Send AcceptChannel responses out-of-band to ensure ordered delivery
[rust-lightning] / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
2 //!
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
6 //!
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
10
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
17
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
21 use secp256k1;
22
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs;
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HandleError, RAACommitmentOrder};
30 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
37
38 use crypto;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
43
44 use std::{ptr, mem};
45 use std::collections::HashMap;
46 use std::collections::hash_map;
47 use std::io::Cursor;
48 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51
52 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 ///
54 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 ///
58 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 mod channel_held_info {
65         use ln::msgs;
66         use ln::router::Route;
67         use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68         use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
69
70         /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
71         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72         pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
73                 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
74                 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
75                 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
76                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
77                 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
78                 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
79         }
80
81         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82         pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
83                 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
84                 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
85         }
86
87         /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
88         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
89         pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
90                 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
91                 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
92         }
93
94         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95         #[derive(Clone)]
96         pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
97                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
98                 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
99                 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
100         }
101
102         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
103         #[derive(Clone)]
104         pub enum HTLCSource {
105                 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
106                 OutboundRoute {
107                         route: Route,
108                         session_priv: SecretKey,
109                         /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
110                         /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
111                         first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
112                 },
113         }
114         #[cfg(test)]
115         impl HTLCSource {
116                 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
117                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
118                                 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
119                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
120                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
121                         }
122                 }
123         }
124
125         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
126         pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
127                 ErrorPacket {
128                         err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
129                 },
130                 Reason {
131                         failure_code: u16,
132                         data: Vec<u8>,
133                 }
134         }
135 }
136 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
137
138 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
139         err: msgs::HandleError,
140         needs_channel_force_close: bool,
141 }
142 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
143         #[inline]
144         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
145                 Self {
146                         err: HandleError {
147                                 err,
148                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
149                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
150                                                 channel_id,
151                                                 data: err.to_string()
152                                         },
153                                 }),
154                         },
155                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
156                 }
157         }
158         #[inline]
159         fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
160                 Self {
161                         err: HandleError {
162                                 err,
163                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
164                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
165                                                 channel_id,
166                                                 data: err.to_string()
167                                         },
168                                 }),
169                         },
170                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
171                 }
172         }
173         #[inline]
174         fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
175                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
176         }
177         #[inline]
178         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
179                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
180         }
181         #[inline]
182         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
183                 Self {
184                         err: match err {
185                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
186                                         err: msg,
187                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
188                                 },
189                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
190                                         err: msg,
191                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
192                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
193                                                         channel_id,
194                                                         data: msg.to_string()
195                                                 },
196                                         }),
197                                 },
198                         },
199                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
200                 }
201         }
202         #[inline]
203         fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
204                 Self {
205                         err: match err {
206                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
207                                         err: msg,
208                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
209                                 },
210                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
211                                         err: msg,
212                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
213                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
214                                                         channel_id,
215                                                         data: msg.to_string()
216                                                 },
217                                         }),
218                                 },
219                         },
220                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
221                 }
222         }
223 }
224
225 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
226 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
227 #[derive(PartialEq)]
228 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
229         /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
230         PreimageUnknown,
231         /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
232         AmountMismatch,
233 }
234
235 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
236 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
237 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
238 /// probably increase this significantly.
239 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
240
241 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
242         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
243         prev_htlc_id: u64,
244         forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
245 }
246
247 struct ChannelHolder {
248         by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
249         short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
250         next_forward: Instant,
251         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
252         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
253         /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
254         /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
255         forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
256         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
257         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
258         /// go to read them!
259         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
260         /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
261         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
262         pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
263 }
264 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
265         by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
266         short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
267         next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
268         forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
269         claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
270         pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
271 }
272 impl ChannelHolder {
273         fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
274                 MutChannelHolder {
275                         by_id: &mut self.by_id,
276                         short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
277                         next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
278                         forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
279                         claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
280                         pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
281                 }
282         }
283 }
284
285 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
286 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
287
288 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
289 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
290 ///
291 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
292 /// to individual Channels.
293 pub struct ChannelManager {
294         genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
295         fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
296         monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
297         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
298         tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
299
300         announce_channels_publicly: bool,
301         fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
302         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
303         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
304
305         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
306         our_network_key: SecretKey,
307
308         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
309
310         keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
311
312         logger: Arc<Logger>,
313 }
314
315 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
316 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
317 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
318 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
319 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
320 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
321 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
322
323 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
324 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
325 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
326 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
327 #[deny(const_err)]
328 #[allow(dead_code)]
329 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
330
331 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
332 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
333 #[deny(const_err)]
334 #[allow(dead_code)]
335 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
336
337 macro_rules! secp_call {
338         ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
339                 match $res {
340                         Ok(key) => key,
341                         Err(_) => return Err($err),
342                 }
343         };
344 }
345
346 struct OnionKeys {
347         #[cfg(test)]
348         shared_secret: SharedSecret,
349         #[cfg(test)]
350         blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
351         ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
352         rho: [u8; 32],
353         mu: [u8; 32],
354 }
355
356 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
357 pub struct ChannelDetails {
358         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
359         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
360         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
361         /// lifetime of the channel.
362         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
363         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
364         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
365         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
366         /// The node_id of our counterparty
367         pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
368         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
369         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
370         /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
371         pub user_id: u64,
372 }
373
374 impl ChannelManager {
375         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
376         ///
377         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
378         /// ChannelMessageHandler.
379         ///
380         /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
381         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
382         ///
383         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
384         pub fn new(fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
385                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
386
387                 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
388                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
389                         fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
390                         monitor: monitor.clone(),
391                         chain_monitor,
392                         tx_broadcaster,
393
394                         announce_channels_publicly,
395                         fee_proportional_millionths,
396                         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
397                         secp_ctx,
398
399                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
400                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
401                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
402                                 next_forward: Instant::now(),
403                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
404                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
405                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
406                         }),
407                         our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
408
409                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
410
411                         keys_manager,
412
413                         logger,
414                 });
415                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
416                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
417                 Ok(res)
418         }
419
420         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
421         ///
422         /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
423         /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
424         /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
425         /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
426         ///
427         /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
428         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
429         ///
430         /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
431         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
432                 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
433                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
434                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
435                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
436                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
437                                 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
438                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
439                                 } else {
440                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
441                                 }
442                         },
443                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
444                 }
445                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
446                         node_id: their_network_key,
447                         msg: res,
448                 });
449                 Ok(())
450         }
451
452         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
453         /// more information.
454         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
455                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
456                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
457                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
458                         res.push(ChannelDetails {
459                                 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
460                                 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
461                                 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
462                                 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
463                                 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
464                         });
465                 }
466                 res
467         }
468
469         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
470         /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
471         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
472                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
473                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
474                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
475                         // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
476                         // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
477                         // really wanted anyway.
478                         if channel.is_live() {
479                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
480                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
481                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
482                                         remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
483                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
484                                         user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
485                                 });
486                         }
487                 }
488                 res
489         }
490
491         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
492         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
493         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
494         ///
495         /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
496         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
497                 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
498                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
499                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
500                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
501                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
502                                         let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
503                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
504                                                 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
505                                                 msg: shutdown_msg
506                                         });
507                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
508                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
509                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
510                                                 }
511                                                 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
512                                         } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
513                                 },
514                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
515                         }
516                 };
517                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
518                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
519                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
520                 }
521                 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
522                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
523                                 Some(update)
524                         } else { None }
525                 } else { None };
526
527                 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
528                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
529                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
530                                 msg: update
531                         });
532                 }
533
534                 Ok(())
535         }
536
537         #[inline]
538         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
539                 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
540                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
541                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
542                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
543                 }
544                 for tx in local_txn {
545                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
546                 }
547                 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
548                 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
549                 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
550                 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
551                 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
552                 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
553                 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
554         }
555
556         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
557         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
558         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
559                 let mut chan = {
560                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
561                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
562                         if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
563                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
564                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
565                                 }
566                                 chan
567                         } else {
568                                 return;
569                         }
570                 };
571                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
572                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
573                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
574                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
575                                 msg: update
576                         });
577                 }
578         }
579
580         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
581         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
582         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
583                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
584                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
585                 }
586         }
587
588         fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
589                 match err {
590                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
591                                 let mut chan = {
592                                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
593                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
594                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
595                                                 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
596                                         }
597                                         chan
598                                 };
599                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
600                                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
601                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
602                                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
603                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
604                                                 msg: update
605                                         });
606                                 }
607                         },
608                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
609                                 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
610                                 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
611                         },
612                 }
613         }
614
615         #[inline]
616         fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
617                 ({
618                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
619                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
620                         let mut res = [0; 32];
621                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
622                         res
623                 },
624                 {
625                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
626                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
627                         let mut res = [0; 32];
628                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
629                         res
630                 })
631         }
632
633         #[inline]
634         fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
635                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
636                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
637                 let mut res = [0; 32];
638                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
639                 res
640         }
641
642         #[inline]
643         fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
644                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
645                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
646                 let mut res = [0; 32];
647                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
648                 res
649         }
650
651         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
652         #[inline]
653         fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
654                 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
655                 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
656
657                 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
658                         let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
659
660                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
661                         sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
662                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
663                         let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
664                         sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
665
666                         let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
667
668                         blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
669                         blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
670
671                         callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
672                 }
673
674                 Ok(())
675         }
676
677         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
678         fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
679                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
680
681                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
682                         let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
683
684                         res.push(OnionKeys {
685                                 #[cfg(test)]
686                                 shared_secret,
687                                 #[cfg(test)]
688                                 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
689                                 ephemeral_pubkey,
690                                 rho,
691                                 mu,
692                         });
693                 })?;
694
695                 Ok(res)
696         }
697
698         /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
699         fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
700                 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
701                 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
702                 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
703                 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
704                 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
705                 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
706
707                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
708                         // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
709                         // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
710                         // the intended recipient).
711                         let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
712                         let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
713                         res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
714                                 realm: 0,
715                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
716                                         short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
717                                         amt_to_forward: value_msat,
718                                         outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
719                                 },
720                                 hmac: [0; 32],
721                         };
722                         cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
723                         if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
724                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
725                         }
726                         cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
727                         if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
728                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
729                         }
730                         last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
731                 }
732                 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
733         }
734
735         #[inline]
736         fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
737                 unsafe {
738                         ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
739                 }
740                 for i in 0..65 {
741                         arr[i] = 0;
742                 }
743         }
744
745         #[inline]
746         fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
747                 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
748
749                 for i in 0..dst.len() {
750                         dst[i] ^= src[i];
751                 }
752         }
753
754         const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
755         fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
756                 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
757                 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
758
759                 let filler = {
760                         let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
761                         let end_len = iters * 65;
762                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
763                         res.resize(end_len, 0);
764
765                         for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
766                                 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
767                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
768                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
769                                 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
770                         }
771                         res
772                 };
773
774                 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
775                 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
776
777                 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
778                         ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
779                         payload.hmac = hmac_res;
780                         packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
781
782                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
783                         chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
784                         packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
785
786                         if i == 0 {
787                                 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
788                         }
789
790                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
791                         hmac.input(&packet_data);
792                         hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
793                         hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
794                 }
795
796                 msgs::OnionPacket{
797                         version: 0,
798                         public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
799                         hop_data: packet_data,
800                         hmac: hmac_res,
801                 }
802         }
803
804         /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
805         /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
806         fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
807                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
808
809                 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
810                 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
811                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
812                 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
813                 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
814                         data: packet_crypted,
815                 }
816         }
817
818         fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
819                 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
820
821                 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
822
823                 let failuremsg = {
824                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
825                         res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
826                         res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
827                         res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
828                         res
829                 };
830                 let pad = {
831                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
832                         res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
833                         res
834                 };
835                 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
836                         hmac: [0; 32],
837                         failuremsg: failuremsg,
838                         pad: pad,
839                 };
840
841                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
842                 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
843                 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
844
845                 packet
846         }
847
848         #[inline]
849         fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
850                 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
851                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
852         }
853
854         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
855                 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
856                         () => {
857                                 {
858                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
859                                         sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
860                                         let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
861                                         sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
862                                         onion_hash
863                                 }
864                         }
865                 }
866
867                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
868                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
869                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
870                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
871                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
872                                 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
873                                 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
874                         })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
875                 }
876
877                 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
878                 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
879
880                 let mut channel_state = None;
881                 macro_rules! return_err {
882                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
883                                 {
884                                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
885                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
886                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
887                                         }
888                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
889                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
890                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
891                                                 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
892                                         })), channel_state.unwrap());
893                                 }
894                         }
895                 }
896
897                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
898                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
899                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
900                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
901                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
902                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
903                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
904                         return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
905                 }
906
907                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
908                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
909                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
910                 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
911                         return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
912                 }
913
914                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
915                 let next_hop_data = {
916                         let mut decoded = [0; 65];
917                         chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
918                         match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
919                                 Err(err) => {
920                                         let error_code = match err {
921                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
922                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
923                                         };
924                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
925                                 },
926                                 Ok(msg) => msg
927                         }
928                 };
929
930                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
931                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
932                                 // final_expiry_too_soon
933                                 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
934                                         return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
935                                 }
936                                 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
937                                 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
938                                         return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
939                                 }
940                                 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
941                                 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
942                                         return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
943                                 }
944
945                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
946                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
947                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
948                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
949
950                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
951                                         onion_packet: None,
952                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
953                                         short_channel_id: 0,
954                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
955                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
956                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
957                                 })
958                         } else {
959                                 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
960                                 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
961                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
962
963                                 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
964
965                                 let blinding_factor = {
966                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
967                                         sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
968                                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
969                                         let mut res = [0u8; 32];
970                                         sha.result(&mut res);
971                                         match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
972                                                 Err(_) => {
973                                                         return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
974                                                 },
975                                                 Ok(key) => key
976                                         }
977                                 };
978
979                                 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
980                                         return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
981                                 }
982
983                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
984                                         version: 0,
985                                         public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
986                                         hop_data: new_packet_data,
987                                         hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
988                                 };
989
990                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
991                                         onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
992                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
993                                         short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
994                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
995                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
996                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
997                                 })
998                         };
999
1000                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1001                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1002                         if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1003                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1004                                 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1005                                         None => { // unknown_next_peer
1006                                                 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1007                                         },
1008                                         Some(id) => id.clone(),
1009                                 };
1010                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1011                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1012
1013                                         // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1014                                         // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1015                                         // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1016                                         // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1017                                         // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1018                                         if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1019                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1020                                         }
1021                                         if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1022                                                 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1023                                         }
1024                                         let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1025                                         if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1026                                                 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1027                                         }
1028                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1029                                                 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1030                                         }
1031                                         let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1032                                         // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1033                                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1034                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1035                                         }
1036                                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1037                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1038                                         }
1039                                         break None;
1040                                 }
1041                                 {
1042                                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1043                                         if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1044                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1045                                         }
1046                                         else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1047                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1048                                         }
1049                                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1050                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1051                                         }
1052                                         return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1053                                 }
1054                         }
1055                 }
1056
1057                 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1058         }
1059
1060         /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1061         /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1062         fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1063                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1064                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1065                         Some(id) => id,
1066                 };
1067
1068                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1069
1070                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1071                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1072                         short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1073                         timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1074                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1075                         cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1076                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1077                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1078                         fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1079                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
1080                 };
1081
1082                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1083                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1084
1085                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1086                         signature: sig,
1087                         contents: unsigned
1088                 })
1089         }
1090
1091         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1092         ///
1093         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1094         /// fields for more info.
1095         ///
1096         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1097         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1098         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1099         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1100         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1101         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1102         ///
1103         /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1104         ///
1105         /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1106         /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1107         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1108                 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1109                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1110                 }
1111                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1112                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1113                         if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1114                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1115                         }
1116                 }
1117
1118                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1119                         let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1120                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1121                         session_key
1122                 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1123
1124                 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1125
1126                 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1127                                 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1128                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1129                 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1130
1131                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1132
1133                 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1134                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1135                         Some(id) => id.clone(),
1136                 };
1137
1138                 let res = {
1139                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1140                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1141                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1142                         }
1143                         if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1144                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1145                         }
1146                         if !chan.is_live() {
1147                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1148                         }
1149                         chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1150                                 route: route.clone(),
1151                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1152                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1153                         }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1154                 };
1155                 match res {
1156                         Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1157                                 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1158                                         self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1159                                         return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1160                                 }
1161
1162                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1163                                         node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1164                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1165                                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1166                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1167                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1168                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1169                                                 update_fee: None,
1170                                                 commitment_signed,
1171                                         },
1172                                 });
1173                         },
1174                         None => {},
1175                 }
1176
1177                 Ok(())
1178         }
1179
1180         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1181         ///
1182         /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1183         ///
1184         /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1185         /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1186         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1187                 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1188                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1189                         match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1190                                 Some(mut chan) => {
1191                                         match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1192                                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1193                                                         (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1194                                                 },
1195                                                 Err(e) => {
1196                                                         log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1197                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1198                                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1199                                                                 action: e.action,
1200                                                         });
1201                                                         return;
1202                                                 },
1203                                         }
1204                                 },
1205                                 None => return
1206                         }
1207                 };
1208                 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1209                 // lock before add_update_monitor
1210                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1211                         unimplemented!();
1212                 }
1213
1214                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1215                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1216                         node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1217                         msg: msg,
1218                 });
1219                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1220                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1221                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1222                         },
1223                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1224                                 e.insert(chan);
1225                         }
1226                 }
1227         }
1228
1229         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1230                 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1231
1232                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1233                         Ok(res) => res,
1234                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1235                 };
1236                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1237                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1238
1239                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1240                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1241                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1242                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
1243                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1244                 })
1245         }
1246
1247         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1248         ///
1249         /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1250         /// Will likely generate further events.
1251         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1252                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1253                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1254                 {
1255                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1256                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1257
1258                         if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1259                                 return;
1260                         }
1261
1262                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1263                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1264                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1265                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1266                                                 None => {
1267                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1268                                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1269                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1270                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1271                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1272                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1273                                                                 });
1274                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1275                                                         }
1276                                                         continue;
1277                                                 }
1278                                         };
1279                                         let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1280
1281                                         let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1282                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1283                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1284                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1285                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1286                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1287                                                 });
1288                                                 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1289                                                         Err(_e) => {
1290                                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1291                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1292                                                                 continue;
1293                                                         },
1294                                                         Ok(update_add) => {
1295                                                                 match update_add {
1296                                                                         Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1297                                                                         None => {
1298                                                                                 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1299                                                                                 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1300                                                                                 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1301                                                                                 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1302                                                                                 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1303                                                                                 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1304                                                                                 // this channel currently :/.
1305                                                                         }
1306                                                                 }
1307                                                         }
1308                                                 }
1309                                         }
1310
1311                                         if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1312                                                 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1313                                                         Ok(res) => res,
1314                                                         Err(e) => {
1315                                                                 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1316                                                                 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1317                                                                 } else {
1318                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1319                                                                 }
1320                                                                 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1321                                                                 continue;
1322                                                         },
1323                                                 };
1324                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1325                                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1326                                                 }
1327                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1328                                                         node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1329                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1330                                                                 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1331                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1332                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1333                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1334                                                                 update_fee: None,
1335                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1336                                                         },
1337                                                 });
1338                                         }
1339                                 } else {
1340                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1341                                                 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1342                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1343                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1344                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1345                                                 };
1346                                                 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1347                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1348                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1349                                                 };
1350                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1351                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1352                                                         amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1353                                                 });
1354                                         }
1355                                 }
1356                         }
1357                 }
1358
1359                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1360                         match update {
1361                                 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1362                                 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1363                         };
1364                 }
1365
1366                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1367                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1368                 events.append(&mut new_events);
1369         }
1370
1371         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1372         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1373                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1374                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1375                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1376                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1377                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1378                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1379                         }
1380                         true
1381                 } else { false }
1382         }
1383
1384         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1385         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1386         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1387         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1388         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1389         /// still-available channels.
1390         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1391                 match source {
1392                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1393                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1394                                 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1395                                         let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1396                                         if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1397                                                 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1398                                                         events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1399                                                                 update,
1400                                                         }
1401                                                 );
1402                                         }
1403                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1404                                                 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1405                                                 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1406                                         });
1407                                 } else {
1408                                         panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1409                                 }
1410                         },
1411                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1412                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1413                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1414                                                 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1415                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1416                                         },
1417                                         HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1418                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1419                                         }
1420                                 };
1421
1422                                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1423
1424                                 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1425                                         Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1426                                         None => return
1427                                 };
1428
1429                                 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1430                                 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1431                                         Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1432                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1433                                                         unimplemented!();
1434                                                 }
1435                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1436                                                         node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1437                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1438                                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1439                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1440                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1441                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1442                                                                 update_fee: None,
1443                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1444                                                         },
1445                                                 });
1446                                         },
1447                                         Ok(None) => {},
1448                                         Err(_e) => {
1449                                                 //TODO: Do something with e?
1450                                                 return;
1451                                         },
1452                                 }
1453                         },
1454                 }
1455         }
1456
1457         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1458         /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1459         /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1460         ///
1461         /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1462         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1463                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1464                 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1465                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1466                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1467
1468                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1469                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1470                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1471                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1472                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1473                                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1474                         }
1475                         true
1476                 } else { false }
1477         }
1478         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1479                 match source {
1480                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1481                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1482                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1483                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1484                                         payment_preimage
1485                                 });
1486                         },
1487                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1488                                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1489                                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1490
1491                                 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1492                                         Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1493                                         None => {
1494                                                 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1495                                                 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1496                                                 // why its missing.
1497                                                 return
1498                                         }
1499                                 };
1500
1501                                 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1502                                 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1503                                         Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1504                                                 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1505                                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1506                                                                 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1507                                                         }
1508                                                 }
1509                                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1510                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1511                                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1512                                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1513                                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1514                                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1515                                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1516                                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1517                                                                         update_fee: None,
1518                                                                         commitment_signed,
1519                                                                 }
1520                                                         });
1521                                                 }
1522                                         },
1523                                         Err(_e) => {
1524                                                 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1525                                                 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1526                                                 //TODO: Do something with e?
1527                                                 return
1528                                         },
1529                                 }
1530                         },
1531                 }
1532         }
1533
1534         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1535         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1536                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1537         }
1538
1539         /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1540         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1541         /// operation.
1542         pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1543                 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1544                 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1545                 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1546
1547                 {
1548                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1549                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1550                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1551                         let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1552                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1553                                 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1554                                         let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1555                                         if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1556                                                 match e {
1557                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1558                                                                 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1559                                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1560                                                                 }
1561                                                                 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1562                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1563                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1564                                                                                 msg: update
1565                                                                         });
1566                                                                 }
1567                                                                 false
1568                                                         },
1569                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1570                                                 }
1571                                         } else {
1572                                                 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1573                                                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1574                                                         htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1575                                                 }
1576                                                 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1577
1578                                                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1579                                                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1580                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1581                                                                         node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1582                                                                         updates: update,
1583                                                                 });
1584                                                         }
1585                                                 } }
1586                                                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1587                                                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1588                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1589                                                                         node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1590                                                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
1591                                                                 });
1592                                                         }
1593                                                 } }
1594                                                 match order {
1595                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1596                                                                 handle_cs!();
1597                                                                 handle_raa!();
1598                                                         },
1599                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1600                                                                 handle_raa!();
1601                                                                 handle_cs!();
1602                                                         },
1603                                                 }
1604                                                 true
1605                                         }
1606                                 } else { true }
1607                         });
1608                 }
1609
1610                 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1611                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1612                 }
1613                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1614
1615                 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1616                         self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1617                 }
1618         }
1619
1620         fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1621                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1622                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1623                 }
1624
1625                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1626                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1627                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1628                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1629                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1630                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1631                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1632                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1633                                         node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1634                                         msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1635                                 });
1636                                 entry.insert(channel);
1637                         }
1638                 }
1639                 Ok(())
1640         }
1641
1642         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1643                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1644                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1645                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1646                                 Some(chan) => {
1647                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1648                                                 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1649                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1650                                         }
1651                                         chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1652                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1653                                         (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1654                                 },
1655                                 //TODO: same as above
1656                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1657                         }
1658                 };
1659                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1660                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1661                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1662                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
1663                         output_script: output_script,
1664                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1665                 });
1666                 Ok(())
1667         }
1668
1669         fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1670                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1671                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1672                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1673                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1674                                         if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1675                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1676                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1677                                         }
1678                                         match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1679                                                 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1680                                                         (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1681                                                 },
1682                                                 Err(e) => {
1683                                                         return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1684                                                 }
1685                                         }
1686                                 },
1687                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1688                         }
1689                 };
1690                 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1691                 // lock before add_update_monitor
1692                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1693                         unimplemented!();
1694                 }
1695                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1696                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1697                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1698                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1699                         },
1700                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1701                                 e.insert(chan);
1702                         }
1703                 }
1704                 Ok(funding_msg)
1705         }
1706
1707         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1708                 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1709                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1710                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1711                                 Some(chan) => {
1712                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1713                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1714                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1715                                         }
1716                                         let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1717                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1718                                                 unimplemented!();
1719                                         }
1720                                         (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1721                                 },
1722                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1723                         }
1724                 };
1725                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1726                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1727                         funding_txo: funding_txo,
1728                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1729                 });
1730                 Ok(())
1731         }
1732
1733         fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1734                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1735                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1736                         Some(chan) => {
1737                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1738                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1739                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1740                                 }
1741                                 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1742                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1743                                 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1744                         },
1745                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1746                 };
1747         }
1748
1749         fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1750                 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1751                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1752                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1753
1754                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1755                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1756                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1757                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1758                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1759                                         }
1760                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1761                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1762                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1763                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1764                                                 }
1765                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1766                                         } else { (res, None) }
1767                                 },
1768                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1769                         }
1770                 };
1771                 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1772                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1773                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1774                 }
1775                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1776                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1777                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1778                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1779                                         msg: update
1780                                 });
1781                         }
1782                 }
1783                 Ok((res.0, res.1))
1784         }
1785
1786         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1787                 let (res, chan_option) = {
1788                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1789                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1790                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1791                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1792                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1793                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1794                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1795                                         }
1796                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1797                                         if res.1.is_some() {
1798                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1799                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1800                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1801                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1802                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1803                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1804                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1805                                                 }
1806                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1807                                         } else { (res, None) }
1808                                 },
1809                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1810                         }
1811                 };
1812                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1813                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1814                 }
1815                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1816                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1817                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1818                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1819                                         msg: update
1820                                 });
1821                         }
1822                 }
1823                 Ok(res.0)
1824         }
1825
1826         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1827                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1828                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1829                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1830                 //
1831                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1832                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1833                 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1834                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1835
1836                 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1837                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1838
1839                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1840                         Some(chan) => {
1841                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1842                                         //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1843                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1844                                 }
1845                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
1846                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1847                                 }
1848                                 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1849                         },
1850                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1851                 }
1852         }
1853
1854         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1855                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1856                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1857                         Some(chan) => {
1858                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1859                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1860                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1861                                 }
1862                                 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1863                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1864                         },
1865                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1866                 };
1867                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1868                 Ok(())
1869         }
1870
1871         // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
1872         // indicating that the payment itself failed
1873         fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
1874                 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
1875                         macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
1876                                 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
1877                                         log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
1878                                 };
1879                                 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
1880                                         log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
1881                                 };
1882                         }
1883
1884                         const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
1885                         const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
1886                         const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
1887
1888                         let mut res = None;
1889                         let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
1890
1891                         // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1892                         Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1893                                 if res.is_some() { return; }
1894
1895                                 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
1896                                 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
1897                                 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
1898
1899                                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1900
1901                                 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1902                                 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1903                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1904                                 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1905                                 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1906
1907                                 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
1908
1909                                 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1910                                         let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1911                                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1912                                         hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1913                                         let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1914                                         hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1915
1916                                         if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1917                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
1918                                                         // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
1919                                                         // definitely came from the peer in question
1920                                                         res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
1921                                                 } else {
1922                                                         let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
1923
1924                                                         match error_code & 0xff {
1925                                                                 1|2|3 => {
1926                                                                         // either from an intermediate or final node
1927                                                                         //   invalid_realm(PERM|1),
1928                                                                         //   temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
1929                                                                         //   permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
1930                                                                         //   required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
1931                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1932                                                                                 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1933                                                                                 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
1934                                                                         }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
1935                                                                         // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
1936                                                                         // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
1937                                                                         // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
1938                                                                         return;
1939                                                                 },
1940                                                                 _ => {}
1941                                                         }
1942
1943                                                         if is_from_final_node {
1944                                                                 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
1945                                                                         c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
1946                                                                         c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
1947                                                                         17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
1948                                                                         18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1949                                                                                 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
1950                                                                                 true
1951                                                                         },
1952                                                                         19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1953                                                                                 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
1954                                                                                 true
1955                                                                         },
1956                                                                         _ => {
1957                                                                                 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
1958                                                                                 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
1959                                                                                 // does not coform to the spec.
1960                                                                                 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
1961                                                                                 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1962                                                                                         node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1963                                                                                         is_permanent: true,
1964                                                                                 }), false));
1965                                                                                 return;
1966                                                                         }
1967                                                                 };
1968                                                                 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
1969                                                                 return;
1970                                                         }
1971
1972                                                         // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
1973                                                         match error_code {
1974                                                                 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
1975                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1976                                                                                 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
1977                                                                                 is_permanent: true,
1978                                                                         }), false));
1979                                                                 },
1980                                                                 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
1981                                                                         let offset = match error_code {
1982                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|7  => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
1983                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
1984                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
1985                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1986                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
1987                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
1988                                                                                 _ =>  {
1989                                                                                         // node sending unknown code
1990                                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1991                                                                                                 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1992                                                                                                 is_permanent: true,
1993                                                                                         }), false));
1994                                                                                         return;
1995                                                                                 }
1996                                                                         };
1997
1998                                                                         if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
1999                                                                                 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2000                                                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2001                                                                                         if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2002                                                                                                 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2003                                                                                                 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2004                                                                                                 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2005                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2006                                                                                                                 false
2007                                                                                                         },
2008                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2009                                                                                                                 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2010                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2011                                                                                                                 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2012                                                                                                         },
2013                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2014                                                                                                                 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2015                                                                                                                 let new_fee =  amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2016                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2017                                                                                                                 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2018                                                                                                         }
2019                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2020                                                                                                                 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2021                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2022                                                                                                                 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2023                                                                                                         },
2024                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2025                                                                                                                 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2026                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2027                                                                                                                 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2028                                                                                                         },
2029                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2030                                                                                                         _ => { unreachable!(); },
2031                                                                                                 };
2032
2033                                                                                                 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2034                                                                                                         Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2035                                                                                                                 msg: chan_update,
2036                                                                                                         })
2037                                                                                                 };
2038                                                                                                 res = Some((msg, true));
2039                                                                                                 return;
2040                                                                                         }
2041                                                                                 }
2042                                                                         }
2043                                                                 },
2044                                                                 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2045                                                                         //TODO
2046                                                                 },
2047                                                                 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2048                                                                         res = Some((None, true));
2049                                                                         return;
2050                                                                 }
2051                                                                 _ => {
2052                                                                         // node sending unknown code
2053                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2054                                                                                 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2055                                                                                 is_permanent: true,
2056                                                                         }), false));
2057                                                                         return;
2058                                                                 }
2059                                                         }
2060                                                 }
2061                                         }
2062                                 }
2063                         }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2064                         res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2065                 } else { ((None, true)) }
2066         }
2067
2068         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2069                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2070                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2071                         Some(chan) => {
2072                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2073                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2074                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2075                                 }
2076                                 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2077                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2078                         },
2079                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2080                 }?;
2081                 Ok(())
2082         }
2083
2084         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2085                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2086                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2087                         Some(chan) => {
2088                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2089                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2090                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2091                                 }
2092                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
2093                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
2094                                 }
2095                                 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2096                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2097                                 Ok(())
2098                         },
2099                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2100                 }
2101         }
2102
2103         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2104                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = {
2105                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2106                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2107                                 Some(chan) => {
2108                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2109                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2110                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2111                                         }
2112                                         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2113                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2114                                                 unimplemented!();
2115                                         }
2116                                         (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed)
2117                                 },
2118                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2119                         }
2120                 };
2121                 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
2122         }
2123
2124         #[inline]
2125         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2126                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2127                         let mut forward_event = None;
2128                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2129                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2130                                 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2131                                         forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2132                                         channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2133                                 }
2134                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2135                                         match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2136                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2137                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2138                                                 },
2139                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2140                                                         entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2141                                                 }
2142                                         }
2143                                 }
2144                         }
2145                         match forward_event {
2146                                 Some(time) => {
2147                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2148                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2149                                                 time_forwardable: time
2150                                         });
2151                                 }
2152                                 None => {},
2153                         }
2154                 }
2155         }
2156
2157         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2158                 let ((res, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures), short_channel_id) = {
2159                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2160                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2161                                 Some(chan) => {
2162                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2163                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2164                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2165                                         }
2166                                         let (res, pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2167                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2168                                                 unimplemented!();
2169                                         }
2170                                         ((res, pending_forwards, pending_failures), chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2171                                 },
2172                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2173                         }
2174                 };
2175                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2176                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2177                 }
2178                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2179
2180                 Ok(res)
2181         }
2182
2183         fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2184                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2185                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2186                         Some(chan) => {
2187                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2188                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2189                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2190                                 }
2191                                 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2192                         },
2193                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2194                 }
2195         }
2196
2197         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2198                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2199                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2200
2201                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2202                         Some(chan) => {
2203                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2204                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2205                                 }
2206                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
2207                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2208                                 }
2209
2210                                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2211                                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2212                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2213
2214                                 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2215                                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2216                                 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2217                                 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2218                                 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2219
2220                                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2221
2222                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2223                                         msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2224                                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2225                                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2226                                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2227                                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2228                                                 contents: announcement,
2229                                         },
2230                                         update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2231                                 });
2232                         },
2233                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2234                 }
2235                 Ok(())
2236         }
2237
2238         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2239                 let res = {
2240                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2241                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2242                                 Some(chan) => {
2243                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2244                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2245                                         }
2246                                         let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2247                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2248                                         if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2249                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2250                                                         unimplemented!();
2251                                                 }
2252                                         }
2253                                         Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order))
2254                                 },
2255                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2256                         }
2257                 };
2258
2259                 res
2260         }
2261
2262         /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2263         /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2264         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2265         /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2266         #[doc(hidden)]
2267         pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2268                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2269                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2270
2271                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2272                         None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2273                         Some(chan) => {
2274                                 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2275                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2276                                 }
2277                                 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2278                                         return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2279                                 }
2280                                 if !chan.is_live() {
2281                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2282                                 }
2283                                 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2284                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2285                                                 unimplemented!();
2286                                         }
2287                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2288                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2289                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2290                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2291                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2292                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2293                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2294                                                         update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2295                                                         commitment_signed,
2296                                                 },
2297                                         });
2298                                 }
2299                         },
2300                 }
2301                 Ok(())
2302         }
2303 }
2304
2305 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2306         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2307                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2308                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2309                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2310                 ret
2311         }
2312 }
2313
2314 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2315         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2316                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2317                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2318                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2319                 ret
2320         }
2321 }
2322
2323 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2324         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2325                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2326                 {
2327                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2328                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2329                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2330                         let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2331                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2332                                 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2333                                 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2334                                         let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
2335                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2336                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2337                                                 msg: funding_locked,
2338                                                 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2339                                         });
2340                                         short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2341                                 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2342                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2343                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2344                                                 action: e.action,
2345                                         });
2346                                         if channel.is_shutdown() {
2347                                                 return false;
2348                                         }
2349                                 }
2350                                 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2351                                         for tx in txn_matched {
2352                                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2353                                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2354                                                                 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2355                                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2356                                                                 }
2357                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2358                                                                 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2359                                                                 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2360                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2361                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2362                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2363                                                                                 msg: update
2364                                                                         });
2365                                                                 }
2366                                                                 return false;
2367                                                         }
2368                                                 }
2369                                         }
2370                                 }
2371                                 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2372                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2373                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2374                                         }
2375                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2376                                         // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2377                                         // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2378                                         // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2379                                         failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2380                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2381                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2382                                                         msg: update
2383                                                 });
2384                                         }
2385                                         return false;
2386                                 }
2387                                 true
2388                         });
2389                 }
2390                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2391                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2392                 }
2393                 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2394         }
2395
2396         /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2397         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2398                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2399                 {
2400                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2401                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2402                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2403                         let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2404                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_,  v| {
2405                                 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2406                                         if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2407                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2408                                         }
2409                                         failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2410                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2411                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2412                                                         msg: update
2413                                                 });
2414                                         }
2415                                         false
2416                                 } else {
2417                                         true
2418                                 }
2419                         });
2420                 }
2421                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2422                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2423                 }
2424                 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2425         }
2426 }
2427
2428 macro_rules! handle_error {
2429         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2430                 match $internal {
2431                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2432                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2433                                 if needs_channel_force_close {
2434                                         match &err.action {
2435                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2436                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2437                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2438                                                         } else {
2439                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2440                                                         }
2441                                                 },
2442                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2443                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2444                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2445                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2446                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2447                                                         } else {
2448                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2449                                                         }
2450                                                 },
2451                                                 &None => {},
2452                                         }
2453                                 }
2454                                 Err(err)
2455                         },
2456                 }
2457         }
2458 }
2459
2460 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2461         //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2462         fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2463                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2464         }
2465
2466         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2467                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2468         }
2469
2470         fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2471                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2472         }
2473
2474         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2475                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2476         }
2477
2478         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2479                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2480         }
2481
2482         fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2483                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2484         }
2485
2486         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2487                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2488         }
2489
2490         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2491                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2492         }
2493
2494         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2495                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2496         }
2497
2498         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2499                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2500         }
2501
2502         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2503                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2504         }
2505
2506         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2507                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2508         }
2509
2510         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2511                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2512         }
2513
2514         fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2515                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2516         }
2517
2518         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2519                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2520         }
2521
2522         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), HandleError> {
2523                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2524         }
2525
2526         fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2527                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2528                 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2529                 {
2530                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2531                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2532                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2533                         let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2534                         if no_connection_possible {
2535                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2536                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2537                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2538                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2539                                                 }
2540                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2541                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2542                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2543                                                                 msg: update
2544                                                         });
2545                                                 }
2546                                                 false
2547                                         } else {
2548                                                 true
2549                                         }
2550                                 });
2551                         } else {
2552                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2553                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2554                                                 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2555                                                 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2556                                                 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2557                                                         let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2558                                                         failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2559                                                 }
2560                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2561                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2562                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2563                                                         }
2564                                                         return false;
2565                                                 }
2566                                         }
2567                                         true
2568                                 })
2569                         }
2570                 }
2571                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2572                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2573                 }
2574                 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2575                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2576                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2577                         }
2578                 }
2579         }
2580
2581         fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2582                 let mut res = Vec::new();
2583                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2584                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2585                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2586                                 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2587                                         // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2588                                         // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2589                                         // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2590                                         // drop it.
2591                                         false
2592                                 } else {
2593                                         res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2594                                         true
2595                                 }
2596                         } else { true }
2597                 });
2598                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2599                 res
2600         }
2601
2602         fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2603                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2604                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
2605                                 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2606                                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2607                                 }
2608                         }
2609                 } else {
2610                         self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2611                 }
2612         }
2613 }
2614
2615 #[cfg(test)]
2616 mod tests {
2617         use chain::chaininterface;
2618         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2619         use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2620         use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
2621         use chain::keysinterface;
2622         use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason};
2623         use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
2624         use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2625         use ln::msgs;
2626         use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2627         use util::test_utils;
2628         use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
2629         use util::errors::APIError;
2630         use util::logger::Logger;
2631         use util::ser::Writeable;
2632
2633         use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2634         use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2635         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2636         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2637         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2638         use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2639         use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2640
2641         use hex;
2642
2643         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2644         use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2645
2646         use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2647         use crypto::digest::Digest;
2648
2649         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2650
2651         use std::cell::RefCell;
2652         use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2653         use std::default::Default;
2654         use std::rc::Rc;
2655         use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2656         use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
2657         use std::time::Instant;
2658         use std::mem;
2659
2660         fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2661                 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2662                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2663
2664                 let route = Route {
2665                         hops: vec!(
2666                                         RouteHop {
2667                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2668                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2669                                         },
2670                                         RouteHop {
2671                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2672                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2673                                         },
2674                                         RouteHop {
2675                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2676                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2677                                         },
2678                                         RouteHop {
2679                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2680                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2681                                         },
2682                                         RouteHop {
2683                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2684                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2685                                         },
2686                         ),
2687                 };
2688
2689                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2690
2691                 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2692                 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2693                 onion_keys
2694         }
2695
2696         #[test]
2697         fn onion_vectors() {
2698                 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2699                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2700
2701                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2702                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2703                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2704                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2705                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2706
2707                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2708                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2709                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2710                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2711                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2712
2713                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2714                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2715                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2716                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2717                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2718
2719                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2720                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2721                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2722                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2723                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2724
2725                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2726                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2727                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2728                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2729                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2730
2731                 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2732                 let payloads = vec!(
2733                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2734                                 realm: 0,
2735                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2736                                         short_channel_id: 0,
2737                                         amt_to_forward: 0,
2738                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2739                                 },
2740                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2741                         },
2742                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2743                                 realm: 0,
2744                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2745                                         short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2746                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2747                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2748                                 },
2749                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2750                         },
2751                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2752                                 realm: 0,
2753                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2754                                         short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2755                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2756                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2757                                 },
2758                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2759                         },
2760                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2761                                 realm: 0,
2762                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2763                                         short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2764                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2765                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2766                                 },
2767                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2768                         },
2769                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2770                                 realm: 0,
2771                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2772                                         short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2773                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2774                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2775                                 },
2776                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2777                         },
2778                 );
2779
2780                 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2781                 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2782                 // anyway...
2783                 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2784         }
2785
2786         #[test]
2787         fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2788                 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2789
2790                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2791                 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2792                 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2793
2794                 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2795                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2796
2797                 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2798                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2799
2800                 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2801                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2802
2803                 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2804                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2805
2806                 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2807                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2808         }
2809
2810         fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2811                 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2812                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2813                 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2814                 for i in 2..100 {
2815                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2816                         chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2817                 }
2818         }
2819
2820         struct Node {
2821                 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2822                 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2823                 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2824                 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2825                 router: Router,
2826                 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2827                 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2828         }
2829         impl Drop for Node {
2830                 fn drop(&mut self) {
2831                         if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2832                                 // Check that we processed all pending events
2833                                 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
2834                                 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2835                                 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2836                         }
2837                 }
2838         }
2839
2840         fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2841                 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2842         }
2843
2844         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2845                 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2846                 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
2847                 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
2848         }
2849
2850         macro_rules! get_event_msg {
2851                 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
2852                         {
2853                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2854                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2855                                 match events[0] {
2856                                         $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2857                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
2858                                                 (*msg).clone()
2859                                         },
2860                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2861                                 }
2862                         }
2863                 }
2864         }
2865
2866         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
2867                 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
2868                 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
2869                 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
2870
2871                 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2872                 let tx;
2873                 let funding_output;
2874
2875                 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2876                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2877                 match events_2[0] {
2878                         Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2879                                 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
2880                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2881
2882                                 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2883                                         value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2884                                 }]};
2885                                 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2886
2887                                 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2888                                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2889                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2890                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2891                                 added_monitors.clear();
2892                         },
2893                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2894                 }
2895
2896                 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2897                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2898                 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2899                         MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2900                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2901                                 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2902                                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2903                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2904                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2905                                 added_monitors.clear();
2906                                 res
2907                         },
2908                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2909                 };
2910
2911                 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2912                 {
2913                         let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2914                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2915                         assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2916                         added_monitors.clear();
2917                 }
2918
2919                 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2920                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2921                 match events_4[0] {
2922                         Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2923                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2924                                 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2925                         },
2926                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2927                 };
2928
2929                 tx
2930         }
2931
2932         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
2933                 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2934                 let events_5 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2935                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2936                 match events_5[0] {
2937                         MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2938                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2939                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2940                                 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2941                         },
2942                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2943                 };
2944
2945                 let channel_id;
2946
2947                 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2948                 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2949                 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2950                 (match events_6[0] {
2951                         MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2952                                 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2953                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2954                                 (msg.clone(), announcement_sigs.clone().unwrap())
2955                         },
2956                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2957                 }, channel_id)
2958         }
2959
2960         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2961                 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2962                 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
2963                 (msgs, chan_id, tx)
2964         }
2965
2966         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2967                 let bs_announcement_sigs = {
2968                         let bs_announcement_sigs = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap().unwrap();
2969                         node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
2970                         bs_announcement_sigs
2971                 };
2972
2973                 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2974                 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2975                 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
2976                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2977                                 (msg, update_msg)
2978                         },
2979                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2980                 };
2981
2982                 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2983                 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2984                 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2985                 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
2986                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2987                                 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2988                                 update_msg
2989                         },
2990                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2991                 };
2992
2993                 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2994
2995                 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
2996         }
2997
2998         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2999                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3000         }
3001
3002         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3003                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3004                 for node in nodes {
3005                         assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3006                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3007                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3008                 }
3009                 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3010         }
3011
3012         macro_rules! check_spends {
3013                 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3014                         {
3015                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3016                                 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3017                                 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3018                                 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3019                         }
3020                 }
3021         }
3022
3023         fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3024                 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3025                 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3026                 let (tx_a, tx_b);
3027
3028                 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3029                 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3030                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3031                 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
3032                         MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3033                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
3034                                 msg.clone()
3035                         },
3036                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3037                 };
3038
3039                 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
3040                 if !close_inbound_first {
3041                         assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
3042                 }
3043                 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3044                 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
3045                 if close_inbound_first {
3046                         assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
3047                         closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3048                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3049                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3050
3051                         let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3052                         assert!(empty_b.is_none());
3053                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3054                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3055                 } else {
3056                         closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3057                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3058                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3059
3060                         let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3061                         assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
3062                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3063                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3064                 }
3065                 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3066                 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3067
3068                 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3069                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3070                 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
3071                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3072                                 msg.clone()
3073                         },
3074                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3075                 };
3076
3077                 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3078                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3079                 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
3080                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3081                                 msg.clone()
3082                         },
3083                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3084                 };
3085
3086                 (as_update, bs_update)
3087         }
3088
3089         struct SendEvent {
3090                 node_id: PublicKey,
3091                 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3092                 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3093         }
3094         impl SendEvent {
3095                 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3096                         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3097                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3098                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3099                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3100                         SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3101                 }
3102
3103                 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3104                         match event {
3105                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3106                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3107                         }
3108                 }
3109         }
3110
3111         macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3112                 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3113                         {
3114                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3115                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3116                                 added_monitors.clear();
3117                         }
3118                 }
3119         }
3120
3121         macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3122                 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3123                         {
3124                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3125                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3126                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3127                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3128                                 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3129                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3130                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
3131                                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
3132                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3133                                 if $fail_backwards {
3134                                         assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3135                                         assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3136                                 }
3137                                 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3138                                 {
3139                                         let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3140                                         if $fail_backwards {
3141                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3142                                                 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3143                                         } else {
3144                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3145                                         }
3146                                         added_monitors.clear();
3147                                 }
3148                         }
3149                 }
3150         }
3151
3152         macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3153                 ($node: expr) => {
3154                         {
3155                                 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3156                                 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3157                                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3158                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3159                                 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3160                                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3161                                 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3162                         }
3163                 }
3164         }
3165
3166         fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3167                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3168
3169                 let mut payment_event = {
3170                         origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3171                         check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3172
3173                         let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3174                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3175                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3176                 };
3177                 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3178
3179                 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3180                         assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3181
3182                         node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3183                         check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3184                         commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3185
3186                         let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3187                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3188                         match events_1[0] {
3189                                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3190                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3191                         };
3192
3193                         node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3194                         node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3195
3196                         if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3197                                 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3198                                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3199                                 match events_2[0] {
3200                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3201                                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3202                                                 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3203                                         },
3204                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3205                                 }
3206                         } else {
3207                                 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3208                                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3209                                 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3210                                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3211                                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3212                         }
3213
3214                         prev_node = node;
3215                 }
3216
3217                 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3218         }
3219
3220         fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3221                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3222                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3223
3224                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3225                 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
3226                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3227                                 {
3228                                         $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3229                                         if $last_node {
3230                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3231                                         } else {
3232                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3233                                         }
3234                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3235                                 }
3236                         }
3237                 }
3238
3239                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3240                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3241                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3242                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3243                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
3244                                 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
3245                         }
3246
3247                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3248                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3249                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3250                                 match events[0] {
3251                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3252                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3253                                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3254                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3255                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3256                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3257                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3258                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3259                                         },
3260                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3261                                 }
3262                         } else {
3263                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
3264                         }
3265                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3266                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3267                         }
3268
3269                         prev_node = node;
3270                 }
3271
3272                 if !skip_last {
3273                         update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3274                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3275                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3276                         match events[0] {
3277                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3278                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3279                                 },
3280                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3281                         }
3282                 }
3283         }
3284
3285         fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3286                 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3287         }
3288
3289         const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3290
3291         fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3292                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3293                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3294                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3295                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3296                 }
3297
3298                 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3299         }
3300
3301         fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3302                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3303                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3304                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3305                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3306                 }
3307
3308                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3309
3310                 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3311                 match err {
3312                         APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3313                         _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3314                 };
3315         }
3316
3317         fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3318                 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3319                 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3320         }
3321
3322         fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3323                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
3324                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3325
3326                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3327                 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3328                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3329                                 {
3330                                         $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3331                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3332                                 }
3333                         }
3334                 }
3335
3336                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3337                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3338                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3339                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3340                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
3341                                 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3342                                 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3343                                 // second-to-last node!
3344                                 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3345                         }
3346
3347                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3348                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3349                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3350                                 match events[0] {
3351                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3352                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3353                                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3354                                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3355                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3356                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3357                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3358                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3359                                         },
3360                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3361                                 }
3362                         } else {
3363                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
3364                         }
3365                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3366                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3367                         }
3368
3369                         prev_node = node;
3370                 }
3371
3372                 if !skip_last {
3373                         update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3374
3375                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3376                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3377                         match events[0] {
3378                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
3379                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3380                                         assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3381                                 },
3382                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3383                         }
3384                 }
3385         }
3386
3387         fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3388                 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3389         }
3390
3391         fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3392                 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3393                 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3394                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3395                 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3396
3397                 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3398                 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3399
3400                 for _ in 0..node_count {
3401                         let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3402                         let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3403                         let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3404                         let mut seed = [0; 32];
3405                         rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
3406                         let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3407                         let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3408                         let node = ChannelManager::new(0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone()).unwrap();
3409                         let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3410                         nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3411                                 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3412                                 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3413                         });
3414                 }
3415
3416                 nodes
3417         }
3418
3419         #[test]
3420         fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3421                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3422                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3423                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3424
3425                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3426                         ($node: expr) => {{
3427                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3428                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3429                                 chan.get_feerate()
3430                         }}
3431                 }
3432
3433                 // balancing
3434                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3435
3436                 // A                                        B
3437                 // update_fee                            ->
3438                 // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
3439                 //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3440                 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3441                 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3442                 //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3443                 // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
3444                 //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
3445                 //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
3446                 // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
3447                 //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3448                 // send (6) RAA                          -.
3449                 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3450                 //                                       <- RAA
3451                 // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
3452
3453                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3454                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3455                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3456
3457                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3458                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3459                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3460                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3461                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3462                         },
3463                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3464                 };
3465
3466                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3467
3468                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3469                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3470                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3471                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3472
3473                 let payment_event = {
3474                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3475                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3476                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3477                 };
3478                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3479                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3480
3481                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3482                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3483                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3484                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3485                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3486
3487                 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3488                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3489                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3490                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3491
3492                 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3493                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3494                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3495                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3496                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3497                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3498                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3499
3500                 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3501                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3502                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3503                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3504                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3505                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3506                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3507
3508                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3509                 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3510                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3511
3512                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3513                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3514                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3515
3516                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3517                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3518
3519                 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3520                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3521                 match events_2[0] {
3522                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3523                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3524                 }
3525
3526                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3527                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3528         }
3529
3530         #[test]
3531         fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3532                 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3533                 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3534                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3535                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3536                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3537
3538                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3539                         ($node: expr) => {{
3540                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3541                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3542                                 chan.get_feerate()
3543                         }}
3544                 }
3545
3546                 // balancing
3547                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3548
3549                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3550                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3551                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3552
3553                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3554                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3555                 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3556                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3557                                 update_fee.as_ref()
3558                         },
3559                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3560                 };
3561
3562                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3563
3564                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3565                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3566                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3567                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3568
3569                 let payment_event = {
3570                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3571                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3572                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3573                 };
3574                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3575                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3576
3577                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3578                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3579                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3580                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3581                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3582
3583                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3584                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3585
3586                 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3587         }
3588
3589         #[test]
3590         fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3591                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3592                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3593                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3594
3595                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3596                         ($node: expr) => {{
3597                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3598                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3599                                 chan.get_feerate()
3600                         }}
3601                 }
3602
3603                 // A                                        B
3604                 // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
3605                 //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3606                 // update_fee (never committed)          ->
3607                 // (3) update_fee                        ->
3608                 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3609                 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3610                 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3611                 //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
3612                 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
3613                 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3614                 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3615                 //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3616                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3617                 //                                          B should send no response here
3618                 // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
3619                 //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3620                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3621
3622                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3623                 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3624                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3625                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3626
3627                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3628                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3629                 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3630                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3631                                 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3632                         },
3633                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3634                 };
3635
3636                 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3637                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3638                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3639                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3640
3641                 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3642                 // transaction:
3643                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3644                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3645                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3646
3647                 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3648                 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3649                         channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3650                         feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3651                 };
3652
3653                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3654
3655                 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3656                 // Deliver (3)
3657                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3658
3659                 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3660                 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3661                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3662                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3663                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3664                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3665                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3666                 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3667                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3668                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3669
3670                 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3671                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3672                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3673                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3674
3675                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3676                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3677
3678                 // Delever (4)
3679                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3680                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3681
3682                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3683                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3684
3685                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3686                 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3687                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3688
3689                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3690                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3691         }
3692
3693         #[test]
3694         fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3695                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3696                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3697                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3698
3699                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3700                         ($node: expr) => {{
3701                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3702                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3703                                 chan.get_feerate()
3704                         }}
3705                 }
3706
3707                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3708                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3709
3710                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3711                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3712                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3713                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3714                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3715                         },
3716                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3717                 };
3718                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3719
3720                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3721                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3722                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3723                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3724
3725                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3726                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3727                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3728
3729                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3730                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3731                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3732
3733                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3734                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3735                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3736         }
3737
3738         #[test]
3739         fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3740                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3741                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3742                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3743
3744                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3745                         ($node: expr) => {{
3746                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3747                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3748                                 chan.get_feerate()
3749                         }}
3750                 }
3751
3752                 // balancing
3753                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3754
3755                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3756                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3757
3758                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3759                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3760                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3761                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3762                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3763                         },
3764                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3765                 };
3766                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3767                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3768                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3769                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3770                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3771
3772                 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3773
3774                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3775
3776                 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3777                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3778                 {
3779                         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3780                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3781                         added_monitors.clear();
3782                 }
3783                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3784                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3785                 // node[1] has nothing to do
3786
3787                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3788                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3789                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3790
3791                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3792                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3793                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3794                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3795                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3796
3797                 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3798                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3799                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3800                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3801                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3802                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3803
3804                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3805                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3806                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3807                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3808                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3809                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3810                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3811                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3812
3813                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3814                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3815                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3816                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3817                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3818                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3819
3820                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3821                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3822                 match events[0] {
3823                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3824                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3825                 };
3826                 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3827                 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3828
3829                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3830                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3831                 match events[0] {
3832                         Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3833                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3834                 };
3835
3836                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3837
3838                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3839                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3840                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3841         }
3842
3843         #[test]
3844         fn test_update_fee() {
3845                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3846                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3847                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3848
3849                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3850                         ($node: expr) => {{
3851                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3852                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3853                                 chan.get_feerate()
3854                         }}
3855                 }
3856
3857                 // A                                        B
3858                 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3859                 //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3860                 //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
3861                 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3862                 //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3863                 //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3864                 // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
3865                 //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3866                 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
3867                 //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3868                 //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3869                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3870
3871                 // Create and deliver (1)...
3872                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3873                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3874
3875                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3876                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3877                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3878                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3879                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3880                         },
3881                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3882                 };
3883                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3884
3885                 // Generate (2) and (3):
3886                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3887                 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3888                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3889                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3890
3891                 // Deliver (2):
3892                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3893                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3894                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3895
3896                 // Create and deliver (4)...
3897                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3898                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3899                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3900                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3901                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3902                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3903                         },
3904                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3905                 };
3906                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3907
3908                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3909                 // ... creating (5)
3910                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3911                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3912                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3913
3914                 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3915                 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3916                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3917                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3918
3919                 // Deliver (5):
3920                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3921                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3922                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3923
3924                 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3925                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3926                 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3927                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3928
3929                 // Deliver (7)
3930                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3931                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3932                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3933                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3934                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3935                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3936
3937                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3938                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3939                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3940         }
3941
3942         #[test]
3943         fn fake_network_test() {
3944                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3945                 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3946                 let nodes = create_network(4);
3947
3948                 // Create some initial channels
3949                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3950                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3951                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3952
3953                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3954                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3955                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3956                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3957                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3958
3959                 // Send some more payments
3960                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3961                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3962                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3963
3964                 // Test failure packets
3965                 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3966                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3967
3968                 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3969                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3970
3971                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3972                 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3973                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3974                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3975                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3976                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3977                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3978
3979                 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3980                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3981                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3982                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3983                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3984                         fee_msat: 0,
3985                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3986                 });
3987                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3988                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3989                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3990                         fee_msat: 0,
3991                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3992                 });
3993                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3994                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3995                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3996                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3997                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3998                 });
3999                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4000                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4001                 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
4002
4003                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4004                 hops.push(RouteHop {
4005                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4006                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4007                         fee_msat: 0,
4008                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4009                 });
4010                 hops.push(RouteHop {
4011                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4012                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4013                         fee_msat: 0,
4014                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4015                 });
4016                 hops.push(RouteHop {
4017                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4018                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4019                         fee_msat: 1000000,
4020                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4021                 });
4022                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4023                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4024                 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
4025
4026                 // Claim the rebalances...
4027                 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
4028                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4029
4030                 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
4031                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4032
4033                 // Send some payments across both channels
4034                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4035                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4036                 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4037
4038                 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
4039
4040                 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
4041
4042                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4043                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
4044                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
4045
4046                 // Close down the channels...
4047                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
4048                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
4049                 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
4050                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
4051                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
4052         }
4053
4054         #[test]
4055         fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
4056                 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
4057                 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
4058                 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
4059
4060                 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
4061                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
4062                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4063                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4064                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4065                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4066
4067                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
4068
4069                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4070                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4071
4072                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4073                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4074
4075                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
4076                 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
4077                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
4078         }
4079
4080         #[derive(PartialEq)]
4081         enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
4082         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
4083         ///
4084         /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
4085         /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
4086         /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
4087         ///
4088         /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
4089         /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
4090         ///
4091         /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
4092         /// also fail.
4093         fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4094                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4095                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
4096
4097                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
4098                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4099                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
4100                                 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
4101                                 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
4102                                         res.push(tx.clone());
4103                                 }
4104                                 false
4105                         } else { true }
4106                 });
4107                 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
4108                         res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
4109                 }
4110
4111                 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
4112
4113                 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
4114                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4115                                 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
4116                                         check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
4117                                         if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
4118                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
4119                                         } else {
4120                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
4121                                         }
4122                                         res.push(tx.clone());
4123                                         false
4124                                 } else { true }
4125                         });
4126                         assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
4127                 }
4128
4129                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4130                 res
4131         }
4132
4133         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
4134         /// HTLC transaction.
4135         fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
4136                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4137                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4138                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4139                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
4140                                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
4141                                 false
4142                         } else { true }
4143                 });
4144                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4145         }
4146
4147         fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4148                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4149
4150                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
4151                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4152                 let mut found_prev = false;
4153
4154                 for tx in prev_txn {
4155                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
4156                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
4157                                 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
4158                                 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
4159
4160                                 found_prev = true;
4161                                 break;
4162                         }
4163                 }
4164                 assert!(found_prev);
4165
4166                 let mut res = Vec::new();
4167                 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
4168                 res
4169         }
4170
4171         fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
4172                 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4173                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4174                 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
4175                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4176                                 msg.clone()
4177                         },
4178                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4179                 };
4180
4181                 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4182                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4183                 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
4184                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4185                                 msg.clone()
4186                         },
4187                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4188                 };
4189
4190                 for node in nodes {
4191                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4192                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4193                 }
4194         }
4195
4196         macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
4197                 ($node: expr) => {{
4198                         let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4199                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4200                         match events[0] {
4201                                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4202                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4203                         };
4204                         $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4205                         $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4206                 }}
4207         }
4208
4209         #[test]
4210         fn channel_reserve_test() {
4211                 use util::rng;
4212                 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
4213                 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
4214
4215                 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
4216                         ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
4217                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4218                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
4219                                 chan.get_value_stat()
4220                         }}
4221                 }
4222
4223                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4224                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
4225                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
4226
4227                 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4228                 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4229
4230                 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
4231                 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4232
4233                 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
4234                         ($recv_value: expr) => {{
4235                                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4236                                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4237                                 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
4238                         }}
4239                 };
4240
4241                 macro_rules! expect_forward {
4242                         ($node: expr) => {{
4243                                 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4244                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4245                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4246                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
4247                                 payment_event
4248                         }}
4249                 }
4250
4251                 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
4252                         ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
4253                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4254                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4255                                 match events[0] {
4256                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4257                                                 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4258                                                 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
4259                                         },
4260                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4261                                 }
4262                         }
4263                 };
4264
4265                 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4266                 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4267
4268                 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4269
4270                 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4271                 {
4272                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4273                         assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4274                         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4275                         match err {
4276                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4277                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4278                         }
4279                 }
4280
4281                 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4282                 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4283                 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4284                 loop {
4285                         let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4286                         if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4287                                 break;
4288                         }
4289                         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4290                         htlc_id += 1;
4291
4292                         let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4293                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4294                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4295                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4296                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4297                         );
4298
4299                         assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4300                         assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4301                         assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4302                         assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4303                         stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4304                 }
4305
4306                 {
4307                         let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4308                         // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4309                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4310                         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4311                         match err {
4312                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4313                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4314                         }
4315                 }
4316
4317                 // adding pending output
4318                 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4319                 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4320
4321                 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4322                 let payment_event_1 = {
4323                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4324                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4325
4326                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4327                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4328                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4329                 };
4330                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4331
4332                 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4333                 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4334                 {
4335                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4336                         match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4337                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4338                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4339                         }
4340                 }
4341
4342                 {
4343                         // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4344                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4345
4346                         // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4347                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4348                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4349                                 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4350                                 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4351                                 session_key
4352                         }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4353
4354                         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4355                         let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4356                         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4357                         let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4358                         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4359                                 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4360                                 htlc_id,
4361                                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4362                                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4363                                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4364                                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4365                         };
4366
4367                         let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4368                         match err {
4369                                 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4370                         }
4371                 }
4372
4373                 // split the rest to test holding cell
4374                 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4375                 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4376                 {
4377                         let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4378                         assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4379                 }
4380
4381                 // now see if they go through on both sides
4382                 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4383                 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4384                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4385                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4386                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4387                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4388
4389                 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4390                 {
4391                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4392                         match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4393                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4394                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4395                         }
4396                 }
4397
4398                 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4399                 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4400                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4401                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4402                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4403                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4404
4405                 // flush the pending htlc
4406                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4407                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4408
4409                 let commitment_update_2 = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
4410                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4411                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4412                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
4413                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4414                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4415                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4416
4417                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4418
4419                 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4420                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4421                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4422
4423                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4424                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4425
4426                 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4427                 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4428                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4429                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4430                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4431                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4432
4433                 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4434                 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4435                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4436                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4437
4438                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4439                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4440
4441                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4442                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4443                 match events[0] {
4444                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4445                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4446                                 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4447                         },
4448                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4449                 }
4450                 match events[1] {
4451                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4452                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4453                                 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4454                         },
4455                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4456                 }
4457
4458                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4459                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4460                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4461
4462                 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4463                 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4464                 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4465                 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4466
4467                 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4468                 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4469         }
4470
4471         #[test]
4472         fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4473                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4474                 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4475                 let nodes = create_network(5);
4476
4477                 // Create some initial channels
4478                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4479                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4480                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4481                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4482
4483                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4484                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4485                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4486                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4487                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4488
4489                 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4490                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4491                 {
4492                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4493                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4494                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4495                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4496                 }
4497                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4498                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4499                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4500
4501                 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4502                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4503
4504                 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4505                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4506                 {
4507                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4508                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4509                         nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4510                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4511                 }
4512                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4513                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4514                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4515
4516                 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4517                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4518                                 {
4519                                         assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4520                                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4521
4522                                         let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4523                                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4524                                         match events[0] {
4525                                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4526                                                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4527                                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4528                                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4529                                                 },
4530                                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4531                                         };
4532                                 }
4533                         }
4534                 }
4535
4536                 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4537                 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4538                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4539                 {
4540                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4541
4542                         // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4543                         claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4544
4545                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4546                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4547
4548                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4549                 }
4550                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4551                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4552                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4553
4554                 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
4555                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4556                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
4557                 }
4558
4559                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4560                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4561                 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4562                 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4563                 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
4564                 // buffer space).
4565
4566                 {
4567                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4568                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4569                         for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
4570                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4571                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4572                         }
4573
4574                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4575
4576                         // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4577                         claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4578
4579                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4580                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4581                         for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
4582                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4583                                 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4584                         }
4585
4586                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4587
4588                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4589                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4590
4591                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4592                 }
4593                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4594                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4595                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4596
4597                 // Create some new channels:
4598                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4599
4600                 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4601                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4602                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4603                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4604                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4605                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4606                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4607                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4608                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4609                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4610                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4611                 // Revoke the old state
4612                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4613
4614                 {
4615                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4616                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4617                         {
4618                                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4619                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4620                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4621                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4622
4623                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4624                                 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4625                         }
4626                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4627
4628                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4629                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4630                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4631                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4632                         test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4633                 }
4634                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4635                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4636                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4637         }
4638
4639         #[test]
4640         fn revoked_output_claim() {
4641                 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4642                 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4643                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4644                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4645                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4646                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4647                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4648                 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4649                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4650                 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4651                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4652
4653                 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4654                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4655                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4656                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4657                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4658
4659                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4660
4661                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4662                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4663
4664                 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4665                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4666                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4667         }
4668
4669         #[test]
4670         fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4671                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4672                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4673
4674                 // Create some new channel:
4675                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4676
4677                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4678                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4679                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4680                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4681                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4682
4683                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4684                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4685                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4686                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4687                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4688                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4689                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4690                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4691                 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4692
4693                 //Revoke the old state
4694                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4695
4696                 {
4697                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4698
4699                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4700
4701                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4702                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4703                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4704
4705                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4706                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4707
4708                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4709
4710                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4711                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4712                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4713                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4714                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4715                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4716                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4717                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4718
4719                         // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4720                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4721                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4722
4723                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4724                         let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4725                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4726                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4727                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4728                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4729                 }
4730                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4731                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4732                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4733         }
4734
4735         #[test]
4736         fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4737                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4738                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4739
4740                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4741
4742                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4743                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4744                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4745                 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4746                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4747                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4748
4749                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4750                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4751
4752                 //Revoke the old state
4753                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4754
4755                 {
4756                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4757
4758                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4759
4760                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4761                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4762                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4763
4764                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4765                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4766                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4767                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4768                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4769                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4770                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4771
4772                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4773                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4774                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4775
4776                         let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4777                         revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4778                         node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4779                         node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4780                         node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4781
4782                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4783                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4784                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4785                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4786                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4787                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4788                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4789                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4790
4791                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4792                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4793
4794                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4795                         let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4796                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4797                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4798                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4799                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4800                 }
4801                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4802                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4803                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4804         }
4805
4806         #[test]
4807         fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4808                 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4809                 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4810                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4811                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4812
4813                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4814                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4815                 {
4816                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4817                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4818                         match events[0] {
4819                                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4820                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4821                                 },
4822                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4823                         }
4824                 }
4825
4826                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4827                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4828
4829                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4830                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4831
4832                 {
4833                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4834                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4835                         match events[0] {
4836                                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4837                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4838                                 },
4839                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4840                         }
4841                 }
4842
4843                 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4844                 // registering new transactions
4845                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4846         }
4847
4848         #[test]
4849         fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4850                 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4851                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4852                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4853                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4854
4855                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4856
4857                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4858
4859                 let mut payment_event = {
4860                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4861                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4862
4863                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4864                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4865                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4866                 };
4867
4868                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4869                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4870
4871                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4872                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4873                 match events_1[0] {
4874                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4875                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4876                 };
4877
4878                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4879                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4880
4881                 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4882                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4883                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4884                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4885
4886                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4887                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4888                 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4889                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4890
4891                 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4892                 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4893                 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4894
4895                 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4896                 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4897                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4898                 match events_3[0] {
4899                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4900                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4901                         },
4902                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4903                 }
4904
4905                 let tx = {
4906                         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4907                         // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4908                         // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4909                         // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4910                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4911                         node_txn.remove(0)
4912                 };
4913
4914                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4915                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4916
4917                 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4918                 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4919                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4920                 match events_4[0] {
4921                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4922                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4923                         },
4924                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4925                 }
4926
4927                 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4928                 {
4929                         let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4930                         monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4931                                 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4932                 }
4933                 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4934                 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4935                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4936                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4937                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4938                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4939                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4940
4941                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
4942         }
4943
4944         #[test]
4945         fn test_unconf_chan() {
4946                 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
4947                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4948                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4949
4950                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4951                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
4952                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
4953                 mem::drop(channel_state);
4954
4955                 let mut headers = Vec::new();
4956                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4957                 headers.push(header.clone());
4958                 for _i in 2..100 {
4959                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4960                         headers.push(header.clone());
4961                 }
4962                 while !headers.is_empty() {
4963                         nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
4964                 }
4965                 {
4966                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4967                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4968                         match events[0] {
4969                                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4970                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4971                                 },
4972                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4973                         }
4974                 }
4975                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4976                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
4977                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
4978         }
4979
4980         /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
4981         /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
4982         fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
4983                 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4984                 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4985
4986                 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
4987                 for msg in reestablish_1 {
4988                         resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4989                 }
4990                 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4991                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4992                 } else {
4993                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
4994                 }
4995
4996                 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
4997                 for msg in reestablish_2 {
4998                         resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4999                 }
5000                 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5001                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5002                 } else {
5003                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
5004                 }
5005
5006                 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
5007                 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
5008                         (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
5009
5010                 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
5011                         if pre_all_htlcs {
5012                                 let a = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap());
5013                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = a.unwrap();
5014                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
5015                         } else {
5016                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5017                         }
5018                         if pending_raa.0 {
5019                                 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5020                                 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
5021                                 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5022                         } else {
5023                                 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5024                         }
5025                         if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5026                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5027                                 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5028                                         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
5029                                 } else {
5030                                         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5031                                 }
5032                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5033                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5034                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5035                                 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5036                                         node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5037                                 }
5038                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5039                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5040                                 }
5041                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5042                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5043                                 }
5044
5045                                 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5046                                         commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5047                                 } else {
5048                                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5049                                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5050                                         assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5051                                         assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5052                                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5053                                 }
5054                         } else {
5055                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5056                         }
5057                 }
5058
5059                 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
5060                         if pre_all_htlcs {
5061                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5062                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
5063                         } else {
5064                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5065                         }
5066                         if pending_raa.1 {
5067                                 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5068                                 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
5069                                 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5070                         } else {
5071                                 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5072                         }
5073                         if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5074                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5075                                 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5076                                         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
5077                                 }
5078                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5079                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5080                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5081                                 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5082                                         node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5083                                 }
5084                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5085                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5086                                 }
5087                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5088                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5089                                 }
5090
5091                                 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5092                                         commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5093                                 } else {
5094                                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5095                                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5096                                         assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5097                                         assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5098                                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5099                                 }
5100                         } else {
5101                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5102                         }
5103                 }
5104         }
5105
5106         #[test]
5107         fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
5108                 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
5109                 let nodes = create_network(3);
5110                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5111                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5112
5113                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5114                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5115                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5116
5117                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5118                 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5119                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
5120                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
5121
5122                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5123                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5124                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5125
5126                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5127                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5128                 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5129                 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5130
5131                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5132                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5133
5134                 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
5135                 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
5136
5137                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
5138                 {
5139                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5140                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5141                         match events[0] {
5142                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
5143                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
5144                                 },
5145                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5146                         }
5147                         match events[1] {
5148                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
5149                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
5150                                         assert!(rejected_by_dest);
5151                                 },
5152                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5153                         }
5154                 }
5155
5156                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
5157                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
5158         }
5159
5160         fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
5161                 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
5162                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5163                 if messages_delivered == 0 {
5164                         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5165                         // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
5166                 } else {
5167                         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5168                 }
5169
5170                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5171                 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5172
5173                 let payment_event = {
5174                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5175                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5176
5177                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5178                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5179                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5180                 };
5181                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
5182
5183                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5184                         // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
5185                 } else {
5186                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5187                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5188                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5189
5190                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5191                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5192                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5193
5194                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5195                                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5196                                         assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5197                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5198
5199                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5200                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5201                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5202                                         }
5203                                 }
5204                         }
5205                 }
5206
5207                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5208                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5209                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5210                         // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
5211                         // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
5212                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5213                 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5214                         // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5215                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5216                 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5217                         // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5218                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5219                 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5220                         // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5221                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5222                 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5223                         // Everything was delivered...
5224                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5225                 }
5226
5227                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5228                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5229                 match events_1[0] {
5230                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5231                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5232                 };
5233
5234                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5235                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5236                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5237
5238                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5239                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5240
5241                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5242                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5243                 match events_2[0] {
5244                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5245                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5246                                 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5247                         },
5248                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5249                 }
5250
5251                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5252                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5253
5254                 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5255                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5256                 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
5257                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5258                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5259                                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5260                                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5261                                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5262                                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5263                                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5264                                 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5265                         },
5266                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5267                 };
5268
5269                 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
5270                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
5271
5272                         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5273                         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5274                         match events_4[0] {
5275                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5276                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5277                                 },
5278                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5279                         }
5280
5281                         if messages_delivered >= 2 {
5282                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
5283                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5284
5285                                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5286                                         assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5287                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5288
5289                                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5290                                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5291                                                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5292                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5293
5294                                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5295                                                         assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5296                                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5297                                                 }
5298                                         }
5299                                 }
5300                         }
5301                 }
5302
5303                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5304                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5305                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5306                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5307                         //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
5308                         //if messages_delivered < 1 {
5309                                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5310                                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5311                                 match events_4[0] {
5312                                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5313                                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5314                                         },
5315                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5316                                 }
5317                         //}
5318                 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5319                         // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5320                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5321                 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5322                         // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5323                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5324                 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5325                         // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5326                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5327                 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5328                         // Everything was delivered...
5329                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5330                 }
5331
5332                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5333                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5334                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5335
5336                 // Channel should still work fine...
5337                 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
5338                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5339         }
5340
5341         #[test]
5342         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
5343                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
5344                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
5345                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
5346         }
5347
5348         #[test]
5349         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
5350                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
5351                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
5352                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
5353         }
5354
5355         #[test]
5356         fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
5357                 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
5358                 let nodes = create_network(2);
5359                 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5360
5361                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5362                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5363
5364                 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5365                 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5366                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5367                 match events_1[0] {
5368                         MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5369                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5370                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5371                         },
5372                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5373                 }
5374
5375                 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5376                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5377                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5378                 match events_2[0] {
5379                         MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5380                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5381                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5382                         },
5383                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5384                 }
5385
5386                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5387                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5388                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5389                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5390
5391                 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
5392                 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
5393
5394                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5395                 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5396                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
5397         }
5398
5399         #[test]
5400         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
5401                 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
5402                 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
5403                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5404                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5405
5406                 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5407
5408                 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5409                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5410                 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5411
5412                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
5413                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5414
5415                 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5416                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5417                 match events_1[0] {
5418                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5419                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5420                 }
5421
5422                 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5423                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5424
5425                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5426                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5427                 match events_2[0] {
5428                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5429                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5430                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5431                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5432                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5433                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5434                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5435
5436                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5437                                 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5438                                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5439                                 match events_3[0] {
5440                                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5441                                                 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5442                                         },
5443                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5444                                 }
5445
5446                                 let (_, commitment_update) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
5447                                 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
5448                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5449                         },
5450                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5451                 }
5452
5453                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5454                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5455
5456                 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5457                 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5458                 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5459                 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5460
5461                 let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5462                 let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5463
5464                 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5465                 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5466
5467                 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5468                 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5469
5470                 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5471
5472                 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5473                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5474                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5475                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5476                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5477                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5478                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5479                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5480                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5481
5482                 let bs_second_commitment_signed = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap().unwrap();
5483                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5484                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5485                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5486                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5487                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5488                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5489
5490                 let as_commitment_signed = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5491                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5492                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5493                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5494                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5495                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5496                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5497
5498                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5499                 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
5500                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5501
5502                 let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5503                 assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none());
5504                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5505
5506                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5507                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5508
5509                 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5510                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5511                 match events_4[0] {
5512                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5513                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5514                 };
5515
5516                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5517                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5518
5519                 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5520                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5521                 match events_5[0] {
5522                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
5523                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5524                         },
5525                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5526                 }
5527
5528                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5529                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5530
5531                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5532         }
5533
5534         #[test]
5535         fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
5536                 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
5537                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5538                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5539
5540                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5541                 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5542
5543                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5544                 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5545                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5546
5547                 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5548                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5549                 match events_1[0] {
5550                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5551                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5552                 };
5553
5554                 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5555                 // PaymentFailed event
5556
5557                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5558         }
5559
5560         fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
5561                 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
5562                 // a disconnect in between
5563                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5564                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5565
5566                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5567                 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5568
5569                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5570                 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5571                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5572
5573                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5574                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5575                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5576
5577                 if disconnect {
5578                         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5579                         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5580                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5581                 }
5582
5583                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
5584                 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5585                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5586
5587                 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5588                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5589                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
5590                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5591                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5592                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5593
5594                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5595
5596                 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5597                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5598                 match events_3[0] {
5599                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5600                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5601                                 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5602                         },
5603                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5604                 }
5605
5606                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
5607
5608                 // Now set it to failed again...
5609                 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5610                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5611                 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
5612                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5613
5614                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5615                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5616                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5617
5618                 if disconnect {
5619                         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5620                         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5621                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5622                 }
5623
5624                 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
5625                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5626                 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5627                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5628
5629                 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5630                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5631                 match events_5[0] {
5632                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5633                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5634                 }
5635
5636                 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5637                 // PaymentFailed event
5638
5639                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5640         }
5641
5642         #[test]
5643         fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
5644                 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
5645                 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
5646         }
5647
5648         fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
5649                 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
5650
5651                 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
5652                 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
5653                 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
5654                 //   route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
5655                 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
5656                 //   TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
5657                 //   the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
5658                 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
5659                 //   immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
5660                 //   channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
5661                 //   disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
5662                 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
5663                 //   through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
5664                 //   disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
5665                 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
5666                 //   through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
5667                 //   disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
5668                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5669                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5670
5671                 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5672
5673                 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5674                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5675                 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5676
5677                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5678                 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
5679                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5680
5681                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5682                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5683                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5684
5685                 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
5686                 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
5687                 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5688                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5689                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5690                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5691                 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
5692                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5693                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5694                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5695                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5696                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5697                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5698                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5699
5700                                 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5701                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5702                                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5703                                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5704                                         match events_3[0] {
5705                                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5706                                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5707                                                 },
5708                                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5709                                         }
5710
5711                                         if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
5712                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
5713                                         } else { panic!(); }
5714                                 }
5715
5716                                 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
5717                         },
5718                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5719                 };
5720
5721                 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
5722                         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5723                         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5724                 }
5725
5726                 // Now fix monitor updating...
5727                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
5728                 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5729                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5730
5731                 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
5732                         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5733                         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5734
5735                         let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5736                         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5737                         let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5738                         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5739
5740                         let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5741                         let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5742
5743                         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5744                         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5745
5746                         (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
5747                 } } }
5748
5749                 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
5750                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5751                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5752
5753                         let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5754                         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5755                         let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5756                         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5757
5758                         let mut as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5759                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5760                         let mut bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5761                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5762
5763                         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5764                         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5765
5766                         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5767                         if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5768                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5769
5770                                 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
5771                                 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
5772                                 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5773                         } else {
5774                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5775                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5776                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5777                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5778                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
5779                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
5780
5781                                 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5782
5783                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5784                                 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5785                                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5786                                 match events_3[0] {
5787                                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5788                                                 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5789                                         },
5790                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5791                                 }
5792
5793                                 let (as_resp_raa, as_resp_cu) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5794                                 assert!(as_resp_cu.is_none());
5795                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5796
5797                                 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
5798                                 bs_resp.2 = None;
5799                         }
5800
5801                         if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
5802                                 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5803
5804                                 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5805                                         assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
5806                                         assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
5807                                 }
5808                                 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
5809                                 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
5810                         }
5811
5812                         (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
5813                 } else {
5814                         let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5815                         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
5816                         (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
5817                                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5818                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5819                                         msg.clone()
5820                                 },
5821                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5822                         })
5823                 };
5824
5825                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5826
5827                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5828                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5829                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still
5830                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5831
5832                 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
5833                         let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5834
5835                         assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
5836                         assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
5837
5838                         assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
5839                         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5840                 }
5841
5842                 let as_commitment_update;
5843                 let bs_second_commitment_update;
5844
5845                 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
5846                         as_commitment_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5847                         assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5848                         assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5849                         assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5850                         assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5851                         assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
5852                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5853                 } }
5854
5855                 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
5856                         bs_second_commitment_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5857                         assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5858                         assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5859                         assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5860                         assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5861                         assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
5862                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5863                 } }
5864
5865                 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
5866                         handle_bs_raa!();
5867
5868                         if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
5869                                 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5870
5871                                 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
5872                                 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5873
5874                                 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5875                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5876
5877                                 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5878                         }
5879
5880                         handle_initial_raa!();
5881
5882                         if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
5883                                 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5884
5885                                 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5886                                 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5887
5888                                 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5889                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5890                         }
5891                 } else {
5892                         handle_initial_raa!();
5893
5894                         if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
5895                                 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5896
5897                                 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5898                                 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
5899
5900                                 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
5901                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5902
5903                                 assert!(bs_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5904                         }
5905
5906                         handle_bs_raa!();
5907
5908                         if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
5909                                 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5910
5911                                 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5912                                 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5913
5914                                 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5915                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5916                         }
5917                 }
5918
5919                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5920                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5921                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5922
5923                 let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5924                 assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none());
5925                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5926
5927                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5928                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5929
5930                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5931                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5932
5933                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5934
5935                 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5936                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5937                 match events_5[0] {
5938                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5939                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5940                                 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5941                         },
5942                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5943                 }
5944
5945                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5946         }
5947
5948         #[test]
5949         fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
5950                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
5951                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
5952                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
5953                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
5954                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
5955                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
5956         }
5957
5958         #[test]
5959         fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
5960                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
5961                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
5962                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
5963                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
5964         }
5965
5966         #[test]
5967         fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
5968                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
5969                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
5970                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
5971                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
5972                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
5973         }
5974
5975         #[test]
5976         fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
5977                 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
5978                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5979                 let nodes = create_network(2);
5980
5981                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
5982
5983                 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5984                 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5985                 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5986                 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5987
5988                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
5989
5990                 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5991                 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5992
5993                 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5994                 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5995
5996                 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
5997
5998                 let mut chan_announcement;
5999
6000                 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
6001                         () => {
6002                                 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6003                                         features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
6004                                         chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
6005                                         short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
6006                                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
6007                                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
6008                                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
6009                                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
6010                                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
6011                                 };
6012                         }
6013                 }
6014
6015                 macro_rules! sign_msg {
6016                         ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
6017                                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
6018                                 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6019                                 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6020                                 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
6021                                 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
6022                                 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6023                                         node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
6024                                         node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
6025                                         bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
6026                                         bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
6027                                         contents: $unsigned_msg
6028                                 }
6029                         }
6030                 }
6031
6032                 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6033                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6034                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
6035                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6036
6037                 // Configured with Network::Testnet
6038                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6039                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
6040                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6041                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6042
6043                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6044                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
6045                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6046                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6047         }
6048 }