1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
18 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
19 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
22 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
23 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
26 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
29 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
30 use util::config::UserConfig;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
69 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
70 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
71 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
72 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
73 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
75 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
76 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
79 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
80 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
81 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
82 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
85 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
86 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
87 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
88 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
92 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
95 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
96 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
97 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
100 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102 pub enum HTLCSource {
103 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
106 session_priv: SecretKey,
107 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
108 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
109 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
114 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
115 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
116 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
117 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
118 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
126 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
134 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
136 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>);
138 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
139 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
140 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
141 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
142 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
143 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
144 err: msgs::HandleError,
145 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
147 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
149 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
153 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
154 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
156 data: err.to_string()
160 shutdown_finish: None,
164 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
165 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
168 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
172 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
173 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
175 data: err.to_string()
179 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
183 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
186 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
188 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
190 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
192 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
193 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
195 data: msg.to_string()
200 shutdown_finish: None,
205 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
206 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
208 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
209 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
211 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
215 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
216 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
217 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
218 /// probably increase this significantly.
219 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
221 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
222 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
224 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
227 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
228 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
229 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
230 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
231 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
232 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
233 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
235 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
239 struct ChannelHolder {
240 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
241 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
242 next_forward: Instant,
243 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
244 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
245 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
246 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
247 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
248 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
249 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
251 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
252 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
253 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
254 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
256 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
257 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
258 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
259 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
260 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
261 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
262 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
265 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
267 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
268 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
269 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
270 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
271 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
272 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
277 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
278 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
280 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
281 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
283 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
284 /// to individual Channels.
286 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
287 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
288 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
289 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
291 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
292 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
293 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
294 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
295 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
296 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
297 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
299 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
300 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
301 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
302 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
304 pub struct ChannelManager {
305 default_configuration: UserConfig,
306 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
307 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
308 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
309 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
310 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
312 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
313 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
314 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
316 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
317 our_network_key: SecretKey,
319 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
320 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
321 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
322 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
323 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
325 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
330 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
331 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
332 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
333 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
334 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
335 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
336 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
338 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
339 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
340 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
341 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
344 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
346 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
347 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
350 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
352 macro_rules! secp_call {
353 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
356 Err(_) => return Err($err),
363 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
365 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
366 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
371 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
372 pub struct ChannelDetails {
373 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
374 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
375 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
376 /// lifetime of the channel.
377 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
378 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
379 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
380 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
381 /// The node_id of our counterparty
382 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
383 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
384 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
385 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
389 macro_rules! handle_error {
390 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
393 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
394 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
395 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
396 if let Some(update) = update_option {
397 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
398 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
409 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
410 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
413 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
414 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
416 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
417 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
418 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
419 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
421 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
427 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
428 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
431 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
432 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
434 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
435 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
436 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
437 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
439 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
445 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
446 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
447 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
449 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
450 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
451 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
452 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
454 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
456 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
457 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type);
463 impl ChannelManager {
464 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
466 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
467 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
469 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
471 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
472 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
473 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
475 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
476 default_configuration: config.clone(),
477 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
478 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
479 monitor: monitor.clone(),
483 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
484 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
487 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
488 by_id: HashMap::new(),
489 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
490 next_forward: Instant::now(),
491 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
492 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
493 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
495 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
497 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
498 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
504 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
505 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
509 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
511 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
512 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
513 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
514 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
516 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
517 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
519 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
520 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
521 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
522 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
523 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
526 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
527 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
529 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
530 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
531 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
532 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
533 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
534 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
536 panic!("RNG is bad???");
539 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
541 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
542 node_id: their_network_key,
548 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
549 /// more information.
550 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
551 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
552 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
553 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
554 res.push(ChannelDetails {
555 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
556 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
557 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
558 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
559 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
565 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
566 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
567 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
568 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
569 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
570 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
571 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
572 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
573 // really wanted anyway.
574 if channel.is_live() {
575 res.push(ChannelDetails {
576 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
577 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
578 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
579 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
580 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
587 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
588 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
589 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
591 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
592 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
593 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
595 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
596 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
597 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
598 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
599 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
600 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
601 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
602 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
605 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
606 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
607 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
609 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
610 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
612 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
615 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
616 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
617 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
619 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
620 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
625 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
626 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
627 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
636 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
637 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
638 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
639 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
640 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
642 for tx in local_txn {
643 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
645 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
646 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
647 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
648 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
649 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
650 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
651 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
654 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
655 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
656 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
657 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
660 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
661 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
662 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
663 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
664 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
671 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
672 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
673 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
674 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
680 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
681 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
682 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
683 for chan in self.list_channels() {
684 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
689 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
690 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
692 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
693 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
694 let mut res = [0; 32];
695 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
699 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
700 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
701 let mut res = [0; 32];
702 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
708 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
709 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
710 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
711 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
712 let mut res = [0; 32];
713 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
718 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
719 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
720 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
721 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
722 let mut res = [0; 32];
723 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
727 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
729 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
730 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
731 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
733 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
734 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
736 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
737 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
738 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
739 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
740 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
742 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
744 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
745 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
747 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
753 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
754 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
755 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
757 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
758 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
764 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
774 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
775 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
776 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
777 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
778 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
779 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
780 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
781 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
783 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
784 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
785 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
786 // the intended recipient).
787 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
788 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
789 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
791 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
792 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
793 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
794 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
798 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
799 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
800 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
802 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
803 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
804 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
806 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
808 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
812 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
814 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
822 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
823 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
825 for i in 0..dst.len() {
830 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
831 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
832 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
833 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
836 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
837 let end_len = iters * 65;
838 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
839 res.resize(end_len, 0);
841 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
842 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
843 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
844 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
845 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
850 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
851 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
853 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
854 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
855 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
856 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
858 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
859 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
860 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
863 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
866 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
867 hmac.input(&packet_data);
868 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
869 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
874 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
875 hop_data: packet_data,
880 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
881 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
882 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
883 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
885 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
886 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
887 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
888 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
889 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
890 data: packet_crypted,
894 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
895 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
896 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
898 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
901 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
902 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
903 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
904 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
908 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
909 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
912 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
914 failuremsg: failuremsg,
918 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
919 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
920 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
926 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
927 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
928 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
931 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
932 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
935 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
936 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
937 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
938 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
944 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
945 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
946 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
947 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
948 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
949 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
950 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
951 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
954 let shared_secret = {
955 let mut arr = [0; 32];
956 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
959 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
961 let mut channel_state = None;
962 macro_rules! return_err {
963 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
965 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
966 if channel_state.is_none() {
967 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
969 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
970 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
971 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
972 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
973 })), channel_state.unwrap());
978 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
979 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
980 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
981 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
982 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
983 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
984 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
985 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
988 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
989 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
990 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
991 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
992 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
995 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
996 let next_hop_data = {
997 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
998 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
999 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
1001 let error_code = match err {
1002 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1003 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1005 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1011 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1013 // final_expiry_too_soon
1014 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1015 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1017 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1018 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1019 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1021 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1022 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1023 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1026 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1027 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1028 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1029 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1031 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1033 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1034 short_channel_id: 0,
1035 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1036 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1037 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1040 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1041 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1042 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1044 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1046 let blinding_factor = {
1047 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1048 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1049 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1050 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1051 sha.result(&mut res);
1052 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1054 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1060 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1061 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1064 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1066 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1067 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1068 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1071 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1072 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1073 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1074 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1075 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1076 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1077 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1081 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1082 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1083 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1084 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1085 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1086 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1087 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1089 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1091 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1092 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1094 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1095 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1096 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1097 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1098 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1099 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1100 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1102 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1103 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1105 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1106 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1107 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1109 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1110 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1112 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1113 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1114 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1115 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1117 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1118 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1123 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1124 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1125 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1127 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1128 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1130 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1131 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1133 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1138 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1141 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1142 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1143 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1144 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1145 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1149 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1151 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1152 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1153 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1154 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1155 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1156 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1157 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1158 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1159 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1160 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1163 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1164 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1166 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1172 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1174 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1175 /// fields for more info.
1177 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1178 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1179 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1180 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1181 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1182 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1184 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1186 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1187 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1188 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1189 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1190 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1191 /// relevant updates.
1193 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1194 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1195 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1196 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1197 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1198 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1199 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1200 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1202 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1203 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1204 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1205 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1209 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1211 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1213 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1214 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1215 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1216 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1218 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1220 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1221 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1223 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1224 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1225 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1228 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1229 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1231 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1232 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1234 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1235 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1237 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1238 route: route.clone(),
1239 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1240 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1241 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1243 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1244 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1245 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1246 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1247 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1248 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1249 // something else in case we will resend later!
1250 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1253 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1254 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1255 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1256 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1257 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1258 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1259 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1267 } else { unreachable!(); }
1271 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1272 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1274 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1276 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1277 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1278 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1279 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1283 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1288 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1290 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1291 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1293 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1295 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1296 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1297 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1298 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1300 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1302 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1303 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1305 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1306 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1307 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1308 } else { unreachable!(); })
1314 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1315 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1316 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1319 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1320 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1321 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1322 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1329 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1330 // lock before add_update_monitor
1331 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1335 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1336 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1337 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1340 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1341 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1342 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1344 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1350 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1351 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1353 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1355 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1357 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1358 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1360 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1361 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1362 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1363 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1364 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1368 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1370 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1371 /// Will likely generate further events.
1372 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1373 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1375 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1376 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1378 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1379 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1381 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1385 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1386 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1387 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1388 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1390 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1391 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1392 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1393 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1394 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1395 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1397 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1402 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1404 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1405 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1406 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1407 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1408 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1409 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1411 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1413 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1414 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1419 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1421 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1422 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1423 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1424 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1425 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1426 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1427 // this channel currently :/.
1434 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1435 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1438 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1439 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1441 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1445 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1448 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1449 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1450 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1451 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1452 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1453 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1454 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1456 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1461 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1462 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1463 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1464 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1465 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1467 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1468 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1469 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1471 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1472 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1473 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1480 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1482 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1483 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1487 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1488 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1489 events.append(&mut new_events);
1492 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1493 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1494 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1496 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1497 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1498 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1499 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1500 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1501 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1507 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1508 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1509 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1510 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1511 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1512 /// still-available channels.
1513 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1515 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1516 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1517 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1518 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1519 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1520 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1521 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1526 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1527 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1528 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1531 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1534 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1535 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1536 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1537 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1538 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1540 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1541 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1545 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1547 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1548 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1552 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1553 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1554 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1555 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1558 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1559 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1560 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1561 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1562 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1563 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1564 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1566 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1572 //TODO: Do something with e?
1580 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1581 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1582 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1584 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1585 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1586 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1587 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1588 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1589 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1591 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1593 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1594 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1595 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1596 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1597 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1598 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1603 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1605 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1606 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1607 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1608 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1612 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1613 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1614 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1616 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1617 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1619 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1620 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1626 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1627 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1628 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1629 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1630 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1631 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1634 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1635 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1636 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1637 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1638 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1639 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1640 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1641 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1649 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1650 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1651 //TODO: Do something with e?
1659 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1660 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1661 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1664 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1665 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1667 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1668 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1669 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1670 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1671 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1674 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1675 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1676 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1677 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1678 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1679 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1680 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1681 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1683 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1684 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1685 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1687 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1688 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1689 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1695 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1698 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1699 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1700 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1702 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1704 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1705 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1706 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1707 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1712 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1713 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1714 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1715 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1716 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1721 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1725 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1736 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1737 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1739 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1741 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1742 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1746 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1747 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1748 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1751 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1752 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1753 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1754 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1755 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1756 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1757 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1758 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1759 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1760 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1762 entry.insert(channel);
1768 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1769 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1770 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1771 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1772 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1773 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1774 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1775 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1776 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1778 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1779 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1781 //TODO: same as above
1782 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1785 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1786 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1787 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1788 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1789 output_script: output_script,
1790 user_channel_id: user_id,
1795 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1796 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1797 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1798 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1799 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1800 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1801 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1802 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1803 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1805 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1807 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1810 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1811 // lock before add_update_monitor
1812 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1815 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1816 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1817 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1818 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1819 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1821 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1822 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1823 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1832 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1833 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1834 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1835 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1836 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1837 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1838 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1839 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1840 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1842 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1843 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1846 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1848 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1851 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1852 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1853 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1854 user_channel_id: user_id,
1859 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1860 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1861 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1862 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1863 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1864 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1865 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1866 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1868 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1869 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1870 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1871 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1872 msg: announcement_sigs,
1877 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1881 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1882 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1883 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1884 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1886 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1887 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1888 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1889 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1890 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1892 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1893 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1894 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1895 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1899 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1900 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1901 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1905 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1906 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1907 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1909 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1910 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1912 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1915 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1916 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1917 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1919 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1920 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1921 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1922 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1930 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1931 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1932 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1933 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1934 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1935 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1936 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1937 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1938 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1940 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1941 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1942 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1943 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1948 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1949 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1950 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1951 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1952 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1953 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1954 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1956 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1957 } else { (tx, None) }
1959 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1962 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1963 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1965 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1966 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1967 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1968 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1976 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1977 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1978 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1979 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1981 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1982 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1983 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1984 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1986 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1987 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1989 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1990 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1991 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1992 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1993 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1995 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
1996 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1997 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1998 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1999 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2000 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2001 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2002 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2003 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2004 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2005 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &update.encode_with_len()[..])
2007 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2008 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2009 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2010 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2011 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2012 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2017 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2019 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2024 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2025 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2027 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2028 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2029 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2030 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2031 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2032 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2034 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2036 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2039 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2043 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
2044 // indicating that the payment itself failed
2045 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
2046 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
2047 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
2048 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
2049 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
2051 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
2052 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
2056 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
2057 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
2058 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
2061 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
2063 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
2064 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
2065 if res.is_some() { return; }
2067 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
2068 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2069 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2071 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2073 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2074 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2075 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2076 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2077 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2079 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2081 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2082 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2083 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2084 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2085 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2086 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2088 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2089 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
2090 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2091 // definitely came from the peer in question
2092 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
2094 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
2096 match error_code & 0xff {
2098 // either from an intermediate or final node
2099 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
2100 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
2101 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
2102 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
2103 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2104 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2105 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
2106 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2107 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
2108 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2109 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2115 if is_from_final_node {
2116 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2117 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2118 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2119 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2120 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2121 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2124 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2125 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2129 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2130 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2131 // does not coform to the spec.
2132 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2133 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2134 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2140 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2144 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2146 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2147 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2148 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2152 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2153 let offset = match error_code {
2154 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2155 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2156 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2157 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2158 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2159 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2161 // node sending unknown code
2162 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2163 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2170 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2171 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2172 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2173 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2174 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2175 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2176 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2177 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2180 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2181 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2182 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2183 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2185 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2186 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2187 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2188 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2189 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2191 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2192 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2193 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2194 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2196 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2197 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2198 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2199 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2201 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2202 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2205 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2206 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2210 res = Some((msg, true));
2216 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2219 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2220 res = Some((None, true));
2224 // node sending unknown code
2225 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2226 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2235 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2236 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2237 } else { ((None, true)) }
2240 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2241 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2242 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2243 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2244 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2245 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2246 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2247 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2249 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2251 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2256 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2257 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2258 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2259 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2260 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2261 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2262 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2263 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2265 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2266 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2268 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2271 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2275 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2276 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2277 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2278 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2279 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2280 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2281 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2282 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2284 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2285 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2286 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2289 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2290 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2291 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2293 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2294 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2295 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2296 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2297 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2298 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2299 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2300 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2302 commitment_signed: msg,
2306 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2307 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2308 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2314 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2319 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2320 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2321 let mut forward_event = None;
2322 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2323 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2324 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2325 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2326 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2328 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2329 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2330 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2331 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2333 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2334 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2339 match forward_event {
2341 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2342 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2343 time_forwardable: time
2351 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2352 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2353 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2354 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2355 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2356 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2357 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2358 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2359 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2361 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2362 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2363 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2366 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2367 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2368 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2372 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2373 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2374 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2378 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2380 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2383 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2384 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2386 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2391 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2392 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2393 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2394 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2395 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2396 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2397 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2398 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2400 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2402 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2407 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2408 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2409 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2411 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2412 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2413 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2414 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2416 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2417 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2420 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2421 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2422 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2424 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2425 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2426 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2427 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2428 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2431 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2433 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2434 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2435 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2436 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2437 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2438 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2439 contents: announcement,
2441 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2444 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2449 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2450 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2451 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2453 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2454 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2455 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2456 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2458 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order, shutdown) =
2459 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2460 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2461 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2465 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2466 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2467 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2471 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2472 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2473 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2474 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2479 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2480 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2481 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2482 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2488 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2492 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2497 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2498 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2499 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2505 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2509 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2510 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2511 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2512 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2514 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2515 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2517 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2518 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2519 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2521 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2522 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2523 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2524 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2525 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2527 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2528 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2530 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2531 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2533 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2534 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2535 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2537 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2540 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2541 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2542 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2543 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2544 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2545 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2546 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2547 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2557 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2558 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2560 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2562 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2563 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2564 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2565 node_id: their_node_id,
2569 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2575 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2576 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2577 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2578 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2579 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2584 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2585 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2586 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2587 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2588 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2593 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2594 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2595 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2596 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2598 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2599 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2600 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2601 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2602 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2603 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2604 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2605 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2606 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2607 msg: funding_locked,
2609 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2610 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2611 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2612 msg: announcement_sigs,
2615 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2616 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2617 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2618 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2619 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2623 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2624 for tx in txn_matched {
2625 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2626 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2627 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2628 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2630 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2631 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2632 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2633 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2634 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2635 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2644 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2645 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2646 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2648 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2649 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2650 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2651 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2652 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2653 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2654 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2663 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2664 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2666 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2667 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2670 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2671 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2672 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2673 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2675 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2676 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2677 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2678 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2679 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2680 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2681 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2682 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2684 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2685 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2686 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2696 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2697 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2699 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2700 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2704 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2705 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2706 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2707 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2708 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2711 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2712 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2713 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2716 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2717 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2718 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2721 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2722 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2723 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2726 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2727 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2728 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2731 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2732 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2733 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2736 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2737 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2738 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2741 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2742 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2743 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2746 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2747 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2748 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2751 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2752 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2753 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2756 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2757 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2758 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2761 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2762 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2763 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2766 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2767 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2768 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2771 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2772 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2773 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2776 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2777 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2778 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2781 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2782 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2783 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2786 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2787 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2788 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2789 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2791 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2792 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2793 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2794 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2795 if no_connection_possible {
2796 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2797 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2798 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2799 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2800 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2802 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2803 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2804 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2814 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2815 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2816 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2817 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2818 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2819 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2820 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2821 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2823 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2824 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2825 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2834 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2835 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2837 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2838 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2839 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2844 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2845 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2847 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2848 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2849 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2850 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2851 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2852 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2853 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2854 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2855 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2856 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2860 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2861 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2862 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2868 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2871 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2872 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2874 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2875 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2876 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2877 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2881 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2886 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2887 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2889 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2890 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2891 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2893 onion.write(writer)?;
2897 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2898 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2899 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2900 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2901 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2906 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2907 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2908 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2910 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2911 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2913 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2915 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2916 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2917 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2918 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2919 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2924 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2925 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2927 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2929 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2931 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2933 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2940 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2941 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2942 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2943 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2944 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2945 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2950 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2951 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2953 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2955 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2957 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2959 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2966 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2967 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2968 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2969 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2970 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2971 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2976 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2979 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2982 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2983 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2985 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2987 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2989 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2991 route.write(writer)?;
2992 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2993 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3000 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3001 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3002 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3003 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3004 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3005 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3006 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3007 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3009 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3014 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3015 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3017 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
3021 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3023 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3024 data.write(writer)?;
3031 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3032 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3033 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3034 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3035 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3036 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3037 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3039 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3044 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
3045 prev_short_channel_id,
3050 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3051 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3052 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3054 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3055 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3057 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3058 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3059 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3061 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3062 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3063 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3064 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3065 unfunded_channels += 1;
3068 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3069 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3070 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3071 channel.write(writer)?;
3075 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3076 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3077 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3078 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3079 for forward in pending_forwards {
3080 forward.write(writer)?;
3084 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3085 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3086 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3087 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3088 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3089 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3097 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3099 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3101 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3102 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3103 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3104 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3105 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3106 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3107 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3108 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3109 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3110 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3111 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3112 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3113 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3114 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3115 /// deserialization.
3116 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3118 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3120 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3121 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3122 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3124 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3125 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3126 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3127 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3128 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3130 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3131 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3132 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3133 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3134 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3135 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3136 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3137 /// deserialization.
3138 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3139 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3140 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3141 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3143 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3144 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3146 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3147 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3148 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3149 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3151 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3153 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3156 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3157 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3158 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3159 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3160 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3161 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3164 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3165 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3166 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3168 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3170 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3171 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3172 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3173 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3174 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3175 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3176 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3177 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3180 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3181 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3182 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3183 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3184 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3185 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3186 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3187 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3188 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3190 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3191 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3193 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3196 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3200 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3201 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3202 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3206 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3207 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3208 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3209 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3210 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3211 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3212 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3213 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3215 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3218 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3219 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3220 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3221 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3222 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3223 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3224 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3225 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3227 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3230 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3232 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3233 monitor: args.monitor,
3234 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3235 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3237 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3238 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3239 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3241 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3244 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3247 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3249 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3251 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3252 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3253 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3254 logger: args.logger,
3255 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3258 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3259 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3260 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3261 //connection or two.
3264 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3270 use chain::chaininterface;
3271 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3272 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3273 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
3274 use chain::keysinterface;
3275 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
3276 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
3277 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3278 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3280 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
3281 use util::test_utils;
3282 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3283 use util::errors::APIError;
3284 use util::logger::Logger;
3285 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3286 use util::config::UserConfig;
3288 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3289 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3290 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
3291 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
3292 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3293 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
3294 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
3295 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3296 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3297 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3301 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3302 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3304 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3305 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3307 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3309 use std::cell::RefCell;
3310 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
3311 use std::default::Default;
3313 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3314 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3315 use std::time::Instant;
3318 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3319 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3320 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3325 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3326 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3329 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3330 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3333 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3334 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3337 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3338 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3341 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3342 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3347 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3349 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3350 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3355 fn onion_vectors() {
3356 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3357 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3359 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3360 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3361 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3362 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3363 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3365 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3366 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3367 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3368 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3369 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3371 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3372 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3373 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3374 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3375 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3377 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3378 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3379 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3380 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3381 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3383 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3384 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3385 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3386 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3387 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3389 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3390 let payloads = vec!(
3391 msgs::OnionHopData {
3393 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3394 short_channel_id: 0,
3396 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3400 msgs::OnionHopData {
3402 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3403 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3404 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3405 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3409 msgs::OnionHopData {
3411 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3412 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3413 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3414 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3418 msgs::OnionHopData {
3420 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3421 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3422 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3423 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3427 msgs::OnionHopData {
3429 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3430 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3431 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3432 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3438 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
3439 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3441 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3445 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3446 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3448 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3449 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3450 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3452 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3453 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3455 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3456 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3458 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3459 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("a5d3e8634cfe78b2307d87c6d90be6fe7855b4f2cc9b1dfb19e92e4b79103f61ff9ac25f412ddfb7466e74f81b3e545563cdd8f5524dae873de61d7bdfccd496af2584930d2b566b4f8d3881f8c043df92224f38cf094cfc09d92655989531524593ec6d6caec1863bdfaa79229b5020acc034cd6deeea1021c50586947b9b8e6faa83b81fbfa6133c0af5d6b07c017f7158fa94f0d206baf12dda6b68f785b773b360fd0497e16cc402d779c8d48d0fa6315536ef0660f3f4e1865f5b38ea49c7da4fd959de4e83ff3ab686f059a45c65ba2af4a6a79166aa0f496bf04d06987b6d2ea205bdb0d347718b9aeff5b61dfff344993a275b79717cd815b6ad4c0beb568c4ac9c36ff1c315ec1119a1993c4b61e6eaa0375e0aaf738ac691abd3263bf937e3").unwrap());
3461 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3462 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3464 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3465 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3468 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3469 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3470 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3471 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3473 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3474 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3479 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3480 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3481 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3482 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3484 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3485 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3486 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3488 impl Drop for Node {
3489 fn drop(&mut self) {
3490 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3491 // Check that we processed all pending events
3492 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3493 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3494 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3499 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3500 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3503 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3504 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3505 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3506 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3509 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3510 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3512 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3513 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3515 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3516 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3519 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3520 }, match events[1] {
3521 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3522 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3523 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3524 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3525 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3526 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3527 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3528 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3530 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3536 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3537 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3539 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3540 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3542 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3543 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3546 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3552 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3553 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3555 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3556 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3558 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3559 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3562 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3568 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3569 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
3571 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3572 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3579 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3580 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3581 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3582 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3584 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3588 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3589 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3591 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3592 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3593 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3595 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3596 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3598 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3600 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3601 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3602 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3603 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3604 added_monitors.clear();
3606 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3609 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3611 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3612 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3613 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3614 added_monitors.clear();
3617 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3619 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3620 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3621 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3622 added_monitors.clear();
3625 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3626 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3628 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3629 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3630 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3632 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3638 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3639 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3640 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3644 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3645 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3646 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3647 ((match events_6[0] {
3648 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3649 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3650 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3653 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3654 }, match events_6[1] {
3655 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3656 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3659 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3663 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3664 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3665 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3669 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3670 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3671 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3672 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3674 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3675 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3676 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3677 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3680 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3683 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3684 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3685 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3686 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3687 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3688 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3691 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3694 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3696 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3699 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3700 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3703 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3704 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3706 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3707 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3708 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3710 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3713 macro_rules! check_spends {
3714 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3716 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3717 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3718 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3719 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3724 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3725 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3727 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3728 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3729 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3730 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3731 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3734 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3735 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3737 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3738 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3741 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3748 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
3749 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3750 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3753 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3754 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3756 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3757 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3758 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3759 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3760 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3763 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3766 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3767 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3770 Some(match events_1[1] {
3771 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3772 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3779 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3780 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3781 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3782 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3783 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3784 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3785 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3787 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3788 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3789 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3790 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3791 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3792 (as_update, bs_update)
3794 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3796 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3797 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3798 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3799 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3801 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3802 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3803 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3804 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3805 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3806 (as_update, bs_update)
3808 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3809 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3811 (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
3816 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3817 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3820 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3821 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3822 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3823 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3824 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3825 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3828 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3830 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3831 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3836 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3837 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3839 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3840 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3841 added_monitors.clear();
3846 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3847 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3849 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3850 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3851 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3852 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3853 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3856 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
3858 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3859 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3860 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3861 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3862 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3863 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3864 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3865 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3866 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3867 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3869 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3870 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3873 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3874 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3876 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3877 if $fail_backwards {
3878 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3879 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3881 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3883 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3884 if $fail_backwards {
3885 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3886 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3888 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3890 added_monitors.clear();
3895 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
3897 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
3900 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3902 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
3903 if $fail_backwards {
3904 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3905 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3906 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
3907 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3908 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
3910 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3916 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3919 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3920 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3921 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3922 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3923 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3924 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3925 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3930 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3931 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3933 let mut payment_event = {
3934 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3935 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3937 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3938 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3939 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3941 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3943 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3944 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3946 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3947 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3948 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3950 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3951 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3953 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3954 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3957 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3958 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3960 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3961 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3962 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3964 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3965 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3966 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3968 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3971 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3972 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3973 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3974 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3975 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3981 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3984 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3985 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3986 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3988 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3989 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3990 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
3993 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3994 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3996 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3997 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3998 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3999 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4000 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4001 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4002 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4003 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
4005 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4011 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
4012 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
4014 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4015 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
4016 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4017 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4021 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
4022 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
4024 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4025 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4026 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
4027 get_next_msgs!($node)
4029 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4032 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4033 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
4038 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4039 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4040 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4041 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
4042 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4043 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
4044 } else if update_next_msgs {
4045 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
4047 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4049 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4050 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4057 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
4058 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4059 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4061 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4062 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4064 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4069 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
4070 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
4073 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
4075 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
4076 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4077 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4078 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4079 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4082 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4085 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4086 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4087 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4088 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4089 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4092 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4094 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4096 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4097 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4101 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4102 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4103 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4106 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4107 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
4108 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4110 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4111 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4112 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4114 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4115 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4120 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4121 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4122 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4123 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4124 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4125 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4126 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4127 // second-to-last node!
4128 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4131 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4132 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4133 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4135 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4136 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4137 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4138 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4139 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4140 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4141 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4142 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4144 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4147 assert!(events.is_empty());
4149 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4150 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4157 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4159 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4160 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4162 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
4163 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4164 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4166 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4171 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4172 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4175 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4176 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4177 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4178 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4179 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4181 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4182 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4184 for _ in 0..node_count {
4185 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4186 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4187 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4188 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4189 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4190 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4191 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4192 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4193 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4194 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4195 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4196 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4197 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
4198 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4199 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4207 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4208 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4209 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4210 let channel_id = chan.2;
4213 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4217 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4218 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4219 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4220 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4221 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4222 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4223 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4224 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4225 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4226 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4228 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4230 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4232 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4233 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4236 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4237 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4238 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4239 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4240 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4242 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4245 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4247 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4248 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4249 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4252 let payment_event = {
4253 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4254 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4255 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4257 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4258 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4260 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4261 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4262 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4263 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4264 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4267 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4268 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4269 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4270 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4273 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4274 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4275 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4276 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4277 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4278 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4279 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4282 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4283 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4284 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4285 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4286 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4287 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4288 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4291 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4292 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4293 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4296 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4297 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4300 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4303 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4304 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4306 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4307 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4310 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4315 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4316 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4317 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4318 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4319 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4320 let channel_id = chan.2;
4323 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4325 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4326 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4329 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4330 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4331 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4332 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4338 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4340 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4341 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4342 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4345 let payment_event = {
4346 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4347 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4348 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4350 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4351 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4353 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4354 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4355 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4356 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4357 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4360 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4363 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4367 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4368 let nodes = create_network(2);
4369 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4370 let channel_id = chan.2;
4373 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4374 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4375 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4376 // (3) update_fee ->
4377 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4378 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4379 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4380 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4381 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4382 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4383 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4384 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4385 // revoke_and_ack ->
4386 // B should send no response here
4387 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4388 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4389 // revoke_and_ack ->
4391 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4392 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4393 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4396 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4397 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4398 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4399 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4400 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4402 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4405 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4406 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4407 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4408 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4411 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4413 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4414 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4415 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4417 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4418 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4419 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4420 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4423 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4425 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4427 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4429 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4430 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4431 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4433 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4434 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4435 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4436 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4437 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4438 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4439 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4441 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4442 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4443 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4445 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4447 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4448 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4452 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4453 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4456 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4457 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4460 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4461 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4462 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4465 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4466 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4471 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4472 let nodes = create_network(2);
4473 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4474 let channel_id = chan.2;
4476 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4477 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
4478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4480 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4481 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4482 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4483 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4484 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4486 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4488 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4490 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4491 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4494 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4495 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4496 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4498 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4499 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4500 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4503 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4504 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4509 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
4510 let nodes = create_network(2);
4511 let channel_value = 1888;
4512 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
4513 let channel_id = chan.2;
4516 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
4517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4518 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4520 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4522 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
4524 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
4525 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
4527 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4528 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4530 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
4531 let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
4532 let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
4533 let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
4534 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
4535 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
4538 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
4539 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
4540 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
4541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4543 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4545 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4547 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
4548 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
4549 //Should produce and error.
4550 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
4552 assert!(match err.err {
4553 "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
4557 //clear the message we could not handle
4558 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4562 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4563 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4564 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4565 let channel_id = chan.2;
4568 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4570 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4571 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4574 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4575 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4576 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4577 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4578 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4580 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4582 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4583 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4584 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4587 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4589 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4591 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4592 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4594 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4595 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4596 added_monitors.clear();
4598 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4599 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4600 // node[1] has nothing to do
4602 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4603 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4606 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4607 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4608 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4610 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4612 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4614 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4615 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4616 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4617 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4618 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4619 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4621 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4622 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4624 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4626 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4628 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4630 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4632 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4633 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4635 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4637 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4639 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4640 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4642 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4643 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4645 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4646 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4648 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4649 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4651 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4652 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4655 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4657 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4658 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4659 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4663 fn test_update_fee() {
4664 let nodes = create_network(2);
4665 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4666 let channel_id = chan.2;
4669 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4670 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4671 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4672 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4673 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4674 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4675 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4676 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4677 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4678 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4679 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4680 // revoke_and_ack ->
4682 // Create and deliver (1)...
4683 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4684 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4687 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4688 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4689 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4690 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4691 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4693 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4695 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4697 // Generate (2) and (3):
4698 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4699 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4703 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4704 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4707 // Create and deliver (4)...
4708 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4710 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4711 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4712 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4713 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4714 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4716 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4719 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4720 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4723 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4724 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4726 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4727 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4729 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4730 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4733 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4734 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4737 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4738 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4739 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4740 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4741 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4742 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4743 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4744 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4748 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4750 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4751 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4753 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4755 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4757 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4758 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4759 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4763 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4764 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4765 let nodes = create_network(2);
4766 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4767 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4768 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4769 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4771 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4772 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4773 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4774 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4775 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4777 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4778 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4779 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4780 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4781 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4782 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4784 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4785 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4789 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4790 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4791 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4792 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4793 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4794 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4795 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4797 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4799 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4800 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4801 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4802 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4803 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4805 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4806 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4808 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4809 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4810 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4811 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4812 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4814 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4816 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4817 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4818 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4819 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4820 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4821 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4822 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4824 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4825 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4827 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4828 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4829 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4830 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4831 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4832 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4833 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4835 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4836 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4838 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4839 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4841 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4844 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4845 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4846 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4847 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4848 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4849 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4851 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4853 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4854 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4855 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4856 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4857 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4861 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
4862 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
4863 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4864 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4865 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4867 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4868 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4869 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4871 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4872 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4873 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4874 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4875 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4876 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4878 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4879 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4880 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4881 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4883 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4884 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4886 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4887 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
4889 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4890 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4891 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4892 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4893 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4894 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4896 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4897 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4899 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4900 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4902 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest } => {
4903 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4904 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
4906 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4909 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4910 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4911 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4912 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4913 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4914 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4915 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4917 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4919 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4920 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4921 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4922 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4923 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4927 fn update_fee_async_shutdown() {
4928 // Test update_fee works after shutdown start if messages are delivered out-of-order
4929 let nodes = create_network(2);
4930 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4932 let starting_feerate = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().get_feerate();
4933 nodes[0].node.update_fee(chan_1.2.clone(), starting_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4935 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4936 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4937 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4938 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4939 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4940 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_some());
4942 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4943 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4944 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4945 // Note that we don't actually test normative behavior here. The spec indicates we could
4946 // actually send a closing_signed here, but is kinda unclear and could possibly be amended
4947 // to require waiting on the full commitment dance before doing so (see
4948 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/499). In any case, to avoid
4949 // ambiguity, we should wait until after the full commitment dance to send closing_signed.
4950 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4952 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4953 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4955 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4956 let node_0_closing_signed = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, true);
4958 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4959 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), match node_0_closing_signed.unwrap() {
4960 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
4961 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4964 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4966 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4967 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4968 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4969 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4972 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
4973 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
4974 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
4975 let nodes = create_network(3);
4976 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4977 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4979 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4981 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4982 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4984 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4985 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4987 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4991 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4992 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4994 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4995 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4996 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4997 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4999 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
5000 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5001 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5003 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
5004 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
5005 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5006 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5009 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5010 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5011 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
5013 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5015 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5016 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5018 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5020 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5021 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5022 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5023 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5024 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5025 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5026 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5028 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5029 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
5031 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5032 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5033 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5034 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5035 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5036 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5037 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5039 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5040 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5042 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5043 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
5045 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5048 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5050 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5051 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5052 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
5055 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5056 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5058 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5059 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5060 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5061 if recv_count == 0 {
5062 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
5063 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5065 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5066 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5067 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
5069 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5070 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5071 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5073 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5074 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5076 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5077 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5078 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
5080 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
5081 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5082 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5083 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5084 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5086 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5087 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5088 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5089 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5090 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5091 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5093 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5095 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5096 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5097 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5098 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5099 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5100 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5102 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5103 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5104 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5105 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5106 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5108 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5109 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5111 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5115 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5117 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5118 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5119 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5120 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5121 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5125 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5126 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5127 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5128 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5132 fn fake_network_test() {
5133 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5134 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5135 let nodes = create_network(4);
5137 // Create some initial channels
5138 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5139 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5140 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5142 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5143 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5144 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5145 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5146 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5148 // Send some more payments
5149 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5150 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5151 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5153 // Test failure packets
5154 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5155 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5157 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5158 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5160 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5161 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5162 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5163 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5164 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5165 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5166 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5168 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5169 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5170 hops.push(RouteHop {
5171 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5172 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5174 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5176 hops.push(RouteHop {
5177 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5178 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5180 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5182 hops.push(RouteHop {
5183 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5184 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5186 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5188 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5189 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5190 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5192 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5193 hops.push(RouteHop {
5194 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5195 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5197 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5199 hops.push(RouteHop {
5200 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5201 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5203 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5205 hops.push(RouteHop {
5206 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5207 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5209 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5211 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5212 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5213 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5215 // Claim the rebalances...
5216 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5217 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5219 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5220 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5222 // Send some payments across both channels
5223 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5224 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5225 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5227 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5229 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5231 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5232 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5233 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5235 // Close down the channels...
5236 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5237 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5238 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5239 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5240 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5244 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5245 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5246 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5247 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5249 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5250 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5251 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5252 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5253 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5254 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5256 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5258 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5259 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5261 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5262 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5264 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5265 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5266 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5269 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5270 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5271 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5273 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5274 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5275 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5277 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5278 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5280 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5282 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5283 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5284 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5286 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5287 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5288 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5289 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5290 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5291 res.push(tx.clone());
5296 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5297 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5300 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5302 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5303 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5304 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5305 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5306 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5307 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5309 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5311 res.push(tx.clone());
5315 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
5318 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5322 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5323 /// HTLC transaction.
5324 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5325 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5326 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5327 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5328 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5329 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5333 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5336 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5337 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5339 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5340 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5341 let mut found_prev = false;
5343 for tx in prev_txn {
5344 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5345 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5346 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5347 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5353 assert!(found_prev);
5355 let mut res = Vec::new();
5356 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5360 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5361 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5362 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5363 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5364 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5367 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5370 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5371 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5372 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5373 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5376 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5380 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5381 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5385 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5387 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5388 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5390 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5391 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5393 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5394 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5398 fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
5400 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5401 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5403 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5404 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5405 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5406 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5407 chan.get_value_stat()
5411 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5412 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5413 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5415 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5416 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5418 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5419 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5421 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5422 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5423 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5424 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5425 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5429 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5431 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5432 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5433 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5434 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5439 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5440 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5441 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5442 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5444 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5445 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5446 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5448 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5453 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5454 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5456 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5458 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5460 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5461 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5462 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5464 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5465 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5469 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5470 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5471 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5473 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5474 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5477 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5480 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5481 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5482 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5483 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5484 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5487 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5488 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5489 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5490 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5491 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5495 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5496 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5497 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5498 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5500 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5501 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5505 // adding pending output
5506 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5507 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5509 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5510 let payment_event_1 = {
5511 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5514 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5515 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5516 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5518 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5520 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5521 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5523 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5524 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5525 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5526 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5531 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5532 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5534 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5535 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5536 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5537 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5538 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5540 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5542 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5543 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5544 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5545 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5546 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5547 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5549 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5550 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5551 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5552 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5556 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5558 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5560 // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
5561 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5562 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5563 let channel_close_broadcast = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5564 assert_eq!(channel_close_broadcast.len(), 1);
5565 match channel_close_broadcast[0] {
5566 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5567 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5569 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5575 // split the rest to test holding cell
5576 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5577 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5579 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5580 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5583 // now see if they go through on both sides
5584 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5585 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5586 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5588 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5589 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5591 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5593 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5594 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5595 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5596 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5600 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5601 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5602 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5604 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5605 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5607 // flush the pending htlc
5608 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5609 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5612 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5614 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5616 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5617 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5618 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5621 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5622 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5625 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5627 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5628 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5629 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5631 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5632 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5634 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5635 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5636 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5637 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5638 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5639 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5641 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5642 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5643 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5644 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5646 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5647 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5649 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5650 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5652 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5653 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5654 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5656 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5659 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5660 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5661 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5663 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5666 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5667 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5668 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5670 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5671 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5672 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5673 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5675 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5676 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5680 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5681 do_channel_reserve_test(false);
5682 do_channel_reserve_test(true);
5686 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5687 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5688 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5689 let nodes = create_network(5);
5691 // Create some initial channels
5692 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5693 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5694 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5695 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5697 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5698 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5699 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5700 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5701 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5703 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5704 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5706 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5707 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5708 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5709 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5711 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5712 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5713 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5715 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5716 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5718 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5719 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5721 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5722 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5723 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5724 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5726 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5727 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5728 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5730 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5731 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5733 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5734 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5736 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5737 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5739 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5740 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5741 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5742 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5744 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5750 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5751 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5752 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5754 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5756 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5757 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5759 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5760 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5762 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5764 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5765 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5766 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5768 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5769 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5770 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5773 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5774 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5775 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5776 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5777 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5781 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5782 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5783 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5784 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5785 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5788 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5790 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5791 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5793 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5794 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5795 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5796 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5797 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5800 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5802 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5803 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5805 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5807 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5808 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5809 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5813 fn test_justice_tx() {
5814 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5816 let nodes = create_network(2);
5817 // Create some new channels:
5818 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5820 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5821 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5822 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5823 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5824 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5825 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5826 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5827 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5828 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5829 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5830 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5831 // Revoke the old state
5832 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5835 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5836 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5838 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5839 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5840 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5841 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5843 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5844 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5846 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5848 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5849 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5850 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5851 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5852 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5854 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5856 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5857 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5859 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5860 // Create some new channels:
5861 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5863 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5864 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5865 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5866 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5867 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5868 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5869 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5870 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5871 // Revoke the old state
5872 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5874 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5875 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5877 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5878 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5879 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5880 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5882 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5883 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5885 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5887 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5888 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5889 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5890 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5891 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5893 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5894 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5895 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5899 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5900 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5901 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5902 let nodes = create_network(2);
5903 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5904 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5905 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5906 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5907 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5908 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5909 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5910 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5912 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5913 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5914 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5915 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5916 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
5918 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5920 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5921 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
5923 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
5924 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5925 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5929 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
5930 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
5931 let nodes = create_network(2);
5933 // Create some new channel:
5934 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5936 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5937 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5938 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
5939 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5940 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5942 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5943 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5944 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
5945 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5946 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5947 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5948 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5949 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5950 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5952 //Revoke the old state
5953 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5956 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5958 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5960 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5961 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5962 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5964 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
5965 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5967 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
5969 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5970 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5971 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5972 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5973 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5974 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5975 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5976 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
5978 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
5979 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5980 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
5982 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5983 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
5984 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
5985 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
5986 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5987 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
5989 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5990 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5991 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5995 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
5996 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
5997 let nodes = create_network(2);
5999 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6001 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6002 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6003 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
6004 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
6005 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6006 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
6008 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6009 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6011 //Revoke the old state
6012 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6015 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6017 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6019 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6020 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6021 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6023 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
6024 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
6025 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
6026 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
6027 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
6028 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
6029 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
6031 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6032 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6033 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6035 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
6036 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6037 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6038 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6039 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6041 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6042 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6043 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6044 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6045 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6046 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6047 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
6048 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
6050 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
6051 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
6053 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
6054 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
6055 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
6056 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
6057 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6058 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6060 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6061 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6062 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6066 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
6067 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
6068 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
6069 let nodes = create_network(2);
6070 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6072 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
6073 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
6075 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6076 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6078 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6079 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6081 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6085 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6086 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
6088 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6089 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6092 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6093 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6095 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6096 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6098 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6102 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6103 // registering new transactions
6104 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6108 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6109 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6110 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6111 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6112 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6114 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6116 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6118 let mut payment_event = {
6119 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6122 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6123 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6124 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6127 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6128 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6130 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6131 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6133 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6134 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6137 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6138 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6140 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6141 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6142 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6143 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6146 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6147 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6149 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6151 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6152 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6153 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6155 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6156 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6157 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6159 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6160 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6162 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6166 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6167 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6168 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6169 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6170 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6174 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6175 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6177 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6178 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6179 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6181 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6182 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6184 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6187 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6189 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6190 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6191 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6193 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6194 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6195 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6196 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6197 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6198 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6199 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6201 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6205 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6206 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6207 let nodes = create_network(2);
6208 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6210 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6211 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6212 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6213 mem::drop(channel_state);
6215 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6216 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6217 headers.push(header.clone());
6219 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6220 headers.push(header.clone());
6222 while !headers.is_empty() {
6223 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6226 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6227 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6229 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6230 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6232 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6235 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6236 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6237 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6240 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6241 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6243 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6244 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6245 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6246 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6247 res.push(msg.clone());
6249 panic!("Unexpected event")
6257 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6258 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6260 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6262 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6264 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6270 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6271 let mut commitment_update = None;
6272 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6275 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6276 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6277 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6278 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6280 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6281 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6282 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6283 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6285 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6288 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6291 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6293 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6294 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6295 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6296 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6298 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6299 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6300 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6301 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6307 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6312 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6313 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6314 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6315 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6316 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6317 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6318 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6320 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6321 // If a expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6323 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6324 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6327 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6328 // If b expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6330 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6331 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6334 if send_funding_locked.0 || send_funding_locked.1 {
6335 // If we expect any funding_locked's, both sides better have set
6336 // next_local_commitment_number to 1
6337 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6338 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
6340 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6341 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
6345 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
6346 for msg in reestablish_1 {
6347 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6348 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
6350 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6351 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6353 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
6356 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
6357 for msg in reestablish_2 {
6358 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6359 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
6361 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6362 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6364 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
6367 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
6368 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
6369 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
6371 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
6372 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6373 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6374 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6375 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6376 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6377 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6378 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6379 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6382 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6385 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6386 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6387 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6388 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6390 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6392 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6393 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6394 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6395 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
6397 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6399 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6400 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6401 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6402 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6403 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6405 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6406 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6408 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6409 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6412 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6413 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6415 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6416 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6417 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6418 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6419 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6420 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6421 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6424 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6428 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
6429 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6430 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6431 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6432 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6433 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6434 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6435 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6436 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6439 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6442 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6443 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6444 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6445 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6447 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6449 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6450 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6451 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6452 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
6454 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6455 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6456 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6457 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6458 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6460 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6461 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6463 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6464 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6467 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6468 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6470 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6471 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6472 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6473 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6474 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6475 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6476 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6479 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6485 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
6486 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
6487 let nodes = create_network(3);
6488 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6489 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6491 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6492 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6493 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6495 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6496 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6497 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
6498 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
6500 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6501 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6502 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6504 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6505 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6506 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6507 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6509 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6510 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6512 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
6513 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
6515 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
6517 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6518 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6520 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6521 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
6523 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6526 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
6527 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
6528 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
6530 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6534 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
6535 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
6538 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
6539 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
6540 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6541 if messages_delivered == 0 {
6542 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6543 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
6545 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6548 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6549 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6551 let payment_event = {
6552 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
6553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6555 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6556 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6557 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6559 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
6561 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6562 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
6564 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6565 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6566 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6568 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6570 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6571 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6572 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6575 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6576 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6577 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6578 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6581 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
6582 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6583 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6591 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6592 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6593 if messages_delivered < 3 {
6594 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
6595 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
6596 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6597 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6598 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6599 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6600 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6601 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6602 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6603 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6604 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6605 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6606 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
6607 // Everything was delivered...
6608 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6611 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6612 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6614 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6615 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6618 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6619 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6620 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6622 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6623 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6625 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6626 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6628 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6629 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6630 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6632 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6635 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6638 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6639 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6640 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
6641 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6642 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6643 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6644 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6645 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6646 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6647 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6648 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6653 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
6654 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
6656 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6657 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6659 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6660 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6662 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6665 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
6666 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
6667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6668 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6670 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6671 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6672 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6675 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6676 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6677 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6678 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6681 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6682 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6683 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6691 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6692 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6693 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6694 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6695 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
6696 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
6697 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6698 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6700 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6701 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6703 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6706 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
6707 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6708 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6709 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6710 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6711 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6712 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6713 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6714 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6715 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6716 // Everything was delivered...
6717 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6720 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6721 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6722 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6724 // Channel should still work fine...
6725 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
6726 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6730 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
6731 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
6732 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
6733 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
6734 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
6738 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
6739 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
6740 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
6741 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
6745 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
6746 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
6747 let nodes = create_network(2);
6748 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6750 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6751 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6753 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6754 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6755 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6757 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6758 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6760 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6763 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6765 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6766 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6768 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6769 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6770 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
6772 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6773 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6778 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6779 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6781 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6784 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6786 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
6787 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
6789 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6790 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6791 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
6795 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
6796 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
6797 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
6798 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6799 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6801 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6803 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6804 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6805 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6807 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
6808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6810 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6811 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6813 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
6814 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6817 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6820 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6821 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6823 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6824 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6825 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6826 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6827 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6828 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6829 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6831 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6832 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6833 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6835 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6836 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6838 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6841 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6842 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6843 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6846 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6849 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6850 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6852 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6853 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6854 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6855 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6856 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6857 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6859 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6860 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6861 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6862 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6864 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6865 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6867 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6868 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6870 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6872 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6873 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6874 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6875 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6876 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6877 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6878 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6879 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6880 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6883 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
6884 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6885 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6886 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6887 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6888 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6889 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6892 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6893 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6894 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6895 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6896 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6897 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6898 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6901 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6902 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6903 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6906 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6907 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6908 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6911 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6912 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6915 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6916 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6918 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6919 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6922 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6923 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6925 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6926 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6928 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
6929 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6931 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6934 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6935 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6938 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6942 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
6943 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
6944 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6945 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6947 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6948 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6950 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6951 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6954 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6955 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
6957 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6958 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6961 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, .. } => assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
6962 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6965 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6966 // PaymentFailed event
6968 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6971 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
6972 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
6973 // a disconnect in between
6974 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6975 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6977 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6978 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6980 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6981 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6984 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6985 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6986 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6989 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6990 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6991 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6994 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
6995 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6998 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6999 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7000 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
7001 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7002 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7003 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7005 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7007 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7008 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7010 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7011 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7012 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7014 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7017 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
7019 // Now set it to failed again...
7020 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7021 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7022 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7025 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7026 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7027 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7030 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7031 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7032 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7035 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
7036 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7037 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7040 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7041 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7043 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7044 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7047 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7048 // PaymentFailed event
7050 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7054 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
7055 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
7056 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
7059 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
7060 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
7062 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
7063 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
7064 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
7065 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
7066 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
7067 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
7068 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
7069 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
7070 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
7071 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
7072 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
7073 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
7074 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
7075 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
7076 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
7077 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
7078 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
7079 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7080 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7082 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7084 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7085 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7086 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7088 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7089 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7092 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7093 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7094 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7096 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
7097 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
7098 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7100 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7101 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7102 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
7103 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7104 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7105 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7106 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7107 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7108 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7109 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7111 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7112 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7113 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7114 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7116 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7117 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7119 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7122 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
7123 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7124 } else { panic!(); }
7127 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7129 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7132 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7133 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7134 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7137 // Now fix monitor updating...
7138 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7139 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7142 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7143 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7144 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7146 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7147 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7148 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7149 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7150 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7151 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7153 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7154 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7155 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7156 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7158 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7159 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7161 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7164 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7165 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7166 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7168 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7169 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7170 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7171 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7172 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7173 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7175 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7177 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7178 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7180 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7182 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7183 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7185 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7186 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7187 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7189 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7190 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7191 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7193 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7194 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7195 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7196 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7197 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7198 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7200 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7202 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7203 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7204 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7206 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7207 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7209 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7212 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7213 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7214 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7217 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7221 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7222 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7224 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7225 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7226 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7228 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7229 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7232 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7234 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7235 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7236 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7237 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7238 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7241 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7245 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7247 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7248 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7249 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7250 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7253 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7254 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7256 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7257 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7259 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7260 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7263 let as_commitment_update;
7264 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7266 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7267 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7268 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7269 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7270 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7271 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7272 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7273 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7277 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7278 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7279 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7280 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7281 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7282 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7283 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7284 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7288 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7291 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7292 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7294 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7295 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7297 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7298 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7300 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7303 handle_initial_raa!();
7305 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7306 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7308 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7309 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7311 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7312 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7315 handle_initial_raa!();
7317 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7318 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7320 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7321 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7323 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7324 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7326 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7331 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7332 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7334 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7335 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7337 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7338 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7342 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7343 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7344 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7347 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7348 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7349 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7352 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7353 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7354 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7356 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7357 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7360 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7362 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7363 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7365 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7366 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7367 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7369 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7372 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7376 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
7377 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
7378 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
7379 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
7380 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
7381 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
7382 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
7386 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
7387 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
7388 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
7389 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
7390 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
7394 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
7395 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
7396 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
7397 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
7398 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
7399 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
7403 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
7404 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
7405 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7406 let nodes = create_network(2);
7408 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7410 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7411 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7412 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7413 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7415 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7417 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7418 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7420 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7421 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7423 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
7425 let mut chan_announcement;
7427 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
7429 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
7430 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
7431 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
7432 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
7433 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
7434 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
7435 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
7436 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
7437 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7442 macro_rules! sign_msg {
7443 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
7444 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
7445 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7446 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7447 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
7448 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
7449 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
7450 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
7451 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
7452 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
7453 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
7454 contents: $unsigned_msg
7459 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7460 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7461 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
7462 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7464 // Configured with Network::Testnet
7465 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7466 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
7467 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7468 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7470 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7471 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
7472 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7473 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7476 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
7477 impl Writer for VecWriter {
7478 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
7479 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
7482 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
7483 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
7488 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7489 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7491 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7493 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7495 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7496 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7497 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7499 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7500 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7501 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7502 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7504 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7505 let config = UserConfig::new();
7506 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7507 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7508 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7509 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7510 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7511 default_config: config,
7513 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7514 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7515 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7516 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7517 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7518 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7521 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7523 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7524 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7525 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
7526 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
7527 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7530 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7531 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7532 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7533 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7535 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7536 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7537 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7538 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7540 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7541 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
7542 for node in nodes.iter() {
7543 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
7544 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
7545 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
7548 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7552 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7553 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7554 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7556 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7557 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7559 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7561 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7562 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7563 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7565 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7566 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7567 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7568 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7570 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7571 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7572 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7573 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7574 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7575 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7576 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7578 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7579 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7580 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7581 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7582 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7583 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7586 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7588 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7589 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7592 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7594 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
7595 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7599 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
7600 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
7601 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
7602 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7603 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
7604 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
7606 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
7608 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
7609 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7611 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
7612 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7613 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7614 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7616 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
7618 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
7619 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
7620 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7621 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
7622 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
7625 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7626 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
7627 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
7628 let mut read = &serialized[..];
7629 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7630 assert!(read.is_empty());
7631 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
7634 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7635 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7636 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7637 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7639 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7640 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7641 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7642 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7643 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7644 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
7646 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7648 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
7649 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7650 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7651 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
7652 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
7655 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
7656 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
7657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7659 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7661 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
7662 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7663 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7664 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
7665 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7667 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7668 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7669 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
7670 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
7671 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
7672 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
7675 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
7676 ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => {
7678 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7679 let mut txn = Vec::new();
7680 for event in events {
7682 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7683 for outp in outputs {
7685 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
7687 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7688 script_sig: Script::new(),
7690 witness: Vec::new(),
7693 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7694 value: output.value,
7696 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7702 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7703 let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
7704 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
7705 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7706 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
7707 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7708 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7709 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
7712 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
7714 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7715 script_sig: Script::new(),
7716 sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
7717 witness: Vec::new(),
7720 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7721 value: output.value,
7723 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7729 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7730 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7731 let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
7732 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7733 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7734 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
7735 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
7738 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
7739 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7741 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7742 script_sig: Script::new(),
7744 witness: Vec::new(),
7747 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7748 value: output.value,
7750 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7754 output: vec![outp.clone()],
7757 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) {
7759 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
7761 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
7764 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
7767 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
7768 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
7769 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7770 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
7771 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7772 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7773 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
7779 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7788 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
7789 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
7790 let nodes = create_network(2);
7792 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
7793 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
7794 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7796 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7797 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7799 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7800 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7801 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
7802 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
7804 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7805 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
7806 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
7807 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7808 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7812 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
7813 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
7814 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
7816 let nodes = create_network(2);
7818 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
7819 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
7820 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7822 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7823 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7825 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7826 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7827 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
7828 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
7830 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7831 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
7832 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7834 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7835 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7837 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
7838 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
7839 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
7840 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7844 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
7845 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
7846 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
7848 let nodes = create_network(2);
7850 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
7851 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7852 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7853 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7854 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7856 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7857 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7858 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7859 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7861 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7862 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7864 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7865 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
7866 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
7867 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
7868 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7869 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx
7870 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
7874 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
7875 let nodes = create_network(2);
7877 // Create some initial channels
7878 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7880 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7882 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7883 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
7884 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7886 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
7887 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7888 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7890 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
7891 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7893 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7894 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7897 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7898 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
7901 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
7902 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
7903 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
7904 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
7905 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
7906 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
7908 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1);
7909 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
7910 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
7911 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7915 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
7916 let nodes = create_network(2);
7918 // Create some initial channels
7919 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7921 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7922 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7923 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7924 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7926 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7928 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7929 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7930 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7932 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7933 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7935 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7936 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7937 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
7938 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7939 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7941 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
7942 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
7943 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
7944 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7948 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
7949 let nodes = create_network(2);
7951 // Create some initial channels
7952 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7954 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7955 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7956 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7957 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7959 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7961 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7962 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
7963 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7964 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7966 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7967 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7969 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7970 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7971 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7972 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
7973 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7975 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
7976 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7977 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7979 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7980 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7983 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7984 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
7985 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
7986 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
7988 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
7989 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
7990 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
7991 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
7992 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7993 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone());
7997 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
7998 let nodes = create_network(2);
8000 // Create some initial channels
8001 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8003 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8004 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8005 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8006 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8008 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8010 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8011 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
8012 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8013 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8015 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8016 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8018 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8020 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8021 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8022 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
8023 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
8025 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
8026 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8027 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8029 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8030 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8033 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8034 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
8035 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
8036 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
8038 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
8039 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
8040 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5);
8041 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
8042 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
8043 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
8044 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
8045 check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
8049 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
8050 let nodes = create_network(2);
8052 // Create some initial channels
8053 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8055 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
8056 let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8057 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8058 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
8060 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
8061 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8063 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8064 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8065 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8067 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
8068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8071 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8072 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8074 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8075 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8076 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
8077 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8079 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8080 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8081 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8082 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8086 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
8087 let nodes = create_network(2);
8089 // Create some initial channels
8090 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8092 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
8093 let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8094 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8095 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
8097 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8098 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8099 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
8100 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8102 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8103 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8105 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8106 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8107 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
8108 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8110 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8111 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
8112 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
8113 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
8114 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
8115 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8116 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8120 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
8121 let nodes = create_network(2);
8123 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8125 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
8126 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
8128 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8129 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8130 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2);
8131 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8132 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx.clone());
8134 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8135 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2);
8136 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8137 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);