1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
18 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
19 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
22 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
23 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
26 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
29 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
30 use util::config::UserConfig;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
40 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
41 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
42 use crypto::digest::Digest;
43 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
45 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
52 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
54 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
58 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 mod channel_held_info {
66 use ln::router::Route;
67 use ln::channelmanager::PaymentHash;
68 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
70 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
73 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
74 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
75 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
76 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
77 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
78 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
83 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
84 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
87 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
88 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
89 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
90 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
94 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
96 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
97 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
98 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
99 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
102 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
103 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
104 pub enum HTLCSource {
105 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
108 session_priv: SecretKey,
109 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
110 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
111 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
116 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
117 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
118 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
119 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
120 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
125 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
126 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
128 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
136 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
138 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
139 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
140 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
141 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
142 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
143 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
145 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
147 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
148 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
149 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
150 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
151 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
153 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
154 err: msgs::HandleError,
155 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
157 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
159 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
163 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
164 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
166 data: err.to_string()
170 shutdown_finish: None,
174 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
175 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
178 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
182 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
183 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
185 data: err.to_string()
189 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
193 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
196 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
198 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
200 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
202 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
203 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
205 data: msg.to_string()
210 shutdown_finish: None,
215 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
216 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
218 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
219 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
221 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
225 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
226 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
227 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
228 /// probably increase this significantly.
229 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
231 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
232 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
234 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
237 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
238 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
239 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
240 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
241 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
242 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
243 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
245 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
249 struct ChannelHolder {
250 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
251 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
252 next_forward: Instant,
253 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
254 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
255 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
256 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
257 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
258 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
259 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
261 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
262 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
263 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
264 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
266 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
267 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
268 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
269 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
270 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
271 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
272 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
275 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
277 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
278 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
279 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
280 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
281 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
282 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
287 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
288 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
290 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
291 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
293 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
294 /// to individual Channels.
296 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
297 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
298 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
299 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
301 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
302 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
303 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
304 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
305 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
306 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
307 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
309 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
310 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
311 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
312 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
314 pub struct ChannelManager {
315 default_configuration: UserConfig,
316 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
317 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
318 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
319 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
320 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
322 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
323 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
324 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
326 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
327 our_network_key: SecretKey,
329 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
330 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
331 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
332 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
333 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
335 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
340 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
341 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
342 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
343 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
344 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
345 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
346 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
348 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS +
349 // HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
350 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it
351 // backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel
352 // on-chain to time out the HTLC.
355 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
357 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
358 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
361 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
363 macro_rules! secp_call {
364 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
367 Err(_) => return Err($err),
374 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
376 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
377 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
382 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
383 pub struct ChannelDetails {
384 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
385 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
386 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
387 /// lifetime of the channel.
388 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
389 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
390 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
391 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
392 /// The node_id of our counterparty
393 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
394 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
395 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
396 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
400 macro_rules! handle_error {
401 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
404 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
405 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
406 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
407 if let Some(update) = update_option {
408 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
409 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
420 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
421 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
424 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
425 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
427 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
428 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
429 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
430 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
431 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
433 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
439 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
440 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
443 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
444 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
446 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
447 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
448 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
449 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
450 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
452 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
458 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
459 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
460 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
462 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
463 if $action_type != RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst { panic!("Bad return_monitor_err call!"); }
464 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $raa_first_dropped_cs)
466 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
467 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, false)
469 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
471 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
472 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
473 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
474 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
476 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
477 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
478 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
479 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
480 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
481 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
482 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
483 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
484 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
485 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
487 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
488 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $raa_first_dropped_cs);
489 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()));
495 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
496 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
497 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
499 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
500 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
501 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
502 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
504 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
506 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
507 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), false);
513 impl ChannelManager {
514 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
516 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
517 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
519 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
521 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
522 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
523 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
525 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
526 default_configuration: config.clone(),
527 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
528 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
529 monitor: monitor.clone(),
533 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
534 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
537 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
538 by_id: HashMap::new(),
539 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
540 next_forward: Instant::now(),
541 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
542 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
543 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
545 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
547 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
548 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
554 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
555 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
559 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
561 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
562 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
563 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
564 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
566 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
567 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
569 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
570 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
571 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
572 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
573 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
576 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
577 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
579 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
580 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
581 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
582 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
583 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
584 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
586 panic!("RNG is bad???");
589 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
591 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
592 node_id: their_network_key,
598 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
599 /// more information.
600 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
601 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
602 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
603 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
604 res.push(ChannelDetails {
605 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
606 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
607 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
608 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
609 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
615 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
616 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
617 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
618 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
619 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
620 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
621 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
622 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
623 // really wanted anyway.
624 if channel.is_live() {
625 res.push(ChannelDetails {
626 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
627 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
628 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
629 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
630 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
637 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
638 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
639 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
641 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
642 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
643 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
645 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
646 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
647 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
648 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
649 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
650 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
651 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
652 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
655 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
656 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
657 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
659 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
660 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
662 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
665 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
666 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
668 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
669 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
674 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
675 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
676 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
685 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
686 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
687 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
688 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
689 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
691 for tx in local_txn {
692 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
696 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
697 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
698 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
699 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
702 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
703 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
704 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
705 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
706 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
713 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
714 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
715 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
716 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
717 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
723 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
724 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
725 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
726 for chan in self.list_channels() {
727 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
732 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
733 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
735 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
736 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
737 let mut res = [0; 32];
738 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
742 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
743 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
744 let mut res = [0; 32];
745 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
751 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
752 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
753 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
754 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
755 let mut res = [0; 32];
756 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
761 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
762 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
763 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
764 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
765 let mut res = [0; 32];
766 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
770 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
772 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
773 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
774 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
776 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
777 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
779 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
780 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
781 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
782 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
783 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
785 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
787 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
788 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
790 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
796 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
797 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
798 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
800 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
801 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
807 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
817 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
818 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
819 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
820 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
821 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
822 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
823 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
824 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
826 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
827 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
828 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
829 // the intended recipient).
830 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
831 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
832 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
834 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
835 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
836 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
837 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
841 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
842 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
843 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
845 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
846 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
847 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
849 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
851 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
855 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
857 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
865 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
866 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
868 for i in 0..dst.len() {
873 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
874 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
875 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
876 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
879 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
880 let end_len = iters * 65;
881 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
882 res.resize(end_len, 0);
884 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
885 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
886 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
887 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
888 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
893 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
894 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
896 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
897 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
898 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
899 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
901 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
902 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
903 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
906 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
909 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
910 hmac.input(&packet_data);
911 hmac.input(&associated_data.0[..]);
912 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
917 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
918 hop_data: packet_data,
923 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
924 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
925 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
926 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
928 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
929 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
930 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
931 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
932 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
933 data: packet_crypted,
937 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
938 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
939 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
941 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
944 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
945 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
946 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
947 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
951 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
952 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
955 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
957 failuremsg: failuremsg,
961 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
962 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
963 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
969 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
970 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
971 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
974 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
975 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
978 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
979 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
980 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
981 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
987 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
988 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
989 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
990 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
991 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
992 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
993 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
994 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
997 let shared_secret = {
998 let mut arr = [0; 32];
999 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1002 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1004 let mut channel_state = None;
1005 macro_rules! return_err {
1006 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1008 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1009 if channel_state.is_none() {
1010 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1012 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1013 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1014 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1015 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1016 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1021 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1022 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1023 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1024 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1025 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1026 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1027 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1028 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1031 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1032 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1033 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1034 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1035 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1038 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1039 let next_hop_data = {
1040 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1041 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1042 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
1044 let error_code = match err {
1045 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1046 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1048 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1054 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1056 // final_expiry_too_soon
1057 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1058 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1060 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1061 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1062 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1064 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1065 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1066 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1069 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1070 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1071 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1072 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1074 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1076 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1077 short_channel_id: 0,
1078 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1079 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1080 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1083 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1084 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1085 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1087 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1089 let blinding_factor = {
1090 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1091 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1092 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1093 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1094 sha.result(&mut res);
1095 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1097 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1103 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1104 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1107 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1109 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1110 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1111 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1114 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1115 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1116 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1117 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1118 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1119 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1120 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1124 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1125 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1126 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1127 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1128 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1129 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1130 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1132 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1134 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1135 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1137 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1138 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1139 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1140 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1141 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1142 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1143 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1145 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1146 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1148 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1149 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1150 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1152 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1153 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1155 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1156 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1157 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1158 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1160 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1161 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1166 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1167 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1168 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1170 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1171 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1173 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1174 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1176 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1181 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1184 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1185 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1186 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1187 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1188 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1192 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1194 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1195 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1196 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1197 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1198 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1199 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1200 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1201 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1202 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1203 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1206 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1207 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1209 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1215 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1217 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1218 /// fields for more info.
1220 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1221 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1222 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1223 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1224 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1225 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1227 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1229 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1230 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1231 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1232 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1233 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1234 /// relevant updates.
1236 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1237 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1238 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1239 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1240 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1241 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1242 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1243 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1245 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1246 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1247 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1248 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1252 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1254 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1256 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1257 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1258 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1259 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1261 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1263 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1264 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1266 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1267 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1268 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1271 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1272 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1274 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1275 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1277 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1278 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1280 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1281 route: route.clone(),
1282 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1283 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1284 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1286 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1287 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1288 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1289 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1290 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1291 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1292 // something else in case we will resend later!
1293 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1296 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1297 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1298 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1299 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1300 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1301 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1302 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1310 } else { unreachable!(); }
1314 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1315 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1317 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1319 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1320 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1321 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1322 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1326 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1331 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1333 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1334 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1336 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1338 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1339 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1340 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1341 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1343 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1345 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1346 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1348 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1349 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1350 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1351 } else { unreachable!(); })
1357 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1358 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1359 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1362 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1363 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1364 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1365 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1372 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1373 // lock before add_update_monitor
1374 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1378 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1379 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1380 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1383 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1384 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1385 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1387 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1393 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1394 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1396 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1398 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1400 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1401 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1403 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1404 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1405 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1406 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1407 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1411 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1413 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1414 /// Will likely generate further events.
1415 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1416 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1418 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1419 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1421 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1422 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1424 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1428 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1429 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1430 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1431 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1433 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1434 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1435 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1436 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1437 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1438 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1440 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1445 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1447 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1448 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1449 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1450 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1451 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1452 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1454 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1456 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1457 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1462 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1464 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1465 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1466 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1467 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1468 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1469 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1470 // this channel currently :/.
1477 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1478 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1481 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1482 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1484 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1488 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1491 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1492 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1493 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1494 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1495 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1496 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1497 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1499 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1504 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1505 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1506 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1507 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1508 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1510 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1511 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1512 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1514 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1515 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1516 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1523 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1525 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1526 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1530 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1531 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1532 events.append(&mut new_events);
1535 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1536 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1537 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1539 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1540 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1541 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1542 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1543 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1544 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1550 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1551 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1552 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1553 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1554 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1555 /// still-available channels.
1556 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1558 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1559 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1560 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1561 match &onion_error {
1562 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1564 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1566 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1567 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1568 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1569 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1570 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1571 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1572 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1577 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1578 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1579 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1580 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1582 error_code: onion_error_code
1586 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1590 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1591 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1592 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1593 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1595 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1596 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1597 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1598 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1599 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1600 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1602 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1608 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1609 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1610 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1611 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1612 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1613 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1615 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1616 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1617 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1621 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1623 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1624 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1628 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1629 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1630 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1631 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1634 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1635 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1636 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1637 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1638 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1639 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1640 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1642 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1648 //TODO: Do something with e?
1656 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1657 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1658 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1660 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1661 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1662 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1663 sha.input(&payment_preimage.0[..]);
1664 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
1665 sha.result(&mut payment_hash.0[..]);
1667 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1669 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1670 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1671 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1672 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1673 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1674 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1679 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1681 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1682 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1683 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1684 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1688 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1689 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1690 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1692 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1693 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1695 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1696 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1702 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1703 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1704 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1705 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1706 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1707 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1710 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1711 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1712 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1713 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1714 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1715 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1716 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1717 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1725 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1726 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1727 //TODO: Do something with e?
1735 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1736 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1737 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1740 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1741 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1743 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1744 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1745 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1746 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1747 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1750 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1751 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1752 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1753 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1754 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1755 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1756 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1757 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1759 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1760 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1761 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1762 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1763 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1764 // on-chain confirmations.
1765 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once its merged a test
1766 // should be written.
1767 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1768 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1770 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1771 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1772 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1778 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1781 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1782 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1783 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1785 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1787 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1788 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1789 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1790 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1795 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1796 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1797 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1798 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1799 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1804 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1808 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1819 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1820 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1822 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1824 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1825 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1829 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1830 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1831 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1834 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1835 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1836 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1837 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1838 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1839 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1840 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1841 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1842 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1843 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1845 entry.insert(channel);
1851 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1852 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1853 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1854 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1855 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1856 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1857 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1858 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1859 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1861 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1862 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1864 //TODO: same as above
1865 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1868 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1869 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1870 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1871 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1872 output_script: output_script,
1873 user_channel_id: user_id,
1878 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1879 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1880 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1881 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1882 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1884 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1885 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1886 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1888 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1890 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1893 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1894 // lock before add_update_monitor
1895 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1898 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1899 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1900 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1901 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1902 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1904 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1905 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1906 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1915 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1916 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1917 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1918 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1919 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1920 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1921 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1922 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1923 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1925 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1926 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1929 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1931 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1934 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1935 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1936 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1937 user_channel_id: user_id,
1942 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1943 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1944 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1945 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1946 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1947 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1948 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1949 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1951 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1952 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1953 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1954 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1955 msg: announcement_sigs,
1960 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1964 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1965 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1966 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1967 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1969 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1970 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1971 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1972 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1973 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1975 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1976 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1977 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1978 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1982 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1983 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1984 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1988 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1989 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1990 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1992 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1993 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1995 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1998 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1999 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2001 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2002 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2003 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2004 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2012 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2013 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2014 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2015 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2016 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2017 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2018 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2019 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2020 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2022 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2023 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2024 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2025 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2030 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2031 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2032 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2033 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2034 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2035 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2036 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2038 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2039 } else { (tx, None) }
2041 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2044 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2045 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2047 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2048 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2049 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2050 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2058 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2059 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2060 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2061 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2063 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2064 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2065 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2066 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2068 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2069 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2071 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2072 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2073 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2074 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2075 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2077 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2078 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2079 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2080 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2081 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2082 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2083 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2084 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2085 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2086 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2087 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &update.encode_with_len()[..])
2089 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2090 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2091 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2092 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2093 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2094 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2099 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2101 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2106 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2107 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2109 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2110 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2111 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2112 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2113 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2114 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2116 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2118 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2121 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2125 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
2126 // indicating that the payment itself failed
2127 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool, Option<u16>) {
2128 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
2131 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
2132 let mut error_code_ret = None;
2133 let mut next_route_hop_ix = 0;
2134 let mut is_from_final_node = false;
2136 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
2137 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
2138 next_route_hop_ix += 1;
2139 if res.is_some() { return; }
2141 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2142 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2144 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2146 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2147 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2148 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2149 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2150 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2152 is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2154 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2155 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2156 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2157 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2158 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2159 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2161 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2162 if let Some(error_code_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2) {
2163 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
2164 const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
2165 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
2167 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&error_code_slice);
2168 error_code_ret = Some(error_code);
2170 let (debug_field, debug_field_size) = errors::get_onion_debug_field(error_code);
2172 // indicate that payment parameter has failed and no need to
2173 // update Route object
2174 let payment_failed = (match error_code & 0xff {
2175 15|16|17|18|19 => true,
2177 } && is_from_final_node) // PERM bit observed below even this error is from the intermediate nodes
2178 || error_code == 21; // Special case error 21 as the Route object is bogus, TODO: Maybe fail the node if the CLTV was reasonable?
2180 let mut fail_channel_update = None;
2182 if error_code & NODE == NODE {
2183 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM });
2185 else if error_code & PERM == PERM {
2186 fail_channel_update = if payment_failed {None} else {Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2187 short_channel_id: route.hops[next_route_hop_ix - if next_route_hop_ix == route.hops.len() { 1 } else { 0 }].short_channel_id,
2191 else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
2192 if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) {
2193 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&update_len_slice) as usize;
2194 if let Some(update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
2195 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice)) {
2196 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2197 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2198 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code & 0xff {
2200 11 => amt_to_forward > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
2202 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2203 new_fee.is_some() && route_hop.fee_msat >= new_fee.unwrap()
2205 13 => route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
2206 14 => false, // expiry_too_soon; always valid?
2207 20 => chan_update.contents.flags & 2 == 0,
2208 _ => false, // unknown error code; take channel_update as valid
2210 fail_channel_update = if is_chan_update_invalid {
2211 // This probably indicates the node which forwarded
2212 // to the node in question corrupted something.
2213 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2214 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2218 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2225 if fail_channel_update.is_none() {
2226 // They provided an UPDATE which was obviously bogus, not worth
2227 // trying to relay through them anymore.
2228 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2229 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2233 } else if !payment_failed {
2234 // We can't understand their error messages and they failed to
2235 // forward...they probably can't understand our forwards so its
2236 // really not worth trying any further.
2237 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2238 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2243 // TODO: Here (and a few other places) we assume that BADONION errors
2244 // are always "sourced" from the node previous to the one which failed
2245 // to decode the onion.
2246 res = Some((fail_channel_update, !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2248 let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
2249 if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size {
2250 log_warn!(self, "Onion Error[{}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
2253 log_warn!(self, "Onion Error[{}({:#x})] {}", title, error_code, description);
2256 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2257 // definitely came from the peer in question
2258 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2259 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2261 }), !is_from_final_node));
2265 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2266 if let Some((channel_update, payment_retryable)) = res {
2267 (channel_update, payment_retryable, error_code_ret)
2269 // only not set either packet unparseable or hmac does not match with any
2270 // payment not retryable only when garbage is from the final node
2271 (None, !is_from_final_node, None)
2273 } else { unreachable!(); }
2276 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2277 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2278 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2279 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2280 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2281 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2282 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2283 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2285 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2287 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2292 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2293 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2294 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2295 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2296 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2297 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2298 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2299 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2301 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2302 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2304 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2307 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2311 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2312 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2313 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2314 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2315 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2316 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2317 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2318 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2320 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2321 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2322 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2323 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, commitment_signed.is_some());
2324 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2326 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2327 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2328 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2330 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2331 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2332 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2333 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2334 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2335 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2336 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2337 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2339 commitment_signed: msg,
2343 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2344 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2345 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2351 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2356 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2357 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2358 let mut forward_event = None;
2359 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2360 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2361 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2362 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2363 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2365 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2366 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2367 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2368 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2370 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2371 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2376 match forward_event {
2378 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2379 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2380 time_forwardable: time
2388 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2389 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2390 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2391 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2392 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2393 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2394 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2395 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2396 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2398 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2399 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2400 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2401 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2403 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2404 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2405 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2409 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2410 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2411 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2415 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2417 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2420 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2421 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2423 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2428 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2429 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2430 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2431 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2432 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2433 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2434 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2435 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2437 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2439 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2444 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2445 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2446 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2448 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2449 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2450 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2451 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2453 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2454 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2457 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2458 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2459 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2461 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2462 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2463 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2464 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2465 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2468 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2470 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2471 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2472 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2473 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2474 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2475 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2476 contents: announcement,
2478 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2481 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2486 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2487 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2488 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2490 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2491 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2492 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2493 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2495 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2496 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2497 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2498 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2499 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2500 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2501 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2502 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2503 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2505 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2506 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2508 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order);
2509 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2512 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2513 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2514 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2518 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2519 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2520 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2521 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2526 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2527 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2528 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2529 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2535 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2539 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2544 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2545 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2546 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2552 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2556 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2557 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2558 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2559 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2561 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2562 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2564 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2565 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2566 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2568 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2569 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2570 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2571 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2572 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2574 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2575 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2577 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2578 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2580 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2581 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2582 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2584 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2587 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2588 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2589 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2590 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2591 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2592 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2593 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2594 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2604 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2605 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2607 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2609 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2610 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2611 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2612 node_id: their_node_id,
2616 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2622 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2623 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2624 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2625 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2626 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2628 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2629 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2630 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2631 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2632 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2634 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2635 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2640 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2641 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2642 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2647 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2648 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2649 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2650 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2651 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2653 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2654 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2655 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2656 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2657 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2659 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2660 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2665 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2666 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2667 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2672 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2673 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2674 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2675 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2676 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2677 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2679 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2680 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2681 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2682 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2683 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2684 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2685 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2686 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2687 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2688 msg: funding_locked,
2690 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2691 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2692 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2693 msg: announcement_sigs,
2696 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2697 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2698 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2699 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2700 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2704 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2705 for tx in txn_matched {
2706 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2707 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2708 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2709 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2710 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2712 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2713 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2714 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2715 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2716 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2717 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2726 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2727 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2728 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2730 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2731 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2732 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2733 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2734 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2735 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2736 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2745 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2746 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2748 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2749 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2752 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2753 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2754 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2755 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2757 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2758 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2759 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2760 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2761 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2762 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2763 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2764 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2766 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2767 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2768 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2778 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2779 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2781 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2782 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2786 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2787 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2788 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2789 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2790 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2793 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2794 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2795 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2798 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2799 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2800 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2803 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2804 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2805 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2808 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2809 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2810 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2813 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2814 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2815 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2818 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2819 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2820 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2823 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2824 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2825 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2828 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2829 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2830 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2833 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2834 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2835 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2838 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2839 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2840 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2843 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2844 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2845 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2848 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2849 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2850 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2853 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2854 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2855 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2858 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2859 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2860 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2863 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2864 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2865 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2868 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2869 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2870 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2871 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2873 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2874 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2875 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2876 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2877 if no_connection_possible {
2878 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2879 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2880 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2881 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2882 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2884 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2885 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2886 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2896 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2897 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2898 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2899 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2900 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2901 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2902 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2903 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2905 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2906 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2907 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2916 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2917 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2919 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2920 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2921 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2926 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2927 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2929 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2930 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2931 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2932 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2933 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2934 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2935 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2936 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2937 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2938 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2942 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2943 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2944 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2950 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2953 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2954 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2956 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2957 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2958 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2959 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2963 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2968 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2969 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2971 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2972 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2973 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2975 onion.write(writer)?;
2979 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2980 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2981 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2982 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2983 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2988 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2989 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2990 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2992 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2993 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2995 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2997 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2998 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2999 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3000 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3001 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3006 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3007 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3009 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3011 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3013 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3015 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3022 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3023 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3024 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3025 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3026 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3027 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3032 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3033 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3035 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3037 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3039 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3041 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3048 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3049 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3050 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3051 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3052 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3053 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3058 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3061 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3064 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3065 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3067 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3069 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3071 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3073 route.write(writer)?;
3074 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3075 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3082 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3083 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3084 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3085 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3086 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3087 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3088 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3089 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3091 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3096 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3097 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3099 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
3103 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3105 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3106 data.write(writer)?;
3113 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3114 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3115 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3116 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3117 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3118 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3119 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3121 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3126 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
3127 prev_short_channel_id,
3132 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3133 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3134 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3136 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3137 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3139 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3140 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3141 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3143 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3144 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3145 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3146 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3147 unfunded_channels += 1;
3150 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3151 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3152 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3153 channel.write(writer)?;
3157 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3158 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3159 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3160 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3161 for forward in pending_forwards {
3162 forward.write(writer)?;
3166 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3167 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3168 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3169 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3170 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3171 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3179 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3181 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3183 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3184 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3185 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3186 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3187 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3188 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3189 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3190 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3191 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3192 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3193 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3194 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3195 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3196 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3197 /// deserialization.
3198 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3200 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3202 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3203 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3204 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3206 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3207 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3208 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3209 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3210 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3212 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3213 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3214 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3215 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3216 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3217 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3218 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3219 /// deserialization.
3220 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3221 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3222 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3223 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3225 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3226 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3228 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3229 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3230 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3231 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3233 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3235 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3238 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3239 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3240 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3241 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3242 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3243 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3246 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3247 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3248 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3250 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3252 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3253 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3254 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3255 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3256 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3257 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3258 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3259 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3262 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3263 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3264 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3265 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3266 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3267 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3268 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3269 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3270 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3272 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3273 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3275 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3278 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3282 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3283 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3284 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3288 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3289 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3290 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3291 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3292 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3293 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3294 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3295 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3297 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3300 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3301 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3302 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3303 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3304 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3305 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3306 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3307 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3309 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3312 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3314 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3315 monitor: args.monitor,
3316 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3317 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3319 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3320 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3321 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3323 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3326 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3329 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3331 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3333 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3334 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3335 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3336 logger: args.logger,
3337 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3340 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3341 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3342 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3343 //connection or two.
3346 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3352 use chain::chaininterface;
3353 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3354 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3355 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
3356 use chain::keysinterface;
3357 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
3358 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3359 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3360 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
3361 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3363 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
3364 use util::test_utils;
3365 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3366 use util::errors::APIError;
3367 use util::logger::Logger;
3368 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3369 use util::config::UserConfig;
3371 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3372 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3373 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
3374 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
3375 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3376 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
3377 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
3378 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3379 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3380 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3384 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3385 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3387 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3388 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3390 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3392 use std::cell::RefCell;
3393 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap, HashSet};
3394 use std::default::Default;
3396 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3397 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3398 use std::time::Instant;
3401 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3402 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3403 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3408 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3409 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3412 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3413 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3416 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3417 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3420 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3421 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3424 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3425 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3430 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3432 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3433 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3438 fn onion_vectors() {
3439 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3440 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3442 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3443 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3444 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3445 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3446 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3448 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3449 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3450 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3451 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3452 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3454 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3455 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3456 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3457 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3458 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3460 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3461 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3462 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3463 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3464 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3466 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3467 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3468 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3469 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3470 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3472 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3473 let payloads = vec!(
3474 msgs::OnionHopData {
3476 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3477 short_channel_id: 0,
3479 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3483 msgs::OnionHopData {
3485 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3486 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3487 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3488 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3492 msgs::OnionHopData {
3494 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3495 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3496 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3497 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3501 msgs::OnionHopData {
3503 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3504 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3505 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3506 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3510 msgs::OnionHopData {
3512 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3513 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3514 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3515 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3521 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &PaymentHash([0x42; 32]));
3522 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3524 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3528 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3529 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3531 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3532 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3533 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3535 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3536 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3538 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3539 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("c49a1ce81680f78f5f2000cda36268de34a3f0a0662f55b4e837c83a8773c22aa081bab1616a0011585323930fa5b9fae0c85770a2279ff59ec427ad1bbff9001c0cd1497004bd2a0f68b50704cf6d6a4bf3c8b6a0833399a24b3456961ba00736785112594f65b6b2d44d9f5ea4e49b5e1ec2af978cbe31c67114440ac51a62081df0ed46d4a3df295da0b0fe25c0115019f03f15ec86fabb4c852f83449e812f141a9395b3f70b766ebbd4ec2fae2b6955bd8f32684c15abfe8fd3a6261e52650e8807a92158d9f1463261a925e4bfba44bd20b166d532f0017185c3a6ac7957adefe45559e3072c8dc35abeba835a8cb01a71a15c736911126f27d46a36168ca5ef7dccd4e2886212602b181463e0dd30185c96348f9743a02aca8ec27c0b90dca270").unwrap());
3541 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3542 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3544 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3545 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3547 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3548 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3551 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3552 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3553 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3554 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3556 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3557 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3562 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3563 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3564 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3565 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3567 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3568 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3569 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3571 impl Drop for Node {
3572 fn drop(&mut self) {
3573 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3574 // Check that we processed all pending events
3575 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3576 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3577 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3582 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3583 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3586 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3587 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3588 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3589 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3592 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3593 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3595 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3596 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3598 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3599 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3602 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3603 }, match events[1] {
3604 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3605 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3606 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3607 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3608 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3609 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3610 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3611 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3613 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3619 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3620 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3622 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3623 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3625 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3626 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3629 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3635 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3636 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3638 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3639 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3641 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3642 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3645 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3651 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3652 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
3654 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3655 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3662 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3663 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3664 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3665 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3667 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3671 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3672 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3674 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3675 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3676 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3678 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3679 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3681 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3683 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3684 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3685 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3686 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3687 added_monitors.clear();
3689 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3692 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3694 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3695 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3696 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3697 added_monitors.clear();
3700 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3702 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3703 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3704 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3705 added_monitors.clear();
3708 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3709 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3711 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3712 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3713 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3715 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3721 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3722 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3723 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3727 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3728 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3729 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3730 ((match events_6[0] {
3731 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3732 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3733 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3736 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3737 }, match events_6[1] {
3738 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3739 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3742 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3746 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3747 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3748 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3752 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3753 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3754 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3755 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3757 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3758 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3759 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3760 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3763 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3766 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3767 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3768 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3769 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3770 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3771 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3777 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3779 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3782 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3783 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3786 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3787 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3789 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3790 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3791 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3793 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3796 macro_rules! check_spends {
3797 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3799 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3800 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3801 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3802 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3807 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3808 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3810 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3811 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3812 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3813 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3814 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3817 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3818 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3820 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3821 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3824 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3831 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
3832 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3833 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3836 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3837 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3839 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3840 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3841 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3842 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3843 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3846 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3849 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3850 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3853 Some(match events_1[1] {
3854 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3855 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3858 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3862 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3863 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3864 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3865 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3866 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3867 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3868 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3870 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3871 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3872 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3873 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3874 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3875 (as_update, bs_update)
3877 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3879 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3880 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3881 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3882 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3884 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3885 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3886 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3887 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3888 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3889 (as_update, bs_update)
3891 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3892 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3894 (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
3899 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3900 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3903 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3904 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3905 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3906 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3907 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3908 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3911 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3913 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3914 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3918 fn from_node(node: &Node) -> SendEvent {
3919 let mut events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3920 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3921 SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap())
3925 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3926 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3928 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3929 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3930 added_monitors.clear();
3935 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3936 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3938 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3939 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3940 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3941 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3942 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3945 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
3947 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3948 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3949 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3950 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3951 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3952 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3953 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3954 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3955 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3956 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3958 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3959 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3962 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3963 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3965 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3966 if $fail_backwards {
3967 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3968 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3970 (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack)
3973 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
3975 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3976 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3977 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3978 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3979 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
3980 assert!(extra_msg_option.is_none());
3984 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
3986 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
3987 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3989 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3990 if $fail_backwards {
3991 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3992 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3994 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3996 added_monitors.clear();
4001 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
4003 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
4006 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
4008 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
4009 if $fail_backwards {
4010 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4011 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
4012 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
4013 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4014 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4016 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4022 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
4025 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32]);
4026 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
4027 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
4028 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
4029 sha.input(&payment_preimage.0[..]);
4030 sha.result(&mut payment_hash.0[..]);
4031 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
4036 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
4037 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4039 let mut payment_event = {
4040 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4041 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
4043 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4044 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4045 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4047 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
4049 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
4050 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
4052 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4053 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
4054 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4056 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4057 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4059 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4060 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4063 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4064 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4066 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4067 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4068 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4070 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4071 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4072 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
4074 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4077 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4078 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4079 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
4080 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4081 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4087 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
4090 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4091 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4092 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4094 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4095 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4096 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
4099 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4100 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4102 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4103 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4104 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4105 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4106 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4107 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4108 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4109 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
4111 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4117 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
4118 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
4120 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4121 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
4122 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4123 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4127 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
4128 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
4130 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4131 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4132 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
4133 get_next_msgs!($node)
4135 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4138 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4139 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
4144 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4145 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4146 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4147 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
4148 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4149 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
4150 } else if update_next_msgs {
4151 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
4153 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4155 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4156 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4163 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
4164 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4165 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4167 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4168 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4170 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4175 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4176 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
4179 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
4181 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
4182 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4183 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4184 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4185 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4188 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4191 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4192 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4193 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4194 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4195 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4198 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4200 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4202 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4203 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4207 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4208 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4209 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4212 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
4213 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
4214 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4216 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4217 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4218 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4220 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4221 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4226 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4227 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4228 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4229 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4230 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4231 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4232 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4233 // second-to-last node!
4234 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4237 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4238 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4239 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4241 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4242 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4243 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4244 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4245 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4246 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4247 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4248 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4250 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4253 assert!(events.is_empty());
4255 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4256 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4263 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4265 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4266 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4268 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
4269 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4270 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4272 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4277 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
4278 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4281 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4282 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4283 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4284 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4286 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4287 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4289 for i in 0..node_count {
4290 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", i)));
4291 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4292 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4293 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4294 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4295 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4296 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4297 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4298 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4299 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4300 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4301 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4302 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4303 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
4304 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4305 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4313 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4314 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4315 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4316 let channel_id = chan.2;
4319 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4323 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4324 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4325 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4326 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4327 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4328 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4329 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4330 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4331 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4332 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4334 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4336 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4338 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4339 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4342 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4343 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4344 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4345 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4346 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4351 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4353 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4354 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4355 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4358 let payment_event = {
4359 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4360 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4361 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4363 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4364 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4366 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4367 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4368 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4369 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4370 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4373 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4374 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4375 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4376 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4379 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4380 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4381 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4382 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4383 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4384 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4385 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4388 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4389 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4390 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4391 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4392 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4393 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4394 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4397 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4398 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4399 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4402 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4403 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4406 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4409 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4410 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4412 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4413 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4416 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4421 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4422 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4423 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4424 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4425 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4426 let channel_id = chan.2;
4429 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4431 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4432 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4435 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4436 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4437 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4438 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4441 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4444 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4446 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4447 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4448 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4451 let payment_event = {
4452 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4453 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4454 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4456 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4457 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4459 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4460 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4461 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4462 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4463 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4466 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4469 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4473 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4474 let nodes = create_network(2);
4475 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4476 let channel_id = chan.2;
4479 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4480 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4481 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4482 // (3) update_fee ->
4483 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4484 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4485 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4486 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4487 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4488 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4489 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4490 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4491 // revoke_and_ack ->
4492 // B should send no response here
4493 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4494 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4495 // revoke_and_ack ->
4497 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4498 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4499 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4502 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4503 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4504 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4505 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4506 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4508 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4511 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4512 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4513 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4514 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4517 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4519 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4520 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4521 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4523 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4524 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4525 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4526 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4529 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4531 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4533 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4535 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4536 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4537 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4539 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4540 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4541 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4542 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4543 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4544 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4545 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4547 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4548 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4549 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4551 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4553 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4554 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4558 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4559 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4562 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4563 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4566 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4567 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4568 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4571 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4572 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4577 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4578 let nodes = create_network(2);
4579 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4580 let channel_id = chan.2;
4582 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4583 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
4584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4586 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4587 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4588 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4589 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4590 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4592 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4594 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4596 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4597 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4600 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4601 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4604 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4605 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4606 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4609 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4610 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4615 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
4616 let nodes = create_network(2);
4617 let channel_value = 1888;
4618 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
4619 let channel_id = chan.2;
4622 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
4623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4624 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4626 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4628 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
4630 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
4631 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
4633 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4634 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4636 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
4637 let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
4638 let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
4639 let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
4640 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
4641 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
4644 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
4645 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
4646 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
4647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4649 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4651 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4653 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
4654 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
4655 //Should produce and error.
4656 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
4658 assert!(match err.err {
4659 "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
4663 //clear the message we could not handle
4664 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4668 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4669 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4670 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4671 let channel_id = chan.2;
4674 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4676 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4677 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4680 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4681 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4682 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4683 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4684 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4686 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4688 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4689 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4690 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4693 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4695 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4697 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4698 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4700 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4701 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4702 added_monitors.clear();
4704 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4705 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4706 // node[1] has nothing to do
4708 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4709 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4712 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4713 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4714 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4716 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4718 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4720 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4721 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4722 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4723 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4724 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4725 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4727 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4728 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4730 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4732 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4733 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4734 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4736 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4738 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4739 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4741 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4743 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4745 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4746 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4748 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4749 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4751 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4752 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4754 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4755 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4757 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4761 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4763 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4764 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4765 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4769 fn test_update_fee() {
4770 let nodes = create_network(2);
4771 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4772 let channel_id = chan.2;
4775 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4776 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4777 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4778 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4779 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4780 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4781 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4782 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4783 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4784 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4785 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4786 // revoke_and_ack ->
4788 // Create and deliver (1)...
4789 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4790 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4793 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4794 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4795 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4796 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4797 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4799 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4801 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4803 // Generate (2) and (3):
4804 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4805 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4809 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4810 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4813 // Create and deliver (4)...
4814 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4816 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4817 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4818 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4819 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4820 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4822 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4825 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4826 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4829 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4830 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4832 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4833 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4835 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4836 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4839 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4840 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4841 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4843 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4844 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4845 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4846 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4847 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4848 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4849 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4850 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4854 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4856 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4857 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4859 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4861 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4863 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4864 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4865 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4869 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4870 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4871 let nodes = create_network(2);
4872 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4873 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4874 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4875 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4877 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4878 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4879 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4880 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4881 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4883 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4884 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4885 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4886 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4887 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4888 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4890 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4891 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4895 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4896 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4897 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4898 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4899 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4900 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4901 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4903 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4905 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4906 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4907 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4908 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4909 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4911 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4912 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4914 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4915 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4916 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4917 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4918 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4920 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4922 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4923 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4924 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4925 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4926 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4927 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4928 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4930 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4931 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4933 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4934 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4935 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4936 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4937 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4938 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4939 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4941 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4942 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4944 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4945 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4947 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4950 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4951 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4952 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4953 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4954 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4955 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4957 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4959 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4960 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4961 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4962 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4963 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4967 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
4968 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
4969 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4970 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4971 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4973 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4974 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4975 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4977 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4978 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4979 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4980 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4981 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4982 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4984 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4985 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4986 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4987 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4989 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4990 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4991 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4992 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4993 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
4995 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4996 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4997 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4998 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4999 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5000 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5002 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5003 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5005 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5006 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5008 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
5009 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5010 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5012 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5015 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5016 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
5017 let node_0_closing_signed = match msg_events[0] {
5018 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5019 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5022 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5024 match msg_events[1] {
5025 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {
5027 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5030 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5031 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5032 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5033 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5034 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5035 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5037 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5039 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5040 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5041 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5042 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5043 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5046 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
5047 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
5048 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
5049 let nodes = create_network(3);
5050 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5051 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5053 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
5055 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
5056 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5058 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
5059 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5061 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5065 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5066 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5068 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5069 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5070 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5071 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5073 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
5074 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5075 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5077 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
5078 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
5079 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5080 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5083 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5084 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5085 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
5087 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5089 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5090 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5092 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5094 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5095 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5096 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5097 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5098 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5099 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5100 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5102 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5103 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
5105 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5106 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5107 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5108 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5109 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5110 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5111 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5113 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5114 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5116 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5117 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
5119 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5122 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5124 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5125 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5126 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
5129 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5130 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5132 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5133 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5134 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5135 if recv_count == 0 {
5136 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
5137 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5139 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5140 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5141 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
5143 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5144 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5145 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5147 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5148 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5150 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5151 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5152 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
5154 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
5155 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5156 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5157 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5158 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5160 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5161 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5162 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5163 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5164 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5165 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5167 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5169 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5170 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5171 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5172 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5173 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5174 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5176 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5177 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5178 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5179 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5180 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5182 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5183 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5185 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5189 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5191 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5192 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5193 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5194 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5195 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5199 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5200 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5201 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5202 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5206 fn fake_network_test() {
5207 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5208 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5209 let nodes = create_network(4);
5211 // Create some initial channels
5212 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5213 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5214 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5216 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5217 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5218 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5219 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5220 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5222 // Send some more payments
5223 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5224 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5225 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5227 // Test failure packets
5228 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5229 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5231 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5232 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5234 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5235 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5236 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5237 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5238 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5239 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5240 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5242 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5243 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5244 hops.push(RouteHop {
5245 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5246 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5248 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5250 hops.push(RouteHop {
5251 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5252 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5254 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5256 hops.push(RouteHop {
5257 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5258 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5260 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5262 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5263 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5264 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5266 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5267 hops.push(RouteHop {
5268 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5269 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5271 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5273 hops.push(RouteHop {
5274 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5275 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5277 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5279 hops.push(RouteHop {
5280 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5281 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5283 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5285 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5286 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5287 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5289 // Claim the rebalances...
5290 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5291 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5293 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5294 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5296 // Send some payments across both channels
5297 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5298 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5299 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5301 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5303 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5305 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5306 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5307 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5309 // Close down the channels...
5310 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5311 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5312 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5313 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5314 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5318 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5319 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5320 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5321 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5323 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5324 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5325 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5326 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5327 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5328 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5330 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5332 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5333 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5335 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5336 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5338 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5339 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5340 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5343 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5344 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5345 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5347 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5348 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5349 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5351 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5352 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5354 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5356 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5357 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5358 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5360 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5361 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5362 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5363 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5364 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5365 res.push(tx.clone());
5370 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5371 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5374 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5376 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5377 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5378 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5379 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5380 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5381 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5383 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5385 res.push(tx.clone());
5389 assert!(res.len() == 2 || res.len() == 3);
5391 assert_eq!(res[1], res[2]);
5395 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5399 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5400 /// HTLC transaction.
5401 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5402 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5403 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5404 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5405 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5406 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5410 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5413 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5414 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5416 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5417 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5418 let mut found_prev = false;
5420 for tx in prev_txn {
5421 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5422 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5423 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5424 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5430 assert!(found_prev);
5432 let mut res = Vec::new();
5433 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5437 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5438 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5439 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5440 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5441 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5444 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5447 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5448 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5449 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5450 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5453 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5457 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5458 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5462 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5464 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5465 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5467 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5468 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5470 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5471 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5475 fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
5477 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5478 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5480 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5481 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5482 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5483 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5484 chan.get_value_stat()
5488 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5489 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5490 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5492 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5493 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5495 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5496 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5498 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5499 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5500 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5501 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5502 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5506 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5508 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5509 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5510 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5511 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5516 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5517 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5518 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5519 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5521 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5522 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5523 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5525 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5530 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5531 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5533 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5535 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5537 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5538 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5539 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5541 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5542 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5546 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5547 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5548 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5550 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5551 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5554 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5557 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5558 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5559 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5560 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5561 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5564 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5565 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5566 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5567 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5568 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5572 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5573 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5574 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5575 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5577 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5578 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5582 // adding pending output
5583 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5584 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5586 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5587 let payment_event_1 = {
5588 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5591 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5592 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5593 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5595 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5597 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5598 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5600 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5601 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5602 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5603 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5608 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5609 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5611 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5612 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5613 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5614 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5615 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5617 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5619 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5620 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5621 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5622 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5623 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5624 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5626 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5627 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5628 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5629 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5633 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5635 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5637 // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
5638 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5639 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5640 let channel_close_broadcast = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5641 assert_eq!(channel_close_broadcast.len(), 1);
5642 match channel_close_broadcast[0] {
5643 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5644 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5646 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5652 // split the rest to test holding cell
5653 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5654 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5656 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5657 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5660 // now see if they go through on both sides
5661 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5662 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5663 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5665 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5666 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5668 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5670 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5671 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5672 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5673 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5677 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5678 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5679 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5681 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5682 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5684 // flush the pending htlc
5685 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5686 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5689 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5691 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5693 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5694 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5695 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5698 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5699 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5702 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5704 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5705 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5706 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5708 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5709 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5711 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5712 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5713 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5714 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5715 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5716 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5718 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5719 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5720 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5721 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5723 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5724 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5726 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5727 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5729 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5730 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5731 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5733 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5736 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5737 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5738 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5743 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5744 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5745 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5747 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5748 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5749 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5750 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5752 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5753 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5757 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5758 do_channel_reserve_test(false);
5759 do_channel_reserve_test(true);
5763 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5764 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5765 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5766 let nodes = create_network(5);
5768 // Create some initial channels
5769 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5770 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5771 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5772 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5774 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5775 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5776 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5777 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5778 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5780 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5781 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5783 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5784 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5785 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5786 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5788 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5789 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5790 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5792 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5793 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5795 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5796 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5798 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5799 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5800 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5801 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5803 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5804 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5805 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5807 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5808 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5810 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5811 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5813 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5814 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5816 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5817 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5818 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5819 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5821 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5827 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5828 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5829 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5831 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5833 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5834 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5836 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5837 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5839 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5841 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5842 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5843 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5845 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5846 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5847 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5850 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5851 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5852 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5853 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5854 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5858 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5859 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5860 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5861 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5862 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5865 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5867 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5868 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5870 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5871 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5872 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5873 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5874 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5877 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5879 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5880 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5882 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5884 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5885 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5886 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5890 fn test_justice_tx() {
5891 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5893 let nodes = create_network(2);
5894 // Create some new channels:
5895 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5897 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5898 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5899 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5900 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5901 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5902 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5903 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5904 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5905 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5906 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5907 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
5908 // Revoke the old state
5909 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5912 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5913 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5915 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5916 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5917 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5918 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5920 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5921 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5923 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5925 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5926 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5927 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5928 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5929 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5931 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5933 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5934 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5936 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5937 // Create some new channels:
5938 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5940 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5941 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5942 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5943 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5944 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5945 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5946 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5947 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5948 // Revoke the old state
5949 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5951 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5952 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5954 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5955 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5956 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5957 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5959 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5960 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5962 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5964 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5965 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5966 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5967 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5968 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5970 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5971 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5972 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5976 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5977 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5978 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5979 let nodes = create_network(2);
5980 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5981 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5982 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5983 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5984 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5985 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5986 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5987 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5989 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5990 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5991 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5992 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5993 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
5995 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5997 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5998 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6000 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
6001 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6002 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6006 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
6007 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
6008 let nodes = create_network(2);
6010 // Create some new channel:
6011 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6013 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6014 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6015 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
6016 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6017 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
6019 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6020 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6021 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
6022 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6023 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
6024 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6025 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
6026 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
6027 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6029 //Revoke the old state
6030 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6033 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6034 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6035 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6037 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6038 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6040 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6041 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6043 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6046 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6047 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6049 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
6050 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6052 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
6054 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6055 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6056 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6057 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6058 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6059 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6060 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
6061 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
6063 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
6064 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6065 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
6067 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6068 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
6069 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
6070 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
6071 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6072 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
6074 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6075 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6076 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6080 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
6081 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
6082 let nodes = create_network(2);
6084 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6086 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6087 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6088 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
6089 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
6090 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6091 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
6093 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6094 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6096 //Revoke the old state
6097 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6100 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6101 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6102 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6104 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6105 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6107 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6108 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6110 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6113 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6114 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6116 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
6117 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
6118 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
6119 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
6120 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
6121 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
6122 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
6124 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6125 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6126 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6128 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
6129 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6130 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6131 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6132 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6134 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6135 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6136 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6137 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6138 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6139 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6140 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
6141 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
6143 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
6144 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
6146 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
6147 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
6148 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
6149 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
6150 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6151 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6153 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6154 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6155 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6159 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
6160 // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
6161 // ChainWatchInterface and pass the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
6162 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
6163 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
6164 // First, C should claim the HTLC output via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
6165 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
6166 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
6168 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
6169 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
6170 // the HTLC output via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
6171 // PaymentSent event).
6173 let nodes = create_network(3);
6175 // Create some initial channels
6176 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6177 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6179 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
6180 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6181 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6183 let (our_payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
6184 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6186 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
6187 // Broadcast HTLC Success transation by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
6188 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6189 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
6190 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6191 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6193 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6194 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6195 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6196 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6197 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6199 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6200 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6201 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6203 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6204 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6206 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
6207 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
6208 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
6209 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6210 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6211 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6212 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6213 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6215 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
6216 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: node_txn}, 1);
6217 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6219 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
6220 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
6221 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
6222 added_monitors.clear();
6224 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6226 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6227 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6230 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6231 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6232 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6233 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6234 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6235 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6237 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6240 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
6241 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transaction, as well as a
6242 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
6243 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6244 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6245 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6246 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6247 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6248 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6249 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
6250 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
6251 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6252 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6253 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6254 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6255 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
6259 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
6260 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
6261 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6262 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
6263 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6264 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6265 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6267 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6268 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6270 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success) * 2 (block-rescan)
6271 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
6272 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6273 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6274 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6275 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6276 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
6277 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6278 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6279 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
6280 // we already checked the same situation with A.
6282 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
6283 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6284 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6285 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6287 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6288 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6290 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6291 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6293 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6294 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
6296 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6298 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6299 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6300 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6301 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6302 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6303 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6304 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6305 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6306 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6307 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6308 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6309 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6310 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
6314 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
6315 // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
6316 // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC bacward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
6317 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
6318 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
6319 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
6321 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
6323 let nodes = create_network(3);
6325 // Create some intial channels
6326 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6327 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6329 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
6330 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6331 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6333 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
6334 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6336 // Brodacast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
6337 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6338 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6339 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown);
6341 let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
6342 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
6343 added_monitors.clear();
6345 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6346 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6348 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6349 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6350 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6351 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6352 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6353 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6355 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6357 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6358 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6359 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6361 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6362 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6364 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
6365 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6366 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6367 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6369 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output fron C's commitment tx on B's chain
6370 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
6371 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
6374 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6375 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 6 (HTLC-Timeout tx, commitment tx, timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6376 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
6377 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
6378 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[7]);
6379 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6380 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6381 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
6382 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6383 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6384 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6385 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_2.3.clone());
6386 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone());
6387 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6388 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6389 timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone();
6393 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1);
6394 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6396 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6398 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6399 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6402 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6403 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6404 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6405 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6406 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6407 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6409 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6411 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // Well... here we detect our own htlc_timeout_tx so no tx to be generated
6412 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
6414 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
6415 let commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6416 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
6418 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
6419 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6420 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6422 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6423 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6425 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 block-rescan
6426 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6427 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6428 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6429 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6430 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6431 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6432 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6433 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6437 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
6438 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
6439 // and fail backward accordingly.
6441 let nodes = create_network(3);
6443 // Create some initial channels
6444 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6445 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6447 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6448 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
6449 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6450 // Revoke the old state
6451 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
6453 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6455 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6456 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6457 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6459 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6461 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6462 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6465 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
6466 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6467 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6468 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6469 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6470 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6472 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6473 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6475 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6476 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6478 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6479 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6481 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6482 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6484 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
6485 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6488 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6492 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool) {
6493 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
6494 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
6495 // commitment transaction anymore.
6496 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
6497 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
6498 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
6499 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
6500 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
6501 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
6503 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
6504 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
6505 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
6506 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
6507 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
6508 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6510 // Create some initial channels
6511 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6512 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6514 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6515 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
6516 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6517 // Revoke the old state
6518 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
6520 let (_, first_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6521 let (_, second_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6522 let (_, third_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6524 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
6525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6526 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6527 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6528 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6529 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6530 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6531 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6532 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6533 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
6534 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
6536 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
6537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6538 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6539 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6540 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6541 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6542 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6543 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6544 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6545 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6547 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
6548 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
6549 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
6550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6552 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
6553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6554 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6555 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6556 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6557 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6558 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6559 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6560 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6561 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
6562 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
6563 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6565 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
6566 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
6567 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
6568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6570 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
6571 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
6572 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6573 let (_, fourth_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6574 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, fourth_payment_hash).unwrap();
6575 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6576 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6580 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
6581 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, one as we generate a commitment for
6582 // nodes[0] to fail first_payment_hash backwards.
6583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6586 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
6587 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6589 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6590 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6592 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6593 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6595 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6596 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
6598 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6601 if !deliver_bs_raa {
6602 // If we delivered the RAA already then we already failed first_payment_hash backwards.
6603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6606 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6607 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 });
6608 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 0 }] {
6609 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6610 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6614 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6615 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6616 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6617 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6618 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6619 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6621 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6624 // Due to the way backwards-failing occurs we do the updates in two steps.
6625 let updates = match events[1] {
6626 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
6627 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6628 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6629 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6630 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6631 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6633 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6634 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6635 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6636 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6637 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6639 let bs_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6640 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6642 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6643 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6646 if !deliver_bs_raa {
6647 // If we delievered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
6648 // that we should update our routing table for.
6649 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6650 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6652 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6653 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6656 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6657 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6659 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6660 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6662 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6667 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6670 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6671 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
6672 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6673 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6674 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6675 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
6676 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6678 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6679 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6680 for event in events {
6682 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6683 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6687 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6688 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6690 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6691 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6693 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6696 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6697 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6699 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6702 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
6703 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
6704 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
6708 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive() {
6709 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false);
6710 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true);
6714 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
6715 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
6716 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
6717 let nodes = create_network(2);
6718 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6720 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
6721 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
6723 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6724 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6726 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6727 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6729 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6733 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6734 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
6736 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6737 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6740 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6741 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6743 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6744 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6746 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6750 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6751 // registering new transactions
6752 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6756 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6757 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6758 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6759 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6760 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6762 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6764 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6766 let mut payment_event = {
6767 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6770 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6771 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6772 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6775 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6776 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6778 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6779 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6781 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6785 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6786 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6788 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6789 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6790 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6791 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6794 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6795 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6797 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6799 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6800 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6801 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6803 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6804 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6805 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6807 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6808 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6810 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6814 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6815 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6816 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6817 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6818 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6822 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6823 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6825 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6826 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6827 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6829 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6830 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6832 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6835 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6837 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6838 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6839 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6841 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6842 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6843 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6844 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6845 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6846 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6847 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6849 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6853 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6854 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6855 let nodes = create_network(2);
6856 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6858 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6859 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6860 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6861 mem::drop(channel_state);
6863 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6864 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6865 headers.push(header.clone());
6867 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6868 headers.push(header.clone());
6870 while !headers.is_empty() {
6871 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6874 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6875 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6877 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6878 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6880 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6883 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6884 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6885 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6888 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6889 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6891 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6892 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6893 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6894 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6895 res.push(msg.clone());
6897 panic!("Unexpected event")
6905 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6906 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6908 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6910 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6912 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6918 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6919 let mut commitment_update = None;
6920 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6923 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6924 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6925 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6926 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6928 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6929 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6930 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6931 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6933 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6936 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6939 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6941 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6942 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6943 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6944 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6946 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6947 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6948 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6949 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6951 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6955 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6960 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6961 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6962 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6963 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6964 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6965 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6966 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6968 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6969 // If a expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6971 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6972 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6975 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6976 // If b expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6978 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6979 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6982 if send_funding_locked.0 || send_funding_locked.1 {
6983 // If we expect any funding_locked's, both sides better have set
6984 // next_local_commitment_number to 1
6985 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6986 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
6988 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6989 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
6993 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
6994 for msg in reestablish_1 {
6995 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6996 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
6998 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6999 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7001 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
7004 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
7005 for msg in reestablish_2 {
7006 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
7007 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
7009 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
7010 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7012 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
7015 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
7016 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
7017 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
7019 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
7020 if send_funding_locked.0 {
7021 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
7022 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7023 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
7024 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
7025 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
7026 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
7027 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7030 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
7033 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7034 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
7035 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7036 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7038 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
7040 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
7041 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
7042 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7043 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
7045 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7047 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
7048 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
7049 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7050 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
7051 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
7053 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
7054 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
7056 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
7057 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
7060 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7061 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
7063 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7064 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7065 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
7066 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7067 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7068 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7069 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7072 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
7076 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
7077 if send_funding_locked.1 {
7078 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
7079 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7080 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
7081 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
7082 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
7083 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
7084 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7087 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
7090 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7091 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
7092 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7093 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7095 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
7097 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
7098 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
7099 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7100 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
7102 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
7103 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
7104 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7105 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
7106 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
7108 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
7109 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
7111 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
7112 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
7115 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7116 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
7118 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7119 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7120 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
7121 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7122 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7123 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7124 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7127 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
7133 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
7134 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
7135 let nodes = create_network(3);
7136 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7137 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
7139 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7140 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7141 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7143 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7144 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7145 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
7146 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
7148 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7149 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7150 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7152 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7153 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7154 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7155 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7157 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7158 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7160 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
7161 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
7163 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
7165 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7166 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7168 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
7169 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
7171 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7174 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
7175 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
7176 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
7178 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7182 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
7183 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
7186 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
7187 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
7188 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7189 if messages_delivered == 0 {
7190 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7191 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
7193 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7196 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7197 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7199 let payment_event = {
7200 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
7201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7203 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7205 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7207 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
7209 if messages_delivered < 2 {
7210 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
7212 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7213 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
7214 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7216 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7218 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
7219 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7220 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7223 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
7224 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
7225 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7226 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7229 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
7230 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7231 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7239 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7240 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7241 if messages_delivered < 3 {
7242 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
7243 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
7244 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7245 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
7246 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
7247 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
7248 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
7249 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
7250 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7251 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
7252 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
7253 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
7254 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
7255 // Everything was delivered...
7256 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7259 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7260 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7262 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7263 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7266 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7267 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7268 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7270 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7271 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7273 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7274 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7276 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7277 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7278 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7280 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7283 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
7284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7286 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7287 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7288 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
7289 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
7290 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7291 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7292 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7293 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7294 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7295 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7296 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
7298 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7301 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
7302 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
7304 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7305 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7307 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7308 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
7310 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7313 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
7314 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
7315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7316 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7318 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
7319 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7320 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7323 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
7324 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
7325 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7326 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7329 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
7330 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7331 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7339 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7340 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7341 if messages_delivered < 2 {
7342 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7343 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
7344 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
7345 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7346 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7348 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7349 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
7351 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7354 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
7355 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
7356 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
7357 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
7358 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
7359 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7360 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
7361 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
7362 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
7363 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
7364 // Everything was delivered...
7365 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7368 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7369 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7370 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7372 // Channel should still work fine...
7373 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
7374 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7378 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
7379 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
7380 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
7381 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
7382 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
7386 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
7387 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
7388 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
7389 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
7393 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
7394 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
7395 let nodes = create_network(2);
7396 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7398 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7399 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7401 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
7402 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7403 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7405 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7406 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7408 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7411 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7413 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7414 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7416 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
7417 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7418 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
7420 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7421 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7423 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7426 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7427 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7429 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7432 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7434 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
7435 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
7437 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7438 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7439 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
7443 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
7444 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
7445 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
7446 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7447 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7449 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7451 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7452 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7453 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7455 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
7456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7458 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7459 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7461 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7462 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7465 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7468 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7469 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7471 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7472 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7473 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7474 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7475 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7476 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7477 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7479 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7480 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7481 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7483 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7484 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7486 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7489 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
7490 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7491 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7494 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7497 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7498 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7500 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7501 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7502 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7503 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7504 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7505 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7507 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7508 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7509 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7510 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7512 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7513 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7515 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7516 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7518 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7520 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7521 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7522 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7523 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7524 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7525 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7526 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7527 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7528 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7531 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
7532 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7533 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7534 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7535 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7536 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7537 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
7538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7540 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7541 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7542 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7543 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7544 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7545 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7546 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
7547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7549 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7550 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7551 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7554 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7555 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7556 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7559 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7560 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7563 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7564 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7566 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7567 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7570 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7571 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7573 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7574 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7576 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
7577 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7579 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7582 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7583 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7586 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7590 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
7591 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
7592 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7593 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7595 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7596 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7598 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7599 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7602 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7603 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
7605 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7606 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7609 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, .. } => assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
7610 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7613 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7614 // PaymentFailed event
7616 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7619 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
7620 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
7621 // a disconnect in between
7622 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7623 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7625 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7626 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7628 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7629 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7632 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7633 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7634 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7637 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7638 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7639 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7642 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7643 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7646 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7647 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7648 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
7649 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7650 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7651 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7653 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7655 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7656 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7658 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7659 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7660 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7662 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7665 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
7667 // Now set it to failed again...
7668 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7669 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7670 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7673 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7674 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7675 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7678 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7679 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7680 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7683 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
7684 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7685 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7688 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7689 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7691 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7692 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7695 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7696 // PaymentFailed event
7698 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7702 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
7703 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
7704 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
7707 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
7708 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
7710 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
7711 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
7712 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
7713 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
7714 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
7715 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
7716 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
7717 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
7718 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
7719 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
7720 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
7721 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
7722 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
7723 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
7724 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
7725 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
7726 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
7727 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7728 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7730 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7732 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7733 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7734 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7736 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7737 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7740 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7741 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7742 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7744 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
7745 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
7746 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7747 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7748 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7749 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7750 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
7751 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7752 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7753 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7754 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7755 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7756 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7757 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7759 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7760 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7761 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7762 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7764 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7765 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7767 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7770 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
7771 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7772 } else { panic!(); }
7775 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7777 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7780 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7781 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7782 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7785 // Now fix monitor updating...
7786 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7787 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7790 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7791 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7792 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7794 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7795 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7796 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7797 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7798 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7799 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7801 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7802 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7803 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7804 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7806 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7807 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7809 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7812 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7813 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7814 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7816 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7817 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7818 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7819 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7820 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7821 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7823 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7825 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7826 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7828 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7830 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7831 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7833 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7834 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7835 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7837 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7838 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7839 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7841 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7842 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7843 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7844 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7845 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7846 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7848 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7850 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7851 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7852 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7854 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7855 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7857 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7860 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7861 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7862 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7863 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7865 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7869 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7870 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7872 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7873 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7874 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7876 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7877 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7880 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7882 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7883 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7884 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7885 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7886 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7889 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7893 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7895 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7896 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7897 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7898 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7901 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7902 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7904 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7905 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7907 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7908 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7911 let as_commitment_update;
7912 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7914 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7915 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7916 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7917 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7918 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7919 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7920 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7921 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7925 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7926 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7927 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7928 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7929 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7930 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7931 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7932 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7936 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7939 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7940 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7942 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7943 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7945 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7946 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7948 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7951 handle_initial_raa!();
7953 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7954 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7956 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7957 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7959 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7960 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7963 handle_initial_raa!();
7965 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7966 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7968 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7969 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7971 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7972 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7974 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7979 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7980 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7982 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7983 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7985 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7986 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7990 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7991 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7992 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7995 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7996 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7997 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8000 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8001 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8004 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8005 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8008 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8010 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8011 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
8013 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
8014 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
8015 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
8017 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8020 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
8024 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
8025 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
8026 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
8027 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
8028 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
8029 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
8030 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
8034 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
8035 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
8036 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
8037 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
8038 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
8042 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
8043 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
8044 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
8045 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
8046 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
8047 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
8051 fn test_monitor_update_fail_cs() {
8052 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming commitment_signed
8053 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8054 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8056 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8057 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8058 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8061 let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8062 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8064 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8065 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
8066 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8067 } else { panic!(); }
8068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8069 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8071 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8072 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8074 let responses = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8075 assert_eq!(responses.len(), 2);
8077 match responses[0] {
8078 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, ref node_id } => {
8079 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8080 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
8081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8083 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8085 match responses[1] {
8086 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, ref node_id } => {
8087 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8088 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8089 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8090 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8091 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8092 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8094 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8095 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap_err() {
8096 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8097 } else { panic!(); }
8098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8099 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8101 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8104 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8105 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8108 let final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8109 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &final_raa).unwrap();
8110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8112 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8113 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8115 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8116 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8118 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8119 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8121 events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8122 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8124 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, amt } => {
8125 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
8126 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
8128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8131 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
8134 fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) {
8135 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming RAA
8136 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
8137 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8138 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8140 // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 2 to 1.
8141 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000);
8143 // Route a first payment that we'll fail backwards
8144 let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
8146 // Fail the payment backwards, failing the monitor update on nodes[1]'s receipt of the RAA
8147 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
8148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8150 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8151 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8152 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8153 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8154 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8155 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8156 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8158 let bs_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
8159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8161 // While the second channel is AwaitingRAA, forward a second payment to get it into the
8163 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8164 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8165 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
8166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8168 let mut send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8169 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8170 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
8172 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8173 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
8175 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8176 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8179 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8180 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8182 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8184 // Now fail monitor updating.
8185 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8186 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap_err() {
8187 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8188 } else { panic!(); }
8189 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8190 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8193 // Attempt to forward a third payment but fail due to the second channel being unavailable
8196 let (_, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8197 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8198 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap();
8199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8201 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); // We succeed in updating the monitor for the first channel
8202 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8203 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8204 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
8205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8207 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8208 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8209 match events_2.remove(0) {
8210 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8211 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8212 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8213 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8214 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8215 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8216 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8218 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8219 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
8221 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8222 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
8223 match msg_events[0] {
8224 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {
8226 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8229 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8230 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8231 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events[0] {
8232 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
8233 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
8234 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
8236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
8239 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = if test_ignore_second_cs {
8240 // Try to route another payment backwards from 2 to make sure 1 holds off on responding
8241 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8242 let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8243 nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap();
8244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8246 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8247 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8248 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg) {
8249 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
8250 } else { panic!(); }
8251 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8252 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8253 (Some(payment_preimage_4), Some(payment_hash_4))
8254 } else { (None, None) };
8256 // Restore monitor updating, ensuring we immediately get a fail-back update and a
8257 // update_add update.
8258 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8259 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8262 let mut events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8263 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8264 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 3);
8266 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
8269 // Note that the ordering of the events for different nodes is non-prescriptive, though the
8270 // ordering of the two events that both go to nodes[2] have to stay in the same order.
8271 let messages_a = match events_3.pop().unwrap() {
8272 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } => {
8273 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8274 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8275 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8276 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8277 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8278 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8279 (updates.update_fail_htlcs.remove(0), updates.commitment_signed)
8281 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
8283 let raa = if test_ignore_second_cs {
8284 match events_3.remove(1) {
8285 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg } => {
8286 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8289 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8292 let send_event_b = SendEvent::from_event(events_3.remove(0));
8293 assert_eq!(send_event_b.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8295 // Now deliver the new messages...
8297 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &messages_a.0).unwrap();
8298 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], messages_a.1, false);
8299 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8300 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
8301 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events_4[0] {
8302 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
8303 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
8304 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
8306 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8307 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8308 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.commitment_msg).unwrap();
8309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8310 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8311 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa.unwrap()).unwrap();
8312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8313 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8314 assert!(bs_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8315 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8316 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8317 assert!(bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8318 assert!(bs_cs.update_fee.is_none());
8320 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8322 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8323 assert!(as_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8324 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8325 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8326 assert!(as_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8327 assert!(as_cs.update_fee.is_none());
8329 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8331 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8333 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8335 let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8337 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
8338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8339 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8341 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa).unwrap();
8342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8343 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8345 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], send_event_b.commitment_msg, false);
8348 let events_5 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8349 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
8351 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8352 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8355 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8356 nodes[2].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8358 let events_6 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8359 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
8361 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); },
8362 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8365 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8366 let events_7 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8367 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
8369 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8370 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8373 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8374 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8377 send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
8378 assert_eq!(send_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8379 assert_eq!(send_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8380 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8381 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
8383 let events_8 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8384 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
8386 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8387 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8390 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8391 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8393 let events_9 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8394 assert_eq!(events_9.len(), 1);
8396 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_4.unwrap()),
8397 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8399 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4.unwrap());
8402 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
8406 fn test_monitor_update_fail_raa() {
8407 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(false);
8408 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(true);
8412 fn test_monitor_update_fail_reestablish() {
8413 // Simple test for message retransmission after monitor update failure on
8414 // channel_reestablish generating a monitor update (which comes from freeing holding cell
8416 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
8417 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8418 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8420 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
8422 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8423 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8425 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
8426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8427 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8428 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8429 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8430 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8431 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8432 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8433 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8434 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8435 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8436 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8438 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8439 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8440 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8442 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8443 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8445 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
8447 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap_err() {
8448 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8449 } else { panic!(); }
8450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8452 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8453 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8455 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8456 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8458 assert!(as_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8459 assert!(bs_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8461 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
8463 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap();
8464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8465 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8467 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8468 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8471 updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8472 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8473 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8474 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8475 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8476 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8477 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8478 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8480 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8481 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8483 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage),
8484 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8489 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
8490 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
8491 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8492 let nodes = create_network(2);
8494 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8496 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8497 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8498 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
8499 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
8501 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
8503 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8504 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8506 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8507 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8509 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
8511 let mut chan_announcement;
8513 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
8515 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
8516 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
8517 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
8518 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
8519 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
8520 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
8521 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
8522 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
8523 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8528 macro_rules! sign_msg {
8529 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
8530 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
8531 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8532 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8533 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
8534 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
8535 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
8536 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
8537 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
8538 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
8539 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
8540 contents: $unsigned_msg
8545 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8546 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8547 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
8548 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
8550 // Configured with Network::Testnet
8551 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8552 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
8553 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8554 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
8556 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8557 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
8558 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8559 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
8562 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
8563 impl Writer for VecWriter {
8564 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
8565 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
8568 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
8569 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
8574 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
8575 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8577 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
8579 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8581 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8582 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8583 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8585 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8586 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8587 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8588 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8590 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8591 let config = UserConfig::new();
8592 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8593 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
8594 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
8595 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
8596 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8597 default_config: config,
8599 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8600 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8601 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8602 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8603 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8604 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8607 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8609 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8610 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8611 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
8612 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
8613 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
8614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8616 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8617 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
8618 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8619 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
8621 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
8622 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8623 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
8624 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8626 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8627 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8628 for node in nodes.iter() {
8629 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
8630 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
8631 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
8634 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8638 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
8639 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8640 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8642 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8643 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8645 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8647 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8648 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8649 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8651 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8652 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8653 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8654 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8656 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8657 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8658 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
8659 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
8660 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
8661 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8662 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8664 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8665 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8666 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8667 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8668 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8669 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8672 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8674 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8675 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8678 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8680 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
8681 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8685 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
8686 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
8687 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
8688 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8689 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
8690 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
8692 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
8694 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
8695 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8697 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
8698 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8699 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8700 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8702 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
8704 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
8705 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
8706 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8707 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
8708 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
8711 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8712 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
8713 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
8714 let mut read = &serialized[..];
8715 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8716 assert!(read.is_empty());
8717 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
8720 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8721 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8722 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8723 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8725 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8726 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8727 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8728 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8729 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8730 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
8732 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8734 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
8735 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8736 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8737 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
8738 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
8741 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
8742 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
8743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8745 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8747 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
8748 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8749 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8750 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
8751 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8753 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8754 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8755 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
8756 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
8757 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8758 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
8761 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
8762 ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => {
8764 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8765 let mut txn = Vec::new();
8766 for event in events {
8768 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
8769 for outp in outputs {
8771 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
8773 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8774 script_sig: Script::new(),
8776 witness: Vec::new(),
8779 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8780 value: output.value,
8782 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8788 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8789 let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
8790 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8791 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8792 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8793 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8794 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8795 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8798 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
8800 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8801 script_sig: Script::new(),
8802 sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
8803 witness: Vec::new(),
8806 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8807 value: output.value,
8809 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8815 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8816 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8817 let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8818 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8819 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8820 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
8821 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
8824 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
8825 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8827 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8828 script_sig: Script::new(),
8830 witness: Vec::new(),
8833 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8834 value: output.value,
8836 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8840 output: vec![outp.clone()],
8843 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) {
8845 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
8847 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
8850 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
8853 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
8854 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8855 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8856 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
8857 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8858 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8859 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8874 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
8875 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
8876 let nodes = create_network(2);
8878 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8879 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8880 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8882 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8883 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8885 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8886 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8887 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8888 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8890 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8891 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8892 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8893 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8894 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8898 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
8899 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8900 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8902 let nodes = create_network(2);
8904 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8905 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8906 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8908 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8909 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8911 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8912 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8913 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8914 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8916 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8917 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8918 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8920 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8921 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8923 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8924 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
8925 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
8926 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8930 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
8931 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8932 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8934 let nodes = create_network(2);
8936 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
8937 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8938 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8939 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8940 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8942 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8943 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8944 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8945 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8947 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8948 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8950 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8951 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8952 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
8953 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
8954 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
8955 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx
8956 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8960 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
8961 let nodes = create_network(2);
8963 // Create some initial channels
8964 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8966 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8968 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8969 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
8970 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8972 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
8973 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8974 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8976 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
8977 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8979 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
8980 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8983 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8984 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8987 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
8988 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
8989 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
8990 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
8991 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8992 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
8994 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1);
8995 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
8996 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
8997 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9001 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
9002 let nodes = create_network(2);
9004 // Create some initial channels
9005 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9007 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9008 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9009 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9010 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9012 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9014 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9015 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9016 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9018 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9019 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9021 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9022 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
9023 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
9024 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
9025 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9027 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9028 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9029 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9030 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9034 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
9035 let nodes = create_network(2);
9037 // Create some initial channels
9038 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9040 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9041 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9042 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9043 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9045 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9047 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9048 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
9049 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9050 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9052 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9053 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9055 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9056 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
9057 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
9058 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9059 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9060 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9061 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
9063 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
9064 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9065 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9067 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9071 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9072 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
9073 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
9074 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
9076 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
9077 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9078 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
9079 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9080 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9081 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone());
9085 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
9086 let nodes = create_network(2);
9088 // Create some initial channels
9089 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9091 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9092 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9093 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9094 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9096 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9098 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9099 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
9100 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9101 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9103 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9104 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9106 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9108 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
9109 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
9110 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9111 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9112 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9114 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
9115 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9116 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9118 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9119 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9122 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9123 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
9124 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
9125 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
9127 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
9128 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
9129 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5);
9130 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
9131 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
9132 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
9133 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
9134 check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
9138 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
9139 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output thanks to
9140 // ChainWatchInterface and claim HTLC on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
9141 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
9142 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
9144 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
9147 let nodes = create_network(3);
9149 // Create some initial channels
9150 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9151 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9153 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
9154 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
9155 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
9157 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
9158 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9159 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9160 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
9161 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9163 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9164 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9165 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9166 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9167 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9169 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
9170 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9171 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9173 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9174 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9177 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
9178 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
9179 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
9180 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
9181 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
9182 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1].clone());
9183 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
9184 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9185 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
9186 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
9188 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
9189 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1);
9191 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9192 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4);
9193 assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]);
9194 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9195 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone()); // HTLC-Timeout on B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9196 assert_eq!(b_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9197 assert!(b_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
9198 assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
9199 check_spends!(b_txn[0], c_txn[1].clone()); // timeout tx on C remote commitment tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
9200 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9201 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
9202 assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
9205 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9207 match msg_events[0] {
9208 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9209 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9211 match msg_events[1] {
9212 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
9213 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9214 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9215 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9216 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9217 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
9219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9221 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
9222 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9223 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
9224 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9225 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
9226 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9227 assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[2]); // HTLC-Success tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
9228 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
9229 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9230 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
9231 assert_eq!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
9232 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9233 match msg_events[0] {
9234 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9235 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9240 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
9241 // Topology : A --> B --> C
9242 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
9243 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
9245 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9246 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9248 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
9249 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
9250 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000).1, duplicate_payment_hash);
9252 let commitment_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9253 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9254 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
9256 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9257 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9258 let htlc_timeout_tx;
9259 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
9260 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9261 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
9262 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
9263 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
9264 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9265 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9266 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9267 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9268 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0], node_txn[1].input[0]);
9269 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
9270 check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone());
9271 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone());
9272 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
9275 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9277 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9278 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9281 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
9282 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
9284 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9286 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
9287 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9290 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9291 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9293 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9294 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5);
9295 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
9296 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0], htlc_success_txn[3]);
9297 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9298 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9299 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1], htlc_success_txn[4]);
9300 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9301 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9302 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0], htlc_success_txn[1].input[0]);
9303 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9304 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9306 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200);
9307 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9308 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9309 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9310 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 1);
9311 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9312 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9315 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9316 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9318 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9319 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9320 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9322 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { .. } } => {
9324 _ => { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
9327 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9329 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
9330 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
9332 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9335 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
9336 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
9337 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9338 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9339 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9340 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9341 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 0);
9342 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9345 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9346 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
9348 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9350 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
9351 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
9353 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9358 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
9359 let nodes = create_network(2);
9361 // Create some initial channels
9362 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9364 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
9365 let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9366 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9367 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
9369 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
9370 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9372 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9373 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9374 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9376 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
9377 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9380 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9381 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9383 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9384 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9385 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9386 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9388 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
9389 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9390 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9391 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9392 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone());
9396 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
9397 let nodes = create_network(2);
9399 // Create some initial channels
9400 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9402 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
9403 let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9404 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9405 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
9407 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9408 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9409 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
9410 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9412 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9413 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9415 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9416 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9417 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9418 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9420 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
9421 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
9422 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 8);
9423 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
9424 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[4]);
9425 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[6]);
9426 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
9427 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[5]);
9428 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[7]);
9429 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9430 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
9434 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
9435 let nodes = create_network(2);
9437 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9439 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
9440 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
9442 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9443 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
9444 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2);
9445 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
9446 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx.clone());
9448 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
9449 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2);
9450 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
9451 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);