088 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2089 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2090 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2091 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2093 // node sending unknown code
2094 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2095 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2102 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2103 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2104 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2105 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2106 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2107 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2108 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2109 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2112 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2113 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2114 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2115 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2117 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2118 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2119 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2120 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2121 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2123 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2124 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2125 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2126 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2128 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2129 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2130 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2131 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2133 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2134 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2137 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2138 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2142 res = Some((msg, true));
2148 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2151 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2152 res = Some((None, true));
2156 // node sending unknown code
2157 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2158 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2167 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2168 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2169 } else { ((None, true)) }
2172 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2173 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2174 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2176 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2177 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2178 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2180 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2181 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2183 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2188 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2189 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2190 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2192 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2193 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2194 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2196 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2197 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set", msg.channel_id));
2199 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2200 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2203 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2207 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2208 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2209 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2210 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2212 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2213 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2214 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2216 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2217 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2220 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2221 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2222 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2224 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2225 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2226 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2227 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2228 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2229 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2230 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2231 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2233 commitment_signed: msg,
2237 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2238 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2239 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2245 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2250 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2251 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2252 let mut forward_event = None;
2253 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2254 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2255 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2256 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2257 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2259 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2260 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2261 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2262 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2264 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2265 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2270 match forward_event {
2272 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2273 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2274 time_forwardable: time
2282 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2283 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2284 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2285 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2286 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2288 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2289 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2290 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2292 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2293 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2296 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2297 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2298 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2302 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2303 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2304 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2308 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2310 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2313 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2314 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2316 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2321 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2322 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2323 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2325 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2326 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2327 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2329 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2331 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2335 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2336 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2337 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2339 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2341 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2342 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2344 if !chan.is_usable() {
2345 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2348 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2349 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2350 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2352 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2353 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2354 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2355 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2356 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2358 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2360 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2361 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2362 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2363 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2364 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2365 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2366 contents: announcement,
2368 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2371 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2376 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2377 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2378 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2380 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2382 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2383 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2385 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order, shutdown) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2386 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2387 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2388 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2392 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2393 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2394 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2398 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2399 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2400 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2401 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2406 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2407 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2408 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2409 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2415 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2419 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2424 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2425 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2426 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2432 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2436 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2437 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2438 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2439 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2441 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2442 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2443 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2444 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2446 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2447 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2449 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2450 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2452 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2453 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2455 if !chan.is_live() {
2456 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2458 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2459 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2462 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2463 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2464 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2465 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2466 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2467 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2468 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2469 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2480 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2481 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2482 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2483 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2484 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2489 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2490 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2491 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2492 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2493 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2498 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2499 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2500 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2501 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2503 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2504 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2505 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2506 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2507 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2508 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2509 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2510 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2511 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2512 msg: funding_locked,
2514 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2515 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2516 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2517 msg: announcement_sigs,
2520 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2521 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2522 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2523 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2526 if channel.is_shutdown() {
2530 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2531 for tx in txn_matched {
2532 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2533 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2534 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2535 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2537 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2538 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2539 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2540 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2541 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2542 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2551 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2552 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2553 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2555 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2556 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2557 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2558 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2559 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2560 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2561 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2570 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2571 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2573 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2574 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2577 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2578 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2579 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2580 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2582 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2583 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2584 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2585 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2586 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2587 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2588 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2589 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2591 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2592 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2593 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2603 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2604 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2606 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2607 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2611 macro_rules! handle_error {
2612 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2615 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2616 if needs_channel_force_close {
2618 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2619 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2620 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2622 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2625 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2626 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2627 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2628 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2629 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2631 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2643 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2644 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2645 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2646 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2647 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2650 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2651 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2652 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2655 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2656 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2657 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2660 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2661 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2662 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2665 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2666 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2667 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2670 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2671 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2672 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2675 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2676 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2677 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2680 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2681 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2682 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2685 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2686 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2687 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2690 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2691 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2692 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2695 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2696 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2697 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2700 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2701 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2702 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2705 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2706 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2707 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2710 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2711 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2712 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2715 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2716 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2717 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2720 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2721 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2722 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2725 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2726 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2727 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2728 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2730 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2731 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2732 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2733 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2734 if no_connection_possible {
2735 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2736 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2737 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2738 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2739 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2741 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2742 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2743 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2753 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2754 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2755 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2756 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2757 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2758 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2759 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2760 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2762 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2763 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2764 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2773 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2774 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2776 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2777 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2778 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2783 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2784 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2786 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2787 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2788 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2789 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2790 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2791 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2792 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2793 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2794 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2795 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2799 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2800 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2801 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2807 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2810 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2811 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2813 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2814 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2815 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2816 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2820 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2825 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2826 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2828 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2829 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2830 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2832 onion.write(writer)?;
2836 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2837 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2838 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2839 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2840 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2845 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2846 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2847 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2849 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2850 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2852 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2854 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2855 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2856 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2857 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2858 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2863 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2864 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2866 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2868 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2870 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2872 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2879 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2880 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2881 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2882 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2883 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2884 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2889 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2890 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2892 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2894 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2896 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2898 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2905 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2906 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2907 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2908 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2909 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2910 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2915 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2918 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2921 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2922 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2924 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2926 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2928 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2930 route.write(writer)?;
2931 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2932 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2939 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2940 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2941 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2942 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2943 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2944 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2945 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2946 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2948 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2953 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2954 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2956 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2960 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2962 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2963 data.write(writer)?;
2970 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
2971 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
2972 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2973 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
2974 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2975 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
2976 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
2978 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2983 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
2984 prev_short_channel_id,
2989 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
2990 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2991 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
2993 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2994 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2996 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
2997 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
2998 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3000 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3001 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3002 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3003 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3004 unfunded_channels += 1;
3007 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3008 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3009 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3010 channel.write(writer)?;
3014 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3015 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3016 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3017 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3018 for forward in pending_forwards {
3019 forward.write(writer)?;
3023 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3024 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3025 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3026 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3027 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3028 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3036 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3038 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3040 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3041 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3042 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3043 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3044 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3045 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3046 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3047 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3048 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3049 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3050 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3051 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3052 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3053 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3054 /// deserialization.
3055 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3057 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3059 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3060 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3061 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3063 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3064 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3065 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3066 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3067 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3069 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3070 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3071 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3072 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3073 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3074 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3075 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3076 /// deserialization.
3077 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3078 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3079 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3080 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3082 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3083 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3085 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3086 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3087 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3088 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3090 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3092 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3095 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3096 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3097 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3098 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3099 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3100 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3103 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3104 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3105 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3107 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3109 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3110 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3111 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3112 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3113 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3114 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3115 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3116 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3119 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3120 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3121 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3122 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3123 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3124 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3125 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3126 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3127 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3129 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3130 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3132 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3135 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3139 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3140 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3141 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3145 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3146 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3147 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3148 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3149 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3150 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3151 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3152 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3154 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3157 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3158 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3159 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3160 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3161 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3162 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3163 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3164 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3166 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3169 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3171 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3172 monitor: args.monitor,
3173 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3174 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3176 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3177 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3178 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3180 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3183 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3186 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3188 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3190 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3191 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3192 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3193 logger: args.logger,
3194 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3197 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3198 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3199 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3200 //connection or two.
3203 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3209 use chain::chaininterface;
3210 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3211 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3212 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
3213 use chain::keysinterface;
3214 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
3215 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3216 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3218 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
3219 use util::test_utils;
3220 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3221 use util::errors::APIError;
3222 use util::logger::Logger;
3223 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3224 use util::config::UserConfig;
3226 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3227 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3228 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
3229 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3230 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3234 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3235 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3237 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3238 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3240 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3242 use std::cell::RefCell;
3243 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
3244 use std::default::Default;
3246 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3247 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3248 use std::time::Instant;
3251 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3252 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3253 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3258 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3259 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3262 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3263 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3266 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3267 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3270 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3271 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3274 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3275 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3280 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3282 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3283 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3288 fn onion_vectors() {
3289 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3290 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3292 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3293 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3294 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3295 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3296 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3298 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3299 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3300 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3301 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3302 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3304 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3305 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3306 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3307 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3308 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3310 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3311 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3312 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3313 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3314 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3316 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3317 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3318 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3319 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3320 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3322 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3323 let payloads = vec!(
3324 msgs::OnionHopData {
3326 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3327 short_channel_id: 0,
3329 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3333 msgs::OnionHopData {
3335 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3336 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3337 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3338 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3342 msgs::OnionHopData {
3344 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3345 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3346 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3347 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3351 msgs::OnionHopData {
3353 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3354 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3355 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3356 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3360 msgs::OnionHopData {
3362 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3363 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3364 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3365 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3371 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
3372 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3374 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3378 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3379 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3381 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3382 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3383 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3385 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3386 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3388 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3389 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3391 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3392 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3394 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3395 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3397 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3398 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3401 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3402 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3403 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3404 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3406 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3407 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3412 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3413 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3414 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3415 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3417 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3418 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3419 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3421 impl Drop for Node {
3422 fn drop(&mut self) {
3423 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3424 // Check that we processed all pending events
3425 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3426 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3427 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3432 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3433 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3436 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3437 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3438 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3439 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3442 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3443 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3445 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3446 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3448 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3449 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3452 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3453 }, match events[1] {
3454 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3455 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3456 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3457 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3458 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3459 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3460 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3461 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3463 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3469 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3470 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3472 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3473 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3475 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3476 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3479 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3485 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3486 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3488 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3489 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3491 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3492 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3495 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3501 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3502 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3503 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3504 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3506 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3510 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3511 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3513 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3514 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3515 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3517 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3518 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3520 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3522 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3523 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3524 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3525 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3526 added_monitors.clear();
3528 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3531 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3533 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3534 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3535 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3536 added_monitors.clear();
3539 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3541 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3542 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3543 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3544 added_monitors.clear();
3547 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3548 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3550 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3551 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3552 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3554 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3560 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3561 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3562 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3566 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3567 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3568 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3569 ((match events_6[0] {
3570 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3571 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3572 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3575 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3576 }, match events_6[1] {
3577 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3578 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3581 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3585 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3586 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3587 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3591 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3592 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3593 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3594 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3596 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3597 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3598 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3599 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3602 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3605 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3606 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3607 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3608 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3609 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3610 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3613 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3616 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3618 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3621 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3622 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3625 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3626 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3628 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3629 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3630 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3632 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3635 macro_rules! check_spends {
3636 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3638 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3639 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3640 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3641 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3646 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3647 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3649 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3650 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3651 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3652 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3653 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3656 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3657 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3659 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3660 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3663 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3670 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3671 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3672 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3675 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3676 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3678 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3679 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3680 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3681 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3682 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3685 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3688 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3689 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3692 Some(match events_1[1] {
3693 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3694 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3697 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3701 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3702 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3703 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3704 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3705 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3706 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3707 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3709 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3710 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3711 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3712 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3713 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3714 (as_update, bs_update)
3716 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3718 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3719 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3720 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3721 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3723 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3724 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3725 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3726 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3727 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3728 (as_update, bs_update)
3730 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3731 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3733 (as_update, bs_update)
3738 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3739 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3742 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3743 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3744 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3745 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3746 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3747 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3750 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3752 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3753 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3758 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3759 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3761 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3762 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3763 added_monitors.clear();
3768 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3769 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3771 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3772 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3773 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3774 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3775 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3778 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
3780 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3781 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3782 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3783 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3784 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3785 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3786 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3787 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3788 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3789 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3791 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3792 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3795 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3796 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3798 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3799 if $fail_backwards {
3800 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3801 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3803 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3805 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3806 if $fail_backwards {
3807 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3808 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3810 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3812 added_monitors.clear();
3817 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
3819 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
3822 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3824 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
3825 if $fail_backwards {
3826 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3827 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3828 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
3829 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3830 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
3832 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3838 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3841 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3842 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3843 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3844 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3845 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3846 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3847 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3852 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3853 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3855 let mut payment_event = {
3856 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3857 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3859 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3860 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3861 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3863 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3865 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3866 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3868 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3869 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3870 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3872 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3873 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3875 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3876 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3879 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3880 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3882 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3883 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3884 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3886 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3887 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3888 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3890 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3893 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3894 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3895 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3896 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3897 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3903 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3906 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3907 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3908 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3910 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3911 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3912 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
3915 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3916 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3918 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3919 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3920 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3921 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3922 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3923 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3924 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3925 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
3927 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3933 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
3934 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
3936 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3937 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3938 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3939 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3943 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
3944 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
3946 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3947 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3948 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
3949 get_next_msgs!($node)
3951 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3954 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3955 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
3960 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3961 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3962 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3963 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
3964 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3965 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
3966 } else if update_next_msgs {
3967 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
3969 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3971 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3972 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3979 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
3980 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3981 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3983 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3984 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3986 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3991 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3992 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3995 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3997 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3998 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3999 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4000 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4001 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4004 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4007 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4008 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4009 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4010 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4011 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4014 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4016 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4018 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4019 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4023 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4024 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4025 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4028 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4029 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
4030 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4032 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4033 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4034 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4036 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4037 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4042 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4043 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4044 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4045 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4046 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4047 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4048 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4049 // second-to-last node!
4050 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4053 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4054 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4055 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4057 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4058 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4059 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4060 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4061 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4062 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4063 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4064 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4066 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4069 assert!(events.is_empty());
4071 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4072 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4079 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4081 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4082 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4084 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
4085 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4086 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4088 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4093 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4094 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4097 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4098 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4099 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4100 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4101 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4103 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4104 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4106 for _ in 0..node_count {
4107 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4108 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4109 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4110 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4111 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4112 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4113 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4114 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4115 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4116 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4117 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4118 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4119 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
4120 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4121 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4129 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4130 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4131 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4132 let channel_id = chan.2;
4134 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4136 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4137 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4143 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4147 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4148 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4149 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4150 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4151 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4152 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4153 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4154 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4155 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4156 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4158 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4160 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4162 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4163 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
4164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4166 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4167 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4168 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4169 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4170 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4172 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4175 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4177 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4178 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4179 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4182 let payment_event = {
4183 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4184 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4185 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4187 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4188 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4190 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4191 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4192 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4193 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4194 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4197 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4198 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4199 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4200 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4203 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4204 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4205 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4206 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4207 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4208 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4209 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4212 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4213 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4214 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4215 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4216 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4217 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4218 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4221 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4222 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4223 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4226 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4227 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4230 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4233 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4234 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4236 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4237 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4240 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4245 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4246 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4247 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4248 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4249 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4250 let channel_id = chan.2;
4252 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4254 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4255 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4261 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4263 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4264 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
4265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4267 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4268 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4269 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4270 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4273 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4276 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4278 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4279 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4280 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4283 let payment_event = {
4284 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4285 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4286 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4288 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4289 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4291 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4292 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4293 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4294 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4295 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4298 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4301 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4305 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4306 let nodes = create_network(2);
4307 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4308 let channel_id = chan.2;
4310 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4312 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4313 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4319 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4320 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4321 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4322 // (3) update_fee ->
4323 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4324 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4325 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4326 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4327 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4328 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4329 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4330 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4331 // revoke_and_ack ->
4332 // B should send no response here
4333 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4334 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4335 // revoke_and_ack ->
4337 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4338 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4339 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4342 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4343 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4344 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4345 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4346 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4351 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4352 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4353 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4354 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4357 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4359 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4360 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4361 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4363 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4364 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4365 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4366 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4369 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4371 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4373 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4375 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4376 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4377 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4379 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4380 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4381 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4382 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4383 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4384 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4385 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4387 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4388 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4389 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4391 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4393 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4394 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4398 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4399 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4402 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4403 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4406 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4407 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4408 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4411 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4412 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4417 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4418 let nodes = create_network(2);
4419 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4420 let channel_id = chan.2;
4422 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4424 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4425 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4430 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4431 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4434 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4435 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4436 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4437 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4438 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4440 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4442 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4444 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4445 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4448 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4449 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4452 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4453 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4454 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4457 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4458 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4463 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4464 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4465 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4466 let channel_id = chan.2;
4468 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4470 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4471 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4477 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4479 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4480 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4483 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4484 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4485 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4486 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4487 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4489 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4491 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4492 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4493 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4496 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4498 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4500 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4501 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4503 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4504 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4505 added_monitors.clear();
4507 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4508 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4509 // node[1] has nothing to do
4511 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4512 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4513 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4515 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4516 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4517 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4519 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4521 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4523 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4524 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4525 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4526 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4527 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4528 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4530 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4531 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4533 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4535 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4537 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4539 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4541 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4542 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4544 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4546 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4548 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4549 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4551 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4552 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4554 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4555 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4557 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4558 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4560 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4561 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4564 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4566 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4567 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4568 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4572 fn test_update_fee() {
4573 let nodes = create_network(2);
4574 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4575 let channel_id = chan.2;
4577 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4579 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4580 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4586 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4587 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4588 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4589 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4590 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4591 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4592 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4593 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4594 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4595 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4596 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4597 // revoke_and_ack ->
4599 // Create and deliver (1)...
4600 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4601 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4604 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4605 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4606 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4607 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4608 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4610 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4612 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4614 // Generate (2) and (3):
4615 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4616 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4620 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4621 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4624 // Create and deliver (4)...
4625 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4627 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4628 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4629 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4630 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4631 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4636 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4637 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4640 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4641 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4643 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4644 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4646 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4647 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4650 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4651 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4654 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4655 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4656 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4657 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4658 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4659 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4660 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4661 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4665 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4667 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4668 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4670 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4672 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4674 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
4675 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
4676 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4680 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4681 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4682 let nodes = create_network(2);
4683 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4684 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4685 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4686 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4688 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4689 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4690 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4691 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4692 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4694 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4695 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4696 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4697 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4698 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4699 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4701 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4702 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4706 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4707 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4708 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4709 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4710 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4711 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4712 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4714 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4716 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4717 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4718 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4719 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4720 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4722 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4723 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4725 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4726 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4727 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4728 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4729 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4731 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4733 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4734 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4735 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4736 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4737 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4738 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4739 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4741 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4742 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4744 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4745 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4746 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4747 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4748 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4749 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4750 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4752 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4753 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4755 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4756 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4761 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4762 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4763 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4764 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4765 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4766 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4768 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4770 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4771 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4772 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4773 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4774 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4778 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
4779 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
4780 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4781 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4782 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4784 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4785 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4786 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4788 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4789 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4790 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4791 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4792 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4793 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4795 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4796 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4797 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4798 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4800 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4801 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4803 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4804 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
4806 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4807 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4808 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4809 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4810 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4811 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4813 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4814 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4816 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4817 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4819 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest } => {
4820 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4821 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
4823 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4826 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4827 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4828 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4829 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4830 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4831 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4832 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4834 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4836 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4837 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4838 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4839 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4840 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4844 fn update_fee_async_shutdown() {
4845 // Test update_fee works after shutdown start if messages are delivered out-of-order
4846 let nodes = create_network(2);
4847 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4849 let starting_feerate = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().get_feerate();
4850 nodes[0].node.update_fee(chan_1.2.clone(), starting_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4852 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4853 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4854 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4855 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4856 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4857 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_some());
4859 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4860 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4861 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4862 // Note that we don't actually test normative behavior here. The spec indicates we could
4863 // actually send a closing_signed here, but is kinda unclear and could possibly be amended
4864 // to require waiting on the full commitment dance before doing so (see
4865 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/499). In any case, to avoid
4866 // ambiguity, we should wait until after the full commitment dance to send closing_signed.
4867 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4869 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4870 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4872 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4873 let node_0_closing_signed = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, true);
4875 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4876 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), match node_0_closing_signed.unwrap() {
4877 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
4878 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4881 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4883 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4884 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4885 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4886 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4889 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
4890 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
4891 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
4892 let nodes = create_network(3);
4893 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4894 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4896 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4898 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4899 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4901 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4902 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4904 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4908 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4909 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4911 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4912 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4913 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4914 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4916 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
4917 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4918 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
4920 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
4921 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
4922 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4923 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
4926 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4927 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
4928 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
4930 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
4932 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4933 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4935 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4937 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4938 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4939 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4940 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4941 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4942 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4943 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4945 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4946 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4948 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4949 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4950 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4951 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4952 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4953 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4954 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4956 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4957 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4959 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4960 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4962 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4965 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4967 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4968 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4969 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
4972 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4973 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4975 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4976 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4977 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4978 if recv_count == 0 {
4979 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
4980 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4982 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
4983 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4984 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
4986 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
4987 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4988 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
4990 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
4991 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4993 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
4994 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4995 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
4997 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
4998 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4999 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5000 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5001 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5003 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5004 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5005 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5006 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5007 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5008 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5010 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5012 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5013 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5014 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5015 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5016 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5017 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5019 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5020 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5021 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5022 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5023 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5025 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5026 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5032 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5034 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5035 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5036 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5037 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5038 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5042 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5043 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5044 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5045 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5049 fn fake_network_test() {
5050 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5051 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5052 let nodes = create_network(4);
5054 // Create some initial channels
5055 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5056 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5057 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5059 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5060 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5061 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5062 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5063 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5065 // Send some more payments
5066 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5067 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5068 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5070 // Test failure packets
5071 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5072 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5074 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5075 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5077 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5078 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5079 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5080 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5081 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5082 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5083 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5085 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5086 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5087 hops.push(RouteHop {
5088 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5089 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5091 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5093 hops.push(RouteHop {
5094 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5095 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5097 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5099 hops.push(RouteHop {
5100 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5101 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5103 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5105 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5106 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5107 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5109 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5110 hops.push(RouteHop {
5111 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5112 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5114 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5116 hops.push(RouteHop {
5117 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5118 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5120 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5122 hops.push(RouteHop {
5123 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5124 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5126 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5128 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5129 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5130 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5132 // Claim the rebalances...
5133 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5134 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5136 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5137 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5139 // Send some payments across both channels
5140 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5141 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5142 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5144 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5146 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5148 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5149 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5150 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5152 // Close down the channels...
5153 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5154 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5155 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5156 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5157 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5161 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5162 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5163 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5164 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5166 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5167 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5168 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5169 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5170 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5171 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5173 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5175 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5176 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5178 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5179 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5181 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5182 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5183 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5186 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5187 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5188 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5190 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5191 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5192 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5194 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5195 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5197 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5199 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5200 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5201 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5203 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5204 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5205 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5206 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5207 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5208 res.push(tx.clone());
5213 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5214 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5217 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5219 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5220 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5221 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5222 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5223 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5224 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5226 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5228 res.push(tx.clone());
5232 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
5235 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5239 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5240 /// HTLC transaction.
5241 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5242 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5243 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5244 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5245 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5246 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5250 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5253 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5254 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5256 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5257 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5258 let mut found_prev = false;
5260 for tx in prev_txn {
5261 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5262 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5263 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5264 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5270 assert!(found_prev);
5272 let mut res = Vec::new();
5273 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5277 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5278 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5279 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5280 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5281 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5284 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5287 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5288 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5289 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5290 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5293 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5297 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5298 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5302 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5304 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5305 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5307 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5308 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5310 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5311 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5316 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5318 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5319 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5321 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5322 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5323 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5324 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5325 chan.get_value_stat()
5329 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5330 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5331 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5333 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5334 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5336 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5337 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5339 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5340 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5341 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5342 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5343 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5347 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5349 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5350 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5351 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5352 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5357 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5358 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5359 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5360 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5362 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5363 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5364 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5366 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5371 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5372 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5374 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5376 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5378 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5379 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5380 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5382 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5383 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5387 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5388 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5389 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5391 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5392 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5395 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5398 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5399 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5400 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5401 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5402 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5405 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5406 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5407 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5408 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5409 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5413 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5414 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5415 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5416 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5418 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5419 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5423 // adding pending output
5424 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5425 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5427 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5428 let payment_event_1 = {
5429 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5432 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5433 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5434 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5436 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5438 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5439 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5441 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5442 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5443 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5444 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5449 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5450 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5452 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5453 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5454 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5455 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5456 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5458 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5460 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5461 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5462 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5463 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5464 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5465 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5467 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5468 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5469 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5470 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5473 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5475 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5479 // split the rest to test holding cell
5480 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5481 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5483 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5484 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5487 // now see if they go through on both sides
5488 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5489 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5490 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5492 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5493 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5495 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5497 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5498 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5499 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5500 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5504 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5505 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5506 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5507 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5508 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5509 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5511 // flush the pending htlc
5512 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5513 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5516 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5518 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5520 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5521 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5522 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5525 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5526 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5529 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5531 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5532 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5533 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5535 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5536 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5538 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5539 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5540 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5541 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5542 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5543 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5545 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5546 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5547 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5548 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5550 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5551 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5553 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5554 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5556 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5557 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5558 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5560 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5563 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5564 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5565 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5567 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5570 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5571 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5572 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5574 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5575 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5576 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5577 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5579 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5580 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5584 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5585 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5586 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5587 let nodes = create_network(5);
5589 // Create some initial channels
5590 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5591 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5592 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5593 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5595 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5596 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5597 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5598 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5599 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5601 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5602 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5604 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5605 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5606 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5607 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5609 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5610 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5611 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5613 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5614 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5616 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5617 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5619 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5620 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5621 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5622 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5624 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5625 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5626 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5628 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5629 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5631 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5632 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5634 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5635 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5637 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5638 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5639 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5640 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5642 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5648 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5649 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5650 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5652 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5654 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5655 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5657 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5658 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5660 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5662 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5663 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5664 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5666 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5667 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5668 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5671 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5672 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5673 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5674 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5675 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5679 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5680 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5681 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5682 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5683 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5686 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5688 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5689 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5691 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5692 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5693 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5694 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5695 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5698 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5700 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5701 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5703 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5705 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5706 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5707 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5711 fn test_justice_tx() {
5712 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5714 let nodes = create_network(2);
5715 // Create some new channels:
5716 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5718 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5719 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5720 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5721 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5722 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5723 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5724 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5725 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5726 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5727 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5728 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5729 // Revoke the old state
5730 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5733 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5734 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5736 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5737 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5738 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5739 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5741 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5742 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5744 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5746 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5747 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5748 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5749 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5750 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5752 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5754 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5755 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5757 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5758 // Create some new channels:
5759 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5761 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5762 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5763 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5764 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5765 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5766 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5767 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5768 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5769 // Revoke the old state
5770 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5772 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5773 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5775 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5776 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5777 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5778 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5780 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5781 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5783 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5785 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5786 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5787 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5788 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5789 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5791 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5792 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5793 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5797 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5798 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5799 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5800 let nodes = create_network(2);
5801 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5802 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5803 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5804 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5805 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5806 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5807 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5808 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5810 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5811 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5812 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5813 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5814 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
5816 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5818 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5819 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
5821 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
5822 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5823 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5827 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
5828 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
5829 let nodes = create_network(2);
5831 // Create some new channel:
5832 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5834 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5835 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5836 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
5837 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5838 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5840 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5841 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5842 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
5843 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5844 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5845 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5846 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5847 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5848 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5850 //Revoke the old state
5851 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5854 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5856 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5858 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5859 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5860 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5862 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
5863 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5865 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
5867 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5868 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5869 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5870 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5871 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5872 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5873 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5874 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
5876 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
5877 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5878 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
5880 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5881 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
5882 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
5883 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
5884 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5885 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
5887 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5888 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5889 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5893 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
5894 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
5895 let nodes = create_network(2);
5897 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5899 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5900 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5901 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
5902 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
5903 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5904 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5906 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5907 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5909 //Revoke the old state
5910 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5913 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5915 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
5917 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
5918 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5919 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
5921 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
5922 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
5923 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
5924 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
5925 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
5926 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
5927 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
5929 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5930 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5931 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5933 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
5934 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5935 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5936 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5937 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5939 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5940 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5941 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5942 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5943 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5944 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5945 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5946 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
5948 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
5949 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
5951 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
5952 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
5953 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
5954 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
5955 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5956 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5958 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5959 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5960 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5964 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
5965 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
5966 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
5967 let nodes = create_network(2);
5968 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5970 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
5971 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
5973 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5974 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5976 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5977 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5979 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5983 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5984 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5986 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5987 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
5990 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5991 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5993 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5994 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5996 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6000 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6001 // registering new transactions
6002 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6006 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6007 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6008 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6009 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6010 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6012 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6014 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6016 let mut payment_event = {
6017 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6020 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6021 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6022 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6025 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6026 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6028 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6029 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6031 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6032 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6035 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6036 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6038 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6039 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6040 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6041 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6044 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6045 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6047 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6049 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6050 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6051 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6053 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6054 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6055 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6057 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6058 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6060 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6064 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6065 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6066 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6067 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6068 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6072 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6073 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6075 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6076 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6077 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6079 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6080 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6082 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6085 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6087 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6088 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6089 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6091 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6092 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6093 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6094 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6095 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6096 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6097 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6099 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6103 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6104 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6105 let nodes = create_network(2);
6106 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6108 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6109 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6110 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6111 mem::drop(channel_state);
6113 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6114 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6115 headers.push(header.clone());
6117 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6118 headers.push(header.clone());
6120 while !headers.is_empty() {
6121 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6124 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6125 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6127 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6128 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6130 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6133 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6134 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6135 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6138 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6139 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6141 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6142 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6143 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6144 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6145 res.push(msg.clone());
6147 panic!("Unexpected event")
6155 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6156 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6158 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6160 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6162 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6168 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6169 let mut commitment_update = None;
6170 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6173 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6174 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6175 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6176 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6178 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6179 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6180 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6181 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6186 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6189 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6191 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6192 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6193 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6194 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6196 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6197 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6198 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6199 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6201 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6205 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6210 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6211 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6212 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6213 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6214 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6215 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6216 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6218 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
6219 for msg in reestablish_1 {
6220 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6221 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
6223 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6224 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6226 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
6229 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
6230 for msg in reestablish_2 {
6231 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6232 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
6234 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6235 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6237 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
6240 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
6241 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
6242 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
6244 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
6246 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6247 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6248 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6249 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6250 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6251 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6252 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6255 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6258 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6259 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6260 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6261 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6263 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6265 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6266 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6267 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6268 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
6270 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6272 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6273 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6274 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6275 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6276 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6278 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6279 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6281 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6282 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6285 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6286 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6288 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6289 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6290 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6291 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6292 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6293 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6294 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6297 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6301 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
6303 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6304 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6305 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6306 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6307 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6308 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6309 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6312 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6315 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6316 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6317 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6318 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6320 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6322 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6323 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6324 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6325 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
6327 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6328 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6329 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6330 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6331 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6333 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6334 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6336 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6337 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6340 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6341 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6343 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6344 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6345 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6346 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6347 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6348 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6349 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6352 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6358 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
6359 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
6360 let nodes = create_network(3);
6361 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6362 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6364 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6365 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6366 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6368 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6369 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6370 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
6371 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
6373 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6374 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6375 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6377 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6378 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6379 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6380 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6382 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6383 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6385 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
6386 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
6388 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
6390 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6391 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6393 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6394 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
6396 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6399 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
6400 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
6401 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
6403 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6407 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
6408 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
6411 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
6412 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
6413 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6414 if messages_delivered == 0 {
6415 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6416 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
6418 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6421 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6422 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6424 let payment_event = {
6425 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
6426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6428 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6429 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6430 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6432 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
6434 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6435 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
6437 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6438 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6439 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6441 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6443 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6444 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6445 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6448 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6449 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6450 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6451 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6454 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
6455 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6456 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6464 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6465 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6466 if messages_delivered < 3 {
6467 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
6468 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
6469 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6470 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6471 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6472 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6473 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6474 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6475 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6476 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6477 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6478 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6479 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
6480 // Everything was delivered...
6481 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6484 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6485 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6487 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6488 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6491 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6492 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6493 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6495 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6496 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6498 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6499 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6501 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6502 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6503 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6505 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6508 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6511 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6512 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6513 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
6514 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6515 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6516 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6517 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6518 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6519 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6520 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6521 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6523 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6526 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
6527 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
6529 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6530 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6532 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6533 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6535 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6538 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
6539 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
6540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6541 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6543 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6544 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6545 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6548 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6549 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6550 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6551 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6554 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6555 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6556 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6564 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6565 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6566 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6567 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6568 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
6569 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
6570 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6571 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6573 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6574 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6576 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6579 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
6580 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6581 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6582 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6583 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6584 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6585 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6586 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6587 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6588 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6589 // Everything was delivered...
6590 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6593 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6594 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6595 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6597 // Channel should still work fine...
6598 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
6599 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6603 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
6604 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
6605 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
6606 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
6607 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
6611 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
6612 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
6613 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
6614 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
6618 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
6619 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
6620 let nodes = create_network(2);
6621 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6623 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6624 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6626 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6627 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6628 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6630 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6631 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6636 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6637 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6638 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6640 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6641 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6643 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6646 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6647 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6648 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6649 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6651 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
6652 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
6654 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6655 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6656 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
6660 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
6661 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
6662 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
6663 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6664 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6666 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6668 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6669 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6670 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6672 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
6673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6675 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6676 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6678 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
6679 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6682 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6683 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6685 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6686 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6688 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6689 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6690 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6691 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6692 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6693 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6694 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6696 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6697 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6698 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6700 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6701 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6703 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6706 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6707 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6708 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6711 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6714 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6715 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6717 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6718 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6719 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6720 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6721 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6722 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6724 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6725 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6726 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6727 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6729 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6730 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6732 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6733 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6735 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6737 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6738 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6739 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6740 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6741 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6742 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6743 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6744 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6745 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6748 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
6749 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6750 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6751 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6752 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6753 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6754 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6757 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6758 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6759 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6760 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6761 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6762 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6763 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6766 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6767 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6768 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6771 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6772 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6773 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6776 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6777 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6778 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6780 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6781 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6783 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6784 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6787 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6788 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6790 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6791 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6793 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
6794 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6796 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6799 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6800 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6803 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6807 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
6808 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
6809 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6810 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6812 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6813 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6815 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6816 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6819 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6820 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6822 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6823 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6826 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6827 // PaymentFailed event
6829 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6832 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
6833 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
6834 // a disconnect in between
6835 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6836 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6838 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6839 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6841 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6842 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6845 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6846 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6847 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6850 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6851 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6852 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6855 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
6856 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6859 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6860 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6861 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
6862 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6863 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6864 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6866 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6868 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6869 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6871 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6872 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6873 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6875 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6878 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
6880 // Now set it to failed again...
6881 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6882 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6883 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
6884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6886 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6887 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6888 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6891 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6892 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6893 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6896 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
6897 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6898 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6901 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6902 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6904 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6905 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6908 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6909 // PaymentFailed event
6911 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6915 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
6916 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
6917 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
6920 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
6921 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
6923 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
6924 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
6925 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
6926 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
6927 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
6928 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
6929 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
6930 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
6931 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
6932 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
6933 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
6934 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
6935 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
6936 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
6937 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
6938 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
6939 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
6940 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6941 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6943 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6945 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6946 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6947 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6949 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6950 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
6951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6953 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6954 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6955 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6957 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
6958 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
6959 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6961 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6962 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6963 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
6964 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6965 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6966 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6967 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6968 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6969 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6970 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6972 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6973 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6974 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6975 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6977 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6978 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6980 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6983 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
6984 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
6985 } else { panic!(); }
6988 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6990 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6993 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
6994 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6995 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6998 // Now fix monitor updating...
6999 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7000 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7003 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7004 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7005 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7007 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7008 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7009 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7010 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7011 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7012 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7014 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7015 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7016 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7017 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7019 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7020 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7022 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7025 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7026 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7027 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7029 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7030 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7031 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7032 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7033 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7034 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7036 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7038 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7039 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7041 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7043 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7044 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7046 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7047 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7048 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7050 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7051 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7052 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7054 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7055 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7056 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7057 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7058 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7059 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7061 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7063 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7064 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7065 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7067 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7068 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7070 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7073 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7074 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7075 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7078 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7082 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7083 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7085 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7086 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7087 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7089 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7090 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7093 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7095 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7096 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7097 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7098 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7099 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7102 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7106 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7108 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7109 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7110 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7111 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7114 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7115 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7117 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7118 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7120 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7121 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7124 let as_commitment_update;
7125 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7127 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7128 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7129 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7130 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7131 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7132 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7133 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7134 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7138 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7139 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7140 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7141 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7142 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7143 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7144 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7145 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7149 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7152 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7153 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7155 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7156 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7158 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7159 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7161 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7164 handle_initial_raa!();
7166 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7167 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7169 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7170 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7172 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7173 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7176 handle_initial_raa!();
7178 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7179 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7181 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7182 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7184 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7185 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7187 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7192 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7193 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7195 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7196 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7198 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7199 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7203 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7204 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7205 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7208 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7209 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7210 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7213 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7214 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7217 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7218 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7221 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7223 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7224 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7226 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7227 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7228 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7230 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7233 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7237 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
7238 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
7239 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
7240 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
7241 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
7242 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
7243 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
7247 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
7248 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
7249 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
7250 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
7251 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
7255 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
7256 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
7257 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
7258 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
7259 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
7260 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
7264 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
7265 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
7266 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7267 let nodes = create_network(2);
7269 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7271 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7272 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7273 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7274 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7276 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7278 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7279 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7281 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7282 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7284 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
7286 let mut chan_announcement;
7288 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
7290 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
7291 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
7292 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
7293 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
7294 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
7295 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
7296 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
7297 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
7298 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7303 macro_rules! sign_msg {
7304 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
7305 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
7306 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7307 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7308 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
7309 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
7310 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
7311 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
7312 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
7313 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
7314 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
7315 contents: $unsigned_msg
7320 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7321 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7322 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
7323 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7325 // Configured with Network::Testnet
7326 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7327 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
7328 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7329 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7331 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7332 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
7333 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7334 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7337 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
7338 impl Writer for VecWriter {
7339 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
7340 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
7343 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
7344 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
7349 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7350 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7352 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7354 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7356 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7357 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7358 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7360 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7361 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7362 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7363 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7365 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7366 let config = UserConfig::new();
7367 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7368 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7369 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7370 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7371 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7372 default_config: config,
7374 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7375 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7376 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7377 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7378 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7379 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7382 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7384 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7385 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7386 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
7387 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
7388 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7391 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7392 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7393 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7394 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7396 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7397 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7398 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7399 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7401 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7402 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
7403 for node in nodes.iter() {
7404 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
7405 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
7406 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
7409 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7413 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7414 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7415 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7417 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7418 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7420 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7422 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7423 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7424 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7426 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7427 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7428 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7429 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7431 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7432 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7433 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7434 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7435 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7436 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7437 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7439 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7440 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7441 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7442 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7443 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7444 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7447 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7449 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7450 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7453 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7455 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
7456 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7460 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
7461 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
7462 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
7463 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7464 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
7465 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
7467 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
7469 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
7470 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7472 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
7473 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7474 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7475 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7477 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
7479 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
7480 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
7481 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7482 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
7483 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
7486 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7487 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
7488 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
7489 let mut read = &serialized[..];
7490 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7491 assert!(read.is_empty());
7492 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
7495 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7496 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7497 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7498 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7500 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7501 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7502 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7503 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7504 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7505 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
7507 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7509 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
7510 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7511 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7512 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
7513 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
7516 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
7517 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
7518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7520 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7522 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
7523 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7524 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7525 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
7526 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7528 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7529 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7530 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
7531 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
7532 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
7533 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }