1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
7 use bitcoin::util::uint::Uint256;
9 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
10 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
11 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
14 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
15 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
16 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
17 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
18 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
20 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable};
21 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
22 use util::sha2::Sha256;
25 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
26 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
27 use crypto::digest::Digest;
28 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
29 use crypto::chacha20::ChaCha20;
31 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
32 use std::collections::HashMap;
33 use std::collections::hash_map;
35 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
37 mod channel_held_info {
40 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
41 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
42 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
43 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
44 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
45 pub(super) prev_short_channel_id: u64,
46 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
47 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
50 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
51 impl PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
52 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
55 payment_hash: [0; 32],
57 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
59 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
64 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
65 pub enum HTLCFailReason {
67 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
75 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
77 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
78 HTLCFailReason::Reason {
79 failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(),
84 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
85 pub use self::channel_held_info::*;
86 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
87 pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*;
89 enum PendingOutboundHTLC {
91 source_short_channel_id: u64,
92 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
96 session_priv: SecretKey,
98 /// Used for channel rebalancing
100 source_short_channel_id: u64,
101 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
103 session_priv: SecretKey,
107 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
108 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
109 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
110 /// probably increase this significantly.
111 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
113 struct ChannelHolder {
114 by_id: HashMap<Uint256, Channel>,
115 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, Uint256>,
116 next_forward: Instant,
117 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
118 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
119 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
121 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
122 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<Uint256, Channel>,
123 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Uint256>,
124 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
125 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
126 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
127 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
130 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
132 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
133 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
134 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
135 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
136 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
137 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
142 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
143 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
144 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
145 /// to individual Channels.
146 pub struct ChannelManager {
147 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
148 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
149 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
150 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
151 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
153 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
154 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
157 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
158 our_network_key: SecretKey,
160 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
163 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
165 macro_rules! secp_call {
169 //TODO: Make the err a parameter!
170 Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Key error", msg: None})
177 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
179 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
180 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
185 pub struct ChannelDetails {
186 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
187 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
188 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
189 /// lifetime of the channel.
190 pub channel_id: Uint256,
191 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
192 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
193 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
194 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
195 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
196 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
200 impl ChannelManager {
201 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
202 /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
203 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
204 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
205 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
206 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
207 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
209 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
210 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
211 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
212 monitor: monitor.clone(),
216 announce_channels_publicly,
217 fee_proportional_millionths,
220 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
221 by_id: HashMap::new(),
222 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
223 next_forward: Instant::now(),
224 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
225 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
229 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
231 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
232 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
236 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
237 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
238 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
239 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
240 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
241 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
242 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
243 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
244 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
246 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
247 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
248 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
249 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
250 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
251 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
252 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
253 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
256 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
257 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
258 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
260 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
264 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id);
265 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?;
266 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
267 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
268 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
272 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
273 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
274 node_id: their_network_key,
280 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
281 /// more information.
282 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
283 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
284 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
285 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
286 res.push(ChannelDetails {
287 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
288 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
289 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
290 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
291 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
297 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
298 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
299 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
300 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &Uint256) -> Result<msgs::Shutdown, HandleError> {
301 let (res, chan_option) = {
302 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
303 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
304 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
305 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
306 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
307 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
308 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
309 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
311 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
312 } else { (res, None) }
314 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", msg: None})
317 for payment_hash in res.1 {
318 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
319 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
321 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
322 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
323 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
324 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
333 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
335 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
336 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
337 let mut res = [0; 32];
338 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
342 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
343 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
344 let mut res = [0; 32];
345 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
351 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
352 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
353 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
354 let mut res = [0; 32];
355 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
360 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
361 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
362 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
363 let mut res = [0; 32];
364 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
368 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
370 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
371 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
372 let mut blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
373 let mut first_iteration = true;
375 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
376 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
378 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
379 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
380 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
381 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
382 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
385 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
386 first_iteration = false;
388 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
390 secp_call!(blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor))));
391 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
393 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
399 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
400 fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, HandleError> {
401 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
403 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
404 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
410 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
420 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
421 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
422 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
423 let mut cur_cltv = 0u32;
424 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
425 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
426 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
427 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
429 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
430 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
431 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
432 // the intended recipient).
433 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
434 let cltv = if cur_cltv == 0 { hop.cltv_expiry_delta } else { cur_cltv };
435 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
437 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
438 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
439 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
440 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
444 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
445 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
446 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", msg: None});
448 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
449 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
450 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", msg: None});
452 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
454 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
458 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
460 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
468 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
469 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
471 for i in 0..dst.len() {
476 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
477 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, HandleError> {
478 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
479 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
482 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
483 let end_len = iters * 65;
484 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
485 res.resize(end_len, 0);
487 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
488 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
489 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
490 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
491 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
496 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
497 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
499 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
500 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
501 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
502 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
504 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
505 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
506 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
509 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
512 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
513 hmac.input(&packet_data);
514 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
515 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
518 Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{
520 public_key: onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey,
521 hop_data: packet_data,
526 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
527 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
528 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
529 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
531 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
532 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
533 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
534 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
535 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
536 data: packet_crypted,
540 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
541 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
543 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
546 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
547 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
548 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
549 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
553 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
554 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
557 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
559 failuremsg: failuremsg,
563 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
564 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
565 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
571 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
572 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
573 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
576 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
577 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
578 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
579 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", msg: None}),
583 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap().serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
585 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
586 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
587 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
588 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
589 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
590 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
591 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
592 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
593 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
596 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
597 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).unwrap(); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
599 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
605 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
606 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
607 /// fields for more info.
608 /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
609 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
610 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
611 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
612 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", msg: None});
614 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
615 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
616 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
617 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", msg: None});
621 let session_priv = secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
622 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
623 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
627 let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here?
629 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv)?;
630 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route)?;
631 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, associated_data)?;
633 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
634 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
635 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
636 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", msg: None}),
637 Some(id) => id.clone()
640 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
641 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
642 return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", msg: None});
644 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
647 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
649 if channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
653 // TODO: We need to track these better, we're not generating these, so a
654 // third-party might make this happen:
655 panic!("payment_hash was repeated! Don't let this happen");
659 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
660 None => return Ok(()),
664 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
665 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
668 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
669 events.push(events::Event::SendHTLCs {
670 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
671 msgs: vec![update_add],
672 commitment_msg: commitment_signed,
677 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
678 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
679 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &Uint256, funding_txo: OutPoint) {
680 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
681 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
682 match channel_state.by_id.remove(&temporary_channel_id) {
684 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
686 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
689 //TODO: Push e to pendingevents
696 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
697 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
698 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
701 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
702 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
703 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
708 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
709 channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan);
712 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
713 if !chan.is_usable() { return Ok(None) }
715 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
716 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
717 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
719 Ok(Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
720 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
721 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
722 node_signature: our_node_sig,
723 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
727 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forward(&self) {
728 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
729 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
731 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
732 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
734 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
738 for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
739 if short_chan_id != 0 {
740 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
741 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
743 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
744 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
745 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
750 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
752 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
753 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
754 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
756 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
757 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
762 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
764 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
765 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
766 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
767 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
768 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
769 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
770 // this channel currently :/.
777 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
778 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
781 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
785 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::SendHTLCs {
786 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
788 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
792 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
793 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
794 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
795 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
802 for failed_forward in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
803 match failed_forward.2 {
804 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: Vec::new() }),
805 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
809 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
811 new_events.retain(|event| {
812 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
813 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
814 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
820 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
821 events.reserve(new_events.len());
822 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
823 events.push(event.1);
827 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
828 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
829 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() })
832 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool {
833 let mut pending_htlc = {
834 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) {
835 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
836 None => return false,
841 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
842 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.clone(), PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
846 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
852 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
853 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
854 mem::drop(channel_state);
856 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
857 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
858 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
862 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => {
863 let err_packet = match onion_error {
864 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
865 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
866 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
868 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
869 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
873 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
874 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
875 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
879 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
880 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(payment_hash, err_packet) {
881 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
883 //TODO: Do something with e?
890 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
891 mem::drop(channel_state);
893 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
894 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
897 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
898 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFailHTLC {
901 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
912 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
913 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
914 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
915 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
916 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
917 self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true)
919 pub fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
920 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
921 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
922 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
923 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
925 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
926 let mut pending_htlc = {
927 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
928 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
929 None => return false,
934 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
935 if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us
936 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
937 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv });
938 } else { // This came from the first upstream node
939 // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow???
940 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv };
941 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret });
948 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
949 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
951 panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this...");
953 mem::drop(channel_state);
954 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
955 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
960 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => {
961 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
962 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
963 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
967 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
968 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(payment_preimage) {
969 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
971 //TODO: Do something with e?
977 mem::drop(channel_state);
979 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
980 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
981 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
984 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
985 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFulfillHTLC {
998 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
999 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1000 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap()
1003 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1004 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1006 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1011 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1012 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1013 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1014 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1015 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1020 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1021 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1022 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1024 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1025 let mut short_to_ids_to_insert = Vec::new();
1026 let mut short_to_ids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1027 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1028 if let Some(funding_locked) = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched) {
1029 let announcement_sigs = match self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1032 //TODO: push e on events and blow up the channel (it has bad keys)
1036 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1037 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1038 msg: funding_locked,
1039 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1041 short_to_ids_to_insert.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()));
1043 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1044 for tx in txn_matched {
1045 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1046 if inp.prev_hash == funding_txo.txid && inp.prev_index == funding_txo.index as u32 {
1047 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1048 short_to_ids_to_remove.push(short_id);
1050 channel.force_shutdown();
1051 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1052 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1061 if channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1062 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1063 short_to_ids_to_remove.push(short_id);
1065 channel.force_shutdown();
1066 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1067 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1075 for to_remove in short_to_ids_to_remove {
1076 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&to_remove);
1078 for to_insert in short_to_ids_to_insert {
1079 channel_state.short_to_id.insert(to_insert.0, to_insert.1);
1082 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1083 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1084 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1088 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
1089 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1090 for channel in channel_state.by_id.values_mut() {
1091 if channel.block_disconnected(header) {
1092 //TODO Close channel here
1098 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
1099 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
1100 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
1101 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1102 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown genesis block hash", msg: None});
1104 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1105 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1106 return Err(HandleError{err: "temporary_channel_id collision!", msg: None});
1109 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1111 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1112 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1113 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1114 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1115 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1116 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1117 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1118 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1121 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1122 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1123 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1125 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1129 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, self.announce_channels_publicly)?;
1130 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel()?;
1131 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1135 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1136 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1137 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1138 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1140 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1141 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1143 chan.accept_channel(&msg)?;
1144 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1146 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1149 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1150 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1151 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1152 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1153 output_script: output_script,
1154 user_channel_id: user_id,
1159 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
1160 //TODO: broke this - a node shouldn't be able to get their channel removed by sending a
1161 //funding_created a second time, or long after the first, or whatever (note this also
1162 //leaves the short_to_id map in a busted state.
1163 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1164 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1165 match channel_state.by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1167 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1168 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1170 match chan.funding_created(msg) {
1171 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1172 (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update)
1179 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1181 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1182 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1183 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1184 // for a bogus channel.
1185 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1188 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1189 channel_state.by_id.insert(funding_msg.channel_id, chan);
1193 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1194 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1195 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1196 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1198 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1199 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1201 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg)?;
1202 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1204 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1207 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1210 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1211 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1212 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1213 user_channel_id: user_id,
1218 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
1219 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1220 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1222 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1223 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1225 chan.funding_locked(&msg)?;
1226 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan)?);
1228 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1232 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
1233 let (res, chan_option) = {
1234 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1235 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1237 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1238 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1239 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1240 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1242 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1243 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1244 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1245 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1247 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1248 } else { (res, None) }
1250 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1253 for payment_hash in res.2 {
1254 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1255 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1257 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1258 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1259 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1260 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1268 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
1269 let (res, chan_option) = {
1270 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1271 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1272 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1273 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1274 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1275 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1277 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1278 if res.1.is_some() {
1279 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1280 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1281 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1282 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1283 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1284 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1285 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1287 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1288 } else { (res, None) }
1290 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1293 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1294 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1296 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1297 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1298 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1299 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1307 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
1308 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1309 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1310 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1312 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1313 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1314 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1315 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1317 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key);
1318 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1320 let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here?
1322 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
1325 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1326 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1327 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
1328 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
1334 macro_rules! return_err {
1335 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1336 return Err(msgs::HandleError {
1338 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::UpdateFailHTLC {
1339 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1340 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1341 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1342 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1349 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1350 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1351 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1352 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1353 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1354 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1355 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1356 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1359 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1360 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1361 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
1362 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1363 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1366 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1367 let next_hop_data = {
1368 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1369 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1370 match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
1372 let error_code = match err {
1373 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
1374 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1376 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1382 let mut pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1384 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
1385 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1387 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1388 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1391 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1392 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1393 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1394 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1396 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1398 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1399 short_channel_id: 0,
1400 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1401 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1402 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1405 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1406 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1407 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1409 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone();
1411 let blinding_factor = {
1412 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1413 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1414 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
1415 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1416 sha.result(&mut res);
1417 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1419 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1421 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1427 match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1429 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1431 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1436 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1438 public_key: new_pubkey,
1439 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1440 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1443 //TODO: Check amt_to_forward and outgoing_cltv_value are within acceptable ranges!
1445 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1446 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1447 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1448 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1449 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1450 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1451 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1455 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1456 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1458 if pending_forward_info.onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1459 let forwarding_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&pending_forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1461 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1463 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1465 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1466 if !chan.is_live() {
1467 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap();
1468 return_err!("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x4000 | 7, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1472 let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
1474 // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
1475 // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
1476 // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
1477 // we send permanent_node_failure.
1478 match &claimable_htlcs_entry {
1479 &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) => {
1480 let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
1482 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1483 acceptable_cycle = pending_forward_info.short_channel_id == 0;
1487 if !acceptable_cycle {
1488 return_err!("Payment looped through us twice", 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1494 let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1496 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1497 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1499 if !chan.is_usable() {
1500 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", msg: None});
1502 let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
1503 pending_forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1504 (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
1506 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}), //TODO: panic?
1509 match claimable_htlcs_entry {
1510 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
1511 let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
1512 let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route {
1513 &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1514 (route.clone(), session_priv.clone())
1516 _ => { panic!("WAT") },
1518 *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
1519 source_short_channel_id,
1520 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1525 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1526 e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
1527 source_short_channel_id,
1528 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1536 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1537 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1538 // Claim funds first, cause we don't really care if the channel we received the message on
1539 // is broken, we may have enough info to get our own money!
1540 self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false);
1543 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1544 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1546 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1547 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1549 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)?
1551 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1554 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1560 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
1561 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1562 let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1564 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1565 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1567 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1569 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1572 if let Some(pending_htlc) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.get(&payment_hash) {
1573 match pending_htlc {
1574 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1575 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1576 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1578 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1579 if res.is_some() { return; }
1581 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1583 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1584 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1585 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1586 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1587 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1589 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::decode(&packet_decrypted) {
1590 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1591 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1593 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1594 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1595 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1596 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1597 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1598 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1599 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1600 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1601 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1602 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1603 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1604 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1605 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::decode(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len]) {
1606 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1614 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1615 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1616 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1617 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1620 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1635 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1636 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1637 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1639 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1640 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1642 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1644 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1648 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
1649 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1650 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1651 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1653 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1654 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1656 chan.commitment_signed(&msg)?
1658 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1661 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1665 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1668 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
1669 let (res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor) = {
1670 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1671 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1673 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1674 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1676 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)?
1678 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1681 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1684 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1685 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failure.0, failure.1);
1688 let mut forward_event = None;
1689 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1690 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1691 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1692 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1693 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1695 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1696 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1697 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1698 entry.get_mut().push(forward_info);
1700 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1701 entry.insert(vec!(forward_info));
1706 match forward_event {
1708 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1709 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1710 time_forwardable: time
1719 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1720 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1721 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1723 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1724 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1726 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)
1728 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1732 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1733 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1734 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1735 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1737 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1738 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1740 if !chan.is_usable() {
1741 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", msg: None });
1744 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1745 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
1747 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1748 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1749 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }));
1750 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }));
1752 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
1754 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1755 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1756 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1757 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1758 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1759 contents: announcement,
1760 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1762 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1765 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1766 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1770 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
1771 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1773 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1774 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1775 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1776 if no_connection_possible {
1777 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
1778 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1779 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1780 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1782 let txn_to_broadcast = chan.force_shutdown();
1783 for tx in txn_to_broadcast {
1784 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1786 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1787 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1797 for chan in channel_state.by_id {
1798 if chan.1.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1799 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). Also
1800 //fail and wipe any uncommitted outbound HTLCs as those are considered after
1806 if !new_events.is_empty() {
1807 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1808 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1809 pending_events.push(event);
1817 use chain::chaininterface;
1818 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
1819 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
1820 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
1822 use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
1823 use util::test_utils;
1824 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1826 use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
1827 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
1828 use bitcoin::util::uint::Uint256;
1829 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
1830 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
1831 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1832 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
1833 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
1835 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
1836 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
1838 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
1839 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1841 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1843 use std::collections::HashMap;
1844 use std::default::Default;
1845 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
1846 use std::time::Instant;
1849 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
1850 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
1851 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1856 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1857 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1860 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1861 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1864 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1865 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1868 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1869 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1872 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1873 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1878 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1880 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
1881 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
1886 fn onion_vectors() {
1887 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
1888 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1890 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
1891 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
1892 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
1893 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex_bytes("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
1894 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex_bytes("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
1896 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
1897 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
1898 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
1899 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex_bytes("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
1900 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex_bytes("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
1902 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
1903 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
1904 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
1905 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex_bytes("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
1906 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex_bytes("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
1908 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
1909 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
1910 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
1911 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex_bytes("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
1912 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex_bytes("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
1914 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
1915 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
1916 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
1917 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex_bytes("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
1918 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex_bytes("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
1920 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
1921 let payloads = vec!(
1922 msgs::OnionHopData {
1924 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1925 short_channel_id: 0,
1927 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1931 msgs::OnionHopData {
1933 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1934 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
1935 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
1936 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1940 msgs::OnionHopData {
1942 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1943 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
1944 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
1945 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1949 msgs::OnionHopData {
1951 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1952 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
1953 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
1954 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1958 msgs::OnionHopData {
1960 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1961 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
1962 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
1963 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1969 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, hex_bytes("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()).unwrap();
1970 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
1972 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1976 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
1977 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
1979 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1980 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
1981 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1983 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
1984 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1986 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
1987 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1989 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
1990 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex_bytes("a5d3e8634cfe78b2307d87c6d90be6fe7855b4f2cc9b1dfb19e92e4b79103f61ff9ac25f412ddfb7466e74f81b3e545563cdd8f5524dae873de61d7bdfccd496af2584930d2b566b4f8d3881f8c043df92224f38cf094cfc09d92655989531524593ec6d6caec1863bdfaa79229b5020acc034cd6deeea1021c50586947b9b8e6faa83b81fbfa6133c0af5d6b07c017f7158fa94f0d206baf12dda6b68f785b773b360fd0497e16cc402d779c8d48d0fa6315536ef0660f3f4e1865f5b38ea49c7da4fd959de4e83ff3ab686f059a45c65ba2af4a6a79166aa0f496bf04d06987b6d2ea205bdb0d347718b9aeff5b61dfff344993a275b79717cd815b6ad4c0beb568c4ac9c36ff1c315ec1119a1993c4b61e6eaa0375e0aaf738ac691abd3263bf937e3").unwrap());
1992 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
1993 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1995 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
1996 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1999 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2000 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2001 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2003 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2004 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2009 feeest: Arc<test_utils::TestFeeEstimator>,
2010 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2011 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2012 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2014 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2018 static mut CHAN_COUNT: u32 = 0;
2019 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Uint256, Transaction) {
2020 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42).unwrap();
2022 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2023 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2024 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2025 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2026 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2027 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2029 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2032 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2034 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
2038 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2039 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2041 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2042 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2043 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2045 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2046 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2048 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2050 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2051 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2052 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2053 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2054 added_monitors.clear();
2056 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2059 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2060 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2061 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2062 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2063 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2064 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2065 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2066 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2067 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2068 added_monitors.clear();
2071 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2074 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2076 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2077 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2078 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2079 added_monitors.clear();
2082 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2083 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2085 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2086 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2087 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2089 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2092 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2093 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2094 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2096 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2097 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2098 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2099 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2101 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2106 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2107 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2108 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2109 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2110 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2111 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2112 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2113 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2114 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2115 as_announcement_sigs
2117 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2120 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2121 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2122 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2123 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2126 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2129 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2130 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2131 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2132 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2133 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2134 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2137 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2144 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2147 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Uint256, Transaction) {
2148 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2150 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2151 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2152 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2154 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2157 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &Uint256, funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2158 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2159 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2162 let shutdown_a = node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2163 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2164 if !close_inbound_first {
2165 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2167 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2168 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2169 if close_inbound_first {
2170 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2171 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2172 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2173 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2175 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2176 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2177 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2178 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2180 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2181 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2182 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2184 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2185 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2186 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2187 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2189 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2190 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2191 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2192 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2194 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2195 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2196 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
2197 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2200 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2203 let events_2 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2204 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2205 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
2206 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2209 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2212 (as_update, bs_update)
2217 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2218 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2221 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2223 Event::SendHTLCs { node_id, msgs, commitment_msg } => {
2224 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: msgs, commitment_msg: commitment_msg }
2226 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2231 static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0;
2232 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2233 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2234 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2235 let our_payment_hash = {
2236 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2237 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2238 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2239 sha.result(&mut ret);
2243 let mut payment_event = {
2244 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2246 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2247 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2248 added_monitors.clear();
2251 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2252 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2253 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2255 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2257 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2258 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2260 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2262 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2263 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2266 let revoke_and_ack = node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
2268 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2269 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2270 added_monitors.clear();
2272 assert!(prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2273 let prev_revoke_and_ack = prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2275 let mut added_monitors = prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2276 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2277 added_monitors.clear();
2279 assert!(node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &prev_revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2280 assert!(prev_revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2282 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2283 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2284 added_monitors.clear();
2287 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2288 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2290 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2291 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2294 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2295 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forward();
2297 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2298 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2299 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2301 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2302 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2303 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2305 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2309 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2310 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2311 added_monitors.clear();
2313 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2314 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2320 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2323 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2324 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2326 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2327 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2328 added_monitors.clear();
2331 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2332 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2333 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2335 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2337 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2339 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2341 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2342 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2344 added_monitors.clear();
2346 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2348 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2349 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2350 added_monitors.clear();
2352 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2353 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2354 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2356 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2357 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2358 added_monitors.clear();
2360 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2362 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2363 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2364 added_monitors.clear();
2370 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2371 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2372 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2373 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2374 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2375 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2378 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2379 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2381 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2382 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2383 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2385 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2391 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2392 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2394 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2395 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2397 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2398 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2400 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2404 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2406 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2407 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2408 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2409 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2410 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2413 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2416 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2417 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2418 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2419 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2420 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2423 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2424 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2425 let our_payment_hash = {
2426 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2427 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2428 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2429 sha.result(&mut ret);
2433 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2434 assert_eq!(err.err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight");
2437 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2438 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2439 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2442 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2443 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2445 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2446 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2447 added_monitors.clear();
2450 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2451 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2452 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2454 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2455 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2458 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2459 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2460 added_monitors.clear();
2462 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2464 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2465 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2466 added_monitors.clear();
2468 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2470 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2471 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2472 added_monitors.clear();
2474 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2475 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2476 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2478 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2480 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2482 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2483 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2485 added_monitors.clear();
2491 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2492 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2493 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2494 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2495 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2496 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2499 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2500 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2502 Event::SendFailHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2503 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2504 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2506 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2512 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2513 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2515 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2516 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2518 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2519 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2521 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2525 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2526 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2527 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2528 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2530 for _ in 0..node_count {
2531 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
2532 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
2533 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2534 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
2536 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2537 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2538 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2540 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()).unwrap();
2541 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id).unwrap());
2542 nodes.push(Node { feeest, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node_id, node, router });
2549 fn fake_network_test() {
2550 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2551 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
2552 let nodes = create_network(4);
2554 // Create some initial channels
2555 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2556 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2557 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2559 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2560 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2561 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2562 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2563 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2565 // Send some more payments
2566 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2567 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
2568 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
2570 // Test failure packets
2571 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
2572 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
2574 // Add a new channel that skips 3
2575 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2577 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2578 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2579 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2580 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2581 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2582 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2583 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2585 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
2586 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2587 hops.push(RouteHop {
2588 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2589 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2591 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2593 hops.push(RouteHop {
2594 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2595 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2597 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2599 hops.push(RouteHop {
2600 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2601 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2603 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2605 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2606 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2607 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
2609 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2610 hops.push(RouteHop {
2611 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2612 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2614 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2616 hops.push(RouteHop {
2617 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2618 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2620 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2622 hops.push(RouteHop {
2623 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2624 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2626 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2628 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2629 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2630 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
2632 // Claim the rebalances...
2633 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
2634 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2636 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
2637 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2639 // Send some payments across both channels
2640 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2641 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2642 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2644 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
2646 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
2648 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2649 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2650 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
2652 // Close down the channels...
2653 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
2654 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
2655 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
2656 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
2657 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
2659 // Check that we processed all pending events
2661 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2662 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2666 #[derive(PartialEq)]
2667 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
2668 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Uint256, Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2669 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2670 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
2672 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2674 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
2675 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
2677 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2678 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == chan.3.txid() {
2679 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2680 funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
2681 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2682 res.push(tx.clone());
2686 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
2688 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
2689 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2690 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == res[0].txid() {
2691 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2692 funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
2693 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2694 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
2695 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
2697 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
2699 res.push(tx.clone());
2703 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
2709 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2710 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2712 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
2713 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2714 let mut found_prev = false;
2716 for tx in prev_txn {
2717 if node_txn[0].input[0].prev_hash == tx.txid() {
2718 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2719 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
2720 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2722 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
2723 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
2729 assert!(found_prev);
2731 let mut res = Vec::new();
2732 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
2736 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
2737 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2738 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2739 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
2740 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2743 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2746 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2747 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2748 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
2749 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2752 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2756 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
2757 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
2762 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2763 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2764 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2765 let nodes = create_network(5);
2767 // Create some initial channels
2768 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2769 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2770 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2771 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2773 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2774 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2775 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2776 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2777 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2779 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2780 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2782 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2783 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2784 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0]; 1], &[4; 1]);
2785 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2787 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2788 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2789 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2791 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2792 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2794 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
2795 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2797 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2798 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2799 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0]; 1], &[4; 1]);
2800 assert_eq!(nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2802 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
2803 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2804 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2806 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2807 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2809 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2811 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2812 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2813 added_monitors.clear();
2816 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2817 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2819 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, .. } => {
2820 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2822 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2828 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2829 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2830 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2832 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2834 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2835 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2837 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2838 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0]; 1], &[4; 1]);
2840 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2842 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
2843 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2844 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2846 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2847 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2850 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2851 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2852 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5 {
2853 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2854 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2857 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2859 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2860 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2862 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2863 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2864 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5 {
2865 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2866 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2869 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2871 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2872 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5, &[&node_txn[0]; 1], &[4; 1]);
2874 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2876 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
2877 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2878 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2880 // Create some new channels:
2881 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2883 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2884 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2885 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2886 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
2887 // Revoke the old state
2888 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2891 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2892 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &vec![&revoked_local_txn[0]; 1], &[4; 1]);
2894 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2895 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2896 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2898 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2899 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2900 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2904 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &vec![&revoked_local_txn[0]; 1], &[4; 0]);
2905 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2906 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2907 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[1]; 1], &[4; 1]);
2909 //TODO: At this point nodes[1] should claim the revoked HTLC-Timeout output, but that's
2910 //not yet implemented in ChannelMonitor
2912 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2913 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2914 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2916 // Check that we processed all pending events
2918 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2919 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);