1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
34 use ln::msgs::LocalFeatures;
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
52 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
54 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
58 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
65 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
66 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
67 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
68 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
69 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
70 short_channel_id: u64,
71 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
72 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
75 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
76 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
77 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
78 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
81 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
82 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
83 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
84 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
88 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
89 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
90 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
91 short_channel_id: u64,
93 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
96 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
97 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
98 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
99 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
102 session_priv: SecretKey,
103 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
104 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
105 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
110 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
111 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
112 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
113 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
114 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
122 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
130 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
131 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
132 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
133 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
134 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
135 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
137 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
139 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
140 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
141 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
142 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
143 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
145 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
146 err: msgs::LightningError,
147 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
149 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
151 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
153 err: LightningError {
155 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
156 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
158 data: err.to_string()
162 shutdown_finish: None,
166 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
168 err: LightningError {
170 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
172 shutdown_finish: None,
176 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
177 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
180 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
182 err: LightningError {
184 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
185 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
187 data: err.to_string()
191 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
195 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
198 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
200 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
202 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
204 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
205 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
207 data: msg.to_string()
211 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
213 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
214 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
216 data: msg.to_string()
221 shutdown_finish: None,
226 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
227 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
228 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
229 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
230 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
232 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
234 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
236 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
240 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
244 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
245 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
246 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
247 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
248 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
249 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
250 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
252 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
256 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
257 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
258 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
259 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
260 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
261 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
262 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
263 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
264 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
265 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
266 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
267 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
268 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
270 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
271 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
272 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
273 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
275 pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
276 pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
277 pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
278 pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
279 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
280 pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
283 pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
285 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
286 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
287 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
288 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
289 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
294 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
295 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
297 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
298 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
300 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
301 /// to individual Channels.
303 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
304 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
305 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
306 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
308 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
309 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
310 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
311 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
312 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
313 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
314 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
316 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
317 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
318 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
319 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
321 pub struct ChannelManager {
322 default_configuration: UserConfig,
323 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
324 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
325 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
326 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
327 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
330 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
332 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
333 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
334 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
337 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
339 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
340 our_network_key: SecretKey,
342 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
343 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
344 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
345 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
346 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
348 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
353 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
354 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
355 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
356 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
357 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
359 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
360 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
361 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
362 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
363 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
364 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
365 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
367 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
368 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
369 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
370 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
371 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
372 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
375 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
377 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
378 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
381 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
383 macro_rules! secp_call {
384 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
387 Err(_) => return Err($err),
392 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
393 pub struct ChannelDetails {
394 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
395 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
396 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
397 /// lifetime of the channel.
398 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
399 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
400 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
401 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
402 /// The node_id of our counterparty
403 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
404 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
405 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
406 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
408 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
409 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
410 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
411 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
412 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
413 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
414 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
415 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
416 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
417 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
418 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
419 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
420 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
424 macro_rules! handle_error {
425 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
428 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
429 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
430 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
431 if let Some(update) = update_option {
432 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
433 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
444 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
445 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
448 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
449 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
451 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
452 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
453 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
454 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
455 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
457 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
459 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
464 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
465 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
468 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
469 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
471 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
472 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
473 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
474 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
475 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
477 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
479 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
480 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
481 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
482 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
483 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
485 if let Some(update) = update {
486 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.add_update_monitor(update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
488 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
489 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
490 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
491 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
492 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
493 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
497 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
498 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
499 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
501 shutdown_res.0.clear();
502 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
508 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
509 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
510 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
512 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
514 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
515 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
516 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
517 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
518 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
520 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
521 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
522 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
523 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
524 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
525 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
526 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
527 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
528 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
529 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
532 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
533 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
534 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
535 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
537 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
538 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
540 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
541 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
543 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
544 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
545 if !$resend_commitment {
546 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
549 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
551 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
552 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
558 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
559 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
560 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
562 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
563 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
567 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
568 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
569 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
570 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
571 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
574 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
579 impl ChannelManager {
580 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
582 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
583 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
585 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
587 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
589 /// User must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
590 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
591 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
592 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
594 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
595 default_configuration: config.clone(),
596 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
597 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
598 monitor: monitor.clone(),
602 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
603 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
606 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
607 by_id: HashMap::new(),
608 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
609 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
610 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
611 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
613 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
615 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
616 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
622 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
623 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
627 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
629 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
630 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
631 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
632 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
634 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
635 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
637 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
638 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
639 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
640 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
641 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
644 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
645 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
647 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
648 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
649 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
650 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
651 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
652 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
654 panic!("RNG is bad???");
657 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
659 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
660 node_id: their_network_key,
666 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
667 /// more information.
668 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
669 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
670 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
671 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
672 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
673 res.push(ChannelDetails {
674 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
675 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
676 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
677 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
678 inbound_capacity_msat,
679 outbound_capacity_msat,
680 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
681 is_live: channel.is_live(),
687 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
688 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
690 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
691 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
692 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
693 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
694 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
695 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
696 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
697 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
698 // really wanted anyway.
699 if channel.is_live() {
700 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
701 res.push(ChannelDetails {
702 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
703 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
704 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
705 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
706 inbound_capacity_msat,
707 outbound_capacity_msat,
708 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
716 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
717 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
718 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
720 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
721 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
722 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
724 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
725 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
726 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
727 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
728 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
729 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
730 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
731 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
734 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
735 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
736 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
738 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
739 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
741 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
744 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
745 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
747 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
748 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
753 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
754 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
755 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
764 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
765 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
766 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
767 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
768 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
770 for tx in local_txn {
771 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
775 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
776 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
777 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
778 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
781 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
782 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
783 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
784 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
785 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
792 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
793 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
794 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
795 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
796 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
802 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
803 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
804 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
805 for chan in self.list_channels() {
806 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
810 const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
811 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
812 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
813 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
815 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
816 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
817 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
818 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
819 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
820 failure_code: $err_code,
821 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
826 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
827 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
830 let shared_secret = {
831 let mut arr = [0; 32];
832 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
835 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
837 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
838 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
839 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
840 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
841 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
842 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
843 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
844 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
847 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
848 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
849 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
850 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
851 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
854 let mut channel_state = None;
855 macro_rules! return_err {
856 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
858 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
859 if channel_state.is_none() {
860 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
862 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
863 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
864 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
865 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
866 })), channel_state.unwrap());
871 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
872 let next_hop_data = {
873 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
874 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
875 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
877 let error_code = match err {
878 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
879 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
881 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
887 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
889 // final_expiry_too_soon
890 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
891 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
893 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
894 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
895 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
897 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
898 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
899 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
902 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
903 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
904 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
905 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
907 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
909 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
911 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
912 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
913 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
916 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
917 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
918 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
920 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
922 let blinding_factor = {
923 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
924 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
925 sha.input(&shared_secret);
926 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
929 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
931 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
933 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
936 hop_data: new_packet_data,
937 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
940 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
941 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
942 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
943 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
944 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
945 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
946 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
950 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
951 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
952 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
953 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
954 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
955 None => { // unknown_next_peer
956 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
958 Some(id) => id.clone(),
960 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
961 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
963 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
964 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
965 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
966 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
967 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
968 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
969 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
971 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
972 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
974 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
975 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
976 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
978 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
979 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
981 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
982 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
983 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
984 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
986 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
987 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
992 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
993 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
994 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
995 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
997 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
998 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1000 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1001 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1003 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1005 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1010 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1013 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1014 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1015 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1016 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1017 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1021 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1023 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1024 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1025 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1026 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1027 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1028 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1029 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1030 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1031 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1032 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1035 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1036 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1038 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1044 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1046 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1047 /// fields for more info.
1049 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1050 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1051 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1052 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1053 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1054 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1056 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1058 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1059 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1060 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1061 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1062 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1063 /// relevant updates.
1065 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1066 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1067 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1068 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1069 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1070 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1071 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1072 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1074 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1075 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1076 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1077 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1081 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1083 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1085 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1086 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1087 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1088 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1090 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1092 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1093 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1095 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1096 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1097 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1100 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1101 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1103 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1104 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1106 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1107 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1109 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1110 route: route.clone(),
1111 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1112 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1113 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1115 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1116 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1117 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1118 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1119 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1120 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1121 // something else in case we will resend later!
1122 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1125 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1126 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1127 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1128 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1129 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1130 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1131 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1139 } else { unreachable!(); }
1143 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1144 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1146 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.action {
1148 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1149 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1150 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1151 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1155 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1160 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1162 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1163 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1165 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1167 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1168 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1169 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1170 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1172 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1174 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1175 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1177 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1178 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1179 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1180 } else { unreachable!(); })
1186 match handle_error!(self, res) {
1187 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1188 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1191 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1192 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1193 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1194 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1201 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1202 // lock before add_update_monitor
1203 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1205 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1206 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None))) {
1208 log_error!(self, "Failed to store ChannelMonitor update for funding tx generation");
1209 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1210 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1211 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1216 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1219 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1220 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1221 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1222 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1224 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1229 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1230 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1231 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1234 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1235 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1236 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1238 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1244 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1245 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1247 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1249 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1251 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1252 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1254 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1255 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1256 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1257 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1258 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1262 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1264 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1265 /// Will likely generate further events.
1266 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1267 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1269 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1270 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1271 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1273 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1274 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1276 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1277 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1278 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1279 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1281 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1282 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1283 match forward_info {
1284 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1285 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1286 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1287 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1288 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1290 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1292 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1293 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1294 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1295 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1296 // problem, not ours.
1303 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1304 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1305 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1306 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1307 match forward_info {
1308 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1309 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1310 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1311 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1312 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1313 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1315 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1317 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1318 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1320 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1322 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1323 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1328 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1330 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1331 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1332 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1333 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1334 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1335 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1336 // this channel currently :/.
1342 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1343 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1344 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1346 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1347 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1349 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1351 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1352 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1353 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1356 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1358 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1359 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1360 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1361 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1362 // messages when we can.
1363 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1364 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1365 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1372 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1373 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1376 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1377 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1378 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1379 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1380 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1381 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1383 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1384 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1385 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1386 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1387 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1389 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1391 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1393 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1394 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1397 msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError => {},
1399 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1400 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1401 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1402 node_id: their_node_id,
1412 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1413 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1416 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1417 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1418 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1419 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1420 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1421 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1422 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1424 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1432 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1433 match forward_info {
1434 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1435 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1436 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1437 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1438 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1440 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1441 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1442 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1444 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1445 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1446 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1449 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1450 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1458 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1460 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1461 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1465 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1466 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1469 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.action {
1471 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1472 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1473 node_id: their_node_id,
1481 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1482 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1483 events.append(&mut new_events);
1486 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1487 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1488 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1489 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1490 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1491 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1492 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1494 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1495 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1496 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1497 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1498 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1499 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1500 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1501 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1507 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1508 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1509 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1510 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1511 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1512 /// still-available channels.
1513 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1514 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1515 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1516 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1519 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1520 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1521 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1522 match &onion_error {
1523 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1525 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1527 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1528 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1529 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1530 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1531 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1532 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1533 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1538 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1539 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1540 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1541 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1543 error_code: onion_error_code
1547 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1551 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1552 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1553 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1554 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1556 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1557 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1558 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1559 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1560 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1561 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1563 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1569 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1570 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1571 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1572 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1573 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1574 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1576 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1577 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1578 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1582 let mut forward_event = None;
1583 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1584 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1586 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1587 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1588 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1590 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1591 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1594 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1595 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1596 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1597 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1598 time_forwardable: time
1605 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1606 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1607 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1609 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1610 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1611 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1612 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1613 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1614 /// motivated attackers.
1616 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1617 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1618 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1620 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1622 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1623 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1624 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1625 for (received_amount, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1626 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1627 if received_amount < expected_amount || received_amount > expected_amount * 2 {
1628 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(received_amount).to_vec();
1629 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1630 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1631 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1632 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), &payment_hash,
1633 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1635 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1641 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1642 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1644 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1645 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1646 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1647 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1651 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1652 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1653 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1655 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1656 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1658 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1659 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1660 // why it's missing.
1665 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1666 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1667 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1668 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1669 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1670 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1671 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1672 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1674 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1678 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1679 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1680 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1681 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1682 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1683 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1684 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1685 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1693 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1694 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1695 //TODO: Do something with e?
1699 } else { unreachable!(); }
1705 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1708 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.action {
1710 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1711 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1712 node_id: their_node_id,
1720 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1721 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1722 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1725 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1726 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1728 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1729 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1730 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1731 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1732 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1733 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1736 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1737 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1738 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1739 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1740 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1741 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1742 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1743 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1745 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1746 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1747 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1748 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1749 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1750 // on-chain confirmations.
1751 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1752 // should be written.
1753 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1754 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1756 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1757 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1758 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1764 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1767 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1768 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1769 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1771 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1773 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1774 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1775 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1776 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1781 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1782 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1783 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1784 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1785 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1790 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1794 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1799 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1800 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1801 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1802 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1805 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
1806 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1807 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1810 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1811 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1812 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1813 msg: announcement_sigs,
1816 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1824 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
1826 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1827 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1829 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1831 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1832 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1836 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1837 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1838 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1841 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_local_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1842 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1843 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1844 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1845 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1846 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1847 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1848 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1849 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1850 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1852 entry.insert(channel);
1858 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1859 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1860 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1861 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1862 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1863 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1864 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1865 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1866 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1868 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_local_features), channel_state, chan);
1869 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1871 //TODO: same as above
1872 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1875 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1876 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1877 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1878 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1879 output_script: output_script,
1880 user_channel_id: user_id,
1885 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1886 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
1887 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1888 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1889 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1890 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1891 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1892 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1893 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1895 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1897 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1900 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1901 // lock before add_update_monitor
1902 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1904 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1905 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
1906 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
1907 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
1908 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
1909 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
1911 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1912 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
1913 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
1914 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
1915 // until we have persisted our monitor.
1916 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1920 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1921 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1922 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1923 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1924 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1926 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1927 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1928 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1937 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1938 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1939 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1940 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1941 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1942 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1943 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1944 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1945 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1947 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1948 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1949 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
1951 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1953 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1956 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1957 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1958 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1959 user_channel_id: user_id,
1964 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1965 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1966 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1967 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1968 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1969 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1970 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1971 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1973 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1974 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1975 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1976 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1977 msg: announcement_sigs,
1982 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1986 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1987 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1988 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1989 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1991 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1992 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1993 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1994 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1995 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1997 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1998 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1999 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2000 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2004 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2005 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2006 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2010 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2011 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2012 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2014 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2015 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2017 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2020 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2021 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2023 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2024 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2025 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2026 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2034 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2035 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2036 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2037 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2038 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2039 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2040 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2041 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2042 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2044 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2045 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2046 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2047 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2052 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2053 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2054 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2055 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2056 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2057 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2058 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2060 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2061 } else { (tx, None) }
2063 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2066 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2067 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2069 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2070 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2071 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2072 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2080 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2081 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2082 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2083 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2085 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2086 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2087 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2088 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2090 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2091 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2093 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2094 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2095 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2096 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2097 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2099 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2100 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2101 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2102 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2103 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2104 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2105 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2106 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2107 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2108 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2109 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2110 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2111 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2112 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2114 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2115 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2116 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2117 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2121 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2122 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2123 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2124 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2125 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2126 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2131 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2133 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2138 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2139 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2141 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2142 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2143 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2144 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2145 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2146 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2148 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2150 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2153 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2157 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2158 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2159 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2160 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2161 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2162 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2163 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2164 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2166 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2168 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2173 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2174 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2175 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2176 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2177 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2178 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2179 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2180 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2182 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2183 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2185 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2188 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2192 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2193 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2194 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2195 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2196 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2197 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2198 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2199 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2201 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2202 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2203 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2204 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2205 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2207 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2208 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2209 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2211 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2212 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2213 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2214 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2215 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2216 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2217 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2218 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2220 commitment_signed: msg,
2224 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2225 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2226 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2232 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2237 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2238 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2239 let mut forward_event = None;
2240 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2241 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2242 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2243 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2245 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2246 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2247 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2248 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2250 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2251 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2256 match forward_event {
2258 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2259 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2260 time_forwardable: time
2268 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2269 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2270 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2271 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2272 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2273 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2274 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2275 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2276 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2278 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2279 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2280 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2281 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2282 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2283 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2284 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2286 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2289 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2290 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2291 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2295 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2296 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2297 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2301 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2303 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2306 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2307 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2309 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2314 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2315 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2316 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2317 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2318 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2319 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2320 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2321 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2323 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2325 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2330 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2331 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2332 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2334 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2335 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2336 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2337 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2339 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2340 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2343 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2344 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2345 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2347 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2348 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2349 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2350 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2351 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2354 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2356 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2357 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2358 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2359 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2360 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2361 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2362 contents: announcement,
2364 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2367 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2372 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2373 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2374 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2376 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2377 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2378 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2379 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2381 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2382 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2383 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2384 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2385 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2386 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2387 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2388 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2389 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2391 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2392 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2394 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2395 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2398 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2399 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2400 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2404 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2405 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2406 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2407 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2412 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2413 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2414 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2415 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2421 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2425 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2430 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2431 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2432 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2438 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2442 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2443 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2444 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2445 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2447 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2448 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2450 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2451 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2452 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2454 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2455 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2456 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2457 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2458 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2460 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2461 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2463 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2464 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2466 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2467 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2468 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2470 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2473 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2474 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2475 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2476 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2477 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2478 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2479 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2480 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2490 match handle_error!(self, err) {
2491 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2493 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.action {
2495 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2496 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2497 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2498 node_id: their_node_id,
2502 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2508 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2509 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2510 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2511 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2512 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2514 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2515 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2516 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2517 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2518 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2520 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2521 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2526 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2527 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2528 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2533 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2534 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2535 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2536 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2537 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2539 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2540 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2541 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2542 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2543 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2545 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2546 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2551 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2552 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2553 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2558 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2559 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2560 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2561 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2562 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2563 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2565 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2566 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2567 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2568 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2569 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2570 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2571 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2572 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2573 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2574 msg: funding_locked,
2576 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2577 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2578 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2579 msg: announcement_sigs,
2582 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2583 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2584 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2585 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2586 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2590 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2591 for tx in txn_matched {
2592 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2593 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2594 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2595 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2596 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2598 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2599 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2600 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2601 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2602 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2603 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2612 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2613 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2614 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2616 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2617 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2618 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2619 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2620 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2621 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2622 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2631 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2632 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2634 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2635 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2638 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2639 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2640 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2641 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2643 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2644 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2645 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2646 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2647 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2648 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2649 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2650 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2652 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2653 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2654 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2664 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2665 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2667 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2668 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2672 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2673 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2674 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2675 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2676 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_local_features, msg))
2679 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2680 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2681 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_local_features, msg))
2684 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2685 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2686 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg))
2689 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2690 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2691 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2694 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2695 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2696 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg))
2699 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2700 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2701 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg))
2704 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2705 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2706 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2709 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2710 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2711 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2714 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2715 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2716 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2719 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2720 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2721 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2724 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2725 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2726 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2729 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2730 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2731 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2734 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2735 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2736 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg))
2739 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2740 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2741 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg))
2744 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2745 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2746 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg))
2749 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2750 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2751 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg))
2754 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2755 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2756 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2757 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2759 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2760 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2761 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2762 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2763 if no_connection_possible {
2764 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2765 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2766 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2767 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2768 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2770 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2771 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2772 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2782 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2783 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2784 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2785 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2786 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2787 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2788 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2789 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2791 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2792 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2793 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2801 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2803 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2804 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2805 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2806 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2807 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2808 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2809 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2810 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2811 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2812 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2813 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2814 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2815 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2816 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2817 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2821 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2822 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2824 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2825 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2826 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2831 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2832 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2834 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2835 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2836 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2837 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2838 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2839 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2840 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2841 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2842 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2843 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2847 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2848 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2849 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2855 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2858 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2859 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2861 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2862 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2863 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2864 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2868 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2873 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2874 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2876 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2877 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2878 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
2879 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2880 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2881 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2882 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2883 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2888 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2889 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2890 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2891 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2892 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2893 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2894 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2895 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2896 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2901 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2902 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2904 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2906 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2908 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2910 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2917 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2918 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2919 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2920 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2921 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2922 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2927 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2928 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2930 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2932 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2934 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2936 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2943 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2944 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2945 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2946 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2947 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2948 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2953 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2956 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2959 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2960 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2962 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2964 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2966 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2968 route.write(writer)?;
2969 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2970 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2977 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2978 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2979 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2980 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2981 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2982 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2983 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2984 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2986 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2991 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2992 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2994 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2998 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3000 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3001 data.write(writer)?;
3008 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3009 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3010 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3011 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3012 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3013 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3014 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3016 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3021 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3022 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3024 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3026 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3027 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3028 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3030 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3032 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3033 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3040 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
3041 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3042 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3043 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3044 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3045 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3046 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3048 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3049 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3050 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3052 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3057 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3058 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3059 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3061 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3062 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3064 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3065 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3066 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3068 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3069 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3070 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3071 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3072 unfunded_channels += 1;
3075 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3076 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3077 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3078 channel.write(writer)?;
3082 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3083 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3084 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3085 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3086 for forward in pending_forwards {
3087 forward.write(writer)?;
3091 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3092 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3093 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3094 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3095 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
3096 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
3097 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3105 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3107 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3109 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3110 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3111 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3112 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3113 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3114 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3115 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3116 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3117 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3118 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3119 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3120 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3121 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3122 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3123 /// deserialization.
3124 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3126 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3128 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3129 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3130 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3132 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3133 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3134 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3135 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3136 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3138 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3139 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3140 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3141 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3142 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3143 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3144 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3145 /// deserialization.
3146 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3147 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3148 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3149 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3151 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3152 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3154 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3155 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3156 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3157 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3159 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3161 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3164 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3165 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3166 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3167 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3168 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3169 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3172 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3173 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3174 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3176 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3178 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3179 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3180 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3181 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3182 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3183 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3184 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3185 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3188 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3189 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3190 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3191 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3192 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3193 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3194 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3195 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3196 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3198 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3199 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3201 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3204 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3208 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3209 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3210 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3214 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3215 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3216 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3217 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3218 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3219 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3220 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3221 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3223 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3226 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3227 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3228 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3229 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3230 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3231 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3232 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3233 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3235 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3238 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3240 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3241 monitor: args.monitor,
3242 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3243 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3245 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3246 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3247 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3249 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3254 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3256 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3258 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3259 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3260 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3261 logger: args.logger,
3262 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3265 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3266 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3267 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3268 //connection or two.
3271 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))