1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
18 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
19 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
22 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
23 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
26 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
29 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
30 use util::config::UserConfig;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
69 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
70 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
71 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
72 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
73 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
75 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
76 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
79 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
80 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
81 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
82 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
85 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
86 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
87 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
88 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
92 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
95 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
96 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
97 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
100 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102 pub enum HTLCSource {
103 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
106 session_priv: SecretKey,
107 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
108 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
109 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
114 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
115 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
116 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
117 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
118 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
126 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
134 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
136 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>);
138 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
139 err: msgs::HandleError,
140 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
141 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
143 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
145 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
149 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
150 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
152 data: err.to_string()
156 needs_channel_force_close: false,
157 shutdown_finish: None,
161 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
165 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
166 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
168 data: err.to_string()
172 needs_channel_force_close: true,
173 shutdown_finish: None,
177 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
178 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false, shutdown_finish: None }
181 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
185 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
186 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
188 data: err.to_string()
192 needs_channel_force_close: false,
193 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
197 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
200 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
202 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
204 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
206 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
207 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
209 data: msg.to_string()
214 needs_channel_force_close: false,
215 shutdown_finish: None,
219 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
222 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
224 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
226 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
228 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
229 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
231 data: msg.to_string()
236 needs_channel_force_close: true,
237 shutdown_finish: None,
242 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
243 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
245 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
246 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
248 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
252 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
253 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
254 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
255 /// probably increase this significantly.
256 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
258 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
259 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
261 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
264 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
265 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
266 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
267 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
268 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
269 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
270 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
272 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
276 struct ChannelHolder {
277 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
278 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
279 next_forward: Instant,
280 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
281 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
282 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
283 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
284 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
285 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
286 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
288 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
289 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
290 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
291 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
293 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
294 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
295 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
296 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
297 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
298 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
299 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
302 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
304 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
305 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
306 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
307 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
308 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
309 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
314 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
315 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
317 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
318 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
320 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
321 /// to individual Channels.
323 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
324 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
325 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
326 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
328 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
329 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
330 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
331 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
332 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
333 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
334 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
336 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
337 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
338 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
339 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
341 pub struct ChannelManager {
342 default_configuration: UserConfig,
343 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
344 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
345 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
346 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
347 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
349 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
350 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
351 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
353 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
354 our_network_key: SecretKey,
356 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
357 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
358 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
359 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
360 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
362 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
367 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
368 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
369 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
370 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
371 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
372 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
373 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
375 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
376 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
377 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
378 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
381 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
383 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
384 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
387 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
389 macro_rules! secp_call {
390 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
393 Err(_) => return Err($err),
400 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
402 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
403 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
408 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
409 pub struct ChannelDetails {
410 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
411 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
412 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
413 /// lifetime of the channel.
414 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
415 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
416 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
417 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
418 /// The node_id of our counterparty
419 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
420 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
421 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
422 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
426 macro_rules! handle_error {
427 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
430 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close, shutdown_finish }) => {
431 if needs_channel_force_close {
433 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
434 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
435 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
437 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
440 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
441 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
442 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
443 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
444 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
446 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
452 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
453 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
454 if let Some(update) = update_option {
455 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
456 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
467 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
468 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
471 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
472 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
474 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
475 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
476 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
477 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
479 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
485 impl ChannelManager {
486 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
488 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
489 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
491 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
493 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
494 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
495 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
497 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
498 default_configuration: config.clone(),
499 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
500 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
501 monitor: monitor.clone(),
505 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
506 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
509 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
510 by_id: HashMap::new(),
511 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
512 next_forward: Instant::now(),
513 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
514 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
515 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
517 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
519 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
520 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
526 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
527 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
531 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
533 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
534 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
535 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
536 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
538 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
539 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
541 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
542 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
543 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
544 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
545 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
548 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
549 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
551 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
552 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
553 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
554 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
555 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
556 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
558 panic!("RNG is bad???");
561 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
563 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
564 node_id: their_network_key,
570 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
571 /// more information.
572 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
573 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
574 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
575 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
576 res.push(ChannelDetails {
577 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
578 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
579 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
580 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
581 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
587 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
588 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
589 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
590 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
591 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
592 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
593 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
594 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
595 // really wanted anyway.
596 if channel.is_live() {
597 res.push(ChannelDetails {
598 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
599 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
600 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
601 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
602 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
609 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
610 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
611 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
613 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
614 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
615 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
617 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
618 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
619 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
620 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
621 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
622 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
623 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
624 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
627 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
628 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
629 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
631 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
632 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
634 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
637 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
638 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
639 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
641 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
642 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
647 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
648 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
649 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
658 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
659 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
660 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
661 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
662 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
664 for tx in local_txn {
665 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
667 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
668 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
669 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
670 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
671 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
672 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
673 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
676 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
677 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
678 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
679 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
682 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
683 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
684 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
685 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
686 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
693 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
694 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
695 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
696 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
702 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
703 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
704 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
705 for chan in self.list_channels() {
706 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
710 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
712 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
714 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
715 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
716 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
717 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
721 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
722 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
723 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
724 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
725 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
730 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
731 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
732 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
738 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
739 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
741 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
742 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
743 let mut res = [0; 32];
744 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
748 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
749 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
750 let mut res = [0; 32];
751 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
757 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
758 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
759 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
760 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
761 let mut res = [0; 32];
762 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
767 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
768 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
769 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
770 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
771 let mut res = [0; 32];
772 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
776 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
778 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
779 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
780 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
782 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
783 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
785 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
786 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
787 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
788 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
789 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
791 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
793 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
794 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
796 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
802 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
803 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
804 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
806 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
807 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
813 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
823 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
824 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
825 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
826 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
827 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
828 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
829 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
830 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
832 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
833 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
834 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
835 // the intended recipient).
836 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
837 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
838 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
840 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
841 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
842 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
843 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
847 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
848 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
849 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
851 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
852 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
853 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
855 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
857 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
861 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
863 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
871 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
872 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
874 for i in 0..dst.len() {
879 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
880 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
881 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
882 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
885 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
886 let end_len = iters * 65;
887 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
888 res.resize(end_len, 0);
890 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
891 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
892 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
893 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
894 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
899 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
900 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
902 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
903 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
904 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
905 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
907 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
908 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
909 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
912 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
915 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
916 hmac.input(&packet_data);
917 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
918 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
923 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
924 hop_data: packet_data,
929 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
930 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
931 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
932 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
934 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
935 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
936 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
937 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
938 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
939 data: packet_crypted,
943 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
944 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
945 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
947 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
950 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
951 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
952 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
953 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
957 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
958 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
961 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
963 failuremsg: failuremsg,
967 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
968 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
969 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
975 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
976 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
977 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
980 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
981 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
984 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
985 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
986 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
987 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
993 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
994 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
995 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
996 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
997 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
998 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
999 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
1000 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1003 let shared_secret = {
1004 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1005 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1008 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1010 let mut channel_state = None;
1011 macro_rules! return_err {
1012 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1014 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1015 if channel_state.is_none() {
1016 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1018 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1019 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1020 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1021 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1022 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1027 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1028 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1029 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1030 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1031 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1032 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1033 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1034 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1037 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1038 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1039 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
1040 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1041 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1044 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1045 let next_hop_data = {
1046 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1047 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1048 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
1050 let error_code = match err {
1051 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1052 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1054 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1060 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1062 // final_expiry_too_soon
1063 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1064 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1066 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1067 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1068 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1070 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1071 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1072 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1075 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1076 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1077 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1078 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1080 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1082 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1083 short_channel_id: 0,
1084 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1085 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1086 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1089 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1090 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1091 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1093 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1095 let blinding_factor = {
1096 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1097 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1098 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1099 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1100 sha.result(&mut res);
1101 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1103 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1109 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1110 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1113 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1115 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1116 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1117 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1120 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1121 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1122 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1123 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1124 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1125 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1126 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1130 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1131 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1132 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1133 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1134 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1135 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1136 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1138 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1140 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1141 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1143 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1144 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1145 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1146 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1147 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1148 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1149 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1151 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1152 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1154 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1155 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1156 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1158 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1159 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1161 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1162 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1163 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1164 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1166 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1167 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1172 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1173 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1174 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1176 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1177 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1179 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1180 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1182 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1187 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1190 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1191 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1192 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1193 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1194 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1198 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1200 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1201 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1202 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1203 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1204 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1205 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1206 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1207 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1208 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1209 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1212 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1213 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1215 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1221 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1223 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1224 /// fields for more info.
1226 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1227 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1228 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1229 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1230 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1231 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1233 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1235 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1236 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1237 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1238 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1239 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1241 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1242 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1243 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1244 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1248 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1249 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1250 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1252 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1254 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1256 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1257 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1258 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1259 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1261 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1262 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1264 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1265 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1266 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1270 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1271 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1272 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1274 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1275 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1277 if !chan.is_live() {
1278 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1280 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1281 route: route.clone(),
1282 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1283 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1284 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he|
1286 ChannelError::Close(err) => {
1287 // TODO: We need to close the channel here, but for that to be safe we have
1288 // to do all channel closure inside the channel_state lock which is a
1289 // somewhat-larger refactor, so we leave that for later.
1290 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }
1292 ChannelError::Ignore(err) => APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err },
1297 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1298 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1299 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1300 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1303 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1304 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1305 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1306 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1307 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1308 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1309 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1321 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1323 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1324 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1326 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1328 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1329 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1330 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1331 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1333 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1335 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1336 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1338 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1339 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, chan.channel_id()))
1345 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1346 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1347 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1350 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1351 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1352 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1353 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1360 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1361 // lock before add_update_monitor
1362 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1366 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1367 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1368 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1371 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1372 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1373 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1375 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1381 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1382 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1384 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1386 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1388 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1389 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1391 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1392 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1393 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1394 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1395 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1399 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1401 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1402 /// Will likely generate further events.
1403 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1404 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1406 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1407 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1409 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1410 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1412 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1416 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1417 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1418 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1419 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1421 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1422 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1423 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1424 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1425 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1426 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1428 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1433 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1435 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1436 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1437 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1438 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1439 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1440 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1442 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1444 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1445 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1450 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1452 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1453 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1454 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1455 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1456 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1457 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1458 // this channel currently :/.
1465 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1466 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1469 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1470 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1472 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1476 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1477 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1479 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1480 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1481 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1482 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1483 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1484 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1485 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1487 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1492 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1493 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1494 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1495 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1496 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1498 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1499 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1500 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1502 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1503 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1504 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1511 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1513 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1514 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1518 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1519 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1520 events.append(&mut new_events);
1523 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1524 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1525 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1527 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1528 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1529 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1530 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1531 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1532 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1538 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1539 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1540 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1541 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1542 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1543 /// still-available channels.
1544 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1546 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1547 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1548 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1549 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1550 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1551 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1552 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1557 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1558 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1559 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1562 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1565 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1566 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1567 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1568 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1569 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1571 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1572 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1576 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1578 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1579 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1583 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1584 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1585 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1586 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1589 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1590 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1591 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1592 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1593 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1594 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1595 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1597 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1603 //TODO: Do something with e?
1611 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1612 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1613 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1615 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1616 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1617 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1618 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1619 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1620 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1622 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1624 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1625 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1626 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1627 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1628 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1629 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1634 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1636 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1637 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1638 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1639 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1643 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1644 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1645 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1647 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1648 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1650 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1651 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1657 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1658 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1659 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1660 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1661 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1662 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1665 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1666 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1667 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1668 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1669 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1670 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1671 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1672 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1680 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1681 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1682 //TODO: Do something with e?
1690 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1691 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1692 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1695 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1696 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1698 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1699 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1700 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1701 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1702 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1705 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1706 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1707 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1708 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1709 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1710 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1711 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1712 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1714 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1715 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1716 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1718 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1719 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1720 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1726 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1729 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1730 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1731 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1733 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1735 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1736 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1737 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1738 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1743 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1744 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1745 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1746 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1747 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1752 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1756 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1767 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1768 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1770 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1772 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1773 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1777 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1778 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1779 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1782 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1783 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1784 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1785 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1786 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1787 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1788 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1789 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1790 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1791 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1793 entry.insert(channel);
1799 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1800 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1801 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1802 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1803 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1804 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1805 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1806 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1807 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1809 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1810 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1812 //TODO: same as above
1813 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1816 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1817 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1818 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1819 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1820 output_script: output_script,
1821 user_channel_id: user_id,
1826 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1827 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1828 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1829 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1830 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1832 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1833 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1834 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1836 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1838 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1841 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1842 // lock before add_update_monitor
1843 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1846 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1847 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1848 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1850 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1852 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1853 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1854 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1863 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1864 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1865 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1866 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1867 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1868 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1869 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1870 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1871 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1873 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1874 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1877 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1879 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1882 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1883 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1884 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1885 user_channel_id: user_id,
1890 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1891 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1892 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1893 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1894 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1895 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1896 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1897 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1899 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1900 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1901 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1902 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1903 msg: announcement_sigs,
1908 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1912 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1913 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1914 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1915 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1917 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1918 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1919 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1920 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1921 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1923 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1924 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1925 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1926 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1930 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1931 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1932 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1936 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1937 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1938 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1940 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1941 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1943 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1946 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1947 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1948 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1950 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1951 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1952 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1953 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1961 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1962 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1963 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1964 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1965 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1967 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1968 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1969 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1971 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1972 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1973 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1974 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1979 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1980 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1981 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1982 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1983 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1984 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1985 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1987 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1988 } else { (tx, None) }
1990 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1993 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1994 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1996 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1997 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1998 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1999 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2007 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2008 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2009 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2010 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2012 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2013 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2014 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2015 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2017 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2018 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2020 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2021 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2022 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2023 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2024 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2026 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2027 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2028 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2029 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2030 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2031 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2032 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2033 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2034 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2035 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2036 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &update.encode_with_len()[..])
2038 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2039 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2040 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2041 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2042 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2043 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2048 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2050 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2055 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2056 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2058 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2059 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2060 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2061 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2062 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2063 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2065 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2067 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2070 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2074 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
2075 // indicating that the payment itself failed
2076 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
2077 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
2078 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
2079 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
2080 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
2082 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
2083 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
2087 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
2088 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
2089 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
2092 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
2094 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
2095 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
2096 if res.is_some() { return; }
2098 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
2099 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2100 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2102 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2104 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2105 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2106 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2107 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2108 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2110 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2112 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2113 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2114 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2115 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2116 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2117 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2119 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2120 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
2121 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2122 // definitely came from the peer in question
2123 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
2125 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
2127 match error_code & 0xff {
2129 // either from an intermediate or final node
2130 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
2131 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
2132 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
2133 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
2134 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2135 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2136 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
2137 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2138 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
2139 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2140 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2146 if is_from_final_node {
2147 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2148 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2149 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2150 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2151 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2152 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2155 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2156 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2160 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2161 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2162 // does not coform to the spec.
2163 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2164 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2165 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2171 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2175 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2177 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2178 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2179 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2183 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2184 let offset = match error_code {
2185 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2186 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2187 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2188 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2189 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2190 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2192 // node sending unknown code
2193 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2194 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2201 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2202 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2203 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2204 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2205 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2206 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2207 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2208 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2211 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2212 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2213 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2214 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2216 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2217 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2218 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2219 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2220 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2222 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2223 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2224 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2225 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2227 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2228 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2229 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2230 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2232 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2233 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2236 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2237 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2241 res = Some((msg, true));
2247 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2250 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2251 res = Some((None, true));
2255 // node sending unknown code
2256 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2257 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2266 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2267 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2268 } else { ((None, true)) }
2271 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2272 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2273 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2274 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2275 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2276 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2277 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2278 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2280 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2282 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2287 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2288 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2289 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2290 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2291 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2292 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2293 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2294 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2296 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2297 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set", msg.channel_id));
2299 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2302 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2306 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2307 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2308 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2309 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2310 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2311 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2312 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2313 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2315 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2316 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2317 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2320 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2321 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2322 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2324 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2325 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2326 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2327 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2328 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2329 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2330 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2331 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2333 commitment_signed: msg,
2337 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2338 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2339 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2345 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2350 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2351 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2352 let mut forward_event = None;
2353 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2354 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2355 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2356 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2357 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2359 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2360 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2361 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2362 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2364 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2365 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2370 match forward_event {
2372 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2373 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2374 time_forwardable: time
2382 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2383 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2384 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2385 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2386 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2387 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2388 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2389 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2390 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2392 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2393 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2394 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2397 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2398 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2399 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2403 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2404 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2405 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2409 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2411 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2414 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2415 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2417 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2422 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2423 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2424 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2425 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2426 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2427 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2428 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2429 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2431 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2433 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2438 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2439 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2440 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2442 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2443 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2444 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2445 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2447 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2448 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2451 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2452 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2453 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2455 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2456 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2457 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2458 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2459 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2461 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2463 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2464 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2465 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2466 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2467 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2468 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2469 contents: announcement,
2471 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2474 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2479 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2480 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2481 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2483 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2484 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2485 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2486 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2488 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order, shutdown) =
2489 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2490 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2491 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2495 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2496 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2497 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2501 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2502 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2503 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2504 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2509 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2510 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2511 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2512 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2518 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2522 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2527 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2528 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2529 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2535 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2539 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2540 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2541 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2542 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2544 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2545 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2546 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2547 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2549 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2550 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2552 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2553 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2555 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2556 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2558 if !chan.is_live() {
2559 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2561 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw)
2562 .map_err(|e| match e {
2563 ChannelError::Ignore(err) => APIError::APIMisuseError{err},
2564 ChannelError::Close(err) => {
2565 // TODO: We need to close the channel here, but for that to be safe we have
2566 // to do all channel closure inside the channel_state lock which is a
2567 // somewhat-larger refactor, so we leave that for later.
2568 APIError::APIMisuseError{err}
2571 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2574 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2575 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2576 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2577 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2578 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2579 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2580 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2581 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2592 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2593 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2594 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2595 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2596 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2601 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2602 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2603 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2604 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2605 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2610 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2611 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2612 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2613 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2615 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2616 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2617 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2618 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2619 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2620 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2621 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2622 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2623 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2624 msg: funding_locked,
2626 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2627 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2628 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2629 msg: announcement_sigs,
2632 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2633 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2634 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2635 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2636 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2640 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2641 for tx in txn_matched {
2642 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2643 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2644 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2645 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2647 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2648 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2649 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2650 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2651 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2652 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2661 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2662 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2663 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2665 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2666 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2667 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2668 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2669 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2670 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2671 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2680 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2681 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2683 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2684 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2687 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2688 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2689 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2690 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2692 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2693 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2694 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2695 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2696 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2697 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2698 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2699 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2701 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2702 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2703 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2713 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2714 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2716 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2717 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2721 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2722 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2723 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2724 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2725 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2728 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2729 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2730 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2733 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2734 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2735 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2738 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2739 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2740 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2743 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2744 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2745 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2748 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2749 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2750 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2753 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2754 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2755 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2758 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2759 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2760 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2763 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2764 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2765 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2768 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2769 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2770 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2773 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2774 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2775 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2778 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2779 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2780 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2783 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2784 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2785 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2788 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2789 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2790 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2793 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2794 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2795 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2798 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2799 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2800 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2803 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2804 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2805 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2806 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2808 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2809 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2810 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2811 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2812 if no_connection_possible {
2813 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2814 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2815 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2816 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2817 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2819 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2820 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2821 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2831 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2832 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2833 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2834 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2835 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2836 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2837 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2838 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2840 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2841 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2842 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2851 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2852 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2854 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2855 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2856 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2861 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2862 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2864 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2865 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2866 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2867 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2868 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2869 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2870 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2871 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2872 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2873 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2877 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2878 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2879 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2885 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2888 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2889 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2891 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2892 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2893 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2894 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2898 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2903 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2904 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2906 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2907 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2908 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2910 onion.write(writer)?;
2914 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2915 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2916 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2917 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2918 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2923 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2924 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2925 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2927 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2928 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2930 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2932 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2933 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2934 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2935 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2936 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2941 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2942 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2944 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2946 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2948 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2950 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2957 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2958 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2959 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2960 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2961 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2962 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2967 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2968 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2970 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2972 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2974 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2976 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2983 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2984 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2985 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2986 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2987 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2988 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2993 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2996 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2999 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3000 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3002 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3004 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3006 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3008 route.write(writer)?;
3009 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3010 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3017 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3018 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3019 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3020 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3021 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3022 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3023 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3024 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3026 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3031 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3032 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3034 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
3038 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3040 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3041 data.write(writer)?;
3048 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3049 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3050 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3051 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3052 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3053 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3054 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3056 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3061 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
3062 prev_short_channel_id,
3067 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3068 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3069 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3071 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3072 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3074 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3075 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3076 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3078 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3079 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3080 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3081 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3082 unfunded_channels += 1;
3085 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3086 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3087 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3088 channel.write(writer)?;
3092 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3093 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3094 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3095 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3096 for forward in pending_forwards {
3097 forward.write(writer)?;
3101 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3102 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3103 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3104 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3105 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3106 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3114 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3116 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3118 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3119 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3120 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3121 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3122 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3123 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3124 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3125 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3126 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3127 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3128 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3129 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3130 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3131 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3132 /// deserialization.
3133 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3135 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3137 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3138 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3139 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3141 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3142 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3143 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3144 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3145 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3147 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3148 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3149 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3150 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3151 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3152 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3153 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3154 /// deserialization.
3155 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3156 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3157 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3158 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3160 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3161 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3163 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3164 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3165 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3166 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3168 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3170 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3173 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3174 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3175 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3176 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3177 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3178 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3181 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3182 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3183 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3185 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3187 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3188 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3189 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3190 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3191 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3192 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3193 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3194 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3197 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3198 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3199 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3200 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3201 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3202 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3203 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3204 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3205 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3207 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3208 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3210 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3213 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3217 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3218 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3219 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3223 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3224 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3225 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3226 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3227 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3228 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3229 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3230 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3232 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3235 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3236 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3237 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3238 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3239 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3240 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3241 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3242 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3244 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3247 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3249 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3250 monitor: args.monitor,
3251 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3252 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3254 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3255 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3256 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3258 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3261 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3264 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3266 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3268 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3269 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3270 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3271 logger: args.logger,
3272 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3275 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3276 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3277 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3278 //connection or two.
3281 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3287 use chain::chaininterface;
3288 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3289 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3290 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
3291 use chain::keysinterface;
3292 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
3293 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
3294 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3295 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3297 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
3298 use util::test_utils;
3299 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3300 use util::errors::APIError;
3301 use util::logger::Logger;
3302 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3303 use util::config::UserConfig;
3305 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3306 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3307 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
3308 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
3309 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3310 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
3311 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
3312 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3313 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3314 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3318 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3319 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3321 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3322 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3324 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3326 use std::cell::RefCell;
3327 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
3328 use std::default::Default;
3330 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3331 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3332 use std::time::Instant;
3335 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3336 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3337 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3342 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3343 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3346 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3347 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3350 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3351 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3354 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3355 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3358 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3359 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3364 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3366 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3367 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3372 fn onion_vectors() {
3373 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3374 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3376 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3377 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3378 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3379 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3380 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3382 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3383 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3384 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3385 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3386 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3388 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3389 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3390 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3391 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3392 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3394 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3395 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3396 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3397 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3398 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3400 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3401 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3402 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3403 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3404 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3406 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3407 let payloads = vec!(
3408 msgs::OnionHopData {
3410 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3411 short_channel_id: 0,
3413 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3417 msgs::OnionHopData {
3419 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3420 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3421 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3422 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3426 msgs::OnionHopData {
3428 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3429 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3430 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3431 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3435 msgs::OnionHopData {
3437 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3438 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3439 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3440 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3444 msgs::OnionHopData {
3446 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3447 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3448 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3449 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3455 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
3456 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3458 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3462 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3463 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3465 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3466 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3467 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3469 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3470 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3472 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3473 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3475 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3476 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3478 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3479 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3481 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3482 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3485 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3486 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3487 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3488 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3490 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3491 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3496 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3497 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3498 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3499 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3501 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3502 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3503 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3505 impl Drop for Node {
3506 fn drop(&mut self) {
3507 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3508 // Check that we processed all pending events
3509 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3510 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3511 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3516 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3517 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3520 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3521 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3522 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3523 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3526 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3527 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3529 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3530 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3532 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3533 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3536 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3537 }, match events[1] {
3538 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3539 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3540 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3541 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3542 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3543 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3544 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3545 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3547 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3553 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3554 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3556 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3557 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3559 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3560 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3563 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3569 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3570 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3572 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3573 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3575 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3576 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3579 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3585 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3586 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
3588 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3589 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3596 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3597 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3598 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3599 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3601 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3605 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3606 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3608 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3609 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3610 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3612 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3613 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3615 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3617 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3618 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3619 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3620 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3621 added_monitors.clear();
3623 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3626 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3628 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3629 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3630 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3631 added_monitors.clear();
3634 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3636 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3637 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3638 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3639 added_monitors.clear();
3642 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3643 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3645 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3646 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3647 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3649 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3655 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3656 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3657 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3661 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3662 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3663 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3664 ((match events_6[0] {
3665 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3666 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3667 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3670 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3671 }, match events_6[1] {
3672 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3673 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3676 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3680 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3681 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3682 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3686 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3687 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3688 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3689 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3691 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3692 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3693 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3694 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3697 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3700 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3701 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3702 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3703 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3704 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3705 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3708 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3711 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3713 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3716 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3717 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3720 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3721 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3723 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3724 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3725 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3727 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3730 macro_rules! check_spends {
3731 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3733 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3734 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3735 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3736 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3741 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3742 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3744 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3745 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3746 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3747 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3748 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3752 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3754 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3755 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3765 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
3766 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3767 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3770 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3771 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3773 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3774 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3775 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3776 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3777 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3780 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3783 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3784 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3787 Some(match events_1[1] {
3788 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3789 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3792 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3796 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3797 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3798 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3799 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3800 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3801 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3802 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3804 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3805 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3806 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3807 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3808 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3809 (as_update, bs_update)
3811 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3813 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3814 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3815 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3816 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3818 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3819 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3820 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3821 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3822 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3823 (as_update, bs_update)
3825 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3826 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3828 (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
3833 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3834 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3837 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3838 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3839 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3840 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3841 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3842 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3845 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3847 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3848 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3853 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3854 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3856 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3857 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3858 added_monitors.clear();
3863 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3864 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3866 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3867 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3868 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3869 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3870 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3873 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
3875 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3876 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3877 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3878 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3879 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3880 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3881 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3882 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3883 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3884 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3886 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3887 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3890 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3891 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3893 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3894 if $fail_backwards {
3895 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3896 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3898 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3900 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3901 if $fail_backwards {
3902 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3903 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3905 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3907 added_monitors.clear();
3912 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
3914 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
3917 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3919 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
3920 if $fail_backwards {
3921 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3922 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3923 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
3924 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3925 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
3927 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3933 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3936 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3937 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3938 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3939 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3940 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3941 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3942 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3947 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3948 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3950 let mut payment_event = {
3951 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3952 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3954 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3955 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3956 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3958 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3960 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3961 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3963 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3964 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3965 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3967 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3968 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3970 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3971 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3974 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3975 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3977 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3978 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3979 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3981 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3982 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3983 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3985 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3988 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3989 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3990 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3991 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3992 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3998 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
4001 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
4002 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4003 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4005 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4006 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4007 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
4010 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4011 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4013 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4014 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4015 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4016 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4017 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4018 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4019 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4020 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
4022 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4028 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
4029 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
4031 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4032 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
4033 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4034 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4038 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
4039 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
4041 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4042 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4043 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
4044 get_next_msgs!($node)
4046 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4049 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4050 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
4055 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4056 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4057 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4058 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
4059 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4060 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
4061 } else if update_next_msgs {
4062 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
4064 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4066 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4067 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4074 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
4075 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4076 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4078 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4079 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4081 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4086 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
4087 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
4090 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
4092 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
4093 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4094 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4095 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4096 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4099 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4102 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4103 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4104 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4105 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4106 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4109 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4111 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4113 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4114 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4118 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4119 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4120 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4123 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4124 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
4125 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4127 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4128 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4129 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4131 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4132 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4137 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4138 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4139 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4140 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4141 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4142 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4143 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4144 // second-to-last node!
4145 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4148 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4149 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4150 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4152 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4153 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4154 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4155 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4156 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4157 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4158 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4159 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4161 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4164 assert!(events.is_empty());
4166 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4167 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4174 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4176 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4177 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4179 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
4180 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4181 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4188 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4189 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4192 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4193 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4194 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4195 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4196 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4198 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4199 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4201 for _ in 0..node_count {
4202 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4203 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4204 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4205 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4206 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4207 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4208 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4209 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4210 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4211 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4212 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4213 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4214 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
4215 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4216 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4224 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4225 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4226 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4227 let channel_id = chan.2;
4230 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4234 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4235 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4236 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4237 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4238 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4239 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4240 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4241 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4242 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4243 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4245 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4247 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4249 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4250 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4253 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4254 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4255 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4256 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4257 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4259 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4262 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4264 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4265 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4266 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4269 let payment_event = {
4270 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4271 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4272 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4274 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4275 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4277 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4278 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4279 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4280 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4281 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4284 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4285 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4286 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4287 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4290 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4291 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4292 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4293 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4294 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4295 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4296 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4299 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4300 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4301 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4302 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4303 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4304 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4305 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4308 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4309 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4310 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4313 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4314 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4317 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4320 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4321 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4323 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4324 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4327 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4332 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4333 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4334 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4335 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4336 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4337 let channel_id = chan.2;
4340 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4342 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4343 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4346 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4347 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4348 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4349 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4352 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4355 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4357 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4358 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4359 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4362 let payment_event = {
4363 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4364 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4365 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4367 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4368 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4370 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4371 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4372 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4373 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4374 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4377 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4380 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4384 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4385 let nodes = create_network(2);
4386 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4387 let channel_id = chan.2;
4390 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4391 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4392 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4393 // (3) update_fee ->
4394 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4395 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4396 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4397 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4398 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4399 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4400 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4401 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4402 // revoke_and_ack ->
4403 // B should send no response here
4404 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4405 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4406 // revoke_and_ack ->
4408 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4409 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4410 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4413 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4414 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4415 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4416 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4417 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4419 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4422 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4423 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4424 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4425 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4428 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4430 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4431 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4432 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4434 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4435 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4436 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4437 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4440 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4442 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4444 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4446 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4447 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4448 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4450 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4451 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4452 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4453 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4454 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4455 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4456 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4458 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4459 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4460 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4462 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4464 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4465 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4469 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4470 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4473 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4474 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4477 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4478 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4479 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4482 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4483 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4488 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4489 let nodes = create_network(2);
4490 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4491 let channel_id = chan.2;
4493 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4494 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
4495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4497 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4498 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4499 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4500 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4501 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4503 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4505 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4507 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4508 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4511 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4512 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4513 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4515 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4516 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4517 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4520 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4521 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4526 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
4527 let nodes = create_network(2);
4528 let channel_value = 1888;
4529 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
4530 let channel_id = chan.2;
4533 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
4534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4535 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4537 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4539 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
4541 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
4542 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
4544 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4545 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4547 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
4548 let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
4549 let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
4550 let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
4551 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
4552 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
4555 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
4556 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
4557 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
4558 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4560 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4562 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4564 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
4565 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
4566 //Should produce and error.
4567 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
4569 assert!(match err.err {
4570 "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
4574 //clear the message we could not handle
4575 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4579 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4580 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4581 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4582 let channel_id = chan.2;
4585 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4587 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4588 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4591 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4592 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4593 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4594 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4595 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4597 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4599 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4600 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4601 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4604 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4606 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4608 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4609 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4611 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4612 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4613 added_monitors.clear();
4615 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4616 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4617 // node[1] has nothing to do
4619 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4620 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4623 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4624 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4625 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4627 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4629 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4631 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4632 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4633 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4634 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4635 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4636 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4638 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4639 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4641 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4643 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4645 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4647 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4649 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4650 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4652 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4654 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4656 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4657 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4659 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4660 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4662 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4663 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4665 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4666 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4668 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4669 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4672 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4674 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4675 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4676 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4680 fn test_update_fee() {
4681 let nodes = create_network(2);
4682 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4683 let channel_id = chan.2;
4686 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4687 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4688 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4689 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4690 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4691 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4692 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4693 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4694 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4695 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4696 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4697 // revoke_and_ack ->
4699 // Create and deliver (1)...
4700 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4701 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4704 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4705 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4706 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4707 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4708 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4710 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4712 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4714 // Generate (2) and (3):
4715 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4716 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4720 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4721 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4722 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4724 // Create and deliver (4)...
4725 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4727 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4728 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4729 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4730 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4731 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4733 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4736 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4737 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4740 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4741 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4743 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4744 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4746 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4747 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4750 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4751 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4754 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4755 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4756 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4757 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4758 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4759 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4760 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4761 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4765 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4767 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4768 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4770 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4772 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4774 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4775 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4776 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4780 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4781 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4782 let nodes = create_network(2);
4783 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4784 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4785 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4786 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4788 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4789 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4790 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4791 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4792 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4794 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4795 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4796 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4797 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4798 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4799 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4801 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4802 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4806 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4807 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4808 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4809 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4810 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4811 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4812 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4814 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4816 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4817 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4818 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4819 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4820 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4822 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4823 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4825 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4826 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4827 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4828 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4829 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4831 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4833 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4834 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4835 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4836 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4837 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4838 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4839 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4841 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4842 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4844 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4845 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4846 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4847 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4848 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4849 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4850 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4852 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4853 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4855 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4856 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4858 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4861 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4862 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4863 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4864 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4865 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4866 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4868 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4870 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4871 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4872 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4873 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4874 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4878 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
4879 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
4880 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4881 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4882 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4884 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4885 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4886 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4888 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4889 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4890 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4891 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4892 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4893 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4895 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4896 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4897 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4898 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4900 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4901 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4903 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4904 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
4906 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4907 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4908 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4909 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4910 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4911 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4913 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4914 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4916 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4917 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4919 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest } => {
4920 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4921 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
4923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4926 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4927 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4928 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4929 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4930 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4931 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4932 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4934 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4936 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4937 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4938 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4939 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4940 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4944 fn update_fee_async_shutdown() {
4945 // Test update_fee works after shutdown start if messages are delivered out-of-order
4946 let nodes = create_network(2);
4947 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4949 let starting_feerate = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().get_feerate();
4950 nodes[0].node.update_fee(chan_1.2.clone(), starting_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4952 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4953 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4954 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4955 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4956 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4957 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_some());
4959 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4960 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4961 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4962 // Note that we don't actually test normative behavior here. The spec indicates we could
4963 // actually send a closing_signed here, but is kinda unclear and could possibly be amended
4964 // to require waiting on the full commitment dance before doing so (see
4965 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/499). In any case, to avoid
4966 // ambiguity, we should wait until after the full commitment dance to send closing_signed.
4967 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4969 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4970 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4972 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4973 let node_0_closing_signed = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, true);
4975 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4976 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), match node_0_closing_signed.unwrap() {
4977 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
4978 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4981 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4983 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4984 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4985 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4986 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4989 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
4990 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
4991 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
4992 let nodes = create_network(3);
4993 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4994 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4996 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4998 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4999 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5001 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
5002 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5004 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5008 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5009 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5011 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5012 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5013 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5014 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5016 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
5017 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5018 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5020 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
5021 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
5022 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5023 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5026 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5027 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5028 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
5030 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5032 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5033 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5035 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5037 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5038 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5039 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5040 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5041 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5042 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5043 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5045 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5046 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
5048 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5049 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5050 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5051 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5052 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5053 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5054 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5056 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5057 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5059 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5060 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
5062 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5065 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5067 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5068 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5069 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
5072 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5073 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5075 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5076 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5077 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5078 if recv_count == 0 {
5079 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
5080 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5082 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5083 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5084 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
5086 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5087 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5088 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5090 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5091 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5093 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5094 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5095 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
5097 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
5098 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5099 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5100 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5101 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5103 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5104 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5105 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5106 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5107 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5108 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5110 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5112 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5113 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5114 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5115 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5116 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5117 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5119 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5120 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5121 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5122 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5123 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5125 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5126 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5132 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5134 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5135 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5136 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5137 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5138 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5142 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5143 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5144 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5145 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5149 fn fake_network_test() {
5150 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5151 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5152 let nodes = create_network(4);
5154 // Create some initial channels
5155 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5156 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5157 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5159 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5160 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5161 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5162 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5163 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5165 // Send some more payments
5166 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5167 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5168 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5170 // Test failure packets
5171 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5172 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5174 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5175 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5177 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5178 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5179 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5180 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5181 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5182 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5183 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5185 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5186 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5187 hops.push(RouteHop {
5188 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5189 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5191 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5193 hops.push(RouteHop {
5194 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5195 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5197 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5199 hops.push(RouteHop {
5200 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5201 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5203 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5205 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5206 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5207 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5209 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5210 hops.push(RouteHop {
5211 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5212 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5214 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5216 hops.push(RouteHop {
5217 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5218 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5220 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5222 hops.push(RouteHop {
5223 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5224 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5226 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5228 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5229 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5230 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5232 // Claim the rebalances...
5233 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5234 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5236 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5237 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5239 // Send some payments across both channels
5240 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5241 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5242 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5244 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5246 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5248 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5249 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5250 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5252 // Close down the channels...
5253 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5254 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5255 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5256 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5257 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5261 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5262 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5263 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5264 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5266 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5267 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5268 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5269 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5270 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5271 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5273 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5275 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5276 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5278 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5279 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5281 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5282 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5283 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5286 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5287 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5288 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5290 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5291 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5292 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5294 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5295 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5297 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5299 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5300 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5301 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5303 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5304 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5305 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5306 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5307 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5308 res.push(tx.clone());
5313 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5314 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5317 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5319 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5320 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5321 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5322 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5323 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5324 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5326 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5328 res.push(tx.clone());
5332 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
5335 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5339 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5340 /// HTLC transaction.
5341 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5342 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5343 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5344 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5345 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5346 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5350 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5353 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5354 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5356 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5357 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5358 let mut found_prev = false;
5360 for tx in prev_txn {
5361 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5362 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5363 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5364 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5370 assert!(found_prev);
5372 let mut res = Vec::new();
5373 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5377 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5378 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5379 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5380 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5381 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5384 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5387 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5388 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5389 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5390 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5393 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5397 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5398 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5402 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5404 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5405 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5407 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5408 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5410 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5411 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5415 fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
5417 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5418 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5420 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5421 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5422 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5423 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5424 chan.get_value_stat()
5428 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5429 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5430 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5432 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5433 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5435 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5436 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5438 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5439 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5440 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5441 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5442 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5446 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5448 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5449 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5450 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5451 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5456 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5457 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5458 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5459 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5461 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5462 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5463 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5465 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5470 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5471 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5473 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5475 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5477 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5478 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5479 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5481 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5482 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5486 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5487 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5488 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5490 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5491 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5494 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5497 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5498 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5499 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5500 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5501 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5504 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5505 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5506 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5507 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5508 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5512 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5513 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5514 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5515 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5517 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5518 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5522 // adding pending output
5523 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5524 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5526 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5527 let payment_event_1 = {
5528 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5531 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5532 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5533 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5535 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5537 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5538 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5540 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5541 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5542 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5543 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5548 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5549 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5551 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5552 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5553 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5554 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5555 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5557 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5559 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5560 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5561 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5562 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5563 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5564 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5566 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5567 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5568 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5569 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5573 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5575 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5577 // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
5578 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5579 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5580 let channel_close_broadcast = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5581 assert_eq!(channel_close_broadcast.len(), 1);
5582 match channel_close_broadcast[0] {
5583 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5584 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5586 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5592 // split the rest to test holding cell
5593 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5594 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5596 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5597 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5600 // now see if they go through on both sides
5601 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5602 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5603 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5605 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5606 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5608 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5610 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5611 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5612 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5613 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5617 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5618 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5619 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5621 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5622 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5624 // flush the pending htlc
5625 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5626 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5629 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5631 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5633 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5634 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5635 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5638 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5639 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5642 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5644 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5645 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5646 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5648 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5649 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5651 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5652 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5653 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5654 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5655 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5656 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5658 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5659 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5660 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5661 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5663 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5664 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5666 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5667 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5669 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5670 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5671 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5673 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5676 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5677 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5678 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5680 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5683 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5684 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5685 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5687 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5688 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5689 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5690 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5692 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5693 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5697 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5698 do_channel_reserve_test(false);
5699 do_channel_reserve_test(true);
5703 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5704 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5705 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5706 let nodes = create_network(5);
5708 // Create some initial channels
5709 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5710 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5711 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5712 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5714 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5715 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5716 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5717 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5718 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5720 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5721 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5723 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5724 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5725 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5726 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5728 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5729 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5730 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5732 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5733 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5735 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5736 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5738 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5739 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5740 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5741 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5743 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5744 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5745 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5747 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5748 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5750 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5751 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5753 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5754 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5756 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5757 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5758 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5759 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5761 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5767 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5768 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5769 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5771 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5773 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5774 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5776 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5777 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5779 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5781 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5782 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5783 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5785 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5786 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5787 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5790 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5791 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5792 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5793 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5794 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5798 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5799 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5800 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5801 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5802 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5805 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5807 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5808 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5810 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5811 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5812 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5813 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5814 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5817 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5819 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5820 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5822 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5824 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5825 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5826 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5830 fn test_justice_tx() {
5831 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5833 let nodes = create_network(2);
5834 // Create some new channels:
5835 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5837 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5838 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5839 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5840 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5841 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5842 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5843 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5844 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5845 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5846 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5847 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5848 // Revoke the old state
5849 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5852 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5853 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5855 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5856 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5857 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5858 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5860 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5861 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5863 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5865 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5866 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5867 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5868 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5869 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5871 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5873 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5874 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5876 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5877 // Create some new channels:
5878 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5880 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5881 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5882 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5883 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5884 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5885 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5886 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5887 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5888 // Revoke the old state
5889 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5891 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5892 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5894 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5895 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5896 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5897 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5899 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5900 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5902 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5904 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5905 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5906 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5907 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5908 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5910 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5911 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5912 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5916 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5917 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5918 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5919 let nodes = create_network(2);
5920 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5921 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5922 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5923 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5924 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5925 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5926 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5927 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5929 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5930 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5931 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5932 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5933 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
5935 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5937 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5938 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
5940 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
5941 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5942 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5946 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
5947 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
5948 let nodes = create_network(2);
5950 // Create some new channel:
5951 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5953 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5954 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5955 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
5956 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5957 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5959 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5960 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5961 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
5962 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5963 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5964 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5965 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5966 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5967 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5969 //Revoke the old state
5970 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5973 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5975 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5977 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5978 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5979 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5981 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
5982 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5984 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
5986 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5987 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5988 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5989 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5990 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5991 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5992 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5993 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
5995 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
5996 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5997 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
5999 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6000 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
6001 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
6002 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
6003 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6004 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
6006 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6007 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6008 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6012 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
6013 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
6014 let nodes = create_network(2);
6016 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6018 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6019 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6020 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
6021 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
6022 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6023 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
6025 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6026 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6028 //Revoke the old state
6029 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6032 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6034 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6036 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6037 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6038 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6040 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
6041 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
6042 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
6043 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
6044 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
6045 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
6046 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
6048 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6049 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6050 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6052 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
6053 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6054 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6055 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6056 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6058 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6059 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6060 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6061 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6062 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6063 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6064 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
6065 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
6067 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
6068 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
6070 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
6071 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
6072 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
6073 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
6074 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6075 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6077 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6078 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6079 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6083 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
6084 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
6085 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
6086 let nodes = create_network(2);
6087 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6089 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
6090 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
6092 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6093 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6095 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6096 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6098 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6102 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6103 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
6105 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6106 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6109 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6110 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6112 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6113 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6115 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6119 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6120 // registering new transactions
6121 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6125 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6126 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6127 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6128 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6129 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6131 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6133 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6135 let mut payment_event = {
6136 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6139 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6140 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6141 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6144 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6145 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6147 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6148 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6150 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6151 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6154 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6155 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6157 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6158 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6159 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6160 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6163 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6164 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6166 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6168 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6169 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6170 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6172 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6173 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6174 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6176 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6177 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6179 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6183 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6184 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6185 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6186 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6187 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6191 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6192 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6194 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6195 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6196 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6198 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6199 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6201 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6204 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6206 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6207 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6208 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6210 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6211 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6212 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6213 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6214 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6215 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6216 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6218 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6222 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6223 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6224 let nodes = create_network(2);
6225 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6227 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6228 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6229 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6230 mem::drop(channel_state);
6232 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6233 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6234 headers.push(header.clone());
6236 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6237 headers.push(header.clone());
6239 while !headers.is_empty() {
6240 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6243 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6244 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6246 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6247 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6252 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6253 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6254 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6257 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6258 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6260 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6261 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6262 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6263 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6264 res.push(msg.clone());
6266 panic!("Unexpected event")
6274 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6275 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6277 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6279 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6281 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6287 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6288 let mut commitment_update = None;
6289 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6292 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6293 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6294 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6295 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6297 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6298 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6299 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6300 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6302 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6305 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6308 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6310 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6311 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6312 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6313 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6315 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6316 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6317 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6318 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6320 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6324 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6329 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6330 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6331 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6332 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6333 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6334 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6335 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6337 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
6338 for msg in reestablish_1 {
6339 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6340 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
6342 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6343 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6345 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
6348 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
6349 for msg in reestablish_2 {
6350 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6351 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
6353 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6354 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6356 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
6359 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
6360 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
6361 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
6363 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
6364 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6365 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6366 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6367 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6368 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6369 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6370 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6371 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6374 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6377 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6378 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6379 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6380 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6382 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6384 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6385 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6386 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6387 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
6389 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6391 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6392 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6393 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6394 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6395 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6397 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6398 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6400 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6401 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6404 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6405 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6407 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6408 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6409 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6410 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6411 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6412 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6413 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6416 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6420 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
6421 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6422 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6423 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6424 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6425 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6426 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6427 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6428 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6431 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6434 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6435 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6436 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6437 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6439 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6441 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6442 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6443 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6444 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
6446 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6447 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6448 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6449 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6450 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6452 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6453 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6455 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6456 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6459 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6460 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6462 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6463 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6464 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6465 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6466 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6467 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6468 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6471 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6477 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
6478 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
6479 let nodes = create_network(3);
6480 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6481 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6483 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6484 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6485 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6487 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6488 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6489 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
6490 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
6492 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6493 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6494 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6496 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6497 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6498 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6499 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6501 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6502 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6504 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
6505 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
6507 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
6509 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6510 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6512 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6513 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
6515 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6518 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
6519 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
6520 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
6522 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6526 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
6527 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
6530 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
6531 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
6532 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6533 if messages_delivered == 0 {
6534 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6535 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
6537 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6540 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6541 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6543 let payment_event = {
6544 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
6545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6547 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6548 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6549 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6551 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
6553 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6554 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
6556 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6557 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6558 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6560 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6562 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6563 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6564 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6567 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6568 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6569 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6570 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6573 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
6574 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6575 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6583 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6584 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6585 if messages_delivered < 3 {
6586 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
6587 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
6588 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6589 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6590 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6591 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6592 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6593 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6594 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6595 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6596 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6597 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6598 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
6599 // Everything was delivered...
6600 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6603 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6604 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6606 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6607 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6610 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6611 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6612 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6614 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6615 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6617 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6618 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6620 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6621 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6622 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6624 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6627 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6630 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6631 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6632 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
6633 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6634 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6635 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6636 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6637 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6638 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6639 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6640 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6642 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6645 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
6646 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
6648 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6649 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6651 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6652 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6654 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6657 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
6658 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
6659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6660 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6662 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6663 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6664 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6667 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6668 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6669 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6670 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6673 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6674 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6675 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6683 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6684 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6685 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6686 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6687 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
6688 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
6689 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6690 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6692 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6693 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6695 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6698 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
6699 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6700 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6701 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6702 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6703 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6704 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6705 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6706 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6707 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6708 // Everything was delivered...
6709 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6712 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6713 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6714 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6716 // Channel should still work fine...
6717 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
6718 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6722 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
6723 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
6724 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
6725 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
6726 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
6730 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
6731 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
6732 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
6733 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
6737 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
6738 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
6739 let nodes = create_network(2);
6740 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6742 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6743 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6745 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6746 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6747 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6749 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6750 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6752 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6755 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6757 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6758 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6760 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6761 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6762 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
6764 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6765 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6767 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6770 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6771 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6773 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6776 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6778 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
6779 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
6781 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6782 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6783 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
6787 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
6788 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
6789 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
6790 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6791 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6793 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6795 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6796 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6797 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6799 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
6800 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6802 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6803 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6805 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
6806 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6809 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6812 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6813 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6815 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6816 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6817 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6818 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6819 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6820 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6821 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6823 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6824 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6825 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6827 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6828 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6830 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6833 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6834 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6835 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6838 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6841 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6842 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6844 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6845 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6846 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6847 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6848 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6849 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6851 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6852 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6853 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6854 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6856 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6857 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6859 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6860 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6862 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6864 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6865 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6866 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6867 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6868 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6869 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6870 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6871 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6872 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6875 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
6876 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6877 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6878 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6879 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6880 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6881 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6884 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6885 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6886 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6887 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6888 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6889 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6890 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6893 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6894 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6895 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6898 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6899 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6900 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6903 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6904 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6907 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6908 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6910 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6911 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6914 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6915 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6917 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6918 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6920 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
6921 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6926 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6927 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6930 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6934 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
6935 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
6936 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6937 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6939 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6940 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6942 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6943 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6946 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6947 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6949 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6950 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6953 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6954 // PaymentFailed event
6956 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6959 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
6960 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
6961 // a disconnect in between
6962 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6963 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6965 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6966 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6968 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6969 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6972 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6973 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6974 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6977 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6978 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6979 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6982 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
6983 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6986 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6987 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6988 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
6989 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6990 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6991 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6993 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6995 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6996 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6998 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6999 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7000 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7002 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7005 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
7007 // Now set it to failed again...
7008 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7009 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7010 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7013 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7014 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7015 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7018 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7019 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7020 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7023 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
7024 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7025 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7028 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7029 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7031 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7032 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7035 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7036 // PaymentFailed event
7038 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7042 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
7043 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
7044 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
7047 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
7048 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
7050 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
7051 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
7052 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
7053 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
7054 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
7055 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
7056 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
7057 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
7058 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
7059 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
7060 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
7061 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
7062 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
7063 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
7064 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
7065 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
7066 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
7067 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7068 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7070 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7072 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7073 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7074 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7076 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7077 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7080 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7081 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7082 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7084 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
7085 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
7086 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7088 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7089 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7090 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
7091 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7092 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7093 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7094 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7095 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7096 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7097 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7099 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7100 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7101 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7102 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7104 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7105 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7107 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7110 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
7111 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7112 } else { panic!(); }
7115 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7117 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7120 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7121 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7122 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7125 // Now fix monitor updating...
7126 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7127 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7130 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7131 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7132 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7134 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7135 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7136 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7137 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7138 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7139 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7141 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7142 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7143 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7144 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7146 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7147 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7149 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7152 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7153 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7154 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7156 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7157 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7158 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7159 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7160 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7161 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7163 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7165 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7166 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7168 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7170 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7171 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7173 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7174 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7175 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7177 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7178 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7179 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7181 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7182 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7183 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7184 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7185 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7186 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7188 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7190 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7191 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7192 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7194 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7195 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7197 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7200 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7201 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7202 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7205 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7209 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7210 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7212 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7213 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7214 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7216 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7217 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7220 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7222 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7223 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7224 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7225 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7226 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7233 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7235 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7236 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7237 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7238 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7241 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7242 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7244 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7245 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7247 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7248 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7251 let as_commitment_update;
7252 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7254 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7255 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7256 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7257 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7258 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7259 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7260 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7261 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7265 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7266 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7267 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7268 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7269 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7270 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7271 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7272 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7276 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7279 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7280 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7282 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7283 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7285 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7286 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7288 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7291 handle_initial_raa!();
7293 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7294 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7296 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7297 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7299 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7300 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7303 handle_initial_raa!();
7305 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7306 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7308 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7309 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7311 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7312 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7314 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7319 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7320 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7322 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7323 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7325 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7326 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7330 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7331 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7332 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7335 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7336 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7337 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7340 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7341 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7344 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7345 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7348 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7350 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7351 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7353 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7354 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7355 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7357 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7360 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7364 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
7365 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
7366 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
7367 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
7368 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
7369 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
7370 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
7374 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
7375 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
7376 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
7377 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
7378 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
7382 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
7383 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
7384 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
7385 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
7386 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
7387 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
7391 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
7392 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
7393 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7394 let nodes = create_network(2);
7396 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7398 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7399 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7400 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7401 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7403 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7405 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7406 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7408 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7409 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7411 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
7413 let mut chan_announcement;
7415 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
7417 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
7418 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
7419 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
7420 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
7421 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
7422 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
7423 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
7424 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
7425 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7430 macro_rules! sign_msg {
7431 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
7432 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
7433 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7434 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7435 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
7436 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
7437 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
7438 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
7439 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
7440 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
7441 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
7442 contents: $unsigned_msg
7447 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7448 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7449 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
7450 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7452 // Configured with Network::Testnet
7453 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7454 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
7455 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7456 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7458 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7459 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
7460 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7461 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7464 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
7465 impl Writer for VecWriter {
7466 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
7467 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
7470 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
7471 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
7476 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7477 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7479 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7481 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7483 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7484 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7485 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7487 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7488 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7489 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7490 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7492 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7493 let config = UserConfig::new();
7494 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7495 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7496 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7497 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7498 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7499 default_config: config,
7501 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7502 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7503 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7504 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7505 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7506 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7509 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7511 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7512 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7513 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
7514 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
7515 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7518 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7519 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7520 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7521 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7523 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7524 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7525 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7526 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7528 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7529 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
7530 for node in nodes.iter() {
7531 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
7532 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
7533 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
7536 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7540 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7541 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7542 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7544 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7545 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7547 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7549 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7550 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7551 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7553 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7554 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7555 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7556 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7558 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7559 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7560 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7561 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7562 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7563 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7564 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7566 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7567 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7568 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7569 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7570 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7571 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7574 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7576 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7577 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7580 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7582 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
7583 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7587 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
7588 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
7589 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
7590 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7591 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
7592 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
7594 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
7596 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
7597 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7599 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
7600 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7601 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7602 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7604 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
7606 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
7607 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
7608 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7609 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
7610 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
7613 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7614 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
7615 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
7616 let mut read = &serialized[..];
7617 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7618 assert!(read.is_empty());
7619 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
7622 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7623 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7624 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7625 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7627 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7628 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7629 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7630 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7631 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7632 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
7634 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7636 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
7637 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7638 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7639 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
7640 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
7643 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
7644 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
7645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7647 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7649 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
7650 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7651 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7652 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
7653 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7655 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7656 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7657 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
7658 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
7659 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
7660 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
7663 macro_rules! check_dynamic_output_p2wsh {
7666 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7667 let mut txn = Vec::new();
7668 for event in events {
7670 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7671 for outp in outputs {
7673 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
7675 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7676 script_sig: Script::new(),
7677 sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
7678 witness: Vec::new(),
7681 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7682 value: output.value,
7684 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7690 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7691 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7692 let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
7693 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7694 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7695 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
7696 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
7699 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7703 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7711 macro_rules! check_dynamic_output_p2wpkh {
7714 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7715 let mut txn = Vec::new();
7716 for event in events {
7718 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7719 for outp in outputs {
7721 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
7723 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7724 script_sig: Script::new(),
7726 witness: Vec::new(),
7729 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7730 value: output.value,
7732 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7738 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7739 let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
7740 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
7741 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7742 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
7743 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7744 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7745 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
7748 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7752 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7760 macro_rules! check_static_output {
7761 ($event: expr, $node: expr, $event_idx: expr, $output_idx: expr, $der_idx: expr, $idx_node: expr) => {
7762 match $event[$event_idx] {
7763 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7764 match outputs[$output_idx] {
7765 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
7766 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7768 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7769 script_sig: Script::new(),
7771 witness: Vec::new(),
7774 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7775 value: output.value,
7777 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7781 output: vec![outp.clone()],
7784 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node[$idx_node].node_seed) {
7786 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
7788 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
7791 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
7794 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
7795 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
7796 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7797 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
7798 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7799 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7800 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
7803 _ => panic!("Unexpected event !"),
7806 _ => panic!("Unexpected event !"),
7812 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
7813 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
7814 let nodes = create_network(2);
7816 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
7817 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
7818 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7820 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7821 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7823 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7824 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7825 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
7826 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
7828 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7829 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
7830 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wsh!(nodes[1]);
7831 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7832 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7836 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
7837 // Same test as precedent, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
7838 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
7840 let nodes = create_network(2);
7842 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
7843 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
7844 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7846 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7847 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7849 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7850 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7851 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
7852 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
7854 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7855 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
7856 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7858 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7859 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7861 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wpkh!(nodes[1]);
7862 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
7863 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
7864 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7868 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
7869 let nodes = create_network(2);
7871 // Create some initial channels
7872 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7874 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7876 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7877 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
7878 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7880 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
7881 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7882 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7883 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7884 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
7885 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7887 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7891 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7892 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
7895 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
7896 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
7897 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
7898 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
7899 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
7900 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
7902 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7903 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 1, 1);
7904 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[0].clone());
7908 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
7909 let nodes = create_network(2);
7911 // Create some initial channels
7912 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7914 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7915 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7916 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7917 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7919 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7921 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7922 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7923 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7925 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7926 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7928 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7929 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7930 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
7931 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7932 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7934 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7935 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 1, 1);
7936 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[0].clone());
7940 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
7941 let nodes = create_network(2);
7943 // Create some initial channels
7944 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7946 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7947 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7948 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7949 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7951 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7953 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7954 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
7955 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7956 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7958 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7959 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7961 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7962 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7963 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7964 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
7965 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7967 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
7968 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7969 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7971 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7972 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7975 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7976 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
7977 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
7978 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
7980 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7981 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
7982 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 1, 1, 1, 1);
7983 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[3].clone());
7987 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
7988 let nodes = create_network(2);
7990 // Create some initial channels
7991 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7993 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7994 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7995 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7996 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7998 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8000 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8001 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
8002 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8003 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8005 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8006 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8008 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8010 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8011 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8012 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
8013 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
8015 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
8016 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8017 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8019 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8020 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8023 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8024 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
8025 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
8026 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
8028 let events = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8029 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
8030 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 1, 2, 1, 0);
8031 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[3].clone());
8035 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
8036 let nodes = create_network(2);
8038 // Create some initial channels
8039 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8041 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
8042 let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8043 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8044 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
8046 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
8047 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8049 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8050 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8051 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8053 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
8054 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8057 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8058 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8060 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8061 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8062 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
8063 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8065 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8066 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wsh!(nodes[1]);
8067 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8068 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8072 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
8073 let nodes = create_network(2);
8075 // Create some initial channels
8076 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8078 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
8079 let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8080 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8081 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
8083 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8084 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8085 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
8086 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8088 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8089 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8091 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8092 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8093 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
8094 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8096 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8097 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wsh!(nodes[0]);
8098 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
8099 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
8100 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
8101 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8102 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8106 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
8107 let nodes = create_network(2);
8109 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8111 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
8112 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
8114 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8115 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8116 let events = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8117 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 2, 0);
8118 check_spends!(spend_tx, closing_tx.clone());
8120 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8121 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8122 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 2, 1);
8123 check_spends!(spend_tx, closing_tx);