ChannelManager support for monitor update failure in one place
[rust-lightning] / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
2 //!
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
6 //!
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
10
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
17
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
21 use secp256k1;
22
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelKeys};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs;
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HandleError, RAACommitmentOrder};
30 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
31 use util::sha2::Sha256;
32 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
33 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
34 use util::logger::Logger;
35 use util::errors::APIError;
36
37 use crypto;
38 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
39 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
40 use crypto::digest::Digest;
41 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
42
43 use std::{ptr, mem};
44 use std::collections::HashMap;
45 use std::collections::hash_map;
46 use std::io::Cursor;
47 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
50
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
52 ///
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
56 ///
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
64         use ln::msgs;
65         use ln::router::Route;
66         use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
67         use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
68
69         /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
70         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71         pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
72                 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
73                 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
74                 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
75                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
76                 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
77                 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
78         }
79
80         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81         pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
82                 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
83                 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
84         }
85
86         /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
87         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88         pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
89                 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
90                 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
91         }
92
93         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94         #[derive(Clone)]
95         pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
96                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
97                 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
98                 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
99         }
100
101         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102         #[derive(Clone)]
103         pub enum HTLCSource {
104                 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
105                 OutboundRoute {
106                         route: Route,
107                         session_priv: SecretKey,
108                         /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
109                         /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
110                         first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
111                 },
112         }
113         #[cfg(test)]
114         impl HTLCSource {
115                 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
116                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
117                                 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
118                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
119                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
120                         }
121                 }
122         }
123
124         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125         pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
126                 ErrorPacket {
127                         err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
128                 },
129                 Reason {
130                         failure_code: u16,
131                         data: Vec<u8>,
132                 }
133         }
134 }
135 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
136
137 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
138         err: msgs::HandleError,
139         needs_channel_force_close: bool,
140 }
141 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
142         #[inline]
143         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
144                 Self {
145                         err: HandleError {
146                                 err,
147                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
148                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
149                                                 channel_id,
150                                                 data: err.to_string()
151                                         },
152                                 }),
153                         },
154                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
155                 }
156         }
157         #[inline]
158         fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
159                 Self {
160                         err: HandleError {
161                                 err,
162                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
163                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
164                                                 channel_id,
165                                                 data: err.to_string()
166                                         },
167                                 }),
168                         },
169                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
170                 }
171         }
172         #[inline]
173         fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
174                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
175         }
176         #[inline]
177         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
178                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
179         }
180         #[inline]
181         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
182                 Self {
183                         err: match err {
184                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
185                                         err: msg,
186                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
187                                 },
188                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
189                                         err: msg,
190                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
191                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
192                                                         channel_id,
193                                                         data: msg.to_string()
194                                                 },
195                                         }),
196                                 },
197                         },
198                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
199                 }
200         }
201         #[inline]
202         fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
203                 Self {
204                         err: match err {
205                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
206                                         err: msg,
207                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
208                                 },
209                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
210                                         err: msg,
211                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
212                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
213                                                         channel_id,
214                                                         data: msg.to_string()
215                                                 },
216                                         }),
217                                 },
218                         },
219                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
220                 }
221         }
222 }
223
224 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
225 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
226 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
227 /// probably increase this significantly.
228 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
229
230 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
231         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
232         prev_htlc_id: u64,
233         forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
234 }
235
236 struct ChannelHolder {
237         by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
238         short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
239         next_forward: Instant,
240         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
241         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
242         /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
243         /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
244         forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
245         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
246         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
247         /// go to read them!
248         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
249 }
250 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
251         by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
252         short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
253         next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
254         forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
255         claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
256 }
257 impl ChannelHolder {
258         fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
259                 MutChannelHolder {
260                         by_id: &mut self.by_id,
261                         short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
262                         next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
263                         forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
264                         claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
265                 }
266         }
267 }
268
269 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
270 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
271
272 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
273 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
274 ///
275 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
276 /// to individual Channels.
277 pub struct ChannelManager {
278         genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
279         fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
280         monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
281         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
282         tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
283
284         announce_channels_publicly: bool,
285         fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
286         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
287         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
288
289         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
290         our_network_key: SecretKey,
291
292         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
293
294         logger: Arc<Logger>,
295 }
296
297 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
298 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
299 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
300 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
301 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
302 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
303 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
304
305 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
306 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
307 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
308 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
309 #[deny(const_err)]
310 #[allow(dead_code)]
311 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
312
313 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
314 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
315 #[deny(const_err)]
316 #[allow(dead_code)]
317 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
318
319 macro_rules! secp_call {
320         ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
321                 match $res {
322                         Ok(key) => key,
323                         Err(_) => return Err($err),
324                 }
325         };
326 }
327
328 struct OnionKeys {
329         #[cfg(test)]
330         shared_secret: SharedSecret,
331         #[cfg(test)]
332         blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
333         ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
334         rho: [u8; 32],
335         mu: [u8; 32],
336 }
337
338 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
339 pub struct ChannelDetails {
340         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
341         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
342         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
343         /// lifetime of the channel.
344         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
345         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
346         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
347         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
348         /// The node_id of our counterparty
349         pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
350         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
351         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
352         /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
353         pub user_id: u64,
354 }
355
356 impl ChannelManager {
357         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
358         ///
359         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
360         /// ChannelMessageHandler.
361         ///
362         /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
363         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
364         ///
365         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
366         pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
367                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
368
369                 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
370                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
371                         fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
372                         monitor: monitor.clone(),
373                         chain_monitor,
374                         tx_broadcaster,
375
376                         announce_channels_publicly,
377                         fee_proportional_millionths,
378                         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
379                         secp_ctx,
380
381                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
382                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
383                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
384                                 next_forward: Instant::now(),
385                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
386                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
387                         }),
388                         our_network_key,
389
390                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
391
392                         logger,
393                 });
394                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
395                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
396                 Ok(res)
397         }
398
399         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
400         ///
401         /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
402         /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
403         /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
404         /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
405         ///
406         /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
407         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
408         ///
409         /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
410         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
411                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
412                         ChannelKeys {
413                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
414                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
415                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
416                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
417                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
418                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
419                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
420                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
421                         }
422                 } else {
423                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
424                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
425                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
426                                 Ok(key) => key,
427                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
428                         }
429                 };
430
431                 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
432                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
433                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
434                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
435                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
436                                 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
437                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
438                                 } else {
439                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
440                                 }
441                         },
442                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
443                 }
444
445                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
446                 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
447                         node_id: their_network_key,
448                         msg: res,
449                 });
450                 Ok(())
451         }
452
453         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
454         /// more information.
455         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
456                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
457                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
458                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
459                         res.push(ChannelDetails {
460                                 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
461                                 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
462                                 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
463                                 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
464                                 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
465                         });
466                 }
467                 res
468         }
469
470         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
471         /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
472         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
473                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
474                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
475                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
476                         // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
477                         // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
478                         // really wanted anyway.
479                         if channel.is_live() {
480                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
481                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
482                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
483                                         remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
484                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
485                                         user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
486                                 });
487                         }
488                 }
489                 res
490         }
491
492         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
493         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
494         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
495         ///
496         /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
497         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
498                 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
499                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
500                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
501                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
502                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
503                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
504                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
505                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
506                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
507                                                 }
508                                                 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
509                                         } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
510                                 },
511                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
512                         }
513                 };
514                 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
515                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
516                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
517                 }
518                 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
519                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
520                                 Some(update)
521                         } else { None }
522                 } else { None };
523
524                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
525                 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
526                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
527                                 msg: update
528                         });
529                 }
530                 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
531                         node_id,
532                         msg: res.0
533                 });
534
535                 Ok(())
536         }
537
538         #[inline]
539         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
540                 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
541                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
542                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
543                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
544                 }
545                 for tx in local_txn {
546                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
547                 }
548                 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
549                 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
550                 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
551                 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
552                 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
553                 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
554                 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
555         }
556
557         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
558         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
559         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
560                 let mut chan = {
561                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
562                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
563                         if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
564                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
565                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
566                                 }
567                                 chan
568                         } else {
569                                 return;
570                         }
571                 };
572                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
573                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
574                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
575                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
576                                 msg: update
577                         });
578                 }
579         }
580
581         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
582         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
583         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
584                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
585                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
586                 }
587         }
588
589         fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
590                 match err {
591                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
592                                 let mut chan = {
593                                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
594                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
595                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
596                                                 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
597                                         }
598                                         chan
599                                 };
600                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
601                                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
602                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
603                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
604                                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
605                                                 msg: update
606                                         });
607                                 }
608                         },
609                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
610                                 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
611                                 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
612                         },
613                 }
614         }
615
616         #[inline]
617         fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
618                 ({
619                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
620                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
621                         let mut res = [0; 32];
622                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
623                         res
624                 },
625                 {
626                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
627                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
628                         let mut res = [0; 32];
629                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
630                         res
631                 })
632         }
633
634         #[inline]
635         fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
636                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
637                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
638                 let mut res = [0; 32];
639                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
640                 res
641         }
642
643         #[inline]
644         fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
645                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
646                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
647                 let mut res = [0; 32];
648                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
649                 res
650         }
651
652         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
653         #[inline]
654         fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
655                 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
656                 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
657
658                 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
659                         let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
660
661                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
662                         sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
663                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
664                         let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
665                         sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
666
667                         let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
668
669                         blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
670                         blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
671
672                         callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
673                 }
674
675                 Ok(())
676         }
677
678         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
679         fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
680                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
681
682                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
683                         let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
684
685                         res.push(OnionKeys {
686                                 #[cfg(test)]
687                                 shared_secret,
688                                 #[cfg(test)]
689                                 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
690                                 ephemeral_pubkey,
691                                 rho,
692                                 mu,
693                         });
694                 })?;
695
696                 Ok(res)
697         }
698
699         /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
700         fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
701                 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
702                 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
703                 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
704                 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
705                 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
706                 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
707
708                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
709                         // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
710                         // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
711                         // the intended recipient).
712                         let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
713                         let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
714                         res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
715                                 realm: 0,
716                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
717                                         short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
718                                         amt_to_forward: value_msat,
719                                         outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
720                                 },
721                                 hmac: [0; 32],
722                         };
723                         cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
724                         if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
725                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
726                         }
727                         cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
728                         if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
729                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
730                         }
731                         last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
732                 }
733                 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
734         }
735
736         #[inline]
737         fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
738                 unsafe {
739                         ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
740                 }
741                 for i in 0..65 {
742                         arr[i] = 0;
743                 }
744         }
745
746         #[inline]
747         fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
748                 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
749
750                 for i in 0..dst.len() {
751                         dst[i] ^= src[i];
752                 }
753         }
754
755         const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
756         fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
757                 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
758                 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
759
760                 let filler = {
761                         let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
762                         let end_len = iters * 65;
763                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
764                         res.resize(end_len, 0);
765
766                         for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
767                                 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
768                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
769                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
770                                 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
771                         }
772                         res
773                 };
774
775                 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
776                 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
777
778                 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
779                         ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
780                         payload.hmac = hmac_res;
781                         packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
782
783                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
784                         chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
785                         packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
786
787                         if i == 0 {
788                                 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
789                         }
790
791                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
792                         hmac.input(&packet_data);
793                         hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
794                         hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
795                 }
796
797                 msgs::OnionPacket{
798                         version: 0,
799                         public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
800                         hop_data: packet_data,
801                         hmac: hmac_res,
802                 }
803         }
804
805         /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
806         /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
807         fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
808                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
809
810                 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
811                 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
812                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
813                 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
814                 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
815                         data: packet_crypted,
816                 }
817         }
818
819         fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
820                 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
821
822                 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
823
824                 let failuremsg = {
825                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
826                         res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
827                         res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
828                         res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
829                         res
830                 };
831                 let pad = {
832                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
833                         res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
834                         res
835                 };
836                 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
837                         hmac: [0; 32],
838                         failuremsg: failuremsg,
839                         pad: pad,
840                 };
841
842                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
843                 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
844                 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
845
846                 packet
847         }
848
849         #[inline]
850         fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
851                 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
852                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
853         }
854
855         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
856                 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
857                         () => {
858                                 {
859                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
860                                         sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
861                                         let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
862                                         sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
863                                         onion_hash
864                                 }
865                         }
866                 }
867
868                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
869                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
870                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
871                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
872                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
873                                 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
874                                 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
875                         })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
876                 }
877
878                 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
879                 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
880
881                 let mut channel_state = None;
882                 macro_rules! return_err {
883                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
884                                 {
885                                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
886                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
887                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
888                                         }
889                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
890                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
891                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
892                                                 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
893                                         })), channel_state.unwrap());
894                                 }
895                         }
896                 }
897
898                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
899                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
900                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
901                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
902                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
903                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
904                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
905                         return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
906                 }
907
908                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
909                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
910                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
911                 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
912                         return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
913                 }
914
915                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
916                 let next_hop_data = {
917                         let mut decoded = [0; 65];
918                         chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
919                         match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
920                                 Err(err) => {
921                                         let error_code = match err {
922                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
923                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
924                                         };
925                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
926                                 },
927                                 Ok(msg) => msg
928                         }
929                 };
930
931                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
932                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
933                                 // final_expiry_too_soon
934                                 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
935                                         return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
936                                 }
937                                 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
938                                 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
939                                         return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
940                                 }
941                                 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
942                                 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
943                                         return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
944                                 }
945
946                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
947                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
948                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
949                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
950
951                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
952                                         onion_packet: None,
953                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
954                                         short_channel_id: 0,
955                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
956                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
957                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
958                                 })
959                         } else {
960                                 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
961                                 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
962                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
963
964                                 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
965
966                                 let blinding_factor = {
967                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
968                                         sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
969                                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
970                                         let mut res = [0u8; 32];
971                                         sha.result(&mut res);
972                                         match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
973                                                 Err(_) => {
974                                                         return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
975                                                 },
976                                                 Ok(key) => key
977                                         }
978                                 };
979
980                                 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
981                                         return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
982                                 }
983
984                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
985                                         version: 0,
986                                         public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
987                                         hop_data: new_packet_data,
988                                         hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
989                                 };
990
991                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
992                                         onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
993                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
994                                         short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
995                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
996                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
997                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
998                                 })
999                         };
1000
1001                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1002                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1003                         if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1004                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1005                                 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1006                                         None => { // unknown_next_peer
1007                                                 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1008                                         },
1009                                         Some(id) => id.clone(),
1010                                 };
1011                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1012                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1013
1014                                         // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1015                                         // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1016                                         // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1017                                         // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1018                                         // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1019                                         if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1020                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1021                                         }
1022                                         if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1023                                                 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1024                                         }
1025                                         let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1026                                         if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1027                                                 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1028                                         }
1029                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1030                                                 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1031                                         }
1032                                         let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1033                                         // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1034                                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1035                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1036                                         }
1037                                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1038                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1039                                         }
1040                                         break None;
1041                                 }
1042                                 {
1043                                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1044                                         if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1045                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1046                                         }
1047                                         else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1048                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1049                                         }
1050                                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1051                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1052                                         }
1053                                         return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1054                                 }
1055                         }
1056                 }
1057
1058                 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1059         }
1060
1061         /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1062         /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1063         fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1064                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1065                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1066                         Some(id) => id,
1067                 };
1068
1069                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1070
1071                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1072                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1073                         short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1074                         timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1075                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1076                         cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1077                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1078                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1079                         fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1080                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
1081                 };
1082
1083                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1084                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1085
1086                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1087                         signature: sig,
1088                         contents: unsigned
1089                 })
1090         }
1091
1092         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1093         ///
1094         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1095         /// fields for more info.
1096         ///
1097         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1098         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1099         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1100         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1101         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1102         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1103         ///
1104         /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
1105         ///
1106         /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1107         /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1108         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1109                 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1110                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1111                 }
1112                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1113                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1114                         if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1115                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1116                         }
1117                 }
1118
1119                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1120                         let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1121                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1122                         session_key
1123                 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1124
1125                 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1126
1127                 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1128                                 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1129                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1130                 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1131
1132                 let (first_hop_node_id, update_add, commitment_signed) = {
1133                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1134
1135                         let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1136                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1137                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1138                         };
1139
1140                         let res = {
1141                                 let res = {
1142                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1143                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1144                                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1145                                         }
1146                                         if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1147                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1148                                         }
1149                                         if !chan.is_live() {
1150                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1151                                         }
1152                                         chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1153                                                 route: route.clone(),
1154                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1155                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1156                                         }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1157                                 };
1158                                 match res {
1159                                         Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1160                                                 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1161                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1162                                                         return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1163                                                 }
1164                                                 Some((update_add, commitment_signed))
1165                                         },
1166                                         None => None,
1167                                 }
1168                         };
1169
1170                         let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1171
1172                         match res {
1173                                 Some((update_add, commitment_signed)) => {
1174                                         (first_hop_node_id, update_add, commitment_signed)
1175                                 },
1176                                 None => return Ok(()),
1177                         }
1178                 };
1179
1180                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1181                 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1182                         node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1183                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1184                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1185                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1186                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1187                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1188                                 update_fee: None,
1189                                 commitment_signed,
1190                         },
1191                 });
1192                 Ok(())
1193         }
1194
1195         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1196         ///
1197         /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1198         ///
1199         /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1200         /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1201         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1202                 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1203                         ($event: expr) => {
1204                                 {
1205                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1206                                         pending_events.push($event);
1207                                 }
1208                         }
1209                 }
1210
1211                 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1212                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1213                         match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1214                                 Some(mut chan) => {
1215                                         match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1216                                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1217                                                         (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1218                                                 },
1219                                                 Err(e) => {
1220                                                         log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1221                                                         mem::drop(channel_state);
1222                                                         add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1223                                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1224                                                                 action: e.action,
1225                                                         });
1226                                                         return;
1227                                                 },
1228                                         }
1229                                 },
1230                                 None => return
1231                         }
1232                 };
1233                 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1234                 // lock before add_update_monitor
1235                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1236                         unimplemented!();
1237                 }
1238                 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1239                         node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1240                         msg: msg,
1241                 });
1242
1243                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1244                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1245                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1246                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1247                         },
1248                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1249                                 e.insert(chan);
1250                         }
1251                 }
1252         }
1253
1254         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1255                 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1256
1257                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1258                         Ok(res) => res,
1259                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1260                 };
1261                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1262                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1263
1264                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1265                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1266                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1267                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
1268                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1269                 })
1270         }
1271
1272         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1273         ///
1274         /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1275         /// Will likely generate further events.
1276         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1277                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1278                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1279                 {
1280                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1281                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1282
1283                         if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1284                                 return;
1285                         }
1286
1287                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1288                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1289                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1290                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1291                                                 None => {
1292                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1293                                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1294                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1295                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1296                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1297                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1298                                                                 });
1299                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1300                                                         }
1301                                                         continue;
1302                                                 }
1303                                         };
1304                                         let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1305
1306                                         let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1307                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1308                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1309                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1310                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1311                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1312                                                 });
1313                                                 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1314                                                         Err(_e) => {
1315                                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1316                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1317                                                                 continue;
1318                                                         },
1319                                                         Ok(update_add) => {
1320                                                                 match update_add {
1321                                                                         Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1322                                                                         None => {
1323                                                                                 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1324                                                                                 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1325                                                                                 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1326                                                                                 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1327                                                                                 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1328                                                                                 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1329                                                                                 // this channel currently :/.
1330                                                                         }
1331                                                                 }
1332                                                         }
1333                                                 }
1334                                         }
1335
1336                                         if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1337                                                 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1338                                                         Ok(res) => res,
1339                                                         Err(e) => {
1340                                                                 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1341                                                                 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1342                                                                 } else {
1343                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1344                                                                 }
1345                                                                 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1346                                                                 continue;
1347                                                         },
1348                                                 };
1349                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1350                                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1351                                                 }
1352                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1353                                                         node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1354                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1355                                                                 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1356                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1357                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1358                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1359                                                                 update_fee: None,
1360                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1361                                                         },
1362                                                 });
1363                                         }
1364                                 } else {
1365                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1366                                                 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1367                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1368                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1369                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1370                                                 };
1371                                                 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1372                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1373                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1374                                                 };
1375                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1376                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1377                                                         amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1378                                                 });
1379                                         }
1380                                 }
1381                         }
1382                 }
1383
1384                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1385                         match update {
1386                                 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1387                                 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1388                         };
1389                 }
1390
1391                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1392                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1393                 events.append(&mut new_events);
1394         }
1395
1396         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1397         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1398                 // TODO: Add ability to return 0x4000|16 (incorrect_payment_amount) if the amount we
1399                 // received is < expected or > 2*expected
1400                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1401                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1402                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1403                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1404                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1405                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1406                         }
1407                         true
1408                 } else { false }
1409         }
1410
1411         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1412         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1413         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1414         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1415         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1416         /// still-available channels.
1417         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1418                 match source {
1419                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1420                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1421                                 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1422                                         let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1423                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1424                                         if let Some(channel_update) = channel_update {
1425                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1426                                                         update: channel_update,
1427                                                 });
1428                                         }
1429                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1430                                                 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1431                                                 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1432                                         });
1433                                 } else {
1434                                         panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1435                                 }
1436                         },
1437                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1438                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1439                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1440                                                 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1441                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1442                                         },
1443                                         HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1444                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1445                                         }
1446                                 };
1447
1448                                 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1449                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1450                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1451                                                 None => return
1452                                         };
1453
1454                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1455                                         match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1456                                                 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1457                                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1458                                                                 unimplemented!();
1459                                                         }
1460                                                         (chan.get_their_node_id(), Some((msg, commitment_msg)))
1461                                                 },
1462                                                 Ok(None) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), None),
1463                                                 Err(_e) => {
1464                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1465                                                         return;
1466                                                 },
1467                                         }
1468                                 };
1469
1470                                 match fail_msgs {
1471                                         Some((msg, commitment_msg)) => {
1472                                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1473
1474                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1475                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1476                                                         node_id,
1477                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1478                                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1479                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1480                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1481                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1482                                                                 update_fee: None,
1483                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1484                                                         },
1485                                                 });
1486                                         },
1487                                         None => {},
1488                                 }
1489                         },
1490                 }
1491         }
1492
1493         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1494         /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1495         /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1496         ///
1497         /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1498         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1499                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1500                 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1501                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1502                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1503
1504                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1505                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1506                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1507                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1508                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1509                                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1510                         }
1511                         true
1512                 } else { false }
1513         }
1514         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1515                 match source {
1516                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1517                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1518                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1519                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1520                                         payment_preimage
1521                                 });
1522                         },
1523                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1524                                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1525                                 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1526                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1527                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1528                                                 None => {
1529                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1530                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1531                                                         // why its missing.
1532                                                         return
1533                                                 }
1534                                         };
1535
1536                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1537                                         match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1538                                                 Ok((msgs, Some(chan_monitor))) => {
1539                                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1540                                                                 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1541                                                         }
1542                                                         (chan.get_their_node_id(), msgs)
1543                                                 },
1544                                                 Ok((msgs, None)) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msgs),
1545                                                 Err(_e) => {
1546                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1547                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1548                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1549                                                         return
1550                                                 },
1551                                         }
1552                                 };
1553
1554                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1555                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs {
1556                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1557                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1558                                                 node_id: node_id,
1559                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1560                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1561                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1562                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1563                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1564                                                         update_fee: None,
1565                                                         commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1566                                                 }
1567                                         });
1568                                 }
1569                         },
1570                 }
1571         }
1572
1573         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1574         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1575                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1576         }
1577
1578         /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1579         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1580         /// operation.
1581         pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1582                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1583                 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1584                 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1585                 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1586
1587                 {
1588                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1589                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1590                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1591                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1592                                 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1593                                         let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1594                                         if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1595                                                 match e {
1596                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1597                                                                 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1598                                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1599                                                                 }
1600                                                                 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1601                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1602                                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1603                                                                                 msg: update
1604                                                                         });
1605                                                                 }
1606                                                                 false
1607                                                         },
1608                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1609                                                 }
1610                                         } else {
1611                                                 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1612                                                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1613                                                         htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1614                                                 }
1615                                                 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1616
1617                                                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1618                                                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1619                                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1620                                                                         node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1621                                                                         updates: update,
1622                                                                 });
1623                                                         }
1624                                                 } }
1625                                                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1626                                                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1627                                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::SendRevokeAndACK {
1628                                                                         node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1629                                                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
1630                                                                 });
1631                                                         }
1632                                                 } }
1633                                                 match order {
1634                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1635                                                                 handle_cs!();
1636                                                                 handle_raa!();
1637                                                         },
1638                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1639                                                                 handle_raa!();
1640                                                                 handle_cs!();
1641                                                         },
1642                                                 }
1643                                                 true
1644                                         }
1645                                 } else { true }
1646                         });
1647                 }
1648
1649                 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1650                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1651                 }
1652                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1653
1654                 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1655                         self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1656                 }
1657
1658                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut new_events);
1659         }
1660
1661         fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1662                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1663                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1664                 }
1665                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1666                 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1667                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1668                 }
1669
1670                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1671                         ChannelKeys {
1672                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1673                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1674                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1675                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1676                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1677                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1678                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1679                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1680                         }
1681                 } else {
1682                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1683                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1684                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1685                                 Ok(key) => key,
1686                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1687                         }
1688                 };
1689
1690                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1691                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1692                 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1693                 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1694                 Ok(accept_msg)
1695         }
1696
1697         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1698                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1699                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1700                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1701                                 Some(chan) => {
1702                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1703                                                 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1704                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1705                                         }
1706                                         chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1707                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1708                                         (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1709                                 },
1710                                 //TODO: same as above
1711                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1712                         }
1713                 };
1714                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1715                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1716                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1717                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
1718                         output_script: output_script,
1719                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1720                 });
1721                 Ok(())
1722         }
1723
1724         fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1725                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1726                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1727                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1728                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1729                                         if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1730                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1731                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1732                                         }
1733                                         match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1734                                                 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1735                                                         (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1736                                                 },
1737                                                 Err(e) => {
1738                                                         return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1739                                                 }
1740                                         }
1741                                 },
1742                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1743                         }
1744                 };
1745                 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1746                 // lock before add_update_monitor
1747                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1748                         unimplemented!();
1749                 }
1750                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1751                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1752                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1753                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1754                         },
1755                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1756                                 e.insert(chan);
1757                         }
1758                 }
1759                 Ok(funding_msg)
1760         }
1761
1762         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1763                 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1764                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1765                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1766                                 Some(chan) => {
1767                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1768                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1769                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1770                                         }
1771                                         let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1772                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1773                                                 unimplemented!();
1774                                         }
1775                                         (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1776                                 },
1777                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1778                         }
1779                 };
1780                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1781                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1782                         funding_txo: funding_txo,
1783                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1784                 });
1785                 Ok(())
1786         }
1787
1788         fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1789                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1790                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1791                         Some(chan) => {
1792                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1793                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1794                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1795                                 }
1796                                 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1797                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1798                                 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1799                         },
1800                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1801                 };
1802         }
1803
1804         fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1805                 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1806                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1807                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1808
1809                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1810                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1811                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1812                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1813                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1814                                         }
1815                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1816                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1817                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1818                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1819                                                 }
1820                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1821                                         } else { (res, None) }
1822                                 },
1823                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1824                         }
1825                 };
1826                 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1827                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1828                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1829                 }
1830                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1831                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1832                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1833                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1834                                         msg: update
1835                                 });
1836                         }
1837                 }
1838                 Ok((res.0, res.1))
1839         }
1840
1841         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1842                 let (res, chan_option) = {
1843                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1844                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1845                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1846                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1847                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1848                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1849                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1850                                         }
1851                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1852                                         if res.1.is_some() {
1853                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1854                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1855                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1856                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1857                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1858                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1859                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1860                                                 }
1861                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1862                                         } else { (res, None) }
1863                                 },
1864                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1865                         }
1866                 };
1867                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1868                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1869                 }
1870                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1871                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1872                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1873                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1874                                         msg: update
1875                                 });
1876                         }
1877                 }
1878                 Ok(res.0)
1879         }
1880
1881         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1882                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1883                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1884                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1885                 //
1886                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1887                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1888                 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1889                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1890
1891                 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1892                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1893
1894                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1895                         Some(chan) => {
1896                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1897                                         //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1898                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1899                                 }
1900                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
1901                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1902                                 }
1903                                 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1904                         },
1905                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1906                 }
1907         }
1908
1909         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1910                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1911                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1912                         Some(chan) => {
1913                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1914                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1915                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1916                                 }
1917                                 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1918                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1919                         },
1920                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1921                 };
1922                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1923                 Ok(())
1924         }
1925
1926         // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
1927         // indicating that the payment itself failed
1928         fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
1929                 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
1930                         macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
1931                                 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
1932                                         log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
1933                                 };
1934                                 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
1935                                         log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
1936                                 };
1937                         }
1938
1939                         const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
1940                         const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
1941                         const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
1942
1943                         let mut res = None;
1944                         let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
1945
1946                         // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1947                         Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1948                                 if res.is_some() { return; }
1949
1950                                 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
1951                                 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
1952                                 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
1953
1954                                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1955
1956                                 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1957                                 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1958                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1959                                 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1960                                 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1961
1962                                 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
1963
1964                                 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1965                                         let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1966                                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1967                                         hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1968                                         let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1969                                         hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1970
1971                                         if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1972                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
1973                                                         // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
1974                                                         // definitely came from the peer in question
1975                                                         res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
1976                                                 } else {
1977                                                         let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
1978
1979                                                         match error_code & 0xff {
1980                                                                 1|2|3 => {
1981                                                                         // either from an intermediate or final node
1982                                                                         //   invalid_realm(PERM|1),
1983                                                                         //   temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
1984                                                                         //   permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
1985                                                                         //   required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
1986                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1987                                                                                 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1988                                                                                 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
1989                                                                         }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
1990                                                                         // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
1991                                                                         // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
1992                                                                         // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
1993                                                                         return;
1994                                                                 },
1995                                                                 _ => {}
1996                                                         }
1997
1998                                                         if is_from_final_node {
1999                                                                 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2000                                                                         c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2001                                                                         c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2002                                                                         17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2003                                                                         18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2004                                                                                 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2005                                                                                 true
2006                                                                         },
2007                                                                         19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2008                                                                                 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2009                                                                                 true
2010                                                                         },
2011                                                                         _ => {
2012                                                                                 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2013                                                                                 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2014                                                                                 // does not coform to the spec.
2015                                                                                 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2016                                                                                 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2017                                                                                         node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2018                                                                                         is_permanent: true,
2019                                                                                 }), false));
2020                                                                                 return;
2021                                                                         }
2022                                                                 };
2023                                                                 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2024                                                                 return;
2025                                                         }
2026
2027                                                         // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2028                                                         match error_code {
2029                                                                 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2030                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2031                                                                                 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2032                                                                                 is_permanent: true,
2033                                                                         }), false));
2034                                                                 },
2035                                                                 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2036                                                                         let offset = match error_code {
2037                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|7  => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2038                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2039                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2040                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2041                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2042                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2043                                                                                 _ =>  {
2044                                                                                         // node sending unknown code
2045                                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2046                                                                                                 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2047                                                                                                 is_permanent: true,
2048                                                                                         }), false));
2049                                                                                         return;
2050                                                                                 }
2051                                                                         };
2052
2053                                                                         if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2054                                                                                 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2055                                                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2056                                                                                         if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2057                                                                                                 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2058                                                                                                 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2059                                                                                                 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2060                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2061                                                                                                                 false
2062                                                                                                         },
2063                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2064                                                                                                                 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2065                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2066                                                                                                                 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2067                                                                                                         },
2068                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2069                                                                                                                 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2070                                                                                                                 let new_fee =  amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2071                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2072                                                                                                                 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2073                                                                                                         }
2074                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2075                                                                                                                 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2076                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2077                                                                                                                 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2078                                                                                                         },
2079                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2080                                                                                                                 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2081                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2082                                                                                                                 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2083                                                                                                         },
2084                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2085                                                                                                         _ => { unreachable!(); },
2086                                                                                                 };
2087
2088                                                                                                 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2089                                                                                                         Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2090                                                                                                                 msg: chan_update,
2091                                                                                                         })
2092                                                                                                 };
2093                                                                                                 res = Some((msg, true));
2094                                                                                                 return;
2095                                                                                         }
2096                                                                                 }
2097                                                                         }
2098                                                                 },
2099                                                                 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2100                                                                         //TODO
2101                                                                 },
2102                                                                 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2103                                                                         res = Some((None, true));
2104                                                                         return;
2105                                                                 }
2106                                                                 _ => {
2107                                                                         // node sending unknown code
2108                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2109                                                                                 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2110                                                                                 is_permanent: true,
2111                                                                         }), false));
2112                                                                         return;
2113                                                                 }
2114                                                         }
2115                                                 }
2116                                         }
2117                                 }
2118                         }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2119                         res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2120                 } else { ((None, true)) }
2121         }
2122
2123         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2124                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2125                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2126                         Some(chan) => {
2127                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2128                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2129                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2130                                 }
2131                                 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2132                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2133                         },
2134                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2135                 }?;
2136                 Ok(())
2137         }
2138
2139         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2140                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2141                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2142                         Some(chan) => {
2143                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2144                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2145                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2146                                 }
2147                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
2148                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
2149                                 }
2150                                 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2151                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2152                                 Ok(())
2153                         },
2154                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2155                 }
2156         }
2157
2158         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2159                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = {
2160                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2161                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2162                                 Some(chan) => {
2163                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2164                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2165                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2166                                         }
2167                                         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2168                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2169                                                 unimplemented!();
2170                                         }
2171                                         (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed)
2172                                 },
2173                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2174                         }
2175                 };
2176                 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
2177         }
2178
2179         #[inline]
2180         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2181                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2182                         let mut forward_event = None;
2183                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2184                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2185                                 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2186                                         forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2187                                         channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2188                                 }
2189                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2190                                         match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2191                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2192                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2193                                                 },
2194                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2195                                                         entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2196                                                 }
2197                                         }
2198                                 }
2199                         }
2200                         match forward_event {
2201                                 Some(time) => {
2202                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2203                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2204                                                 time_forwardable: time
2205                                         });
2206                                 }
2207                                 None => {},
2208                         }
2209                 }
2210         }
2211
2212         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2213                 let ((res, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures), short_channel_id) = {
2214                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2215                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2216                                 Some(chan) => {
2217                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2218                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2219                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2220                                         }
2221                                         let (res, pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2222                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2223                                                 unimplemented!();
2224                                         }
2225                                         ((res, pending_forwards, pending_failures), chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2226                                 },
2227                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2228                         }
2229                 };
2230                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2231                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2232                 }
2233                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2234
2235                 Ok(res)
2236         }
2237
2238         fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2239                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2240                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2241                         Some(chan) => {
2242                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2243                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2244                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2245                                 }
2246                                 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2247                         },
2248                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2249                 }
2250         }
2251
2252         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2253                 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
2254                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2255                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2256                                 Some(chan) => {
2257                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2258                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2259                                         }
2260                                         if !chan.is_usable() {
2261                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2262                                         }
2263
2264                                         let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2265                                         let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2266                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2267
2268                                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2269                                         let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2270                                         let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2271                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2272                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2273
2274                                         let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2275
2276                                         (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2277                                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2278                                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2279                                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2280                                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2281                                                 contents: announcement,
2282                                         }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2283                                 },
2284                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2285                         }
2286                 };
2287                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2288                 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
2289                 Ok(())
2290         }
2291
2292         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2293                 let res = {
2294                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2295                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2296                                 Some(chan) => {
2297                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2298                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2299                                         }
2300                                         let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2301                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2302                                         if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2303                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2304                                                         unimplemented!();
2305                                                 }
2306                                         }
2307                                         Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order))
2308                                 },
2309                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2310                         }
2311                 };
2312
2313                 res
2314         }
2315
2316         /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2317         /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2318         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2319         /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2320         #[doc(hidden)]
2321         pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2322                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2323                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2324                         None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2325                         Some(chan) => {
2326                                 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2327                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2328                                 }
2329                                 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2330                                         return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2331                                 }
2332                                 if !chan.is_live() {
2333                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2334                                 }
2335                                 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2336                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2337                                                 unimplemented!();
2338                                         }
2339                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2340                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
2341                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2342                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2343                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2344                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2345                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2346                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2347                                                         update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2348                                                         commitment_signed,
2349                                                 },
2350                                         });
2351                                 }
2352                         },
2353                 }
2354                 Ok(())
2355         }
2356 }
2357
2358 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2359         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2360                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2361                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2362                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2363                 ret
2364         }
2365 }
2366
2367 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2368         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2369                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2370                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2371                 {
2372                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2373                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2374                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2375                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2376                                 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2377                                 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2378                                         let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
2379                                         new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
2380                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2381                                                 msg: funding_locked,
2382                                                 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2383                                         });
2384                                         short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2385                                 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2386                                         new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
2387                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2388                                                 action: e.action,
2389                                         });
2390                                         if channel.is_shutdown() {
2391                                                 return false;
2392                                         }
2393                                 }
2394                                 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2395                                         for tx in txn_matched {
2396                                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2397                                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2398                                                                 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2399                                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2400                                                                 }
2401                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2402                                                                 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2403                                                                 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2404                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2405                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2406                                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2407                                                                                 msg: update
2408                                                                         });
2409                                                                 }
2410                                                                 return false;
2411                                                         }
2412                                                 }
2413                                         }
2414                                 }
2415                                 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2416                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2417                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2418                                         }
2419                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2420                                         // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2421                                         // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2422                                         // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2423                                         failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2424                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2425                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2426                                                         msg: update
2427                                                 });
2428                                         }
2429                                         return false;
2430                                 }
2431                                 true
2432                         });
2433                 }
2434                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2435                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2436                 }
2437                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2438                 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2439                         pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2440                 }
2441                 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2442         }
2443
2444         /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2445         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2446                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2447                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2448                 {
2449                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2450                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2451                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2452                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_,  v| {
2453                                 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2454                                         if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2455                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2456                                         }
2457                                         failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2458                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2459                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2460                                                         msg: update
2461                                                 });
2462                                         }
2463                                         false
2464                                 } else {
2465                                         true
2466                                 }
2467                         });
2468                 }
2469                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2470                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2471                 }
2472                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2473                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2474                         for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2475                                 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2476                         }
2477                 }
2478                 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2479         }
2480 }
2481
2482 macro_rules! handle_error {
2483         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2484                 match $internal {
2485                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2486                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2487                                 if needs_channel_force_close {
2488                                         match &err.action {
2489                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2490                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2491                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2492                                                         } else {
2493                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2494                                                         }
2495                                                 },
2496                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2497                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2498                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2499                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2500                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2501                                                         } else {
2502                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2503                                                         }
2504                                                 },
2505                                                 &None => {},
2506                                         }
2507                                 }
2508                                 Err(err)
2509                         },
2510                 }
2511         }
2512 }
2513
2514 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2515         //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2516         fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2517                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2518         }
2519
2520         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2521                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2522         }
2523
2524         fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2525                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2526         }
2527
2528         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2529                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2530         }
2531
2532         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2533                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2534         }
2535
2536         fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2537                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2538         }
2539
2540         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2541                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2542         }
2543
2544         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2545                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2546         }
2547
2548         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2549                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2550         }
2551
2552         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2553                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2554         }
2555
2556         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2557                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2558         }
2559
2560         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2561                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2562         }
2563
2564         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2565                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2566         }
2567
2568         fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2569                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2570         }
2571
2572         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2573                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2574         }
2575
2576         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), HandleError> {
2577                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2578         }
2579
2580         fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2581                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2582                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2583                 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2584                 {
2585                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2586                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2587                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2588                         if no_connection_possible {
2589                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2590                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2591                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2592                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2593                                                 }
2594                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2595                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2596                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2597                                                                 msg: update
2598                                                         });
2599                                                 }
2600                                                 false
2601                                         } else {
2602                                                 true
2603                                         }
2604                                 });
2605                         } else {
2606                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2607                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2608                                                 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2609                                                 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2610                                                 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2611                                                         let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2612                                                         failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2613                                                 }
2614                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2615                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2616                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2617                                                         }
2618                                                         return false;
2619                                                 }
2620                                         }
2621                                         true
2622                                 })
2623                         }
2624                 }
2625                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2626                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2627                 }
2628                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2629                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2630                         for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2631                                 pending_events.push(event);
2632                         }
2633                 }
2634                 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2635                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2636                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2637                         }
2638                 }
2639         }
2640
2641         fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2642                 let mut res = Vec::new();
2643                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2644                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2645                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2646                                 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2647                                         // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2648                                         // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2649                                         // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2650                                         // drop it.
2651                                         false
2652                                 } else {
2653                                         res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2654                                         true
2655                                 }
2656                         } else { true }
2657                 });
2658                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2659                 res
2660         }
2661
2662         fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2663                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2664                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
2665                                 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2666                                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2667                                 }
2668                         }
2669                 } else {
2670                         self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2671                 }
2672         }
2673 }
2674
2675 #[cfg(test)]
2676 mod tests {
2677         use chain::chaininterface;
2678         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2679         use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2680         use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2681         use ln::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
2682         use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2683         use ln::msgs;
2684         use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2685         use util::test_utils;
2686         use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2687         use util::errors::APIError;
2688         use util::logger::Logger;
2689         use util::ser::Writeable;
2690
2691         use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2692         use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2693         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2694         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2695         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2696         use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2697         use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2698
2699         use hex;
2700
2701         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2702         use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2703
2704         use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2705         use crypto::digest::Digest;
2706
2707         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2708
2709         use std::cell::RefCell;
2710         use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2711         use std::default::Default;
2712         use std::rc::Rc;
2713         use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2714         use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
2715         use std::time::Instant;
2716         use std::mem;
2717
2718         fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2719                 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2720                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2721
2722                 let route = Route {
2723                         hops: vec!(
2724                                         RouteHop {
2725                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2726                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2727                                         },
2728                                         RouteHop {
2729                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2730                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2731                                         },
2732                                         RouteHop {
2733                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2734                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2735                                         },
2736                                         RouteHop {
2737                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2738                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2739                                         },
2740                                         RouteHop {
2741                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2742                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2743                                         },
2744                         ),
2745                 };
2746
2747                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2748
2749                 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2750                 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2751                 onion_keys
2752         }
2753
2754         #[test]
2755         fn onion_vectors() {
2756                 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2757                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2758
2759                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2760                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2761                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2762                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2763                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2764
2765                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2766                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2767                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2768                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2769                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2770
2771                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2772                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2773                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2774                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2775                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2776
2777                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2778                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2779                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2780                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2781                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2782
2783                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2784                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2785                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2786                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2787                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2788
2789                 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2790                 let payloads = vec!(
2791                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2792                                 realm: 0,
2793                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2794                                         short_channel_id: 0,
2795                                         amt_to_forward: 0,
2796                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2797                                 },
2798                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2799                         },
2800                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2801                                 realm: 0,
2802                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2803                                         short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2804                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2805                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2806                                 },
2807                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2808                         },
2809                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2810                                 realm: 0,
2811                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2812                                         short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2813                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2814                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2815                                 },
2816                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2817                         },
2818                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2819                                 realm: 0,
2820                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2821                                         short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2822                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2823                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2824                                 },
2825                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2826                         },
2827                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2828                                 realm: 0,
2829                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2830                                         short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2831                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2832                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2833                                 },
2834                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2835                         },
2836                 );
2837
2838                 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2839                 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2840                 // anyway...
2841                 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2842         }
2843
2844         #[test]
2845         fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2846                 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2847
2848                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2849                 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2850                 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2851
2852                 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2853                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2854
2855                 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2856                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2857
2858                 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2859                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2860
2861                 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2862                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2863
2864                 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2865                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2866         }
2867
2868         fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2869                 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2870                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2871                 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2872                 for i in 2..100 {
2873                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2874                         chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2875                 }
2876         }
2877
2878         struct Node {
2879                 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2880                 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2881                 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2882                 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2883                 router: Router,
2884                 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2885                 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2886         }
2887         impl Drop for Node {
2888                 fn drop(&mut self) {
2889                         if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2890                                 // Check that we processed all pending events
2891                                 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2892                                 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2893                         }
2894                 }
2895         }
2896
2897         fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2898                 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2899         }
2900
2901         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2902                 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2903                 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
2904                 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
2905         }
2906
2907         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
2908                 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
2909
2910                 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2911                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2912                 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2913                         Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2914                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2915                                 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2916                         },
2917                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2918                 };
2919
2920                 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2921
2922                 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2923                 let tx;
2924                 let funding_output;
2925
2926                 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2927                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2928                 match events_2[0] {
2929                         Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2930                                 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
2931                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2932
2933                                 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2934                                         value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2935                                 }]};
2936                                 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2937
2938                                 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2939                                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2940                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2941                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2942                                 added_monitors.clear();
2943                         },
2944                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2945                 }
2946
2947                 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2948                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2949                 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2950                         Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2951                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2952                                 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2953                                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2954                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2955                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2956                                 added_monitors.clear();
2957                                 res
2958                         },
2959                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2960                 };
2961
2962                 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2963                 {
2964                         let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2965                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2966                         assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2967                         added_monitors.clear();
2968                 }
2969
2970                 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2971                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2972                 match events_4[0] {
2973                         Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2974                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2975                                 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2976                         },
2977                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2978                 };
2979
2980                 tx
2981         }
2982
2983         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
2984                 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2985                 let events_5 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2986                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2987                 match events_5[0] {
2988                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2989                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2990                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2991                                 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2992                         },
2993                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2994                 };
2995
2996                 let channel_id;
2997
2998                 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2999                 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3000                 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3001                 (match events_6[0] {
3002                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
3003                                 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3004                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3005                                 (msg.clone(), announcement_sigs.clone().unwrap())
3006                         },
3007                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3008                 }, channel_id)
3009         }
3010
3011         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3012                 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3013                 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3014                 (msgs, chan_id, tx)
3015         }
3016
3017         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3018                 let bs_announcement_sigs = {
3019                         let bs_announcement_sigs = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap().unwrap();
3020                         node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3021                         bs_announcement_sigs
3022                 };
3023
3024                 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3025                 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3026                 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3027                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3028                                 (msg, update_msg)
3029                         },
3030                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3031                 };
3032
3033                 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3034                 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3035                 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3036                 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3037                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3038                                 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3039                                 update_msg
3040                         },
3041                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3042                 };
3043
3044                 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3045
3046                 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3047         }
3048
3049         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3050                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3051         }
3052
3053         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3054                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3055                 for node in nodes {
3056                         assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3057                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3058                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3059                 }
3060                 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3061         }
3062
3063         macro_rules! check_spends {
3064                 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3065                         {
3066                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3067                                 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3068                                 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3069                                 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3070                         }
3071                 }
3072         }
3073
3074         fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3075                 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3076                 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3077                 let (tx_a, tx_b);
3078
3079                 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3080                 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3081                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3082                 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
3083                         Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3084                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
3085                                 msg.clone()
3086                         },
3087                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3088                 };
3089
3090                 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
3091                 if !close_inbound_first {
3092                         assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
3093                 }
3094                 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3095                 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
3096                 if close_inbound_first {
3097                         assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
3098                         closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3099                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3100                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3101
3102                         let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3103                         assert!(empty_b.is_none());
3104                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3105                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3106                 } else {
3107                         closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3108                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3109                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3110
3111                         let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3112                         assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
3113                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3114                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3115                 }
3116                 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3117                 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3118
3119                 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3120                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3121                 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
3122                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3123                                 msg.clone()
3124                         },
3125                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3126                 };
3127
3128                 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3129                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3130                 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
3131                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3132                                 msg.clone()
3133                         },
3134                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3135                 };
3136
3137                 (as_update, bs_update)
3138         }
3139
3140         struct SendEvent {
3141                 node_id: PublicKey,
3142                 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3143                 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3144         }
3145         impl SendEvent {
3146                 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
3147                         match event {
3148                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
3149                                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3150                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3151                                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3152                                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3153                                         SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
3154                                 },
3155                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3156                         }
3157                 }
3158         }
3159
3160         macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3161                 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3162                         {
3163                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3164                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3165                                 added_monitors.clear();
3166                         }
3167                 }
3168         }
3169
3170         macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3171                 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3172                         {
3173                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3174                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3175                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3176                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3177                                 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3178                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3179                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
3180                                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
3181                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3182                                 if $fail_backwards {
3183                                         assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3184                                 }
3185                                 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3186                                 {
3187                                         let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3188                                         if $fail_backwards {
3189                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3190                                                 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3191                                         } else {
3192                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3193                                         }
3194                                         added_monitors.clear();
3195                                 }
3196                         }
3197                 }
3198         }
3199
3200         macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3201                 ($node: expr) => {
3202                         {
3203                                 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3204                                 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3205                                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3206                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3207                                 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3208                                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3209                                 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3210                         }
3211                 }
3212         }
3213
3214         fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3215                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3216
3217                 let mut payment_event = {
3218                         origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3219                         check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3220
3221                         let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3222                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3223                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3224                 };
3225                 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3226
3227                 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3228                         assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3229
3230                         node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3231                         check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3232                         commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3233
3234                         let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3235                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3236                         match events_1[0] {
3237                                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3238                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3239                         };
3240
3241                         node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3242                         node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3243
3244                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3245                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3246                         if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3247                                 match events_2[0] {
3248                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3249                                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3250                                                 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3251                                         },
3252                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3253                                 }
3254                         } else {
3255                                 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3256                                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3257                                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3258                         }
3259
3260                         prev_node = node;
3261                 }
3262
3263                 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3264         }
3265
3266         fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3267                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3268                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3269
3270                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3271                 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
3272                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3273                                 {
3274                                         $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3275                                         if $last_node {
3276                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3277                                         } else {
3278                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3279                                         }
3280                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3281                                 }
3282                         }
3283                 }
3284
3285                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3286                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3287                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3288                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3289                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
3290                                 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
3291                         }
3292
3293                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3294                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3295                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3296                                 match events[0] {
3297                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3298                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3299                                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3300                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3301                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3302                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3303                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3304                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3305                                         },
3306                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3307                                 }
3308                         } else {
3309                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
3310                         }
3311                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3312                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3313                         }
3314
3315                         prev_node = node;
3316                 }
3317
3318                 if !skip_last {
3319                         update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3320                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3321                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3322                         match events[0] {
3323                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3324                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3325                                 },
3326                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3327                         }
3328                 }
3329         }
3330
3331         fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3332                 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3333         }
3334
3335         const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3336
3337         fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3338                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3339                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3340                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3341                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3342                 }
3343
3344                 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3345         }
3346
3347         fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3348                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3349                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3350                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3351                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3352                 }
3353
3354                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3355
3356                 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3357                 match err {
3358                         APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3359                         _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3360                 };
3361         }
3362
3363         fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3364                 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3365                 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3366         }
3367
3368         fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3369                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
3370                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3371
3372                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3373                 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3374                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3375                                 {
3376                                         $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3377                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3378                                 }
3379                         }
3380                 }
3381
3382                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3383                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3384                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3385                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3386                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
3387                                 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3388                                 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3389                                 // second-to-last node!
3390                                 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3391                         }
3392
3393                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3394                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3395                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3396                                 match events[0] {
3397                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3398                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3399                                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3400                                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3401                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3402                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3403                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3404                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3405                                         },
3406                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3407                                 }
3408                         } else {
3409                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
3410                         }
3411                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3412                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3413                         }
3414
3415                         prev_node = node;
3416                 }
3417
3418                 if !skip_last {
3419                         update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3420
3421                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3422                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3423                         match events[0] {
3424                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
3425                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3426                                         assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3427                                 },
3428                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3429                         }
3430                 }
3431         }
3432
3433         fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3434                 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3435         }
3436
3437         fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3438                 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3439                 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3440                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3441                 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3442
3443                 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3444                 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3445
3446                 for _ in 0..node_count {
3447                         let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3448                         let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3449                         let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3450                         let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3451                         let node_id = {
3452                                 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3453                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3454                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3455                         };
3456                         let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3457                         let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3458                         nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3459                                 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3460                                 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3461                         });
3462                 }
3463
3464                 nodes
3465         }
3466
3467         #[test]
3468         fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3469                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3470                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3471                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3472
3473                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3474                         ($node: expr) => {{
3475                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3476                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3477                                 chan.get_feerate()
3478                         }}
3479                 }
3480
3481                 // balancing
3482                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3483
3484                 // A                                        B
3485                 // update_fee                            ->
3486                 // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
3487                 //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3488                 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3489                 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3490                 //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3491                 // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
3492                 //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
3493                 //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
3494                 // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
3495                 //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3496                 // send (6) RAA                          -.
3497                 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3498                 //                                       <- RAA
3499                 // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
3500
3501                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3502                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3503                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3504
3505                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3506                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3507                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3508                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3509                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3510                         },
3511                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3512                 };
3513
3514                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3515
3516                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3517                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3518                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3519                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3520
3521                 let payment_event = {
3522                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3523                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3524                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3525                 };
3526                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3527                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3528
3529                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3530                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3531                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3532                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3533                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3534
3535                 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3536                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3537                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3538                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3539
3540                 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3541                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3542                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3543                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3544                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3545                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3546                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3547
3548                 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3549                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3550                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3551                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3552                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3553                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3554                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3555
3556                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3557                 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3558                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3559
3560                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3561                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3562                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3563
3564                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3565                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3566
3567                 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3568                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3569                 match events_2[0] {
3570                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3571                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3572                 }
3573
3574                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3575                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3576         }
3577
3578         #[test]
3579         fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3580                 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3581                 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3582                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3583                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3584                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3585
3586                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3587                         ($node: expr) => {{
3588                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3589                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3590                                 chan.get_feerate()
3591                         }}
3592                 }
3593
3594                 // balancing
3595                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3596
3597                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3598                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3599                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3600
3601                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3602                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3603                 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3604                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3605                                 update_fee.as_ref()
3606                         },
3607                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3608                 };
3609
3610                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3611
3612                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3613                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3614                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3615                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3616
3617                 let payment_event = {
3618                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3619                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3620                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3621                 };
3622                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3623                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3624
3625                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3626                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3627                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3628                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3629                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3630
3631                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3632                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3633
3634                 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3635         }
3636
3637         #[test]
3638         fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3639                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3640                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3641                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3642
3643                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3644                         ($node: expr) => {{
3645                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3646                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3647                                 chan.get_feerate()
3648                         }}
3649                 }
3650
3651                 // A                                        B
3652                 // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
3653                 //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3654                 // update_fee (never committed)          ->
3655                 // (3) update_fee                        ->
3656                 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3657                 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3658                 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3659                 //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
3660                 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
3661                 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3662                 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3663                 //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3664                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3665                 //                                          B should send no response here
3666                 // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
3667                 //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3668                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3669
3670                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3671                 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3672                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3673                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3674
3675                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3676                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3677                 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3678                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3679                                 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3680                         },
3681                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3682                 };
3683
3684                 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3685                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3686                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3687                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3688
3689                 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3690                 // transaction:
3691                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3692                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3693
3694                 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3695                 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3696                         channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3697                         feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3698                 };
3699
3700                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3701
3702                 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3703                 // Deliver (3)
3704                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3705
3706                 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3707                 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3708                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3709                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3710                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3711                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3712                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3713                 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3714                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3715                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3716
3717                 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3718                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3719                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3720                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3721
3722                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3723                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3724
3725                 // Delever (4)
3726                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3727                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3728
3729                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3730                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3731
3732                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3733                 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3734                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3735
3736                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3737                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3738         }
3739
3740         #[test]
3741         fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3742                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3743                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3744                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3745
3746                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3747                         ($node: expr) => {{
3748                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3749                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3750                                 chan.get_feerate()
3751                         }}
3752                 }
3753
3754                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3755                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3756
3757                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3758                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3759                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3760                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3761                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3762                         },
3763                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3764                 };
3765                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3766
3767                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3768                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3769                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3770                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3771
3772                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3773                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3774                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3775
3776                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3777                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3778                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3779
3780                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3781                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3782                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3783         }
3784
3785         #[test]
3786         fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3787                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3788                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3789                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3790
3791                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3792                         ($node: expr) => {{
3793                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3794                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3795                                 chan.get_feerate()
3796                         }}
3797                 }
3798
3799                 // balancing
3800                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3801
3802                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3803                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3804
3805                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3806                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3807                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3808                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3809                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3810                         },
3811                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3812                 };
3813                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3814                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3815                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3816                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3817                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3818
3819                 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3820
3821                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3822
3823                 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3824                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3825                 {
3826                         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3827                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3828                         added_monitors.clear();
3829                 }
3830                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3831                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3832                 // node[1] has nothing to do
3833
3834                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3835                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3836                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3837
3838                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3839                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3840                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3841                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3842                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3843
3844                 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3845                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3846                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3847                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3848                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3849                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3850
3851                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3852                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3853                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3854                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3855                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3856                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3857                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3858                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3859
3860                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3861                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3862                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3863                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3864                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3865                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3866
3867                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3868                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3869                 match events[0] {
3870                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3871                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3872                 };
3873                 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3874                 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3875
3876                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3877                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3878                 match events[0] {
3879                         Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3880                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3881                 };
3882
3883                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3884
3885                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3886                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3887                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3888         }
3889
3890         #[test]
3891         fn test_update_fee() {
3892                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3893                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3894                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3895
3896                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3897                         ($node: expr) => {{
3898                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3899                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3900                                 chan.get_feerate()
3901                         }}
3902                 }
3903
3904                 // A                                        B
3905                 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3906                 //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3907                 //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
3908                 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3909                 //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3910                 //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3911                 // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
3912                 //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3913                 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
3914                 //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3915                 //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3916                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3917
3918                 // Create and deliver (1)...
3919                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3920                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3921
3922                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3923                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3924                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3925                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3926                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3927                         },
3928                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3929                 };
3930                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3931
3932                 // Generate (2) and (3):
3933                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3934                 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3935                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3936                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3937
3938                 // Deliver (2):
3939                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3940                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3941                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3942
3943                 // Create and deliver (4)...
3944                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3945                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3946                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3947                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3948                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3949                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3950                         },
3951                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3952                 };
3953                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3954
3955                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3956                 // ... creating (5)
3957                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3958                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3959                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3960
3961                 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3962                 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3963                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3964                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3965
3966                 // Deliver (5):
3967                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3968                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3969                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3970
3971                 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3972                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3973                 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3974                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3975
3976                 // Deliver (7)
3977                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3978                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3979                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3980                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3981                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3982                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3983
3984                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3985                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3986                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3987         }
3988
3989         #[test]
3990         fn fake_network_test() {
3991                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3992                 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3993                 let nodes = create_network(4);
3994
3995                 // Create some initial channels
3996                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3997                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3998                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3999
4000                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4001                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4002                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4003                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4004                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4005
4006                 // Send some more payments
4007                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4008                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
4009                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
4010
4011                 // Test failure packets
4012                 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
4013                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
4014
4015                 // Add a new channel that skips 3
4016                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4017
4018                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4019                 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4020                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4021                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4022                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4023                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4024                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4025
4026                 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
4027                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4028                 hops.push(RouteHop {
4029                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4030                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4031                         fee_msat: 0,
4032                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4033                 });
4034                 hops.push(RouteHop {
4035                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4036                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4037                         fee_msat: 0,
4038                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4039                 });
4040                 hops.push(RouteHop {
4041                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4042                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4043                         fee_msat: 1000000,
4044                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4045                 });
4046                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4047                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4048                 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
4049
4050                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4051                 hops.push(RouteHop {
4052                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4053                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4054                         fee_msat: 0,
4055                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4056                 });
4057                 hops.push(RouteHop {
4058                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4059                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4060                         fee_msat: 0,
4061                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4062                 });
4063                 hops.push(RouteHop {
4064                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4065                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4066                         fee_msat: 1000000,
4067                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4068                 });
4069                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4070                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4071                 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
4072
4073                 // Claim the rebalances...
4074                 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
4075                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4076
4077                 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
4078                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4079
4080                 // Send some payments across both channels
4081                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4082                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4083                 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4084
4085                 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
4086
4087                 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
4088
4089                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4090                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
4091                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
4092
4093                 // Close down the channels...
4094                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
4095                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
4096                 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
4097                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
4098                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
4099         }
4100
4101         #[test]
4102         fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
4103                 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
4104                 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
4105                 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
4106
4107                 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
4108                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
4109                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4110                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4111                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4112                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4113
4114                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
4115
4116                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4117                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4118
4119                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4120                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4121
4122                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
4123                 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
4124                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
4125         }
4126
4127         #[derive(PartialEq)]
4128         enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
4129         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
4130         ///
4131         /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
4132         /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
4133         /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
4134         ///
4135         /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
4136         /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
4137         ///
4138         /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
4139         /// also fail.
4140         fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4141                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4142                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
4143
4144                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
4145                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4146                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
4147                                 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
4148                                 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
4149                                         res.push(tx.clone());
4150                                 }
4151                                 false
4152                         } else { true }
4153                 });
4154                 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
4155                         res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
4156                 }
4157
4158                 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
4159
4160                 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
4161                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4162                                 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
4163                                         check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
4164                                         if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
4165                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
4166                                         } else {
4167                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
4168                                         }
4169                                         res.push(tx.clone());
4170                                         false
4171                                 } else { true }
4172                         });
4173                         assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
4174                 }
4175
4176                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4177                 res
4178         }
4179
4180         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
4181         /// HTLC transaction.
4182         fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
4183                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4184                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4185                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4186                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
4187                                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
4188                                 false
4189                         } else { true }
4190                 });
4191                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4192         }
4193
4194         fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4195                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4196
4197                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
4198                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4199                 let mut found_prev = false;
4200
4201                 for tx in prev_txn {
4202                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
4203                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
4204                                 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
4205                                 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
4206
4207                                 found_prev = true;
4208                                 break;
4209                         }
4210                 }
4211                 assert!(found_prev);
4212
4213                 let mut res = Vec::new();
4214                 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
4215                 res
4216         }
4217
4218         fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
4219                 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4220                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4221                 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
4222                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4223                                 msg.clone()
4224                         },
4225                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4226                 };
4227
4228                 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4229                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4230                 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
4231                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4232                                 msg.clone()
4233                         },
4234                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4235                 };
4236
4237                 for node in nodes {
4238                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4239                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4240                 }
4241         }
4242
4243         #[test]
4244         fn channel_reserve_test() {
4245                 use util::rng;
4246                 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
4247                 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
4248
4249                 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
4250                         ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
4251                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4252                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
4253                                 chan.get_value_stat()
4254                         }}
4255                 }
4256
4257                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4258                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
4259                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
4260
4261                 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4262                 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4263
4264                 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
4265                 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4266
4267                 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
4268                         ($recv_value: expr) => {{
4269                                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4270                                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4271                                 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
4272                         }}
4273                 };
4274
4275                 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
4276                         ($node: expr) => {{
4277                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4278                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4279                                 match events[0] {
4280                                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4281                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4282                                 };
4283                                 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4284                                 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4285                         }}
4286                 };
4287
4288                 macro_rules! expect_forward {
4289                         ($node: expr) => {{
4290                                 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4291                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4292                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4293                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
4294                                 payment_event
4295                         }}
4296                 }
4297
4298                 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
4299                         ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
4300                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4301                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4302                                 match events[0] {
4303                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4304                                                 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4305                                                 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
4306                                         },
4307                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4308                                 }
4309                         }
4310                 };
4311
4312                 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4313                 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4314
4315                 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4316
4317                 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4318                 {
4319                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4320                         assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4321                         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4322                         match err {
4323                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4324                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4325                         }
4326                 }
4327
4328                 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4329                 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4330                 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4331                 loop {
4332                         let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4333                         if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4334                                 break;
4335                         }
4336                         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4337                         htlc_id += 1;
4338
4339                         let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4340                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4341                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4342                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4343                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4344                         );
4345
4346                         assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4347                         assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4348                         assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4349                         assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4350                         stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4351                 }
4352
4353                 {
4354                         let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4355                         // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4356                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4357                         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4358                         match err {
4359                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4360                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4361                         }
4362                 }
4363
4364                 // adding pending output
4365                 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4366                 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4367
4368                 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4369                 let payment_event_1 = {
4370                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4371                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4372
4373                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4374                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4375                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4376                 };
4377                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4378
4379                 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4380                 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4381                 {
4382                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4383                         match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4384                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4385                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4386                         }
4387                 }
4388
4389                 {
4390                         // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4391                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4392
4393                         // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4394                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4395                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4396                                 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4397                                 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4398                                 session_key
4399                         }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4400
4401                         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4402                         let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4403                         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4404                         let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4405                         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4406                                 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4407                                 htlc_id,
4408                                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4409                                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4410                                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4411                                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4412                         };
4413
4414                         let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4415                         match err {
4416                                 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4417                         }
4418                 }
4419
4420                 // split the rest to test holding cell
4421                 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4422                 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4423                 {
4424                         let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4425                         assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4426                 }
4427
4428                 // now see if they go through on both sides
4429                 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4430                 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4431                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4432                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4433                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4434                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4435
4436                 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4437                 {
4438                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4439                         match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4440                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4441                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4442                         }
4443                 }
4444
4445                 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4446                 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4447                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4448                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4449                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4450                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4451
4452                 // flush the pending htlc
4453                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4454                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4455
4456                 let commitment_update_2 = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
4457                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4458                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4459                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
4460                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4461                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4462                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4463
4464                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4465
4466                 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4467                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4468                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4469
4470                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4471                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4472
4473                 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4474                 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4475                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4476                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4477                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4478                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4479
4480                 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4481                 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4482                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4483                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4484
4485                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4486                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4487
4488                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4489                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4490                 match events[0] {
4491                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4492                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4493                                 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4494                         },
4495                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4496                 }
4497                 match events[1] {
4498                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4499                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4500                                 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4501                         },
4502                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4503                 }
4504
4505                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4506                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4507                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4508
4509                 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4510                 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4511                 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4512                 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4513
4514                 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4515                 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4516         }
4517
4518         #[test]
4519         fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4520                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4521                 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4522                 let nodes = create_network(5);
4523
4524                 // Create some initial channels
4525                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4526                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4527                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4528                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4529
4530                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4531                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4532                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4533                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4534                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4535
4536                 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4537                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4538                 {
4539                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4540                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4541                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4542                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4543                 }
4544                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4545                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4546                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4547
4548                 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4549                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4550
4551                 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4552                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4553                 {
4554                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4555                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4556                         nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4557                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4558                 }
4559                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4560                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4561                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4562
4563                 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4564                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4565                                 {
4566                                         assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4567                                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4568
4569                                         let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4570                                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4571                                         match events[0] {
4572                                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4573                                                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4574                                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4575                                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4576                                                 },
4577                                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4578                                         };
4579                                 }
4580                         }
4581                 }
4582
4583                 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4584                 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4585                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4586                 {
4587                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4588
4589                         // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4590                         claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4591
4592                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4593                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4594
4595                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4596                 }
4597                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4598                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4599                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4600
4601                 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
4602                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4603                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
4604                 }
4605
4606                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4607                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4608                 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4609                 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4610                 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
4611                 // buffer space).
4612
4613                 {
4614                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4615                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4616                         for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
4617                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4618                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4619                         }
4620
4621                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4622
4623                         // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4624                         claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4625
4626                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4627                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4628                         for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
4629                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4630                                 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4631                         }
4632
4633                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4634
4635                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4636                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4637
4638                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4639                 }
4640                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4641                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4642                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4643
4644                 // Create some new channels:
4645                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4646
4647                 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4648                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4649                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4650                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4651                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4652                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4653                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4654                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4655                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4656                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4657                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4658                 // Revoke the old state
4659                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4660
4661                 {
4662                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4663                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4664                         {
4665                                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4666                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4667                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4668                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4669
4670                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4671                                 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4672                         }
4673                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4674
4675                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4676                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4677                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4678                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4679                         test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4680                 }
4681                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4682                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4683                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4684         }
4685
4686         #[test]
4687         fn revoked_output_claim() {
4688                 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4689                 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4690                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4691                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4692                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4693                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4694                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4695                 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4696                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4697                 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4698                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4699
4700                 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4701                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4702                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4703                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4704                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4705
4706                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4707
4708                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4709                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4710
4711                 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4712                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4713                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4714         }
4715
4716         #[test]
4717         fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4718                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4719                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4720
4721                 // Create some new channel:
4722                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4723
4724                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4725                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4726                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4727                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4728                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4729
4730                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4731                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4732                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4733                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4734                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4735                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4736                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4737                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4738                 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4739
4740                 //Revoke the old state
4741                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4742
4743                 {
4744                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4745
4746                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4747
4748                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4749                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4750                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4751
4752                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4753                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4754
4755                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4756
4757                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4758                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4759                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4760                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4761                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4762                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4763                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4764                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4765
4766                         // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4767                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4768                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4769
4770                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4771                         let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4772                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4773                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4774                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4775                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4776                 }
4777                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4778                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4779                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4780         }
4781
4782         #[test]
4783         fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4784                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4785                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4786
4787                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4788
4789                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4790                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4791                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4792                 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4793                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4794                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4795
4796                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4797                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4798
4799                 //Revoke the old state
4800                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4801
4802                 {
4803                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4804
4805                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4806
4807                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4808                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4809                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4810
4811                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4812                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4813                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4814                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4815                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4816                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4817                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4818
4819                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4820                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4821                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4822
4823                         let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4824                         revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4825                         node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4826                         node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4827                         node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4828
4829                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4830                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4831                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4832                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4833                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4834                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4835                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4836                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4837
4838                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4839                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4840
4841                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4842                         let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4843                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4844                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4845                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4846                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4847                 }
4848                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4849                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4850                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4851         }
4852
4853         #[test]
4854         fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4855                 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4856                 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4857                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4858                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4859
4860                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4861                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4862                 {
4863                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4864                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4865                         match events[0] {
4866                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4867                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4868                                 },
4869                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4870                         }
4871                 }
4872
4873                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4874                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4875
4876                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4877                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4878
4879                 {
4880                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4881                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4882                         match events[0] {
4883                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4884                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4885                                 },
4886                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4887                         }
4888                 }
4889
4890                 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4891                 // registering new transactions
4892                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4893         }
4894
4895         #[test]
4896         fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4897                 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4898                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4899                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4900                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4901
4902                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4903
4904                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4905
4906                 let mut payment_event = {
4907                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4908                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4909
4910                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4911                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4912                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4913                 };
4914
4915                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4916                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4917
4918                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4919                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4920                 match events_1[0] {
4921                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4922                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4923                 };
4924
4925                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4926                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4927
4928                 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4929                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4930                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4931                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4932
4933                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4934                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4935                 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4936                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4937
4938                 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4939                 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4940                 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4941
4942                 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4943                 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4944                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4945                 match events_3[0] {
4946                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4947                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4948                         },
4949                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4950                 }
4951
4952                 let tx = {
4953                         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4954                         // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4955                         // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4956                         // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4957                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4958                         node_txn.remove(0)
4959                 };
4960
4961                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4962                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4963
4964                 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4965                 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4966                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4967                 match events_4[0] {
4968                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4969                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4970                         },
4971                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4972                 }
4973
4974                 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4975                 {
4976                         let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4977                         monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4978                                 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4979                 }
4980                 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4981                 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4982                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4983                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4984                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4985                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4986                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4987
4988                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
4989         }
4990
4991         #[test]
4992         fn test_unconf_chan() {
4993                 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
4994                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4995                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4996
4997                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4998                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
4999                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
5000                 mem::drop(channel_state);
5001
5002                 let mut headers = Vec::new();
5003                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5004                 headers.push(header.clone());
5005                 for _i in 2..100 {
5006                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5007                         headers.push(header.clone());
5008                 }
5009                 while !headers.is_empty() {
5010                         nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
5011                 }
5012                 {
5013                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5014                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5015                         match events[0] {
5016                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5017                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5018                                 },
5019                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5020                         }
5021                 }
5022                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5023                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
5024                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
5025         }
5026
5027         /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
5028         /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
5029         fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
5030                 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5031                 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5032
5033                 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
5034                 for msg in reestablish_1 {
5035                         resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
5036                 }
5037                 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5038                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5039                 } else {
5040                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
5041                 }
5042
5043                 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
5044                 for msg in reestablish_2 {
5045                         resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
5046                 }
5047                 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5048                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5049                 } else {
5050                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
5051                 }
5052
5053                 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
5054                 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
5055                         (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
5056
5057                 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
5058                         if pre_all_htlcs {
5059                                 let a = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap());
5060                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = a.unwrap();
5061                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
5062                         } else {
5063                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5064                         }
5065                         if pending_raa.0 {
5066                                 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5067                                 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
5068                                 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5069                         } else {
5070                                 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5071                         }
5072                         if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5073                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5074                                 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5075                                         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
5076                                 } else {
5077                                         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5078                                 }
5079                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5080                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5081                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5082                                 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5083                                         node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5084                                 }
5085                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5086                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5087                                 }
5088                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5089                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5090                                 }
5091
5092                                 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5093                                         commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5094                                 } else {
5095                                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5096                                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5097                                         assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5098                                         assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5099                                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5100                                 }
5101                         } else {
5102                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5103                         }
5104                 }
5105
5106                 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
5107                         if pre_all_htlcs {
5108                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5109                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
5110                         } else {
5111                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5112                         }
5113                         if pending_raa.1 {
5114                                 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5115                                 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
5116                                 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5117                         } else {
5118                                 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5119                         }
5120                         if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5121                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5122                                 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5123                                         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
5124                                 }
5125                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5126                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5127                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5128                                 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5129                                         node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5130                                 }
5131                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5132                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5133                                 }
5134                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5135                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5136                                 }
5137
5138                                 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5139                                         commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5140                                 } else {
5141                                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5142                                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5143                                         assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5144                                         assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5145                                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5146                                 }
5147                         } else {
5148                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5149                         }
5150                 }
5151         }
5152
5153         #[test]
5154         fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
5155                 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
5156                 let nodes = create_network(3);
5157                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5158                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5159
5160                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5161                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5162                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5163
5164                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5165                 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5166                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
5167                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
5168
5169                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5170                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5171                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5172
5173                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5174                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5175                 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5176                 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5177
5178                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5179                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5180
5181                 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
5182                 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
5183
5184                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
5185                 {
5186                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5187                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5188                         match events[0] {
5189                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
5190                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
5191                                 },
5192                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5193                         }
5194                         match events[1] {
5195                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
5196                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
5197                                         assert!(rejected_by_dest);
5198                                 },
5199                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5200                         }
5201                 }
5202
5203                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
5204                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
5205         }
5206
5207         fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
5208                 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
5209                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5210                 if messages_delivered == 0 {
5211                         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5212                         // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
5213                 } else {
5214                         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5215                 }
5216
5217                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5218                 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5219
5220                 let payment_event = {
5221                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5222                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5223
5224                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5225                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5226                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5227                 };
5228                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
5229
5230                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5231                         // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
5232                 } else {
5233                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5234                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5235                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5236
5237                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5238                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5239                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5240
5241                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5242                                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5243                                         assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5244                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5245
5246                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5247                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5248                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5249                                         }
5250                                 }
5251                         }
5252                 }
5253
5254                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5255                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5256                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5257                         // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
5258                         // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
5259                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5260                 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5261                         // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5262                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5263                 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5264                         // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5265                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5266                 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5267                         // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5268                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5269                 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5270                         // Everything was delivered...
5271                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5272                 }
5273
5274                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5275                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5276                 match events_1[0] {
5277                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5278                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5279                 };
5280
5281                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5282                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5283                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5284
5285                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5286                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5287
5288                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5289                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5290                 match events_2[0] {
5291                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5292                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5293                                 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5294                         },
5295                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5296                 }
5297
5298                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5299                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5300
5301                 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5302                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5303                 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
5304                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5305                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5306                                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5307                                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5308                                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5309                                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5310                                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5311                                 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5312                         },
5313                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5314                 };
5315
5316                 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
5317                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
5318
5319                         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5320                         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5321                         match events_4[0] {
5322                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5323                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5324                                 },
5325                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5326                         }
5327
5328                         if messages_delivered >= 2 {
5329                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
5330                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5331
5332                                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5333                                         assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5334                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5335
5336                                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5337                                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5338                                                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5339                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5340
5341                                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5342                                                         assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5343                                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5344                                                 }
5345                                         }
5346                                 }
5347                         }
5348                 }
5349
5350                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5351                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5352                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5353                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5354                         //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
5355                         //if messages_delivered < 1 {
5356                                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5357                                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5358                                 match events_4[0] {
5359                                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5360                                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5361                                         },
5362                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5363                                 }
5364                         //}
5365                 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5366                         // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5367                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5368                 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5369                         // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5370                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5371                 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5372                         // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5373                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5374                 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5375                         // Everything was delivered...
5376                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5377                 }
5378
5379                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5380                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5381                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5382
5383                 // Channel should still work fine...
5384                 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
5385                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5386         }
5387
5388         #[test]
5389         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
5390                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
5391                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
5392                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
5393         }
5394
5395         #[test]
5396         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
5397                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
5398                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
5399                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
5400         }
5401
5402         #[test]
5403         fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
5404                 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
5405                 let nodes = create_network(2);
5406                 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5407
5408                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5409                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5410
5411                 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5412                 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5413                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5414                 match events_1[0] {
5415                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5416                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5417                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5418                         },
5419                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5420                 }
5421
5422                 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5423                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5424                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5425                 match events_2[0] {
5426                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5427                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5428                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5429                         },
5430                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5431                 }
5432
5433                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5434                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5435                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5436                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5437
5438                 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
5439                 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
5440
5441                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5442                 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5443                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
5444         }
5445
5446         #[test]
5447         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
5448                 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
5449                 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
5450                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5451                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5452
5453                 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5454
5455                 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5456                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5457                 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5458
5459                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
5460                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5461
5462                 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5463                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5464                 match events_1[0] {
5465                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5466                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5467                 }
5468
5469                 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5470                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5471
5472                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5473                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5474                 match events_2[0] {
5475                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5476                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5477                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5478                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5479                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5480                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5481                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5482
5483                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5484                                 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5485                                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5486                                 match events_3[0] {
5487                                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5488                                                 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5489                                         },
5490                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5491                                 }
5492
5493                                 let (_, commitment_update) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
5494                                 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
5495                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5496                         },
5497                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5498                 }
5499
5500                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5501                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5502
5503                 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5504                 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5505                 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5506                 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5507
5508                 let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5509                 let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5510
5511                 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5512                 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5513
5514                 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5515                 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5516
5517                 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5518
5519                 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5520                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5521                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5522                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5523                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5524                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5525                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5526                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5527                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5528
5529                 let bs_second_commitment_signed = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap().unwrap();
5530                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5531                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5532                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5533                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5534                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5535                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5536
5537                 let as_commitment_signed = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5538                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5539                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5540                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5541                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5542                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5543                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5544
5545                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5546                 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
5547                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5548
5549                 let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5550                 assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none());
5551                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5552
5553                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5554                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5555
5556                 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5557                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5558                 match events_4[0] {
5559                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5560                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5561                 };
5562
5563                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5564                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5565
5566                 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5567                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5568                 match events_5[0] {
5569                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
5570                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5571                         },
5572                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5573                 }
5574
5575                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5576                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5577
5578                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5579         }
5580
5581         #[test]
5582         fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
5583                 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
5584                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5585                 let nodes = create_network(2);
5586
5587                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
5588
5589                 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5590                 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5591                 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5592                 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5593
5594                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
5595
5596                 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5597                 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5598
5599                 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5600                 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5601
5602                 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
5603
5604                 let mut chan_announcement;
5605
5606                 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
5607                         () => {
5608                                 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5609                                         features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
5610                                         chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
5611                                         short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5612                                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
5613                                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
5614                                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
5615                                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
5616                                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
5617                                 };
5618                         }
5619                 }
5620
5621                 macro_rules! sign_msg {
5622                         ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
5623                                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
5624                                 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5625                                 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5626                                 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
5627                                 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
5628                                 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5629                                         node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
5630                                         node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
5631                                         bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
5632                                         bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
5633                                         contents: $unsigned_msg
5634                                 }
5635                         }
5636                 }
5637
5638                 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5639                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5640                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
5641                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
5642
5643                 // Configured with Network::Testnet
5644                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5645                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
5646                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5647                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
5648
5649                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5650                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
5651                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5652                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
5653         }
5654 }