1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
22 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
23 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
24 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
27 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
28 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
29 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
30 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
31 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
33 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
34 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
35 use util::config::UserConfig;
36 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
37 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
38 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
39 use util::logger::Logger;
40 use util::errors::APIError;
43 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
46 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
47 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
48 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
50 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
52 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
53 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
54 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
56 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
57 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
58 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
59 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
60 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
61 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
62 mod channel_held_info {
64 use ln::router::Route;
65 use ln::channelmanager::PaymentHash;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
69 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
70 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
71 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
72 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
73 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
74 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
75 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
76 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
79 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
80 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
81 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
82 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
85 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
86 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
87 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
88 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
92 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
93 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
94 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
95 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
96 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
97 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
100 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
101 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
102 pub enum HTLCSource {
103 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
106 session_priv: SecretKey,
107 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
108 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
109 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
114 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
115 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
116 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
117 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
118 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
126 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
134 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
136 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
137 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
138 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
139 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
140 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
141 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
143 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
145 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
146 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
147 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
148 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
149 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
151 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
152 err: msgs::HandleError,
153 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
155 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
157 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
161 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
162 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
164 data: err.to_string()
168 shutdown_finish: None,
172 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
173 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
176 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
180 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
181 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
183 data: err.to_string()
187 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
191 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
194 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
196 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
198 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
200 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
201 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
203 data: msg.to_string()
208 shutdown_finish: None,
213 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
214 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
215 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
216 /// probably increase this significantly.
217 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
219 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
220 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
222 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
225 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
226 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
227 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
228 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
229 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
230 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
231 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
233 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
237 struct ChannelHolder {
238 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
239 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
240 next_forward: Instant,
241 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
242 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
243 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
244 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
245 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
246 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
247 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
249 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
250 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
251 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
252 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
254 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
255 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
256 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
257 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
258 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
259 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
260 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
263 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
265 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
266 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
267 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
268 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
269 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
270 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
275 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
276 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
278 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
279 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
281 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
282 /// to individual Channels.
284 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
285 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
286 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
287 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
289 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
290 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
291 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
292 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
293 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
294 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
295 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
297 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
298 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
299 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
300 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
302 pub struct ChannelManager {
303 default_configuration: UserConfig,
304 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
305 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
306 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
307 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
308 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
310 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
311 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
312 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
314 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
315 our_network_key: SecretKey,
317 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
318 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
319 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
320 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
321 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
323 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
328 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
329 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
330 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
331 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
332 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
333 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
334 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
336 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS +
337 // HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
338 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it
339 // backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel
340 // on-chain to time out the HTLC.
343 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
345 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
346 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
349 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
351 macro_rules! secp_call {
352 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
355 Err(_) => return Err($err),
362 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
364 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
365 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
370 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
371 pub struct ChannelDetails {
372 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
373 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
374 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
375 /// lifetime of the channel.
376 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
377 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
378 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
379 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
380 /// The node_id of our counterparty
381 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
382 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
383 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
384 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
388 macro_rules! handle_error {
389 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
392 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
393 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
394 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
395 if let Some(update) = update_option {
396 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
397 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
408 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
409 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
412 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
413 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
415 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
416 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
417 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
418 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
419 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
421 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
427 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
428 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
431 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
432 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
434 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
435 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
436 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
437 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
438 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
440 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
446 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
447 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
448 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
450 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
451 if $action_type != RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst { panic!("Bad return_monitor_err call!"); }
452 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $raa_first_dropped_cs)
454 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
455 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, false)
457 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
459 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
460 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
461 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
462 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
464 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
465 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
466 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
467 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
468 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
469 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
470 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
471 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
472 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
473 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
475 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
476 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $raa_first_dropped_cs);
477 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()));
483 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
484 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
485 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
487 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
488 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
489 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
490 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
492 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
494 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
495 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), false);
501 impl ChannelManager {
502 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
504 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
505 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
507 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
509 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
510 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
511 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
513 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
514 default_configuration: config.clone(),
515 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
516 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
517 monitor: monitor.clone(),
521 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
522 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
525 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
526 by_id: HashMap::new(),
527 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
528 next_forward: Instant::now(),
529 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
530 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
531 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
533 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
535 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
536 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
542 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
543 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
547 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
549 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
550 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
551 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
552 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
554 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
555 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
557 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
558 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
559 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
560 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
561 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
564 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
565 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
567 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
568 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
569 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
570 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
571 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
572 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
574 panic!("RNG is bad???");
577 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
579 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
580 node_id: their_network_key,
586 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
587 /// more information.
588 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
589 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
590 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
591 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
592 res.push(ChannelDetails {
593 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
594 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
595 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
596 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
597 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
603 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
604 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
605 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
606 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
607 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
608 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
609 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
610 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
611 // really wanted anyway.
612 if channel.is_live() {
613 res.push(ChannelDetails {
614 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
615 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
616 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
617 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
618 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
625 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
626 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
627 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
629 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
630 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
631 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
633 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
634 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
635 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
636 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
637 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
638 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
639 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
640 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
643 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
644 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
645 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
647 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
648 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
650 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
653 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
654 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
656 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
657 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
662 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
663 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
664 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
673 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
674 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
675 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
676 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
677 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
679 for tx in local_txn {
680 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
684 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
685 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
686 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
687 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
690 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
691 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
692 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
693 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
694 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
701 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
702 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
703 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
704 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
705 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
711 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
712 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
713 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
714 for chan in self.list_channels() {
715 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
720 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
721 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
723 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
724 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
725 Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
728 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
729 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
730 Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
735 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
736 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
737 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
738 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
739 Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
743 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
744 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
745 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
746 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
747 Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
750 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
752 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
753 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
754 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
756 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
757 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
759 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
760 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
761 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
762 let blinding_factor = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
764 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
766 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
767 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
769 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
775 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
776 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
777 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
779 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
780 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
786 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
796 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
797 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
798 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
799 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
800 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
801 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
802 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
803 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
805 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
806 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
807 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
808 // the intended recipient).
809 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
810 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
811 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
813 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
814 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
815 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
816 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
820 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
821 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
822 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
824 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
825 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
826 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
828 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
830 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
834 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
836 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
844 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
845 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
847 for i in 0..dst.len() {
852 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
853 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
854 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
855 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
858 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
859 let end_len = iters * 65;
860 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
861 res.resize(end_len, 0);
863 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
864 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
865 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
866 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
867 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
872 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
873 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
875 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
876 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
877 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
878 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
880 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
881 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
882 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
885 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
888 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.mu);
889 hmac.input(&packet_data);
890 hmac.input(&associated_data.0[..]);
891 hmac_res = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
896 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
897 hop_data: packet_data,
902 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
903 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
904 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
905 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
907 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
908 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
909 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
910 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
911 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
912 data: packet_crypted,
916 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
917 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
918 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
920 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
923 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
924 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
925 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
926 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
930 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
931 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
934 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
936 failuremsg: failuremsg,
940 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
941 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
942 packet.hmac = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
948 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
949 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
950 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
953 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
954 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
955 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
957 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
958 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
959 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
960 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
961 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
962 failure_code: $err_code,
963 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
968 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
969 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
972 let shared_secret = {
973 let mut arr = [0; 32];
974 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
977 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
979 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
980 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
981 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
982 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
983 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
984 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
985 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
986 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
990 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
991 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
992 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
993 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
994 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
997 let mut channel_state = None;
998 macro_rules! return_err {
999 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1001 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1002 if channel_state.is_none() {
1003 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1005 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1006 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1007 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1008 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1009 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1014 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1015 let next_hop_data = {
1016 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1017 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1018 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
1020 let error_code = match err {
1021 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1022 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1024 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1030 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1032 // final_expiry_too_soon
1033 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1034 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1036 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1037 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1038 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1040 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1041 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1042 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1045 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1046 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1047 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1048 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1050 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1052 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1053 short_channel_id: 0,
1054 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1055 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1056 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1059 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1060 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1061 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1063 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1065 let blinding_factor = {
1066 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1067 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1068 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1069 SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()).expect("SHA-256 is broken?")
1072 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1074 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1076 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1079 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1080 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1083 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1084 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1085 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1086 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1087 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1088 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1089 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1093 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1094 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1095 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1096 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1097 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1098 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1099 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1101 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1103 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1104 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1106 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1107 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1108 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1109 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1110 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1111 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1112 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1114 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1115 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1117 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1118 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1119 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1121 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1122 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1124 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1125 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1126 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1127 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1129 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1130 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1135 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1136 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1137 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1138 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1140 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1141 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1143 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1144 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1146 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1148 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1153 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1156 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1157 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1158 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1159 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1160 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1164 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1166 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1167 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1168 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1169 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1170 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1171 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1172 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1173 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1174 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1175 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1178 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1179 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1181 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1187 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1189 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1190 /// fields for more info.
1192 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1193 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1194 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1195 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1196 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1197 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1199 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1201 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1202 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1203 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1204 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1205 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1206 /// relevant updates.
1208 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1209 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1210 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1211 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1212 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1213 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1214 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1215 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1217 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1218 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1219 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1220 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1224 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1226 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1228 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1229 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1230 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1231 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1233 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1235 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1236 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1238 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1239 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1240 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1243 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1244 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1246 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1247 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1249 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1250 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1252 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1253 route: route.clone(),
1254 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1255 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1256 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1258 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1259 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1260 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1261 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1262 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1263 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1264 // something else in case we will resend later!
1265 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1268 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1269 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1270 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1271 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1272 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1273 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1274 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1282 } else { unreachable!(); }
1286 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1287 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1289 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1291 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1292 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1293 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1294 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1298 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1303 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1305 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1306 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1308 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1310 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1311 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1312 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1313 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1315 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1317 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1318 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1320 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1321 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1322 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1323 } else { unreachable!(); })
1329 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1330 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1331 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1334 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1335 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1336 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1337 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1344 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1345 // lock before add_update_monitor
1346 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1350 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1351 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1352 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1355 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1356 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1357 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1359 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1365 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1366 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1368 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1370 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1372 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1373 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1375 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1376 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1377 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1378 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1379 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1383 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1385 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1386 /// Will likely generate further events.
1387 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1388 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1390 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1391 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1393 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1394 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1396 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1400 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1401 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1402 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1403 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1405 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1406 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1407 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1408 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1409 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1410 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1412 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1417 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1419 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1420 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1421 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1422 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1423 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1424 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1426 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1428 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1429 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1434 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1436 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1437 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1438 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1439 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1440 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1441 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1442 // this channel currently :/.
1449 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1450 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1453 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1454 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1456 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1460 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1463 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1464 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1465 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1466 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1467 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1468 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1469 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1471 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1476 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1477 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1478 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1479 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1480 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1482 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1483 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1484 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1486 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1487 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1488 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1495 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1497 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1498 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1502 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1503 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1504 events.append(&mut new_events);
1507 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1508 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
1509 /// expected_value is the value you expected the payment to be for (not the amount it actually
1510 /// was for from the PaymentReceived event).
1511 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, expected_value: u64) -> bool {
1512 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1514 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1515 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1516 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1517 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1518 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1519 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1520 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1521 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(expected_value).to_vec() });
1527 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1528 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1529 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1530 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1531 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1532 /// still-available channels.
1533 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1535 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1536 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1537 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1538 match &onion_error {
1539 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1541 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1543 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1544 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1545 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1546 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1547 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1548 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1549 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1554 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1555 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1556 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1557 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1559 error_code: onion_error_code
1563 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1567 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1568 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1569 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1570 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1572 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1573 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1574 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1575 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1576 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1577 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1579 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1585 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1586 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1587 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1588 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1589 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1590 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1592 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1593 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1594 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1598 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1600 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1601 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1605 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1606 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1607 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1608 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1611 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1612 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1613 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1614 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1615 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1616 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1617 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1619 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1625 //TODO: Do something with e?
1633 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1634 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1635 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1637 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1638 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1639 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1641 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1643 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1644 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1645 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1646 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1647 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1648 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1653 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1655 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1656 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1657 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1658 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1662 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1663 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1664 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1666 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1667 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1669 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1670 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1676 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1677 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1678 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1679 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1680 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1681 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1684 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1685 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1686 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1687 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1688 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1689 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1690 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1691 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1699 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1700 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1701 //TODO: Do something with e?
1709 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1710 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1711 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1714 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1715 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1717 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1718 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1719 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1720 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1721 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1724 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1725 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1726 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1727 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1728 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1729 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1730 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1731 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1733 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1734 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1735 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1736 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1737 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1738 // on-chain confirmations.
1739 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once its merged a test
1740 // should be written.
1741 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1742 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1744 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1745 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1746 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1752 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1755 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1756 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1757 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1759 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1761 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1762 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1763 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1764 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1769 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1770 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1771 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1772 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1773 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1778 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1782 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1793 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1794 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1796 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1798 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1799 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1803 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1804 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1805 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1808 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1809 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1810 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1811 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1812 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1813 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1814 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1815 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1816 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1817 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1819 entry.insert(channel);
1825 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1826 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1827 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1828 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1829 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1830 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1831 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1832 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1833 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1835 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1836 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1838 //TODO: same as above
1839 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1842 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1843 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1844 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1845 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1846 output_script: output_script,
1847 user_channel_id: user_id,
1852 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1853 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1854 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1855 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1856 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1857 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1858 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1859 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1860 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1862 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1864 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1867 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1868 // lock before add_update_monitor
1869 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1872 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1873 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1874 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1875 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1876 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1878 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1879 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1880 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1889 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1890 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1891 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1892 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1893 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1894 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1895 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1896 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1897 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1899 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1900 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1903 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1905 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1908 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1909 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1910 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1911 user_channel_id: user_id,
1916 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1917 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1918 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1919 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1920 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1921 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1922 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1923 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1925 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1926 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1927 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1928 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1929 msg: announcement_sigs,
1934 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1938 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1939 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1940 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1941 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1943 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1944 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1945 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1946 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1947 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1949 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1950 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1951 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1952 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1956 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1957 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1958 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1962 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1963 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1964 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1966 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1967 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1969 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1972 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1973 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1975 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1976 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1977 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1978 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1986 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1987 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1988 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1989 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1990 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1991 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1992 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1993 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1994 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1996 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1997 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1998 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1999 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2004 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2005 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2006 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2007 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2008 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2009 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2010 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2012 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2013 } else { (tx, None) }
2015 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2018 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2019 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2021 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2022 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2023 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2024 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2032 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2033 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2034 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2035 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2037 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2038 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2039 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2040 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2042 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2043 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2045 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2046 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2047 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2048 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2049 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2051 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2052 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2053 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2054 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2055 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2056 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2057 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2058 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2059 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2060 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2061 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2062 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2063 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2064 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2066 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2067 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2068 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2069 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2073 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2074 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2075 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2076 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2077 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2078 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2083 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2085 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2090 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2091 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2093 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2094 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2095 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2096 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2097 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2098 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2100 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2102 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2105 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2109 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
2110 // indicating that the payment itself failed
2111 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool, Option<u16>) {
2112 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
2115 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
2116 let mut error_code_ret = None;
2117 let mut next_route_hop_ix = 0;
2118 let mut is_from_final_node = false;
2120 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
2121 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
2122 next_route_hop_ix += 1;
2123 if res.is_some() { return; }
2125 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2126 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2128 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2130 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2131 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2132 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2133 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2134 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2136 is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2138 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2139 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2140 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
2141 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2143 if fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &err_packet.hmac) {
2144 if let Some(error_code_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2) {
2145 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
2146 const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
2147 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
2149 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&error_code_slice);
2150 error_code_ret = Some(error_code);
2152 let (debug_field, debug_field_size) = errors::get_onion_debug_field(error_code);
2154 // indicate that payment parameter has failed and no need to
2155 // update Route object
2156 let payment_failed = (match error_code & 0xff {
2157 15|16|17|18|19 => true,
2159 } && is_from_final_node) // PERM bit observed below even this error is from the intermediate nodes
2160 || error_code == 21; // Special case error 21 as the Route object is bogus, TODO: Maybe fail the node if the CLTV was reasonable?
2162 let mut fail_channel_update = None;
2164 if error_code & NODE == NODE {
2165 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM });
2167 else if error_code & PERM == PERM {
2168 fail_channel_update = if payment_failed {None} else {Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2169 short_channel_id: route.hops[next_route_hop_ix - if next_route_hop_ix == route.hops.len() { 1 } else { 0 }].short_channel_id,
2173 else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
2174 if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) {
2175 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&update_len_slice) as usize;
2176 if let Some(update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
2177 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice)) {
2178 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2179 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2180 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code & 0xff {
2182 11 => amt_to_forward > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
2184 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2185 new_fee.is_some() && route_hop.fee_msat >= new_fee.unwrap()
2187 13 => route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
2188 14 => false, // expiry_too_soon; always valid?
2189 20 => chan_update.contents.flags & 2 == 0,
2190 _ => false, // unknown error code; take channel_update as valid
2192 fail_channel_update = if is_chan_update_invalid {
2193 // This probably indicates the node which forwarded
2194 // to the node in question corrupted something.
2195 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2196 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2200 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2207 if fail_channel_update.is_none() {
2208 // They provided an UPDATE which was obviously bogus, not worth
2209 // trying to relay through them anymore.
2210 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2211 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2215 } else if !payment_failed {
2216 // We can't understand their error messages and they failed to
2217 // forward...they probably can't understand our forwards so its
2218 // really not worth trying any further.
2219 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2220 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2225 // TODO: Here (and a few other places) we assume that BADONION errors
2226 // are always "sourced" from the node previous to the one which failed
2227 // to decode the onion.
2228 res = Some((fail_channel_update, !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2230 let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
2231 if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size {
2232 log_warn!(self, "Onion Error[{}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
2235 log_warn!(self, "Onion Error[{}({:#x})] {}", title, error_code, description);
2238 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2239 // definitely came from the peer in question
2240 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2241 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2243 }), !is_from_final_node));
2247 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2248 if let Some((channel_update, payment_retryable)) = res {
2249 (channel_update, payment_retryable, error_code_ret)
2251 // only not set either packet unparseable or hmac does not match with any
2252 // payment not retryable only when garbage is from the final node
2253 (None, !is_from_final_node, None)
2255 } else { unreachable!(); }
2258 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2259 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2260 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2261 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2262 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2263 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2264 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2265 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2267 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2269 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2274 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2275 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2276 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2277 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2278 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2279 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2280 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2281 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2283 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2284 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2286 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2289 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2293 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2294 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2295 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2296 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2297 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2298 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2299 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2300 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2302 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2303 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2304 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2305 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, commitment_signed.is_some());
2306 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2308 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2309 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2310 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2312 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2313 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2314 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2315 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2316 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2317 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2318 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2319 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2321 commitment_signed: msg,
2325 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2326 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2327 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2333 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2338 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2339 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2340 let mut forward_event = None;
2341 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2342 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2343 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2344 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2345 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2347 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2348 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2349 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2350 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2352 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2353 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2358 match forward_event {
2360 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2361 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2362 time_forwardable: time
2370 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2371 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2372 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2373 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2374 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2375 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2376 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2377 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2378 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2380 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2381 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2382 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2383 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2385 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2386 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2387 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2391 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2392 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2393 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2397 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2399 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2402 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2403 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2405 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2410 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2411 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2412 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2413 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2414 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2415 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2416 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2417 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2419 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2421 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2426 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2427 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2428 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2430 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2431 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2432 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2433 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2435 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2436 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2439 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2440 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2441 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2443 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2444 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2445 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2446 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2447 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2450 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2452 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2453 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2454 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2455 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2456 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2457 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2458 contents: announcement,
2460 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2463 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2468 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2469 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2470 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2472 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2473 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2474 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2475 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2477 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2478 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2479 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2480 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2481 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2482 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2483 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2484 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2485 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2487 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2488 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2490 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order);
2491 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2494 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2495 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2496 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2500 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2501 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2502 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2503 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2508 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2509 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2510 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2511 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2517 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2521 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2526 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2527 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2528 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2534 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2538 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2539 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2540 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2541 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2543 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2544 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2546 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2547 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2548 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2550 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2551 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2552 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2553 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2554 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2556 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2557 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2559 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2560 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2562 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2563 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2564 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2566 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2569 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2570 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2571 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2572 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2573 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2574 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2575 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2576 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2586 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2587 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2589 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2591 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2592 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2593 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2594 node_id: their_node_id,
2598 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2604 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2605 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2606 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2607 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2608 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2610 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2611 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2612 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2613 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2614 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2616 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2617 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2622 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2623 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2624 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2629 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2630 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2631 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2632 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2633 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2635 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2636 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2637 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2638 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2639 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2641 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2642 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2647 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2648 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2649 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2654 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2655 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2656 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2657 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2658 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2659 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2661 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2662 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2663 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2664 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2665 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2666 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2667 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2668 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2669 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2670 msg: funding_locked,
2672 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2673 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2674 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2675 msg: announcement_sigs,
2678 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2679 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2680 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2681 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2682 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2686 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2687 for tx in txn_matched {
2688 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2689 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2690 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2691 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2692 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2694 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2695 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2696 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2697 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2698 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2699 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2708 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2709 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2710 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2712 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2713 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2714 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2715 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2716 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2717 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2718 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2727 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2728 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2730 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2731 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2734 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2735 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2736 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2737 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2739 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2740 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2741 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2742 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2743 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2744 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2745 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2746 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2748 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2749 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2750 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2760 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2761 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2763 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2764 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2768 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2769 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2770 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2771 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2772 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2775 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2776 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2777 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2780 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2781 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2782 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2785 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2786 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2787 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2790 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2791 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2792 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2795 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2796 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2797 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2800 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2801 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2802 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2805 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2806 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2807 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2810 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2811 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2812 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2815 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2816 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2817 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2820 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2821 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2822 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2825 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2826 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2827 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2830 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2831 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2832 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2835 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2836 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2837 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2840 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2841 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2842 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2845 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2846 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2847 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2850 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2851 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2852 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2853 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2855 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2856 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2857 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2858 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2859 if no_connection_possible {
2860 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2861 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2862 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2863 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2864 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2866 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2867 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2868 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2878 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2879 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2880 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2881 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2882 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2883 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2884 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2885 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2887 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2888 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2889 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2898 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2899 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2901 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2902 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2903 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2908 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2909 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2911 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2912 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2913 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2914 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2915 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2916 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2917 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2918 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2919 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2920 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2924 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2925 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2926 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2932 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2935 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2936 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2938 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2939 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2940 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2941 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2945 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2950 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2951 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2953 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2954 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2955 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2957 onion.write(writer)?;
2961 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2962 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2963 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2964 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2965 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2970 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2971 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2972 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2974 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2975 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2977 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2979 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2980 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2981 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2982 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2983 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2988 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2989 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2991 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2993 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2995 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2997 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3004 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3005 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3006 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3007 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3008 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3009 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3014 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3015 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3017 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3019 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3021 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3023 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3030 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3031 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3032 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3033 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3034 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3035 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3040 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3043 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3046 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3047 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3049 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3051 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3053 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3055 route.write(writer)?;
3056 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3057 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3064 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3065 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3066 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3067 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3068 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3069 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3070 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3071 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3073 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3078 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3079 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3081 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
3085 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3087 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3088 data.write(writer)?;
3095 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3096 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3097 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3098 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3099 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3100 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3101 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3103 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3108 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
3109 prev_short_channel_id,
3114 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3115 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3116 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3118 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3119 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3121 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3122 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3123 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3125 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3126 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3127 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3128 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3129 unfunded_channels += 1;
3132 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3133 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3134 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3135 channel.write(writer)?;
3139 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3140 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3141 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3142 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3143 for forward in pending_forwards {
3144 forward.write(writer)?;
3148 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3149 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3150 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3151 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3152 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3153 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3161 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3163 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3165 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3166 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3167 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3168 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3169 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3170 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3171 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3172 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3173 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3174 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3175 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3176 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3177 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3178 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3179 /// deserialization.
3180 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3182 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3184 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3185 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3186 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3188 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3189 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3190 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3191 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3192 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3194 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3195 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3196 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3197 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3198 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3199 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3200 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3201 /// deserialization.
3202 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3203 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3204 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3205 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3207 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3208 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3210 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3211 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3212 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3213 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3215 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3217 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3220 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3221 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3222 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3223 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3224 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3225 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3228 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3229 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3230 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3232 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3234 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3235 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3236 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3237 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3238 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3239 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3240 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3241 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3244 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3245 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3246 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3247 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3248 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3249 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3250 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3251 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3252 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3254 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3255 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3257 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3260 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3264 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3265 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3266 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3270 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3271 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3272 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3273 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3274 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3275 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3276 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3277 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3279 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3282 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3283 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3284 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3285 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3286 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3287 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3288 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3289 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3291 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3294 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3296 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3297 monitor: args.monitor,
3298 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3299 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3301 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3302 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3303 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3305 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3308 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3311 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3313 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3315 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3316 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3317 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3318 logger: args.logger,
3319 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3322 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3323 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3324 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3325 //connection or two.
3328 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3334 use chain::chaininterface;
3335 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3336 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3337 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
3338 use chain::keysinterface;
3339 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
3340 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3341 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3342 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
3343 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3345 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler,HTLCFailChannelUpdate};
3346 use util::test_utils;
3347 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3348 use util::errors::APIError;
3349 use util::logger::Logger;
3350 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3351 use util::config::UserConfig;
3353 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3354 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3355 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
3356 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
3357 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3358 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
3359 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
3360 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3361 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3362 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3364 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3365 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
3369 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3370 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3372 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3374 use std::cell::RefCell;
3375 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap, HashSet};
3376 use std::default::Default;
3378 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3379 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3380 use std::time::Instant;
3383 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3384 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3385 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3390 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3391 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3394 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3395 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3398 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3399 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3402 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3403 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3406 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3407 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3412 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3414 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3415 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3420 fn onion_vectors() {
3421 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3422 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3424 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3425 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3426 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3427 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3428 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3430 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3431 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3432 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3433 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3434 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3436 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3437 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3438 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3439 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3440 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3442 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3443 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3444 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3445 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3446 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3448 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3449 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3450 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3451 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3452 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3454 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3455 let payloads = vec!(
3456 msgs::OnionHopData {
3458 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3459 short_channel_id: 0,
3461 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3465 msgs::OnionHopData {
3467 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3468 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3469 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3470 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3474 msgs::OnionHopData {
3476 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3477 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3478 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3479 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3483 msgs::OnionHopData {
3485 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3486 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3487 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3488 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3492 msgs::OnionHopData {
3494 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3495 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3496 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3497 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3503 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &PaymentHash([0x42; 32]));
3504 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3506 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("0002eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619e5f14350c2a76fc232b5e46d421e9615471ab9e0bc887beff8c95fdb878f7b3a716a996c7845c93d90e4ecbb9bde4ece2f69425c99e4bc820e44485455f135edc0d10f7d61ab590531cf08000179a333a347f8b4072f216400406bdf3bf038659793d4a1fd7b246979e3150a0a4cb052c9ec69acf0f48c3d39cd55675fe717cb7d80ce721caad69320c3a469a202f1e468c67eaf7a7cd8226d0fd32f7b48084dca885d56047694762b67021713ca673929c163ec36e04e40ca8e1c6d17569419d3039d9a1ec866abe044a9ad635778b961fc0776dc832b3a451bd5d35072d2269cf9b040f6b7a7dad84fb114ed413b1426cb96ceaf83825665ed5a1d002c1687f92465b49ed4c7f0218ff8c6c7dd7221d589c65b3b9aaa71a41484b122846c7c7b57e02e679ea8469b70e14fe4f70fee4d87b910cf144be6fe48eef24da475c0b0bcc6565ae82cd3f4e3b24c76eaa5616c6111343306ab35c1fe5ca4a77c0e314ed7dba39d6f1e0de791719c241a939cc493bea2bae1c1e932679ea94d29084278513c77b899cc98059d06a27d171b0dbdf6bee13ddc4fc17a0c4d2827d488436b57baa167544138ca2e64a11b43ac8a06cd0c2fba2d4d900ed2d9205305e2d7383cc98dacb078133de5f6fb6bed2ef26ba92cea28aafc3b9948dd9ae5559e8bd6920b8cea462aa445ca6a95e0e7ba52961b181c79e73bd581821df2b10173727a810c92b83b5ba4a0403eb710d2ca10689a35bec6c3a708e9e92f7d78ff3c5d9989574b00c6736f84c199256e76e19e78f0c98a9d580b4a658c84fc8f2096c2fbea8f5f8c59d0fdacb3be2802ef802abbecb3aba4acaac69a0e965abd8981e9896b1f6ef9d60f7a164b371af869fd0e48073742825e9434fc54da837e120266d53302954843538ea7c6c3dbfb4ff3b2fdbe244437f2a153ccf7bdb4c92aa08102d4f3cff2ae5ef86fab4653595e6a5837fa2f3e29f27a9cde5966843fb847a4a61f1e76c281fe8bb2b0a181d096100db5a1a5ce7a910238251a43ca556712eaadea167fb4d7d75825e440f3ecd782036d7574df8bceacb397abefc5f5254d2722215c53ff54af8299aaaad642c6d72a14d27882d9bbd539e1cc7a527526ba89b8c037ad09120e98ab042d3e8652b31ae0e478516bfaf88efca9f3676ffe99d2819dcaeb7610a626695f53117665d267d3f7abebd6bbd6733f645c72c389f03855bdf1e4b8075b516569b118233a0f0971d24b83113c0b096f5216a207ca99a7cddc81c130923fe3d91e7508c9ac5f2e914ff5dccab9e558566fa14efb34ac98d878580814b94b73acbfde9072f30b881f7f0fff42d4045d1ace6322d86a97d164aa84d93a60498065cc7c20e636f5862dc81531a88c60305a2e59a985be327a6902e4bed986dbf4a0b50c217af0ea7fdf9ab37f9ea1a1aaa72f54cf40154ea9b269f1a7c09f9f43245109431a175d50e2db0132337baa0ef97eed0fcf20489da36b79a1172faccc2f7ded7c60e00694282d93359c4682135642bc81f433574aa8ef0c97b4ade7ca372c5ffc23c7eddd839bab4e0f14d6df15c9dbeab176bec8b5701cf054eb3072f6dadc98f88819042bf10c407516ee58bce33fbe3b3d86a54255e577db4598e30a135361528c101683a5fcde7e8ba53f3456254be8f45fe3a56120ae96ea3773631fcb3873aa3abd91bcff00bd38bd43697a2e789e00da6077482e7b1b1a677b5afae4c54e6cbdf7377b694eb7d7a5b913476a5be923322d3de06060fd5e819635232a2cf4f0731da13b8546d1d6d4f8d75b9fce6c2341a71b0ea6f780df54bfdb0dd5cd9855179f602f9172307c7268724c3618e6817abd793adc214a0dc0bc616816632f27ea336fb56dfd").unwrap());
3510 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3511 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3513 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3514 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3515 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3517 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3518 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3520 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3521 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3523 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3524 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3526 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3527 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3529 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3530 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3533 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3534 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3535 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3536 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3538 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3539 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3544 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3545 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3546 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3547 keys_manager: Arc<test_utils::TestKeysInterface>,
3548 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3550 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3551 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3552 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3554 impl Drop for Node {
3555 fn drop(&mut self) {
3556 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3557 // Check that we processed all pending events
3558 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3559 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3560 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3565 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3566 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3569 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3570 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3571 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3572 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3575 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3576 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3578 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3579 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3581 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3582 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3585 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3586 }, match events[1] {
3587 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3588 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3589 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3590 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3591 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3592 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3593 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3594 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3596 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3602 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3603 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3605 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3606 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3608 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3609 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3612 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3618 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3619 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3621 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3622 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3624 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3625 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3628 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3634 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3635 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
3637 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3638 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3645 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3646 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3647 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3648 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3650 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3654 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3655 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3657 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3658 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3659 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3661 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3662 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3664 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3666 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3667 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3668 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3669 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3670 added_monitors.clear();
3672 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3675 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3677 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3678 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3679 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3680 added_monitors.clear();
3683 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3685 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3686 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3687 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3688 added_monitors.clear();
3691 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3692 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3694 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3695 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3696 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3698 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3704 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3705 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3706 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3710 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3711 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3712 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3713 ((match events_6[0] {
3714 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3715 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3716 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3719 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3720 }, match events_6[1] {
3721 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3722 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3725 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3729 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3730 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3731 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3735 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3736 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3737 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3738 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3740 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3741 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3742 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3743 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3746 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3749 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3750 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3751 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3752 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3753 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3754 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3755 assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
3756 assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, bs_update.contents.short_channel_id);
3759 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3762 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3764 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3767 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3768 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3771 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3772 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3774 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3775 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3776 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3778 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3781 macro_rules! check_spends {
3782 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3784 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3785 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3786 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3787 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3792 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3793 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3795 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3796 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3797 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3798 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3799 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3802 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3803 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3805 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3806 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3809 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3816 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
3817 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3818 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3821 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3822 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3824 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3825 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3826 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3827 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3828 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3831 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3834 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3835 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3838 Some(match events_1[1] {
3839 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3840 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3847 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3848 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3849 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3850 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3851 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3852 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3853 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3855 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3856 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3857 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3858 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3859 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3860 (as_update, bs_update)
3862 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3864 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3865 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3866 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3867 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3869 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3870 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3871 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3872 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3873 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3874 (as_update, bs_update)
3876 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3877 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3879 (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
3884 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3885 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3888 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3889 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3890 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3891 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3892 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3893 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3896 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3898 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3899 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3903 fn from_node(node: &Node) -> SendEvent {
3904 let mut events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3905 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3906 SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap())
3910 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3911 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3913 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3914 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3915 added_monitors.clear();
3920 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3921 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3923 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3924 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3925 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3926 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3927 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3930 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
3932 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3933 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3934 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3935 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3936 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3937 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3938 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3939 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3940 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3941 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3943 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3944 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3947 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3948 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3950 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3951 if $fail_backwards {
3952 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3953 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3955 (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack)
3958 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
3960 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3961 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3962 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3963 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3964 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
3965 assert!(extra_msg_option.is_none());
3969 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
3971 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
3972 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3974 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3975 if $fail_backwards {
3976 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3977 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3979 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3981 added_monitors.clear();
3986 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
3988 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
3991 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3993 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
3994 if $fail_backwards {
3995 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3996 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3997 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
3998 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3999 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4001 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4007 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
4010 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32]);
4011 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
4012 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4013 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
4018 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
4019 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4021 let mut payment_event = {
4022 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4023 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
4025 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4026 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4027 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4029 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
4031 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
4032 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
4034 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4035 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
4036 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4038 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4039 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4041 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4045 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4046 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4048 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4049 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4050 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4052 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4053 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4054 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
4056 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4059 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4060 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4061 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
4062 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4063 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4069 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
4072 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4073 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4074 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4076 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4077 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4078 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
4081 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4082 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4084 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4085 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4086 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4087 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4088 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4089 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4090 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4091 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
4093 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4099 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
4100 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
4102 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4103 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
4104 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4105 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4109 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
4110 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
4112 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4113 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4114 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
4115 get_next_msgs!($node)
4117 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4120 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4121 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
4126 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4127 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4128 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4129 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
4130 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4131 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
4132 } else if update_next_msgs {
4133 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
4135 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4137 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4138 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4145 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
4146 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4147 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4149 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4150 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4152 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4157 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4158 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
4161 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
4163 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
4164 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4165 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4166 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4167 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4170 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4173 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4174 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4175 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4176 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4177 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4180 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4182 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4184 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4185 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4189 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4190 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4191 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4194 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
4195 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, 0));
4196 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4198 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4199 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4200 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4202 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4203 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4208 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4209 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4210 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4211 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4212 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4213 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4214 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4215 // second-to-last node!
4216 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4219 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4220 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4221 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4223 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4224 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4225 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4226 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4227 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4228 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4229 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4230 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4232 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4235 assert!(events.is_empty());
4237 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4238 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4245 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4247 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4248 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4250 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
4251 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4252 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4254 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4259 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
4260 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4263 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4264 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4265 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4266 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4268 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4269 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4271 for i in 0..node_count {
4272 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", i)));
4273 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4274 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4275 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4276 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4277 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4278 let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4279 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4280 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4281 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4282 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4283 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4284 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4285 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, keys_manager, node_seed: seed,
4286 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4287 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4295 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4296 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4297 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4298 let channel_id = chan.2;
4301 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4305 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4306 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4307 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4308 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4309 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4310 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4311 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4312 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4313 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4314 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4316 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4318 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4320 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4321 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4324 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4325 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4326 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4327 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4328 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4330 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4333 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4335 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4336 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4337 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4340 let payment_event = {
4341 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4342 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4343 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4345 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4346 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4348 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4349 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4350 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4351 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4352 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4355 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4356 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4357 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4358 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4361 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4362 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4363 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4364 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4365 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4366 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4367 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4370 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4371 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4372 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4373 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4374 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4375 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4376 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4379 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4380 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4381 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4384 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4385 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4388 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4391 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4392 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4394 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4395 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4398 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4403 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4404 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4405 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4406 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4407 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4408 let channel_id = chan.2;
4411 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4413 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4414 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4417 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4418 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4419 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4420 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4423 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4426 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4428 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4429 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4430 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4431 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4433 let payment_event = {
4434 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4435 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4436 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4438 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4439 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4441 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4442 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4443 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4444 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4445 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4448 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4451 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4455 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4456 let nodes = create_network(2);
4457 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4458 let channel_id = chan.2;
4461 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4462 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4463 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4464 // (3) update_fee ->
4465 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4466 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4467 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4468 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4469 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4470 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4471 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4472 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4473 // revoke_and_ack ->
4474 // B should send no response here
4475 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4476 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4477 // revoke_and_ack ->
4479 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4480 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4481 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4484 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4485 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4486 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4487 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4488 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4490 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4493 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4494 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4495 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4496 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4499 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4501 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4502 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4503 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4505 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4506 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4507 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4508 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4511 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4513 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4515 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4517 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4518 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4519 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4521 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4522 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4523 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4524 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4525 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4526 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4527 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4529 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4530 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4531 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4533 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4535 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4536 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4540 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4541 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4544 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4545 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4548 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4549 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4550 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4553 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4554 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4559 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4560 let nodes = create_network(2);
4561 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4562 let channel_id = chan.2;
4564 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4565 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
4566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4568 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4569 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4570 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4571 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4572 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4574 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4576 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4578 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4579 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4582 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4583 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4586 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4587 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4588 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4591 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4592 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4597 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
4598 let nodes = create_network(2);
4599 let channel_value = 1888;
4600 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
4601 let channel_id = chan.2;
4604 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
4605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4606 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4608 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4610 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
4612 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
4613 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
4615 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4616 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4618 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
4619 let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
4620 let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
4621 let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
4622 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
4623 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
4626 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
4627 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
4628 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
4629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4631 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4633 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4635 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
4636 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
4637 //Should produce and error.
4638 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
4640 assert!(match err.err {
4641 "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
4645 //clear the message we could not handle
4646 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4650 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4651 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4652 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4653 let channel_id = chan.2;
4656 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4658 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4659 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4662 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4663 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4664 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4665 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4666 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4670 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4671 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4672 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4675 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4677 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4679 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4680 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4682 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4683 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4684 added_monitors.clear();
4686 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4687 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4688 // node[1] has nothing to do
4690 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4691 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4694 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4695 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4696 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4698 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4700 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4702 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4703 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4704 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4705 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4706 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4707 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4709 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4710 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4712 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4714 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4716 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4718 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4720 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4721 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4723 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4725 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4727 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4728 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4730 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4731 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4733 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4734 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4736 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4737 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4739 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4743 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4745 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4746 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4747 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4751 fn test_update_fee() {
4752 let nodes = create_network(2);
4753 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4754 let channel_id = chan.2;
4757 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4758 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4759 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4760 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4761 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4762 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4763 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4764 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4765 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4766 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4767 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4768 // revoke_and_ack ->
4770 // Create and deliver (1)...
4771 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4772 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4775 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4776 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4777 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4778 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4779 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4781 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4783 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4785 // Generate (2) and (3):
4786 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4787 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4791 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4792 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4795 // Create and deliver (4)...
4796 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4797 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4798 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4799 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4800 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4801 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4802 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4804 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4807 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4808 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4811 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4812 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4814 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4815 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4817 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4818 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4821 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4822 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4825 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4826 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4827 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4828 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4829 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4830 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4831 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4832 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4836 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4838 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4839 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4841 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4843 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4845 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4846 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4847 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4851 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4852 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4853 let nodes = create_network(2);
4854 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4855 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4856 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4857 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4859 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4860 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4861 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4862 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4863 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4865 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4866 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4867 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4868 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4869 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4870 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4872 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4873 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4877 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4878 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4879 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4880 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4881 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4882 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4883 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4885 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4887 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4888 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4889 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4890 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4891 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4893 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4894 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4896 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4897 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4898 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4899 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4900 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4902 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4904 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4905 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4906 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4907 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4908 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4909 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4910 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4912 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4913 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4915 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4916 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4917 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4918 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4919 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4920 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4921 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4923 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4924 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4926 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4927 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4929 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4932 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4933 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4934 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4935 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4936 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4937 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4939 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4941 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4942 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4943 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4944 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4945 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4949 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
4950 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
4951 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4952 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4953 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4955 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4956 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4957 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4959 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4960 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4961 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4962 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4963 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4964 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4966 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4967 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4968 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4969 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4971 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4972 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4974 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4975 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
4977 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4978 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4979 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4980 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4981 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4982 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4984 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4985 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4987 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4988 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4990 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
4991 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4992 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
4994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4997 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4998 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
4999 let node_0_closing_signed = match msg_events[0] {
5000 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5001 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5004 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5006 match msg_events[1] {
5007 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
5008 assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_1.0.contents.short_channel_id);
5010 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5013 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5014 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5015 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5016 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5017 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5018 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5020 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5022 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5023 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5024 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5025 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5026 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5029 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
5030 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
5031 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
5032 let nodes = create_network(3);
5033 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5034 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5036 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
5038 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
5039 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5041 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
5042 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5044 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5048 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5049 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5051 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5052 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5053 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5054 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5056 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
5057 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5058 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5060 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
5061 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
5062 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5063 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5066 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5067 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5068 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
5070 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5072 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5073 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5075 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5077 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5078 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5079 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5080 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5081 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5082 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5083 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5085 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5086 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
5088 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5089 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5090 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5091 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5092 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5093 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5094 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5096 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5097 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5099 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5100 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
5102 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5105 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5107 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5108 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5109 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
5112 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5113 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5115 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5116 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5117 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5118 if recv_count == 0 {
5119 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
5120 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5122 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5123 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5124 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
5126 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5127 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5128 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5130 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5131 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5133 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5134 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5135 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
5137 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
5138 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5139 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5140 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5141 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5143 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5144 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5145 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5146 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5147 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5148 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5150 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5152 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5153 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5154 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5155 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5156 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5157 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5159 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5160 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5161 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5162 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5163 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5165 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5166 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5168 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5172 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5174 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5175 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5176 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5177 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5178 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5182 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5183 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5184 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5185 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5189 fn fake_network_test() {
5190 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5191 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5192 let nodes = create_network(4);
5194 // Create some initial channels
5195 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5196 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5197 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5199 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5200 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5201 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5202 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5203 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5205 // Send some more payments
5206 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5207 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5208 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5210 // Test failure packets
5211 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5212 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5214 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5215 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5217 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5218 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5219 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5220 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5221 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5222 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5223 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5225 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5226 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5227 hops.push(RouteHop {
5228 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5229 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5231 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5233 hops.push(RouteHop {
5234 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5235 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5237 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5239 hops.push(RouteHop {
5240 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5241 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5243 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5245 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5246 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5247 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5249 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5250 hops.push(RouteHop {
5251 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5252 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5254 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5256 hops.push(RouteHop {
5257 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5258 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5260 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5262 hops.push(RouteHop {
5263 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5264 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5266 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5268 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5269 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5270 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5272 // Claim the rebalances...
5273 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5274 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5276 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5277 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5279 // Send some payments across both channels
5280 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5281 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5282 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5284 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5286 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5288 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5289 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5290 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5292 // Close down the channels...
5293 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5294 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5295 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5296 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5297 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5301 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5302 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5303 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5304 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5306 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5307 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5308 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5309 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5310 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5311 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5313 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5315 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5316 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5318 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5319 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5321 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5322 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5323 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5326 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5327 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5328 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5330 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5331 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5332 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5334 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5335 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5337 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5339 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5340 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5341 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5343 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5344 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5345 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5346 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5347 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5348 res.push(tx.clone());
5353 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5354 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5357 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5359 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5360 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5361 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5362 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5363 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5364 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5366 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5368 res.push(tx.clone());
5372 assert!(res.len() == 2 || res.len() == 3);
5374 assert_eq!(res[1], res[2]);
5378 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5382 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5383 /// HTLC transaction.
5384 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5385 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5386 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5387 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5388 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5389 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5393 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5396 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5397 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5399 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5400 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5401 let mut found_prev = false;
5403 for tx in prev_txn {
5404 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5405 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5406 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5407 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5413 assert!(found_prev);
5415 let mut res = Vec::new();
5416 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5420 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5421 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5422 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5423 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5424 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5427 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5430 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5431 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5432 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5433 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5436 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5440 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5441 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5445 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5447 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5448 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5450 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5451 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5453 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5454 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5458 fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
5460 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5461 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5463 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5464 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5465 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5466 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5467 chan.get_value_stat()
5471 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5472 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5473 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5475 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5476 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5478 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5479 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5481 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5482 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5483 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5484 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5485 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5489 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5491 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5492 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5493 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5494 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5499 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5500 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5501 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5502 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5504 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5505 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5506 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5508 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5513 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5514 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5516 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5518 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5520 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5521 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5522 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5524 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5525 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5529 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5530 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5531 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5533 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5534 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5537 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5540 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5541 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5542 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5543 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5544 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5547 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5548 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5549 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5550 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5551 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5555 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5556 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5557 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5558 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5560 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5561 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5565 // adding pending output
5566 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5567 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5569 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5570 let payment_event_1 = {
5571 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5574 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5575 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5576 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5578 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5580 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5581 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5583 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5584 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5585 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5586 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5591 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5592 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5594 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5595 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5596 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5597 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5598 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5600 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5602 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5603 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5604 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5605 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5606 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5607 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5609 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5610 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5611 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5612 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5616 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5618 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5620 // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
5621 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5622 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5623 let channel_close_broadcast = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5624 assert_eq!(channel_close_broadcast.len(), 1);
5625 match channel_close_broadcast[0] {
5626 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5627 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5629 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5635 // split the rest to test holding cell
5636 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5637 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5639 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5640 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5643 // now see if they go through on both sides
5644 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5645 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5646 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5648 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5649 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5651 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5653 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5654 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5655 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5656 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5660 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5661 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5662 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5664 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5665 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5667 // flush the pending htlc
5668 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5669 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5672 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5674 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5676 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5677 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5678 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5681 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5682 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5683 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5685 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5687 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5688 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5689 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5691 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5692 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5694 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5695 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5696 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5697 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5698 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5699 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5701 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5702 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5703 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5704 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5706 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5707 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5709 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5710 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5712 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5713 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5714 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5716 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5719 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5720 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5721 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5723 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5726 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5727 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5728 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5730 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5731 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5732 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5733 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5735 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5736 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5740 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5741 do_channel_reserve_test(false);
5742 do_channel_reserve_test(true);
5746 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5747 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5748 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5749 let nodes = create_network(5);
5751 // Create some initial channels
5752 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5753 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5754 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5755 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5757 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5758 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5759 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5760 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5761 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5763 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5764 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5766 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5767 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5768 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5769 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5771 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5772 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5773 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5775 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5776 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5778 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5779 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5781 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5782 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5783 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5784 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5786 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5787 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5788 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5790 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5791 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5793 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5794 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5796 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5797 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5799 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5800 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5801 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5802 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5804 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5810 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5811 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5812 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5814 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5816 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5817 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5819 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5820 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5822 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5824 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5825 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5826 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5828 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5829 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5830 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5833 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5834 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5835 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5836 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5837 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5841 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5842 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5843 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5844 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5845 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5848 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5850 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5851 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5853 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5854 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5855 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5856 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5857 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5860 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5862 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5863 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5865 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5867 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5868 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5869 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5873 fn test_justice_tx() {
5874 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5876 let nodes = create_network(2);
5877 // Create some new channels:
5878 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5880 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5881 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5882 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5883 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5884 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5885 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5886 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5887 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5888 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5889 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5890 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
5891 // Revoke the old state
5892 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5895 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5896 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5898 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5899 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5900 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5901 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5903 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5904 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5906 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5908 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5909 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5910 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5911 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5912 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5914 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5916 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5917 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5919 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5920 // Create some new channels:
5921 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5923 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5924 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5925 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5926 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5927 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5928 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5929 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5930 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5931 // Revoke the old state
5932 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5934 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5935 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5937 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5938 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5939 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5940 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5942 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5943 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5945 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5947 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5948 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5949 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5950 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5951 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5953 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5954 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5955 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5959 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5960 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5961 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5962 let nodes = create_network(2);
5963 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5964 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5965 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5966 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5967 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5968 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5969 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5970 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5972 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5973 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5974 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5975 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5976 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
5978 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5980 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5981 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
5983 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
5984 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5985 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5989 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
5990 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
5991 let nodes = create_network(2);
5993 // Create some new channel:
5994 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5996 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5997 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5998 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
5999 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6000 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
6002 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6003 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6004 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
6005 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6006 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
6007 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6008 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
6009 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
6010 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6012 //Revoke the old state
6013 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6016 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6017 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6018 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6020 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6021 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6023 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6024 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6026 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6029 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6030 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6032 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
6033 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6035 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
6037 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6038 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6039 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6040 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6041 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6042 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6043 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
6044 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
6046 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
6047 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6048 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
6050 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6051 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
6052 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
6053 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
6054 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6055 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
6057 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6058 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6059 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6063 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
6064 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
6065 let nodes = create_network(2);
6067 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6069 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6070 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6071 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
6072 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
6073 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6074 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
6076 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6077 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6079 //Revoke the old state
6080 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6083 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6084 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6085 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6087 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6088 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6090 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6091 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6093 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6096 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6097 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6099 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
6100 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
6101 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
6102 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
6103 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
6104 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
6105 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
6107 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6108 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6109 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6111 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
6112 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6113 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6114 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6115 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6117 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6118 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6119 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6120 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6121 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6122 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6123 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
6124 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
6126 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
6127 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
6129 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
6130 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
6131 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
6132 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
6133 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6134 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6136 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6137 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6138 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6142 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
6143 // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
6144 // ChainWatchInterface and pass the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
6145 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
6146 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
6147 // First, C should claim the HTLC output via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
6148 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
6149 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
6151 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
6152 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
6153 // the HTLC output via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
6154 // PaymentSent event).
6156 let nodes = create_network(3);
6158 // Create some initial channels
6159 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6160 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6162 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
6163 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6164 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6166 let (our_payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
6167 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6169 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
6170 // Broadcast HTLC Success transation by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
6171 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6172 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
6173 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6174 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6176 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6177 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6178 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6179 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6180 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6182 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6183 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6184 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6186 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6187 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6189 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
6190 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
6191 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
6192 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6193 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6194 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6195 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6196 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6198 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
6199 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: node_txn}, 1);
6200 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6202 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
6203 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
6204 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
6205 added_monitors.clear();
6207 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6209 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6210 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6213 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6214 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6215 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6216 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6217 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6218 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6223 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
6224 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transaction, as well as a
6225 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
6226 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6227 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6228 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6229 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6230 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6231 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6232 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
6233 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
6234 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6235 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6236 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6237 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6238 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
6242 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
6243 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
6244 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6245 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
6246 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6247 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6248 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6250 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6251 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6253 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success) * 2 (block-rescan)
6254 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
6255 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6256 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6257 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6258 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6259 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
6260 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6261 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6262 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
6263 // we already checked the same situation with A.
6265 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
6266 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6267 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6268 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6270 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6271 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6273 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6274 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6276 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6277 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
6279 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6281 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6282 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6283 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6284 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6285 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6286 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6287 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6288 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6289 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6290 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6291 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6292 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6293 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
6297 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
6298 // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
6299 // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC bacward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
6300 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
6301 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
6302 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
6304 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
6306 let nodes = create_network(3);
6308 // Create some intial channels
6309 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6310 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6312 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
6313 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6314 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6316 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
6317 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6319 // Brodacast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
6320 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6321 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6322 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
6324 let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
6325 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
6326 added_monitors.clear();
6328 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6329 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6331 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6332 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6333 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6334 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6335 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6336 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6338 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6340 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6341 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6342 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6344 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6345 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6347 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
6348 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6349 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6350 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6352 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output fron C's commitment tx on B's chain
6353 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
6354 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
6357 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6358 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 6 (HTLC-Timeout tx, commitment tx, timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6359 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
6360 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
6361 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[7]);
6362 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6363 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6364 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
6365 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6366 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6367 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6368 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_2.3.clone());
6369 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone());
6370 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6371 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6372 timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone();
6376 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1);
6377 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6379 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6381 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6382 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6385 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6386 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6387 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6388 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6389 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6390 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6392 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6394 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // Well... here we detect our own htlc_timeout_tx so no tx to be generated
6395 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
6397 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
6398 let commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6399 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
6401 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
6402 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6403 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6405 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6406 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6408 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 block-rescan
6409 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6410 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6411 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6412 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6413 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6414 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6415 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6416 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6420 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
6421 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
6422 // and fail backward accordingly.
6424 let nodes = create_network(3);
6426 // Create some initial channels
6427 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6428 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6430 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6431 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
6432 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6433 // Revoke the old state
6434 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
6436 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6438 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6439 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6440 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6442 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6444 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6445 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6448 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
6449 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6450 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6451 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6452 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6453 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6455 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6456 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6458 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6459 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6461 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6462 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6464 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6465 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6467 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
6468 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6471 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6475 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool) {
6476 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
6477 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
6478 // commitment transaction anymore.
6479 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
6480 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
6481 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
6482 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
6483 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
6484 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
6486 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
6487 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
6488 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
6489 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
6490 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
6491 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6493 // Create some initial channels
6494 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6495 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6497 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6498 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
6499 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6500 // Revoke the old state
6501 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
6503 let (_, first_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6504 let (_, second_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6505 let (_, third_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6507 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash, 0));
6508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6509 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6510 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6511 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6512 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6513 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6514 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6515 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6516 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
6517 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
6519 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash, 0));
6520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6521 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6522 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6523 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6524 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6525 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6526 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6527 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6528 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6530 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
6531 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
6532 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
6533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6535 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash, 0));
6536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6537 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6538 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6539 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6540 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6541 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6542 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6543 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6544 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
6545 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
6546 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6548 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
6549 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
6550 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
6551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6553 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
6554 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
6555 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6556 let (_, fourth_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6557 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, fourth_payment_hash).unwrap();
6558 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6559 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6563 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
6564 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, one as we generate a commitment for
6565 // nodes[0] to fail first_payment_hash backwards.
6566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6569 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
6570 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6572 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6573 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6575 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6576 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6578 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6579 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
6581 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6584 if !deliver_bs_raa {
6585 // If we delivered the RAA already then we already failed first_payment_hash backwards.
6586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6589 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6590 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 });
6591 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 0 }] {
6592 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6593 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6597 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6598 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6599 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6600 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6601 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6602 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6604 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6607 // Due to the way backwards-failing occurs we do the updates in two steps.
6608 let updates = match events[1] {
6609 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
6610 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6611 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6612 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6613 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6614 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6616 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6617 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6619 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6620 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6622 let bs_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6623 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6625 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6626 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6629 if !deliver_bs_raa {
6630 // If we delievered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
6631 // that we should update our routing table for.
6632 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6633 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6635 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6636 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6639 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6640 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6642 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6643 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6645 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6653 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6654 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
6655 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6656 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6657 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6658 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
6659 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6661 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6662 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6663 for event in events {
6665 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6666 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6670 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6671 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6673 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6674 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6676 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6679 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6680 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6682 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6685 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
6686 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
6687 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
6691 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive() {
6692 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false);
6693 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true);
6697 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
6698 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
6699 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
6700 let nodes = create_network(2);
6701 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6703 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
6704 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
6706 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6707 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6709 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6710 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6712 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6716 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6717 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
6719 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6720 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6723 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6724 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6726 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6727 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6729 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6733 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6734 // registering new transactions
6735 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6739 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6740 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6741 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6742 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6743 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6745 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6747 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6749 let mut payment_event = {
6750 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6753 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6754 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6755 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6758 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6759 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6761 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6762 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6764 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6765 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6768 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6769 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6771 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6772 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6773 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6774 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6777 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6778 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6780 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6782 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6783 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6784 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6786 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6787 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6788 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6790 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6791 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6793 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6797 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6798 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6799 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6800 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6801 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6805 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6806 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6808 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6809 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6810 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6812 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6813 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6815 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6818 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6820 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6821 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6822 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6824 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6825 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6826 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6827 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6828 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6829 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6830 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6832 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6836 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6837 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6838 let nodes = create_network(2);
6839 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6841 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6842 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6843 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6844 mem::drop(channel_state);
6846 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6847 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6848 headers.push(header.clone());
6850 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6851 headers.push(header.clone());
6853 while !headers.is_empty() {
6854 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6857 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6858 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6860 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6861 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6863 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6866 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6867 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6868 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6871 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6872 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6874 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6875 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6876 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6877 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6878 res.push(msg.clone());
6880 panic!("Unexpected event")
6888 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6889 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6891 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6893 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6895 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6901 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6902 let mut commitment_update = None;
6903 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6906 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6907 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6908 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6909 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6911 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6912 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6913 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6914 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6916 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6919 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6922 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6924 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6925 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6926 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6927 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6929 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6930 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6931 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6932 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6934 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6938 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6943 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6944 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6945 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6946 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6947 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6948 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6949 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6951 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6952 // If a expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6954 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6955 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6958 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6959 // If b expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6961 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6962 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6965 if send_funding_locked.0 || send_funding_locked.1 {
6966 // If we expect any funding_locked's, both sides better have set
6967 // next_local_commitment_number to 1
6968 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6969 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
6971 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6972 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
6976 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
6977 for msg in reestablish_1 {
6978 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6979 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
6981 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6982 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6984 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
6987 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
6988 for msg in reestablish_2 {
6989 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6990 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
6992 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6993 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6995 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
6998 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
6999 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
7000 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
7002 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
7003 if send_funding_locked.0 {
7004 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
7005 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7006 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
7007 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
7008 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
7009 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
7010 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7013 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
7016 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7017 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
7018 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7019 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7021 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
7023 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
7024 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
7025 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7026 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
7028 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7030 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
7031 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
7032 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7033 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
7034 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
7036 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
7037 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
7039 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
7040 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
7043 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7044 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
7046 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7047 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7048 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
7049 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7050 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7051 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7052 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7055 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
7059 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
7060 if send_funding_locked.1 {
7061 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
7062 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7063 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
7064 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
7065 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
7066 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
7067 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7070 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
7073 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7074 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
7075 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7076 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7078 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
7080 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
7081 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
7082 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7083 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
7085 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
7086 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
7087 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7088 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
7089 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
7091 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
7092 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
7094 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
7095 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
7098 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7099 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
7101 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7102 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7103 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
7104 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7105 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7106 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7107 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7110 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
7116 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
7117 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
7118 let nodes = create_network(3);
7119 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7120 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
7122 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7123 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7124 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7126 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7127 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7128 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
7129 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
7131 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7132 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7133 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7135 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7136 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7137 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7138 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7140 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7141 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7143 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
7144 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
7146 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
7148 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7149 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7151 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
7152 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
7154 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7157 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
7158 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
7159 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
7161 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7165 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
7166 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
7169 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
7170 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
7171 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7172 if messages_delivered == 0 {
7173 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7174 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
7176 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7179 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7180 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7182 let payment_event = {
7183 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
7184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7186 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7187 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7188 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7190 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
7192 if messages_delivered < 2 {
7193 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
7195 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7196 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
7197 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7199 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7201 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
7202 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7203 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7206 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
7207 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
7208 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7209 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7212 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
7213 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7214 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7222 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7223 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7224 if messages_delivered < 3 {
7225 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
7226 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
7227 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7228 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
7229 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
7230 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
7231 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
7232 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
7233 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7234 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
7235 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
7236 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
7237 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
7238 // Everything was delivered...
7239 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7242 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7243 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7245 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7249 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7250 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7251 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7253 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7254 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7256 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7257 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7259 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7260 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7261 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7263 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7266 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
7267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7269 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7270 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7271 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
7272 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
7273 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7274 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7275 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7276 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7277 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7278 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7279 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
7281 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7284 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
7285 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
7287 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7288 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7290 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7291 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
7293 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7296 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
7297 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
7298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7299 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7301 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
7302 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7303 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7306 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
7307 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
7308 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7309 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7312 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
7313 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7314 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7322 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7323 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7324 if messages_delivered < 2 {
7325 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7326 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
7327 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
7328 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7329 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7331 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7332 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
7334 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7337 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
7338 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
7339 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
7340 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
7341 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
7342 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7343 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
7344 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
7345 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
7346 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
7347 // Everything was delivered...
7348 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7351 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7352 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7353 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7355 // Channel should still work fine...
7356 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
7357 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7361 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
7362 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
7363 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
7364 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
7365 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
7369 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
7370 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
7371 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
7372 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
7376 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
7377 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
7378 let nodes = create_network(2);
7379 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7381 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7382 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7384 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
7385 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7386 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7388 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7389 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7391 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7394 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7396 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7397 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7399 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
7400 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7401 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
7403 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7404 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7406 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7409 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7410 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7412 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7415 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7417 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
7418 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
7420 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7421 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7422 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
7426 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
7427 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
7428 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
7429 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7430 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7432 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7434 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7435 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7436 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7438 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
7439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7441 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7442 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7444 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7445 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7448 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7451 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7452 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7454 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7455 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7456 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7457 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7458 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7459 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7460 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7462 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7463 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7464 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7466 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7467 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7469 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7472 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
7473 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7474 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7477 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7480 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7481 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7483 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7484 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7485 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7486 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7487 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7488 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7490 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7491 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7492 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7493 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7495 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7496 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7498 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7499 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7501 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7503 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7504 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7505 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7506 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7507 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7508 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7509 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7510 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7511 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7514 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
7515 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7516 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7517 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7518 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7519 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7520 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
7521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7523 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7524 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7525 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7526 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7527 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7528 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7529 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
7530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7532 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7533 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7534 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7537 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7538 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7539 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7542 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7543 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7546 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7547 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7549 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7550 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7553 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7554 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7556 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7557 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7559 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
7560 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7562 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7565 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7566 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7569 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7573 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
7574 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
7575 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7576 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7578 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7579 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7581 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7582 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7585 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7586 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
7588 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7589 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7592 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, .. } => assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
7593 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7596 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7597 // PaymentFailed event
7599 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7602 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
7603 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
7604 // a disconnect in between
7605 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7606 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7608 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7609 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7611 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7612 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7615 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7616 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7617 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7620 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7621 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7622 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7625 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7626 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7629 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7630 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7631 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
7632 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7633 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7634 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7636 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7638 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7639 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7641 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7642 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7643 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7645 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7648 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
7650 // Now set it to failed again...
7651 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7652 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7653 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7656 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7657 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7658 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7661 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7662 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7663 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7666 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
7667 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7668 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7671 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7672 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7674 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7675 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7678 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7679 // PaymentFailed event
7681 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7685 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
7686 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
7687 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
7690 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
7691 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
7693 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
7694 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
7695 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
7696 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
7697 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
7698 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
7699 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
7700 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
7701 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
7702 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
7703 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
7704 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
7705 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
7706 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
7707 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
7708 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
7709 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
7710 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7711 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7713 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7715 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7716 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7717 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7719 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7720 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7723 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7724 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7725 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7727 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
7728 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
7729 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7731 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7732 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7733 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
7734 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7735 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7736 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7737 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7738 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7739 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7740 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7742 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7743 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7744 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7745 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7747 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7748 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7750 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7753 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
7754 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7755 } else { panic!(); }
7758 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7760 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7763 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7764 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7765 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7768 // Now fix monitor updating...
7769 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7770 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7773 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7774 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7775 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7777 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7778 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7779 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7780 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7781 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7782 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7784 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7785 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7786 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7787 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7789 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7790 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7792 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7795 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7796 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7797 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7799 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7800 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7801 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7802 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7803 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7804 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7806 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7808 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7809 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7811 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7813 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7814 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7816 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7817 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7818 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7820 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7821 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7822 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7824 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7825 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7826 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7827 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7828 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7829 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7831 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7833 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7834 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7835 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7837 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7838 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7840 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7843 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7844 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7845 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7848 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7852 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7853 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7855 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7856 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7857 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7859 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7860 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7863 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7865 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7866 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7867 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7868 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7869 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7872 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7876 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7878 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7879 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7880 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7881 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7884 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7885 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7887 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7888 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7890 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7891 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7894 let as_commitment_update;
7895 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7897 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7898 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7899 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7900 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7901 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7902 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7903 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7904 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7908 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7909 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7910 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7911 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7912 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7913 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7914 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7915 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7919 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7922 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7923 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7925 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7926 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7928 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7929 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7931 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7934 handle_initial_raa!();
7936 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7937 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7939 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7940 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7942 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7943 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7946 handle_initial_raa!();
7948 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7949 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7951 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7952 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7954 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7955 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7957 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7962 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7963 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7965 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7966 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7968 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7969 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7973 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7974 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7975 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7978 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7979 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7980 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7983 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7984 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7987 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7988 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7991 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7993 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7994 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7996 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7997 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7998 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
8000 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8003 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
8007 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
8008 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
8009 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
8010 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
8011 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
8012 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
8013 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
8017 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
8018 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
8019 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
8020 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
8021 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
8025 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
8026 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
8027 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
8028 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
8029 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
8030 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
8034 fn test_monitor_update_fail_cs() {
8035 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming commitment_signed
8036 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8037 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8039 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8040 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8041 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8044 let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8045 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8047 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8048 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
8049 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8050 } else { panic!(); }
8051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8052 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8054 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8055 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8057 let responses = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8058 assert_eq!(responses.len(), 2);
8060 match responses[0] {
8061 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, ref node_id } => {
8062 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8063 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
8064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8066 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8068 match responses[1] {
8069 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, ref node_id } => {
8070 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8071 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8072 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8073 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8074 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8075 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8077 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8078 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap_err() {
8079 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8080 } else { panic!(); }
8081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8082 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8084 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8087 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8088 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8091 let final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8092 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &final_raa).unwrap();
8093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8095 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8096 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8098 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8099 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8101 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8102 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8104 events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8105 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8107 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, amt } => {
8108 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
8109 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
8111 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8114 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
8117 fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) {
8118 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming RAA
8119 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
8120 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8121 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8123 // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 2 to 1.
8124 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000);
8126 // Route a first payment that we'll fail backwards
8127 let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
8129 // Fail the payment backwards, failing the monitor update on nodes[1]'s receipt of the RAA
8130 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1, 0));
8131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8133 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8134 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8135 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8136 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8137 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8138 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8139 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8141 let bs_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
8142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8144 // While the second channel is AwaitingRAA, forward a second payment to get it into the
8146 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8147 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8148 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
8149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8151 let mut send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8152 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8153 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
8155 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8156 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
8158 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8159 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8162 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8163 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8165 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8167 // Now fail monitor updating.
8168 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8169 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap_err() {
8170 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8171 } else { panic!(); }
8172 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8173 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8176 // Attempt to forward a third payment but fail due to the second channel being unavailable
8179 let (_, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8180 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8181 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap();
8182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8184 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); // We succeed in updating the monitor for the first channel
8185 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8186 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8187 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
8188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8190 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8191 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8192 match events_2.remove(0) {
8193 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8194 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8195 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8196 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8197 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8198 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8199 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8201 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8202 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
8204 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8205 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
8206 match msg_events[0] {
8207 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
8208 assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
8209 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2); // temp disabled
8211 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8214 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8215 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8216 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events[0] {
8217 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
8218 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
8219 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
8221 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
8224 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = if test_ignore_second_cs {
8225 // Try to route another payment backwards from 2 to make sure 1 holds off on responding
8226 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8227 let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8228 nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap();
8229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8231 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8232 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8233 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg) {
8234 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
8235 } else { panic!(); }
8236 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8237 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8238 (Some(payment_preimage_4), Some(payment_hash_4))
8239 } else { (None, None) };
8241 // Restore monitor updating, ensuring we immediately get a fail-back update and a
8242 // update_add update.
8243 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8244 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8247 let mut events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8248 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8249 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 3);
8251 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
8254 // Note that the ordering of the events for different nodes is non-prescriptive, though the
8255 // ordering of the two events that both go to nodes[2] have to stay in the same order.
8256 let messages_a = match events_3.pop().unwrap() {
8257 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } => {
8258 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8259 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8260 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8261 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8262 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8263 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8264 (updates.update_fail_htlcs.remove(0), updates.commitment_signed)
8266 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
8268 let raa = if test_ignore_second_cs {
8269 match events_3.remove(1) {
8270 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg } => {
8271 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8274 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8277 let send_event_b = SendEvent::from_event(events_3.remove(0));
8278 assert_eq!(send_event_b.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8280 // Now deliver the new messages...
8282 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &messages_a.0).unwrap();
8283 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], messages_a.1, false);
8284 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8285 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
8286 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events_4[0] {
8287 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
8288 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
8289 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
8291 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8292 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8293 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.commitment_msg).unwrap();
8294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8295 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8296 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa.unwrap()).unwrap();
8297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8298 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8299 assert!(bs_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8300 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8301 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8302 assert!(bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8303 assert!(bs_cs.update_fee.is_none());
8305 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8307 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8308 assert!(as_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8309 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8310 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8311 assert!(as_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8312 assert!(as_cs.update_fee.is_none());
8314 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8316 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8318 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8320 let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8322 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
8323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8324 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8326 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa).unwrap();
8327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8328 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8330 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], send_event_b.commitment_msg, false);
8333 let events_5 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8334 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
8336 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8337 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8340 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8341 nodes[2].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8343 let events_6 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8344 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
8346 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); },
8347 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8350 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8351 let events_7 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8352 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
8354 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8355 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8358 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8359 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8362 send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
8363 assert_eq!(send_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8364 assert_eq!(send_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8365 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8366 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
8368 let events_8 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8369 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
8371 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8372 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8375 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8376 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8378 let events_9 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8379 assert_eq!(events_9.len(), 1);
8381 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_4.unwrap()),
8382 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8384 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4.unwrap());
8387 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
8391 fn test_monitor_update_fail_raa() {
8392 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(false);
8393 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(true);
8397 fn test_monitor_update_fail_reestablish() {
8398 // Simple test for message retransmission after monitor update failure on
8399 // channel_reestablish generating a monitor update (which comes from freeing holding cell
8401 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
8402 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8403 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8405 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
8407 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8408 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8410 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
8411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8412 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8413 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8414 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8415 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8416 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8417 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8418 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8420 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8421 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8423 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8424 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8425 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8427 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8428 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8430 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
8432 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap_err() {
8433 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8434 } else { panic!(); }
8435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8437 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8438 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8440 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8441 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8443 assert!(as_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8444 assert!(bs_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8446 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
8448 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap();
8449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8450 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8452 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8453 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8456 updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8457 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8458 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8459 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8460 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8461 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8462 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8463 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8465 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8466 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8468 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage),
8469 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8474 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
8475 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
8476 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8477 let nodes = create_network(2);
8479 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8481 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8482 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8483 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
8484 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
8486 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
8488 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8489 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8491 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8492 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8494 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
8496 let mut chan_announcement;
8498 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
8500 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
8501 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
8502 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
8503 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
8504 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
8505 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
8506 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
8507 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
8508 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8513 macro_rules! sign_msg {
8514 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
8515 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
8516 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8517 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8518 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
8519 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
8520 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
8521 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
8522 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
8523 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
8524 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
8525 contents: $unsigned_msg
8530 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8531 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8532 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
8533 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
8535 // Configured with Network::Testnet
8536 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8537 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
8538 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8539 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
8541 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8542 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
8543 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8544 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
8547 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
8548 impl Writer for VecWriter {
8549 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
8550 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
8553 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
8554 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
8559 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
8560 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8562 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
8564 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8566 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8567 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8568 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8570 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8571 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8572 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8573 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8575 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8576 let config = UserConfig::new();
8577 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8578 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
8579 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
8580 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
8581 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8582 default_config: config,
8584 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8585 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8586 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8587 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8588 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8589 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8592 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8594 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8595 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8596 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
8597 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
8598 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
8599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8601 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8602 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
8603 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8604 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
8606 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
8607 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8608 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
8609 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8611 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8612 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8613 for node in nodes.iter() {
8614 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
8615 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
8616 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
8619 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8623 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
8624 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8625 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8627 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8628 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8630 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8632 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8633 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8634 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8636 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8637 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8638 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8639 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8641 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8642 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8643 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
8644 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
8645 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
8646 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8647 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8649 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8650 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8651 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8652 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8653 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8654 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8657 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8659 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8660 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8663 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8665 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
8666 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8670 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
8671 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
8672 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
8673 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8674 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
8675 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
8677 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
8679 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
8680 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8682 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
8683 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8684 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8685 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8687 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
8689 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
8690 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
8691 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8692 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
8693 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
8696 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8697 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
8698 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
8699 let mut read = &serialized[..];
8700 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8701 assert!(read.is_empty());
8702 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
8705 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8706 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8707 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8708 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8710 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8711 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8712 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8713 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8714 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8715 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
8717 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8719 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
8720 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8721 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8722 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
8723 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
8726 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
8727 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
8728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8730 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8732 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
8733 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8734 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8735 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
8736 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8738 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8739 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8740 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
8741 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
8742 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8743 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
8746 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
8747 ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => {
8749 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8750 let mut txn = Vec::new();
8751 for event in events {
8753 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
8754 for outp in outputs {
8756 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
8758 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8759 script_sig: Script::new(),
8761 witness: Vec::new(),
8764 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8765 value: output.value,
8767 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8773 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8774 let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
8775 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8776 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8777 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8778 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8779 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8780 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8783 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
8785 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8786 script_sig: Script::new(),
8787 sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
8788 witness: Vec::new(),
8791 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8792 value: output.value,
8794 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8800 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8801 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8802 let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8803 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8804 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8805 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
8806 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
8809 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
8810 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8812 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8813 script_sig: Script::new(),
8815 witness: Vec::new(),
8818 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8819 value: output.value,
8821 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8825 output: vec![outp.clone()],
8828 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) {
8830 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
8832 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
8835 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
8838 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
8839 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8840 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8841 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
8842 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8843 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8844 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8850 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8859 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
8860 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
8861 let nodes = create_network(2);
8863 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8864 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8865 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8867 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8868 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8870 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8871 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8872 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8873 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8875 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8876 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8877 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8878 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8879 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8883 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
8884 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8885 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8887 let nodes = create_network(2);
8889 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8890 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8891 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8893 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8894 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8896 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8897 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8898 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8899 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8901 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8902 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8903 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8905 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8906 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8908 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8909 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
8910 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
8911 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8915 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
8916 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8917 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8919 let nodes = create_network(2);
8921 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
8922 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8923 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8924 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8925 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8927 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8928 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8929 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8930 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8932 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8933 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8935 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8936 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8937 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
8938 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
8939 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
8940 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx
8941 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8945 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
8946 let nodes = create_network(2);
8948 // Create some initial channels
8949 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8951 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8953 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8954 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
8955 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8957 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
8958 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8959 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8961 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
8962 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8964 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
8965 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8968 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8969 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8972 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
8973 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
8974 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
8975 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
8976 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8977 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
8979 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1);
8980 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
8981 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
8982 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8986 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
8987 let nodes = create_network(2);
8989 // Create some initial channels
8990 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8992 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8993 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8994 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8995 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8997 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8999 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9000 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9001 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9003 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9004 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9006 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9007 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
9008 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
9009 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
9010 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9012 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9013 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9014 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9015 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9019 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
9020 let nodes = create_network(2);
9022 // Create some initial channels
9023 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9025 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9026 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9027 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9028 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9030 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9032 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9033 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
9034 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9035 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9037 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9038 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9040 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9041 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
9042 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
9043 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9044 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9045 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9046 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
9048 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
9049 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9050 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9052 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9053 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9056 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9057 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
9058 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
9059 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
9061 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
9062 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9063 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
9064 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9065 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9066 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone());
9070 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
9071 let nodes = create_network(2);
9073 // Create some initial channels
9074 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9076 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9077 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9078 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9079 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9081 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9083 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9084 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
9085 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9086 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9088 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9089 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9091 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9093 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
9094 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
9095 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9096 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9097 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9099 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
9100 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9101 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9103 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9104 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9107 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9108 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
9109 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
9110 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
9112 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
9113 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
9114 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5);
9115 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
9116 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
9117 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
9118 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
9119 check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
9123 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
9124 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output thanks to
9125 // ChainWatchInterface and claim HTLC on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
9126 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
9127 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
9129 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
9132 let nodes = create_network(3);
9134 // Create some initial channels
9135 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9136 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9138 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
9139 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
9140 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
9142 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
9143 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9144 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9145 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
9146 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9148 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9149 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9150 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9151 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9152 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9154 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
9155 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9156 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9158 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9159 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9162 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
9163 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
9164 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
9165 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
9166 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
9167 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1].clone());
9168 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
9169 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9170 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
9171 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
9173 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
9174 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1);
9176 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9177 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4);
9178 assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]);
9179 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9180 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone()); // HTLC-Timeout on B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9181 assert_eq!(b_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9182 assert!(b_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
9183 assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
9184 check_spends!(b_txn[0], c_txn[1].clone()); // timeout tx on C remote commitment tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
9185 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9186 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
9187 assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
9190 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9192 match msg_events[0] {
9193 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9194 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9196 match msg_events[1] {
9197 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
9198 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9199 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9200 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9201 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9202 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
9204 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9206 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
9207 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9208 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
9209 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9210 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
9211 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9212 assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[2]); // HTLC-Success tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
9213 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
9214 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9215 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
9216 assert_eq!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
9217 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9218 match msg_events[0] {
9219 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9225 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
9226 // Topology : A --> B --> C
9227 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
9228 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
9230 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9231 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9233 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
9234 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
9235 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000).1, duplicate_payment_hash);
9237 let commitment_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9238 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9239 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
9241 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9242 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9243 let htlc_timeout_tx;
9244 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
9245 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9246 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
9247 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
9248 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
9249 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9250 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9251 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9252 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9253 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0], node_txn[1].input[0]);
9254 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
9255 check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone());
9256 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone());
9257 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
9260 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9262 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9263 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9266 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
9267 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
9269 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9271 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
9272 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9275 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9276 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9278 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9279 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5);
9280 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
9281 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0], htlc_success_txn[3]);
9282 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9283 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9284 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1], htlc_success_txn[4]);
9285 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9286 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9287 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0], htlc_success_txn[1].input[0]);
9288 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9289 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9291 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200);
9292 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9293 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9294 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9295 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 1);
9296 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9297 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9300 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9301 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9303 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9304 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9305 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9307 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { .. } } => {
9309 _ => { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
9312 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9314 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
9315 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
9317 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9320 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
9321 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
9322 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9323 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9324 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9325 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9326 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 0);
9327 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9330 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9331 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
9333 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9335 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
9336 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
9338 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9343 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
9344 let nodes = create_network(2);
9346 // Create some initial channels
9347 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9349 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
9350 let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9351 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9352 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
9354 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
9355 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9357 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9358 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9359 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9361 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
9362 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9365 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9366 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9368 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9369 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9370 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9371 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9373 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
9374 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9375 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9376 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9377 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone());
9381 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
9382 let nodes = create_network(2);
9384 // Create some initial channels
9385 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9387 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
9388 let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9389 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9390 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
9392 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9393 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9394 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
9395 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9397 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9398 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9400 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9401 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9402 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9403 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9405 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
9406 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
9407 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 8);
9408 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
9409 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[4]);
9410 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[6]);
9411 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
9412 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[5]);
9413 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[7]);
9414 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9415 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
9419 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
9420 let nodes = create_network(2);
9422 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9424 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
9425 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
9427 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9428 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
9429 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2);
9430 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
9431 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx.clone());
9433 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
9434 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2);
9435 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
9436 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
9439 fn run_onion_failure_test<F1,F2>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, callback_msg: F1, callback_node: F2, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
9440 where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
9443 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept(_name, test_case, nodes, route, payment_hash, callback_msg, |_|{}, callback_node, expected_retryable, expected_error_code, expected_channel_update);
9447 // 0: node1 fail backward
9448 // 1: final node fail backward
9449 // 2: payment completed but the user reject the payment
9450 // 3: final node fail backward (but tamper onion payloads from node0)
9451 // 100: trigger error in the intermediate node and tamper returnning fail_htlc
9452 // 200: trigger error in the final node and tamper returnning fail_htlc
9453 fn run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept<F1,F2,F3>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, mut callback_msg: F1, mut callback_fail: F2, mut callback_node: F3, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
9454 where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
9455 F2: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
9458 use ln::msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate;
9460 // reset block height
9461 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9462 for ix in 0..nodes.len() {
9463 nodes[ix].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
9466 macro_rules! expect_event {
9467 ($node: expr, $event_type: path) => {{
9468 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9469 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9471 $event_type { .. } => {},
9472 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9477 macro_rules! expect_htlc_forward {
9479 expect_event!($node, Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable);
9480 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
9481 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9485 // 0 ~~> 2 send payment
9486 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash.clone()).unwrap();
9487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9488 let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9489 // temper update_add (0 => 1)
9490 let mut update_add_0 = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
9491 if test_case == 0 || test_case == 3 || test_case == 100 {
9492 callback_msg(&mut update_add_0);
9495 // 0 => 1 update_add & CS
9496 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_0).unwrap();
9497 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
9499 let update_1_0 = match test_case {
9500 0|100 => { // intermediate node failure; fail backward to 0
9501 let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9502 assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()+update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1 && (update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()==1 || update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1));
9505 1|2|3|200 => { // final node failure; forwarding to 2
9506 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9508 if test_case != 200 {
9511 expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[1]);
9513 let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9514 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
9515 assert_eq!(update_1.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9516 // tamper update_add (1 => 2)
9517 let mut update_add_1 = update_1.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
9518 if test_case != 3 && test_case != 200 {
9519 callback_msg(&mut update_add_1);
9523 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_1).unwrap();
9524 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false, true);
9526 if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
9527 expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[2]);
9528 expect_event!(&nodes[2], Event::PaymentReceived);
9532 let update_2_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9533 if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
9534 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[2], 1);
9536 assert!(update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
9538 let mut fail_msg = update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
9539 if test_case == 200 {
9540 callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
9544 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
9545 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_2_1.commitment_signed, true, true);
9547 // backward fail on 1
9548 let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9549 assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
9552 _ => unreachable!(),
9555 // 1 => 0 commitment_signed_dance
9556 if update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() > 0 {
9557 let mut fail_msg = update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
9558 if test_case == 100 {
9559 callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
9561 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
9563 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9566 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
9568 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9569 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9570 if let &Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash:_, ref rejected_by_dest, ref error_code } = &events[0] {
9571 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, !expected_retryable);
9572 assert_eq!(*error_code, expected_error_code);
9574 panic!("Uexpected event");
9577 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9578 if expected_channel_update.is_some() {
9579 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9581 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { ref update } => {
9583 &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } => {
9584 if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {} else {
9585 panic!("channel_update not found!");
9588 &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { ref short_channel_id, ref is_permanent } => {
9589 if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: ref expected_short_channel_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
9590 assert!(*short_channel_id == *expected_short_channel_id);
9591 assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
9593 panic!("Unexpected message event");
9596 &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, ref is_permanent } => {
9597 if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: ref expected_node_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
9598 assert!(*node_id == *expected_node_id);
9599 assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
9601 panic!("Unexpected message event");
9606 _ => panic!("Unexpected message event"),
9609 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9613 impl msgs::ChannelUpdate {
9614 fn dummy() -> msgs::ChannelUpdate {
9615 use secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9616 use secp256k1::Signature;
9617 msgs::ChannelUpdate {
9618 signature: Signature::from(FFISignature::new()),
9619 contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9620 chain_hash: Sha256dHash::from_data(&vec![0u8][..]),
9621 short_channel_id: 0,
9624 cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
9625 htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
9627 fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
9628 excess_data: vec![],
9635 fn test_onion_failure() {
9636 use ln::msgs::ChannelUpdate;
9637 use ln::channelmanager::CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY;
9640 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
9641 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
9642 const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
9643 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
9645 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
9646 for node in nodes.iter() {
9647 *node.keys_manager.override_session_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some(SecretKey::from_slice(&Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap());
9649 let channels = [create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1), create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2)];
9650 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
9651 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9653 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 40000);
9655 // intermediate node failure
9656 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9657 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9658 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
9659 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9660 let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
9661 onion_payloads[0].realm = 3;
9662 msg.onion_routing_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
9663 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));//XXX incremented channels idx here
9665 // final node failure
9666 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 3, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9667 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9668 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
9669 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9670 let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
9671 onion_payloads[1].realm = 3;
9672 msg.onion_routing_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
9673 }, ||{}, false, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9675 // the following three with run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept() test only the origin node
9676 // receiving simulated fail messages
9677 // intermediate node failure
9678 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9680 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9682 // and tamper returing error message
9683 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9684 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9685 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9686 }, ||{}, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
9688 // final node failure
9689 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
9690 // and tamper returing error message
9691 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9692 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9693 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9695 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9696 }, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
9698 // intermediate node failure
9699 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9700 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9702 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9703 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9704 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9705 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9707 // final node failure
9708 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
9709 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9710 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9711 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9713 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9714 }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9716 // intermediate node failure
9717 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9718 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9720 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9721 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9722 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
9724 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9725 }, true, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9727 // final node failure
9728 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
9729 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9730 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9731 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
9733 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9734 }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9736 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_version", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.version = 1; }, ||{}, true,
9737 Some(BADONION|PERM|4), None);
9739 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_hmac", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac = [3; 32]; }, ||{}, true,
9740 Some(BADONION|PERM|5), None);
9742 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_key", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key = Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey);}, ||{}, true,
9743 Some(BADONION|PERM|6), None);
9745 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9746 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9748 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9749 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9750 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], UPDATE|7, &ChannelUpdate::dummy().encode_with_len()[..]);
9751 }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|7), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9753 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9754 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9756 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9757 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9758 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|8, &[0;0]);
9759 // short_channel_id from the processing node
9760 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|8), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9762 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_channel_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9763 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9765 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9766 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9767 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|9, &[0;0]);
9768 // short_channel_id from the processing node
9769 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|9), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9771 let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
9772 bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id -= 1;
9773 run_onion_failure_test("unknown_next_peer", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|10),
9774 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id, is_permanent:true}));
9776 let amt_to_forward = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&channels[1].2).unwrap().get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() - 1;
9777 let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
9778 let route_len = bogus_route.hops.len();
9779 bogus_route.hops[route_len-1].fee_msat = amt_to_forward;
9780 run_onion_failure_test("amount_below_minimum", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|11), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9782 //TODO: with new config API, we will be able to generate both valid and
9783 //invalid channel_update cases.
9784 run_onion_failure_test("fee_insufficient", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9785 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9786 }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|12), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9788 run_onion_failure_test("incorrect_cltv_expiry", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9789 // need to violate: cltv_expiry - cltv_expiry_delta >= outgoing_cltv_value
9790 msg.cltv_expiry -= 1;
9791 }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|13), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9793 run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_soon", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9794 let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
9795 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9796 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
9797 }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|14), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9799 run_onion_failure_test("unknown_payment_hash", 2, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9800 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9801 }, false, Some(PERM|15), None);
9803 run_onion_failure_test("final_expiry_too_soon", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9804 let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
9805 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9806 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
9807 }, || {}, true, Some(17), None);
9809 run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_cltv_expiry", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9810 for (_, mut pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9811 for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
9812 f.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value += 1;
9815 }, true, Some(18), None);
9817 run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_htlc_amount", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9818 // violate amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat
9819 for (_, mut pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9820 for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
9821 f.forward_info.amt_to_forward -= 1;
9824 }, true, Some(19), None);
9826 run_onion_failure_test("channel_disabled", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9827 // disconnect event to the channel between nodes[1] ~ nodes[2]
9828 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9829 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9830 }, true, Some(UPDATE|20), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9831 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9833 run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_far", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9834 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9835 let mut route = route.clone();
9837 route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta += CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY + route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta + 1;
9838 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9839 let (onion_payloads, _, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, height).unwrap();
9840 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
9841 msg.cltv_expiry = htlc_cltv;
9842 msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_packet;
9843 }, ||{}, true, Some(21), None);