1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
35 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
36 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
37 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use util::{byte_utils, events, rng};
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
40 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
41 use util::logger::Logger;
42 use util::errors::APIError;
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
64 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
65 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
66 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
67 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
68 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
69 short_channel_id: u64,
70 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
71 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
74 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
75 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
76 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
77 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
80 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
83 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
87 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
88 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
89 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
90 short_channel_id: u64,
92 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
95 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
96 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
97 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
98 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
101 session_priv: SecretKey,
102 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
103 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
104 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
109 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
110 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
111 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
112 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
113 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
121 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
129 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
130 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
131 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
132 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
133 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
134 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
136 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
138 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
139 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
140 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
141 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
142 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
144 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
145 err: msgs::HandleError,
146 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
148 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
150 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
154 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
155 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
157 data: err.to_string()
161 shutdown_finish: None,
165 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
169 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
171 shutdown_finish: None,
175 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
176 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
179 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
183 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
184 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
186 data: err.to_string()
190 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
194 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
197 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
199 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
201 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
203 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
204 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
206 data: msg.to_string()
211 shutdown_finish: None,
216 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
217 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
218 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
219 /// probably increase this significantly.
220 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
222 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
224 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
226 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
230 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
234 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
235 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
236 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
237 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
238 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
239 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
240 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
242 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
246 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
247 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
248 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
249 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
250 pub(super) next_forward: Instant,
251 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
252 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
253 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
254 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
255 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
256 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
257 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
258 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
259 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
261 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
262 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
263 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
264 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
266 pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
267 pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
268 pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
269 pub(super) next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
270 pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
271 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
272 pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
275 pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
277 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
278 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
279 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
280 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
281 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
282 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
287 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
288 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
290 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
291 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
293 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
294 /// to individual Channels.
296 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
297 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
298 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
299 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
301 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
302 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
303 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
304 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
305 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
306 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
307 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
309 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
310 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
311 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
312 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
314 pub struct ChannelManager {
315 default_configuration: UserConfig,
316 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
317 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
318 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
319 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
320 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
323 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
325 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
326 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
327 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
330 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
332 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
333 our_network_key: SecretKey,
335 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
336 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
337 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
338 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
339 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
341 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
346 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
347 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
348 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
349 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
350 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
351 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
352 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
354 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS +
355 // HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
356 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it
357 // backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel
358 // on-chain to time out the HTLC.
361 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
363 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
364 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
367 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
369 macro_rules! secp_call {
370 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
373 Err(_) => return Err($err),
378 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
379 pub struct ChannelDetails {
380 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
381 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
382 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
383 /// lifetime of the channel.
384 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
385 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
386 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
387 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
388 /// The node_id of our counterparty
389 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
390 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
391 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
392 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
394 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
395 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
396 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
397 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
398 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
399 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
400 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
401 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
402 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
403 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
404 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
405 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
406 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
410 macro_rules! handle_error {
411 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
414 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
415 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
416 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
417 if let Some(update) = update_option {
418 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
419 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
430 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
431 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
434 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
435 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
437 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
438 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
439 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
440 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
441 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
443 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
449 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
450 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
453 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
454 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
456 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
457 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
458 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
459 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
460 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
462 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
468 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
469 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
470 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
472 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
474 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
475 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
476 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
477 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
478 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
480 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
481 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
482 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
483 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
484 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
485 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
486 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
487 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
488 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
489 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
492 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
493 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
494 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
495 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
497 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
498 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
500 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
501 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
503 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
504 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
505 if !$resend_commitment {
506 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
509 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
511 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
512 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
518 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
519 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
520 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
522 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
523 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
527 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
528 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
529 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
530 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
531 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
534 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
539 impl ChannelManager {
540 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
542 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
543 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
545 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
547 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
548 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
549 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
551 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
552 default_configuration: config.clone(),
553 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
554 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
555 monitor: monitor.clone(),
559 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
560 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
563 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
564 by_id: HashMap::new(),
565 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
566 next_forward: Instant::now(),
567 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
568 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
569 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
571 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
573 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
574 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
580 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
581 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
585 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
587 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
588 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
589 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
590 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
592 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
593 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
595 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
596 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
597 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
598 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
599 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
602 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
603 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
605 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
606 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
607 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
608 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
609 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
610 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
612 panic!("RNG is bad???");
615 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
617 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
618 node_id: their_network_key,
624 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
625 /// more information.
626 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
627 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
628 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
629 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
630 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
631 res.push(ChannelDetails {
632 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
633 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
634 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
635 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
636 inbound_capacity_msat,
637 outbound_capacity_msat,
638 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
639 is_live: channel.is_live(),
645 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
646 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
648 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
649 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
650 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
651 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
652 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
653 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
654 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
655 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
656 // really wanted anyway.
657 if channel.is_live() {
658 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
659 res.push(ChannelDetails {
660 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
661 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
662 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
663 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
664 inbound_capacity_msat,
665 outbound_capacity_msat,
666 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
674 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
675 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
676 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
678 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
679 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
680 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
682 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
683 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
684 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
685 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
686 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
687 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
688 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
689 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
692 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
693 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
694 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
696 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
697 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
699 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
702 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
703 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
705 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
706 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
711 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
712 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
713 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
722 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
723 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
724 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
725 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
726 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
728 for tx in local_txn {
729 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
733 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
734 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
735 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
736 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
739 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
740 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
741 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
742 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
743 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
750 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
751 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
752 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
753 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
754 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
760 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
761 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
762 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
763 for chan in self.list_channels() {
764 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
768 const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
769 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
770 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
771 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
773 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
774 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
775 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
776 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
777 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
778 failure_code: $err_code,
779 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
784 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
785 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
788 let shared_secret = {
789 let mut arr = [0; 32];
790 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
793 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
795 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
796 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
797 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
798 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
799 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
800 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
801 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
802 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
805 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
806 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
807 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
808 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
809 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
812 let mut channel_state = None;
813 macro_rules! return_err {
814 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
816 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
817 if channel_state.is_none() {
818 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
820 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
821 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
822 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
823 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
824 })), channel_state.unwrap());
829 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
830 let next_hop_data = {
831 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
832 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
833 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
835 let error_code = match err {
836 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
837 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
839 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
845 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
847 // final_expiry_too_soon
848 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
849 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
851 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
852 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
853 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
855 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
856 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
857 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
860 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
861 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
862 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
863 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
865 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
867 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
869 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
870 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
871 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
874 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
875 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
876 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
878 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
880 let blinding_factor = {
881 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
882 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
883 sha.input(&shared_secret);
884 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
887 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
889 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
891 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
894 hop_data: new_packet_data,
895 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
898 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
899 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
900 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
901 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
902 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
903 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
904 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
908 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
909 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
910 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
911 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
912 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
913 None => { // unknown_next_peer
914 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
916 Some(id) => id.clone(),
918 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
919 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
921 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
922 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
923 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
924 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
925 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
926 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
927 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
929 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
930 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
932 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
933 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
934 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
936 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
937 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
939 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
940 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
941 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
942 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
944 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
945 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
950 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
951 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
952 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
953 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
955 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
956 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
958 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
959 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
961 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
963 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
968 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
971 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
972 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
973 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
974 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
975 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
979 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
981 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
982 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
983 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
984 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
985 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
986 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
987 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
988 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
989 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
990 excess_data: Vec::new(),
993 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
994 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
996 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1002 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1004 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1005 /// fields for more info.
1007 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1008 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1009 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1010 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1011 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1012 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1014 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1016 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1017 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1018 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1019 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1020 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1021 /// relevant updates.
1023 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1024 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1025 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1026 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1027 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1028 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1029 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1030 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1032 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1033 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1034 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1035 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1039 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1041 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1043 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1044 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1045 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1046 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1048 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1050 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1051 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1053 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1054 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1055 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1058 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1059 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1061 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1062 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1064 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1065 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1067 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1068 route: route.clone(),
1069 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1070 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1071 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1073 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1074 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1075 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1076 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1077 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1078 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1079 // something else in case we will resend later!
1080 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1083 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1084 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1085 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1086 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1087 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1088 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1089 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1097 } else { unreachable!(); }
1101 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1102 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1104 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1106 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1107 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1108 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1109 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1113 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1118 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1120 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1121 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1123 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1125 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1126 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1127 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1128 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1130 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1132 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1133 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1135 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1136 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1137 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1138 } else { unreachable!(); })
1144 match handle_error!(self, res) {
1145 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1146 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1149 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1150 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1151 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1152 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1159 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1160 // lock before add_update_monitor
1161 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1165 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1166 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1167 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1170 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1171 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1172 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1174 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1180 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1181 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1183 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1185 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1187 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1188 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1190 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1191 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1192 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1193 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1194 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1198 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1200 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1201 /// Will likely generate further events.
1202 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1203 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1205 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1206 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1207 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1209 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1210 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1212 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1216 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1217 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1218 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1219 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1221 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1222 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1223 match forward_info {
1224 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1225 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1226 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1227 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1228 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1230 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1232 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1233 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1234 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1235 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1236 // problem, not ours.
1243 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1244 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1245 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1246 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1247 match forward_info {
1248 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1249 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1250 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1251 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1252 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1253 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1255 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1257 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1258 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1260 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1262 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1263 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1268 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1270 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1271 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1272 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1273 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1274 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1275 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1276 // this channel currently :/.
1282 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1283 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1284 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1286 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1287 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1289 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1291 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1292 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1293 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1296 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1298 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1299 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1300 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1301 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1302 // messages when we can.
1303 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1304 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1305 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1312 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1313 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1316 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1317 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1319 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1323 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1324 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1327 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1328 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1329 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1330 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1331 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1332 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1333 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1335 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1343 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1344 match forward_info {
1345 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1346 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1347 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1348 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1349 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1351 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1352 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1353 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1355 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1356 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1357 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1360 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1361 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1369 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1371 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1372 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1376 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1377 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1380 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1382 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1383 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1384 node_id: their_node_id,
1392 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1393 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1394 events.append(&mut new_events);
1397 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1398 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1399 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1400 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1401 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1402 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1403 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1405 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1406 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1407 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1408 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1409 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1410 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1411 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1412 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1418 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1419 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1420 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1421 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1422 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1423 /// still-available channels.
1424 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1425 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1426 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1427 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1430 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1431 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1432 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1433 match &onion_error {
1434 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1436 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1438 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1439 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1440 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1441 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1442 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1443 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1444 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1449 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1450 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1451 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1452 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1454 error_code: onion_error_code
1458 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1462 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1463 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1464 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1465 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1467 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1468 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1469 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1470 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1471 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1472 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1474 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1480 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1481 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1482 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1483 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1484 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1485 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1487 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1488 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1489 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1493 let mut forward_event = None;
1494 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1495 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1496 channel_state_lock.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1498 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1499 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1500 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1502 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1503 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1506 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1507 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1508 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1509 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1510 time_forwardable: time
1517 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1518 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1519 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1521 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1522 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1523 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1525 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1527 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1528 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1529 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1530 // TODO: We should require the user specify the expected amount so that we can claim
1531 // only payments for the correct amount, and reject payments for incorrect amounts
1532 // (which are probably middle nodes probing to break our privacy).
1533 for (_, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1534 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1535 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1540 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1541 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1543 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1544 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1545 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1546 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1550 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1551 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1552 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1554 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1555 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1557 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1558 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1559 // why it's missing.
1564 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1565 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1566 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1567 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1568 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1569 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1570 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1571 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1573 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1577 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1578 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1579 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1580 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1581 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1582 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1583 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1584 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1592 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1593 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1594 //TODO: Do something with e?
1598 } else { unreachable!(); }
1604 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1607 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1609 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1610 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1611 node_id: their_node_id,
1619 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1620 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1621 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1624 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1625 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1627 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1628 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1629 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1630 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1631 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1634 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1635 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1636 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1637 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1638 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1639 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1640 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1641 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1643 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1644 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1645 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1646 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1647 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1648 // on-chain confirmations.
1649 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1650 // should be written.
1651 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1652 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1654 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1655 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1656 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1662 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1665 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1666 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1667 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1669 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1671 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1672 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1673 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1674 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1679 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1680 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1681 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1682 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1683 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1688 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1692 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1703 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1704 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1706 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1708 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1709 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1713 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1714 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1715 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1718 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1719 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1720 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1721 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1722 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1723 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1725 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1726 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1727 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1729 entry.insert(channel);
1735 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1736 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1737 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1738 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1739 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1740 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1741 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1742 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1743 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1745 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1746 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1748 //TODO: same as above
1749 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1752 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1753 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1754 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1755 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1756 output_script: output_script,
1757 user_channel_id: user_id,
1762 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1763 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1764 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1765 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1766 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1767 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1768 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1769 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1770 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1772 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1774 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1777 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1778 // lock before add_update_monitor
1779 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1782 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1783 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1784 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1785 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1786 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1788 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1789 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1790 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1799 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1800 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1801 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1802 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1803 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1804 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1805 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1806 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1807 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1809 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1810 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1813 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1815 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1818 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1819 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1820 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1821 user_channel_id: user_id,
1826 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1827 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1828 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1829 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1830 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1831 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1832 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1833 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1835 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1836 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1837 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1838 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1839 msg: announcement_sigs,
1844 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1848 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1849 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1850 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1851 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1853 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1854 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1855 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1856 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1857 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1859 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1860 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1861 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1862 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1866 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1867 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1868 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1872 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1873 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1874 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1876 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1877 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1879 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1882 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1883 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1885 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1886 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1887 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1888 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1896 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1897 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1898 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1899 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1900 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1901 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1902 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1903 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1904 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1906 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1907 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1908 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1909 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1914 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1915 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1916 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1917 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1918 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1919 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1920 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1922 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1923 } else { (tx, None) }
1925 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1928 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1929 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1931 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1932 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1933 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1934 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1942 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1943 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1944 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1945 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1947 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1948 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1949 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1950 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1952 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1953 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1955 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1956 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1957 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1958 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1959 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1961 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
1962 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1963 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1964 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1965 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1966 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
1967 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1968 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1969 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1970 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
1971 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
1972 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
1973 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
1974 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
1976 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
1977 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1978 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
1979 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1983 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
1984 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
1985 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
1986 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
1987 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
1988 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
1993 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
1995 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2000 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2001 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2003 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2004 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2005 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2006 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2007 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2008 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2010 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2012 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2015 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2019 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2020 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2021 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2022 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2023 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2024 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2025 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2026 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2028 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2030 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2035 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2036 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2037 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2038 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2039 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2040 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2041 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2042 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2044 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2045 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2047 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2050 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2054 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2055 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2056 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2057 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2058 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2059 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2060 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2061 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2063 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2064 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2065 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2066 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2067 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2069 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2070 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2071 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2073 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2074 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2075 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2076 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2077 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2078 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2079 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2080 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2082 commitment_signed: msg,
2086 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2087 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2088 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2094 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2099 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2100 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2101 let mut forward_event = None;
2102 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2103 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2104 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2105 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2106 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2108 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2109 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2110 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2111 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2113 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2114 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2119 match forward_event {
2121 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2122 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2123 time_forwardable: time
2131 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2132 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2133 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2134 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2135 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2136 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2137 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2138 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2139 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2141 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2142 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2143 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2144 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2145 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2146 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2147 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2149 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2152 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2153 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2154 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2158 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2159 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2160 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2164 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2166 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2169 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2170 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2172 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2177 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2178 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2179 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2180 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2181 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2182 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2183 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2184 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2186 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2188 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2193 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2194 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2195 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2197 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2198 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2199 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2200 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2202 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2203 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2206 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2207 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2208 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2210 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2211 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2212 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2213 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2214 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2217 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2219 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2220 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2221 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2222 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2223 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2224 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2225 contents: announcement,
2227 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2230 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2235 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2236 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2237 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2239 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2240 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2241 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2242 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2244 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2245 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2246 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2247 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2248 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2249 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2250 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2251 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2252 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2254 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2255 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2257 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2258 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2261 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2262 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2263 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2267 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2268 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2269 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2270 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2275 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2276 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2277 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2278 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2284 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2288 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2293 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2294 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2295 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2301 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2305 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2306 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2307 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2308 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2310 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2311 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2313 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2314 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2315 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2317 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2318 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2319 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2320 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2321 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2323 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2324 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2326 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2327 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2329 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2330 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2331 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2333 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2336 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2337 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2338 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2339 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2340 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2341 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2342 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2343 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2353 match handle_error!(self, err) {
2354 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2356 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2358 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2359 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2360 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2361 node_id: their_node_id,
2365 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2371 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2372 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2373 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2374 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2375 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2377 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2378 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2379 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2380 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2381 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2383 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2384 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2389 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2390 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2391 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2396 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2397 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2398 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2399 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2400 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2402 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2403 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2404 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2405 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2406 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2408 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2409 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2414 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2415 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2416 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2421 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2422 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2423 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2424 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2425 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2426 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2428 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2429 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2430 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2431 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2432 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2433 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2434 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2435 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2436 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2437 msg: funding_locked,
2439 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2440 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2441 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2442 msg: announcement_sigs,
2445 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2446 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2447 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2448 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2449 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2453 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2454 for tx in txn_matched {
2455 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2456 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2457 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2458 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2459 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2461 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2462 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2463 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2464 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2465 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2466 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2475 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2476 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2477 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2479 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2480 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2481 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2482 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2483 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2484 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2485 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2494 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2495 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2497 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2498 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2501 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2502 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2503 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2504 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2506 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2507 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2508 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2509 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2510 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2511 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2512 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2513 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2515 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2516 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2517 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2527 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2528 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2530 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2531 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2535 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2536 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2537 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2538 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2539 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg))
2542 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2543 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2544 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg))
2547 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2548 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2549 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg))
2552 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2553 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2554 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2557 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2558 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2559 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg))
2562 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2563 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2564 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg))
2567 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2568 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2569 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2572 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2573 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2574 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2577 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2578 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2579 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2582 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2583 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2584 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2587 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2588 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2589 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2592 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2593 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2594 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2597 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2598 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2599 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg))
2602 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2603 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2604 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg))
2607 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2608 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2609 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg))
2612 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2613 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2614 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg))
2617 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2618 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2619 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2620 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2622 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2623 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2624 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2625 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2626 if no_connection_possible {
2627 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2628 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2629 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2630 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2631 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2633 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2634 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2635 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2645 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2646 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2647 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2648 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2649 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2650 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2651 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2652 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2654 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2655 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2656 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2664 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2666 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2667 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2668 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2669 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2670 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2671 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2672 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2673 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2674 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2675 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2676 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2677 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2678 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2679 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2680 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2684 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2685 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2687 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2688 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2689 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2694 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2695 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2697 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2698 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2699 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2700 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2701 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2702 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2703 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2704 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2705 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2706 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2710 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2711 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2712 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2718 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2721 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2722 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2724 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2725 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2726 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2727 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2731 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2736 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2737 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2739 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2740 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2741 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
2742 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2743 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2744 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2745 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2746 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2751 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2752 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2753 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2754 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2755 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2756 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2757 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2758 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2759 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2764 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2765 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2767 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2769 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2771 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2773 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2780 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2781 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2782 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2783 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2784 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2785 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2790 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2791 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2793 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2795 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2797 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2799 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2806 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2807 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2808 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2809 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2810 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2811 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2816 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2819 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2822 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2823 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2825 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2827 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2829 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2831 route.write(writer)?;
2832 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2833 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2840 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2841 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2842 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2843 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2844 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2845 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2846 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2847 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2849 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2854 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2855 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2857 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2861 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2863 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2864 data.write(writer)?;
2871 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
2872 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
2873 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2874 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
2875 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2876 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
2877 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
2879 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2884 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
2885 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2887 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
2889 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2890 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2891 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2893 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2895 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2896 err_packet.write(writer)?;
2903 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
2904 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
2905 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2906 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
2907 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2908 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2909 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
2911 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
2912 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2913 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2915 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2920 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
2921 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2922 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
2924 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2925 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2927 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
2928 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
2929 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
2931 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2932 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
2933 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2934 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2935 unfunded_channels += 1;
2938 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
2939 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2940 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2941 channel.write(writer)?;
2945 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2946 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
2947 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2948 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2949 for forward in pending_forwards {
2950 forward.write(writer)?;
2954 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2955 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
2956 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2957 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2958 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
2959 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
2960 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
2968 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
2970 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
2972 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
2973 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
2974 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
2975 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
2976 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
2977 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
2978 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
2979 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
2980 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
2981 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
2982 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
2983 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
2984 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
2985 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
2986 /// deserialization.
2987 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
2989 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2991 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
2992 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
2993 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2995 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
2996 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
2997 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
2998 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
2999 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3001 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3002 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3003 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3004 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3005 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3006 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3007 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3008 /// deserialization.
3009 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3010 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3011 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3012 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3014 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3015 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3017 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3018 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3019 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3020 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3022 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3024 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3027 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3028 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3029 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3030 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3031 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3032 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3035 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3036 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3037 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3039 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3041 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3042 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3043 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3044 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3045 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3046 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3047 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3048 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3051 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3052 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3053 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3054 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3055 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3056 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3057 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3058 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3059 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3061 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3062 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3064 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3067 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3071 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3072 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3073 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3077 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3078 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3079 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3080 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3081 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3082 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3083 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3084 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3086 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3089 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3090 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3091 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3092 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3093 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3094 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3095 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3096 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3098 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3101 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3103 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3104 monitor: args.monitor,
3105 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3106 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3108 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3109 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3110 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3112 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3115 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3118 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3120 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3122 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3123 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3124 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3125 logger: args.logger,
3126 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3129 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3130 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3131 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3132 //connection or two.
3135 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))