Pull out the HTLC forwarding loop into a function
[rust-lightning] / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
2 //!
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
6 //!
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
10
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
17
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
21 use secp256k1;
22
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelKeys};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs;
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HandleError, RAACommitmentOrder};
30 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
31 use util::sha2::Sha256;
32 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
33 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
34 use util::logger::Logger;
35 use util::errors::APIError;
36
37 use crypto;
38 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
39 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
40 use crypto::digest::Digest;
41 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
42
43 use std::{ptr, mem};
44 use std::collections::HashMap;
45 use std::collections::hash_map;
46 use std::io::Cursor;
47 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
50
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
52 ///
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
56 ///
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
64         use ln::msgs;
65         use ln::router::Route;
66         use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
67         use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
68
69         /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
70         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71         pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
72                 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
73                 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
74                 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
75                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
76                 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
77                 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
78         }
79
80         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81         pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
82                 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
83                 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
84         }
85
86         /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
87         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88         pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
89                 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
90                 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
91         }
92
93         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94         #[derive(Clone)]
95         pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
96                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
97                 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
98                 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
99         }
100
101         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102         #[derive(Clone)]
103         pub enum HTLCSource {
104                 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
105                 OutboundRoute {
106                         route: Route,
107                         session_priv: SecretKey,
108                         /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
109                         /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
110                         first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
111                 },
112         }
113         #[cfg(test)]
114         impl HTLCSource {
115                 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
116                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
117                                 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
118                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
119                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
120                         }
121                 }
122         }
123
124         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125         pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
126                 ErrorPacket {
127                         err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
128                 },
129                 Reason {
130                         failure_code: u16,
131                         data: Vec<u8>,
132                 }
133         }
134 }
135 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
136
137 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
138         err: msgs::HandleError,
139         needs_channel_force_close: bool,
140 }
141 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
142         #[inline]
143         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
144                 Self {
145                         err: HandleError {
146                                 err,
147                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
148                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
149                                                 channel_id,
150                                                 data: err.to_string()
151                                         },
152                                 }),
153                         },
154                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
155                 }
156         }
157         #[inline]
158         fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
159                 Self {
160                         err: HandleError {
161                                 err,
162                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
163                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
164                                                 channel_id,
165                                                 data: err.to_string()
166                                         },
167                                 }),
168                         },
169                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
170                 }
171         }
172         #[inline]
173         fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
174                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
175         }
176         #[inline]
177         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
178                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
179         }
180         #[inline]
181         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
182                 Self {
183                         err: match err {
184                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
185                                         err: msg,
186                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
187                                 },
188                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
189                                         err: msg,
190                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
191                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
192                                                         channel_id,
193                                                         data: msg.to_string()
194                                                 },
195                                         }),
196                                 },
197                         },
198                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
199                 }
200         }
201         #[inline]
202         fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
203                 Self {
204                         err: match err {
205                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
206                                         err: msg,
207                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
208                                 },
209                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
210                                         err: msg,
211                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
212                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
213                                                         channel_id,
214                                                         data: msg.to_string()
215                                                 },
216                                         }),
217                                 },
218                         },
219                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
220                 }
221         }
222 }
223
224 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
225 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
226 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
227 /// probably increase this significantly.
228 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
229
230 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
231         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
232         prev_htlc_id: u64,
233         forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
234 }
235
236 struct ChannelHolder {
237         by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
238         short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
239         next_forward: Instant,
240         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
241         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
242         /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
243         /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
244         forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
245         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
246         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
247         /// go to read them!
248         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
249 }
250 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
251         by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
252         short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
253         next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
254         forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
255         claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
256 }
257 impl ChannelHolder {
258         fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
259                 MutChannelHolder {
260                         by_id: &mut self.by_id,
261                         short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
262                         next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
263                         forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
264                         claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
265                 }
266         }
267 }
268
269 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
270 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
271
272 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
273 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
274 ///
275 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
276 /// to individual Channels.
277 pub struct ChannelManager {
278         genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
279         fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
280         monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
281         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
282         tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
283
284         announce_channels_publicly: bool,
285         fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
286         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
287         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
288
289         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
290         our_network_key: SecretKey,
291
292         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
293
294         logger: Arc<Logger>,
295 }
296
297 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
298 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
299 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
300 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
301 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
302 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
303 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
304
305 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
306 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
307 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
308 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
309 #[deny(const_err)]
310 #[allow(dead_code)]
311 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
312
313 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
314 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
315 #[deny(const_err)]
316 #[allow(dead_code)]
317 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
318
319 macro_rules! secp_call {
320         ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
321                 match $res {
322                         Ok(key) => key,
323                         Err(_) => return Err($err),
324                 }
325         };
326 }
327
328 struct OnionKeys {
329         #[cfg(test)]
330         shared_secret: SharedSecret,
331         #[cfg(test)]
332         blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
333         ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
334         rho: [u8; 32],
335         mu: [u8; 32],
336 }
337
338 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
339 pub struct ChannelDetails {
340         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
341         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
342         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
343         /// lifetime of the channel.
344         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
345         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
346         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
347         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
348         /// The node_id of our counterparty
349         pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
350         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
351         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
352         /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
353         pub user_id: u64,
354 }
355
356 impl ChannelManager {
357         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
358         ///
359         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
360         /// ChannelMessageHandler.
361         ///
362         /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
363         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
364         ///
365         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
366         pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
367                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
368
369                 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
370                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
371                         fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
372                         monitor: monitor.clone(),
373                         chain_monitor,
374                         tx_broadcaster,
375
376                         announce_channels_publicly,
377                         fee_proportional_millionths,
378                         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
379                         secp_ctx,
380
381                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
382                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
383                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
384                                 next_forward: Instant::now(),
385                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
386                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
387                         }),
388                         our_network_key,
389
390                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
391
392                         logger,
393                 });
394                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
395                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
396                 Ok(res)
397         }
398
399         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
400         ///
401         /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
402         /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
403         /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
404         /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
405         ///
406         /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
407         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
408         ///
409         /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
410         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
411                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
412                         ChannelKeys {
413                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
414                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
415                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
416                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
417                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
418                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
419                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
420                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
421                         }
422                 } else {
423                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
424                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
425                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
426                                 Ok(key) => key,
427                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
428                         }
429                 };
430
431                 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
432                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
433                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
434                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
435                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
436                                 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
437                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
438                                 } else {
439                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
440                                 }
441                         },
442                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
443                 }
444
445                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
446                 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
447                         node_id: their_network_key,
448                         msg: res,
449                 });
450                 Ok(())
451         }
452
453         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
454         /// more information.
455         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
456                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
457                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
458                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
459                         res.push(ChannelDetails {
460                                 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
461                                 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
462                                 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
463                                 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
464                                 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
465                         });
466                 }
467                 res
468         }
469
470         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
471         /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
472         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
473                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
474                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
475                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
476                         // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
477                         // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
478                         // really wanted anyway.
479                         if channel.is_live() {
480                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
481                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
482                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
483                                         remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
484                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
485                                         user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
486                                 });
487                         }
488                 }
489                 res
490         }
491
492         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
493         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
494         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
495         ///
496         /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
497         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
498                 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
499                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
500                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
501                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
502                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
503                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
504                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
505                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
506                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
507                                                 }
508                                                 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
509                                         } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
510                                 },
511                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
512                         }
513                 };
514                 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
515                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
516                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
517                 }
518                 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
519                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
520                                 Some(update)
521                         } else { None }
522                 } else { None };
523
524                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
525                 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
526                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
527                                 msg: update
528                         });
529                 }
530                 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
531                         node_id,
532                         msg: res.0
533                 });
534
535                 Ok(())
536         }
537
538         #[inline]
539         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
540                 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
541                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
542                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
543                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
544                 }
545                 for tx in local_txn {
546                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
547                 }
548                 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
549                 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
550                 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
551                 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
552                 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
553                 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
554                 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
555         }
556
557         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
558         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
559         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
560                 let mut chan = {
561                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
562                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
563                         if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
564                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
565                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
566                                 }
567                                 chan
568                         } else {
569                                 return;
570                         }
571                 };
572                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
573                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
574                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
575                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
576                                 msg: update
577                         });
578                 }
579         }
580
581         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
582         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
583         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
584                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
585                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
586                 }
587         }
588
589         #[inline]
590         fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
591                 ({
592                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
593                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
594                         let mut res = [0; 32];
595                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
596                         res
597                 },
598                 {
599                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
600                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
601                         let mut res = [0; 32];
602                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
603                         res
604                 })
605         }
606
607         #[inline]
608         fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
609                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
610                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
611                 let mut res = [0; 32];
612                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
613                 res
614         }
615
616         #[inline]
617         fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
618                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
619                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
620                 let mut res = [0; 32];
621                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
622                 res
623         }
624
625         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
626         #[inline]
627         fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
628                 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
629                 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
630
631                 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
632                         let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
633
634                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
635                         sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
636                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
637                         let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
638                         sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
639
640                         let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
641
642                         blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
643                         blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
644
645                         callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
646                 }
647
648                 Ok(())
649         }
650
651         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
652         fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
653                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
654
655                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
656                         let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
657
658                         res.push(OnionKeys {
659                                 #[cfg(test)]
660                                 shared_secret,
661                                 #[cfg(test)]
662                                 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
663                                 ephemeral_pubkey,
664                                 rho,
665                                 mu,
666                         });
667                 })?;
668
669                 Ok(res)
670         }
671
672         /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
673         fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
674                 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
675                 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
676                 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
677                 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
678                 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
679                 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
680
681                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
682                         // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
683                         // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
684                         // the intended recipient).
685                         let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
686                         let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
687                         res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
688                                 realm: 0,
689                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
690                                         short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
691                                         amt_to_forward: value_msat,
692                                         outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
693                                 },
694                                 hmac: [0; 32],
695                         };
696                         cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
697                         if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
698                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
699                         }
700                         cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
701                         if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
702                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
703                         }
704                         last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
705                 }
706                 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
707         }
708
709         #[inline]
710         fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
711                 unsafe {
712                         ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
713                 }
714                 for i in 0..65 {
715                         arr[i] = 0;
716                 }
717         }
718
719         #[inline]
720         fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
721                 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
722
723                 for i in 0..dst.len() {
724                         dst[i] ^= src[i];
725                 }
726         }
727
728         const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
729         fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
730                 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
731                 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
732
733                 let filler = {
734                         let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
735                         let end_len = iters * 65;
736                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
737                         res.resize(end_len, 0);
738
739                         for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
740                                 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
741                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
742                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
743                                 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
744                         }
745                         res
746                 };
747
748                 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
749                 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
750
751                 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
752                         ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
753                         payload.hmac = hmac_res;
754                         packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
755
756                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
757                         chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
758                         packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
759
760                         if i == 0 {
761                                 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
762                         }
763
764                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
765                         hmac.input(&packet_data);
766                         hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
767                         hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
768                 }
769
770                 msgs::OnionPacket{
771                         version: 0,
772                         public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
773                         hop_data: packet_data,
774                         hmac: hmac_res,
775                 }
776         }
777
778         /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
779         /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
780         fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
781                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
782
783                 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
784                 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
785                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
786                 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
787                 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
788                         data: packet_crypted,
789                 }
790         }
791
792         fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
793                 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
794
795                 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
796
797                 let failuremsg = {
798                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
799                         res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
800                         res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
801                         res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
802                         res
803                 };
804                 let pad = {
805                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
806                         res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
807                         res
808                 };
809                 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
810                         hmac: [0; 32],
811                         failuremsg: failuremsg,
812                         pad: pad,
813                 };
814
815                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
816                 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
817                 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
818
819                 packet
820         }
821
822         #[inline]
823         fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
824                 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
825                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
826         }
827
828         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
829                 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
830                         () => {
831                                 {
832                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
833                                         sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
834                                         let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
835                                         sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
836                                         onion_hash
837                                 }
838                         }
839                 }
840
841                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
842                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
843                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
844                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
845                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
846                                 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
847                                 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
848                         })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
849                 }
850
851                 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
852                 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
853
854                 let mut channel_state = None;
855                 macro_rules! return_err {
856                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
857                                 {
858                                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
859                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
860                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
861                                         }
862                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
863                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
864                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
865                                                 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
866                                         })), channel_state.unwrap());
867                                 }
868                         }
869                 }
870
871                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
872                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
873                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
874                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
875                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
876                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
877                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
878                         return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
879                 }
880
881                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
882                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
883                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
884                 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
885                         return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
886                 }
887
888                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
889                 let next_hop_data = {
890                         let mut decoded = [0; 65];
891                         chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
892                         match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
893                                 Err(err) => {
894                                         let error_code = match err {
895                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
896                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
897                                         };
898                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
899                                 },
900                                 Ok(msg) => msg
901                         }
902                 };
903
904                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
905                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
906                                 // final_expiry_too_soon
907                                 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
908                                         return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
909                                 }
910                                 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
911                                 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
912                                         return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
913                                 }
914                                 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
915                                 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
916                                         return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
917                                 }
918
919                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
920                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
921                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
922                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
923
924                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
925                                         onion_packet: None,
926                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
927                                         short_channel_id: 0,
928                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
929                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
930                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
931                                 })
932                         } else {
933                                 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
934                                 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
935                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
936
937                                 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
938
939                                 let blinding_factor = {
940                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
941                                         sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
942                                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
943                                         let mut res = [0u8; 32];
944                                         sha.result(&mut res);
945                                         match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
946                                                 Err(_) => {
947                                                         return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
948                                                 },
949                                                 Ok(key) => key
950                                         }
951                                 };
952
953                                 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
954                                         return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
955                                 }
956
957                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
958                                         version: 0,
959                                         public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
960                                         hop_data: new_packet_data,
961                                         hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
962                                 };
963
964                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
965                                         onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
966                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
967                                         short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
968                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
969                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
970                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
971                                 })
972                         };
973
974                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
975                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
976                         if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
977                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
978                                 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
979                                         None => { // unknown_next_peer
980                                                 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
981                                         },
982                                         Some(id) => id.clone(),
983                                 };
984                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
985                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
986
987                                         if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
988                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
989                                         }
990                                         if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
991                                                 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
992                                         }
993                                         let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
994                                         if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
995                                                 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
996                                         }
997                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
998                                                 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
999                                         }
1000                                         let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1001                                         // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1002                                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1003                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1004                                         }
1005                                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1006                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1007                                         }
1008                                         break None;
1009                                 }
1010                                 {
1011                                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1012                                         if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1013                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1014                                         }
1015                                         else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1016                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1017                                         }
1018                                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1019                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1020                                         }
1021                                         return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1022                                 }
1023                         }
1024                 }
1025
1026                 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1027         }
1028
1029         /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1030         fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1031                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1032                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1033                         Some(id) => id,
1034                 };
1035
1036                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1037
1038                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1039                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1040                         short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1041                         timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1042                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1043                         cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1044                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1045                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1046                         fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1047                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
1048                 };
1049
1050                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1051                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1052
1053                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1054                         signature: sig,
1055                         contents: unsigned
1056                 })
1057         }
1058
1059         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1060         ///
1061         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1062         /// fields for more info.
1063         ///
1064         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1065         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1066         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1067         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1068         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1069         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1070         ///
1071         /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
1072         ///
1073         /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1074         /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1075         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1076                 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1077                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1078                 }
1079                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1080                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1081                         if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1082                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1083                         }
1084                 }
1085
1086                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1087                         let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1088                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1089                         session_key
1090                 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1091
1092                 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1093
1094                 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1095                                 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1096                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1097                 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1098
1099                 let (first_hop_node_id, update_add, commitment_signed) = {
1100                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1101                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1102
1103                         let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1104                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1105                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1106                         };
1107
1108                         let res = {
1109                                 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1110                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1111                                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1112                                 }
1113                                 if !chan.is_live() {
1114                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1115                                 }
1116                                 match chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1117                                         route: route.clone(),
1118                                         session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1119                                         first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1120                                 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})? {
1121                                         Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1122                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1123                                                         unimplemented!();
1124                                                 }
1125                                                 Some((update_add, commitment_signed))
1126                                         },
1127                                         None => None,
1128                                 }
1129                         };
1130
1131                         let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1132
1133                         match res {
1134                                 Some((update_add, commitment_signed)) => {
1135                                         (first_hop_node_id, update_add, commitment_signed)
1136                                 },
1137                                 None => return Ok(()),
1138                         }
1139                 };
1140
1141                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1142                 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1143                         node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1144                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1145                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1146                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1147                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1148                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1149                                 update_fee: None,
1150                                 commitment_signed,
1151                         },
1152                 });
1153                 Ok(())
1154         }
1155
1156         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1157         ///
1158         /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1159         ///
1160         /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1161         /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1162         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1163                 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1164                         ($event: expr) => {
1165                                 {
1166                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1167                                         pending_events.push($event);
1168                                 }
1169                         }
1170                 }
1171
1172                 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1173                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1174                         match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1175                                 Some(mut chan) => {
1176                                         match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1177                                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1178                                                         (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1179                                                 },
1180                                                 Err(e) => {
1181                                                         log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1182                                                         mem::drop(channel_state);
1183                                                         add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1184                                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1185                                                                 action: e.action,
1186                                                         });
1187                                                         return;
1188                                                 },
1189                                         }
1190                                 },
1191                                 None => return
1192                         }
1193                 };
1194                 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1195                 // lock before add_update_monitor
1196                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1197                         unimplemented!();
1198                 }
1199                 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1200                         node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1201                         msg: msg,
1202                 });
1203
1204                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1205                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1206                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1207                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1208                         },
1209                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1210                                 e.insert(chan);
1211                         }
1212                 }
1213         }
1214
1215         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1216                 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1217
1218                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1219                         Ok(res) => res,
1220                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1221                 };
1222                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1223                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1224
1225                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1226                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1227                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1228                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
1229                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1230                 })
1231         }
1232
1233         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1234         ///
1235         /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1236         /// Will likely generate further events.
1237         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1238                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1239                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1240                 {
1241                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1242                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1243
1244                         if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1245                                 return;
1246                         }
1247
1248                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1249                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1250                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1251                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1252                                                 None => {
1253                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1254                                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1255                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1256                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1257                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1258                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1259                                                                 });
1260                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1261                                                         }
1262                                                         continue;
1263                                                 }
1264                                         };
1265                                         let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1266
1267                                         let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1268                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1269                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1270                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1271                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1272                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1273                                                 });
1274                                                 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1275                                                         Err(_e) => {
1276                                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1277                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1278                                                                 continue;
1279                                                         },
1280                                                         Ok(update_add) => {
1281                                                                 match update_add {
1282                                                                         Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1283                                                                         None => {
1284                                                                                 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1285                                                                                 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1286                                                                                 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1287                                                                                 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1288                                                                                 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1289                                                                                 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1290                                                                                 // this channel currently :/.
1291                                                                         }
1292                                                                 }
1293                                                         }
1294                                                 }
1295                                         }
1296
1297                                         if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1298                                                 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1299                                                         Ok(res) => res,
1300                                                         Err(e) => {
1301                                                                 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1302                                                                 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1303                                                                 } else {
1304                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1305                                                                 }
1306                                                                 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1307                                                                 continue;
1308                                                         },
1309                                                 };
1310                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1311                                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1312                                                 }
1313                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1314                                                         node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1315                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1316                                                                 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1317                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1318                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1319                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1320                                                                 update_fee: None,
1321                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1322                                                         },
1323                                                 });
1324                                         }
1325                                 } else {
1326                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1327                                                 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1328                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1329                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1330                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1331                                                 };
1332                                                 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1333                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1334                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1335                                                 };
1336                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1337                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1338                                                         amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1339                                                 });
1340                                         }
1341                                 }
1342                         }
1343                 }
1344
1345                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1346                         match update {
1347                                 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1348                                 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1349                         };
1350                 }
1351
1352                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1353                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1354                 events.append(&mut new_events);
1355         }
1356
1357         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1358         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1359                 // TODO: Add ability to return 0x4000|16 (incorrect_payment_amount) if the amount we
1360                 // received is < expected or > 2*expected
1361                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1362                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1363                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1364                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1365                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1366                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1367                         }
1368                         true
1369                 } else { false }
1370         }
1371
1372         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1373         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1374         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1375         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1376         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1377         /// still-available channels.
1378         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1379                 match source {
1380                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1381                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1382                                 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1383                                         let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1384                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1385                                         if let Some(channel_update) = channel_update {
1386                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1387                                                         update: channel_update,
1388                                                 });
1389                                         }
1390                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1391                                                 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1392                                                 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1393                                         });
1394                                 } else {
1395                                         panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1396                                 }
1397                         },
1398                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1399                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1400                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1401                                                 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1402                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1403                                         },
1404                                         HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1405                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1406                                         }
1407                                 };
1408
1409                                 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1410                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1411                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1412                                                 None => return
1413                                         };
1414
1415                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1416                                         match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1417                                                 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1418                                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1419                                                                 unimplemented!();
1420                                                         }
1421                                                         (chan.get_their_node_id(), Some((msg, commitment_msg)))
1422                                                 },
1423                                                 Ok(None) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), None),
1424                                                 Err(_e) => {
1425                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1426                                                         return;
1427                                                 },
1428                                         }
1429                                 };
1430
1431                                 match fail_msgs {
1432                                         Some((msg, commitment_msg)) => {
1433                                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1434
1435                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1436                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1437                                                         node_id,
1438                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1439                                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1440                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1441                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1442                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1443                                                                 update_fee: None,
1444                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1445                                                         },
1446                                                 });
1447                                         },
1448                                         None => {},
1449                                 }
1450                         },
1451                 }
1452         }
1453
1454         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1455         /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1456         /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1457         ///
1458         /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1459         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1460                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1461                 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1462                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1463                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1464
1465                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1466                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1467                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1468                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1469                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1470                                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1471                         }
1472                         true
1473                 } else { false }
1474         }
1475         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1476                 match source {
1477                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1478                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1479                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1480                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1481                                         payment_preimage
1482                                 });
1483                         },
1484                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1485                                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1486                                 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1487                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1488                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1489                                                 None => {
1490                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1491                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1492                                                         // why its missing.
1493                                                         return
1494                                                 }
1495                                         };
1496
1497                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1498                                         match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1499                                                 Ok((msgs, Some(chan_monitor))) => {
1500                                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1501                                                                 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1502                                                         }
1503                                                         (chan.get_their_node_id(), msgs)
1504                                                 },
1505                                                 Ok((msgs, None)) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msgs),
1506                                                 Err(_e) => {
1507                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1508                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1509                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1510                                                         return
1511                                                 },
1512                                         }
1513                                 };
1514
1515                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1516                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs {
1517                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1518                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1519                                                 node_id: node_id,
1520                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1521                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1522                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1523                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1524                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1525                                                         update_fee: None,
1526                                                         commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1527                                                 }
1528                                         });
1529                                 }
1530                         },
1531                 }
1532         }
1533
1534         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1535         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1536                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1537         }
1538
1539         /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1540         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1541         /// operation.
1542         pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1543                 unimplemented!();
1544         }
1545
1546         fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1547                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1548                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1549                 }
1550                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1551                 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1552                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1553                 }
1554
1555                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1556                         ChannelKeys {
1557                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1558                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1559                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1560                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1561                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1562                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1563                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1564                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1565                         }
1566                 } else {
1567                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1568                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1569                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1570                                 Ok(key) => key,
1571                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1572                         }
1573                 };
1574
1575                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1576                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1577                 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1578                 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1579                 Ok(accept_msg)
1580         }
1581
1582         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1583                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1584                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1585                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1586                                 Some(chan) => {
1587                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1588                                                 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1589                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1590                                         }
1591                                         chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1592                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1593                                         (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1594                                 },
1595                                 //TODO: same as above
1596                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1597                         }
1598                 };
1599                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1600                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1601                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1602                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
1603                         output_script: output_script,
1604                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1605                 });
1606                 Ok(())
1607         }
1608
1609         fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1610                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1611                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1612                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1613                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1614                                         if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1615                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1616                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1617                                         }
1618                                         match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1619                                                 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1620                                                         (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1621                                                 },
1622                                                 Err(e) => {
1623                                                         return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1624                                                 }
1625                                         }
1626                                 },
1627                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1628                         }
1629                 };
1630                 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1631                 // lock before add_update_monitor
1632                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1633                         unimplemented!();
1634                 }
1635                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1636                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1637                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1638                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1639                         },
1640                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1641                                 e.insert(chan);
1642                         }
1643                 }
1644                 Ok(funding_msg)
1645         }
1646
1647         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1648                 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1649                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1650                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1651                                 Some(chan) => {
1652                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1653                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1654                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1655                                         }
1656                                         let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1657                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1658                                                 unimplemented!();
1659                                         }
1660                                         (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1661                                 },
1662                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1663                         }
1664                 };
1665                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1666                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1667                         funding_txo: funding_txo,
1668                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1669                 });
1670                 Ok(())
1671         }
1672
1673         fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1674                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1675                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1676                         Some(chan) => {
1677                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1678                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1679                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1680                                 }
1681                                 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1682                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1683                                 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1684                         },
1685                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1686                 };
1687         }
1688
1689         fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1690                 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1691                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1692                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1693
1694                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1695                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1696                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1697                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1698                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1699                                         }
1700                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1701                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1702                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1703                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1704                                                 }
1705                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1706                                         } else { (res, None) }
1707                                 },
1708                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1709                         }
1710                 };
1711                 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1712                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1713                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1714                 }
1715                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1716                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1717                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1718                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1719                                         msg: update
1720                                 });
1721                         }
1722                 }
1723                 Ok((res.0, res.1))
1724         }
1725
1726         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1727                 let (res, chan_option) = {
1728                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1729                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1730                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1731                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1732                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1733                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1734                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1735                                         }
1736                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1737                                         if res.1.is_some() {
1738                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1739                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1740                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1741                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1742                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1743                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1744                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1745                                                 }
1746                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1747                                         } else { (res, None) }
1748                                 },
1749                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1750                         }
1751                 };
1752                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1753                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1754                 }
1755                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1756                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1757                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1758                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1759                                         msg: update
1760                                 });
1761                         }
1762                 }
1763                 Ok(res.0)
1764         }
1765
1766         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1767                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1768                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1769                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1770                 //
1771                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1772                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1773                 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1774                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1775
1776                 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1777                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1778
1779                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1780                         Some(chan) => {
1781                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1782                                         //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1783                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1784                                 }
1785                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
1786                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1787                                 }
1788                                 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1789                         },
1790                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1791                 }
1792         }
1793
1794         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1795                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1796                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1797                         Some(chan) => {
1798                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1799                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1800                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1801                                 }
1802                                 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1803                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1804                         },
1805                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1806                 };
1807                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1808                 Ok(())
1809         }
1810
1811         // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
1812         // indicating that the payment itself failed
1813         fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
1814                 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
1815                         macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
1816                                 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
1817                                         log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
1818                                 };
1819                                 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
1820                                         log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
1821                                 };
1822                         }
1823
1824                         const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
1825                         const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
1826                         const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
1827
1828                         let mut res = None;
1829                         let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
1830
1831                         // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1832                         Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1833                                 if res.is_some() { return; }
1834
1835                                 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
1836                                 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
1837                                 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
1838
1839                                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1840
1841                                 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1842                                 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1843                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1844                                 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1845                                 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1846
1847                                 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
1848
1849                                 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1850                                         let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1851                                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1852                                         hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1853                                         let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1854                                         hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1855
1856                                         if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1857                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
1858                                                         // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
1859                                                         // definitely came from the peer in question
1860                                                         res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
1861                                                 } else {
1862                                                         let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
1863
1864                                                         match error_code & 0xff {
1865                                                                 1|2|3 => {
1866                                                                         // either from an intermediate or final node
1867                                                                         //   invalid_realm(PERM|1),
1868                                                                         //   temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
1869                                                                         //   permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
1870                                                                         //   required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
1871                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1872                                                                                 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1873                                                                                 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
1874                                                                         }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
1875                                                                         // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
1876                                                                         // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
1877                                                                         // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
1878                                                                         return;
1879                                                                 },
1880                                                                 _ => {}
1881                                                         }
1882
1883                                                         if is_from_final_node {
1884                                                                 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
1885                                                                         c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
1886                                                                         c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
1887                                                                         17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
1888                                                                         18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1889                                                                                 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
1890                                                                                 true
1891                                                                         },
1892                                                                         19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1893                                                                                 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
1894                                                                                 true
1895                                                                         },
1896                                                                         _ => {
1897                                                                                 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
1898                                                                                 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
1899                                                                                 // does not coform to the spec.
1900                                                                                 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
1901                                                                                 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1902                                                                                         node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1903                                                                                         is_permanent: true,
1904                                                                                 }), false));
1905                                                                                 return;
1906                                                                         }
1907                                                                 };
1908                                                                 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
1909                                                                 return;
1910                                                         }
1911
1912                                                         // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
1913                                                         match error_code {
1914                                                                 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
1915                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1916                                                                                 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
1917                                                                                 is_permanent: true,
1918                                                                         }), false));
1919                                                                 },
1920                                                                 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
1921                                                                         let offset = match error_code {
1922                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|7  => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
1923                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
1924                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
1925                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1926                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
1927                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
1928                                                                                 _ =>  {
1929                                                                                         // node sending unknown code
1930                                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1931                                                                                                 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1932                                                                                                 is_permanent: true,
1933                                                                                         }), false));
1934                                                                                         return;
1935                                                                                 }
1936                                                                         };
1937
1938                                                                         if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
1939                                                                                 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
1940                                                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
1941                                                                                         if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
1942                                                                                                 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
1943                                                                                                 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
1944                                                                                                 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
1945                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
1946                                                                                                                 false
1947                                                                                                         },
1948                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
1949                                                                                                                 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
1950                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
1951                                                                                                                 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
1952                                                                                                         },
1953                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
1954                                                                                                                 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
1955                                                                                                                 let new_fee =  amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
1956                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
1957                                                                                                                 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
1958                                                                                                         }
1959                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1960                                                                                                                 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
1961                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
1962                                                                                                                 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
1963                                                                                                         },
1964                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
1965                                                                                                                 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
1966                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
1967                                                                                                                 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
1968                                                                                                         },
1969                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
1970                                                                                                         _ => { unreachable!(); },
1971                                                                                                 };
1972
1973                                                                                                 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
1974                                                                                                         Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1975                                                                                                                 msg: chan_update,
1976                                                                                                         })
1977                                                                                                 };
1978                                                                                                 res = Some((msg, true));
1979                                                                                                 return;
1980                                                                                         }
1981                                                                                 }
1982                                                                         }
1983                                                                 },
1984                                                                 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
1985                                                                         //TODO
1986                                                                 },
1987                                                                 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
1988                                                                         res = Some((None, true));
1989                                                                         return;
1990                                                                 }
1991                                                                 _ => {
1992                                                                         // node sending unknown code
1993                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1994                                                                                 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1995                                                                                 is_permanent: true,
1996                                                                         }), false));
1997                                                                         return;
1998                                                                 }
1999                                                         }
2000                                                 }
2001                                         }
2002                                 }
2003                         }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2004                         res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2005                 } else { ((None, true)) }
2006         }
2007
2008         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2009                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2010                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2011                         Some(chan) => {
2012                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2013                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2014                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2015                                 }
2016                                 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2017                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2018                         },
2019                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2020                 }?;
2021                 Ok(())
2022         }
2023
2024         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2025                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2026                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2027                         Some(chan) => {
2028                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2029                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2030                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2031                                 }
2032                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
2033                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
2034                                 }
2035                                 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2036                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2037                                 Ok(())
2038                         },
2039                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2040                 }
2041         }
2042
2043         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2044                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = {
2045                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2046                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2047                                 Some(chan) => {
2048                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2049                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2050                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2051                                         }
2052                                         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2053                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2054                                                 unimplemented!();
2055                                         }
2056                                         (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed)
2057                                 },
2058                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2059                         }
2060                 };
2061                 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
2062         }
2063
2064         #[inline]
2065         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2066                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2067                         let mut forward_event = None;
2068                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2069                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2070                                 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2071                                         forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2072                                         channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2073                                 }
2074                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2075                                         match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2076                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2077                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2078                                                 },
2079                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2080                                                         entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2081                                                 }
2082                                         }
2083                                 }
2084                         }
2085                         match forward_event {
2086                                 Some(time) => {
2087                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2088                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2089                                                 time_forwardable: time
2090                                         });
2091                                 }
2092                                 None => {},
2093                         }
2094                 }
2095         }
2096
2097         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2098                 let ((res, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures), short_channel_id) = {
2099                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2100                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2101                                 Some(chan) => {
2102                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2103                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2104                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2105                                         }
2106                                         let (res, pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2107                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2108                                                 unimplemented!();
2109                                         }
2110                                         ((res, pending_forwards, pending_failures), chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2111                                 },
2112                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2113                         }
2114                 };
2115                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2116                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2117                 }
2118                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2119
2120                 Ok(res)
2121         }
2122
2123         fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2124                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2125                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2126                         Some(chan) => {
2127                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2128                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2129                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2130                                 }
2131                                 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2132                         },
2133                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2134                 }
2135         }
2136
2137         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2138                 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
2139                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2140                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2141                                 Some(chan) => {
2142                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2143                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2144                                         }
2145                                         if !chan.is_usable() {
2146                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2147                                         }
2148
2149                                         let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2150                                         let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2151                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2152
2153                                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2154                                         let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2155                                         let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2156                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2157                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2158
2159                                         let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2160
2161                                         (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2162                                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2163                                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2164                                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2165                                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2166                                                 contents: announcement,
2167                                         }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2168                                 },
2169                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2170                         }
2171                 };
2172                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2173                 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
2174                 Ok(())
2175         }
2176
2177         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2178                 let res = {
2179                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2180                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2181                                 Some(chan) => {
2182                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2183                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2184                                         }
2185                                         let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2186                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2187                                         if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2188                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2189                                                         unimplemented!();
2190                                                 }
2191                                         }
2192                                         Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order))
2193                                 },
2194                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2195                         }
2196                 };
2197
2198                 res
2199         }
2200
2201         /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2202         /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2203         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2204         /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2205         #[doc(hidden)]
2206         pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2207                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2208                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2209                         None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2210                         Some(chan) => {
2211                                 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2212                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2213                                 }
2214                                 if !chan.is_live() {
2215                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2216                                 }
2217                                 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2218                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2219                                                 unimplemented!();
2220                                         }
2221                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2222                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
2223                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2224                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2225                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2226                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2227                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2228                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2229                                                         update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2230                                                         commitment_signed,
2231                                                 },
2232                                         });
2233                                 }
2234                         },
2235                 }
2236                 Ok(())
2237         }
2238 }
2239
2240 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2241         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2242                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2243                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2244                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2245                 ret
2246         }
2247 }
2248
2249 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2250         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2251                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2252                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2253                 {
2254                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2255                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2256                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2257                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2258                                 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2259                                 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2260                                         let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
2261                                         new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
2262                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2263                                                 msg: funding_locked,
2264                                                 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2265                                         });
2266                                         short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2267                                 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2268                                         new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
2269                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2270                                                 action: e.action,
2271                                         });
2272                                         if channel.is_shutdown() {
2273                                                 return false;
2274                                         }
2275                                 }
2276                                 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2277                                         for tx in txn_matched {
2278                                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2279                                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2280                                                                 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2281                                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2282                                                                 }
2283                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2284                                                                 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2285                                                                 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2286                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2287                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2288                                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2289                                                                                 msg: update
2290                                                                         });
2291                                                                 }
2292                                                                 return false;
2293                                                         }
2294                                                 }
2295                                         }
2296                                 }
2297                                 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2298                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2299                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2300                                         }
2301                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2302                                         // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2303                                         // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2304                                         // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2305                                         failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2306                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2307                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2308                                                         msg: update
2309                                                 });
2310                                         }
2311                                         return false;
2312                                 }
2313                                 true
2314                         });
2315                 }
2316                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2317                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2318                 }
2319                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2320                 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2321                         pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2322                 }
2323                 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2324         }
2325
2326         /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2327         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2328                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2329                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2330                 {
2331                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2332                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2333                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2334                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_,  v| {
2335                                 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2336                                         if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2337                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2338                                         }
2339                                         failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2340                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2341                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2342                                                         msg: update
2343                                                 });
2344                                         }
2345                                         false
2346                                 } else {
2347                                         true
2348                                 }
2349                         });
2350                 }
2351                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2352                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2353                 }
2354                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2355                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2356                         for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2357                                 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2358                         }
2359                 }
2360                 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2361         }
2362 }
2363
2364 macro_rules! handle_error {
2365         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2366                 match $internal {
2367                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2368                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2369                                 if needs_channel_force_close {
2370                                         match &err.action {
2371                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2372                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2373                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2374                                                         } else {
2375                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2376                                                         }
2377                                                 },
2378                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2379                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2380                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2381                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2382                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2383                                                         } else {
2384                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2385                                                         }
2386                                                 },
2387                                                 &None => {},
2388                                         }
2389                                 }
2390                                 Err(err)
2391                         },
2392                 }
2393         }
2394 }
2395
2396 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2397         //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2398         fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2399                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2400         }
2401
2402         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2403                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2404         }
2405
2406         fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2407                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2408         }
2409
2410         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2411                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2412         }
2413
2414         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2415                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2416         }
2417
2418         fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2419                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2420         }
2421
2422         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2423                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2424         }
2425
2426         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2427                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2428         }
2429
2430         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2431                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2432         }
2433
2434         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2435                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2436         }
2437
2438         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2439                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2440         }
2441
2442         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2443                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2444         }
2445
2446         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2447                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2448         }
2449
2450         fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2451                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2452         }
2453
2454         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2455                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2456         }
2457
2458         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), HandleError> {
2459                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2460         }
2461
2462         fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2463                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2464                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2465                 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2466                 {
2467                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2468                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2469                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2470                         if no_connection_possible {
2471                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2472                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2473                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2474                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2475                                                 }
2476                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2477                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2478                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2479                                                                 msg: update
2480                                                         });
2481                                                 }
2482                                                 false
2483                                         } else {
2484                                                 true
2485                                         }
2486                                 });
2487                         } else {
2488                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2489                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2490                                                 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2491                                                 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2492                                                 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2493                                                         let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2494                                                         failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2495                                                 }
2496                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2497                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2498                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2499                                                         }
2500                                                         return false;
2501                                                 }
2502                                         }
2503                                         true
2504                                 })
2505                         }
2506                 }
2507                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2508                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2509                 }
2510                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2511                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2512                         for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2513                                 pending_events.push(event);
2514                         }
2515                 }
2516                 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2517                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2518                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2519                         }
2520                 }
2521         }
2522
2523         fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2524                 let mut res = Vec::new();
2525                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2526                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2527                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2528                                 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2529                                         // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2530                                         // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2531                                         // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2532                                         // drop it.
2533                                         false
2534                                 } else {
2535                                         res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2536                                         true
2537                                 }
2538                         } else { true }
2539                 });
2540                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2541                 res
2542         }
2543
2544         fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2545                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2546                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
2547                                 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2548                                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2549                                 }
2550                         }
2551                 } else {
2552                         self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2553                 }
2554         }
2555 }
2556
2557 #[cfg(test)]
2558 mod tests {
2559         use chain::chaininterface;
2560         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2561         use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2562         use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2563         use ln::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
2564         use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2565         use ln::msgs;
2566         use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2567         use util::test_utils;
2568         use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2569         use util::errors::APIError;
2570         use util::logger::Logger;
2571         use util::ser::Writeable;
2572
2573         use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2574         use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2575         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2576         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2577         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2578         use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2579         use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2580
2581         use hex;
2582
2583         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2584         use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2585
2586         use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2587         use crypto::digest::Digest;
2588
2589         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2590
2591         use std::cell::RefCell;
2592         use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2593         use std::default::Default;
2594         use std::rc::Rc;
2595         use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2596         use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
2597         use std::time::Instant;
2598         use std::mem;
2599
2600         fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2601                 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2602                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2603
2604                 let route = Route {
2605                         hops: vec!(
2606                                         RouteHop {
2607                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2608                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2609                                         },
2610                                         RouteHop {
2611                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2612                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2613                                         },
2614                                         RouteHop {
2615                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2616                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2617                                         },
2618                                         RouteHop {
2619                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2620                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2621                                         },
2622                                         RouteHop {
2623                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2624                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2625                                         },
2626                         ),
2627                 };
2628
2629                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2630
2631                 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2632                 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2633                 onion_keys
2634         }
2635
2636         #[test]
2637         fn onion_vectors() {
2638                 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2639                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2640
2641                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2642                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2643                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2644                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2645                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2646
2647                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2648                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2649                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2650                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2651                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2652
2653                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2654                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2655                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2656                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2657                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2658
2659                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2660                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2661                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2662                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2663                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2664
2665                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2666                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2667                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2668                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2669                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2670
2671                 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2672                 let payloads = vec!(
2673                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2674                                 realm: 0,
2675                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2676                                         short_channel_id: 0,
2677                                         amt_to_forward: 0,
2678                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2679                                 },
2680                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2681                         },
2682                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2683                                 realm: 0,
2684                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2685                                         short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2686                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2687                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2688                                 },
2689                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2690                         },
2691                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2692                                 realm: 0,
2693                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2694                                         short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2695                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2696                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2697                                 },
2698                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2699                         },
2700                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2701                                 realm: 0,
2702                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2703                                         short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2704                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2705                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2706                                 },
2707                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2708                         },
2709                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2710                                 realm: 0,
2711                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2712                                         short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2713                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2714                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2715                                 },
2716                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2717                         },
2718                 );
2719
2720                 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2721                 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2722                 // anyway...
2723                 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2724         }
2725
2726         #[test]
2727         fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2728                 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2729
2730                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2731                 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2732                 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2733
2734                 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2735                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("a5e6bd0c74cb347f10cce367f949098f2457d14c046fd8a22cb96efb30b0fdcda8cb9168b50f2fd45edd73c1b0c8b33002df376801ff58aaa94000bf8a86f92620f343baef38a580102395ae3abf9128d1047a0736ff9b83d456740ebbb4aeb3aa9737f18fb4afb4aa074fb26c4d702f42968888550a3bded8c05247e045b866baef0499f079fdaeef6538f31d44deafffdfd3afa2fb4ca9082b8f1c465371a9894dd8c243fb4847e004f5256b3e90e2edde4c9fb3082ddfe4d1e734cacd96ef0706bf63c9984e22dc98851bcccd1c3494351feb458c9c6af41c0044bea3c47552b1d992ae542b17a2d0bba1a096c78d169034ecb55b6e3a7263c26017f033031228833c1daefc0dedb8cf7c3e37c9c37ebfe42f3225c326e8bcfd338804c145b16e34e4").unwrap());
2736
2737                 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2738                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("c49a1ce81680f78f5f2000cda36268de34a3f0a0662f55b4e837c83a8773c22aa081bab1616a0011585323930fa5b9fae0c85770a2279ff59ec427ad1bbff9001c0cd1497004bd2a0f68b50704cf6d6a4bf3c8b6a0833399a24b3456961ba00736785112594f65b6b2d44d9f5ea4e49b5e1ec2af978cbe31c67114440ac51a62081df0ed46d4a3df295da0b0fe25c0115019f03f15ec86fabb4c852f83449e812f141a9395b3f70b766ebbd4ec2fae2b6955bd8f32684c15abfe8fd3a6261e52650e8807a92158d9f1463261a925e4bfba44bd20b166d532f0017185c3a6ac7957adefe45559e3072c8dc35abeba835a8cb01a71a15c736911126f27d46a36168ca5ef7dccd4e2886212602b181463e0dd30185c96348f9743a02aca8ec27c0b90dca270").unwrap());
2739
2740                 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2741                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2742
2743                 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2744                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2745
2746                 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2747                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2748         }
2749
2750         fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2751                 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2752                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2753                 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2754                 for i in 2..100 {
2755                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2756                         chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2757                 }
2758         }
2759
2760         struct Node {
2761                 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2762                 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2763                 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2764                 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2765                 router: Router,
2766                 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2767                 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2768         }
2769         impl Drop for Node {
2770                 fn drop(&mut self) {
2771                         if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2772                                 // Check that we processed all pending events
2773                                 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2774                                 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2775                         }
2776                 }
2777         }
2778
2779         fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2780                 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2781         }
2782
2783         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2784                 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2785                 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
2786                 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
2787         }
2788
2789         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
2790                 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
2791
2792                 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2793                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2794                 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2795                         Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2796                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2797                                 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2798                         },
2799                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2800                 };
2801
2802                 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2803
2804                 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2805                 let tx;
2806                 let funding_output;
2807
2808                 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2809                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2810                 match events_2[0] {
2811                         Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2812                                 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
2813                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2814
2815                                 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2816                                         value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2817                                 }]};
2818                                 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2819
2820                                 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2821                                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2822                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2823                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2824                                 added_monitors.clear();
2825                         },
2826                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2827                 }
2828
2829                 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2830                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2831                 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2832                         Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2833                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2834                                 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2835                                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2836                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2837                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2838                                 added_monitors.clear();
2839                                 res
2840                         },
2841                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2842                 };
2843
2844                 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2845                 {
2846                         let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2847                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2848                         assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2849                         added_monitors.clear();
2850                 }
2851
2852                 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2853                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2854                 match events_4[0] {
2855                         Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2856                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2857                                 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2858                         },
2859                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2860                 };
2861
2862                 tx
2863         }
2864
2865         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
2866                 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2867                 let events_5 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2868                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2869                 match events_5[0] {
2870                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2871                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2872                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2873                                 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2874                         },
2875                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2876                 };
2877
2878                 let channel_id;
2879
2880                 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2881                 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2882                 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2883                 (match events_6[0] {
2884                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2885                                 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2886                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2887                                 (msg.clone(), announcement_sigs.clone().unwrap())
2888                         },
2889                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2890                 }, channel_id)
2891         }
2892
2893         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2894                 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2895                 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
2896                 (msgs, chan_id, tx)
2897         }
2898
2899         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2900                 let bs_announcement_sigs = {
2901                         let bs_announcement_sigs = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap().unwrap();
2902                         node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
2903                         bs_announcement_sigs
2904                 };
2905
2906                 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2907                 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2908                 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
2909                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2910                                 (msg, update_msg)
2911                         },
2912                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2913                 };
2914
2915                 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2916                 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2917                 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2918                 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
2919                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2920                                 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2921                                 update_msg
2922                         },
2923                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2924                 };
2925
2926                 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2927
2928                 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
2929         }
2930
2931         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2932                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
2933         }
2934
2935         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2936                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
2937                 for node in nodes {
2938                         assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2939                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2940                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2941                 }
2942                 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2943         }
2944
2945         macro_rules! check_spends {
2946                 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
2947                         {
2948                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2949                                 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
2950                                 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
2951                                 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2952                         }
2953                 }
2954         }
2955
2956         fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2957                 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2958                 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2959                 let (tx_a, tx_b);
2960
2961                 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2962                 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2963                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2964                 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2965                         Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2966                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2967                                 msg.clone()
2968                         },
2969                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2970                 };
2971
2972                 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2973                 if !close_inbound_first {
2974                         assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2975                 }
2976                 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2977                 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2978                 if close_inbound_first {
2979                         assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2980                         closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2981                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2982                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2983
2984                         let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2985                         assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2986                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2987                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2988                 } else {
2989                         closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2990                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2991                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2992
2993                         let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2994                         assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2995                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2996                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2997                 }
2998                 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2999                 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3000
3001                 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3002                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3003                 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
3004                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3005                                 msg.clone()
3006                         },
3007                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3008                 };
3009
3010                 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3011                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3012                 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
3013                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3014                                 msg.clone()
3015                         },
3016                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3017                 };
3018
3019                 (as_update, bs_update)
3020         }
3021
3022         struct SendEvent {
3023                 node_id: PublicKey,
3024                 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3025                 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3026         }
3027         impl SendEvent {
3028                 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
3029                         match event {
3030                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
3031                                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3032                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3033                                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3034                                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3035                                         SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
3036                                 },
3037                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3038                         }
3039                 }
3040         }
3041
3042         macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3043                 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3044                         {
3045                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3046                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3047                                 added_monitors.clear();
3048                         }
3049                 }
3050         }
3051
3052         macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3053                 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3054                         {
3055                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3056                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3057                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3058                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3059                                 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3060                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3061                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
3062                                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
3063                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3064                                 if $fail_backwards {
3065                                         assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3066                                 }
3067                                 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3068                                 {
3069                                         let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3070                                         if $fail_backwards {
3071                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3072                                                 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3073                                         } else {
3074                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3075                                         }
3076                                         added_monitors.clear();
3077                                 }
3078                         }
3079                 }
3080         }
3081
3082         macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3083                 ($node: expr) => {
3084                         {
3085                                 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3086                                 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3087                                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3088                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3089                                 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3090                                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3091                                 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3092                         }
3093                 }
3094         }
3095
3096         fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3097                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3098
3099                 let mut payment_event = {
3100                         origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3101                         check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3102
3103                         let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3104                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3105                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3106                 };
3107                 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3108
3109                 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3110                         assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3111
3112                         node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3113                         check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3114                         commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3115
3116                         let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3117                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3118                         match events_1[0] {
3119                                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3120                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3121                         };
3122
3123                         node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3124                         node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3125
3126                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3127                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3128                         if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3129                                 match events_2[0] {
3130                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3131                                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3132                                                 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3133                                         },
3134                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3135                                 }
3136                         } else {
3137                                 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3138                                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3139                                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3140                         }
3141
3142                         prev_node = node;
3143                 }
3144
3145                 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3146         }
3147
3148         fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3149                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3150                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3151
3152                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3153                 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
3154                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3155                                 {
3156                                         $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3157                                         if $last_node {
3158                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3159                                         } else {
3160                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3161                                         }
3162                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3163                                 }
3164                         }
3165                 }
3166
3167                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3168                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3169                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3170                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3171                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
3172                                 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
3173                         }
3174
3175                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3176                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3177                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3178                                 match events[0] {
3179                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3180                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3181                                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3182                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3183                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3184                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3185                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3186                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3187                                         },
3188                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3189                                 }
3190                         } else {
3191                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
3192                         }
3193                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3194                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3195                         }
3196
3197                         prev_node = node;
3198                 }
3199
3200                 if !skip_last {
3201                         update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3202                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3203                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3204                         match events[0] {
3205                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3206                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3207                                 },
3208                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3209                         }
3210                 }
3211         }
3212
3213         fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3214                 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3215         }
3216
3217         const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3218
3219         fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3220                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3221                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3222                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3223                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3224                 }
3225
3226                 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3227         }
3228
3229         fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3230                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3231                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3232                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3233                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3234                 }
3235
3236                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3237
3238                 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3239                 match err {
3240                         APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3241                         _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3242                 };
3243         }
3244
3245         fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3246                 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3247                 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3248         }
3249
3250         fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3251                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
3252                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3253
3254                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3255                 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3256                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3257                                 {
3258                                         $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3259                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3260                                 }
3261                         }
3262                 }
3263
3264                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3265                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3266                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3267                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3268                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
3269                                 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3270                                 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3271                                 // second-to-last node!
3272                                 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3273                         }
3274
3275                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3276                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3277                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3278                                 match events[0] {
3279                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3280                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3281                                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3282                                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3283                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3284                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3285                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3286                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3287                                         },
3288                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3289                                 }
3290                         } else {
3291                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
3292                         }
3293                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3294                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3295                         }
3296
3297                         prev_node = node;
3298                 }
3299
3300                 if !skip_last {
3301                         update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3302
3303                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3304                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3305                         match events[0] {
3306                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
3307                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3308                                         assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3309                                 },
3310                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3311                         }
3312                 }
3313         }
3314
3315         fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3316                 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3317         }
3318
3319         fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3320                 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3321                 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3322                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3323                 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3324
3325                 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3326                 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3327
3328                 for _ in 0..node_count {
3329                         let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3330                         let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3331                         let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3332                         let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3333                         let node_id = {
3334                                 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3335                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3336                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3337                         };
3338                         let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3339                         let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3340                         nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3341                                 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3342                                 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3343                         });
3344                 }
3345
3346                 nodes
3347         }
3348
3349         #[test]
3350         fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3351                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3352                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3353                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3354
3355                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3356                         ($node: expr) => {{
3357                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3358                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3359                                 chan.get_feerate()
3360                         }}
3361                 }
3362
3363                 // balancing
3364                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3365
3366                 // A                                        B
3367                 // update_fee                            ->
3368                 // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
3369                 //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3370                 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3371                 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3372                 //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3373                 // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
3374                 //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
3375                 //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
3376                 // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
3377                 //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3378                 // send (6) RAA                          -.
3379                 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3380                 //                                       <- RAA
3381                 // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
3382
3383                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3384                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3385                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3386
3387                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3388                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3389                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3390                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3391                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3392                         },
3393                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3394                 };
3395
3396                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3397
3398                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3399                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3400                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3401                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3402
3403                 let payment_event = {
3404                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3405                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3406                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3407                 };
3408                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3409                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3410
3411                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3412                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3413                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3414                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3415                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3416
3417                 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3418                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3419                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3420                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3421
3422                 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3423                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3424                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3425                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3426                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3427                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3428                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3429
3430                 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3431                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3432                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3433                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3434                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3435                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3436                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3437
3438                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3439                 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3440                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3441
3442                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3443                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3444                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3445
3446                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3447                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3448
3449                 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3450                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3451                 match events_2[0] {
3452                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3453                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3454                 }
3455
3456                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3457                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3458         }
3459
3460         #[test]
3461         fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3462                 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3463                 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3464                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3465                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3466                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3467
3468                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3469                         ($node: expr) => {{
3470                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3471                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3472                                 chan.get_feerate()
3473                         }}
3474                 }
3475
3476                 // balancing
3477                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3478
3479                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3480                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3481                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3482
3483                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3484                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3485                 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3486                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3487                                 update_fee.as_ref()
3488                         },
3489                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3490                 };
3491
3492                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3493
3494                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3495                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3496                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3497                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3498
3499                 let payment_event = {
3500                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3501                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3502                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3503                 };
3504                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3505                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3506
3507                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3508                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3509                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3510                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3511                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3512
3513                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3514                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3515
3516                 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3517         }
3518
3519         #[test]
3520         fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3521                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3522                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3523                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3524
3525                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3526                         ($node: expr) => {{
3527                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3528                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3529                                 chan.get_feerate()
3530                         }}
3531                 }
3532
3533                 // A                                        B
3534                 // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
3535                 //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3536                 // update_fee (never committed)          ->
3537                 // (3) update_fee                        ->
3538                 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3539                 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3540                 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3541                 //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
3542                 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
3543                 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3544                 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3545                 //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3546                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3547                 //                                          B should send no response here
3548                 // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
3549                 //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3550                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3551
3552                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3553                 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3554                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3555                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3556
3557                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3558                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3559                 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3560                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3561                                 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3562                         },
3563                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3564                 };
3565
3566                 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3567                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3568                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3569                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3570
3571                 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3572                 // transaction:
3573                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3574                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3575
3576                 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3577                 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3578                         channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3579                         feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3580                 };
3581
3582                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3583
3584                 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3585                 // Deliver (3)
3586                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3587
3588                 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3589                 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3590                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3591                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3592                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3593                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3594                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3595                 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3596                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3597                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3598
3599                 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3600                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3601                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3602                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3603
3604                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3605                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3606
3607                 // Delever (4)
3608                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3609                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3610
3611                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3612                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3613
3614                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3615                 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3616                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3617
3618                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3619                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3620         }
3621
3622         #[test]
3623         fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3624                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3625                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3626                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3627
3628                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3629                         ($node: expr) => {{
3630                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3631                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3632                                 chan.get_feerate()
3633                         }}
3634                 }
3635
3636                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3637                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3638
3639                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3640                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3641                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3642                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3643                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3644                         },
3645                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3646                 };
3647                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3648
3649                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3650                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3651                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3652                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3653
3654                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3655                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3656                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3657
3658                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3659                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3660                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3661
3662                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3663                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3664                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3665         }
3666
3667         #[test]
3668         fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3669                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3670                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3671                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3672
3673                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3674                         ($node: expr) => {{
3675                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3676                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3677                                 chan.get_feerate()
3678                         }}
3679                 }
3680
3681                 // balancing
3682                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3683
3684                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3685                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3686
3687                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3688                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3689                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3690                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3691                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3692                         },
3693                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3694                 };
3695                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3696                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3697                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3698                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3699                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3700
3701                 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3702
3703                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3704
3705                 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3706                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3707                 {
3708                         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3709                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3710                         added_monitors.clear();
3711                 }
3712                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3713                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3714                 // node[1] has nothing to do
3715
3716                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3717                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3718                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3719
3720                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3721                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3722                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3723                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3724                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3725
3726                 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3727                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3728                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3729                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3730                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3731                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3732
3733                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3734                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3735                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3736                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3737                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3738                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3739                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3740                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3741
3742                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3743                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3744                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3745                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3746                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3747                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3748
3749                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3750                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3751                 match events[0] {
3752                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3753                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3754                 };
3755                 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3756                 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3757
3758                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3759                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3760                 match events[0] {
3761                         Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3762                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3763                 };
3764
3765                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3766
3767                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3768                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3769                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3770         }
3771
3772         #[test]
3773         fn test_update_fee() {
3774                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3775                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3776                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3777
3778                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3779                         ($node: expr) => {{
3780                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3781                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3782                                 chan.get_feerate()
3783                         }}
3784                 }
3785
3786                 // A                                        B
3787                 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3788                 //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3789                 //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
3790                 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3791                 //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3792                 //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3793                 // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
3794                 //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3795                 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
3796                 //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3797                 //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3798                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3799
3800                 // Create and deliver (1)...
3801                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3802                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3803
3804                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3805                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3806                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3807                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3808                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3809                         },
3810                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3811                 };
3812                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3813
3814                 // Generate (2) and (3):
3815                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3816                 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3817                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3818                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3819
3820                 // Deliver (2):
3821                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3822                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3823                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3824
3825                 // Create and deliver (4)...
3826                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3827                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3828                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3829                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3830                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3831                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3832                         },
3833                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3834                 };
3835                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3836
3837                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3838                 // ... creating (5)
3839                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3840                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3841                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3842
3843                 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3844                 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3845                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3846                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3847
3848                 // Deliver (5):
3849                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3850                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3851                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3852
3853                 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3854                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3855                 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3856                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3857
3858                 // Deliver (7)
3859                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3860                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3861                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3862                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3863                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3864                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3865
3866                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3867                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3868                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3869         }
3870
3871         #[test]
3872         fn fake_network_test() {
3873                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3874                 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3875                 let nodes = create_network(4);
3876
3877                 // Create some initial channels
3878                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3879                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3880                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3881
3882                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3883                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3884                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3885                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3886                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3887
3888                 // Send some more payments
3889                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3890                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3891                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3892
3893                 // Test failure packets
3894                 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3895                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3896
3897                 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3898                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3899
3900                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3901                 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3902                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3903                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3904                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3905                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3906                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3907
3908                 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3909                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3910                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3911                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3912                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3913                         fee_msat: 0,
3914                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3915                 });
3916                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3917                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3918                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3919                         fee_msat: 0,
3920                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3921                 });
3922                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3923                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3924                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3925                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3926                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3927                 });
3928                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3929                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3930                 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3931
3932                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3933                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3934                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3935                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3936                         fee_msat: 0,
3937                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3938                 });
3939                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3940                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3941                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3942                         fee_msat: 0,
3943                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3944                 });
3945                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3946                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3947                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3948                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3949                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3950                 });
3951                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3952                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3953                 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3954
3955                 // Claim the rebalances...
3956                 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3957                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3958
3959                 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3960                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3961
3962                 // Send some payments across both channels
3963                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3964                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3965                 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3966
3967                 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3968
3969                 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3970
3971                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3972                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3973                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3974
3975                 // Close down the channels...
3976                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3977                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3978                 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3979                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3980                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3981         }
3982
3983         #[test]
3984         fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
3985                 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
3986                 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
3987                 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
3988
3989                 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
3990                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
3991                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3992                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3993                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3994                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
3995
3996                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
3997
3998                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3999                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4000
4001                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4002                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4003
4004                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
4005                 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
4006                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
4007         }
4008
4009         #[derive(PartialEq)]
4010         enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
4011         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
4012         ///
4013         /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
4014         /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
4015         /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
4016         ///
4017         /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
4018         /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
4019         ///
4020         /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
4021         /// also fail.
4022         fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4023                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4024                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
4025
4026                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
4027                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4028                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
4029                                 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
4030                                 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
4031                                         res.push(tx.clone());
4032                                 }
4033                                 false
4034                         } else { true }
4035                 });
4036                 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
4037                         res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
4038                 }
4039
4040                 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
4041
4042                 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
4043                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4044                                 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
4045                                         check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
4046                                         if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
4047                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
4048                                         } else {
4049                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
4050                                         }
4051                                         res.push(tx.clone());
4052                                         false
4053                                 } else { true }
4054                         });
4055                         assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
4056                 }
4057
4058                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4059                 res
4060         }
4061
4062         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
4063         /// HTLC transaction.
4064         fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
4065                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4066                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4067                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4068                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
4069                                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
4070                                 false
4071                         } else { true }
4072                 });
4073                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4074         }
4075
4076         fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4077                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4078
4079                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
4080                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4081                 let mut found_prev = false;
4082
4083                 for tx in prev_txn {
4084                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
4085                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
4086                                 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
4087                                 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
4088
4089                                 found_prev = true;
4090                                 break;
4091                         }
4092                 }
4093                 assert!(found_prev);
4094
4095                 let mut res = Vec::new();
4096                 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
4097                 res
4098         }
4099
4100         fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
4101                 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4102                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4103                 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
4104                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4105                                 msg.clone()
4106                         },
4107                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4108                 };
4109
4110                 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4111                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4112                 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
4113                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4114                                 msg.clone()
4115                         },
4116                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4117                 };
4118
4119                 for node in nodes {
4120                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4121                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4122                 }
4123         }
4124
4125         #[test]
4126         fn channel_reserve_test() {
4127                 use util::rng;
4128                 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
4129                 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
4130
4131                 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
4132                         ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
4133                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4134                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
4135                                 chan.get_value_stat()
4136                         }}
4137                 }
4138
4139                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4140                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
4141                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
4142
4143                 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4144                 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4145
4146                 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
4147                 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4148
4149                 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
4150                         ($recv_value: expr) => {{
4151                                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4152                                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4153                                 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
4154                         }}
4155                 };
4156
4157                 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
4158                         ($node: expr) => {{
4159                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4160                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4161                                 match events[0] {
4162                                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4163                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4164                                 };
4165                                 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4166                                 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4167                         }}
4168                 };
4169
4170                 macro_rules! expect_forward {
4171                         ($node: expr) => {{
4172                                 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4173                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4174                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4175                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
4176                                 payment_event
4177                         }}
4178                 }
4179
4180                 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
4181                         ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
4182                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4183                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4184                                 match events[0] {
4185                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4186                                                 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4187                                                 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
4188                                         },
4189                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4190                                 }
4191                         }
4192                 };
4193
4194                 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4195                 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4196
4197                 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4198
4199                 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4200                 {
4201                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4202                         assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4203                         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4204                         match err {
4205                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4206                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4207                         }
4208                 }
4209
4210                 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4211                 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4212                 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4213                 loop {
4214                         let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4215                         if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4216                                 break;
4217                         }
4218                         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4219                         htlc_id += 1;
4220
4221                         let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4222                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4223                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4224                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4225                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4226                         );
4227
4228                         assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4229                         assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4230                         assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4231                         assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4232                         stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4233                 }
4234
4235                 {
4236                         let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4237                         // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4238                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4239                         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4240                         match err {
4241                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4242                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4243                         }
4244                 }
4245
4246                 // adding pending output
4247                 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4248                 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4249
4250                 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4251                 let payment_event_1 = {
4252                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4253                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4254
4255                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4256                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4257                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4258                 };
4259                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4260
4261                 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4262                 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4263                 {
4264                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4265                         match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4266                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4267                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4268                         }
4269                 }
4270
4271                 {
4272                         // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4273                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4274
4275                         // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4276                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4277                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4278                                 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4279                                 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4280                                 session_key
4281                         }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4282
4283                         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4284                         let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4285                         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4286                         let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4287                         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4288                                 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4289                                 htlc_id,
4290                                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4291                                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4292                                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4293                                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4294                         };
4295
4296                         let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4297                         match err {
4298                                 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4299                         }
4300                 }
4301
4302                 // split the rest to test holding cell
4303                 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4304                 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4305                 {
4306                         let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4307                         assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4308                 }
4309
4310                 // now see if they go through on both sides
4311                 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4312                 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4313                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4314                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4315                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4316                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4317
4318                 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4319                 {
4320                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4321                         match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4322                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4323                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4324                         }
4325                 }
4326
4327                 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4328                 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4329                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4330                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4331                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4332                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4333
4334                 // flush the pending htlc
4335                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4336                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4337
4338                 let commitment_update_2 = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
4339                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4340                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4341                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
4342                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4343                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4344                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4345
4346                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4347
4348                 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4349                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4350                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4351
4352                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4353                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4354
4355                 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4356                 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4357                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4358                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4359                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4360                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4361
4362                 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4363                 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4364                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4365                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4366
4367                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4368                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4369
4370                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4371                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4372                 match events[0] {
4373                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4374                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4375                                 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4376                         },
4377                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4378                 }
4379                 match events[1] {
4380                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4381                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4382                                 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4383                         },
4384                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4385                 }
4386
4387                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4388                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4389                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4390
4391                 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4392                 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4393                 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4394                 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4395
4396                 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4397                 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4398         }
4399
4400         #[test]
4401         fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4402                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4403                 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4404                 let nodes = create_network(5);
4405
4406                 // Create some initial channels
4407                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4408                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4409                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4410                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4411
4412                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4413                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4414                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4415                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4416                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4417
4418                 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4419                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4420                 {
4421                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4422                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4423                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4424                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4425                 }
4426                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4427                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4428                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4429
4430                 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4431                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4432
4433                 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4434                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4435                 {
4436                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4437                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4438                         nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4439                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4440                 }
4441                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4442                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4443                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4444
4445                 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4446                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4447                                 {
4448                                         assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4449                                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4450
4451                                         let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4452                                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4453                                         match events[0] {
4454                                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4455                                                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4456                                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4457                                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4458                                                 },
4459                                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4460                                         };
4461                                 }
4462                         }
4463                 }
4464
4465                 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4466                 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4467                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4468                 {
4469                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4470
4471                         // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4472                         claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4473
4474                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4475                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4476
4477                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4478                 }
4479                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4480                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4481                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4482
4483                 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
4484                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4485                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
4486                 }
4487
4488                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4489                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4490                 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4491                 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4492                 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
4493                 // buffer space).
4494
4495                 {
4496                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4497                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4498                         for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
4499                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4500                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4501                         }
4502
4503                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4504
4505                         // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4506                         claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4507
4508                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4509                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4510                         for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
4511                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4512                                 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4513                         }
4514
4515                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4516
4517                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4518                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4519
4520                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4521                 }
4522                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4523                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4524                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4525
4526                 // Create some new channels:
4527                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4528
4529                 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4530                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4531                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4532                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4533                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4534                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4535                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4536                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4537                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4538                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4539                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4540                 // Revoke the old state
4541                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4542
4543                 {
4544                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4545                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4546                         {
4547                                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4548                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4549                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4550                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4551
4552                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4553                                 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4554                         }
4555                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4556
4557                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4558                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4559                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4560                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4561                         test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4562                 }
4563                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4564                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4565                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4566         }
4567
4568         #[test]
4569         fn revoked_output_claim() {
4570                 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4571                 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4572                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4573                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4574                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4575                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4576                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4577                 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4578                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4579                 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4580                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4581
4582                 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4583                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4584                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4585                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4586                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4587
4588                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4589
4590                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4591                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4592
4593                 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4594                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4595                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4596         }
4597
4598         #[test]
4599         fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4600                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4601                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4602
4603                 // Create some new channel:
4604                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4605
4606                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4607                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4608                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4609                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4610                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4611
4612                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4613                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4614                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4615                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4616                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4617                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4618                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4619                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4620                 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4621
4622                 //Revoke the old state
4623                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4624
4625                 {
4626                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4627
4628                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4629
4630                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4631                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4632                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4633
4634                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4635                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4636
4637                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4638
4639                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4640                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4641                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4642                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4643                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4644                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4645                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4646                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4647
4648                         // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4649                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4650                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4651
4652                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4653                         let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4654                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4655                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4656                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4657                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4658                 }
4659                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4660                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4661                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4662         }
4663
4664         #[test]
4665         fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4666                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4667                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4668
4669                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4670
4671                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4672                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4673                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4674                 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4675                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4676                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4677
4678                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4679                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4680
4681                 //Revoke the old state
4682                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4683
4684                 {
4685                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4686
4687                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4688
4689                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4690                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4691                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4692
4693                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4694                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4695                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4696                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4697                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4698                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4699                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4700
4701                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4702                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4703                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4704
4705                         let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4706                         revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4707                         node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4708                         node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4709                         node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4710
4711                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4712                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4713                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4714                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4715                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4716                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4717                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4718                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4719
4720                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4721                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4722
4723                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4724                         let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4725                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4726                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4727                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4728                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4729                 }
4730                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4731                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4732                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4733         }
4734
4735         #[test]
4736         fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4737                 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4738                 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4739                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4740                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4741
4742                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4743                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4744                 {
4745                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4746                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4747                         match events[0] {
4748                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4749                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4750                                 },
4751                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4752                         }
4753                 }
4754
4755                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4756                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4757
4758                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4759                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4760
4761                 {
4762                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4763                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4764                         match events[0] {
4765                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4766                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4767                                 },
4768                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4769                         }
4770                 }
4771
4772                 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4773                 // registering new transactions
4774                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4775         }
4776
4777         #[test]
4778         fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4779                 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4780                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4781                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4782                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4783
4784                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4785
4786                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4787
4788                 let mut payment_event = {
4789                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4790                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4791
4792                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4793                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4794                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4795                 };
4796
4797                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4798                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4799
4800                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4801                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4802                 match events_1[0] {
4803                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4804                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4805                 };
4806
4807                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4808                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4809
4810                 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4811                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4812                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4813                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4814
4815                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4816                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4817                 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4818                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4819
4820                 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4821                 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4822                 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4823
4824                 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4825                 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4826                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4827                 match events_3[0] {
4828                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4829                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4830                         },
4831                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4832                 }
4833
4834                 let tx = {
4835                         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4836                         // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4837                         // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4838                         // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4839                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4840                         node_txn.remove(0)
4841                 };
4842
4843                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4844                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4845
4846                 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4847                 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4848                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4849                 match events_4[0] {
4850                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4851                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4852                         },
4853                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4854                 }
4855
4856                 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4857                 {
4858                         let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4859                         monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4860                                 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4861                 }
4862                 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4863                 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4864                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4865                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4866                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4867                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4868                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4869
4870                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
4871         }
4872
4873         #[test]
4874         fn test_unconf_chan() {
4875                 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
4876                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4877                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4878
4879                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4880                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
4881                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
4882                 mem::drop(channel_state);
4883
4884                 let mut headers = Vec::new();
4885                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4886                 headers.push(header.clone());
4887                 for _i in 2..100 {
4888                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4889                         headers.push(header.clone());
4890                 }
4891                 while !headers.is_empty() {
4892                         nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
4893                 }
4894                 {
4895                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4896                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4897                         match events[0] {
4898                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4899                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4900                                 },
4901                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4902                         }
4903                 }
4904                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4905                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
4906                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
4907         }
4908
4909         /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
4910         /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
4911         fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
4912                 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4913                 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4914
4915                 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
4916                 for msg in reestablish_1 {
4917                         resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4918                 }
4919                 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4920                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4921                 } else {
4922                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
4923                 }
4924
4925                 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
4926                 for msg in reestablish_2 {
4927                         resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4928                 }
4929                 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4930                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4931                 } else {
4932                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4933                 }
4934
4935                 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
4936                 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
4937                         (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
4938
4939                 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
4940                         if pre_all_htlcs {
4941                                 let a = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap());
4942                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = a.unwrap();
4943                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4944                         } else {
4945                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4946                         }
4947                         if pending_raa.0 {
4948                                 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
4949                                 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
4950                                 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4951                         } else {
4952                                 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4953                         }
4954                         if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4955                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4956                                 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4957                                         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
4958                                 } else {
4959                                         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4960                                 }
4961                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
4962                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
4963                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4964                                 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
4965                                         node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
4966                                 }
4967                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4968                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4969                                 }
4970                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4971                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4972                                 }
4973
4974                                 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4975                                         commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4976                                 } else {
4977                                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4978                                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4979                                         assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
4980                                         assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4981                                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4982                                 }
4983                         } else {
4984                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4985                         }
4986                 }
4987
4988                 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
4989                         if pre_all_htlcs {
4990                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
4991                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4992                         } else {
4993                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4994                         }
4995                         if pending_raa.1 {
4996                                 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
4997                                 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
4998                                 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4999                         } else {
5000                                 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5001                         }
5002                         if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5003                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5004                                 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5005                                         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
5006                                 }
5007                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5008                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5009                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5010                                 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5011                                         node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5012                                 }
5013                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5014                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5015                                 }
5016                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5017                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5018                                 }
5019
5020                                 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5021                                         commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5022                                 } else {
5023                                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5024                                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5025                                         assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5026                                         assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5027                                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5028                                 }
5029                         } else {
5030                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5031                         }
5032                 }
5033         }
5034
5035         #[test]
5036         fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
5037                 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
5038                 let nodes = create_network(3);
5039                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5040                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5041
5042                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5043                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5044                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5045
5046                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5047                 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5048                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
5049                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
5050
5051                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5052                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5053                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5054
5055                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5056                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5057                 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5058                 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5059
5060                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5061                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5062
5063                 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
5064                 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
5065
5066                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
5067                 {
5068                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5069                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5070                         match events[0] {
5071                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
5072                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
5073                                 },
5074                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5075                         }
5076                         match events[1] {
5077                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
5078                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
5079                                         assert!(rejected_by_dest);
5080                                 },
5081                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5082                         }
5083                 }
5084
5085                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
5086                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
5087         }
5088
5089         fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
5090                 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
5091                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5092                 if messages_delivered == 0 {
5093                         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5094                         // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
5095                 } else {
5096                         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5097                 }
5098
5099                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5100                 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5101
5102                 let payment_event = {
5103                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5104                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5105
5106                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5107                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5108                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5109                 };
5110                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
5111
5112                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5113                         // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
5114                 } else {
5115                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5116                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5117                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5118
5119                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5120                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5121                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5122
5123                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5124                                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5125                                         assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5126                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5127
5128                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5129                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5130                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5131                                         }
5132                                 }
5133                         }
5134                 }
5135
5136                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5137                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5138                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5139                         // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
5140                         // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
5141                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5142                 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5143                         // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5144                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5145                 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5146                         // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5147                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5148                 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5149                         // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5150                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5151                 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5152                         // Everything was delivered...
5153                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5154                 }
5155
5156                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5157                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5158                 match events_1[0] {
5159                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5160                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5161                 };
5162
5163                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5164                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5165                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5166
5167                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5168                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5169
5170                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5171                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5172                 match events_2[0] {
5173                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5174                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5175                                 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5176                         },
5177                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5178                 }
5179
5180                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5181                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5182
5183                 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5184                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5185                 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
5186                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5187                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5188                                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5189                                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5190                                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5191                                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5192                                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5193                                 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5194                         },
5195                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5196                 };
5197
5198                 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
5199                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
5200
5201                         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5202                         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5203                         match events_4[0] {
5204                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5205                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5206                                 },
5207                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5208                         }
5209
5210                         if messages_delivered >= 2 {
5211                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
5212                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5213
5214                                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5215                                         assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5216                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5217
5218                                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5219                                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5220                                                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5221                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5222
5223                                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5224                                                         assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5225                                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5226                                                 }
5227                                         }
5228                                 }
5229                         }
5230                 }
5231
5232                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5233                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5234                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5235                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5236                         //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
5237                         //if messages_delivered < 1 {
5238                                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5239                                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5240                                 match events_4[0] {
5241                                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5242                                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5243                                         },
5244                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5245                                 }
5246                         //}
5247                 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5248                         // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5249                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5250                 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5251                         // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5252                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5253                 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5254                         // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5255                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5256                 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5257                         // Everything was delivered...
5258                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5259                 }
5260
5261                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5262                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5263                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5264
5265                 // Channel should still work fine...
5266                 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
5267                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5268         }
5269
5270         #[test]
5271         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
5272                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
5273                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
5274                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
5275         }
5276
5277         #[test]
5278         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
5279                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
5280                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
5281                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
5282         }
5283
5284         #[test]
5285         fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
5286                 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
5287                 let nodes = create_network(2);
5288                 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5289
5290                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5291                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5292
5293                 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5294                 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5295                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5296                 match events_1[0] {
5297                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5298                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5299                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5300                         },
5301                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5302                 }
5303
5304                 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5305                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5306                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5307                 match events_2[0] {
5308                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5309                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5310                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5311                         },
5312                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5313                 }
5314
5315                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5316                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5317                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5318                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5319
5320                 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
5321                 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
5322
5323                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5324                 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5325                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
5326         }
5327
5328         #[test]
5329         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
5330                 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
5331                 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
5332                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5333                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5334
5335                 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5336
5337                 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5338                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5339                 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5340
5341                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
5342                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5343
5344                 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5345                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5346                 match events_1[0] {
5347                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5348                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5349                 }
5350
5351                 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5352                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5353
5354                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5355                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5356                 match events_2[0] {
5357                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5358                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5359                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5360                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5361                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5362                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5363                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5364
5365                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5366                                 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5367                                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5368                                 match events_3[0] {
5369                                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5370                                                 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5371                                         },
5372                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5373                                 }
5374
5375                                 let (_, commitment_update) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
5376                                 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
5377                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5378                         },
5379                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5380                 }
5381
5382                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5383                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5384
5385                 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5386                 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5387                 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5388                 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5389
5390                 let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5391                 let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5392
5393                 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5394                 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5395
5396                 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5397                 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5398
5399                 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5400
5401                 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5402                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5403                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5404                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5405                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5406                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5407                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5408                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5409                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5410
5411                 let bs_second_commitment_signed = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap().unwrap();
5412                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5413                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5414                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5415                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5416                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5417                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5418
5419                 let as_commitment_signed = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5420                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5421                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5422                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5423                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5424                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5425                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5426
5427                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5428                 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
5429                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5430
5431                 let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5432                 assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none());
5433                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5434
5435                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5436                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5437
5438                 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5439                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5440                 match events_4[0] {
5441                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5442                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5443                 };
5444
5445                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5446                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5447
5448                 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5449                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5450                 match events_5[0] {
5451                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
5452                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5453                         },
5454                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5455                 }
5456
5457                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5458                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5459
5460                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5461         }
5462
5463         #[test]
5464         fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
5465                 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
5466                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5467                 let nodes = create_network(2);
5468
5469                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
5470
5471                 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5472                 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5473                 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5474                 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5475
5476                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
5477
5478                 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5479                 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5480
5481                 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5482                 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5483
5484                 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
5485
5486                 let mut chan_announcement;
5487
5488                 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
5489                         () => {
5490                                 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5491                                         features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
5492                                         chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
5493                                         short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5494                                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
5495                                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
5496                                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
5497                                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
5498                                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
5499                                 };
5500                         }
5501                 }
5502
5503                 macro_rules! sign_msg {
5504                         ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
5505                                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
5506                                 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5507                                 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5508                                 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
5509                                 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
5510                                 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5511                                         node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
5512                                         node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
5513                                         bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
5514                                         bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
5515                                         contents: $unsigned_msg
5516                                 }
5517                         }
5518                 }
5519
5520                 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5521                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5522                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
5523                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
5524
5525                 // Configured with Network::Testnet
5526                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5527                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
5528                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5529                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
5530
5531                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5532                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
5533                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5534                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
5535         }
5536 }